Showing posts with label Israel/Palestine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel/Palestine. Show all posts

February 4, 2013

Al-Qaeda Rises, Falls According To U.S. Politics

Last Sunday, The Washington Post published a not-so-fascinating map of al-Qaeda's diversification and decentralization from its previous headquarters in Pakistan and Afghanistan (although Osama bin Laden began jihad in response to U.S. troops on Saudi territory and Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands). The simplistic map is mis-weighted by an inaccurate assessment of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose prospects in Yemen remain on an upward "trend" despite losing territory. The insurgency is, at the least, treading sideways rather than permanently falling, and swapping AQAP would give three "green arrows" to al-Qaeda's core.

In any event, measuring the protracted nature of insurgency and terrorism in dualistic terms of "up" and "down" is the realm of mainstream media.

The Washington Post offers few pieces of information that would catch the attention of international observers, but one startling figure is the high estimate of al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2,500. The largest operational count on the map (if roughly accurate) not only occurs within a country that al-Qaeda entered after American soldiers - al-Qaeda has maintained a presence in a war that was supposed to be over. Today the network allegedly struck again when a suicide bomber infiltrated the Sahwa - "Sons of Iraq" - headquarters in Taji, presumably as retaliation for the so-called Sunni Awakening. An estimated 340 civilians were killed and many hundreds wounded in January alone and, with Baghdad paralyzed by a power struggle between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sunni opposition, Iraq's violence stands to persist and possibly intensify.

While al-Qaeda's ideology may be on set on a long-term "path to defeat," as the Obama administration and U.S. mainstream media continue to assert, an entire war has been declared over when it is far from it. This broken "promise" became the third leg of President Barack Obama's re-election campaign, illustrating how al-Qaeda's estimated strength varies in relation to the administration's political needs at a given time. Taking Syria into account adds a new dimension to this dilemma. Now the same war that is supposedly "over" is fueling a new war across the border and new fears in Washington, where concerns of al-Noura's influence have overshadowed other aspects of Syria's revolution.

The administration clearly wants these situations to cut both ways - Syria is new news, Iraq is old news. Highlighting accomplishments and concealing failures is standard practice.

Add al-Qaeda's operations Iraq and Syria to AQAP and, to a lesser extent AQIM's activities in North Africa, and al-Qaeda's momentum doesn't feel as weak as the Obama administration claims. This isn't to lobby in favor of escalation, but to advise against an endless campaign of militarizing Muslim states and the undermining of their peoples. In order to truly counter al-Qaeda's ideology over the long-term, U.S. foreign policy must invest in the political energy needed to compliment military operations and establish genuine relations with local populations.

Such a multidimensional policy remains sorely missing in Yemen, Iraq, Mali and Pakistan.

December 13, 2012

The Void Between Israeli Settlements and Obama's "Bravery"

In the days following Israel's latest settlement announcement at East Jerusalem's controversial E-1 plan, more than a few media sources on the liberal side of America's Jewish base unleashed a cautiously firm critique of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's decision-making process. Among them: The Atlantic, New York Times and Economist. Besides the shared frustration with Israel's hawkish premier, their editorials were bound by another common thread of advice on the U.S. front. All would express the need for President Barack Obama to speak louder against Netanyahu and do more to resurrect a peace process that too many have declared dead.

"A braver Mr Obama would this time tell Israel some home truths," The Economist concluded.

Given that Obama's administration has reacted with deceptively tepid concern from lower officials - not a personal and public response - is the President himself acting on strategy or cowardliness? An administration that pulled in an estimated 75% of Jewish-American voters in two elections naturally defends its policy as active and balanced, punching back against all contrary observations, and surface ripples are liable to create this impression. Several administration officials expressed the White House's concern in public, augmenting the scripted answers fed to a hungry press corp.

"I can just tell you," spokesman Jay Carney told inquiring reporters, "that I don't have any specific information about those communications between the Israeli government and this administration. I don't think we could be clearer about our position that we oppose unilateral actions that make the return to bilateral negotiations harder. We oppose Israeli settlement activity and the construction in East Jerusalem. And we're obviously communicating that."

Except the obviousness of what Washington is communicating, and who is doing the communicating, remains blurred. According to Palestinian sources, Jordanian King Abdullah II "conveyed U.S. assurances" to de facto President Mahmoud Abbas that the Obama administration would block the E1 settlement plans from moving forward. This pressure, if real, still comes with a cost - "not starting the Palestinian efforts to join UN agencies" - that has been inserted under Washington's opposition to unilateral actions. The eventual pressure may skimp on the Israeli side as the Obama administration attempts to block Palestinian advances in the United Nations.

The administration has also constructed a second defense that avoids an appeal to morality, and instead focuses on strategy to highlight Obama's policy in the region. According to The Daily Beast's Peter Beinart, a noted White House insider, the administration is testing out a new plan to isolate Netanyahu and thus alter his behavior towards the Palestinians. This plan isn't as "clear" as Carney's description, since the bulk of it has been leaked by anonymous officials nearly two weeks after Israel's announcement.

"And even though the Israelis alerted the White House mere hours before they announced the decision," Beinart reports, "the Obama administration’s response was pro forma and bland. Publicly, Obama himself said nothing. It was the first sign of what senior administration officials predict may be a new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Obama’s second term: benign neglect."

In this scenario, the administration hopes that international isolation will force Netanyahu to "shift course and embrace the kind of Palestinian state supported by his predecessor." This policy would theoretically contract European allies to do Washington's dirty work and cut down the individual friction with Netanyahu. Furthermore, Beinart claims that the administration will not appoint a "big name" envoy or initiate another formal round of peace negotiations, believing that Netanyahu would attempt to stall the talks and prevent isolation. Beinart, for good reason, expresses skepticism towards this plan. Fundamentally, the entire process hinges on the assumption that Netanyahu will respond to international pressure, when his past behavior forecasts a stubborn defiance.

He may, as Beinart predicts, simply politicize the issue ahead of an election that his right-wing alliance is currently favored to win.

Obama's passivity stands a higher chance of backfiring than altering the conflict's status quo. Expecting any significant change in Netanyahu's negotiating position or regional perspective, whether pressured by the world or not, is unrealistic. The administration's decision to sit back from a peace initiative also runs contrary to its repeated calls for "direct negotiations," which the White House intends to mediate. This policy will reinforce the status quo by allowing Netanyahu to continue acting as he sees fit, and by allowing the conflict to drift further into a vicious cycle of hostilities without any corresponding movement in negotiations.

Although Netanyahu may relish the opportunity to challenge Obama personally, earnestly standing up to him could disrupt a status quo that shows no current sign of breaking. Failure to confront has reinforced a personal weakness and lack of urgency on Obama's part, giving Netanyahu the continual impression that he can act without real consequence from Washington. The notion of "isolation" is similarly flawed; in the heat of battle, when everything counts most, Obama stood beside Netanyahu as he bombarded Gaza and took a "principled stand" against the Palestinians' observer status in the UN.

The administration is now covering its tracks with media mirages, but cowardliness attributed to politicking and self-interests won't revive the peace process of an entrenched long war.

December 4, 2012

Israeli Settlements Become Prop In U.S. Propaganda

Israel's response to the Palestinians' successful observer bid in the United Nations was equally swift and predictable. Less than 48 hours removed from the 138-9-41 vote, members of the Israeli government announced that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had approved the “preliminary zoning and planning preparations" for 3,000 new settlements units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. One section intends to fill the space between the West Bank settlement of Ma'ale Adumim and East Jerusalem, located some five miles east of the city, as part of the highly controversial E1 development project. Israeli officials stress that the plans remain in their "preliminary" stages.

"No one will build until it is clear what will be done there," Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Attias attempted to clarify on Sunday.

