tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15712012041159525442024-03-16T11:49:47.031-07:00The TrenchJames Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.comBlogger1880125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-41243606526268738452013-03-08T19:01:00.001-08:002013-03-08T19:39:55.315-08:00With "Friends" Like Yemen's, No Enemies Needed<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In early January 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in Sana'a to manage the autocratic habits of a useful ally in the war against al-Qaeda.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Having warned other allies (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria) of a youth bulge prior to the Arab uprisings, the Secretary now found herself just above the surface of a volcano as she mingled with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. U.S. policy needed his approval to facilitate an expansion of military and counter-terrorism platforms in the country, but that need required less antagonistic leadership atop the government. For Clinton, this meant walking Saleh away from a parliamentary proposal that would eliminate term limits and allow him to run indefinitely, which he eventually agreed to in return for Washington's political and military assistance.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“We support an inclusive government,” Clinton <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/middleeast/12diplo.html?_r=0">replied</a> when asked how the Obama administration could support Saleh's government and human rights at the same time. “We see that Yemen is going through a transition. And you’re right: it could one way or the other. It could go the right way or the wrong way.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yemen's revolution would spark weeks after Clinton shook hands with Saleh and departed the capital, never to return. Despite her professed support for a representative government, the Obama administration first treated Yemen's uprising as an obstruction to be neutralized, fearing a loss of influence with the next government. During this time al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) capitalized on Saleh's distraction in the cities to expand its ranks and territorial control in Yemen's southern governorates; Saleh's U.S.-trained counter-terrorism forces aided the process by fighting Yemen's revolutionaries and tribesmen rather than terrorists. However this chain of events ultimately created an opportunity for Washington and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia and European partners, to replace the duplicitous Saleh with his vice president and continue their policies unimpeded.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, "elected" through the UN's single-candidate referendum in February 2012, doubles as a leading proponent of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This hegemonic policy was displayed again on Thursday when the Obama administration released a two-part press notice from the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/03/07/partnering-people-yemen">White House</a> and <a href="http://www.state.gov/s/d/2013/205807.htm">State Department</a>. Lying to the American people when talking Yemen, unfortunately, is simpler and easier than stealing candy from a baby. The American majority lives in ignorance of Yemen's troubles and their government's own interference in the country. Chronic fear of al-Qaeda and a high degree of hostility, reminiscent of American attitudes towards Pakistanis and Iraqis, contribute to this detachment, which in turn allows the Obama administration to interfere in Yemen's affairs without domestic cost.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Lack of political incentives to support the Yemeni people have endangered them in multiple ways: undermining their quest for representative government, damaging property and life without legal recourse, and ensuring that AQAP retains a presence in their country. Such a defeat in the war for "hearts and minds" is especially tragic when considering Yemenis' fondness for Americans themselves.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Current U.S. policy presents a view diametrically opposed to Yemen's streets, where the actions of Washington and its allies have obstructed a continuation of the revolution.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Over the past 15 months,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns told the latest "Friends of Yemen" Ministerial, "Yemen – with the support of all of its friends – has made important progress in implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Yemenis elected a new leader for the first time in three decades, launched a major reform of their armed forces, regained control of large areas of their national territory held by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and today stand on the cusp of an historic National Dialogue."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Burns' statements are constructed on the boundary of inaccuracy. Yemenis selected Hadi out of necessity and coercion rather than free will, while Hadi himself was tasked to clean up a mess made by Saleh and the foreign policies that supported him. The so-called GCC initiative also excluded the same youth that the White House claims to support. Instead, the power-sharing agreement granted immunity for Saleh's human rights abuses (some committed with U.S. equipment), as well as preserving military influence with the new government. That U.S. interests in Yemen have improved since Saleh's resignation is unquestionable, even as U.S. policy remains unpopular with everyone outside the GCC initiative: the independent revolutionaries, northern-based Houthi sect and secessionist-minded Southern Movement.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yemen's youth received the least seats of all parties - nearly four times less than Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) - in the heralded National Dialogue.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Further complicating the situation, the GCC's power-sharing agreement obstructs deeply-rooted political causes in the north and south, as their autonomous designs threaten the central government's authority and, by extension, involved foreign powers. In mid-February the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) <a href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sc10919.doc.htm">released a statement</a> warning against interference in Yemen's affairs, only this statement targeted Saleh to the extent that it isolated a former Vice President and current Southern activist, Ali Salim Al-Beidh. The statement had minimal effect on Saleh, who copied the UNSC's message (minus himself) during a speech to commemorate Hadi's promotion, but it did spark Southern protests that led to clashes with the government and oppositional Islah party.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Hadi eventually met with Southern leaders to ease tensions and coax them into the National Dialogue, but the movement's leaders and followers remain leery of participating under UN-GCC terms. While a national dialogue is needed to advance Yemen's revolution, the present environment could degenerate into political warfare between the ruling GPC, Islah and Hirak.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">To some credit U.S. non-military assistance has increased since the revolution launched in January 2011. Problematically, the long-term reality in Yemen indicates that these measures serve as camouflage for widespread geopolitical interference. U.S. aid has risen above $100 million to keep pace with a similar figure in the military column, and this information is used to promote a comprehensive policy. Since military and counterterrorism spending is especially obscured in Yemen, one of Washington's biggest "small wars," State Department officials and CIA Director John Brennan can now claim with greater safety that non-military spending exceeds military spending.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">However U.S. policy remains decisively oriented towards influencing Yemen's political and military spheres - economic development and humanitarian support furthers this goal.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yemen's revolution is effectively over in the eyes of UN, EU and GCC powers, and they have stopped at nothing to control its "transition." In their world 2014's elections will continue the reforms started by Hadi and Yemen will be gradually integrated into the GCC with Western assistance. Far from genuinely helping its people, U.S. policy in Yemen currently amounts to a joint neocolonialist takeover with neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government rivals Washington and Tehran in unpopularity. All have worked tirelessly to prevent a national revolution in Yemen, while at the same time claiming to advance it.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"The transition is about to enter a new, critical, phase," Burns told his audience in London. "While Yemenis courageously work to rebuild their country, extremists and their patrons are working hard to tear it down. The Co-Chairs called on all parties to commit to the principle of non-interference and the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen. This is an effort we endorse in the strongest terms."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Rampant foreign interference is no secret amongst Yemenis and concerned observers. Burns' own statements demonstrate the oxymoronic forces at work: supporting Yemen's unity and territorial integrity, for instance, directly contradicts the principles of sovereignty and independence. Washington, Riyadh and their allies are not looking to create a new future based on self-determination, but to recreate Yemen's old hegemonic model using new tactics and materials.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">These "friends" will sell anything except the truth to Yemenis and Americans alike.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-8326855108948265482013-03-05T18:37:00.000-08:002013-03-05T16:40:55.706-08:00"National Dialogue" Masks Foreign Interference In Yemen<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="color: red;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">UN envoy Jamal Benomar presents a distorted view of Yemen's situation and the GCC's power-sharing agreement via a Saudi daily</span></b></span><span style="color: red;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">: "The Yemenis have done this without any foreign dictates."</span></b></span><br />
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<span style="color: red;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">To be fair to him, though, the general script of his interview was presumably written by those working above him:</span></b></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yemen is perhaps the most troubled state in the Middle East with a
history of poverty, civil war and division. Uncertainty about its future
following the instability that led to and followed the resignation of
its former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has prompted regional and UN
intervention in a bid to prevent the state from descending into chaos. </span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The first meetings of a conference that brings together political
parties, regional factions, interest groups and civil society
organizations from across the country will get underway soon, in a bid
to stabilize the situation. Prompted by the UN and Yemen’s neighbors,
Yemen’s quarreling groups will attempt to thrash out a settlement on
elections and a new constitution among other issues, a settlement that
many hope will allow Yemen to avoid secession and possible civil war. </span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><i>Asharq Al-Awsat</i> spoke to Jamal Benomar, an Assistant
Secretary-General of the UN and the organization’s special envoy to
Yemen, who has played an important role in the organization of the
forthcoming National Dialogue Conference. Speaking by telephone, Benomar
told <i>Asharq Al-Awsat</i> about his hopes for the conference, the
obstacles it faces, and the efforts of the UN and Yemen’s neighbors to
assist the process of a peaceful transfer of power in the troubled
