With "Friends" Like Yemen's, No Enemies Needed

In early January 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in Sana'a to manage the autocratic habits of a useful ally in the war against al-Qaeda.

Having warned other allies (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria) of a youth bulge prior to the Arab uprisings, the Secretary now found herself just above the surface of a volcano as she mingled with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. U.S. policy needed his approval to facilitate an expansion of military and counter-terrorism platforms in the country, but that need required less antagonistic leadership atop the government. For Clinton, this meant walking Saleh away from a parliamentary proposal that would eliminate term limits and allow him to run indefinitely, which he eventually agreed to in return for Washington's political and military assistance.

“We support an inclusive government,” Clinton replied when asked how the Obama administration could support Saleh's government and human rights at the same time. “We see that Yemen is going through a transition. And you’re right: it could one way or the other. It could go the right way or the wrong way.”

Yemen's revolution would spark weeks after Clinton shook hands with Saleh and departed the capital, never to return. Despite her professed support for a representative government, the Obama administration first treated Yemen's uprising as an obstruction to be neutralized, fearing a loss of influence with the next government. During this time al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) capitalized on Saleh's distraction in the cities to expand its ranks and territorial control in Yemen's southern governorates; Saleh's U.S.-trained counter-terrorism forces aided the process by fighting Yemen's revolutionaries and tribesmen rather than terrorists. However this chain of events ultimately created an opportunity for Washington and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia and European partners, to replace the duplicitous Saleh with his vice president and continue their policies unimpeded.

President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, "elected" through the UN's single-candidate referendum in February 2012, doubles as a leading proponent of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen.

This hegemonic policy was displayed again on Thursday when the Obama administration released a two-part press notice from the White House and State Department. Lying to the American people when talking Yemen, unfortunately, is simpler and easier than stealing candy from a baby. The American majority lives in ignorance of Yemen's troubles and their government's own interference in the country. Chronic fear of al-Qaeda and a high degree of hostility, reminiscent of American attitudes towards Pakistanis and Iraqis, contribute to this detachment, which in turn allows the Obama administration to interfere in Yemen's affairs without domestic cost.

Lack of political incentives to support the Yemeni people have endangered them in multiple ways: undermining their quest for representative government, damaging property and life without legal recourse, and ensuring that AQAP retains a presence in their country. Such a defeat in the war for "hearts and minds" is especially tragic when considering Yemenis' fondness for Americans themselves.

Current U.S. policy presents a view diametrically opposed to Yemen's streets, where the actions of Washington and its allies have obstructed a continuation of the revolution.

"Over the past 15 months,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns told the latest "Friends of Yemen" Ministerial, "Yemen – with the support of all of its friends – has made important progress in implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Yemenis elected a new leader for the first time in three decades, launched a major reform of their armed forces, regained control of large areas of their national territory held by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and today stand on the cusp of an historic National Dialogue."

Burns' statements are constructed on the boundary of inaccuracy. Yemenis selected Hadi out of necessity and coercion rather than free will, while Hadi himself was tasked to clean up a mess made by Saleh and the foreign policies that supported him. The so-called GCC initiative also excluded the same youth that the White House claims to support. Instead, the power-sharing agreement granted immunity for Saleh's human rights abuses (some committed with U.S. equipment), as well as preserving military influence with the new government. That U.S. interests in Yemen have improved since Saleh's resignation is unquestionable, even as U.S. policy remains unpopular with everyone outside the GCC initiative: the independent revolutionaries, northern-based Houthi sect and secessionist-minded Southern Movement.

Yemen's youth received the least seats of all parties - nearly four times less than Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) - in the heralded National Dialogue.

Further complicating the situation, the GCC's power-sharing agreement obstructs deeply-rooted political causes in the north and south, as their autonomous designs threaten the central government's authority and, by extension, involved foreign powers. In mid-February the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released a statement warning against interference in Yemen's affairs, only this statement targeted Saleh to the extent that it isolated a former Vice President and current Southern activist, Ali Salim Al-Beidh. The statement had minimal effect on Saleh, who copied the UNSC's message (minus himself) during a speech to commemorate Hadi's promotion, but it did spark Southern protests that led to clashes with the government and oppositional Islah party.

Hadi eventually met with Southern leaders to ease tensions and coax them into the National Dialogue, but the movement's leaders and followers remain leery of participating under UN-GCC terms. While a national dialogue is needed to advance Yemen's revolution, the present environment could degenerate into political warfare between the ruling GPC, Islah and Hirak.

To some credit U.S. non-military assistance has increased since the revolution launched in January 2011. Problematically, the long-term reality in Yemen indicates that these measures serve as camouflage for widespread geopolitical interference. U.S. aid has risen above $100 million to keep pace with a similar figure in the military column, and this information is used to promote a comprehensive policy. Since military and counterterrorism spending is especially obscured in Yemen, one of Washington's biggest "small wars," State Department officials and CIA Director John Brennan can now claim with greater safety that non-military spending exceeds military spending.

However U.S. policy remains decisively oriented towards influencing Yemen's political and military spheres - economic development and humanitarian support furthers this goal.

Yemen's revolution is effectively over in the eyes of UN, EU and GCC powers, and they have stopped at nothing to control its "transition." In their world 2014's elections will continue the reforms started by Hadi and Yemen will be gradually integrated into the GCC with Western assistance. Far from genuinely helping its people, U.S. policy in Yemen currently amounts to a joint neocolonialist takeover with neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government rivals Washington and Tehran in unpopularity. All have worked tirelessly to prevent a national revolution in Yemen, while at the same time claiming to advance it.

"The transition is about to enter a new, critical, phase," Burns told his audience in London. "While Yemenis courageously work to rebuild their country, extremists and their patrons are working hard to tear it down. The Co-Chairs called on all parties to commit to the principle of non-interference and the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen. This is an effort we endorse in the strongest terms."

Rampant foreign interference is no secret amongst Yemenis and concerned observers. Burns' own statements demonstrate the oxymoronic forces at work: supporting Yemen's unity and territorial integrity, for instance, directly contradicts the principles of sovereignty and independence. Washington, Riyadh and their allies are not looking to create a new future based on self-determination, but to recreate Yemen's old hegemonic model using new tactics and materials.

These "friends" will sell anything except the truth to Yemenis and Americans alike.

Hostages Become Easy Prey In Mali's Intervention

Tuesday's raid on an Algerian oil facility highlights the simplistic chaos of unconventional warfare. Known by many names - terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, rebellion, revolution - unconventional warfare encompasses all terms on the asymmetric side of warcraft, and has bedeviled countless sources of authority throughout human civilization. Even the predictable cannot be fully predicted and the unexpected happens enough to become expected.

Beyond the numerous strategic implications of the attack on Tigantourine, the raid is remarkable for two factors: the straightforward nature of the attack and its location. Despite the high alert of those European and African capitals contributing to Mali's intervention, none could anticipate where the Islamists eventually struck or how quickly they reacted to France's overflights through Algeria. Their "surprise" attack was also delivered exactly as promised. In early December Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former commander of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), announced the creation of his El Moulethemine katibat ("Brigade of the Veiled Ones"), a unit dedicated to kidnapping foreigners in the Sahel region. Afterward followed an introductory video for the "Signers in Blood," a purported suicide squad.