However his government's message is crystal clear. In addition to the E1 announcement, 1,600 units were also penciled into the Ramat Shlomo settlement, which gained prominence in March 2010 at the expense of visiting U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. The following year, 1,000 units were announced prior to an April 2011 meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli President Shimon Peres. Apparently Israel's Interior Ministry doesn't put a premium on creativity, since it announced 1,600 units in Ramat Shlomo during the run-up to last year's UN confrontation with the Palestinians. This settlement, in addition to E1, is being utilized as provocative soft-power against the Palestinians and Washington alike - a threat capable of morphing into tangible damage to a two-state solution.

"The answer to the attack on the Zionist character of the state of Israel obliges us to increase the tempo of settlement building plans in all the areas that the government has decided to settle in," Netanyahu said before the start of his weekly Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem.

How Israel benefits from these decisions remains speculative, given that Israeli officials and citizens expressed regret over the announcement's nature. Current and former officials, along with Israel's various allies, have unveiled a calculated response that weighs Israel's right to build against the provocative selection of territory. They generally believe that Netanyahu erred in defying Washington so soon after the Obama administration stood on the losing side of an overwhelming victory in the UN, as well as the losing side of Gaza's 8-day battle. And they fear that a two-state solution is drifting further into history with each passing day.

Even pro-settlement actors have been forced to disapprove of Netanyahu's timing and its implications.

"We don’t like the idea of developing our communities as a sort of retaliatory or punitive step,” said Dani Dayan, the leader of Israel’s settler movement and a supporter of E1.

Except Israel's government will get what it wants in the end - sticking its finger in the UN's chest - and suffer negligible punishment from Western capitals. The EU ministers that rushed to condemn settlement announcements in East Jerusalem still hope to "persuade" Israel back to the negotiating table with the Palestinians. Nor is President Barack Obama and his administration willing to openly break ranks with Netanyahu's hardline government, whatever the cost to America's image. The White House and State Department defended America's "no" vote as a "principled stand" when reporters inquired into the motivation behind resisting the international community at large.

AP journalist Matt Lee was forced to respond, "Doesn’t this ever give anybody any pause that you might be – that your principled stance doesn’t – isn’t seen as a principled stance by the rest of the world, but seen as – it’s seen as an obstacle? Doesn’t anyone ever – why does the United States think that it has the moral high ground and the rest of the world doesn’t on this when the rest of the world disagrees with you?"

As for Washington, settlement announcements prove too useful to a government in need of appearing objective. The output of criticism from the White House and State department has certainly piled up since the weekend announcement, having nowhere else to go after the UN debacle; ironically, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters on Friday that the administration opposes "any action that undercuts the way Israel is seen by the world." Unfortunately a hollow tone continues to pervade U.S. rhetoric. Each statement is so formulaic that a sense of "going through the motions" becomes evident. Now the U.S. gets to oppose Israel's unilateral actions and market itself as "fair and balanced," a narrative that runs perpendicular to reality. The U.S. will still be standing behind Israel during "direct negotiations" with the Palestinians - whether on the table or battlefield.

"We reiterate our longstanding opposition to settlements and east Jerusalem construction and announcements," said Tommy Vietor, spokesman for Obama's National Security Council. "We believe these actions are counterproductive and make it harder to resume direct negotiations or achieve a two-state solution. Direct negotiations remain our goal and we encourage all parties to take steps to make that easier to achieve."

"We have made clear to the Israeli Government that such action is contrary to U.S. policy," added a special statement from the State Department, which quickly flooded the international media with false headlines of "shock" and "condemnation." "The United States and the international community expect all parties to play a constructive role in efforts to achieve peace. We urge the parties to cease unilateral actions and take concrete steps to return to direct negotiations so all the issues can be discussed and the goal of two states living side by side in peace and security can be realized."

This situation is too coincidental to be coincidental. 

At least Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz will allude to this much: "I want to tell you that those same Europeans and Americans who are now telling us 'naughty, naughty' over our response, understand full-well that we have to respond, and they themselves warned the Palestinian Authority."

November 29, 2012

Palestinians Secure UN Observer Status, New Battles Await

Today the Palestinians took a step towards self-determination after a popular landslide in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of their observer status.

The vote culminates a multi-year plan by de facto Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose term officially ended in January 2009, and his dangerous dance with Israel and Western powers. These forces had hoped to use Abbas as their own pawn during final-status negotiations, a plan that contributed to Abbas's image as an U.S.-Israeli puppet, but they appear to have underestimated his pliability and survivalism. Abbas will now face a higher level of Western pressure to reengage the Israelis on their terms, before his UN mission and future elections potentially decreases the control over Palestinian leadership.

"Regardless of what happens in New York today," the State Department's Victoria Nuland told a group of incredulous reporters shortly before the vote, "the United States is going to continue to try to bring these parties back to the table. Obviously we’re going to. The President is committed to that, and I think the only question is what kind of environment we’re working in."

Obviously - because President Barack Obama has been so supportive of the Palestinians and generally engaging towards a frozen peace process.

There is no questioning the type of environment that Washington envisions. The Obama administration's new diplomatic push will almost certainly be directed behind Israeli and Western interests, rather than an equitable two-state solution. Accordingly, the administration attempted (futilely) to counteract these immovable perceptions by deploying UN Ambassador Susan Rice with a serious piece of doublespeak:
For decades, the United States has worked to help achieve a comprehensive end to the long and tragic Arab-Israeli conflict. We have always been clear that only through direct negotiations between the parties can the Palestinians and Israelis achieve the peace that both deserve: two states for two peoples, with a sovereign, viable and independent Palestine living side by side in peace and security with a Jewish and democratic Israel.

That remains our goal, and we therefore measure any proposed action against that clear yardstick: will it bring the parties closer to peace or push them further apart? Will it help Israelis and Palestinians return to negotiations or hinder their efforts to reach a mutually acceptable agreement? Today’s unfortunate and counterproductive resolution places further obstacles in the path to peace. That is why the United States voted against it.
The rest of her speech continues to advance this argument: only the Israelis and Palestinians can solve their problems, therefore no one should get in the middle. Except if Rice meant what she said, Washington wouldn't dictate terms to the Palestinians at the behest of Israel - deciding Jerusalem's fate or a demilitarized Palestine, for example. Rice's twisted logic is designed to whitewash America's own dirty hands in the process, and to spin the source of obstruction from the Israelis back into the Palestinians. Israel's blockade of Gaza and disproportionate warfare is counterproductive to peace. So too is the U.S. bias in Israel's favor, whether inside or outside the Palestinian conflict. The Obama administration isn't protecting regional or world peace, only the private interests of Wasington and allies, and the Palestinians must guard against Western diplomatic retaliation.

Today's vote is widely viewed as a vote for or against oppression and occupation. The Obama administration possesses no rhetoric capable of burying this reality, but it will try in the coming months.