state. </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.aawsat.net/2013/03/article55294395"><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Read Interview: </b></span></a></span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-49850696115682780902013-03-01T22:35:00.000-08:002013-03-01T22:35:00.074-08:00Zainab Al-Khawaja Ruling Disregards Bahraini Rights<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The latest evidence of King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa's resistance to self-determination and denial of human rights couldn't be more blatant. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/02/bahrains-monarchy-defies-promotion-of.html">Arrested on Tuesday</a> during a protest for Mahmoud al-Jazeeri, Zainab Al-Khawaja found herself back in a holding cell only for the moments before she was whisked away to a court. Al-Khawaja had joined protesters in demanding the proper burial of al-Jazeeri - the government is keeping his body in an attempt to dictate the funeral's location - when arrested by security forces. She was immediately charged with obstructing traffic, violating a regime structure and damaging property.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Since February 2011 Al-Khawaja has been arrested multiple times, endured physical and mental abuse from Bahraini security forces, and faces over a dozen charges related to "illegal protesting." All of her protests have been conducted peacefully, and many by herself. She is simply too popular and symbolic to leave on the streets, and too defiant against King Hamad's personal authority to escape retribution. Al-Khawaja is known to chants slogans and craft placards against the King, and was picked up in Tuesday with a sign that read "your prisons we don't fear."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">She is regularly jailed because Bahrain's monarchy fears peaceful protesters more than violent ones.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Now, after being acquitted from a separate charge of insulting a public official (Bahrain's judiciary throws out certain charges while keeping the more severe ones), the monarchy's Court of Appeals <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/548919">has overturned the ruling</a> and sentenced her to three months in prison. She joins her father Abdulhadi, activist Nabeel Rajab and other oppositional figures in the unfriendly confines of Bahrain's political prison system.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A major security crackdown or political jailing in Bahrain is often accompanied by statements of support for human rights, and Friday's ruling adhered to this pattern when Human Rights Affairs Minister Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdulrahman met with UNHRC Ambassador Remigiusz Achilles Henczel in Geneva. Bahrain has <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/09/bahrain-monarchy-openly-defies-un-last.html">slipped through the UNHRC's sessions with ease</a>, demonstrating the UN's level of compliance in Bahrain and its inability to defend the rights of those who are being trampled on by a power-hungry monarchy. None of the monarchy's words should be believed when its own actions oppose them. Promotion of human rights is mainly a political and propaganda exercise.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"<a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/549038">According to a statement</a> issued by the Human Rights Affairs Ministry, Dr. Salah congratulated Mr. Henczel on the new post and lauded the advanced level of the communication and coordination relations between the Ministry and the Human Rights Council, asserting that Bahrain is among the main supporters of the UN mechanisms in all fields, especially the human rights one."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Al-Khawaja's ruling is self-explanatory in its counterrevolutionary nature. Unfortunately the U.S. response was mute as usual, a reaction that jars with the Obama administration's attempt to restart a National Dialogue between the monarchy and opposition. No debate of national proportions can lift off of the ground in the current environment, but the monarchy has taken great efforts to portray the National Dialogue as a success.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">It will crash again soon if this denial continues.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-60972551981365609282013-02-28T23:23:00.000-08:002013-03-01T19:01:34.815-08:00Ali Saleh Mimics UNSC's Statement On Yemen<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On February 15th the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) <a href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sc10919.doc.htm">issued a statement</a> of support for Yemen's political transition and warned potential spoilers against interfering with the UN's diplomacy. Taken at face value, the UNSC's statement appears to spotlight former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and threaten him with financial sanctions. However Saleh's inclusion was primarily based on the art of concealment, as the UNSC couldn't aim at its real targets without first naming Yemen's duplicitous strongman. The other "spoilers" come next: former Vice-President Ali Salim Al-Beidh and the Iranian government.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Accordingly, Saleh has now attempted to blend in by pasting the UNSC's statement into his own rhetorical bag of tricks. Speaking to supporters at a rally organized to mark his transfer of power to Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, his vice president of nearly 18 years, Saleh demonstrated the notorious oratory and scheming mind that maintained his power for over three decades. Ignoring the hundreds of civilians killed by government forces during the first year of Yemen's revolution and his own refusal to resign, the former president claims that he "handed over power peacefully and willingly" to Hadi, and never turned to violence. He also called for "reconciliation, shaking hands and forgiveness of the past to build a new Yemen."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“Forget about the past and look at the future."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Saleh can afford to forget about the past because his crimes against the Yemeni people are insulated by the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing initiative, a U.S.-Saudi proposal that kept Saleh's ruling party in power and granted his family personal immunity. This agreement not only encourages Saleh to continue resisting the formation of a legitimate government, but to play along with the GCC and UNSC's diplomacy so as not to permanently sever the hands that protect him. The U.S. State Department refused to take a definitive stand <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/02/205323.htm">when quizzed on the content of Saleh's speech</a>, saying only that all parties should "play a positive role in Yemen's political transition."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">According to U.S. and UN terms, Saleh is playing a positive role by supporting his former VP, rhetorically targeting Iran and opposing secession in the south - all actions undertaken by the UNSC. Washington and Riyadh both oppose the loss of influence that would result from the autonomous agendas of the northern Houthi sect and Southern Movement, and relevant international blocs have followed suit. All, of course, oppose Tehran's sphere of hegemony in Yemen.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"No to secession... Our people in the south are with unity," Saleh told supporters who had gathered in Sanaa's Sabiin Square. "A small minority which supports secession is funded from abroad... Those who receive money from Iran know that their days are numbered."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Southern cause is rooted in Saleh's own misrule and operates independently of Tehran. Southerners regularly stage mass protests in favor of self-determination.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Whether viewing him as too much trouble or too useful to drop, international powers have yet to make any serious move against Saleh and are unlikely to do so unless he takes extreme measures that cannot be ignored. Only Washington and Riyadh wield the political power capable of uprooting him from Yemen's tense environment, but he is instead treated as an emergency asset and a loose end that must be guarded. Saleh is privy to U.S. and Saudi intelligence, along with the human rights abuses that he committed (against the Houthis, Southern Movement and independent revolutionaries) with their military assistance. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The resulting policy allows him to roam relatively free within Yemen's politics, contrary to warnings from Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman, Yemeni activists and even the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Saleh, in turn, has little reason to act out of line so long as he enjoys international protection. Although he has seen a number of relatives dropped from their political and military positions, Saleh has weathered the brunt of Yemen's political transition and remains a source of power. His mere presence creates a negative inference on foreign politics in the country, while his equally arrogant son Ahmed, former commander of the U.S.-trained Republican Guard, is set to be reassigned rather than stripped of his authority. Saleh's party, the General People's Congress (GPC), also received the most seats of any bloc for Yemen's upcoming National Dialogue, sponsored by the UNSC and GCC.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A gradual reacquisition of power forms the backbone of Saleh's long-term strategy and Wednesday's speech confirmed the planning of a worst-case scenario: the GPC intends to contest next year's parliamentary and presidential elections, and Ahmed has long been feared as an eventual contender.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Everything Saleh says and does obstructs Yemen's revolution, so anything less than international accountability equates to complicity.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-76221677486747584152013-02-28T11:40:00.000-08:002013-02-28T11:40:00.392-08:00Bahrain's Monarchy Defies Promotion of Universal Rights<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On Wednesday Bahrain's Minister of Foreign Affairs' Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa, <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/548560">hosted a lunch banquet</a> for Arab League Secretary-General Dr. Nabil Al Arabi and other diplomats participating in the island's Manama Conference. His motivation: praise King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's initiative calling for the establishment of an Arab Court for Human Rights. Establishing such a court sounds promising in theory, but promoting human rights doesn't sit atop the agenda of Hamad or other regional governments invested in maintaining authority. One gets the distinct impression that Hamad is more concerned with image than reality.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"The Foreign Affairs' Minister pointed out that the initiative of His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to establish a special Arab Court for Human Rights reflects the concern to keep pace with modern international trends towards the promotion of Human Rights practices."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A busy man, Al Khalifa also made an appearance <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/548743">at a security briefing</a> by Interior Minister Lieutenant-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, one of Bahrain's hard-line personalities and a skilled propagandist. The island has experienced chronic unrest since February 2011 and endured new hostilities <a href="http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/5655">following the mayhem of February 14th</a>, when 16-year old Hussain Ali Ahmed Abrahim was fatally shot at close range. Demonstrations ignited around the capital's security cordon and have yet to abate. However the Interior Minister "stated that both the static and moving police patrols that have been deployed throughout Bahrain over the past several weeks were successful in helping to maintain order."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"He said that police patrols are using restraint and are following the law when interacting with those engaging in criminal behavior."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Independent accounts of Bahrain paint an opposing scenario with a few basic pieces of evidence. Several of the island's prominent oppositional leaders remain jailed for peacefully defying King Hamad's rule, including Nabeel Rajab and Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, and the latter's daughter (Zainab) was just arrested again for protesting the death of Mahmoud Issa Al-Jazeri. Al-Jazeri was struck in the face with a teargas canister during February 14th's protests and his body has yet to be released by the government. Later that night, 63-year old Abdul-Majeed Mohsen was arrested at a checkpoint when he allegedly flashed a victory sign to passing demonstrators. The well-known protester has been arrested twice before and stands accused of possessing Molotovs, participating in an illegal protest and disturbing public security.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Any protest against King Hamad's rule - especially the peaceful variety - is considered illegal and unorderly at a metaphysical level. Promoting human rights and maintaining order also necessitates control over basic symbols of resistance, including the V symbol and Guy Fawkes masks. Popularized by the movie <i>V For Vendetta</i>, the mask's importation <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/antiprotest-bahrain-bans-import-of-plastic-guy-fawkes-masks-8510615.html">has now been banned</a> by Bahrain's Industry and Commerce Minister, thus assuring that the mask's popularity will continue to rise.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Contrasting with the island's latest abuses <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21601016">is the acquittal of four policeme</a>n involved in the murder of protesters. These rulings highlight the gamut of Bahrain's flaws: a corrupt judiciary, the government's manipulation of legal evidence and public information, King Hamad's resistance to promoting accountability within his security forces, and the inability to limit outrage with "non-lethal" tactics. Bahrain's monarchy has demonstrated acute skill in parts of its public relations - specifically Western lobbying and demonizing the opposition - and woeful ignorance at other times. Acquitting the policemen in question defies the King's own Commission of Independent Inquiry, naturally upsetting Bahrain's streets and online networks, but that reaction may fit into the government's plans to undermine them during the ongoing National Dialogue.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The circumstances surrounding Fadhil al Matrook, who was fatally shot with bird pellets on February 15th, 2011, reach to the heart of civil disobedience as practiced on the ground. Matrook was shot while attending the funeral of another protester when the procession came under attack, and he allegedly stopped to assist a wounded protester before being shot himself. Bahrain's Ministry of Interior said that police came under attack from the crowd and fired warning shots before applying lethal force. The outcome, in either case, is the type of disproportionate force that drives an escalating cycle of civil disobedience.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">These decisions are made by a government lacking in the ability resolve the long-standing grievances of Bahrain's Shia majority.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-77799528646647157112013-02-27T18:17:00.000-08:002013-02-27T22:35:59.412-08:00US drones blow up any hope of close ties with Yemenis<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><b><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full"> A true representation of U.S. policy in Yemen: </a></b></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last
year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a
