Obama Trying to Rewrite History With Saleh

Covering up the truth still isn’t as easy as it’s beginning to look.

Not that it’s impossible, but truth’s inherent nature can overturn the most complex lie. High information flow makes false stories harder to keep straight. As U.S. policy in Yemen sinks on President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s ego, the Obama administration’s sluggish response has wilted under local and international criticism. A New York Times report then expressed a belated policy shift - designed to rescue the White House from ignominy - and unintentionally exposed how long the administration stood its ground with Saleh.

Now Obama officials want us to know they never trusted him, they simply hoped to buy him off for as long as possible. Because that is so much better!

According to The Wall Street Journal, the U.S. government “was on the verge of launching a record assistance package to Yemen” when the revolution broke out against President Ali Abdullah Saleh.” This information isn’t new. Rumors of a $1.6 billion package over five years emerged in mid-2010, and the WSJ claims the first installment of $1 billion was set to be distributed last February. Beyond an annual $200 million in counter-terrorism support, the package was expected to include roughly equivalent for development assistance that, “Mr. Saleh had long sought to help show a skeptical Yemeni public the benefits of cooperating with the Americans.”

This assistance, however, is more sinister than benevolent.

Two major red flags pop up in the WSJ report. First, officials within the Obama administration are trying to rewrite negative perceptions of U.S. policy in Yemen. Although the White House’s actions and numerous reports indicate a desperate struggle to avoid Saleh’s downfall, Dexter Filkins’s New Yorker piece being a prime example, U.S. officials are telling key outlets such as the NYT and WSJ that they never trusted Saleh to begin with.

“For years,” writes the WSJ, “the conventional wisdom was that only Mr. Saleh prevented Yemen from becoming an al Qaeda sanctuary similar to Afghanistan before 9/11—a safe place for Osama bin Laden's acolytes to train and plot attacks against the West. But Obama administration officials believe Mr. Saleh was never as reliable an ally as the U.S. had hoped, and now—crippled by mass protests and military defections—he is even less use in the fight against al Qaeda.”

If so much doubt existed in the "conventional wisdom," why give him a record package?

Apparently Saleh’s funds would help, “shore up his shaky political position and reward the risks he took by bucking popular opinion and letting U.S. Special Forces hunt down militants inside his country.” Again citing Washington’s concerns over Saleh, the White House became “encouraged” after a financially-strapped Saleh opened his door wider in late 2009 - until a series of U.S. air-strikes killed four times as many civilians as militants. The consequences spilled into Yemen’s public sphere after Saleh stopped taking credit, and a new plan was developed to win him over again.

“U.S. officials hoped the package would nudge Mr. Saleh into a more active counter-terror relationship.”

Thus nudging him into better governance was never the top priority. Corruption has reduced humanitarian aid to a trickle; Saleh concerns himself with appearing to help Yemenis more than actually helping them. In a 2009 cable obtained by WikiLeaks, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the Saudi deputy interior minister, told U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke that Saudi assistance to Yemen was rarely “in the form of cash... Cash tended to end up in Swiss banks.”

On top of cash, the Obama administration provided military assistance that Washington knows has been mis-allocated against the northern Houthi tribe and oppositional Southern Movement. Although U.S. diplomatic cables show that Saleh, “provided counter-terrorism cooperation that was uneven at best, and duplicitous and counter-productive at worst,” the White House resorted to a continuation of this failed strategy. The WSJ once more repeats, “U.S. officials believe Mr. Saleh didn't consider al Qaeda a top priority,” that he was “focused mainly on playing tribes against each other.”

The White House and Pentagon then decided to refill Saleh’s bribery fund, believing it would sustain his power and green-light Special Ops.

Filkins even quotes an adviser in early 2011, describing how Saleh had already begun boosting, “It’s money season.” But Yemen’s revolution consumed the impoverished tribes before he could deliver again. Social pressure against Saleh’s bribes has reached the point where many tribal leaders now reject his ongoing offers to send them home.

Filkins’s article paints an unbroken impression that Washington, while dissatisfied with Saleh’s results, nevertheless continued to trust him and hope for the best. Flattering NYT reports claim the White House lost trust in Saleh’s reforms only last month. One cable described Saleh as “bored and impatient,” while his behavior ranged from “disdainful and dismissive” to “conciliatory and congenial.” U.S. officials knew what they were working with and, in comparison to al-Qaeda, considered him the lesser of two evils. This false dilemma ignored Saleh’s own violent streak and Yemen’s populace, ultimately contributing to the revolution.

The Obama administration understood Yemenis’ discontent but never perceived the oncoming revolution. According to a newly released cable from 2009, one tribal leader laid out plans to a U.S. embassy official to trigger a revolt if Saleh did not guarantee fair parliamentary elections in 2011. The vow of Hamid al-Ahmar, a wealthy sheik who catapulted Yemen's tribes into the revolution, was reportedly diagnosed as a "mild irritation" to Saleh.

The White House’s frantic policy has mirrored its response to Egypt in startling ways. One senior Administration official stated, “Our goal is to help prevent a coup or a usurpation of power by Muslim Brotherhood types or by Al Qaeda.” As in Egypt, many Yemenis already believe the president has usurped power from the people. The Pentagon is also holding out hope for a military transition, and continues to search the old regime for candidates to replace Saleh’s son and nephews, who head the U.S. counter-terrorism program.

"What we call the forces of evil are still there," warns Ahmed Maher, the 30-year-old co-founder of Egypt's April 6th Youth Movement.

Most striking, the White House’s contingency called for Vice President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi to assume power as stipulated “under the constitution.” Although the JMP has submitted this plan under its own name, one U.S. official called Hadi the “preferred scenario” in Washington. Fearing all sorts of Islamist candidates, the official said, “We want to make sure that this is not an abdication.” But Saleh qualifies for both definitions of the word: resignation of the throne and failure of responsibility.

If Yemen’s opposition accepts Saleh’s associate then so be it. However Hadi looks just like the failed transfer of power to Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s torturous intelligence director. And like their Egyptian brethren, Yemenis aren’t concerned with a constitution they intend to rewrite.

Taken in sum, the Obama administration’s “package” aimed to help Saleh delay or permanently suppress the revolution against him. Past, present, and future U.S. policy violates the counterinsurgency maxim of winning the people’s support; already capitalizing on Washington’s porous COIN, AQAP stood an equal chance of growing under a billion dollar slush fund. In attempting to help rewrite the Obama administration's sloppy handling of Yemen, the WSJ has produced a contradictory mess of foreign policy.

No harm done. It got the story right in the end.

Inside Yemen's Power Change

Yemeni Opposition Weighing GCC Proposal

More light is beginning to shine through in Yemen, but the last storm clouds still need to clear. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has submitted a proposal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh that would see him step down immediately, giving way to a three-month “interim council of tribal and political leaders.” Saleh’s presidential powers would be transferred to Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in line with previous offers from the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). The council would then prepare a new constitution and schedule parliamentary elections.

Saleh has supposedly “welcomed” the agreement as it provides amnesty and a safe exit for his family, who controls the majority of the government’s agencies. General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar would join him in exile.

Several problems immediately arise. Letting Saleh walk may tempt the opposition if he won’t leave any other way, except the popular core has insisted on trying him for crimes against the people. More willing to slide, Yemen’s political opposition - mainly the JMP and Islah Party - tried to negotiate a backdoor but refrained out of fear of losing the streets. Amnesty is politically smart and emotionally risky. Regardless, it's better than Saleh leading his General People’s Congress (GPC) from the opposition.

Yemen’s outgoing president has repeatedly expressed his intent to end with dignity, a pointed reference to the neutered Hosni Mubarak, and continue his political career. For him to genuinely switch his mind over a course of days isn’t like him, although a calculated flip-flop is.

“The President’s emotional intelligence is off the scale,’’ a Western official in Yemen told The New Yorker's Dexter Filkins. “He balances all the forces, works all the personal connections, manages somehow to keep it from spinning out of control. He has no fixed positions. His character is entirely situational.”

Hadi also reportedly turned down the role of overseeing the transition. Reuters speculates that “Saleh would appoint a new figure,” which won’t fly with the opposition. The GCC’s agreement might already stipulate political figures from the old regime, another potential red flag. Reuters cites Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar, a leading tribal figure who turned on Saleh and tipped the revolution, as competing with Abdulkarim al-Iryani, a current an adviser to Saleh, and another former premier Abdulaziz Abdul-Ghani.

“Opposition sources say Saleh trusts his Saudi ally to make sure the leader of the council is a figure acceptable to him. The council would appoint the national unity government in coordination with the Saleh-appointed vice president.”

The GCC has extended an invitation to leading members of Yemen's youth and popular opposition. Leery of Saleh’s political allies, most groups are holding tight until detailed information is released. But they still have to play ball if they’re going to play hardball, and the GCC hopes to set a date in the near future. Yemen’s revolution is finally beginning to see its ultimate objective through the chaos.

However, like Egypt’s transition, more smoke will precede and follow the glorious blaze.