November 24, 2012

John Mearsheimer: "A Pillar Built on Sand"

This analysis by John Mearsheimer, co-author of The Israeli Lobby, immediately captured the futility of Israel's 4GW beyond anything The Trench witnessed during Gaza's latest battle:
In response to a recent upsurge in tit for tat strikes between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, Israel decided to ratchet up the violence even further by assassinating Hamas’s military chief, Ahmad Jabari. Hamas, which had been playing a minor role in these exchanges and even appears to have been interested in working out a long-term ceasefire, predictably responded by launching hundreds of rockets into Israel, a few even landing near Tel Aviv. Not surprisingly, the Israelis have threatened a wider conflict, to include a possible invasion of Gaza to topple Hamas and eliminate the rocket threat.
There is some chance that Operation ‘Pillar of Defence’, as the Israelis are calling their current campaign, might become a full-scale war. But even if it does, it will not put an end to Israel’s troubles in Gaza. After all, Israel launched a devastating war against Hamas in the winter of 2008-9 – Operation Cast Lead – and Hamas is still in power and still firing rockets at Israel. In the summer of 2006 Israel went to war against Hizbullah in order to eliminate its missiles and weaken its political position in Lebanon. That offensive failed as well: Hizbullah has far more missiles today than it had in 2006 and its influence in Lebanon is arguably greater than it was in 2006. Pillar of Defence is likely to share a similar fate.
Israel can use force against Hamas in three distinct ways. First, it can try to cripple the organisation by assassinating its leaders, as it did when it killed Jabari two days ago. Decapitation will not work, however, because there is no shortage of subordinates to replace the dead leaders, and sometimes the new ones are more capable and dangerous than their predecessors. The Israelis found this out in Lebanon in 1992 when they assassinated Hizbullah’s leader, Abbas Musawi, only to find that his replacement, Hassan Nasrallah, was an even more formidable adversary.
Second, the Israelis can invade Gaza and take it over. The IDF could do this fairly easily, topple Hamas and put an end to the rocket fire from Gaza. But they would then have to occupy Gaza for years to come, since if they left Hamas would come back to power, the rocket attacks would resume, and Israel would be back where it started.
An occupation of Gaza would trigger bitter and bloody resistance, as the Israelis learned in southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. After 18 years of occupation they conceded defeat and withdrew all their forces. This experience is the reason the IDF did not try to invade and conquer southern Lebanon in 2006 or Gaza in 2008-9. Nothing has changed since then to make a full-scale invasion of Gaza a viable alternative today.
Occupying Gaza would also place another 1.5 million Palestinians under formal Israel control, thereby worsening the so-called ‘demographic threat’. Ariel Sharon withdrew Israeli settlers from Gaza in 2005 to reduce the number of Palestinians living under the Israeli flag; going back now would be a huge strategic reversal.
The final, preferred option is aerial bombardment with aircraft, artillery, missiles, mortars and rockets. The problem, however, is that the strategy does not work as advertised. Israel used it against Hizbullah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008-9, but both groups are still in power and armed to the teeth with rockets and missiles. It is hard to believe that any serious defence analyst in Israel thinks another campaign of sustained bombardment against Gaza will topple Hamas and end the rocket fire permanently.
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November 21, 2012

Israel Remains Careless In Gaza's Fourth-Generation Warfare

Israel's fresh bombardment of Gaza and its political aftershocks have reinforced a maddening status quo: Hamas's armed resistance cannot reverse Israel's statehood, IDF operations cannot physically destroy Hamas's resistance, and involved foreign powers lack a concrete plan to advance an equitable two-state solution.

Hamas and those Palestinian leaders that fail to offer an alternative deserve their share of responsibility for bringing Gaza to boil. Fatah's inability to move a peaceful solution forward, albeit within a biased system of international mediation, has given Hamas ample room to grow and kept Israel's leadership focused on military action. However the blunt reality of asymmetric warfare does not place the burden of responsibility on non-state actors, but on the state actors theoretically beholden to international standards. Non-state actors attract popular support by offering modest improvements over a tyrannical, corrupt government. For this reason (and others, of course), Hamas's behavior is partially or fully accepted by Palestinians and Muslims who view Israel's behavior as incomparably monstrous.

Advanced states can make fourth-generation warfare (4GW) look flawless and futile at the same time.

4GW is named for its placement after 3GW, a phase that technologically evolved the tactical and strategic concepts developed in the 20th century. A major difference between 3GW and 4GW stems from the balance of power; while 3GW conflicts generally occur between states, 4GW develops between state and non-state actors. Firepower becomes less important in this type of warfare as the conflict blurs deeper into the local civilian population, placing a premium on the non-military factors - political, economic and social - that govern a territory. This strategy addresses the need to protect an area's natural and human resources instead of destroying them, along with the tasks of cooperating with international organizations and keeping battlefield blunders out of the international news cycle.

Although amplified by technology, 4GW is designed to confound superior militaries and their technological advantages. Accordingly, retired Marine Colonel Thomas X. Hammes advises America's leadership against believing that technology can overcome non-military sources of conflict and their political manifestations. Having monitored Washington's delusional expeditions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the "War on Terror," Hammes holds this error above all others in asymmetric warfare.

"We continue to focus on technological solutions at the tactical and operational levels without a serious discussion of the strategic imperatives of the nature of the war we are fighting," he writes in The Sling and The Stone, an authoritative study of 4GW.

Israeli leadership and the soldiers under their command are similarly geared towards urban warfare rather than the totality of 4GW. Israel's objectives remain military-oriented: eliminate a key Hamas strategist, destroy his long-range weapons, stop Gazan rockets from falling on southern Israel, and ultimately impose a ceasefire that demands the elimination of Egypt's smuggling tunnels into Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political objective is domestic in nature, or else aimed at the Palestinians' upcoming recognition bid at the United Nations. Settling the conflict's non-military grievances has been noticeably absent from Netanyahu's agenda throughout his four-year term.

Israel certainly enjoys an abundance of political power and media influence, strong-arming Western governments with ease by dangling a ground invasion beneath a massive air raid. Netanyahu has reportedly told President Barack Obama that he will only launch a ground operation if Hamas continues firing rockets into Israel. Naturally Gaza's bombardment becomes more palatable in the face of a bloodier alternative, a comparison that helps maintain the West's green light for as long as possible. Furthermore, Netanyahu is attempting to portray himself as a tough but wise statesman (think Iran) ahead of January 22nd's election.

"Before deciding on a ground invasion, the prime minister intends to exhaust the diplomatic move in order to see if a long-term ceasefire can be achieved," a senior Israeli official said after Monday night's cabinet meeting.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has now arrived in the region to broker a truce "in the days ahead," allowing Israel to continue bombing every last target and giving Hamas little incentive to comply. Except this Western reservoir of diplomatic power cannot fully overcome the power attributed to world opinion, and steamrolling over all objections to the disproportionate force being applied in Gaza generates more enemies - civilian and militant alike - than Israel can eliminate.

Israel's government has grown dangerously accustomed to winning Gaza's tactical battles and losing the conflict's wider political narrative. Its military and intelligence agencies, among the world's elite, skillfully locate arms caches, intercept rockets and track Hamas officials with a Skynet-like grid of technology. Over 1,350 air strikes were counted by Monday, a growing number of them launched from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Many of Hamas's Fajr-5 rockets, considered a "tie-breaker," were wiped out in the moments after Ahmed Jabari's assassination. The Israeli military just Tweeted that it "surgically targeted a Hamas intelligence operations centre" on the seventh floor of a media building.

Meanwhile Carmela Avner, Israel's chief information officer, boasts that Israel can fight a war on three technological fronts: "The first is physical, the second is on the world of social networks and the third is cyber."

All of these capabilities, as Hammes warns, gives Israel's leadership a false sense of control over Gaza's military and non-military battlefields. There will always be more rockets to intercept from the political status quo. New Hamas leaders will inevitably replace the fallen and Israel's own websites are being hacked by supporters of the Palestinians. Worse still, the false sense of security inspired by the Iron Dome emboldens Israel to strike with minimal consequence, producing more hostilities instead of reducing them. "Precision" air strikes, far from precise, contribute to the eventual stalemate imposed by the international community's frantic jockeying to savage credibility with their own populations.

Israel is a master of war - disproportionate warfare. Over 150 Palestinians have been killed (at least 50 of them civilians) and over 840 wounded, including 225 children, since Operation Pillar of Defense began on November 14th. Israelis have suffered five fatalities and an estimated 250 injuries from Gaza's rockets, underscoring the conflict's fundamentally disproportionate nature. The faces of dead Palestinian children will outweigh anything Israel has to say to the world at large, and the government is losing minds and hearts at an unsustainable pace. Contrary to resolving any sources of conflict, disproportionate force and the resulting spectacle functions as a main driver of 4GW.