governorate in South Yemen. - See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a governorate in South Yemen.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Government troops and local militias had been battling fighters from Ansar Al Sharia, an Al Qaeda affiliate, and had forced them from the area only two days earlier. There were reports that some had shaved their beards and stayed. If they had known an American reporter was around, they would have had a golden opportunity for a kidnapping.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Before we boarded the plane in Beirut, I had told McEvers that I would assure her safety. As one of the rare Americans who understands Yemen well, she knew that I was saying I would do whatever it took to protect her, putting her personal security above my own.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">As it happened, the people of Abyan were hospitable and friendly, although their region had been badly damaged by the fighting.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On the edge of the town of Ja'ar, while interviewing some local people, we heard a noise overhead. People peered into the sky until the sharp sunlight forced their heads down. Their expressions changed to alarm - the sound was that of a US drone, they said.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"> <span style="font-size: large;"><b><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full">Continue Reading</a></b></span></span><br />
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a governorate in South Yemen.</span><br />
<div class="article-teaser article-teaser-with-image">
<div class="related-assets">
<h3>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
Related</span></h3>
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<li><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/technology-will-make-debate-over-drones-obsolete" title="Technology will make debate over drones obsolete">
<img alt="Comment" src="http://www.thenational.ae/staticfiles/images/portal/comment.gif" /> Technology will make debate over drones obsolete</a></span>
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<li><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/obama-risks-being-known-as-the-drone-president" title="Obama risks being known as the 'drone president'">
<img alt="Comment" src="http://www.thenational.ae/staticfiles/images/portal/comment.gif" /> Obama risks being known as the 'drone president'</a></span>
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<li><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/drone-war-goes-global-as-demand-soars" title="Drone war goes global as demand soars">
■ Drone war goes global as demand soars</a></span>
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</div>
</div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Government troops and local militias had been battling fighters from
Ansar Al Sharia, an Al Qaeda affiliate, and had forced them from the
area only two days earlier. There were reports that some had shaved
their beards and stayed. If they had known an American reporter was
around, they would have had a golden opportunity for a kidnapping.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">-
See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span></div>
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last
year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a
governorate in South Yemen. - See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span></div>
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last
year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a
governorate in South Yemen. - See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span></div>
<div>
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last
year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a
governorate in South Yemen. - See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span><br />
<div style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Late last
year I escorted the US radio journalist Kelly McEvers to Abyan, a
governorate in South Yemen. - See more at:
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-drones-blow-up-any-hope-of-close-ties-with-yemenis#full</span></div>
</div>
</div>
James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-24276822799207654932013-02-23T16:07:00.000-08:002013-02-23T12:16:39.705-08:00Ongoing Mystery of Afghanistan's Post-2014 Force<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://dawncompk.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/panetta-reut-670.jpg?w=670&h=350" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="208" src="http://dawncompk.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/panetta-reut-670.jpg?w=670&h=350" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">When Hamid Karzai visited the White House in early January to discuss all things Afghanistan, a peculiar piece of disinformation awaited him at the doors of America's capital. Karzai had arrived to sort out the details of many issues, from prisoner treatment to NATO training and air strikes, but most Americans only concern themselves with one topic in Afghanistan: when all U.S. soldiers are coming home for good. Thus the White House exploited this singular concern and deployed its communications director to leak the unrealistic possibility of a <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/near-zero-odds-for-afghanistans-zero.html">"zero option"</a> during Karzai's visit.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Barring a veto from Afghanistan's parliament or Karzai himself (or his potential replacement after 2014's election), the only zero in this plan is the zero possibility of implementation.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">That the Obama administration desires a post-2014 military presence (U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta uses the phrase "enduring presence") in Afghanistan is no secret. Having watched Iraq regress into political deadlock and asymmetric warfare following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, the White House and Pentagon presumably realize that the scope of Afghanistan's challenges exceed its sister war and will not bow easily. They will push Karzai or his replacement to the limit of their political influence. Assuming they comply, the only certainty of a post-2014 force is a number higher than zero.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The mystery over President Barack Obama's final decision is fueling a repetitive cycle of media speculation, with no credible source venturing outside the 3,000-15,000 range. The latest estimate has emerged as NATO ministers meet in Brussels to discuss the war's options: between 8,000 and 12,000 NATO troops. This reasonable estimate was immediately struck down by the Pentagon as hearsay, suggesting that a force of similar proportions may be anticipated. Given the possibility of covert forces, though, the American and Afghan publics are unlikely to receive the full truth.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"First of all, that report is not correct..." Panetta <a href="http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5192">told a press conference</a> on Friday. "I don't want to go into particular numbers, because, frankly, we want - we want to be able to have the flexibility to look at a range of options that we ought to have for our enduring presence. But I want to make very clear that the range of options we were discussing was with regards to the NATO force."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119356"><br /></a></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119356">Pentagon spokesman George Little added</a>, "A range of 8,000 to 12,000 troops was discussed as the possible size of the overall NATO mission, not the U.S. contribution."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A "range of options," amongst other advantages on the battlefield, helps keep the Pentagon in control of policy rather than locked into a set exit. The DOD has privately and publicly resisted the White House's troop caps and deadlines, and the loss of a residual force would erode the Pentagon's grip on Afghanistan (as in Iraq). Whatever the relationship with NATO, whose participation is mostly due to appearances and politicking, Washington is certain to provide more troops than any other country.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The size of this force also nullifies any potential agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban, at least in theory. Rumors from within the insurgency's leadership have claimed that the Taliban's shura may be willing to accept a U.S. presence after 2014, but American troops will only stay to kill Taliban and train Afghan forces to kill Taliban. This policy will be sold as "counter-terrorism operations" against al-Qaeda "and its affiliates," largely meaning the Taliban itself and the elusive Haqqani network that serves as one branch of the movement. U.S. commanders were unable to conduct a planned operation in eastern Afghanistan and resorted to drone operations as a patch - they have yet to give up completely on a ground operation.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">For this reason, a more plausible scenario will operate along Mullah Omar's lines and not accept the presence one U.S. soldier after 2014. Ongoing hostilities could then break down a political deal between Kabul and Islamabad, prolonging the war indefinitely.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">U.S. forces plan to stay until 2020 and possibly beyond.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Lacking air power from NATO, how long will the fight continue between ANA troops, their U.S. trainers and the Taliban? Washington seems to expect a shorter time-line, and all U.S. officials shy away from the slightest negativity in Afghanistan (but not before cautioning against hard times ahead). Panetta told reporters that "expectations" set at last year's Chicago meetings were "truly exceeded": "The ANSF are now in the lead for nearly 90 percent of combat operations. And they are on track to step into the lead for all of these operations by this spring."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Afghanization" offers the only hope for Washington's controlled withdrawal and has been highlighted over all other aspects of U.S. policy. To what degree desertion takes hold after 2014, and how often U.S. forces need to reinforce their Afghan counterparts, remains to be seen.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />The Obama administration intends to leave 52,500 troops in the country until November, hoping to inflict more damage on the Taliban ahead of a political resolution. The insurgency has already survived the full brunt of Obama's surge and will not be significantly impacted by another summer of losses; while the group's foot soldiers may see a time of rest ahead, they are equally unlikely to surrender at this time. One final season (the last 34,000 troops will begin to withdraw after February 2014) may follow to keep the Taliban off-balance ahead of December 2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yet two summers of fighting will simply reinforce Afghanistan's stalemate and leave a bad taste in both parties' mouths. Abruptly shutting off the conflict after more bloodshed is impossible. Considering the war's present conditions and future outlook, the U.S. and its NATO allies are preparing a recipe for ongoing low-intensity conflict that will stretch far past 2014 - when Obama will be tempted to replicate his policy in Iraq and declare an false end to the conflict. This lack of attention is feared by Afghans across the country, as evidenced by a question from Tolo TV Afghanistan. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Sir, most of the Afghans believe that the U.S. will abandon Afghanistan again when the combat mission finishes in Afghanistan. What type of guarantee you can give them, sir? Because on one hand, Taliban still pose a serious threat to the Afghan government, and the peace process is also not going well."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"I want to make clear," Panetta answers, "that the United States and ISAF, the NATO -- the NATO countries that are involved in the ISAF effort, all of us are committed to supporting Afghanistan, not just now, but in the future. And that commitment is unwavering."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">How these words translate into confidence amongst Afghans and Americans alike is much less certain.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-90812014383760897352013-02-17T14:50:00.000-08:002013-02-17T15:03:05.137-08:00Amid Peace Talks, Bahrain's Monarchy Cries Iran<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/reuters/2013-02-16t174828z_362392449_gm1e92h04x501_rtrmadp_3_bahrain-violence.grid-6x3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="268" src="http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/reuters/2013-02-16t174828z_362392449_gm1e92h04x501_rtrmadp_3_bahrain-violence.grid-6x3.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Bahraini monarchy's second attempt at a poorly-named "National Dialogue" has become inevitably <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/02/bahrain-monarchy-greets-feb14-with-gas.html">obscured by the haze of asymmetric warfare</a>. Given the common theory that King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa's regime is provoking Bahrain's opposition to justify harsh retaliation - whether jailing its leadership or shooting its youth - one must speculate on the timing between political negotiations and the February 14th anniversary. The monarchy clearly anticipated demonstrations on this day and has worked diligently to exploit their fallout in its favor.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Restarting the National Dialogue after its first government-induced collapse accomplishes multiple objectives at once: the opposition's actions in the streets are subverted by diplomatic outreach and ultimately held responsible for any failures at the negotiating table.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Days of running battles between protesters and security forces have also presented an opportune time to announce Bahrain's latest "terrorist cell" and bomb plot, courtesy of Iran's shadow. After highlighting the government's own casualties and the vicious actions of "saboteurs," meaning rock and Molotov-throwing youth protesters, Minister of Interior Lt-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546740">informed a televised audience</a> that a 2-kg bomb had been defused at the King Fahd Causeway. Five men linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/officials-iran-syria-aided-bomb-assassination-plot-bahrain/t/story?id=15472224">already stand accused</a> of receiving training in a camp along the Syrian-Lebanese, and allegedly admitted (during interrogation) that they planned to start a terrorist organization in Bahrain.