The Algerian government, international media, and Belmokhtar's own men have attributed the attack to his second creation rather than the first, but both are loosely aligned with AQIM's strategic view. While Belmokhtar has splintered away from the core to be his own boss, he is particularly eager to assist his former deputy in Mali and has been regularly spotted in Gao since the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) encamped in July 2012. Oumar Hamaha, a local Tuareg, doubles as a spokesman for Ansar Dine and a senior military official in MUJAO, and he would confirm Belmokhtar's cooperation with the two groups.

Accordingly, Hamaha was selected to inform The Associated Press of Belmokhtar's actions and the motivation behind them, namely Algeria's overflights and France's killing of Muslims. 

"We have a struck a blow to the heart (of the international community),"he declared ominously. "It's the United Nations that gave the green light to this intervention and all Western countries are now going to pay a price. We are now globalizing our conflict."

What is startling is the depth of Belmokhtar's raid, allegedly conducted by 20 men in three "heavily-armed" vehicles deep inside Algerian territory - a distance that exceeds the space between Mali's capital and the Islamists' northern bases. One immediately wonders how they traveled so far in open terrain, over multiple days, without being discovered by any government. It's certainly possible that the attackers traveled discreetly and acquired their vehicles near the strike point, or entered directly from Libya, but their range is equally impressive.

Hundreds of Algerians were initially taken hostage before being released or escaping. At least 41 people (including Americans, French, British, Irish, Norwegian and Japanese) are believed to have been captured, several more killed, and recent accounts of AQIM's kidnappers have described how quickly and quietly the Islamists move their bargaining chips. They will likely be taken into the cave network constructed along the southeast end of the Algerian-Malian border, where underground bases have been built dozens of miles apart. If the attackers can escape into Libyan territory, that is. 

Algerian forces have approached the complex where the hostages are being held (Westerns are reportedly being held in a separate wing) and reportedly fired shots in the area. Reached by telephone, one of the assailants was quoted as saying, "We will kill all the hostages if the Algerian army try to storm the area."

Even if the Algerian military cuts off their exits, NATO as a whole must factor the risk-reward of a major hostage situation into its plans as French troops mobilize for battle in Diablay, taken by the Islamists shortly after the French began landing en masse. They may need a week or two just to carefully dislodge the Islamists occupying the town - which, contrary to French claims of an offensive on the capital, appears to represent no more than a diversion tactic. Paris has repeatedly measured its ground campaign in weeks rather than months, but unless Special Forces and intelligence agencies can recover the new hostages, they will apply an immediate source of friction against NATO's campaign and further extend Mali's long war.

Another raid in Somalia recently failed to go as planned.

As for strategic planning in the international front, the pressing question is whether Algeria responds militarily on Mali's northern border or continues to take a passive-aggressive role in the conflict. Interior Minister Daho Ould Kabila told the official news agency APS, "The Algerian authorities will not respond to the demands of the terrorists and will not negotiate," suggesting that Belmokhtar has crossed a line that cannot be forgiven. The need for Algerian forces appeared inevitable from the start of Mali's insurgency, given that a hardened force must smash into the Islamists' mountain fortress and from multiple directions. Except Algeria's intelligence is also suspected of collaborating with elements of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in order to enhance the government's regional influence, whether that means interfering with Tuareg separatists or securing Western favors without strings.

A vocal Algiers backed Ansar Dine's superficial dialogue with international mediators over the last five months, now termed a "miscalculation" but a suspicious one at that.

For its part the Algerian government hasn't looked forward to any uncontrollable disturbance, either from France and NATO or the Islamists and Tuaregs. Algiers prefers manageable instability and seeks to avoid entanglement on Mali's ground. Abdallah Baali, the country's ambassador to Washington, warned NATO less than two months ago, "You cannot really fight a conventional war there. Your enemy will vanish in the desert before your eyes."

Obviously Algeria would not fight conventionally inside or outside its territory; assault helicopters and Special Forces would coordinate with local intelligence to beat the Islamists at their own games - mobility and disguise. However the 1,000 mile Algerian-Malian border gives perspective to the enormity of the task at hand inside Mali, and the introduction of Algeria's hegemonic agenda creates yet another dimension to a rapidly evolving conflict.

Islamist Alliance Fortifying Mali's Natural Defenses

Fresh alarms have sounded inside and outside Mali as the Islamist militias currently ruling the northern territory continue to advance south. Their latest move on Konna follows a general culmination of activities into the Inner Niger Delta, the natural barrier between Mali's southern and northern regions, and positions them on both sides of the river. As has been the case with most urban takeovers in Mali's fledgling conflict, each side has disseminated opposing narratives to maintain the upper hand in a fast-paced information war.

"We have chased the army out of the city of Konna, which we have occupied since 11 a.m.," declared Sanda Abou Mohamed, a spokesman for the Ansar Dine militant group, speaking by telephone from Timbuktu.

Several Mali spokesmen have refused to comment on Konna's status. Other officials denied losing control of the town, which sits at the edge of government-controlled territory along the Islamists' front-lines. A third account from Malian soldiers suggests that they staged a tactical retreat with minimal losses, and they probably won't return until Mali's army and foreign allies launch an organized offensive into the Timbuktu region.

"We have deployed technical means and reinforcements to secure the front,"one military official told Reuters by telephone, asking not to be named. "We think (the Islamists) want to attack Sevare.”

Fears of a southerly invasion have injected renewed urgency into African leadership and the international apparatus that is attempting to reach a consensus of action: the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), United Nations (UN) and NATO. Responding to Tuesday's statements by Benin President and AU chairman Thomas Yayi Boni, who told reporters that "NATO should play a part and the African force would lead the way as was done by NATO in Afghanistan," an anonymous NATO official struck the idea down in public even though an intervention is likely to follow Boni's description.

Given that all involved African capitals expect some level of NATO assistance - from training and logistics to intelligence and air-power - this denial is explicitly false: “There has been no request or discussion on a possible role for NATO in Mali. NATO is not involved in this crisis but the situation in northern Mali is of course of grave concern to us all."

Nevertheless, NATO's total involvement is unlikely to accelerate until the UN approves the permanent guidelines of Resolutions 2071 and 2085, drafted in October and December to advance the international community's overall response to northern Mali. French support troops were allegedly scheduled to deploy in late January and may land shortly, but Paris and Washington are equally leery of diving in head first. The UN is currently in the process of holding a closed-doors meeting in response to the Islamists' ongoing movements and their impact on regional mediation. New efforts have been delayed to January 21st in order to give the Tuareg-Islamist faction, Ansar Dine, more time to comply with international demands. 

Until then, the UN can merely repeat its futile request.