Obama Needs A Foreign Policy Doctrine

by Dr Mohammad Taqi, published in Pakistan’s Daily Times:

As President Barack Obama announced his re-election bid for 2012 earlier this week, one was reminded of a 2008 Democratic primaries election campaign advertisement run by his then opponent, Hillary Clinton. It went something like this:

“It is 3 am and your children are safe and asleep. But there is a phone in the White House and it is ringing. Something is happening in the world. Your vote will decide who answers that call, whether it is someone who already knows the world’s leaders, knows the military — someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world. It is 3 am and your children are safe and asleep. Who do you want answering the phone?”

The theatrics of this typical US election campaign ad — including the sleeping babies and the portentous rings of the red phone — were obviously designed to remind the voters that they should opt for the leader who already had national security and foreign policy experience. There was a lot of banter between both the Democratic hopefuls at the time about how ill-prepared each was to handle a grave crisis in the world. Well, four years down the road, it is still not clear if either one of them possessed enough foreign policy experience to handle the situation that has unfolded in the Middle East and North Africa this year.

Frankly, since events started unraveling in the Arab world, the Obama administration’s response has been so erratic that it is hard to tell if one department knows what the other is thinking or doing. Many observers, however, would rightly point out that such chaotic decision-making is really business as usual for the US government, even on a good day. While George W Bush took pride in being the ‘decider’, Obama has been praised or reviled — depending upon one’s perspective — for being the academic president who loves to conduct policy seminars in the White House before making up his mind on major policy matters.

However, what might happen with this group-hug decision-making is that, eventually, different cabals within the government start shaping up things the way they would like. We already know that in the case of Libya, three women prevailed upon Obama, ostensibly to protect human rights and civilian lives, to go along with their gunboat diplomacy, against the advice of his senior defence and intelligence advisors. If a US president does not take a firm stance on what he would like his foreign policy legacy to look like, chances are that someone or some group may end up writing that legacy for him.

US presidents from James Monroe to George W Bush have used their executive position to put forth, in a well-crafted and articulate manner, a constellation of their foreign policy objectives in what have subsequently become known as the various eponymous doctrines of US foreign policy. While doing so, these leaders did not necessarily act independently of the US Congress but used their executive authority to frame the foreign policy agenda that Congress ended up backing on the international front. This past week, President Obama laid out his philosophy about military involvement in conflicts around the world: “The US will not be able to dictate the pace and scope of this change. Only the people of the region can do that. But we can make a difference... we must stand alongside those who believe in the same core principles that have guided us through many storms; our opposition to violence directed at one’s own people, our support for a set of universal rights, including the freedom for people to express themselves and choose their leaders and our support for governments that are ultimately responsive to the aspirations of the people.”

Some admired the speech as a success while others felt that it stopped short of articulating a unifying thesis to analyze not only the upheavals in the Arab world but to define the continued role that the US will have to play therein. Obama himself relied on his nuanced rhetoric: “The US is inundated with false choices. They lurk in national security debates... false choices between protecting our people and upholding our values... false choices even nest in foreign affairs”, to literally keep everyone guessing as to what exactly these subtleties mean.

The most important question being asked remained: why intervene in Libya and not in other places? Emboldened by Obama’s vacillation, sections of the US establishment and media have started calling for regime change among the “enemy nations” (read Iran and Syria) while gently nudging “friendly nations” (read Saudis and their clients) to reform their institutions along more liberal lines. This is not to say that Obama somehow endorses this view. However, if he were to not assert himself, and fast, the fast-changing scenarios in the Middle East, especially in and around Saudi Arabia, may see an unprepared and wishy-washy Obama intervene on the wrong side of Arab opinion. The Arab spring is to the Obama presidency what 9/11 was to the Bush presidency. And it is not that such a scenario is totally lost on Obama. The candidate Obama had written in his book, The Audacity of Hope: “The fact is, close to five years after 9/11 and 15 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the US still lacks a coherent national security policy. Instead of guiding principles, we have what appear to be a series of ad hoc decisions, with dubious results. Why invade Iraq and not North Korea or Burma? Why intervene in Bosnia and not Darfur? Are we committed to use force wherever there is a despotic regime that is terrorising its people — and if so, how long do we stay to ensure democracy takes root? ... Perhaps someone inside the White House has clear answers to these questions. But our allies — and for that matter our enemies — certainly do not know what the answers are. More important, neither do the American people.”

That phone-call ad must have had some impact on him as, despite his dislike for the term Obama Doctrine, he went on to answer the above questions himself: “Without a well-articulated strategy that the public supports and the world understands, the US will lack the legitimacy — and ultimately the power — it needs to make the world safer than it is today.”

One can only add, well said Mr. President — your instincts are right but now is the time to firm up your doctrine and let no clique cherry-pick which tyrants to protect. There are no false choices if you side with the people.

White House Still Playing Saleh’s Game

Facing the journalistic firing line, U.S. officials have steadfastly insisted that the White House regularly condemns the government’s use of violence in Yemen. They also vow continual support for the opposition movement, and never forget to mention that Yemen’s instability poses a top threat to America’s national security. So important is Yemen that its revolution, already receiving the least public attention from Washington, suddenly went quiet again on Tuesday.

The White House’s support for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is cracking, that much is sure. But the Obama administration hasn’t given up on backing Saleh’s terms over the opposition.

Despite ongoing violence in Sana'a, Aden, and the highland city of Ta'izz, the White House’s press briefing didn’t mention Yemen after being forced to on Monday. These non-mentions from low-level officials may sound trivial, however they’re the only officials talking. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton avoid Yemen like it's Ebola, a systematic cover-up of grave concern to U.S. foreign policy as a whole. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the problem worse. As a result spokesmen and counter-terrorism officials have been left to deliver America’s political message, counterproductive policy when image is so vital to earning trust.

And Yemen’s absence on Tuesday morning was obvious enough to force a late-night statement, issued after the White House realized its non-comment stood out too much. This knee-jerk reaction is just that, not a prepared substitute to heighten Yemen’s awareness. Nor did it come from Obama personally, unlike his missive to Côte d'Ivoire.

“The United States strongly condemns the use of violence by Yemeni government forces against demonstrators in Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida in the past several days,” reads a statement by Press Secretary Jay Carney. “The Yemeni people have a right to demonstrate peacefully, and we remind President Ali Abdullah Saleh of his responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Yemenis who are exercising their universal right to engage in political expression. We call upon the Government of Yemen to conduct full investigations into these events and to hold those responsible accountable for their actions.”

The rare singling out of government forces demonstrates the subtle shift in U.S. policy to get behind the opposition movement. But for every shift in the positive direction comes a negative count-shift, and Carney moves from condemning governmental killings to asking for a government investigation in one sentence.

Every protester in Yemen holds Saleh responsible and wonders why America isn't holding him accountable.

Trying to inject some reason into this non-sense, Amnesty International has pointed out the obvious failings of Saleh's “justice” system. Calling for external investigations, regional deputy director Philip Luther warned, “The strongmen at the top cannot be allowed to just shift quietly into the sidelines when the Yemeni people are so vocally calling for accountability. The Yemeni government has an abysmal record of failing to investigate or prosecute those responsible for unlawful killings and torture or other ill-treatment.”

Sure enough, Saleh’s government answered the White House’s demand by opening an "investigation." After several officials denied that any clashes took place, Ta'izz Governor Hamoud al-Soufi told state media he was forming a committee to investigate the last four days of violence. He also blamed the protesters for attacking Ta'izz's governor building and presidential palace: “We express our deep regret for the deviation of peaceful protests.”

Protesters did engage in clashes with security forces, but disproportionate force undermines any attempt to blame them. Fourth-generation warfare is built on provoking disproportionate responses from the government, and Saleh has fallen right into the trap. Protesters also say that security forces and plain-clothed gunmen opened fire as they marched peacefully.

Beyond abetting Saleh’s stall tactics, the White House is possibly sticking to internal investigations in order to preserve Saleh’s political viability. While Saleh has expressed his intent to lead Yemen’s new opposition if disposed, the current opposition vows to hold him accountable for every act of violence during the revolution. Past crimes are a whole separate list. So if Washington wants to give Saleh a second chance later on, they need to get him off the hook now.

The second half of Carney’s statement equally illuminates how little U.S. policy has truly shifted. Hoping to be believed after two months of noticeable silence, “The United States strongly supports the Yemeni people in their quest for greater opportunity and their pursuit of political and economic reform that will fulfill their aspirations. President Saleh needs to resolve the political impasse with the opposition so that meaningful political change can take place in the near term in an orderly and peaceful manner. We call upon all sides to engage in a constructive political dialogue and to chart a course that puts Yemen’s unity, progress and future prosperity ahead of individual agendas.”

To be fair the State Department didn’t completely avoid Yemen’s crisis. Instead, spokesman Mark Toner’s mimicry of Carney provides additional evidence of stalling. When probed on a time-line and how quickly the transition should occur, Toner replies “again, that should be dictated in part by the Yemeni people, the opposition.” The reporter pushes, “You’re not doing like you did with Mubarak in saying his transition should begin now or yesterday?”