Israel's government argues that Hamas's stockpile has essentially been reset, but the same breathing room failed to yield any progress towards a two-state solution following Gaza's last war. Netanyahu will emerge wrapped in victorious rhetoric, ignoring 4GW and dooming the cycle to repeat again.

And if his government doesn't care what the world thinks, why should the world treat Israel with special care?

November 19, 2012

Where Does Sudan Fit Into Gaza's Endgame?

On Saturday The New York Times reported one of the primary objectives of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip: Fajr-5 rockets capable of hitting Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. These rockets are allegedly shipped into Gaza via a complex smuggling chain, imported to Sudan in pieces and transported through Egypt before being assembled in Gaza by Hamas and Iranian arms experts. Each is then assigned a "special operator" to man his rocket on the "day of judgment" at the orders of Hamas's political leadership.

Problematically for Hamas, its "tie-breaker" broke minutes after an Israeli air strike terminated its senior military strategist, Ahmed Jabari.

The pinpoint destruction of Hamas's Iranian-manufactured Fajr-5 rockets, which range to 50 miles, appears to be the greatest tactical blow suffered thus far by the group (Hamas also lost its internal UAV plant). According to the Times, "most" of an estimated 100 rockets were destroyed in the first bombing waves; anonymous Israeli officials place their figure at a modest 20, leaving the probable number somewhere in between. The means of destruction, though, count more than its end. Largely a creation of Jabari, each piece of Hamas's stockpile had been monitored and tagged over several years by IDF intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi.

"The innocent-looking launching sites, covered by soil, were supposed to go into action when the time came,” Al-Monitor reports. "However, the IDF was ahead of them: Just a few minutes following the targeting and killing of Jabari, the second wave of air strikes was already underway and within a quarter of an hour, virtually the entire lineup of Fajr-5 rockets was eliminated."

The upshot is that Hamas need more rockets and will almost certainly find a way to smuggle them in, taking into account Israel's sophisticated intelligence network. This development advances the question of what role, if any, Sudan's government plans to play in Gaza's renewed fighting.

Khartoum's likeliest immediate answer won't extend beyond political rancor. Shortly after Jabari's assassination, Sudanese President Omar Bashir called Israel the “Zionist enemy” that “will remain the enemy" of Sudan and Muslims. Sudan's Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, followed up his boss's rhetoric by calling for the Arab League's heads of state to hold an emergency summit. Raising more eyebrows, Hamas's Khalid Meshal popped up at Khartoum's Armed Forces Mosque after Friday Prayers, vowing retaliation for the Israeli strike on Yarmouk Ammunition Factory.

"You killed Jabari and you can go on and kill Mashaal and others," the defiant chairman told his audience, "but in the end it'll pave our way to Jerusalem… Assassinating our leaders will only make us more powerful."

Meshal boasted that the Sudanese people will "hear good news soon," and the emptiness of his promise is easily taken for granted. Yet the situation's terms do appear to be evolving and Israeli security observers believe that last month's attack on Yarmouk brought Sudan directly into the conflict. This preemptive raid and its warning shot now marks Israel's latest operation in Gaza, and is fortunately enjoying a large share of retrospective observation as a result. While Israel has targeted Sudanese interests throughout the last decade with minimal consequences, the accumulation of grievances and interconnectivity of Israel's relations with the Arab world cannot be underestimated either.

This is not to say that, in the event of an Israeli ground invasion, Sudan will assume any direct combat or support role for Hamas. What should be expected is renewed effort to outsmart the Israelis, improve the defenses of Hamas's armories and stock them with more advanced weaponry. Neither Iran nor Sudan's government will be deterred by Israeli military action, which also serves domestic interests, and Hamas isn't built to quit armed resistance. Rocket fire has yet to abate in the face of over 1,000 airstrikes. Both sides, in the end, are playing into each other's hands and maintaining a regional stalemate.

Gaza's current battle may burn out soon or rage for weeks, but one conclusion is already apparent: Hamas will re-up its weapons and replace Jalabi, leaving the region more hostile for all peoples. How the group refills its army is something to monitor until Gaza's next battle.

November 14, 2012

Reading The Omen Of Israel's Air Strike On Ahmed Jabari

The joint IDF-Shin Bet air strike that killed Ahmed Jabari, Hamas's senior military commander in Gaza, appears to present one of two scenarios: the decapitation strike heralds a finale to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's campaign against Gaza's elusive rocket-launchers, or the beginning of a new war that could exceed the last.


Current developments suggest that the first option remains an outside possibility. Having bagged a trophy for his voting public, Netanyahu may attempt to stay out of a longer, more costly intervention of the Gaza Strip and protect the gains he has secured. Or someone could manage to talk some sense into him, and convince him that a large-scale operation in or above Gaza is not the means to win votes in the UN General Assembly.

However Hamas and Gaza's militant offshoots have no choice except to deliver on their promised retaliation, a cycle that Israel is equally willing to perpetuate. Multiple "truces" have immediately broken down and both sides attribute responsibility to the other. This fire is likely to heat up before cooling down. On Monday the Islamic Jihad's Khaled al-Batsh explained his group's status: "The ball is in Israel's court. The resistance factions will observe Israel's behavior on the ground and will act accordingly."

Israeli Home Defense Minister Avi Dichter announced on Tuesday, "There is no precedent in history of destroying terror by air power alone. It hasn't happened and it won't happen. Thus it is necessary to reformat Gaza altogether."

The air strike on Jabari soon followed.

In the event of a large-scale conflict in Gaza, its fourth-generation waves will reach across oceans and could seriously threaten the region's stability. More political theater than war at this point, Netanyahu is visibly positioning his right-wing coalition with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for January 22d's election. He's also sending a twisted message to the UN General Assembly, as if to prove that Israel will do whatever it wants if it feels threatened. This message has been repeatedly delivered to and discarded by a sizable portion of the international community, which views Israel's disproportionate response as counterproductive to solving Gaza's dilemma. Its latest air strikes are on their way to killing more civilians than Palestinian rockets killed in the last 3 years.

The Israeli government is already floating the idea of withdrawing completely from the Oslo Accords if Mahmoud Abbas plays his hand for "advanced status" on November 29th.

And is there any coincidence to the fact that Ahmed Jabari was assassinated on the same day that President Barack Obama issued his first post-election address, remarks that focused on diplomacy with Iran? The attack on Gaza appears to be aimed equally at Hamas, Iran and Obama, who allowed 2008's invasion to pass in silence and appears unable to stop another. Obama could opt split the difference by opposing war in Gaza and the Palestinians's UN bid; Tehran, Damascus and Cairo's responses are less predictable. None of these options promise much for the people on the ground.

Many combustible factors are reacting to each other in the region, turning Gaza into a microcosm of its surroundings. Information and disinformation has spiked, and further advances in social media will infect the conflict. Only time will shakedown the possibilities into reality.

[Update - The U.S. State Department has just released the following statement voicing unequivocal support for Israel's actions:

STATEMENT BY MARK TONER, DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Gaza Rocket Attacks

We strongly condemn the barrage of rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel, and we regret the death and injury of innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians caused by the ensuing violence. There is no justification for the violence that Hamas and other terrorist organizations are employing against the people of Israel. We call on those responsible to stop these cowardly acts immediately. We support Israel’s right to defend itself, and we encourage Israel to continue to take every effort to avoid civilian casualties.


Hamas claims to have the best interests of the Palestinian people at heart, yet it continues to engage in violence that is counterproductive to the Palestinian cause. Attacking Israel on a near daily basis does nothing to help Palestinians in Gaza or to move the Palestinian people any closer to achieving self determination.