“We ask the Malian rebel groups to abide by Security Council resolutions 2071 and 2085 calling for them to cut off all ties with terrorist organizations,” Martin Nesirky said from UN headquarters in New York. "We urge adherence to the cessation of hostilities declared on 4 December 2012 in Ouagadougou and continue to call on the parties to engage in dialogue to address the situation."

The possibility of a southerly offensive towards Bamako, located 430 miles southwest of Konna, cannot be ruled out entirely; anticipating and planning for the worst scenarios is central to warfare and political science. In the event that the Islamists do push southward, NATO and the AU must be prepared to rapidly deploy a small number of solders as a front and last line of defense. These troops should assist in defending high-level human and structural targets, coordinating logistics, establishing communications, scouting and targeted raids. At the same time, Mali's own forces and civilian population must be tasked to the actual combat of Islamist militants in their local areas. 

Direct foreign intervention is more necessary in the north than south, where the population should be and must be capable of mounting a formidable counterinsurgency.

These factors being duly considered, the Islamists appear to be working towards the alternative objective of reinforcing their perimeter. Rather than an organizing a sincere campaign into Mali's south, which would overtax their resources and commit a potentially fatal blunder, Ansar Dine and its allies are engaged in the strategic defense of their northern territory. Using the muscle imported by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its regional offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine has gradually surrounded the Inner Niger for months in preparation for an international assault. Konna and the local center, Mopti, fit into a larger campaign to secure the entire delta, and thus obstruct the initial advance of Malian and foreign military units.

This plan includes the capture or destruction of Mopti's nearby airport at Sevare.

Having used the cover of dialogue with Ansar Dine to expand their area of operations, AQIM and MUJAO have also set about fortifying Mali's surrounding defenses. To the delta's north lies a desert of greater size than southern Afghanistan or Yemen, which doubles as the established territory between AQIM's network in Mauritania and Algeria. No surprise advance will occur through this terrain. Meanwhile, to the east, several groups operating under the command of AQIM and Ansar Dine have been tasked to fortify the mountains surrounding the Kidal region. These forces expect an Algerian assault at some point during an intervention, although Algiers has strongly backed negotiations with Ansar Dine, and evicting them from the Adrar des Ifoghas will be a challenge in itself.

Viewed as intentional strategic depth, the ongoing assault on Mopti's surrounding areas represents the creation of a buffer zone around northern Mali's population belt. The Islamists expect to be hit hard by foreign armor and air power, and thus expect to lose control of its front lines in the aftermath of "shock and awe" tactics. This inevitability forces them to push out as far as possible, in order to facilitate an organized withdrawal into the north and engage its opponent from multiple directions. Using a combination of ambushes, organized resistance and retreat, the Islamists will occupy a more solid position than if they were to let Malian and foreign forces smash into them at Timbuktu.

Mali's conflict must somehow reach a political agreement with the Tuaregs and other ethnic groups in order to create permanent stability, but the region won't see the light of resolution before a military confrontation.

[Note: This analysis was completed on Thursday night. Updates on France's emerging military involvement will be posted shortly.]

Mali's Islamists Toying With International Negotiators

A rapid turnaround in northern Mali has fully illuminated the multidimensional nature of netwar.

Last Thursday the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution outlining a dual-track approach of political negotiations and military engagement against dissenting Islamic militants. As if coordinated before the UNSC's unanimous vote - itself the process of intense calculation between NATO, the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - Timbuktu's local Islamist outfit struck back immediately on Friday by announcing a pact with Mali's rival Tuareg movement. Under their public terms, Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) pledged to "coordinate their positions and actions in the context of seeking a peaceful and durable solution with the transitional authorities in Mali, with the guarantees of the relevant parties."

Their joint-statement claimed that mutual security would be established "through the deployment of security forces comprising members of both their groups."

These statements belie northern Mali's ground conditions, which indicate that no sustainable agreement can be forged between the two groups. They have already fallen out after leeching each other's abilities to rout Mali's army; once a days-long pact was broken in late May (or possibly never signed to begin with), Ansar Dine and its Islamist allies proceeded to kick the MNLA out of its Gao headquarters. The strategically-located city now hosts the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and is unlikely to be shared with the MNLA. The only tangible progress from months of negotiations between Ansar Dine and the MNLA, organized by neighboring Burkina Faso and Algeria, is the Islamists' military advance on MNLA positions.

Ansar Dine recently assisted in MUJAO's capture of westerly Léré after its leader delivered an ultimatum to the MNLA, essentially threatening to join or die. The MNLA rejected Iyad Ag Ghaly's message and "expressed their determination to fight against all terrorists."

Muddy as these negotiating waters are, Mali's fourth-generation reality emits a polarized clarity and reveals an ingenious plot at work. The possibility of Ansar Dine establishing sincere relations with the MNLA cannot be discarded entirely, on account of Ag Ghaly's history with Tuareg militias, but the odds hover near zero. In addition to a cutthroat ultimatum, Ansar Dine just spun off Mali's own version of Ansar al-Sharia with formal approval from the group's leadership. AQIM has supposedly tasked this new group to improve relations with its Libyan counterpart, a loose network of jihadist groups blamed for the assault on Benghazi's consulate, and potentially construct a training base in eastern Libya.

The group is reportedly overseen by Oumar Ould Hamaha, a senior military official connecting Ansar Dine and MUJAO. Hamaha, a local Tuareg from the Timbuktu area, also doubles as a confidante of AQIM personality Moktar Belmoktar, who announced the formation of his own El Moulethemine katibat ("Brigade of the Veiled Ones") in early December.

Ansar Dine and its allies' vision of peace is total control over northern Mali. Instead of negotiating an agreeable outcome with the international community or MNLA, the group is stalling to attract more human resources from West Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Now Ansar Dine is taking shelter beneath the MNLA, a group that the international community cannot avoid negotiating with, in an attempt to stave off a foreign intervention entirely. This wise maneuver is reminiscent of the guerrilla hiding within an urban population, hugging civilians in order to deter aerial bombardment.

Following the UNSC's vote, an adviser of Mali's interim president said that his government is ready to "wage war against the terrorists and continue to negotiate with our brothers who are ready for dialogue."

Problematically, Malians are expecting military action but lack faith in their government and military, directing a trickle-up effect towards the UNSC. Furthermore, non-state actors move with exceptional quickness in relation to cumbersome international blocs. As a result of Mali's internal crisis, which legally bars the U.S. from direct aid, and the international community's hesitant response to the situation as a whole, both sets of actors have given the distinct impression that they seek to avoid fighting under the present conditions. The UNSC has painted itself into a corner by emphasizing dialogue over military action, and the Islamists are "cooperating" by giving what is being requested. Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO all realize the advantage of this wariness to enter an uncertain terrain the size of Iraq, with less than ideal resources, for an unspecified length of time.

The end product: Ansar Dine is positioning itself as a necessary component of Mali's political solution and an outright international front of AQIM.