“Well, I think we’re saying – I think we do believe it should be done quickly,” Toner answers. “Obviously, there’s ongoing concerns by the protesters and they need to be addressed.”

Another acknowledgment that the White House’s political position is no longer sustainable, followed by another step back.

First, a brief description of Saleh's dialogue still gripping the Obama administration. The youthful core of Yemen’s opposition has yet to negotiate directly with Saleh, even though he has repeatedly denounced the entire opposition save for the youth. Despite frequent condemnation against the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), slandering them as al-Qaeda agents and drug dealers, Saleh has mainly chosen to negotiate with the group. This is because the JMP was willing to offer a time-table behind the youth’s back.

The JMP eventually gave up, citing fears that it would lose the street, and Saleh subsequently lumped them together with Yemen's enemies: the Houthis, Southern Movement, and al-Qaeda. But the Houthis and SM are only enemies of Saleh, not Yemen. Both are open to remaining part of the country so long as Saleh goes, and for this reason he opposes their legitimate participation in the revolution.

Hoping to avoid the youth's demand for his immediate ouster, Saleh has once more flip-flopped on the JMP: "I promise that we will make every effort to return things to normal through talks with rational people from the Joint Meetings Party. We repeat our invitation to them to sit at the table of dialogue and we call for a restraint from violence."

General Ali Mohsen Ahmar, Saleh’s defected commander, has also negotiated on the youth’s behalf. However the coalition explicitly rejects Ahmar as their leader or as a presidential candidate, seeing him as a pawn more than a king. Ahmar reportedly accepted an invite to participate in a Saudi summit held by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as has Saleh. More confusing, Ahmar claimed on Tuesday that “pro-Saleh snipers” tried to assassinate him.

While several opposition groups have welcomed the GCC’s offer, the majority promised to attend only if the focus is an "immediate transfer of power." So by saying Saleh’s time-table should be determine by the opposition - and then not backing their demand for an immediate transition - the White House refuses to accept this possibility. U.S. officials have consistently ignored the many plans submitted by Yemen’s opposition coalition, demanding more “order” as Saleh plunges the country into chaos.

Topping this unstable house of cards, Saleh and Washington have preached dialogue since early February, only for their credibility to drop with each violent day. The White House is asking Yemen’s opposition to trust their killer - this is the current state of dialogue U.S. officials speak of.

U.S. policy has shifted; no longer is the objective to keep Saleh in power. Washington’s overall actions indicate that it doesn’t want to see him go, only that it realizes his rule and U.S. support is untenable. Now the objective becomes sweetening Saleh’s parting terms and salvaging his political options under the guise of “easing him out.” Such an “orderly time-table” attempts to suck the fire out of revolution. Saleh is already using the time-bubble to set up his son and nephews, and CIA and U.S. Special Forces are busy identifying military officers capable of preserving U.S. counter-terrorism operations.

While Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell accepted Saleh’s fate on Tuesday, he insisted that no cuts will be made to Saleh’s military assistance.

Washington’s emergency response to Yemen has largely been copied from Egypt; a slow, painful, insincere slide from the government to the opposition. Although the White House is watching the same political battle unfold between Egypt’s opposition and Mubarak agents, it’s willing to accept Saleh’s remnants. Washington wants to see a controlled burn with Saleh, and is “fine with any timetable” so long as he eventually leaves.

This message has stayed consistent - and has been consistently rejected by Yemen’s opposition. Either the Obama administration still isn’t listening or it doesn’t want to listen.

Toner doesn’t actually leave Yemen’s resolution up to the opposition, saying it should be dictated “in part” by them. Thus Saleh has a say in when he leaves. Yet the opposition doesn’t view him as the plug that keeps Yemen from bleeding. He is the virus that must be cast out to heal the body. Saleh and Washington are still trying to negotiate a surrender that should be unconditional, a policy that will leave the revolution unfinished and produce new instability.

Self-reporting on its own propaganda, a New York Times editorial now calls this “belated realism.”

“The Obama administration is doing the right thing by trying to ease President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen from office,” opens the editorial. “It should have started weeks ago, after Mr. Saleh’s supporters opened fire on protesters and more than 50 people were killed, turning most of the country against him. With the civilian death toll mounting and the military too divided and preoccupied to pursue a dangerous Al Qaeda affiliate, Mr. Saleh’s swift departure is essential.”

The truth is that Saleh turned most of the country against him before March 9th, when snipers opened fire on protesters in Sanaa's "Change Square." And judging by the Obama administration’s own actions, this “swift departure” is nothing more than fleeting idealism. No one is willing to accept Saleh’s terms except Washington and the Kingdom (Gates just landed in Riyadh). Meanwhile the White House continues to broadcast ambiguity rather than clarity, further muddying its message to Yemenis.

Until Obama breaks silence and U.S. officials halt their doublespeak - an unmistakable mark of favoritism and duplicity - U.S. policy will remain a distant dream from Yemen’s reality.

Women Leading the Way in Yemen

by Hibaaq Osman, published in The Huffington Post:

Glued simultaneously to the TV, Blackberry, laptop, and my own windows, I watched Arab politics come back to life just a few short weeks ago. As someone who has devoted her life to promoting women's human rights and political participation, I continue to rejoice at the role women are playing in the ongoing revolutions spreading across the Arab world. The Western media seem surprised that women are on the streets, raising their voices, protesting for democracy, and walking side by side with men who all want the same thing -- political reform and equal rights. They shouldn't be.

As I write this, all eyes are on Yemen. The country's president of 32 years, Ali Abdullah Saleh, had signaled a desire to step down by the end of 2011 or sooner, but suddenly reversed this decision, declaring that he would make no further concessions to end the crisis. This move is unlikely to placate the growing ranks of opposition members. As even more generals and diplomats move into the opposition camp, the questions are: will Yemen follow the route chosen by Egypt and Tunisia, in which the military stepped in to engineer a swift transition of power, or will Yemen become another Libya, where the elite have fractured into a civil war?

Unfortunately, many pundits and policymakers in the U.S., Europe and throughout the Arab world view this historic opportunity in Yemen through the narrow lens of terrorism. They are publicly fretting about how various scenarios may affect the near term fortunes of extremist groups or whether a next strongman will emerge to provide "stability" to preserve their interests in Yemen's capital, Sana'a. Both approaches are shortsighted.

Instead of more guns to fight terrorism, the West and Yemen's Arab neighbors should be asking how we can support Yemen in a transition to a robust and fully representative democracy. A true democracy in Yemen won't be built overnight, but it is the only thing that can begin to ease the economic despair, political sense of helplessness, and resentment of perceived foreign meddling that breeds terrorism and instability. Women must be part of that transition.

The puzzle of democracy has many pieces: civil society groups, better education, and economic opportunities. Women are 50 percent of that puzzle. Their voices have never been silent, but now, at long last, they're being heard. And well they should be.

On March 8, Women's Day in Yemen, a crowd of hundreds of peaceful female protesters gathered in Sana'a to demand the ouster of President Saleh. The protest was an act of courage that would have been unthinkable even a few weeks ago.

Mona Safwan, a participant in the march, captured the attitude of many protesters: "The peaceful struggle through the media and pressed for by human rights organizations, the peaceful sit-ins, they did not bear fruit, and also the peaceful demands and peaceful struggle for this country. Now we join the women because the peaceful means did not work. It must be a revolution."

Consider also the case of Tawakul Karman, a 32- year old mother of three who has emerged at the forefront of the movement to oust Saleh. Several stints in prison and an assassination attempt last year have only redoubled Karman's determination as she works to coordinate the sit-ins and demonstrations that are rocking Yemen's political scene, and some observers have floated her name as a possibility for president.

Yet despite demonstrating, taking risks, mobilizing, suffering, marching, and standing side by side with men in the revolutions and protest movements of the modern era, women have historically found themselves omitted from both power and opportunity in revolutions' aftermaths. For instance, only 8 percent of women are ever represented in any type of reconciliation plans. The unfortunate historical record is that, from Mexico to Iran to post-Soviet Eastern Europe, women are often left out of post-revolutionary decision-making processes, exacerbated by traditionally lower participation rates in government, military and business.

Women have made strides in Arab politics in recent years. In 2005, the International Parliamentary Union said that 6.5 per cent of MPs in the Arab world were women, compared with 3.5 per cent in 2000. And in Tunisia, the first Middle Eastern country to fall to regime change in the region, nearly 23 percent of members of Parliament were women. No wonder the media is now taking time to listen "to us." Having witnessed history being made these past few weeks, we must continue to create political comfort zones where we develop local leaders, and where both sides work without interference from identity politics. Nowhere is this currently more evident than Yemen.

In 2005 I founded Karama, a network of groups around the Arab region working to end violence against women and promote female political participation. The organization, whose name means "dignity" in Arabic, has given me a front row view of the triumphs of Arab women like Tawakul Karman, as well as a perspective on the years and decades of hard work that still lie ahead.

We should acknowledge and celebrate the role of Yemeni women in the movement. They are a hopeful sign of the vibrant democracy that might be born in Yemen -- if it is allowed to. But the only way to truly honor struggle and sacrifice of these heroines is to make sure they have an equal seat at the policymaking table the day after Saleh leaves.