November 8, 2012

Clinton's Replacement Frontrunners: Kerry, Rice, Donilon

Three poor choices being floated for Hillary Clinton's replacement at the State Department.
WASHINGTON — Foreign policy wasn’t the issue that got President Barack Obama re-elected Tuesday, but with upheaval in the Middle East, a war to end in Afghanistan and strained relations with superpowers Russia and China, it’s sure to play an outsized role in shaping his legacy as he enters a hard-won second term.

One of Obama’s first and most crucial tasks will be naming a successor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who’s vowed to step down after this year. Still reeling from his administration’s botched handling of the deadly terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets in Libya, Obama is no doubt seeking a deft and versatile replacement to guard and advance U.S. interests in a volatile world, especially in the Middle East, where creeping fundamentalism undermines longstanding U.S. influence.

“This so-called Arab Spring has not run its course and, in the short to medium term, and I certainly mean to the end of this decade, I think it’s going to be very tumultuous,” said Richard Armitage, who served as deputy secretary of state under President George W. Bush. “You are going to have volatile, weak leadership governments that are Islamic leaning. That is not necessarily going to end up that way. But it’s going to occupy an increasing amount of our time.”

Among those rumored to be under consideration for the top diplomatic slot are Sen. John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice. Rice’s star has fallen somewhat since her role in spreading incorrect information – she says unwittingly – in the aftermath of the Libya attacks that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other American personnel on Sept. 11.

Clinton’s replacement will inherit headaches in virtually every corner of the world: the unresolved debt crisis in Europe, the rise of militant Islamist factions in transitional Arab states, a nuclear showdown with Iran, a moribund Palestinian-Israeli peace process, trade disputes with China, looming wars in Africa, disagreements with Russia over missile defense and Syria, and a backlash to the U.S. drug war in Latin America.

Click here for an overview of Donilon's compliance with Washington's status quo in the Middle East.

October 31, 2012

Team Romney/Netanyahu A Worst-Case Scenario

As Hurricane Sandy inflicts its damage along the American Northeast, another sobering set of "perfect storm" conditions is approaching the Middle East and threatening its inhabitants.

This storm is less certain to develop than relatively predictable weather patterns, but Mitt Romney has managed to stay within striking distance of an upset over President Barack Obama and is currently forcing a tie on pollsters. Romney's victory seems implausible despite his rise in the polls; putting aside Obama's own loss of Democratic support, the American public must undertake a leap of faith in order to approve Romney's entry to the Oval Office. However the Republican challenger is now running neck and neck with Obama, setting the stage for a tight finish and chaotic outcomes.

The effects of Romney's potential victory on U.S. foreign policy are difficult to fully ascertain. His emphasis on an "American Century" and defense spending suggests that Romney will pursue a more overt projection of American power than Obama. Or, given his similarities with Obama, U.S. foreign policy may change styles more than substance in crucial areas: Russia, India, China and the Pacific, North Africa and the Middle East. Their responses to Afghanistan's war, the Arab revolutions and Israeli-Palestinian conflict are left virtually identical after stripping away their personal rhetoric. Romney couldn't agree with Obama's assassination "matrix" fast enough during last Monday's foreign policy debate.

Of their many "differences," though, Obama and Romney's contingencies towards Iran ring truest and hold the potential to affect both hemispheres. Here Romney has struck hardest to distance himself from Obama's “dual track" of containment and diplomacy, which the GOP challenger concedes as necessary but also criticizes as a dead end. A win for Romney pushes the odds of war with Iran to their peak. He doesn't tolerate a sliver of daylight between Jerusalem and has consistently defended Israel's "red-line" on uranium enrichment - slandering Obama for throwing Israel "under the bus" in the process. Loaded with players of George Bush's administration, Romney's circle appears even more gung-ho to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities and has awaited this exact window (2012-2016) to open.

Obama's second term would delay, although not necessarily prevent, an open conflict with Iran. Romney is already playing chicken before his first.

War between America, Israel, Iran and all of their proxies represents a worst-case scenario for the Middle East. One party's unilateral actions can trigger this disastrous outcome, whereby Obama's administration is leveraged into Israel's defense, except two keys are more likely to turn the engine. Washington and Jerusalem are certain to close ranks before a preemptive strike; regardless of their private disagreements, a unilateral decision to bomb Iranian targets is theoretically impossible. That said, a war on this scale may be carried out less effectively by divided leadership, and Obama has  experienced his share of trouble with Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu throughout their terms.

The only trouble expected by a Romney-Netanyahu ticket is how to sell a massive war to their publics. These "old friends" can "almost speak in shorthand" when discussing Iran and other regional issues.

Unpopular with his own people, Western capitals, human rights groups and individuals of all nationalities, Benjamin Netanyahu continues to defy the political odds in his quest for permanent authority. 2011 saw the brief rise and fall of a protest movement for affordable housing. Earlier this year Israel's Kadima party quit his coalition, citing a range of disagreements from military conscription to West Bank settlements and negotiations with the Palestinians. Some commentators believe that Netanyahu's abuse of Obama has made no difference to Israelis, but Americans have generally tired of Netanyahu and so too have the Israelis sitting outside his orthodox voting base.

Now, after announcing an early election in January, Netanyahu has been pegged as the clear frontrunner against a weak field of contenders. The deal between his Likud Party and Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu seals a nightmare ticket for the Palestinians, whom Netanyahu and Lieberman hold responsible for the current breakdown in negotiations. Neither politician will expend any genuine effort to resolve the longstanding crisis - building up Israeli settlements in Jerusalem is a higher priority - for they will be too busy plotting war against Iran and politicking against their own people.

"We are facing great challenges and this is the time to unite forces for the sake of Israel," Netanyahu explained at a news conference. "Therefore Likud and Yisrael Beitenu will run together on the same ticket in the next elections. We are asking for a mandate from the public to lead Israel against security threats, above all preventing Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons and the struggle against terror."

The elusive dream of world peace would face a great challenge if Romney and Netanyahu manage to unite their forces.

October 22, 2012

Mainstream Media Hypes Foreign Policy Circus

A rudimentary display of U.S. foreign policy will take place tonight in Boca Raton, Florida between President Barack Obama and challenger Mitt Romney.

Interestingly, America's mainstream media has taken to hyping Monday's presidential debate with a common narrative: "How the Obama-Romney foreign policy debate could determine the election. With turmoil increasing in world hot spots, foreign policy and national security have become major presidential campaign issues. From China to Israel, Iran to Syria, stateless terrorists to struggling alliances, Mitt Romney and Barack Obama will have plenty to debate Monday night."

"If, at the start of the general election campaign, you told a seasoned political strategist in either party that the fate of the presidential race could well hinge on the foreign-policy-focused third debate, the reaction would have ranged from an eye roll to laughter," writes The Washington Post. "And yet, here we are. President Obama and former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney head to Boca Raton, Fla., for their final debate Monday night with national polls suggesting that the race is tied and with the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, dominating the headlines."

Where to start with this manufactured slant? Does one dead ambassador equal the difference between relevant and unimportant foreign policy in America?

There's no denying factual sections of the media's deceptive hyperbole. In terms of foreign policy, American voters are looking for a "tough" but "responsible" president to confront terrorist threats and international powers. They want someone that won't start a reckless war with Iran but will respond to terrorist pinpricks and plots that never fully develop. Essentially, Americans want their country to maintain global supremacy at an efficient cost. Most now seek limited military engagement abroad on the road to fiscal responsibility at home, a perfect combination for the rise of drone warfare and unconventional Special operations. However these matters address America's national security before its raw foreign policy.

Obama himself told reporters over the weekend, "Spoiler alert: we got Bin Laden." This talking point will make for an extra long debate.