"We denounce this decision," Mohamed Ag Akharib, a representative of Ansar Dine, told reporters between meetings in Algiers. "We have always denounced the (planned) military intervention and we have said that it is not the solution. We are very optimistic and we ask Algeria and the international community to join us in searching for a peaceful solution to the Mali crisis."

Algiers' Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) is suspected of manipulating both sides of the Sahel - coordinating with AQIM and other non-state actors in opposition to the Tuaregs, and using AQIM to establish favorable military and intelligence relations with Western capitals. The government's massive influence in the region is unlikely to prove a source of lasting stability in northern Mali, although Islamists and the Obama administration are both looking its way for assistance. To its credit Algiers is legitimately cautious of spillover into its territory and understands the opponent better than most. Military and intelligence analysts have reached a consensus that the proposed force - 3,000 ECOWAS soldiers, an equal number of Malians and NATO trainers to guide them - falls disturbingly short of northern Mali's taxing demands.

"You cannot really fight a conventional war there," warns Abdallah Baali, Algeria's ambassador to Washington. "Your enemy will vanish in the desert before your eyes."

Of the other scenarios in play, Ansar Dine could be gunning for absolute control of Mali's Tuareg movement with the intention of evicting AQIM, MUJAO and the MNLA in turn. Thus of all the conceivable scenarios, workable peace between Ansar Dine and the MNLA appears furthest removed from reality.

Mali News Travels Slow To Western Media

Nearly six days ago The Trench recorded the formation of a new Islamic militant group that had branched out from Mali's local tree, Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith). Christening themselves as the fourth Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) in the MENA (after Yemen, Tunisia and Libya), this group has allegedly recruited Barabiche tribesmen from Timbuktu's surrounding area and placed them under the authority of several Ansar Dine officials: Omar Ould Hamaha and Sanad Ould Bouamama.

In every manifestation Ansar al-Sharia operates either as a loose front for al-Qaeda's general ideology or a masking agent for the group itself, as in Yemen's case. However Mali's new group has reportedly received specific directions from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On top of decentralizing the group's network and tapping into local human resources, Ansar al-Sharia has been tasked to build a logistics highway between eastern Libya and northern Mali - and, if AFRICOM is to be believed, establish a base in east Libya to strike the West.

"In return, AQIM is offering to provide Libyan Islamist groups with training and finance," The Telegraph reported earlier this month.

Somewhat oddly, this news created no initial splash in the U.S. media and is just now reaching American ears in the form of an ABC News report. New information is only presented in small portions, namely a welcoming statement from one of Ansar Dine's senior leaders. Although potential disinformation, no mention of the connection between Ansar al-Sharia and Libyan militants is made. Instead, speculation of the offshoot's cause revolves around Ansar Dine's leadership and the absorption of fighters from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

In the latter case, ABC News claims that MUJAO has been losing fighters to Ansar Dine and Ansar al-Sharia due to their local reputations, which carry more weight inside and outside Mali.

Unnamed "analysts" attribute this trend to Ansar Dine's legitimacy at the negotiating table, but local credibility and momentum is the likeliest culprit of any established pattern. The network of AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine acts as a jihadist funneling system, drawing fighters from across the MENA and shaking them down into appropriate roles. Both Ansar Dine and MUJAO fighters have joined Ansar al-Sharia because the group is allegedly involved in expanding eastward, where MUJAO hopes to go. MUJAO's military planner, Omar Hamaha, also doubles as an Ansar Dine official, reinforcing the connection between all three groups.

While decentralization can instigate personal feuds within a network of militant groups, Mali is big enough to necessitate a portfolio of groups tasked with specialized agendas. The inflation of open territory and density of local actors are determining factors in slicing up northern Mali's pie.

Coincidently, ABC News's reporting is equally sluggish as the international community's response to northern Mali's conflict. Today, almost a year after the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine began to overrun Mali's military, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution authorizing a two-track intervention in Mali. Except negotiations with Ansar Dine amount to a stalling tactic for AQIM and MUJAO, meaning that an ECOWAS force of 3,300 won't land in Mali until the second half of next year at the earliest. The Trench has frequently reported on the obstacles facing an international coalition, starting with Mali's fractured government and ending with the virtual certainty of guerrilla warfare.

"It is likely that [the MNLA and MUJWA] will avoid direct confrontation, in which case [the intervention force] would have no chance," a senior French officer told the AFP after the UNSC's vote. "If the force sent to deal with them is credible, [the MNLA and MUJWA] will certainly leave the towns and head for their sanctuaries in the mountain ranges close to the Algerian border... and that will become a different ball game to dislodge them."

One "former intelligence chief" states the problem in even blunter terms: "It's not 3,000 men that are needed, it's 100 times as many, and for a long time. We are far from what's required. Take Afghanistan as a reference and you'll understand."

This estimate, while excessively high, still offers a more realistic assessment than the international community (UN, NATO, AU, ECOWAS) has tabled. Roughly speaking, a minimum of 30,000 troops and 3-5 years (plus Western logistics) appear to be needed to control northern Mali's population belt and wage asymmetric warfare against the Islamists. Give Ansar Dine and its allies another 10 months and they will embed themselves that much deeper in northern Mali's terrain.

The international community is trapped between the dilemma of an immediate but reckless campaign, and waiting for Mali's government to put itself back together first.

ECOWAS, NATO Inching Closer To Northern Mali

After months of navigating the world's international blocs, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently approved the submission of a politco-military proposal for northern Mali within 45 days. Whether NATO, the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can launch their intervention before April 2013's election remains uncertain; multiple delays have obstructed an effective response to Mali's coup and burgeoning asymmetric war. Both Western and African powers talk tougher than they seem prepared to act - not that caution or multilateralism is unwise - and initial estimates of 3,000 troops underestimate the task at hand. Mali's interim government has even sent mixed signals about the presence of any foreign troops.

Five days from now, representatives from the UN, ECOWAS, AU, EU and other "neighboring countries" (presumably Algeria and Mauritania) are scheduled to debate a hard mission plan in Mali's capital.

The Islamic network that swept over northern Mali earlier this year takes these threats completely seriously, for an intervention is certain to arrive at some point in the future. Having pledged to defeat any intruder and entrenched themselves within the population, militant spokesmen also promise to send their forces into Mali's south. Nor did they waste any time responding to Friday's at the UNSC and French President Francois Hollande in particular.

"If he continues to throw oil on the fire, we will send him the pictures of dead French hostages in the coming days," Oumar Ould Hamaha, a spokesman for MUJAO, told Reuters on Saturday. "He will not be able to count the bodies of French expatriates across West Africa and elsewhere."

However observers and locals alike have trouble determining who exactly is controlling northern Mali. Two theories may help explain the general situation between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a hydra-like network of African, Arab and Asian militants. Each supposedly has their own agenda. Ansar Dine is commanded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg who fought in earlier rebellions but has broken off under the banner of strict Sharia law. His forces, along with MUJAO, would expel the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) from northern Mali's urban areas after the Tuaregs' own campaign. Ag Ghaly now allies himself with AQIM, whose Arab fighters are periodically reported by locals in northern Mali's towns.