Somali-born Hibaaq Osman has lived in Cairo since 2005. A global political strategist, she leads three regional non-governmental organizations: Karama, the Dignity Fund and the ThinkTank for Arab Women. She serves on the boards of a number of organizations, including Ashoka Arab World, and is a member of the Expert Committee for Peace and Secuirty at the League of Arab States.

Saleh, Yemeni Opposition Invited to Riyadh

Saba Net is reporting that Sheikh Mohammad Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, has invited representatives from the Yemeni government and the opposition to Saudi Arabia to negotiate a political resolution. The invitation was extended from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). More than a few Gulf states have their hands full with their own protests, so how sincere are they in ending Yemen’s revolution on the protesters’ side?

Bahrain and Oman must be scared that Saleh’s domino could tip them over.

Something is obviously happening between Washington and the King, so we’ll see how they treat both parties. Each is motivated to keep President Ali Abdullah Saleh in power due to the belief that Yemen will collapse without him. Never-mind that Yemen has been a failed state since Foreign Policy started indexing them in 2005. Saudi Arabia doesn’t support Saleh; it prefers a weak ruler that allows hegemony in the north. The Saudis have established a deep tribal network to counteract Saleh’s lack of authority, a breach of sovereignty that a democratic government is unlikely to tolerate.

Working in tandem with other Gulf states, the Saudis do possess the most political weight to move a deal, as U.S. consent is presumed. On the other hand, ringleader Saudi Arabia and Gulf states are actively limiting the effects of revolution in the Middle East and North Africa. Yemen’s opposition may have no choice in accepting the invite, but it’s heading into an uphill battle to remove Saleh on their terms.

While defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar accepted the GCC's call, the oppositional coalition is taking a wait-and-see approach.

Fourth-generation warfare is a battle of political wills and Yemen’s opposition needs to send an all-star lineup to hold their position, at the political table and in the global media. Off to a good start, JMP spokesman Muhammad Qahtan just promised that any new regime “will be a strong ally in the War on Terror.” The opposition is watching everything coming out of the U.S. media.

Local networks, mass civil disobedience, low-intensity violence, national insurgency, frequent public outreach, economic disruption, political isolation - now these people understand fourth-generation warfare.

NYT Sounds Terror Alarm For White House

Anyone needing further evidence that the “bombshell” New York Times report on Yemen, while containing traces of truth, is mainly a shot of propaganda should read its latest spin. This report was probably loaded in the second barrel the whole time. Sort of like poison torture, where the antidote is administered after each bite.

Psychological abuse.

Now the biggest “news” is that al-Qaeda militants quartered in Pakistan could be shifting into Yemen to exploit the security vacuum. In typical doublespeak, the Times reports in the same paragraph that U.S. officials “are divided” on a connection between the events. How thoughtful, they felt the need to warn the American people just in case. Humorless jokes aside, a real strategic shift between Pakistan and Yemen falls on Washington’s futile support of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy at work.

One Pentagon official also denied speculation that Saleh’s elite (and U.S.-trained) counter-terrorism units, in order to induce AQAP’s “chaos,” staged an intentional withdrawal in Abyan governorate. A senior military officer with “access to classified intelligence reports” rejected these suspicions on Monday: “This is a reflection of the turmoil in the country, not some political decision to stop.”

Whatever the truth, neither Saleh nor the Pentagon have any credibility in Yemen when speaking of AQAP. Voids in the political and information realms generated these conspiracies; Defense Secretary Robert Gates is personally responsible after issuing several one-sided comments that appeared to mimic Saleh’s threats of civil war. And if AQAP’s advance really is “a reflection of turmoil” and defecting soldiers, not some sinister plot, Saleh and Washington still have no one to blame except themselves. One cannot blame bad governance and poor counterinsurgency on the insurgent.

Among other grievances, Yemen’s opposition accuses Saleh of employing a special tear gas on them, which they claim was provided by America and European states for use against AQAP.

After mentioning increasing terror “chatter,” and the 75 Special Forces trainers and support personnel operating in Yemen, the NYT drops its final bomb. Vividly demonstrating how little Washington understands of Yemen and fourth-generation warfare, United States Central Command has, “dusted off plans to resume air-strikes against top Qaeda targets if the United States receives solid intelligence about the location of senior militants.”

Imagine U.S. strikes going over Saleh’s head during a revolution. Why not send C-130s to dump gasoline while they’re at it?

For now the use of air-strikes exists as a contingency, an automatic response inside the Pentagon. However, the forthcoming excuse that “nothing has been decided” once again ignores the principles of fourth-generation warfare. Military thoughts continue to dominate Washington’s mind in the full-spectrum world of counterinsurgency. People, including Yemenis, are going to read this report and immediately form negative impressions of U.S. policy, shocked that Washington is even considering such a flammable option to put out a fire. Their reaction will further pressure the White House to ditch Saleh.

Of course U.S. air-strikes, carried out under Saleh’s cover, ground to a halt in May after an errant strike killed Jaber al-Shabwani, deputy governor of Maarib province. A tribal revolt ensued, the result of one-sided counterinsurgency. Overall an estimated 200 civilians were killed in four air-strikes during 2010, compared to 30-50 militants. And the Pentagon and CIA thought it had solid intelligence. These actions clearly failed to limit AQAP’s growth while simultaneously triggering fresh anti-American sentiment.

Anwar al-Awlaki, one of AQAP’s spiritual leaders and its Western mouthpiece, is also listed in the report as a possible target. Killing him during Yemen’s revolution would be suicidal, turning al-Awlaki into a martyr and playing right into AQAP’s hands. He definitely reads the NYT - hence this report is a gold-mine for the group.

In sum, Saleh and Washington’s problems are being dumped on Yemeni protesters as excuses to delay or water down their revolution. And while the Obama administration insists that U.S. counter-terrorism is "bigger than one man,” the NYT reports that CIA operatives within the country are frantically identifying low-level officers to ensure mission continuity. This is why the White House’s claim to have seen the light, as propagated by the NYT, feels so dark.

They aren’t simply spouting propaganda, but naive propaganda that damages U.S. policy. The Obama administration and New York Times should give the truth a try. They can start with Saleh's ongoing crackdown on Tuesday.

White House, NYT Spread Yemen’s Propaganda

Maybe he counts The New York Times as a negotiator between Washington and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alleging a policy shift against the defiant autocrat, hidden messages are personally coded for Saleh’s eyes: Barack Obama is running out of room to support him. And if he doesn’t change his violent behavior soon, he might end up on the Times’ front-page instead of a sidebar.

Rather than see through the facade, the majority of news organizations and analysts covering Yemen bit on another of the White House’s tactics to prolong Saleh’s time-table - and set up a favorable fall.

Obama and his inner circle are seriously mistaken if they consider the NYT report an equivalent to public diplomacy. This weak message appears most concerned with defending Obama's handling of Saleh, and continues to broadcast ambiguity rather than clarity. The NYT merely opened as the first act of a political play. With Obama once again leaving Yemen’s violence to spokesmen, Press Secretary Jay Carney and State spokesman Mark Toner expressed shock at Saleh’s systematic repression. While they did start with Yemen, a rarity, and claimed to be pushing for a transition since February, they quickly downplayed the NYT account of regime change.

And there’s been quite a bit of talk about the U.S. government having shifted stance on - in its - on Yemen’s President Saleh, and that it’s now quietly decided that he must leave office because he will not - could not be trusted to bring about necessary reforms. Is that in fact the case?

MR. CARNEY: We are obviously concerned about and are monitoring the situation in Yemen. We’ve seen reports of further violence, and that is a concern, and we’ve been very clear about our views on the need that all sides refrain from violence, that there be an open process that addresses the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people.

We support a dialogue, a political dialogue, and President Saleh has publicly indicated his willingness to engage in a peaceful transition of power, and we believe the timing and form of that transition should be accomplished through dialogue and negotiation. So we urge that process to continue.

Toner, who remained silent throughout last week, refused to discuss details: “Again, I don’t want to get into the substance of our diplomatic discussions, but we’ve made it clear to President Saleh, both in public as I’m doing now and in private, that violence is not a solution and that an agreement with the opposition needs to be reached as soon as possible.”

So far he hasn’t indicated any sincere willingness to step down peacefully, nor has Washington demonstrated the ability to conduct real diplomacy with Yemen’s opposition. Saleh himself copied and pasted the White House's statements to support his version of dialogue.

The White House and Pentagon may excuse their silence by claiming Saleh would turn even more dangerous in the event of public condemnation. This theory, while logically appealing, accepts Saleh’s violent streak as tolerable. Contrary to those arguing that only Saudi Arabia can influence Yemen’s crisis, pulling U.S. military assistance to Saleh would be a big blow to a depleted arsenal. And he hasn’t applied U.S. assistance enough to be missed against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Until Obama personally calls for Saleh's resignation, the fall of his regime and acknowledges the popular revolution as Yemen's new government, Washington’s policy hasn’t noticeably shifted. The administration may want to see Saleh go, but no one wants to see his regime end.