National security understandably becomes more relevant when some visceral incident has just occurred. However foreign policy remains a low set of priorities - the mainstream agenda clearly believes that it needs to exaggerate Monday night's significance. Foreign policy areas themselves will be debated at the shallowest levels. Not even Libya's revolution, from the beginning to NATO's invasion to the country's future, will receive a thorough examination. Neither will seriously engage U.S. policy in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain or other coverups that support U.S. interests over popular movements. Syria is more likely to descend into a brawl over semantics than hard policy.

Worst still, Romney has encouraged his base's anti-Americanism by blaming the Middle East's turmoil on Obama's "abdication of leadership." Obama has failed to uphold his own promise to engage the Arab world, instead consenting to a vast counterrevolution in the region, but Romney dangerously preaches the return to an "American Century."

Larger issues like China may not be movable by one or the other; Russia should cause equal trouble for both.

Each candidate brings a different set of problems to the same table, potentially resulting in similar outcomes. While Obama and Romney diverge widest on the possibility of war against Tehran, both of their regional agendas operate on a steep Iranian tilt. Both will try their hardest to convince the audience that they support Israel more than the other, and ultimately leave the Palestinians in the dust on their way to promising a hollow two-state solution. Their policies are nearly identical in Afghanistan - both want the majority of U.S. troops out by 2014 so long as they can deploy a residual force afterward. Obama publicly claims that Afghanistan's war will end in 2014, and he may prepare a surprise for Monday night, but Iraq's ending says otherwise.

The moderator is unlikely to fact check Obama's wayward policy in Iraq, which the President says he's looking forward to debating. Dozens of bombings and shootings continue to plague the country each month, often as Obama declares the war over from 9,000 miles away. Many large-scale attacks have been claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group that didn't exist before U.S. troops arrived in 2003 and could have 5-10 years of life in it. The response to these security incidents and Iraq's general reconstruction has also been obstructed by the poor leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Obama administration's passivity towards Baghdad's political crisis has resulted in a gradual loss of influence with the divisive al-Maliki, who retained his position in 2010 with U.S. assistance. Obama's policy in Iraq qualifies as one of his worst, but he will spin it into one of his highlights.

The brightest light, of course, will shine upon Osama bin Laden's dead body. Here Obama will hit Romney hardest to score as many points as possible, bludgeoning him on a topic that Romney has no real control over. He will mention his drone achievements and few to none of his failures. Obama could speak of his kills in Yemen but will certainly not mention how unpopular he has become in Yemen. He will rout al-Qaeda on more than one occasion, "from Pakistan to Somalia" before "staying alert" in new hotspots. He may go near Mali if he's feeling bold, to highlight the international coalition being put together by U.S. allies, but avoiding al-Qaeda's other hideouts makes for smarter politics. Obama won't mention that al-Qaeda cells in Iraq crossed into Syria.

Romney will take these punches and throw back as many as he can design. Both will do whatever they can to distract voters from actual issues, instead emphasizing terrorism and the type of American "leadership" that translates into hegemony. U.S. media has already responded in a similar fashion by placing terrorism at the top of their scorecard. "Voters finally get to know Obama and Romney's foreign policies" - when Monday is far too late to make informed decisions. Unfortunately those seeking a deeper conversation on foreign policy will leave empty handed, and those comforted by the shallows will move onto the next channel when the debate is over.

Only a major screw up, not any real wisdom, moves the political needle on election day.

September 27, 2012

Vintage Obama Whitewash At The UN


Although remixed around the patriotic beat of Ambassador Chris Stevens, President Barack Obama's latest foreign policy address provides no reason to edit a review of his Democratic nomination speech. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Obama instead resorts to many of the fallacies and blatant lies that mark his overall foreign policy, especially his administration's duplicitous reaction to the Arab revolutions:
"It has been less than two years since a vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire to protest the oppressive corruption in his country, and sparked what became known as the Arab Spring.  And since then, the world has been captivated by the transformation that’s taken place, and the United States has supported the forces of change.

We were inspired by the Tunisian protests that toppled a dictator, because we recognized our own beliefs in the aspiration of men and women who took to the streets.

We insisted on change in Egypt, because our support for democracy ultimately put us on the side of the people.

We supported a transition of leadership in Yemen, because the interests of the people were no longer being served by a corrupt status quo.

We intervened in Libya alongside a broad coalition, and with the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, because we had the ability to stop the slaughter of innocents, and because we believed that the aspirations of the people were more powerful than a tyrant.

And as we meet here, we again declare that the regime of Bashar al-Assad must come to an end so that the suffering of the Syrian people can stop and a new dawn can begin."
The first claims involving Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen demonstrate, without need of further proof, that Obama entered the UN chamber with the intention of rewriting history rather than making it. Tunisia's events occurred so quickly that Washington never had a chance to fully react, but the administration hesitated from ditching a U.S.-Saudi ally in Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The administration was slightly more prepared when the first embers of revolution engulfed Egypt, resulting in an attempt to install the country's intelligence chief as Vice President. While the experiment predictably failed to prevent the collapse of Hosni Mubarak's regime, Washington's more viable contingency soon kicked in and supported the Egypt's Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) until its dissolution in June 2012. 

During this time the SCAF waged a systemic harassment campaign against Egypt's revolution in order to disrupt their political organization and slander their credibility.

As for U.S. policy in Yemen, Washington had few problems with Ali Abdullah Saleh before the revolution started to threaten spheres of power. Despite his fair-weather friendship, the Obama administration decided that Saleh's corrupt regime needed to be fed if he was to cooperate against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In fact a drones base was approved prior to January 2011 and accelerated after the revolution broke out across the country (a billion dollar aid package was put on hold). Had none of these revolutions occurred, the U.S. government would have stuck behind the exploitive and repressive governments that counted themselves as allies of America. Obama naturally presents an alternative version of this reality.

"Now, let me be clear: Just as we cannot solve every problem in the world, the United States has not and will not seek to dictate the outcome of democratic transitions abroad."

On February 21th, 2012, Washington and Riyadh watched the conclusion of their single-candidate referendum promote Saleh's compliant vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi. Obama recently "dropped by" Hadi's UN side-meeting with counterterrorism czar John Brennan to reinforce America's hegemony in Yemen.

The relationship between Libya and Syria forms the second half of U.S. policy - the half that explicitly desires total regime change. U.S. officials argue that these two warzones far exceed the response of those governments intwined with Western capitals, a truism that obstructs a debate over America's notion of "selective democracy." When paired with the governments that Washington has attempted to preserve, U.S. policy in Libya and Syria appears less concerned with freedom than hegemony. Russia's behavior in Syria is particularly influenced by Libya's events and the general belief that Washington is manipulating revolutionary outcomes in its favor.

"These are not simply American values or Western values - they are universal values," Obama tries to convince his audience. "And even as there will be huge challenges to come with a transition to democracy, I am convinced that ultimately government of the people, by the people, and for the people is more likely to bring about the stability, prosperity, and individual opportunity that serve as a basis for peace in our world."

By frequently invoking Stevens' death as he counters an inflammatory film and its aftershocks, Obama spins the ambassador into another instrument of U.S. propaganda. Couched within his message of unity and tolerance is an unflinching counterrevolutionary message. Obama claims that, "the events of the last two weeks also speak to the need for all of us to honestly address the tensions between the West and the Arab world that is moving towards democracy." This tension is a product of the status quo that Washington is still pushing on the Middle East. After promoting his own administration's counterrevolution and "diplomatically" targeting Iran's nuclear program, Obama ignores the island of Bahrain entirely and puts in a hallow word of support for the Palestinians (who were dropped in favor of Israel during his nomination speech).