MUJAO, on the other hand, is suspected of growing out of AQIM. Looking to expand beyond the Maghreb and into lucrative West Africa, the group touts itself as pan-African and allegedly recruits from local sources. Northern Mali's vast deserts and mountain ranges provide an ideal base to increase the size and training of a guerrilla force.

A second theory places AQIM as the head of these two other groups, rather than as a partner. By absorbing Mali into their area of operations, the group could now control an enormous amount of territory to train in and plot from. What difference this makes on the ground is unclear though; they could experience a leadership dispute similar to al-Shabaab nationalists and al-Qaeda's branch in Somalia. Or they could fight more effectively as a diversified network. With AQIM's random bankroll, MUJAO's regional following and Ansar Dine's local intelligence, the three groups make for a deadly combination on paper. Defeating them on the battlefield won't dismantle all three groups or stop their activities. Thus local resistance, cooperation with the MNLA, political sensitivity and organization within Mali's government form the keys of victory. Resolution 2012 conditions a military response on progress in these areas, but they are no more stable than northern Mali.

Detailed analysis of NATO and ECOWAS's plans will be posted shortly.

London's Political Battleground: Maryam al-Khawaja VS. Bahrain's Prince

She could never stop the onslaught, but Maryam al-Khawaja fired off as many shots as she could before yielding the spotlight. al-Khawaja recently met with William Hague, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to impress upon him the stagnation of Bahrain's political reforms and a theoretical dialogue with the island's opposition network. One of Bahrain's leading activists couldn't have minced words with the Secretary.

While no transcript is available, "diplomatic protocol" may have sounded something like this: "People today are saying the United States and the UK are to Bahrain what Russia is to Syria. They are countries willing to aid repression, people who are willing to overlook human rights violations because it's in their own interests. The only difference is that Russia doesn't try to present itself as a beacon of human rights and democracy."

Al-Khawaja's accusation carries a risk at the government level; Bahrain's monarchy is hypersensitive to being compared with Syria and the Arab revolutions in general. The U.S. and U.K. governments also reject comparisons between the two countries's situations, which have demarcated the ends of the region's violence spectrum. Yet the exiled Al-Khawaja cannot withhold the truth either and she's unpopular enough in Western capitals. Her jailed father and sister can't afford to wait, nor can Bahrain's democratic opposition, and reality must be expressed in order for her to retain credibility with them. Someone has to stand up when Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, pays a visit to London.

Acting as though he hadn't paid attention during Al-Khawaja's meeting, Hague welcomed Al-Khalifa with open arms on Thursday and proceeded to soften Bahrain's hardline environment. The young prince serves as his father's international face as well as the West's "moderate" savior in Bahrain, and Washington and London's doors always remain open as a result. Employing a script that has become set in concrete, Al-Khalifa would "affirm the unprecedented steps taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain had reflected His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's commitment towards the comprehensive reform process that His Majesty had launched." He also claimed that the monarchy realizes "the need to push forward in facing challenges in the path of reform," and "within a pure Bahraini framework implemented in through a unified Bahraini spirit."

Hague, in turn, reciprocated a similar point of view through a combination of flattery and deception. Like his U.S. counterparts, the Secretary praised Bahrain's commitment to reforming its judiciary and police system. He welcomed "recent commitments made by Government of Bahrain last month at the Human Rights Council, in particular to consider ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture." Hague also supports a peaceful dialogue between the monarchy and democratic opposition, in line with U.S. policy. Most interestingly, his "open and honest exchange about political reform in Bahrain... confirmed to me the Crown Prince’s personal commitment to an inclusive political dialogue."

"His Royal Highness the Crown Prince expressed his satisfaction with the progress of ongoing cooperation and coordination between Bahrain and Britain and on working towards reinforcing stability in the region," Bahrain's state media reported of the meeting. "For his part Hague expressed his happiness for meeting His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, welcoming his visit and presented him with a letter from UK President David Cameron."

Of course they did.

Stronger in appearance than logic, the entirety of Hague and Al-Khalifa's meeting can be broken down to its rusted base. Hague's emphasis on the Prince's "personal commitment" is telling - does his father share the feeling? His hawkish great uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, surely doesn't. One of the opposition's fiercest enemies, the 41-year Prime Minister currently stands as the more influential voices in King Hamad's royal circle. Salman told Hague that "the insistence on practicing violence would lead to results harming all that in turn would cripple advancement," when his family is busy outlawing and gassing protests in Manama.

The idea of "considering" the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture is equally absurd. Many of Bahrain's leading activists have been physically assaulted over the past 19 months of demonstrations, including Maryam's sister Zainab. The latter resides in a cell for the seventh time in less than two years, awaiting 13 charges with their father Abdulhadi. King Hamad has made the Al-Khawaja's punishment a national priority, and Abdiulhadi sent her out of the country "to make sure people on the outside made sure what was happening on the inside." This harassment fits into a wider campaign to destroy Bahrain's activist network and the Bahrain's Center for Human Rights, which counts all three Al-Khawajas as senior members. Rajab Nabeel, the BCHR's director, also sits in jail after being given three years for instigating protests. He too reports cruel and unusual punishment of Bahrain's prisoners of conscience, including himself.

Accordingly, the Bahraini regime enjoys far greater access with the necessary Western governments. Al-Khalifa and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa attended other meetings in London, including an "honorary luncheon" with Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Alistair Burt.

Al-Khawaja argues that this double-standard has emboldened Bahrain's government to maintain its crackdown against the opposition. The West is too inclined to accept Manama's hollow promises and superficial attempts to reform, a process that comes nowhere near the opposition's demand for a parliamentary overhaul. Al-Khawaja told The Independent that statements from Washington and London "made a difference" last year, but, "Now they don't make any difference because the Bahraini government now knows that even if there are statements it won't result in any consequences." Western pressure has, from time to time, helped a Bahraini out of prison; Washington supposedly opposed Riyadh's March 2011 intervention, to no avail. Yet public and private comments achieved results only to the extent that Bahrain's monarchy initially believed them. With Rajab and the Al-Khawajas locked within cell walls and Western silence, Manama is visibly prepared to continue its repressive counterrevolution as opposed to a genuine dialogue with Bahrain's opposition.

"I had a meeting at the White House and I told them, 'Everything you fear and is making you not do the right thing because you fear it, you are actually making it a reality.' At the end of the day it only makes sense that when people feel polarized, cornered and ignored they're going to look for help from wherever they can get it. I'm actually really surprised that hasn't happened yet. I'm really surprised that we're still to a large extent peaceful. I'm surprised we're not as sectarian as I thought we would be and that we haven't yet reached a point where we say we'll find help from wherever it comes."

Either Washington and London don't realize this dilemma, or more likely, they believe that their position is as invincible as King Hamad's. Unfortunately Bahrain is traveling far off the path of democratic reform and Western powers comprise a big section of the roadblock.