Gates Sinks Obama Into Yemen's Quicksand

He talks about it all the time, so he must be laughing at the fickle nature of Washington.

Considering the groundswell for “change,” Robert Gates boarded Barack Obama’s administration with surprisingly little push-back from the Democratic base. Suddenly the inexperienced president needed an old hand to manage “orderly transitions” in Iraq and Afghanistan, and George Bush’s Defense Secretary was spun well by his advisers and mainstream U.S. media. Still eager to pursue militaristic strategies abroad, Pentagon budget cuts made him a favorite amongst liberal and conservative lawmakers alike.

Gates has freely expressed approval for a mission extension in Iraq if offered by Baghdad, contrary to Obama’s campaign promise. Despite evidence that he tacitly favored an Afghan buildup, high praise was directed towards his “skepticism” and quiet approach to pressurized war reviews. Gates and General David Petraeus are currently teaming up to minimize Obama’s troop withdrawals in July, with negligible consequences from Congress or the U.S. public. Now, after being hailed by Democrats and Republicans as a voice of reason in Libya, Gates finds himself under fire to the point where some pundits are forecasting his early resignation.

Either U.S. lawmakers are extraordinarily fickle, or Gates finally got caught stepping too far over the line of executive authority. Some officials and pundits expressed concern with his absolute opposition to deploying combat troops in Libya. No one is asking for this scenario, but Gates answered in an ultimatum to the president: “Not as long as I’m in this job.” His joint Congressional testimony with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was also panned for being vague and unresponsive. Politico reports of the Senators' feedback: “They said one dynamic was very clear: The administration doesn’t much care what Congress thinks about the actions it’s taken so far.”

Gates finally tied his tongue after so much doublespeak.

Yet a lingering fickleness cannot be cleansed so easily. Congress and the American people have good reason to question the White House’s handling of Libya; if the operation is legally and militarily sound, why not increase political transparency? Obama cannot disregard the domestic component of supporting an insurgency, as he could generate Congressional and public support through heightened interaction. But if Congress is worried about transparency and political folly, why did Gates receive a free pass where he deserves the most blame?

Where is that same public outcry over Yemen?

The Defense Secretary didn’t want to weigh in - didn’t consider revolution to be America’s business in a fourth-generation conflict - and he’ll probably avoid Yemen’s scales for the time being. Looking lost on each occasion, Gates broke his silence by knocking two dents in U.S. policy. First came the obvious but disturbing admission that the White House hadn't done any "post-planning" for President Ali Abdullah Saleh, multiplying U.S. fears of his replacement and Yemenis’ fear that Washington is colluding with him. A week later, during an interview with ABC News, Gates mentioned Yemen almost in passing and within a strict counter-terrorism context.

“I think it is a real concern,” he said of a Saleh-less Yemen, “because the most active and, at this point, perhaps the most aggressive branch of al Qaeda - al Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula - operates out of Yemen. And we have had a lot of counter-terrorism cooperation from President Saleh and Yemeni Security Services. So if that government collapses or is replaced by one that is dramatically more weak, then I think we'll face some additional challenges out of Yemen. There's no question about it. It's a real problem.”

Gates’s remarks quickly landed him a leading role in the opposition’s propaganda, which accused him of synchronizing threats with Saleh. Yemen's embattled president has repeatedly defied demands to step down after 32 years in office, and blames all sections of Yemen’s opposition except the youth for stirring “chaos” - by collaborating with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But as Saleh and U.S. officials point to territorial gains by AQAP, Yemeni protesters accuse Saleh of orchestrating a pullout in Jaar and intentionally destabilizing the Abyan governorate.

And Gates is being cited as evidence.

According to one of many opposition statements to Obama, “Millions of Yemeni peaceful protesters are questioning the silence and the insubstantial announcements by some members of your administration and moreover, overt bias in favor of the Yemeni tyrant. The respected Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, announced publicly that protests in Yemen are an internal affair and the primary concern of the United States is instability and diversion of attention from dealing with AQAP... Yemeni women, men, children, and elders are all eager and confident that they will hear from you as the leader of the free world and that you will support their democratic goals now and in the future.”

Although Gates is surely monitoring the situation - his name pops up in many opposition complaints - there’s a certain obliviousness to dropping terror threats and evacuating. Normally so cool and collected, Gates stepped on a land mine in Yemen and has retreated behind the Pentagon walls ever since. His personal controversy makes Washington’s blackout that much more impressive and suspicious. Neither the White House nor State Department confronted Saleh’s violent stall tactics last week, an overt blanket that can only be explained by political manipulation.

And when the State Department did address Yemen at Friday's end, spokesman Mark Toner borrowed Gates’s broken field glasses.

“Well, it’s clearly a concern,” he replied when asked about Saleh’s diversion from AQAP, “but as we’ve said, our counter-terrorism cooperation continues in Yemen. And frankly, it’s not something that’s directed at one person; it’s ongoing cooperation with the Government of Yemen. But obviously, we want to see a resolution to the unrest in Yemen. We believe that President Saleh has made some movement on his side, the demonstrators have made some movements, but they need to obviously come together and forge a way forward. But clearly, the counter-terrorism efforts in Yemen are foremost on our minds and our assistance and our counter-terrorism cooperation continues.”

Clearly - and that’s the core problem in U.S. policy. If counter-terrorism was treated as a secondary priority to good governance, America wouldn’t be facing the current level of threat from Yemen’s instability and AQAP.

While Saleh regularly speaks of transferring power and stepping down “with dignity,” his defiant speeches and military commands leave no doubt to his genuine feelings. Saleh continues to react violently, plead innocence or cry conspiracy, and ultimately fall into the disproportionate trap of fourth-generation warfare. He's particularly concerned about the fate of his son and nephews, who double as his military liaisons with Washington, and has refused to bow to their removal. He also rejects exile if forced from office and vows to stay on as chairman of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC). After the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the main political opposition, released a generous offer that would transfer power to Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, Saleh’s Vice President, Speaker of Parliament Yahya Al-Raee dismissed the plan for being “prepared during a khat chew” and “having no value.”

After unsuccessfully negotiating with the JMP to avoid the youth’s demand of immediate resignation, Saleh now accuses the JMP of conspiring with AQAP, the Houthis, and secessionist Southern Movement to hijack the revolution. al-Raee even argued as the youth has - “the JMP does not represent the Yemeni opposition.” Saleh did add, however, that he would discuss a power transfer after the JMP ended “street protests, sit-ins, road blocks, assassination operations, and lifts rebellion inside military units.”

His stall tactics amount to begging for an end to fourth-generation warfare, the only type of resistance Yemenis can mount. They have no reason to stop until they achieve their goals.

Opposition spokesman Mohamed Qahtan warned, "the JMP's offer is the last chance for Saleh to smoothly leave and peacefully pass the power to his deputy, whom the president described as the safe hands. If Saleh rejected such a proposal for him, he would then receive the hard decision from the youth-led street protesters.”

So can the White House maintain its wall of silence into next week and beyond? Stronger statements may be unavoidable after Yemeni police beat hundreds of protesters over the weekend, including women. Of course the freedom and security of women is vital, but ignoring violence against men sets a double-standard in human rights. Protesters were beaten and gassed throughout the week without comment from the White House or State Department, swelling relatively fresh anti-American sentiment. What was still a friendly populace in early March is low on hope in early April.

“We are really very, very angry because America until now didn’t help us similar to what Mr. Obama said that Mubarak has to leave now,” said Tawakel Karman, a female activist and senior member of Al-Islah who helped organize the initial protests and sparked a wider uprising by being arrested. “Obama says he appreciated the courage and dignity of Tunisian people. He didn’t say that for Yemeni people. We feel that we have been betrayed.”

For “security” reasons the Obama administration has remained silent and thus shared in Saleh's consequences. Security concerns cannot justify a policy that further aggravates those concerns; the White House is simply riding out a bad policy. U.S. counterinsurgency remains one-dimensional so long as Washington neglects political and public diplomacy, matters of equal importance during fourth-generation warfare. Only Yemen's military space has been filled, leaving the political and social dimensions void of influence. Public silence is directly linked to AQAP’s territorial gains, as an unresponsive Saleh harms himself, Yemen, and U.S. policy.

This is why Gates’s comments displayed such a low understanding of the world’s dominate style of warfare. Yemen’s insurgency ranges across the non-military spectrum yet he only addressed the military sliver. His errors agitated Yemen's political and information spheres, inflicting real damage on U.S. policy, and no one bothered to cleaned up his mess. Yemen’s struggle doesn’t weigh the stronger military force - it calculates the sharper political message. And America’s high-technology has become a dull blade.

Private diplomacy, an Obama favorite, doesn’t achieve the same results in the public arena of guerrilla warfare. As Yemenis don’t trust his officials, he must take charge in order to preserve any semblance of strategy in Yemen.

The New York Times claims that a policy is slowly coalescing. Unfortunately doubt oozes from its insider reporting. First, the Times provides additional evidence that Washington supported Saleh up to “last week,” demonstrating poor judgment and a slow response time. Apparently the administration only now realizes that Saleh won't follow through on his reforms - or maybe the White House believes it can no longer explain its support for Saleh. The supposed change in mood also reveals a begrudging reaction to criticism of the double-standard between Libya and Yemen, not a sincere belief that life after Saleh will improve for Yemenis and U.S. policy.