"Among Israelis and Palestinians, the future must not belong to those who turn their backs on a prospect of peace. Let us leave behind those who thrive on conflict, those who reject the right of Israel to exist. The road is hard, but the destination is clear -- a secure, Jewish state of Israel and an independent, prosperous Palestine. (Applause.)  Understanding that such a peace must come through a just agreement between the parties, America will walk alongside all who are prepared to make that journey."

Obama has spent the majority of his term ignoring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and appeared to give up until his next potential term after George Mitchell resigned from his mediation role. Nor has he been dissuaded by Iraq's ongoing violence when declaring, "The war in Iraq is over. American troops have come home." Obama claims that "America and our allies will end our war in Afghanistan on schedule in 2014," seemingly ruling out the possibility of a long-term military presence. However the Taliban will continue fighting regardless of the presence of a residual force, meaning this war will also fail to end neatly in December 2014. Given that Obama is willing to lie about the end of war and Washington's involvement in democratic transitions, he's liable to distort the conditions in any area ofU.S. foreign policy.

"The United States of America will always stand up for these aspirations, for our own people and for people all across the world. That was our founding purpose. That is what our history shows. That is what Chris Stevens worked for throughout his life."

This isn't what recent history shows - only a history that is deep in the process of subjective revision.

September 17, 2012

Hezbollah's Nasrallah Sharpens Muslim Outrage

As government officials and international news organizations race to examine the plots of extremist splinters, reactions of involved governments and their relation to the U.S. Embassy protests, Washington finds itself confronting a parallel threat to the safety of its diplomatic assets. America's opponents have grown adept at capitalizing on anti-Muslim propaganda made by rightwing personalities, using the opportunity to challenge Washington's foreign policy and advance their own local interests. The friction generated by this dog-pile effect represents the holistic threat posed by inflammatory anti-Muslim films.

In Yemen, a large body of protesters rallied not to protest Nakoula Basseley Nakoula but Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, whose cooperation with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the new government has earned him widespread disapproval. They have every right and ample motivation to "take advantage of the situation." The Taliban slapped Nakoula's film onto their raid of Camp Bastion even though the assault was planned weeks (or longer) ahead of time, and intend to milk its propaganda for as long as possible. Now another bad nightmare has manifested in reality and jumped on the pile. Speaking to an estimated 500,000 Shia Lebanese on Monday, Hebzollah chief Hassan Nasrallah urged protesters to organize peaceful and sustained demonstrations against the film, the U.S. and Israel.

"The world should know that our anger is not a passing thing... This is the start of a serious campaign that must continue all over the Muslim world in defense of the prophet of God. As long as there's blood in us, we will not remain silent over insults against our prophet."

A credible voice in at least parts of the Arab world, including many anti-Western havens, Nasrallah's words could force the Obama administration into some form of direct response. Hezbollah's face and brains has conclusively lost Muslim support over the last five years, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, and risks a significant amount of popularity by standing behind Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Nasrallah would boldly call for more urgent action from the Arab League, a demand that provokes more ridicule than agreement. At the same time, Hezbollah is still viewed favorably in comparison to other Islamic militant groups and considered a legitimate resistance movement by millions of Arabs. While the group is suffering from a general trend against extremism, active social work and military restraint has kept the group from drifting into al-Qaeda territory.

Anti-Israeli opinion also remains a useful supplier of popularity.

Nasrallah's strategic mindset and flare for the dramatic further demonstrate why his charisma draws supporters from outside Shia Lebanon. Appearing in public for the first time since December 2011, an animated Nasrallah spent the majority of his 15 minutes painting lavish religious overtones and history lessons. He believes that the film is “more serious than burning Al-Aqsa Mosque," which was set aflame by Denis Michael Rohan in 1969 with the intention of spawning the return of Jesus Christ. Yet Nasrallah wisely appeals to peace rather than war, stressing peaceful rallies and unity with other religions in an apparent attempt to modernize Hezbollah's image.

“We should bear the historical responsibility of the whole Islamic Ummah (Nation) and of every honorable Christian believing in coexistence to work to issue an international resolution criminalizing the defamation of heavenly religions, and the prophets at least, especially Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammad.“

In conjunction with his religious call to action, Nasrallah also sees an opportunity to lead the political counterattack against the U.S., Israeli and Arab governments - an offensive that has no central command. Holding Washington responsible for the film's availability, Nastallah called on the Obama administration to intervene and censor the film's release online. This unrealistic but seemingly reasonable demand casts Washington and allied Arab governments as accomplices to the film, “which offers another witness to its hypocrisy, deception and double standards in dealing with issues.”

"The ones who should be held accountable and boycotted are those who support and protect the producers, namely the U.S. administration," Nasrallah said. "We should not only express our anger at an American embassy here or there. We should tell our rulers in the Arab and Muslim world that it is 'your responsibility in the first place' and since you officially represent the governments and states of the Muslim world you should impose on the United States, Europe and the whole world that our prophet, our Quran and our holy places and honor of our Prophet be respected."

In effect, Nasrallah has designed an interdependent politico-religious narrative that, at times, neutralizes the religious in favor of the political. He would get nowhere by portraying the battle as Muslims versus Christians - especially in his own country - and instead posits another conflict between America, Israel and the Arab world. Announcing that, "Muslims released their anger on the U.S. and Israel, and not on Christians," highlights this shift from his perspective. He also dares to transfer blame onto Israel as a means of diffusing tensions with Christians: "Those who made the movie knew that the Muslims would be enraged by it, and attributed it to Christians to cause strife between Muslims and Christians. Israel wants to watch Muslims killing Christians and burning their Churches.”

Protests could wane over time as they tend to do; if not, Nasrallah might only play a limited role in mobilizing sustained demonstrations. Yet the Obama administration cannot afford to ignore the principle of his warning or underestimate his regional influence. Although Hezbollah's strongman will be unable to escape the title of propagandist and extremist, his speech currently represents the highest level of articulation from America's asymmetric opponents in the Middle East.

September 15, 2012

Obama's Hope Is the Middle East's Lesser Evil

In the days following President Barack Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention, administration officials and U.S. media seesawed over a post-convention "bump" that reportedly elevated his values above Republican challenger Mitt Romney. Numerous polls, including a recent Fox News survey, have marked down a widening gap across the board: education (+14), Medicare (+11), terrorism (+8 points) and foreign policy, where Obama rated 15 points higher than Romney. Many Americans and the Middle East's populaces do share something in common after all.

They are stuck with the Obama administration's foreign policy by default.

Judging from the overall actions of his first term, Obama himself received no bump in the Middle East after delivering a one-sided and misleading acceptance speech in Charlotte, North Carolina. Four years removed from promising a new era of engagement between the U.S. government and Muslim world, both sides refuse to stray far from the negative perceptions that have accumulated over decades of war, intervention, exploitation and continual strife. Obama isn't personally responsible for this status quo, only for over-promising and under-delivering in order to cast a favorable political glow upon himself. Stagecraft would trump statecraft as the U.S. economy came first and now U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf's sphere of influence is, as Romney warns, lacking "American leadership." Unfortunately his proposals are both vaguer than Obama's and more hostile to the region's stability, and his circle is staffed by pollsters that apparently aren't "going to let our campaign be dictated by fact checkers."

"The worst part of this election is there are so many valid grounds to criticize Obama," The Guardian's Glenn Greenwald Tweeted the day after Obama's speech, "and the Right voices almost none of them."

Washington's
Shades of War

Although Romney's policies in the Arab world are masked by ambiguity, scarecrows, red herrings and other distractions, his potential administration runs on traditional GOP diesel and factors into account a widespread anti-Muslim trend in the mainstream Republican party. Blaming Obama for "diminishing American leadership" is standard fare, and a valid point in the Middle East if not for his own hawkish and insensitive tendencies. Inside his October 2011 white paper, titled "American Century Strategy: secure America's enduring interests and values," Romney meets Obama at numerous points of mutual interest while exposing the toxicity brewing beneath his sweet rhetoric. His circle of GOP veterans believes that the "unfinished" project for an "American Century" is something to be completed, and the Arab revolutions something to be manipulated under the banner of democracy.