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Accordingly, Al-Khalifa confirmed the arrest of eight individuals with "links to Iran, Iraq and Lebanon," where they received weapons and explosives training similar to the previous cells.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The possibility that Iran and its proxies are operating through Bahrain is high, but they are equally unlikely to cooperate with the island's opposition. These actors are pursuing their own ends rather than the democratic opposition's cause of political representation, and in doing have been conveniently shackled to the youth and Al Wefaq. The Iranian specter undermines Bahrain's opposition too efficiently for anyone other than the Bahraini monarchy's enjoyment - combined with Saudi backing and America's Fifth Fleet, Iranian-funded terror cells and bombs form the trump cards in its arsenal. Now, instead of covering the disproportionate force that triggers civil disobedience, Bahrain's narrative in the international media has mutated into terrorist plots.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The contrived elements of this situation are rendered evident by the precise media roll out of Bahraini officials, beginning with hardline Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546863">and his speech of "unity."</a> Regardless of the messenger, the overall message of King Hamad's royal circle remains unchanged: cast protesters as the island's problem and King Hamad's rule as the solution.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"We will not be discouraged by the actions of those who are intent on undermining the stability and peaceful endeavors of Bahrain's government," the Interior Minister declared on Saturday night. "Ours is a nation committed to reforms, human rights and the rule of law."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">All of these transparent moves are too insincere to improve the noxious climate of Bahrain's National Dialogue.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-86585521200744564482013-02-16T16:17:00.000-08:002013-02-16T17:42:06.807-08:00 Iran warns Israel: We'll avenge Guards commander <span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><b><span style="color: red;">A variety of allied and competing forces are attempting to pull Syria's revolution into a wider regional conflict. The possibility of deescalation currently rests at 0%.</span></b></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Iran will soon exact revenge on Israel for the recent killing of an Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps commander in Syria, an aide to Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was quoted on Saturday as saying.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Iran said on
Thursday that an Iranian military commander named Hassan Shateri, also known as
Hessam Khoshnevis, had been killed in Syria by rebels fighting President Bashar
Assad, an ally of Tehran.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">But Iran’s envoy to Beirut, Ghazanfar
Roknabadi, on Thursday drew a link between the killing and Israel.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Ali
Shirazi, Khamenei’s representative to the IRGC’s elite Quds force, said on
Friday evening that Iran’s “resolve against Israel” had only grown stronger with
Shateri’s killing.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“Our enemies should also know that we will quickly get
revenge for [the death of] Haj Hassan [Shateri] from the Israelis, and the
enemies cannot shut off the Iranian people with such stupid acts,” Shirazi was
quoted as saying by the Iranian Students’ News Agency on Saturday.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Israel
has not commented on the killing.</span></blockquote>
<b><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=303460">Continue Reading </a></span></span></b>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-81381758748582357442013-02-14T00:20:00.000-08:002013-02-14T01:43:54.816-08:00Bahrain Monarchy Greets Feb14 With Gas, Pellets<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BDDSdtVCAAAalOE.jpg:large" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BDDSdtVCAAAalOE.jpg:large" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In order to tamp down national and international pressure against its totalitarian methods - especially during the 2nd marking of Bahrain's revolutionary ignition - King Hamad's monarchy <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/545940">has arranged the second launch</a> of a National Dialogue to buy time and appease foreign backers. A detailed report of this process will be published shortly, but the National Dialogue is already treading on thin ice and may collapse soon if the situation fails to improve.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">To mark February 14th, 2011’s "Day of Rage," Bahraini protesters flooded the streets on Thursday to express their demands for political representation and judicial accountability. Many were met with the type of force that suggests that Bahrain's monarchy won't be changing its ways any time soon. Clashes between demonstrators and state security have been reported around the capital of Manama, which generally remains off limits to organized protests, and feature the King's ubiquitous combination tear gas and bird pellets. Particular incidents were recorded by cell phone in Al Musalla, Bani Jamra, Bilad Al Qadeem, Duraz, Karranah, Sar and other villages that incubate the uprising outside Manama. </span><br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Most urgently, clashes in Al Daih resulted in multiple injuries and at least one casualty after 16-year old Hussein al-Jazeri was shot at close range with a pellet gun. Photographic evidence indicates that he was unarmed - and throwing rocks or Molotovs wouldn't justify the excessive use of force applied to his body. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On the contrary, disproportionate force is both the strength and fatal weakness of an autocratic regime. Al-Jazeri's killing immediately raised parallels to Ali Abdulhadi Mushaima, whose murder accelerated the uprising on February 14th, 2011, and the residents of Al Daih (home to Mushaima and al-Jazeri) have already responded in the streets.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">They too encountered the toxic gas of Bahrain's King and are currently demonstrating in resistance.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Both sides have wasted no time responding with further escalation to Thursday's events. A maximum deployment of security forces has established checkpoints around Manama, leading protesters creating makeshift roadblocks to counter government patrols, and neither side holds any intention of backing down. Meanwhile, the monarchy is content <a href="http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/5645">to keep Bahrain's political leadership in cells</a> and further inflame the streets, rather than work to reduce tensions. Various opposition leaders outside of jail have preconditioned their participation on the release of Nabeel Rajab, Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja and their comrades.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A functioning National Dialogue cannot exist under the present conditions - not when force and deception remain the only languages of Bahrain's monarchy. So long as these types of actions continue, it shouldn't be long before the wobbly legs of King Hamad's "Dialogue" give out again.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-67715710496673926102013-02-13T19:42:00.000-08:002013-02-13T17:25:11.929-08:00After Mali Comes Niger<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="color: red;"><b><a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138931/sebastian-elischer/after-mali-comes-niger?page=show">This report on Niger</a> makes no mention of a <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/u_29.html">potential U.S. drone base in Niger</a>, except in a negative context at the end, but also favors increased support to an admittedly corrupt government:</b></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Last month, the French army's rapid advance into northern Mali and
the timely deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) seemed to result in a swift victory over
Islamist and Tuareg militants there. Equally important, however, was the
Islamist and Tuareg militants' hasty withdrawal into northeastern Mali.
With France planning to pull its troops out of the country as soon as
March, Mali will almost certainly be turned into an ECOWAS trusteeship.
The most likely upshot is not a neat end to the conflict but, rather, a
migration of the problem into neighboring Niger.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Parts of the Tuareg leadership, which signed a power-sharing
agreement in March 2012 with three jihadist militias -- al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
West Africa -- have already fled across the unguarded Nigerien border,
where they will try to regroup. Given Niger's weak government
structures, they also pose a serious security threat to the country as a
whole.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Niger presents an appealingly easy target. For one, despite several
attempts at reform by President Mahamadou Issoufou, who was elected in
April 2011, Niger's secular political elite lacks legitimacy in the eyes
of its largely illiterate, rural, and deeply religious population.
Numerous failed attempts at democratization and rampant corruption by
previous governments have plagued the country for over two decades.
Among the population, this troubled legacy has fostered a general sense
of alienation from the capital.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Large parts of the Nigerien army, meanwhile, are opposed to the
notion of civilian rule. Ever since it was pushed out of power in 1991,
the army leadership has cultivated a deep mistrust of the civilian elite
among all military ranks. Consumed with hatred for the Tuareg following
two major military campaigns against them (1990-1995 and 2007-2009,
respectively), the Nigerien army has overthrown three civilian
governments since 1993. Although recent coup attempts in 2011 and 2012
proved amateurish and lacked sufficient support among both the armed
forces and the population, they indicate long-standing tensions between
parts of the military and the civilian elites.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><b><span style="color: red;"><a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138931/sebastian-elischer/after-mali-comes-niger?page=show">Continue Reading</a> </span></b></span></span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-66182924261069592862013-02-12T23:19:00.000-08:002013-02-13T02:20:50.359-08:00Afghan peace plan in trouble as Pakistani clerics balk at proposed meeting in Kabul<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="color: red;"><b><a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/04/264266.html">Why anyone would propose a six-month deadline</a> to an Afghan-Pakistan-US-Taliban peace agreement makes little sense, given that such a deadline is doomed to fail:</b></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A portion of a peace plan intended to smooth the way for an exit from
Afghanistan of U.S.-led military forces already is in trouble, before
it has even gotten underway.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">At issue is a conference between Pakistani and Afghan
religious leaders scheduled for next month in Kabul, the Afghan capital,
that was intended to provide religious support for efforts to resolve
the war in Afghanistan. But the Pakistani clerics are refusing to
participate unless the Taliban are included, something that would be
impossible in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis also said they were unwilling
to participate in any conference if it could be seen as an endorsement
of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">An emergency meeting Monday in Islamabad between Pakistani and Afghan delegations seemed to make no progress.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“How come people can talk to the Taliban all over the world but
not in Kabul?” asked Tahir Ashrafi, chairman of the Pakistan Ulema
Council, a leading organization of Pakistani clerics, who was seen as a
possible leader of the Pakistani side of the conference. “We support
peace talks. But if we are to discuss peace, then how can you leave out
one of the parties to the war?”</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The proposed conference was
announced last month at a meeting in Great Britain between Karzai and
Pakistani President Asif Zardari, hosted by British Prime Minister David
Cameron.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><b>With virtually no chance that the Taliban will be
defeated on the battlefield</b>, a peace deal with the insurgents is
considered the most hopeful way of avoiding Afghanistan sinking into
chaos as the American-led coalition force leaves next year. Washington
is eagerly supporting the peace process. </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/02/11/182700/afghan-peace-plan-in-trouble-as.html">Continue Reading </a></span></span><br />
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<br />
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/02/11/182700/afghan-peace-plan-in-trouble-as.html#storylink=cpy</div>