Bahraini Activists' Prison Built By Power Politics

Last week, as expected, a Bahraini appeals court refused to release imprisoned activists Nabeel Rajab and Zainab Al-Khawaja. This decision mocks the monarchy's own defense of a trial that is widely perceived as politically motivated - namely the defendant's right to an appeal process. In reality Bahrain's appeals courts function as a vortex to another dimension. Activists like Zainab's father, Abdullahi, have already fallen down this seemingly endless pit only to receive harsh prison terms at the end. Now Nabeel and Rajab are tumbling down their own wormhole of disinformation and injustice.

The second session of Rajab's appeal trial offers a typical example of the modern advances in autocracy, and also displays the obvious collusion between Bahrain's royal family and their judiciary system. In video "evidence" present by the public prosecution, Rajab is shown attending several different protests and failing to call for peaceful demonstrations as "youthful" protesters threw their Molotovs. The defense, however, argues that the videos were edited to remove Rajab's peaceful message and spliced with another protest to discredit him. These videos weren't presented at his trial either, demonstrating the orchestrated nature of Rajab's persecution and how far King Hamad's circle will go to keep him off Manama's streets. The defense also submitted a complaint that no one has been held accountable for his January 6th encounter with Bahraini security forces.

If his government is left to its own devices, one cannot anticipate a favorable hearing on October 16th or the conclusion of Rajab's appeals process. He has been jailed for a total of 126 days and faces a three-year prison sentence for "instigating protests."

The treatment of Zainab is no less horrific. Recently sentenced to two months in prison for “ripping the photo of the king" - after being jailed since August 2nd - she faces at least eight lawsuits and another five pending cases that are designed to exhaust her. And since her spirit cannot be broken, the monarchy has decided to break her down physically in the jetwash of police custody. Having already been assaulted during August's arrest, which left her with a leg injury that has yet to heal, Zainab came under renewed attack at the Isa Town police station. She was later able to inform her mother of the incident:

"Despite being on a fast, she was forced to sit at the police station without food or water from 1 pm to 7pm (fasting break at around 5:40pm). When she started walking around because she got tired of sitting, a female officer told her to sit down. When Alkhawaja sat next to a domestic worker who had a young child who appeared to be Alkhawaja’s daughter’s age, and spoke to the woman, policewoman Basma Alhajeri attacked Alkhawaja verbally. She told her to stop speaking to the other woman, that the other woman is more honourable than her, and continued to verbally assault Alkhawaja in reference to her honour. She then told Alkhawaja to go into the room next door.

Alkhawaja refused saying she should be moved when she will be taken to the police station. The male officer at the station then ordered that she be taken prison, and as soon as Zainab started to walk she noticed the male officer signalling to officer Basma Alhajeri, who proceeded to physically attack Alkhawaja, with no regard to Zainabs injured leg. She knocked Alkhawaja to the ground and continuously kicked and punched her, while verbally assaulting her as well. She then dragged her to the police jeep, and continued to verbally assault her during the drive to the police station where Zainab will be held overnight."

It should be noted that Zainab and Rajab are two of the most peaceful advocates that Bahrain's opposition has to offer, and latter has also endured physical abuse during his time at Jaww Prison.

Due to the monarchy's intractable position, the Bahraini Center for Human Rights (BCHR) has urged the US administration, "as well as other governments that have influence in Bahrain including the UK government and the EU," to call for the immediate release of human rights activists. Unfortunately Bahrain's opposition floats in the outer regions of Western policy; the mobilization needed to overcome U.S.-Saudi dominance is truly astronomical. The island was ignored completely during President Barack Obama's latest address to the UN General Assembly, a speech that is currently plastered on the frontpage of the U.S. Embassy's website, and the White House is too busy campaigning to notice. The State Department has yet to comment on Rajab and Zainab's continual imprisonment. No Facebook post has been issued from the U.S. Embassy and no Tweet by UN Ambassador Susan Rice.

Nothing remains except a black hole of injustice and propaganda.

Meanwhile King Hamad's men blended into the surrounding environment and mingled freely the UNGA's 67th session. High-level consultations with Western or Gulf states often follow prison sentences and security crackdowns, and the days following Rajab's appeal hearing repeated this choreographed process. On the sidelines of Geneva's 21st UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) session, Human Rights Affairs Minister Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdurrahman met to discuss bilateral cooperation with Scott Busby, a senior advisor for the U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (headed by the pro-Bahraini Michael Posner). While Busby did raise "several "issues, including "the prosecution of doctors and the court verdicts against activists," these obligatory concerns are ultimately designed to marginalize Bahrain's political prisoners.

Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa was particularly laden with a "luncheon" hosted by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, a sideline session with US Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Elizabeth Jones, a GCC–EU "troika meeting" and another GCC-U.S. sideline session. All parties would unanimously reaffirm their support for the other and opposition towards the Iranian-Syrian alliance, offering perfect cover for Al-Khalifa and highlighting the unrivaled access that Bahrain's monarchy enjoys. Most interestingly, he and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were "updated on progress of work on a naval operation centre in the Kingdom of Bahrain."

Today Information Affairs Authority (IAA) President Shaikh Fawaz bin Mohammed Al Khalifa met with U.S. Admiral John Miller and Rear Admiral Kevin Scott at the US Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain US Naval Forces Central Command: "They reviewed bilateral friendly relations and both countries' keenness to boost them."

Rajab and Zainab presumably weren't on the agenda.

Stubborn Death of Syria's "Yemenskii Model"

At last, Kofi Annan has accepted the brutal reality of the United Nation's "political transition" in Syria, ending months of futile diplomacy.

Dead for months - possibly on arrival - the UN's plan is ironically forcing its previous secretary-general into submission while its intended target grinds onward. Annan himself deserves a limited amount of blame for this calamity, mainly for meeting so cordially with a murderously delusional Bashar al-Assad. Syria's "Mission Impossible," as he referred to it during Thursday's statements, was thrust upon him and required the engagement of all parties, regardless of their hostility. Maybe Annan will produce a hail mary agreement before his clock officially expires on August 30th. If not, he speculates that, in a world "full of crazy people like me," his replacement could step up and "do a better job."

U.S. officials also claim that "we’re going to continue full ahead with our strategy," however the UN's plan needs more than a facial lift to succeed. As long as foreign powers remain bent on controlling Syria's revolution and its aftermath, the entire situation is doomed to continue spiraling downward.

Before the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011, the White House and other allied governments were already busy copying the blueprints onto Syria's 4th generation battleground. Resolution 2014 would approve a single-candidate referendum in Yemen, replacing 33-year dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh with his 18-year vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, and grant Saleh immunity in return. A two-year transitional period, including a military restructure and "national dialogue," is scheduled to culminate with an open presidential election. This plan has yielded countless positives and negatives for Yemenis; although the threat of civil war has temporarily lifted and Hadi replaced many Saleh loyalists, fundamental divisions between the government, diverse political opposition, revolutionaries, tribal authorities and foreign powers remain outstanding.