"To protect our enduring national interests and to promote our ideals, a Romney administration will pursue a strategy of supporting groups and governments across the Middle East to advance the values of representative government, economic opportunity, and human rights, and opposing any extension of Iranian or jihadist influence. The Romney administration will strive to ensure that the Arab Spring is not followed by an Arab winter."

In a "dangerous, destructive, chaotic" world, Romney plans to "lead the free world" as the "free world leads the entire world." This policy includes joining Israel's crusade against Iran's nuclear sites, a potential war that an estimated 60-70% of Americans disapprove of, as a means of projecting America's strength. Obama, on the other hand, has fashioned himself into an arbitrator of war and peace, wielding a Nobel in one fist and Osama bin Laden's head in the other. The race for bin Laden offered a trophy to the winning administration and Obama will personally reap the benefits as long as he lives. The glorified kill, along with the advance in drone warfare and strategic rise in U.S. Special Forces, also allows him to continue his foreign policy of "less force" with minimal domestic resistance.

Obama's case for non-military action against Iran, withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, and promising to "disrupt terror plots wherever they form" became more convincing after May 2nd, 2011. Well-meaning critics of America's newest version of war find difficulty in attacking a policy that costs less American lives and taxpayer dollars.

War Obama still brings, though, and leaves unfinished. The President has grown fond of bragging that he "ended the war in Iraq," and refuses to unspin Romney's own policy because ongoing Iraqi casualties make for dangerous political ground. Romney claims that "a democratic Iraq allied to the United States is within our reach," but Obama is "threatening to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory." After promising to use a "broad array of foreign policy tools - diplomatic, economic, military," Romney then zeroes on Obama's "failure" to install a residual military force and ignores the political void that the administration has encouraged by supporting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He fails to understand (at least in public) that Washington's problems in Iraq stem from political inequalities, not military shortages. Prolonging the deployment of U.S. troops would give the divisive al-Maliki more leverage over his opponents, not less, while an extension could generate as many security problems as it solves.

Obama, Romney and Tehran have all ended up in al-Maliki's leaky boat, a circumstance that neither candidate likes to talk about.

The incumbent and challenger find similar common ground in Afghanistan, where Romney seems to agree with the bulk of Obama's strategy despite their public feuding. He may keep a lower profile for this reason: Romney's white paper approves of the 2014 transition to Afghan security forces, demands greater accountability from Afghanistan and Pakistan's governments, and expects a residual force to be discussed in the future. The Obama administration also hopes to maintain a long-term security presence after 2014, contrary to his DNC announcement that "in 2014, our longest war will be over."

Nor does the absence of U.S. troops end an asymmetric war. Here the candidates share something else in common, because Romney opposes negotiating with the Taliban and plans to "rid" the group from Afghanistan - and extend the war in this unrealistic quest. He's also more likely to send ground troops across Pakistan's border in search of the elusive Haqqani network, another move that is liable to prolong the conflict.

At a wider strategic level, Romney would surely get the hang of drone warfare as fast as Obama.

A Pattern of Division and Unity

The greatest regional divergence between candidates centers around U.S. policy towards Israel and Iran, where Romney believes he can score fast points by portraying himself as the anti-Obama. For his part Obama has tread cautiously around Tehran at the direction of America's military leadership and public resistance to a "big" war in the Gulf, awaiting the final results of global isolation. Romney concedes the need for economic and diplomatic isolation before clarifying that a real threat of war offers the only possibility of defusing Iran's nuclear ambitions, a plan that includes "repairing relations with Israel." Unlike Obama, he would "never refuse a meeting" with Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu (a story that the White House denies), reject Israel's insistence on a "red-line" for stopping Iran's enrichment program, or throw Israel "under the bus."

Casting Obama as "pro-Palestinian" reinforces the twisted state of U.S. policy under either candidate. In reality he has abandoned the Palestinians to Israel's terms for a two-state solution - requesting a settlement pause distorted this policy in America and Israel alike - and spent far more energy confronting the Iranians. Upon taking office, Obama announced that he would break ranks from the Bush administration's 11th-hour drive for peace and pursue an equitable two-state solution "from day one." Sadly he has fallen into the same trap of bias and inaction, even excluding the Palestinians from his second acceptance speech, which harms Israelis in the process. If peace is harder to make than war, it stands to reason that greater energy must be applied.

Romney claims that Iran, not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, serves as the region's central issue, and Tehran's external policies do run on a variety of unrelated interests. Yet one cannot help observing that the Islamic Republic of Iran has never known a world with a sovereign Palestinian state.

Aside from this divide Romney finds a good amount of common ground in the region, and Washington's transition-oriented counterrevolution to the Arab revolutions is no exception. Obama's absence on the Palestinian sideline has done its own local damage, but this conflict falls into an established struggle between the modern world's haves and have-nots. Romney is right one on account: Obama has failed to deliver the leadership that he promised in the Middle East. However the GOP's new face would offer no respite from Obama's pseudo friendship with the Palestinians and other democratic actors. In Egypt, Romney has consistently and falsely accused the administration of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, finding no fault in supporting the authoritarian Supreme Council of Arms Forces (SCAF) or thwarting Egypt's popular revolutionary forces.

Obama recently countered this charge by urging the Brotherhood to maintain Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.

Elsewhere in Yemen, Obama has deployed his trusted counterterrorism adviser John Brennan as his lord of war and, on important occasions, as Washington's senior "diplomat" in the country. Both he and Ambassador Gerald Feierstein are extremely unpopular figures due to the administration's handling of an ongoing revolution, and Feierstein is currently being denounced at the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a. Romney would surely appreciate the same luxuries afforded by drones, Special Forces, CIA agents and a dominate geopolitical relationship with Saudi Arabia, and thus operate no differently in Yemen. Bahrain's policy would also experience a smooth transition between Obama and Romney's administrations, just not the Bahraini protesters who labor under state-sponsored oppression. Counterrevolutionary actions in select states have reinforced a hypocritical pall over U.S. foreign policy in the region, especially Libya's mission and Syria's intervention, but neither acknowledges this burden.

Instead, Romney accuses Obama of encouraging an "Islamic winter" while portraying himself as tougher on Iran and Islamists. He presumably sees nothing wrong with supporting authoritarian governments, opposing Islamic political groups or aiding an Israeli military operation in the name of America's "enduring interests," even if this policy damages them. Before becoming trapped in another battle over apologies, Obama enjoyed his time in Charlotte by ripping Romney for "taking us back to an era of blustering and blundering that cost America so dearly."

Marooned On Hope Island

Given his own statements and positions, Romney is clearly incapable of fostering lasting stability and peace in the Gulf region. Improving the trajectory of U.S. policy in the Middle East requires the type of personality that Obama promised and never delivered, making his disappointment historically significant. Poll after poll concludes that he fell into an enormous trust gap left by previous administrations. Too many Muslims still perceive America as a unilateralist actor in the region - whether cooperating with its allies or not  - and an outright threat to their national interests. 

Accordingly, Obama's popularity remains anchored near Bush's in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories and other areas entangled in U.S. foreign policy.

The dilemma of lesser evil may be an inherent problem of democracy, but rating America's presidential candidates cannot be jaded by the previous failures of George W. Bush's administration and past presidents. Finding a truly excellent candidate, rather than once again settling for the lesser of two negatives, is an ideal worth pursuing throughout history. As for the diverse peoples of the Middle East, nothing has changed since Obama entered the Oval Office: they must free themselves of foreign interference on the way to determining their future.