James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-31979018177283297672013-02-08T19:07:00.001-08:002013-02-08T19:11:36.209-08:00Foreign Insensitivity Showers Yemen's Crisis<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Despite being publicized on several occasions during its multi-year operations, America's "secret" drone base in Saudi Arabia has flooded the international media cycle with recycled news and non-revelations. All that is being reported is the base's leading "architect," John Brennan, and the rationale behind concealing U.S. drones in Saudi Arabia. The location of the drone base itself - the only missing link - remains a mystery and doesn't alter the story greatly.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">U.S. imperialism in the Gulf is no secret, and neither is the cycle of warfare perpetuated by U.S. and Saudi policies in the region.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Whether or not Washington accepts al-Qaeda's creation as a response to U.S. troops in the Holy Land, this grievance connects a loop of propaganda and violence that won't broke so long as U.S. troops and war machines remain inside Saudi Arabia. The Obama administration, at least on the surface, even acknowledges this dilemma while pursuing an uncompromising course of action on the Arabian Peninsula. Karen DeYoung, who covers national security for The Washington Post, told NPR's All Things Considered that the administration kept the base off record "because of sensitivities in Saudi Arabia itself." False sensitivity is the result - knowing something is offensive but doing it anyway.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Because of their internal politics and because of what they see as their position in the Islamic world, they didn't want it published that they were allowing the CIA to actually occupy real estate inside Saudi Arabia."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Equally disturbing is the notion that Riyadh's interests, and not the average Yemeni's, dictates the information surrounding U.S. drone operations inside Yemen. Being bombed and monitored without recourse is frightening enough - opposing U.S.-Saudi air strikes and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) isn't mutually exclusive - without the internal threat. Flying drones out of Saudi Arabia, a popular enemy in Yemen, simply adds fuel to a long-standing fire and runs contrary to the essence of counterinsurgency. The base offers one example of why true COIN isn't being pursued in Yemen, as imperialism interferes with relating to the population.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Another insensitive act has also emerged on the horizon and, at this point, is less certain than the aforementioned injustice. On the positive side, Yemeni state media finally announced the participants and starting date for the country's National Dialogue after a four-month delay. The necessity of a conference is beyond doubt, but the same cannot be said for its prospects, and a tense situation could escalate further now that a new date has been assigned: March 18th.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This pivotal day rests at the heart of Yemen's ongoing revolution. Two years ago Saleh's security forces (including snipers) opened fire on Freedom Square in Sana'a, killing at least 52 protesters and wounding over a hundred. The massacre would bring the wealthy al-Ahmar brothers and their tribal militia into the streets, trigger the defection of Saleh's northern commander, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and squeeze the first statements out of President Barack Obama after two months of demonstrations. However no one was held accountable due to Yemen's gridlocked politics and the U.S.-sponsored GCC initiative, which granted Saleh and his family immunity from human rights abuses.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Now Yemen's National Dialogue is scheduled to open without any resolution to Saleh's crimes or restitution for the martyrs' families. While Ali Mohsen and Saleh's son, Ahmed, were reassigned by Transitional President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi in early January, they will also remain in their positions for up to six months and stand a good chance of receiving new commands. Thus the National Dialogue will unfold in the presence of Yemen's counterrevolutionary powers, reinforcing the obstructive influence that Saleh maintains in Sana'a. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">His General People's Congress (GPC) has even threatened to not participate in response to the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), which in turn accuses the GPC of interfering with the Dialogue's formation.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"We say yes to Yemen National Dialogue but within the right framework, not as a parody," GPC member Ibrahim Sharaf was quoted as saying on Wednesday, despite the fact that Saleh's party received the most seats of any political bloc.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">It's possible that the GCC and UNSC - meaning Riyadh and Washington - want more time to arrange a vacation for Saleh, as they did for Hadi's UN referendum in February 2012 (he returned to swear his VP in). However the likelihood of Saleh presiding over the National Dialogue's shadows remains too high for comfort. Only an exceedingly reckless move will turn UNSC threats of sanctions into reality, and sanctions aren't designed for accountability so much as control. As for the March 18th start date, The Trench is inquiring into the motivation behind this choice and hopes to obtain an answer soon.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">One theory: Hadi intends to contrast the positives of his government with the negatives of Saleh's regime, possibly through a grand gesture to recognize Yemen's martyrs. However anything less than accountability lacks the power to satisfy revolutionaries who remain leery of the National Dialogue, and outright distrustful of the international community for favoring Saleh's regime.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“He has a lot of money that he uses to destroy Yemen, harm the political process and execute vengeance,” Nobel Laureate Tawwakol Karman recently told The Associated Press. “The political transition process is not going according to the mechanism set in the Gulf initiative, which was imposed on us and we accepted it only on the condition that it will be fully implemented."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">She has suspended her participation in the National Dialogue until further notice.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The positions of various networks towards Yemen's dialogue underlines the geopolitical forces at work. Revolutionaries and tribal authorities disapprove of drones, believing that the immediate benefits of al-Qaeda casualties aren't worth the long-term risks to their sovereignty. They want the opportunity to combat AQAP themselves and have been marginalized instead due to their independence. The northern-based Houthis also want to join in theory but treat the process with entrenched skepticism. For years the sect waged an insurgency against Saleh's regime and Saudi forces (with U.S. assistance), pushing them to a stalemate, and Houthi leadership has trained their eyes on autonomy. Riyadh and Washington, however, reject this position and are extremely unpopular as a result.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Southern Movement is idling in a similar position as the Houthis, looking to enter a dialogue with the central government as another state rather than a political party. UNSC powers also rejects this act of self-determination in favor of "unity" - the same word used by Saleh to justify his oppression of the south - to protect their own interests. The U.S. stands to lose control of its assets in South Yemen, including the drones <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/29/where_the_drones_are?page=0,9">parked at Al-Anad Air Base</a> in Lahij province and the Special Forces training Yemeni personnel in the south, so unity is the only option available to the Southern Movement.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Washington and Riyadh prefer to stick a thorn in their side rather than aid their cause.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The U.S. media attention generated from civilian casualties misses the wider political interference transmitted by drones and their logistics in Yemen. Keeping drones operational and maintaining U.S. hegemony entails the alienation of the same populations that the Obama administration claims to support in their fight against AQAP.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-24657821589512937972013-02-06T16:29:00.000-08:002013-02-07T00:53:07.191-08:00No "Winning" In Yemen With Brennan<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://muftah.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Brennan.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="216" src="http://muftah.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Brennan.jpeg" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On Thursday, February 7th, a relatively quiet affair will unfold at the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington DC.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">His path to the top finally cleared by marital scandal, John Brennan is set to assume the CIA's Directorship after what should be a smooth confirmation before the Senate Select </span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Committee On </span>Intelligence. President Barack Obama's counterterrorism coordinator has been lauded as a tireless model of integrity, portrayed by the U.S. media as one of the President's closest advisers, and delivers the cost-efficient counterterrorism favored by the majority of Congress. Some Senators promise hard questioning - particularly in regards to torture policies, foiled terror plots and the constitutional legality of killing U.S. citizens in foreign countries - but Brennan and the Obama administration expect minimal objections to his promotion.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"There's no indication of any trouble," National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor said Monday.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Accordingly, few Senators are likely to challenge Brennan too deeply on the future of U.S. counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda's remaining networks (dubbed al-Qaeda 2.0), and this outcome is especially probable in a country where Brennan's unpopularity rivals al-Qaeda's. Never mind that his confirmation hearing is scheduled to revolve around the targeted assassination of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, whose case just resurfaced <a href="http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/05/report-memo-backs-u-s-using-lethal-force-against-americans-overseas/">in the form of a Justice Department "white paper"</a> that backs the use of lethal force. This topic, although highly relevant in general, skims right over al-Awlaki's Yemeni homeland and conceals the many gaps that prevent U.S. policy from establishing sustainable relations with its people.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This attention deficit will similarly disregard Brennan's personal approval in Yemen, a reckless way of overseeing an expanding "small" war that was never formally declared by Congress. The systematic bombing of Yemeni territory and any resulting civilian casualties - Brennan estimates few - has been attributed to his hands, and Yemenis rightfully expect the worst from his future actions. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">Speaking to The New York Times</a> in August 2011, Brennan defended the accelerated use of drones by claiming, "for more than a year, due to our discretion and precision, the U.S. government has not found credible evidence of collateral deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan or Iraq."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">If this statement was accurate, and independence evidence suggests otherwise, the argument still functions as a temporal loophole in Yemen. Dozens of civilians (including women and children) were killed by the administration's initial Tomahawk and drone strikes following the attempted Christmas bombing in December 2009, christening the front against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in disastrous fashion. Amnesty International later published <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/yemen-two-years-journalist-remains-behind-bars-after-alleging-us-cluster-bomb-use-2012-08-15">evidence of U.S. cluster bombs</a> and their lethal bomblets, and the Yemeni journalist investigating this event was jailed indefinitely under pressure from the Obama administration.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Brennan has repeatedly argued that U.S. counter-terror operations succeed when the U.S. "supports good governance that addresses people’s basic needs, when we stand up for universal human rights."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Human rights didn't make the agenda on October 14th, 2011, when al-Awlaki's 16-year old son Abdulrahman (a U.S. citizen with no proven involvement in terrorism) was assassinated following his father's execution on September 30th. Abdulrahman's death has never been fully acknowledged, investigated or explained beyond an "outrageous mistake." More civilian casualties would follow up to the present, including one high-profile bombing of a bus in Rada'a, and many Yemenis question the veracity of official statements announcing the deaths of "suspected militants." The New York Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/middleeast/with-brennan-pick-a-light-on-drone-strikes-hazards.html?pagewanted=1">recently published an account</a> of the August 2012 strike that killed Ahmed bin Ali Jaber, a cleric that denounced terrorism only to be bombed when AQAP came looking for him.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Suffering from a total lack of credibility, the latest uptick in Yemen's drone strikes has created the impression that Brennan is padding his stats before confirmation, a charge he that surely denies but cannot erase. In coordination with Brennan's hearing, Yemenis are organizing a Twitter protest - #NoDrones - to express their advice and ignored feelings to the Obama administration.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Furthermore, Brennan played an integral role in negotiating David Petraeus's secret arrangement with dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, which opened Yemen's skies to drones under corrupt and obscure terms. The unstable interchange between Saleh and the Obama administration manufactured numerous coverups (Saleh infamously promised Petraeus that he would take credit for U.S. air strikes, but exploited the collateral when things went wrong) and a "secret" drone base along the Yemeni-Saudi border, and seeded the ground for political hegemony during Yemen's revolution. Brennan was later deployed to assist the equally unpopular Gerald Feierstein, Obama's ambassador in Sana'a, in orchestrating the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement between Saleh's ruling party and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This agreement, among other injustices, offered immunity to Saleh for the very crimes committed jointly with the Obama administration.