Unfortunately, due to the ambitions of certain internal and external powers, the odds of these issues being bridged through November's dialogue are low. Once the Obama administration and King Abdullah's inner circle realized that they could drop Saleh for Hadi, thereby increasing their hegemony in the country, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was employed to maintain a controlled status quo in Yemen. The bulk of Washington and Riyadh's counterrevolution has rolled out under the specter of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), despite the fact that their own operations are contributing to its growth, and U.S. counterterrorism operations have further escalated since Hadi's ascendancy in February.

Many of Yemen's revolutionaries do not agree with Resolution 2014's terms.

One can easily understand (on top of the Iranian angle) why the two powers attempted to hoist "Yemen's model" onto Syria, and why al-Assad's allies saw the same opportunity to control Syria's transition. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wasted no time lobbying the exchange, telling a GCC ministerial in early November, "The Russian position has been embodied in the Security Council resolution on Yemen adopted a few days ago unanimously." Undeterred by this suspiciously mutual agreement, the White House held out an empty hope through multiple Russian statements of support and a UN proposal that didn't explicitly call for al-Assad's resignation.

As recently as May’s G-8 meetings, President Barack Obama himself lobbied the "Yemenskii Varient" to Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.

Leaving aside the vast situational differences between Yemen and Syria, along with the sputtering state of Yemen's transition, external conditions automatically torpedoed a cross-pollination of political designs. Unlike Yemen's agreement, which enjoyed unanimous approval in the UN Security Council, Syria's foreign matrix has been divided from the revolution's beginning. Each side is simply trying to outmaneuver the other through international blocs and their various proposals, whereas the other permanent members of the UN Security Council stood to profit in Yemen by obediently falling behind America's lead.

“Things fell apart in New York,” Annan concluded on Thursday. “The increasing militarization on the ground (in Syria) and the clear lack of unity in the Security Council have fundamentally changed the circumstances for the effective exercise of my role.”

This intensifying netwar between al-Bashar's international allies and enemies is once again manifesting in a tragically ridiculous war of rhetoric. Having defended Annan's mission in order to stall, a process that has enabled the deaths of thousands, Russian President Vladimir Putin called Annan "a very respectable person, a brilliant diplomat and a very decent man, so it's really a shame." White House officials chose similar language for Annan personally, but openly implied that Moscow and Beijing are responsible for Syria's political stalemate.

"Those vetoes," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters, "as we've said repeatedly, were highly regrettable, and place both Russia and China on the wrong side of history and on the wrong side of the Syrian people. Very unfortunate."

Thus Washington publicly expects Moscow to accept Yemen's "model" in Syria when both perceive a "transition" as manipulative. This strategy is far from the "realistic" plan that the Obama administration defends so righteously - a counterrevolution that no diplomat is able to conceal.

Relative Calm Before Yemen’s Next Battle

With Yemen’s Life March expected to officially arrive in the capital of Sana’a on Saturday, the country’s internal and external actors are positioning themselves for the next round of confrontation. Further analysis will follow these updates:

Life March Encountering Government Ambushes

Yemen’s current security is a mixed bag, depending on the area. While the Houthi-contested north has destabilized considerably in December and southern governorates remain in their usual disarray, some military checkpoints were removed from Yemen’s cities during the last week. Oppositional fighters followed as part of an internationally-mediated truce between Ali Abdullah Saleh, his defected general Ali Mohsen, and the al-Ahmar brothers.

However demilitarization is far from complete; both sides maintain an active presence around Yemen’s pro-democracy protesters.

Friday’s attacks mimicked Saleh’s low-key pattern of feigning cooperation before an assault; the regime’s strategy seeks to divide and conquer, rather than directly confront the Life March. According to local sources, Republican Guard and Central Security forces offered protection against pro-regime loyalists as the march passed through Dhamar, Yasleh and Khidar areas. Parts of the strung-out march were then attacked by security forces, splitting protesters from the group and isolating them in the cold. Government forces are reportedly harassing protesters along the way, preventing locals from supplying them, and allegedly kidnapping a handful of marchers.

Since the Life March aims to connect various “freedom squares” between Taizz and Sana’a, Saleh’s forces have also planned to stop others from joining. As the march swells into the “March of the Revolution,” a group of protesters came under attack in northern Sana’a as they attempted to link with the forward party. Republican Guard troops reportedly opened fire after ubiquitous plain-clothed men assaulted the crowd with sticks.

Conversely, Yemen’s government is actively highlighting the Guard’s protection as the first marchers near Sana’a; Saleh’s son (Ahmed) and nephew (Yahya) have supposedly “formalized a security plan” as commanders of the Republican Guard and Central Security. Yet the trust gap between Yemen’s pro-democracy movement and Saleh’s regime is irreversibly vast. Government forces may be slightly less inclined to attack the march under tribal protection, but this protection is regularly exploited by the regime.

Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) has already threatened that it "would not be responsible for the collapse of the initiative, while others violate its letter and spirit.”

Immunity Clause In Quasi-Limbo

The Life March encompasses many demands of Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, from political to economic to religious freedoms. Beyond the rejection of Yemen’s “unity government” between the GPC and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Life Marchers are walking in memory of the 1,000+ protesters killed over the last 11 months. The timing worked out perfectly: Saturday’s festivities coincide with Saleh’s theoretically transfer of power and a parliamentary debate on his immunity as stipulated in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative.

Hard results are another matter though, and the immunity issue was dropped from the government’s weekend agenda. UN and JMP officials are making an effort to deny Saleh’s immunity clause - claiming all parties responsible for violence "should be held accountable" - but their rhetoric has amounted to nothing more than a diversion. Neither the UNSC nor JMP want to clarify this issue at the highest level, instead keeping transparency low as they cooperate with Saleh's regime.

Until immunity is explicitly stricken from UN resolution 2014, one must assume that the clause lurks in Yemen’s political shadows. The same goes for Saleh’s status after Saturday passed without clarification, and Yemen’s strongman is set to remain “honorary president” until February’s election. Washington has left too many counterterror-related secrets in Saleh's possession to cut him loose.

West Maintains Status Quo

Since ordering the Life March to disband would be overtly unreasonable, Western and Gulf powers have progressed to their next course of action by ignoring Yemen’s protesters. Not that Life Marchers didn’t expect this possibility - they organized because the international community is ignoring them. Amid the backdrop of America’s silent consent, allied UNSC powers have taken the diplomatic lead in backing Yemen’s “unity” government.

“Yemen was on a cross section between war and peace,” UK Ambassador Jonathan Wilks said between meetings with government officials. “Thanks to Allah, Yemen chose peace and in last week we have done the first step, and we saw many improvements in the political and security aspects.”

As if Allah drafted the GCC initiative.

Separately, the European Union’s Catherine Ashton called Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi on Wednesday to inform him of her impending arrival. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will assume her counter-revolutionary duties by legitimizing the new government, ignoring Yemen’s Life March. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe also phoned the JMP’s Mohammed Salem Basindwa, now acting as Yemen’s Prime Minister, to congratulate him on “forming the national reconciliation government.”