The White House still intends to “ease” Saleh out of office rather than accept his immediate removal. But most disturbingly, one administration official went off record with a statement nearly identical to parts of Saleh’s speeches.

“Groups of various stripes - Al Qaeda, Houthis, tribal elements, and secessionists - are exploiting the current political turbulence and emerging fissures within the military and security services for their own gain,” the official warns. “Until President Saleh is able to resolve the current political impasse by announcing how and when he will follow through on his earlier commitment to take tangible steps to meet opposition demands, the security situation in Yemen is at risk of further deterioration.”

In spite of all talk otherwise, counter-terrorism still comes before democracy in Washington’s mind, disregarding the connection between the two. If Obama sincerely believes that Saleh must go, he must assume control and prove his resolve in public. Otherwise Yemenis are justified in believing the two presidents are sinking together into chaos.

Libyan Rebel: Training By U.S./Egyptian Special Forces

Full story.

Gbagbo Fomenting Counter-Insurgency in Côte d'Ivoire

When a government designs a proper strategy to counter an insurgency, its ultimate objective aims for the populace’s approval. Support the people through legitimate means and they’re less likely to choose the insurgency willingly; alleviating the reasons to fight offers a more permanent solution than killing insurgents.

COIN that relies on brute force is no COIN at all, as popular resentment fuels the insurgency’s underground and its rise to the surface. And when the stronger force in an asymmetric war possesses comparable power to the weaker force, desperation can produce a counter-insurgency rather than counterinsurgency.

Unlike its counterpart in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire’s opposition recently completed a nationwide sweep of the country with minimal resistance from President Laurent Gbagbo’s forces. The invasion of Abidjan is attributed to two factors: mass defections from Gbagbo’s regular army, which he distrusts and marginalized in favor of his personal forces in Abidjan, and a relatively organized insurgency. Intense fighting in Abidjan has demonstrated the abilities of those fighting under disputed president Alassane Ouattara. Simultaneously targeting Gbagbo’s palace in downtown Abidjan, Ouattara’s allied Forces Nouvelles (FN) fanned out across the city to challenge Gbagbo’s military positions.

Sustained clashes have been reported several miles north in Adjamé, home of the Agban military base, at the RTI headquarters to southeast, further east in Gbagbo’s residential neighborhood of Cocody, and in the southern neighborhoods of Treichville, the Presidential forces stronghold, and Port-Bouet near the airport.

In contrast to Libya’s opposition, FN spent years formulating both a political platform and military hierarchy, establishing a more favorable position to secure decisive victory. They’ve followed the revolutionary blueprint that Libya’s rebels want to copy - a longer preparation period fosters political organization and enables rapid territorial gains. Kouakou Leon Alla, a spokesperson for Ouattara’s prime minister Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, released a statement declaring, "After the tremendous work throughout the interior of the country, the Republican Forces are reorganized to complete their noble mission.”

In addition to his premiership, Soro heads FN as Secretary-General and leads the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire, FN’s main political component.

Despite Gbagbo’s rallying forces and their attempt to lock down Abidjan, the government’s counterattack is also likely to differ from Muammar Gaddafi’s semi-conventional assaults. As Ouattara slowly assumes the conventional party and its moral obligations, Gbagbo’s style of warfare is bound to degenerate into the unconventional, which appears to be only type of force he has left.

Although Gbagbo does possess pieces of a modern arsenal, such as rocket launchers, artillery pieces, helicopter gunships, and tanks, the core of his army remains largely irregular. Depending on the Presidential Guard, his "Young Patriots” militia commanded by firebrand Charles Ble Goude, and foreign mercenaries, Gbagbo cannot mount conventional attacks on the FN without exposing what’s left of his territory. And those troops that arrived to defend his palace arrived with two-by-fours and clubs, common weapons that still suggest Gbagbo is running low on munitions.

Now that FN invaded his final stronghold, Gbagbo just fulfilled a long-standing threat by calling upon his civilian supporters to wage “resistance.” This could result in extremely messy guerrilla warfare on both sides. Corinne Dufka, head of the West Africa office of Human Rights Watch, cautioned, “If there is to be fighting, it needs to be between armed men from one side and armed men from the other side."

A ethical sentiment, but far too conventional to describe Côte d'Ivoire’s current state.

While Dufka is speaking of human rights violations more than styles of warfare, her fears equally apply to the standards of asymmetry. Because Gbagbo lacks the forces to confront Ouattara’s own army, he’s resorted to isolated insurgent tactics of fear, propaganda, and ambush to extend his rule. Loyal forces prefer to operate at night as they kidnap and abuse Ouattara’s supporters, rather than face them openly in the streets.

Once that confrontation has spilled into the open, Gbagbo’s forces don’t hesitate to fire live rounds on civilians. But they often operate in roving bands similar to guerrilla units, firing and shelling indiscriminately to spread terror. If Gbagbo does attempt to push back into the north, he’s more likely to employ mobile warfare and subversive tactics than any semblance of a conventional assault.

Duékoué is one of those strategic towns, a key in Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa-growing region, and correspondingly suffered a large-scale civilian massacre. Further suppressive tactics would be less surprising than a comprehensive counter-attack.

FN’s rapid descent upon Abidjan comes with its pros and cons. Pushed to the brink, Gbagbo will drop all pretense of legitimacy and lash out in horrific fashion, resulting in a vicious urban battle for the city. Ouattara issued multiple ceasefires on Friday and Saturday to spare Gbagbo’s life, along with a statement that too much blood had already been spilled. Such an outcome in Abidjan, however, was inevitable so long as Gbagbo maintained his entrenched position.

Ouattara’s FN may produce a more satisfying result by minimizing the UN’s force requirements, and by keeping the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) out of the country. Although international legitimacy greatly aided his internal struggle, unassisted conquest will contribute to his legitimacy once he secures Abidjan and affirms his sovereignty over Côte d'Ivoire. But the war is by no means over.

Gbagbo may soon restart the cycle by becoming the insurgent himself.

Libyan Guerrillas Train For the Pros

With due respect to the duress Libya’s rebels currently fight under, their last three days unfolded in military tragedy. Being a rookie is no excuse during guerrilla warfare; most guerrillas enter the revolutionary cycle green. So watching them run into the same wall was torturous - once should have been enough to adapt. Instead beleaguered president Muammar Gaddafi adjusted to Western tactics without a corresponding evolution from the rebels.

As the stronger side of an asymmetric war, even a weak government such as Gaddafi’s can temporarily out-muscle and out-pay the insurgency. What Libya’s opposition cannot allow from the very beginning is for Gaddafi to outsmart them.

After sizing up Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte and once again streaking to nearby Bin Jawwad, the rebels find themselves back defending Ajdabiya, their only strengthened position before Benghazi. The rebels caught a case of déjà vu as Gaddafi’s artillery halted their rapid advance, complete with anger at the empty skies (NATO jets were grounded by poor weather). With speed equal to his first counterattack, heavy shelling by Gaddafi’s army forced retreats from Bin Jawwad on Tuesday, and Ras Lanouf and Marsa Brega on Wednesday.

Numerically outnumbered an estimated 10 to 1, the rebels stand no chance in a conventional war against Gaddafi’s army. His core force is running out of defectors and although Libyan soldiers aren’t exceptionally trained, even a moderately experienced soldier holds the initial advantage over a freshly trained guerrilla. All the more reason to avoid set battles and ambushes during the insurgency’s formative stage. By now Libya’s opposition must realize that Sirte marks Gaddafi’s red-line, and he won't leave it vulnerable to a direct assault. Fundamental guerrilla law shuns decisive engagements until favorable conditions have been established.

But during one particular trap near Bin Jawwad, rebels advanced straight up a road and into flanks of armed 4x4 trucks and AK-47s. As the rebels regrouped to retreat, Gaddafi’s artillery targeted their positions and turned a retreat into wild flight. The rebels need another plan of attack.

Gaddafi’s methods have also evolved from his original counterattack. Shedding his dead-weight armor and adopting camouflaged, blitzkrieg attacks, Gaddafi’s hardened core has downshifted from conventional to semi-conventional warfare. To hide from NATO air-strikes and blend in with the rebels, who utilize a jarring mix of civilian vehicles on the battlefield, the bulk of Gaddafi’s tanks are either concealed in the desert or inside loyal cities. Flat-bed trucks known as “technicals,” armed with heavy machine-guns, mortars, and anti-aircraft cannons, have become his new transport. And Gaddafi expects the rebels to mark their vehicles, leading to a signal race over target designation.

To compliment his core of "battle wagons,” Gaddafi has deployed armed sedans, SUVs, and minivans to generate a relatively sophisticated swarm attack.