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Perhaps worst of all is Brennan's public and egotistical indifference to these issues, as this attitude suggests a continuation of the present course. At first the Obama administration's counter-terrorism team would ignore the rancor bubbling up from inaccurate drone strikes and local resentment, whether in Yemen or Pakistan. Following the triumphant killing of Osama bin Laden, the administration elected to take the offensive and began a media rollout of its legal argument for targeted assassinations, led by Brennan and Attorney General Eric Holder. During this phase Brennan rejected a <a href="http://www.acus.org/files/Yemen%20Policy%20Initiative%20Letter%20to%20Obama%206-25-12.pdf">cautionary letter </a>authored by Yemenis and foreign observers, demonstrating his inflexibility by arguing that drone strikes don't cause as much hostility as believed.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Contrary to conventional wisdom," <a href="http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-policy-toward-yemen/p28794">he told the Council on Foreign Relations</a> in August 2012, "we see little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits for AQAP."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Accompanying this statement were outlandish claims of a relationship that few Yemenis would recognize. Of course Brennan would never speak of his own role in the undermining of Yemen's revolution, and won't touch Abdulrahman al-Awlaki's death. He appears to have convinced himself that U.S. policy fully addresses Yemen's non-military needs, and supports the Yemeni people in their quest for political representation and universal rights. Flatly denied is the "suggestion that our policy toward Yemen is dominated by our security and counterterrorism efforts." Nor does Brennan acknowledge the widespread negativity directed towards Riyadh, Washington's partner in crime in Yemen.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Whenever I go out to Yemen, I invariably will go to Saudi Arabia, sometimes before and as well as after my visits there, because what the Saudis and the Yemenis want to do is to make sure that we're working this together."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">As a result, the Obama administration's public stance towards Yemen's people gives the impression that the White House is viewing an alternate reality, or else weighs political and military access with Yemen's transitional government above local sentiments. Left over is the pervasive feeling that U.S. economic support increased as a counterbalance to political interference and military operations; up to this point Brennan and the Obama administration remain unresponsive to Yemen's revolutionaries, activists, tribal authorities, common citizens and whole political blocs. Brennan and U.S. commanders of Special Forces go so far as to claim that "great progress" has been made in Yemen, and that "the corner" is finally being turned against AQAP.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Several questions immediately leap to mind, questions that won't be asked at the Senate's confirmation hearing. First, what happens if transitional President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi follows through on his public intention not to run for president in 2014? Will the U.S. lose operational access due to a less cooperative government, strong-arm this new government into submission or fly over its head? Will Hadi remain in power at the urging of Washington, and would another cooperative government pose the same threat to democracy as relations with Saleh's regime? More to the point, how can the solution to a problem be as problematic as the problem itself?</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Brennan represents the antithesis of democracy in Yemen and offers an ideal villain for AQAP's propaganda - so how can his image or strategies defeat al-Qaeda's ideology?</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-25500550281118608362013-02-05T23:12:00.000-08:002013-02-07T00:53:49.762-08:00Tunisia Opposition Leader Assassinated In Capital<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="color: red;"><b><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/20132683528345786.html">A grave turn of events in Tunisia</a> that will hopefully inspire renewed effort rather than new divisions:</b></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A top Tunisian opposition figure, Shokri Belaid, leader of the
left-leaning opposition Democratic Patriots party, has been shot dead as
he was leaving his home.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">He was transported to a hospital in the suburbs of Tunis on Tuesday, where he died of his wounds, his bother confirmed.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"My brother was assassinated. I am desperate and depressed,"
Abdelmajid Belaid said. The wife of the opposition leader, speaking to
Radio Mosaique, said he had been hit by two bullets.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Al Jazeera's Youssef Gaigi, reporting from Tunis, said the murder came as a shock for many in Tunisia.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"This was clearly a targeted killing of a high profile politician, the first of its kind in this country."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Ziad Lakhader, a leader of the Popular Front, an ally of the
Democratic Patriots, said Belaid was killed by bullets to the head and
chest; "Doctors told us that he has died. This is a sad day for
Tunisia."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="color: red;"><b>Vocal critic</b></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Belaid had been critical of Tunisia's leadership, especially the Islamic party Ennahda that dominates the government.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">He had accused authorities of not doing enough to stop violence by
ultraconservatives who have targeted mausoleums, art exhibits and other
things seen as out of keeping with their strict interpretation of Islam.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Government spokesman Samir Dilou called it an "odious crime".</span></blockquote>
James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-58233782155823657652013-02-04T22:36:00.000-08:002013-02-04T23:46:07.807-08:00Al-Qaeda Rises, Falls According To U.S. Politics<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/02/aq-map-1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="251" src="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/02/aq-map-1.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Last Sunday, The Washington Post <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/although-splintered-al-qaeda-still-poses-threat-to-us-interests/2013/02/02/21fdeee4-6c80-11e2-ada0-5ca5fa7ebe79_story.html">published a not-so-fascinating map</a> of al-Qaeda's diversification and decentralization from its previous headquarters in Pakistan and Afghanistan (although Osama bin Laden began jihad in response to U.S. troops on Saudi territory and Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands). The simplistic map is mis-weighted by an inaccurate assessment of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose prospects in Yemen remain on an upward "trend" despite losing territory. The insurgency is, at the least, treading sideways rather than permanently falling, and swapping AQAP would give three "green arrows" to al-Qaeda's core.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In any event, measuring the protracted nature of insurgency and terrorism in dualistic terms of "up" and "down" is the realm of mainstream media.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Washington Post offers few pieces of information that would catch the attention of international observers, but one startling figure is the high estimate of al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2,500. The largest operational count on the map (if roughly accurate) not only occurs within a country that al-Qaeda entered after American soldiers - al-Qaeda has maintained a presence in a war that was supposed to be over. Today the network allegedly struck again when a suicide bomber infiltrated the Sahwa - "Sons of Iraq" - headquarters in Taji, presumably as retaliation for the so-called Sunni Awakening. An estimated 340 civilians were killed and many hundreds wounded in January alone and, with Baghdad paralyzed by a power struggle between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sunni opposition, Iraq's violence stands to persist and possibly intensify.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">While al-Qaeda's ideology may be on set on a long-term "path to defeat," as the Obama administration and U.S. mainstream media continue to assert, an entire war has been declared over when it is far from it. This broken "promise" became the third leg of President Barack Obama's re-election campaign, illustrating how al-Qaeda's estimated strength varies in relation to the administration's political needs at a given time. Taking Syria into account adds a new dimension to this dilemma. Now the same war that is supposedly "over" is fueling a new war across the border and new fears in Washington, where concerns of al-Noura's influence have overshadowed other aspects of Syria's revolution.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The administration clearly wants these situations to cut both ways - Syria is new news, Iraq is old news. Highlighting accomplishments and concealing failures is standard practice.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Add al-Qaeda's operations Iraq and Syria to AQAP and, to a lesser extent AQIM's activities in North Africa, and al-Qaeda's momentum doesn't feel as weak as the Obama administration claims. This isn't to lobby in favor of escalation, but to advise against an endless campaign of militarizing Muslim states and the undermining of their peoples. In order to truly counter al-Qaeda's ideology over the long-term, U.S. foreign policy must invest in the political energy needed to compliment military operations and establish genuine relations with local populations.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Such a multidimensional policy remains sorely missing in <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/02/u.html">Yemen</a>, <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/u_23.html">Iraq</a>, Mali and Pakistan.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-68087435561537772832013-02-02T19:04:00.000-08:002013-02-03T13:36:54.888-08:00U.S. Accelerates Cycle of War In Yemen<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.acus.org/files/images/yemen%20protest.preview.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="http://www.acus.org/files/images/yemen%20protest.preview.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Hopefully U.S. officials will demonstrate a greater understanding of low-intensity conflict 100 years from now.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">With the tide of war seemingly turning for the better in Somalia and Yemen, two long-standing sources of concern for Washington, the National Defense Industrial Association’s 24th Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium provided a fitting venue to tout the effectiveness of U.S. counter-terrorism. Anchoring the event were two heavyweights of America's Special Forces - Navy Adm. William H. McRaven of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict - who reviewed the “innovative, low-cost approaches” being rolled out by the Obama administration.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This hybrid strategy of "small American footprints” and "building partner capacity" is widely praised by U.S. General Carter Ham, commander of AFRICOM, as the future of America's global counter-terrorism operations, and is currently being unveiled around Mali.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">One assumes that the Pentagon expects eventual success against the militant alliance dug into northern Mali, <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119150">given that Sheehan sees "good results"</a> in Somalia and Yemen. Recent developments in Mogadishu are admittedly significant and, if nurtured, could present a genuine opportunity to decelerate the country's vicious mixture of clan warfare, insurgency, terrorism and foreign intervention. As for the evolution of U.S. policy, the aftermath of Black Hawk Down would necessitate adaption and serve as the mother of invention. Proxies needed to be applied instead of U.S. ground troops, inside and outside Somalia, and within the multilateral framework demanded by multinational insurgencies.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Once Ethiopia's U.S.-supported invasion failed to pacify the country on their terms, the African Union finally took over and scaled up its mission with Western financing.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Three years of hard fighting, punctuated by U.S. drone strikes and Special Forces raids, have now driven al-Shabaab out of its urban bases and into a weakened state. Despite numerous outstanding political issues, such as clan representation and the territorial status of southernly Jubaland, a new government is in the process of jumping from transitional to legitimate. Of course America's (and the European Union's) "small footprint" has been stamped on Somalia for years: Special Forces on the ground, CIA manning Mogadishu's "secret" interrogation center, PMCs training Somali soldiers, flotillas along the coast and drone bases at its corners.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This network also comes with the "small" price of Ethiopia and Uganda's heavy assistance, reinforcing the non-democratic elements of partner building. However these issues have escaped the American majority and pose no real threat to Somalia's portfolio, hence the general success.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Equally unconcerning to the majority of Americans (but no less frightening) is an opposing scenario across the Gulf of Aden. Here Shehaan appears to be even more bullish about the prospects of U.S. special operations, using phrases that few Yemenis outside the government would apply to their country's situation. For years they have watched U.S. policy in Yemen revolve single-mindedly around the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and seen the group's influence expand over the same period of time. Yet the Assistant Secretary of Defense claims that, after several years of interrupted operations, U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel have finally helped Yemen's government “turned the corner" against AQAP.