These statements boil down to self-adulation given the West’s heavy hand within GCC negotiations. Saba state media proudly displays Saleh’s support in the UNSC, where Russia (of all countries) reaffirmed the UN’s support for the GCC initiative. The pro-government Yemeni Observer was even more blatant: “10 international and Arab ambassadors seem to be determined to work day and night for helping the vice president, who is authorized from Saleh to act as president.”

These aren’t the actions of an international community preparing to hold Saleh accountable for extensive human rights abuses and corruption. Two forces are thus marching head to head in Yemen: the pro-democracy Life March, and the international community’s lockstep march behind Saleh's regime.

Syrian Counter-Revolution Enters New Phase

Bashar al-Assad has victory in his eyes. Riding high on his security forces’ crackdown against pro-democracy protesters and army defectors, Syria’s strongman now holds a sweet political settlement in his hands. Better yet, al-Assad had no need to hop a flight to Cairo (unlike Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, who inked a power-sharing deal in Riyadh), sending his foreign minister to sign in his place.

Syrian protesters and foreign observers appear to be asking two main questions: is al-Assad’s regime planning to cooperate with the Arab League rather than the UN, or stalling for more time? The answer to both questions is yes.

That al-Assad has no reason to reject the Arab League’s offer should serve as an immediate warning. While the block’s proposal calls on Syria’s army to withdraw from hostile cities, a concession that many protesters believe would capitulate the regime, regime change was left out of the League’s equation. al-Assad is only required to engage in dialogue with the opposition. Meanwhile 500 observers have received a one-month mandate that can be extended by another month “if both sides agree.” Nabil Elaraby, the Arab League’s Secretary-General, claims that his monitors can “move freely anywhere in Syria to ensure the implementation of the Arab initiative,” but they will be accompanied (and shadowed) by Syrian authorities.

Foreign Minister Walid Moallem declared, "Syrian sovereignty was preserved in the heart of the protocol.”

Moallem’s signing coincided with a three-day conference organized by Syria’s National Council (SNA). Like many Syrian protesters, the bulk of the SNA remains suspicious of al-Assad’s intentions - except the council may be playing with fire. According to several participants involved in drafting a new political document, the SNA “is readying an offer of immunity and exile to Bashar al-Assad... he can leave the country to a destination of his choosing with full immunity and allow the military to take over in conjunction with the SNC.”

Since this strategy is unlikely to draw extensive support from Syria’s streets, justifying foreign assistance (not necessarily military intervention) appears to be the SNA’s next strategic objective. Its chairman, Burhan Ghalioun, quickly branded the Arab League’s ceremony as "worthless,” and warned that al-Assad’s regime “is maneuvering and wants to buy time.” Precisely, al-Assad is maneuvering around the Arab League to buy time and improve his position.

By agreeing to the Arab League’s proposal, al-Assad isn’t simply stalling through the League or avoiding further UN action - Syria’s regime is exploiting the proposal to reconnect with the bloc. In one of his more blatant statements, Moallem expects “the beginning of cooperation between us and the Arab League, and we will welcome the Arab League observers." Damascus plans to use the League’s monitors to “get out the truth,” viewing them “as an opportunity to prove Syria was battling terrorists.” Moallem, if he is to be believed, successfully amended the League’s proposal to protect Syria’s sovereignty.

He explained how, “coordination with the Syrian government will take place via a national committee that will send reports to both sides which will be discussed before taking any other action according to the protocol and the Syrian amendments.”

Speaking before an Iraqi delegation, al-Assad told his audience that he "dealt positively with proposals presented because it's in (Syria's) interest for the world to know what is happening in Syria."

On its surface, the Arab League’s proposal represents the first tangible step to deescalating Syria’s open violence. Foreign monitors and journalists may be able to push security forces and armed defectors off the streets - but the regime will try its hardest to manipulate them. The League’s deal with al-Assad is, at its core, a settlement between the AL and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Russia, China and Western capitals.

The GCC issued a surprisingly tough statement against al-Assad’s regime, scoring easy political points during its summit in Riyadh, however the bloc continues to follow the League’s maneuvering. Russia’s Foreign Ministry naturally boasted, "Signing the protocol in Cairo guarantees the protection of all Syrians and stability in the country by applying an independent monitoring mechanism.”

Moallem “stressed” that Russia “advised signing the protocol, which Syria did.”

The imperialist nature of Syria’s initiative diminishes any benefits coming near the opposition’s direction. Although the Arab League has yet to cancel its proposed economic sanctions, Moallem expects these to be lifted after Syria “complies” with foreign monitors. He rationalized Syria’s position after the League ignored several of his memos: "we don't entreat anyone… if they think that their sanctions will affect the steadfastness of the Syrian people then they are delusional… they imposed the sanctions and they will lift them, and we won't ask for it again."

Yet Syria remains suspicious of Arab League despite a favorable political deal, deflecting criticism by accusing the bloc itself of stalling (not entirely invalid). Moallem asserted that Damascus “doesn’t fear internationalization as the West and some Arabs' intentions have been revealed,” and flipped the international position by threatening to take Syria’s case to the UN Security Council. al-Assad’s government also organized mass rallies against the Arab League’s proposal.

Western capitals have been sucked into the Arab League’s political vortex amid their quest to open additional sources of pressure on Syria. While Washington, London, Paris and Berlin responded with the same hard-line - actions, not words - they might be stepping too deep into Syria’s counter-revolutionary offensive. The U.S. and EU have thrown their weight behind the Arab League’s proposal, tacitly protecting the regime, and the State Department’s Victoria Nuland unconsciously exposed this reality on Tuesday.

“Just to be clear that there were four aspects to the Arab League program which the Syrians say they are now signed on to, so it’s not just the unfettered access to monitors. It’s also stopping all acts of violence, withdrawing armed elements from populated areas and releasing all political prisoners.”

These limited conditions prompted one journalist to ask, “so you are stepping aside from your attitude that Assad has to step out?” Nuland would respond with a flat “No.” When pressed a second time, the State’s spokeswoman took another moment to articulate, “let me just be clear on behalf of the United States of America. We continue to believe that Asad needs to step aside, that Syria cannot progress with him at the head of the government. And we are concerned that there are delaying tactics here.”

Having covered this angle over the past two months, Washington and Moscow’s behavior continues to leave the door ajar for a political settlement. The two governments recently installed a puppet in Yemen and fully support Bahrain’s monarchy over its opposition movement. Hillary Clinton and her counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, enjoyed a cordial meeting on Tuesday and would likely agree to a consensus replacement for al-Assad.

Syria’s cooperative phase with the Arab League should continue for at least a month, perhaps longer, before breaking down and entering a new counter-revolutionary phase. That leaves Syria’s opposition to fend for itself and accept any foreign assistance available (NATO, Turkey, Libya). While the League’s monitors should be shown a peaceful face, the opposition must devise a strategy to disrupt Syria’s foreign connections and seize the narrative.

al-Assad’s regime cannot be given space or time to maneuver.