On the opposition's side, sporadic attacks and hasty retreats mark the insurgent principles they most relate to, not ideal traits to lead with. Individual crews decide when to race forward from the front-line, empty their rounds, and vanish. Not that there’s anything wrong with running and hiding; mobility is the essence of guerrilla warfare. The rebels should run more but with controlled movement, constantly roving in cells and dividing the numerically superior enemy across a wider battlefield. Concentrating forces and digging entrenchments gives Gaddafi the offensive advantage. Libyan rebels must run through the country and strike where Gaddafi doesn’t expect.

And if Gaddafi grows accustomed to them running, they need to develop ambushes utilizing feigned retreats and NATO air-strikes.

One rebel officer, Quafe, assures the retreat is tactical, explaining, “We can’t fight in an open area like this.” A good observation for an insurgent to make - before joining battle. While Libya’s desert offers sparse cover, the rebels must adapt their tactics to the terrain. Desert insurgencies enjoy low odds of success against government air-power, odds that increase dramatically in the absence of that power.

The rebels’ temporarily loss of momentum has further exasperated decision cycles in Western capitals, as NATO members fear a protracted, costly stalemate with a suicidal Gaddafi. Such concerns also run high in the U.S. Congress and populace, ensnaring Libya's debate in a black-and-white endgame. Many officials and observers believe the rebels cannot force Gaddafi to surrender without direct ground support, either in the form of foreign combat troops, intelligence agents, or imported arms. Both the rebels and NATO still hope to establish a front near Sirte, which among its strategic advantages would simplify target designation. Then they can connect with the besieged opposition in Misrata and advance the front to Tripoli.

But as NATO wonders how to speed up the revolution and induce Gaddafi’s fall, the international community risks committing a fundamental error in guerrilla warfare. Because America and Europe now hold a direct interest in Libya, its leadership inevitably views the insurgency through conventional Western glasses. Reflexively gagging on a prolonged struggle - a revolution’s natural state - conventional terms like “decisive force” and “decapitation strike” are thrown around in a sincere search for them.

“Open-ended” gives politicians nightmares.

However Libya’s revolution doesn’t demand a speedy resolution; an inherent incongruence exists in the conventional guidance of unconventional forces. Foreign advisers commonly offer technical assistance to guerrilla movements, but the essence of asymmetric warfare must remain intact. The objective remains the same as 50 years ago: defeat a technologically and economically superior force with mass resistance, mobility, and ingenuity. If, as U.S. and EU officials suggest, Gaddafi should be worn out until he falls of his own accord, they must also end the contradictory thirst that craves immediate results.

Western assistance can imbue Libya’s insurgency with conventional notes, enhancing their firepower and communications. Then allow guerrillas to be guerrillas.

Most of the rebels’ military problems and solutions start at the top; their insurgency will flourish once a strong chain of command has been established. The National Transitional Council is charting a steady international course and, for all of its inadequacies, has put the rebels in position to win on the ground. But it must instill immediate order in the ranks by devising a training regiment and comprehensive strategy at the national level. The rebels must be convinced of the leadership’s abilities in order to earn their undying trust. Once the Council establishes a military command and makes sound decisions on the battlefield, the rebels will ultimately overpower the energy of Gaddafi’s last stand.

Libya’s rebels need to drill first, advance second. Each should receive two weeks of basic training followed by two weeks (or more) of specialized training. They need riflemen, mortar-gunners, demolitions experts, spies, engineers, technicians. Elite units must be trained as well, and new commanders must be selected during the reorganization period. Every unit should train unconventionally and semi-conventionally, as the initial advance will eventually transition from one phase to the next.

Much of the opposition's training can be provided by Gaddafi’s defectors, CIA and NATO trainers, and possibly Arab advisers. America isn’t necessarily needed beyond the minimum, a message U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen recently delivered to Congress. The same goes for providing light arms, anti-tank weapons, and explosives. It’s important to differentiate between Afghanistan and Libya, contrary to the remarks of many Senators. Libya needn’t be a weapons dump like Soviet-occupied Kabul.

A modest but steady flow of light arms will suffice with the right tactics and strategy.

Fortunately the seeds of organization already appear to be sprouting. New reports from the front-line paint a more disciplined insurgency, as if a lesson was finally learned from recklessly advancing upon Sirte. Libya’s courageous but inexperienced recruits have been redeployed to the flanks or rearguard, while the most experienced troops (especially those who served in Libya’s reserves) are filling up the front-line. Not only do they have more weapons training, they claim to avoid roads and follow orders.

"We were setting up and training and establishing units all over Libya," said Hamid Muftah, one of Gaddaf’s defectors, as he explained the 25 days of training volunteers received in March. Many have been organized into six or seven-man squads led by a defected officer. And most importantly, they claim to obey orders from the top of the chain. Ahmed al-Shiri, a defected officer from Benghazi, blamed the failure of Sirte’s advances on a "lack of organization.”

Now, "we get orders from the military council in Benghazi. They're in control. The army is in control.”

As Sirte cannot be captured immediately, strategies must be employed to alter the battlefield. The rebels can still harden their eastern front at Brega and, going no further, train the majority of the force behind their lines. They should consider slowing down a month or two, or more, to train an elite guerrilla army. Doing so would speed up their revolution in the end. Gaddafi’s hometown is undoubtedly a tempting prize, and he knows it too well. His defensive counterattacks have systematically driven back the rebel advance with ease, as if he was toying with them.

Seizing the city by direct force poses an improbable, if not impossible objective. At the minimum, Libya’s opposition requires the allegiance of Sirte’s main tribe, the Firjan. Gaddafi’s own tribe, the Gadhadhfa, historically run the city and have alienated the Firjan population, which already participated in the eastern uprising. Col. Khalifa Hafter, a Firjani who defected from Gadhafi's forces in February, is engaged in ongoing talks as chief of the Libyan People’s Army.

While the opposition may envision surrounding Sirte before turning its population, an internal rebellion would make a better distraction for an invasion.

Armed with a stronger, more disciplined fighting force, one alternative would stab into the country’s western heart. In Sabha, another of Gaddafi’s strongholds, members of his Gadhadhfa tribe are supposedly making plans to flee a rebel invasion. A simple act of warfare, conventional or unconventional, is to move the opponent by seizing something valuable. Advancing southwest may distract Gaddafi enough to gain the advantage in Sirte, either by taking out his peripheral command or inspiring Sirte’s occupations to rise up.

At the political level many Warfalla and Magarha tribesmen, Gaddafi's long-standing allies, fear the threats that trickle down through their local leaders. To defy Gaddafi is to become a social outcast - if they’re lucky. Flipping them as the final piece before Tripoli calls for measures beyond military success and senior defections. The opposition must offer Gaddafi’s tribal supporters a viable alternative, including an amnesty program, so that Libya’s minority doesn’t feel as though they’re losing the little they have.

Libya's opposition must develop its shadow government to the point where it can replace Gaddafi’s regime at any moment. The two events should overlap as close as possible.

Although a cornered Gaddafi may hold out for months, Libya’s opposition is steadily acquiring every advantage needed to eliminate his regime. So long as the rebels wage an insurgency until securing the conventional edge, Gaddafi will ultimately lose his political, economic, military, and social advantages. In general they must stay mobile, unlike their present use of flying columns. However light and mobile Gaddafi is moving, the guerrillas must move faster. And premature advances extend Gaddafi’s life by interrupting the revolutionary cycle. The international community must accept the natural speed of insurgency, which can oscillate between fire and ice.

Once ordered and trained, Libya's guerrillas may deliver victory sooner that the West thinks.

Saleh and Assad Echo Conspiracies

Far from compromising with Yemen's opposition or giving to their demands, President Ali Abdullah Saleh continues to throw down "chaos" hammers. The meat of his latest address to "youth leadership" in Sana'a:

The youth are the future's force, the youth are the foundation. We support those of the youth who are pure, clean, and non-politicized. Non-politicized, unlike those who are controlled with a remote control.

You were born free, and it is wrong for those seeking power to step on the youth. Those seeking power will have to do it in a civilized manner by going to the ballot boxes, and if the people grant them confidence, then they will immediately hand over the power.

However, The JMP are acting in a chaotic and mob-like manner, they believe that they can step on the youth's blood to achieve power. The JMP leaders are responsible for the regrettable events of Friday [18 March]. They are responsible for the pure blood that was shed in Taiz, Abyan, Sana'a, and other governorates. They are responsible for all this bloodshed, they are behind this crisis, and they are responsible for causing panic and unrest among citizens.

The blame falls on them, not on the regime. The JMP's illegitimate ambitions and uncivilized behavior are the reasons behind the crisis, and they want to reach power by coups. They are all allies: the al-Qaeda, Houthis, separatists, JMP, and all of them have joined forces so as to overthrow the political system. Overthrowing the political system will lead to disunity.

We support the youth and their demands and we will meet your legitimate demands. We will work and direct the concerned parties to meet all your demands.

"It is not legitimately right for a minority to impose its will on the majority. It is not possible in any case that the minority twists the arm of the majority. 95 per cent of the general population supports security and stability, a number of the so-called opposition have no shame in front of TV screens, satellite channels, and say that those who participated in the Friday march, in which more than 1.5 million people rallied, are from the central security, republican guard, and rescue forces.