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“A year ago in Yemen," </span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Sheehan</span> told his receptive audience, "al-Qaida had taken over vast swaths of territory... and was really threatening the state in Yemen, and also threatening to re-establish some capabilities that were very problematic. Over the past year, we’ve made great progress in Yemen.”</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Denying the progress of intergovernmental relations between Washington and Sana'a is impossible. Until this past year, U.S. policy remained hitched to the corrupt and duplicitous behavior of strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh, who traded drone strikes for U.S. favoritism and shared intelligence only when his interests needed protecting (or his enemies needed bombing). He was even known to utilize local jihadists for his own ends, paying them or arresting (and later releasing) them in order to create artificial instability and secure U.S. funds/weapons. The Obama administration managed to replace Saleh with his vice president, Abd Mansur Rabbo Hadi, in response to a nation-wide revolution, and U.S. operations have smoothed since he assumed command in February 2012. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The time between December 2009 and 2012 verged on calamity though, and Washington's “partner building” would have failed spectacularly if continued under Saleh's regime. The Obama administration, in the end, lucked out during Yemen's revolution, but a sustainable partnership with its people remains absent.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">What McRaven and </span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Sheehan</span> didn't explain to their audiences is how U.S. policy contributed to AQAP's influence in the jihadist world and its local support with Yemen's tribes, brought on by unaccountable military operations in their lands. The Obama administration would ramp up vertically in response to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed bombing on Christmas 2009 and never look back. From the civilians killed by initial cruise missiles and drone strikes to Ma'rib's deputy governor Jabar al shabwani, to Anwar al-Awlaki's 16-year old son and younger civilians, the administration has struck with impunity during its hunt for AQAP leadership. All of these strikes were enabled by a secret agreement between Saleh and former CIA Director David Petraeus, then commander of CENTCOM, who passed along the arrangement to his nominated replacement, John Brennan. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Amid Yemen's revolution, construction of a drone base along the Saudi border was also reportedly accelerated from two years to eight months.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">McRaven says that all U.S. Special Forces <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119137">are invited by foreign governments</a> and don't operate without their permission - except this process can error militarily and trample over democracy along the way. The outbreak of Yemen's revolution would compel Saleh to distort the situation with AQAP, creating a false analogy that now serves as the driving rationale of U.S. policy. Beyond leveraging access to Yemen's air-space in return for political protection, Saleh relocated some of his U.S.-trained "counter-terrorism" forces to kill protesters and ordered others to stand down, which enabled AQAP's takeover of "vast swaths of territory" in Yemen's south.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Now the two governments must take back the same territory that they just lost due to incompetence, short-sightedness and greed.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">While greater cooperation with Yemen's government has been attained in the aftermath of Saleh's resignation, U.S. policy has also reached the depths of unpopularity with Yemeni civilians, activists and tribes. How much these factors offset military achievements is difficult to gauge, but the chain reaction is visibly evident. Yemenis universally cringed as President Barack Obama <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/brennan-dons-cias-death-mask-in-yemen.html">promoted a public enemy to bomb their country</a>. They reject foreign interference from Washington and nearby Riyadh, as does, coincidentally, AQAP. It's true that America is leaving smaller footprints in Muslim countries, only these boots are still relatively large and obtrusive, and they cannot defeat al-Qaeda's ideology without the help of Yemen's people. The Pentagon's argument is thus circular: U.S. counterterrorism is both poison and cure, but ultimately perpetual rather than remedial.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A recipe for low-intensity conflict in Yemen.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-24875170435547149132013-02-01T11:57:00.000-08:002013-02-01T01:03:13.547-08:00Taliban "Rift" Conceals Similar U.S. Divisions<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">As some parts of the Obama administration explore safe passage out of Afghanistan and Pakistan's harsh battlefields, other parts must remain on the offensive in their campaign against the Taliban network. This asymmetric task naturally extends beyond the military battlefield to global media, where the battle for Afghanistan is waged just as fiercely by the Taliban and NATO forces.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Both sides follow the rule of Propaganda 101: lead with truth and end in falsity.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/31/afghanistan-taliban/1880459/">Speaking to Jim Michaels</a>, USA TODAY's military editor, on the topic of Mullah Omar's "code of conduct," Pentagon official David Sedney says that Omar's order to avoid civilian casualties has agitated the foot soldiers that rely on IEDs and suicide vests to attack U.S. and Afghan convoys. This order was first given in response to the Obama administration incoming surge, as part of its own PSYOPS for Afghan "hearts and minds," but the operational side of Omar's tactic didn't fit with the Taliban's style of fighting. Unarmored guerrillas need explosives to counter NATO armor and penetrate security countdowns, and the constant nature of IEDs inevitably outpaces the civilian casualties from U.S. air-strikes and raids. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Sedney, a deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, paraphrased the thought process of an average Taliban gunman: "'You're telling us to keep fighting and we have no choice but to use those methods.'"</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"That's creating a lot of tension."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Pentagon is obviously motivated to announce its interpretation through the U.S. mainstream (and in a brief report with no alternative viewpoint). Faced with a disbelieving, war-weary public and the sobering reality that the Taliban isn't near capitulation, the Obama administration must pry inside the insurgency in order to generate negotiating leverage in 2013 and 2014. Effectively spreading division amongst the Taliban's long-term strategists could be a quick means of bringing pragmatic individuals into Kabul's political fold, or at least driving some foot soldiers into reconciliation programs.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"It's already clear that some parts of the Taliban are interested in a political solution," Sedney explains.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">However the Taliban are likely to unite against any Pentagon official, and Sedney's rhetoric appears to be aimed at Americans before Afghans. His points of friction are common knowledge to the Taliban and foreign observers alike; The Daily Beast and other U.S. media have covered the issue in relative detail by tracking down players in the Taliban's mid-level and senior leadership. The "very large losses" endured by foot soldiers is frequently cited as a main source of contention, and one can imagine the feelings of disgruntled or tired guerrillas as they question Mullah Omar's alleged home inside Pakistani territory. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Sedney and the Pentagon may be correct to assume, "The contrast between that and the life of the leaders who are staying in Pakistan has become even greater." Yet the Taliban remains operational and potent to this day - U.S. officials are engaging in PSYOPS precisely because the insurgency has maintained a resilience beyond Washington's public expectations. Unless the Taliban's leadership makes an exceptionally rash decision, few guerrillas out of some 25,000 will ultimately choose Kabul's authority and the presence of American soldiers over "The Commander of the Faithful." Most soldiers fight far from their supreme commanders anyway, and managing to assassinate Omar wouldn't guarantee their surrender. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Additionally, Omar's shura should be interested in a political solution because the Taliban lack the strength needed to openly defeat a conventional army. Stalemate is victory and political power the prize.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Omar's dilemma lies in the terms that Washington, at this point, refuses to give him: the withdrawal of every last American soldier, spy and war plane. Thus the Taliban is compelled to wage war until 2014 at the earliest, when its actions may force the U.S. into a smaller post-2014 role, and possibly beyond to secure control over its traditional territory. This policy could create the same political threat to U.S. influence that Muqtada al-Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah pose in their respective countries.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Nor is the U.S. position towards Afghanistan's hazardous negotiations any surer than the Taliban's. Three years after President Barack Obama's first surge troops landed in Kandahar and Helmand provinces - with the intention of "breaking the Taliban's momentum" and strong-arming Omar to the negotiating table - Ambassador James Cunningham recently told reporters that the “process that hasn’t even really begun.” Washington as a whole remains split over its options: negotiate soon or continue fighting until the Taliban's leadership softens its terms over a long-term U.S. presence.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The White House and Pentagon are also locked in disagreements over how many troops to leave, who to leave, how long to leave them, and the types of missions they will be assigned. This decision was initially expected in December 2012 and later discussed during President Hamid Karzai's stateside visit in mid-January, <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/near-zero-odds-for-afghanistans-zero.html">when an implausible "zero option"</a> was floated for political purposes. A final decision on the extension of U.S. forces hinges on a wide variety of competing factors in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad. The result is two opposing scenarios of equal instability: the U.S. will lose its military presence in the end, as in Iraq's case, or keep a military-intelligence force and continue fighting indefinitely until one side concedes politically.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Iraq's ongoing insurgency suggests that Afghanistan's war won't be ending when Obama says it will.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-85478211908874506682013-01-30T20:01:00.000-08:002013-01-30T20:01:00.813-08:00UN Face Masks US-Saudi Counterrevolution In Yemen<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://images.alarabiya.net/60/07/640x392_53741_262810.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="245" src="http://images.alarabiya.net/60/07/640x392_53741_262810.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><b><span style="color: red;">Yemenis march against Saleh's immunity agreement with the GCC and UNSC </span></b></span></span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_117" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_129" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_119" />The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently landed a team in
Yemen to assess the country's political situation and lend support to a
planned National Dialogue, which has been delayed several times since
its scheduled opening in November 2012. The busy delegation would hold
its own council with many of Yemen's political actors, including
President Abd Mansur Rabbo Hadi's transitional government, the country's
Military Committee and National Dialogue Technical Committee, and
representatives of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and
oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_113" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_116" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_115" />"We
believe that President Hadi's leadership has been instrumental in
driving forward the reforms necessary to make Yemen a more stable and
prosperous country," British representative Mark Lyall Grant said as
foreign sponsors met to discuss the progress of the Gulf Cooperation
Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_109" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_112" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_111" />The
UN's representatives surely arrived in Sana'a with good intentions to
aide Yemenis during a time of crisis and hardship. Assisting their new
president has become the pillar of international efforts to prevent
civil strife between Yemen's array of political actors, re-energize the
country's crippled economy, and roll back the influence of al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). To his credit Hadi has performed beyond
expectations in his quest to achieve independence from his former boss,
Ali Abdullah Saleh, and is gradually nudging the dictator's relatives
out of their political and military positions. Without Hadi's perceived
neutrality, Yemen's diverse set of actors would struggle to find an