Those jugglers and liars have no shame. One party, member of the JMP, said that the dialogue is over, and that it serves no purpose now that the president is in a conflict with his own people. If all those millions from Taiz, Hodeidah, Hadramout, Hajjah, Ibb, Mahwait, Amran, Dhamar, Raymah, if all those millions from the republic's governorates are in a conflict with the president, then the president should step down within hours.

If the 95 per cent majority is supporting the security and stability of the country, development and unity, while the 5 per cent minority is disturbing the security of the homeland, then who should be the one leaving? The minority should leave. Not only should they leave power, but the homeland as well. They should leave the country where they are no longer accepted. They should leave the country, which they are destabilizing.

Saleh's definition of "unity" grows stranger by the day. He also forgets to mention that he attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate with the JMP behind the youth movement's back. Yemen's youth, above all other actors, are determined to see Saleh resign unconditionally and decide their own future. And they constitute the majority of Yemen's population.

Quote of the Day

“Our hope is that we’ll be able to get away with no combat troops getting pulled out this summer. But we recognize that may not be possible.”

- anonymous U.S. official, explaining the White House and Pentagon's showdown over troop withdrawals from Afghanistan

The Washington Post reports, "Two senior military officials outlined one set of options being developed by staff officers in Kabul: the removal of almost no forces; the withdrawal of a few thousand support personnel, including headquarters staff, engineers and logisticians; and the pullout of a brigade’s worth of troops — about 5,000 personnel— by culling a battalion of Marines in Helmand province that was added after the surge, a contingent of soldiers training Afghan security forces and an Army infantry battalion in either the country’s east or far west."

We've been expecting the third option to displace the first; this may have been the plan prior to December 2009. The U.S. government cannot be allowed to walk over the anti-war movement so easily.

Exposed: The US-Saudi Libya Deal

By Asia Times Online's Pepe Escobar:

You invade Bahrain. We take out Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. This, in short, is the essence of a deal struck between the Barack Obama administration and the House of Saud. Two diplomatic sources at the United Nations independently confirmed that Washington, via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their neighbor in exchange for a "yes" vote by the Arab League for a no-fly zone over Libya - the main rationale that led to United Nations Security Council resolution 1973.

The revelation came from two different diplomats, a European and a member of the BRIC group, and was made separately to a US scholar and Asia Times Online. According to diplomatic protocol, their names cannot be disclosed. One of the diplomats said, "This is the reason why we could not support resolution 1973. We were arguing that Libya, Bahrain and Yemen were similar cases, and calling for a fact-finding mission. We maintain our official position that the resolution is not clear, and may be interpreted in a belligerent manner."

As Asia Times Online has reported, a full Arab League endorsement of a no-fly zone is a myth. Of the 22 full members, only 11 were present at the voting. Six of them were Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the US-supported club of Gulf kingdoms/sheikhdoms, of which Saudi Arabia is the top dog. Syria and Algeria were against it. Saudi Arabia only had to "seduce" three other members to get the vote.

Translation: only nine out of 22 members of the Arab League voted for the no-fly zone. The vote was essentially a House of Saud-led operation, with Arab League secretary general Amr Moussa keen to polish his CV with Washington with an eye to become the next Egyptian President.

Thus, in the beginning, there was the great 2011 Arab revolt. Then, inexorably, came the US-Saudi counter-revolution.

Profiteers rejoice

Humanitarian imperialists will spin en masse this is a "conspiracy", as they have been spinning the bombing of Libya prevented a hypothetical massacre in Benghazi. They will be defending the House of Saud - saying it acted to squash Iranian subversion in the Gulf; obviously R2P - "responsibility to protect" does not apply to people in Bahrain. They will be heavily promoting post-Gaddafi Libya as a new - oily - human rights Mecca, complete with US intelligence assets, black ops, special forces and dodgy contractors.

Whatever they say won't alter the facts on the ground - the graphic results of the US-Saudi dirty dancing. Asia Times Online has already reported on who profits from the foreign intervention in Libya (see There's no business like war business, March 30). Players include the Pentagon (via Africom), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Saudi Arabia, the Arab League's Moussa, and Qatar. Add to the list the al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain, assorted weapons contractors, and the usual neo-liberal suspects eager to privatize everything in sight in the new Libya - even the water. And we're not even talking about the Western vultures hovering over the Libyan oil and gas industry.

Exposed, above all, is the astonishing hypocrisy of the Obama administration, selling a crass geopolitical coup involving northern Africa and the Persian Gulf as a humanitarian operation. As for the fact of another US war on a Muslim nation, that's just a "kinetic military action".

There's been wide speculation in both the US and across the Middle East that considering the military stalemate - and short of the "coalition of the willing" bombing the Gaddafi family to oblivion - Washington, London and Paris might settle for the control of eastern Libya; a northern African version of an oil-rich Gulf Emirate. Gaddafi would be left with a starving North Korea-style Tripolitania.

But considering the latest high-value defections from the regime, plus the desired endgame ("Gaddafi must go", in President Obama's own words), Washington, London, Paris and Riyadh won't settle for nothing but the whole kebab. Including a strategic base for both Africom and NATO.

Round up the unusual suspects

One of the side effects of the dirty US-Saudi deal is that the White House is doing all it can to make sure the Bahrain drama is buried by US media. BBC America news anchor Katty Kay at least had the decency to stress, "they would like that one [Bahrain] to go away because there's no real upside for them in supporting the rebellion by the Shi'ites."

For his part the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, showed up on al-Jazeera and said that action was needed because the Libyan people were attacked by Gaddafi. The otherwise excellent al-Jazeera journalists could have politely asked the emir whether he would send his Mirages to protect the people of Palestine from Israel, or his neighbors in Bahrain from Saudi Arabia.

The al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain is essentially a bunch of Sunni settlers who took over 230 years ago. For a great deal of the 20th century they were obliging slaves of the British empire. Modern Bahrain does not live under the specter of a push from Iran; that's an al-Khalifa (and House of Saud) myth.

Bahrainis, historically, have always rejected being part of a sort of Shi'ite nation led by Iran. The protests come a long way, and are part of a true national movement - way beyond sectarianism. No wonder the slogan in the iconic Pearl roundabout - smashed by the fearful al-Khalifa police state - was "neither Sunni nor Shi'ite; Bahraini".

What the protesters wanted was essentially a constitutional monarchy; a legitimate parliament; free and fair elections; and no more corruption. What they got instead was "bullet-friendly Bahrain" replacing "business-friendly Bahrain", and an invasion sponsored by the House of Saud.

And the repression goes on - invisible to US corporate media. Tweeters scream that everybody and his neighbor are being arrested. According to Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, over 400 people are either missing or in custody, some of them "arrested at checkpoints controlled by thugs brought in from other Arab and Asian countries - they wear black masks in the streets." Even blogger Mahmood Al Yousif was arrested at 3 am, leading to fears that the same will happen to any Bahraini who has blogged, tweeted, or posted Facebook messages in favor of reform.

Globocop is on a roll

Odyssey Dawn is now over. Enter Unified Protector - led by Canadian Charles Bouchard. Translation: the Pentagon (as in Africom) transfers the "kinetic military action " to itself (as in NATO, which is nothing but the Pentagon ruling over Europe). Africom and NATO are now one.

The NATO show will include air and cruise missile strikes; a naval blockade of Libyia; and shady, unspecified ground operations to help the "rebels". Hardcore helicopter gunship raids a la AfPak - with attached "collateral damage" - should be expected.

A curious development is already visible. NATO is deliberately allowing Gaddafi forces to advance along the Mediterranean coast and repel the "rebels". There have been no surgical air strikes for quite a while.

The objective is possibly to extract political and economic concessions from the defector and Libyan exile-infested Interim National Council (INC) - a dodgy cast of characters including former Justice minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil, US-educated former secretary of planning Mahmoud Jibril, and former Virginia resident, new "military commander" and CIA asset Khalifa Hifter. The laudable, indigenous February 17 Youth movement - which was in the forefront of the Benghazi uprising - has been completely sidelined.

This is NATO's first African war, as Afghanistan is NATO's first Central/South Asian war. Now firmly configured as the UN's weaponized arm, Globocop NATO is on a roll implementing its "strategic concept" approved at the Lisbon summit last November (see Welcome to NATOstan, Asia Times Online, November 20, 2010).

Gaddafi's Libya must be taken out so the Mediterranean - the mare nostrum of ancient Rome - becomes a NATO lake. Libya is the only nation in northern Africa not subordinated to Africom or Centcom or any one of the myriad NATO "partnerships". The other non-NATO-related African nations are Eritrea, Sawahiri Arab Democratic Republic, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Moreover, two members of NATO's "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" - Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - are now fighting alongside Africom/NATO for the fist time. Translation: NATO and Persian Gulf partners are fighting a war in Africa. Europe? That's too provincial. Globocop is the way to go.

According to the Obama administration's own official doublespeak, dictators who are eligible for "US outreach" - such as in Bahrain and Yemen - may relax, and get away with virtually anything. As for those eligible for "regime alteration", from Africa to the Middle East and Asia, watch out. Globocop NATO is coming to get you. With or without dirty deals.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

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