individual capable of guiding the country through a National Dialogue.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_105" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_108" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />However
this same earnestness doesn't apply to the powers that these
individuals represent, and rarely has a UN mission been dominated by so
few powers. In reality the UNSC is minimally involved with Yemen's
crisis. The political transition that its officials speak of originated
in the back-channels of U.S.-Saudi relations, conceived with the
intention of salvaging the useful remains of Saleh's regime and the
influence they amassed within Yemen's government. The GCC's
power-sharing deal was initially crafted by U.S. and Saudi diplomats in
conjunction with Saleh's GPC and the equally unpopular JMP, as a means
of splitting power amongst themselves.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_105" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_202" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_107" />Left
out of the equation were the civil revolutionaries that forced
Washington and Riyadh to intervene against their cause of a sovereign
Yemen.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_101" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_104" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_103" />This
private agreement was eventually passed along to the GCC itself and
signed by Saleh in Riyadh, far from Yemen's street demonstrations,
before undergoing final ratification in the UNSC. Unlike in Syria or
Libya's geopolitical war zones, the UNSC's five permanent members had
already unified around the U.S.-Saudi position in Yemen and approved the
measure unanimously, adding the final veneer of international law to
the GCC's "initiative." Among those conditions endorsed by the UNSC:
immunity for Saleh and his family, the powers responsible for
mismanaging Yemen and attempting to violently suppress the country's
revolution.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_97" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_100" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_99" />UN
officials have argued otherwise at infrequent points, claiming that
those responsible for human rights abuses should face justice, but that
argument invalidates itself. <a href="https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10418.doc.htm">UNSC Resolution 2014</a>
accepts the GCC initiative and all of its conditions as the basis of
the UN-sponsored "political transition," a term used by foreign
officials in lieu of revolution. While Resolution 2014 "stresses that
all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses
should be held accountable," its legal wording is theoretical rather
than practical - Saleh and his crew "should" or "must" be held
accountable, but they won't be. Instead UN and U.S. officials surface on
occasion to remind certain "spoilers" that sanctions could be levied on
them, but only if they don't obey the powers in control of Yemen's
transition. The strongman and his relatives possess too much information
on U.S. and Saudi to see an international court or endure Western-Gulf
sanctions.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_93" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_96" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_95" />Coordinating
their actions with the UN's, Yemenis rallied over the weekend to hammer
their objective into diplomatic minds and repeat their demands to
prosecute Saleh for crimes against humanity.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_89" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_92" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_91" />A
letter written by Yemen's Nobel Laureate, Tawakkol Karman, delivered
the following message to the UNSC's delegation: "Though the GCC-brokered
deal, its implementation mechanism and UN Security Council resolutions
envisaged the departure of Saleh and his family from power and politics
in general, and despite the fact the deal has granted him immunity from
prosecution, Saleh is still leading the General People's Congress (GPC)
to take revenge at the political and public life in Yemen. Our people
and great youth are waiting for your resolutions to openly bind Saleh
not only to step aside as the chairman of the GPC, but also to quit
politics once and for all, or else the transition will either fail or
stall at best."</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_85" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_88" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_87" />To this end Karman has urged Hadi to quit Saleh's GPC and form an independent party.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_81" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_84" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_83" />The
Saleh family's immunity isn't the GCC and UNSC's only transgression.
These blocs conveniently arranged for Hadi to replace his boss after
serving for nearly 18 years as his vice president, a suspect trade-off
in itself. After being selected by foreign powers to maintain their
relationships, Hadi was then "elected" by a single-candidate referendum
and tasked to lead the country through a two-year political transition,
culminating in true elections in 2014. This policy continues to carry
its positives and negatives into the future, as Hadi has utilized every
ounce of strength and intelligence to hold the country together.
Problematically, he also serves as an obvious tool of Washington and
Riyadh, and <a href="http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10022404.html" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_239">has opened the skies to U.S. drones</a> in an effort to secure influence with the Obama administration.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_77" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_80" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_79" />The controlled transition that is supposed to prevent civil war serves a double purpose of maintaining Yemen's status quo.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_73" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_76" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_75" />Yemen's
National Dialogue has also been delayed for multiple reasons and, in
the best case scenario, won't be held until months after its original
date. On one hand a conference of this magnitude cannot begin until
positive conditions are established, but a handful of delays could
impact future electoral time-lines and reform policies. The main cited
problem is the exclusion (or inclusion, depending on the viewpoint) of
Yemen's Southern Movement, whose split leadership cautiously approached
the process and has yet to make a final decision. UN and GCC officials
have spent most of their energy trying to secure the South's
participation, and for good reason since a National Dialogue goes
nowhere with half of a country. Except the UNSC's position is determined
by powers that oppose South Yemen's secession and refuse to allow
self-determination; among the motivating factors is a loss of control
over al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in the south.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_69" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_72" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_71" />UNSC
Resolution 2014 begins by, "Reaffirming its strong commitment to the
unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen."
Responding to the UNSC's delegation, protesters gathered in the southern
port of Aden to reject its coercion and chant, "The decision is ours."</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_61" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_68" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_63" />Additionally,
the JMP has publicly refused to participate in the National Dialogue if
Saleh represents his GPC party, and the JMP in turn has interfered with
the youth's efforts to be represented. The most seats went to Saleh's
party, Southerners and JMP - in that order - leaving the youth and
women's movements with leftover crumbs (60 combined seats out of 565).
As a result, Yemen's civil movement has encountered disagreements over
how deeply to participate and receives little attention from the
international community. The country's northern-based Houthi sect has
remained similarly ambivalent about a National Dialogue; its thirst for
autonomy mirrors the outright hunger in Yemen's south.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_65" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_60" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_67" />A
national summit is badly needed and clearly preferable to violence, but
its current state is likely to inflame tensions and divisions rather
than alleviate them. Yemenis must also be left to their own choices
rather than be forced by foreign hands.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_57" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_64" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_59" />Yemen's
present situation combines the local dilemmas of sharing power with the
international dilemma of hoarding influence, and cannot move forward
until numerous preconditions are established. Otherwise a dialogue
stands a high chance of collapsing or becoming irreparably corrupted by
self-interests (think Bahrain), at which point Yemen will continue along
a dangerous course until 2014's wildcard elections. According to UNSC
Resolution 2014, the implementation of the GCC's power-sharing agreement
"is essential for an inclusive, orderly, and Yemeni-led process of
political transition." Unfortunately this statement fails to conform
with reality or else the whole initiative would be altered - or it may
not exist to begin with.</span></div>
<div class="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_144" id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_55" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br id="yui_3_7_2_16_1359591928143_146" />Until
Washington, Riyadh and their proxies elevate sovereignty to the top of
Yemen's agenda, long-term hegemony will cast a destabilizing shadow over
the country's future.</span></div>
James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-56895601525913608182013-01-29T10:56:00.000-08:002013-01-29T02:14:38.451-08:00U.S. Drone Base Headed For North Africa<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/sites/default/files/nfs/uploaded/u25930/2011/pic_corner_PB_061412_malibig_0.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="248" src="https://www.nationalreview.com/sites/default/files/nfs/uploaded/u25930/2011/pic_corner_PB_061412_malibig_0.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">After months of speculation that concrete plans would begin to take shape, the theoretical <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/us/us-plans-base-for-surveillance-drones-in-northwest-africa.html">is finally nearing reality</a> in an undecided North African location.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">For more than a decade U.S. military and intelligence officials have laid the groundwork of a "light" but vast network across the Sahel region, chasing al-Qaeda affiliates that have spun off their own franchises. In order to counter impressions of colonialism, utilize local forces and intelligence, and keep large numbers of U.S. troops off the continent, this process hinges on bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with cooperative African states. Included are a series of joint forward operating bases constructed through the Sahel, and training programs between national and U.S. forces.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The same program that failed amid Mali's coup and left Washington to patch together a emergency response, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html">as reported by The New York Times</a> earlier this month: "American spy planes and surveillance drones have tried to make sense of the mess, but American officials and their allies are still scrambling even to get a detailed picture of who they are up against."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The next logical step of a bigger presence in North Africa is drone bases in friendly (and needy) countries, and that is where the Obama administration and its partners are headed. Neighboring Niger has been designated as the leading candidate - few African leaders have urged a quicker NATO intervention than President Mahamadou Issoufou - followed by Burkina Faso. The latter currently serves as the base for clandestine PC-12 surveillance aircraft.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The military necessities of a drone base or, more likely, a series of bases around Mali is clear enough. American military commanders and intelligence analysts have good reason to complain about “sorely lacking" information in northern Mali, a territory roughly the size of France and many times more extreme. This environment has already created hurdles for logistics and overflights, and plays into the hands of militants in control of mountainous desert until international air-power scales up (at which point guerrillas lose their advantage).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The task will increase in difficulty when Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in North Africa (MUJAO) fall back to their mountain bases along the Algerian border.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">America is the only state capable of delivering the level of surveillance required to effectively coordinate African ground forces with Western air power; eliminate U.S. support and NATO's mission in Mali will collapse. However U.S. officials won't be as candid about the litany of questions and concerns that drones entail. Suffice to say, drone bases function as instruments of control and are never built without strings attached. This manipulation goes both ways too, especially when an unpopular government makes use of U.S. support to buttress its international standing (Yemen and Ethiopia being primary examples). Some observers suspect that Issoufou is operating along these lines.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Mali's conflict has now afforded the perfect opportunity to begin building the first of several "lily pads" in the desert, a plan that is designed to synchronize with greater numbers of U.S. Special Forces and intelligence operatives. U.S. officials say that the drones will fly unarmed over Mali, but Mali is bigger than Mali to both the international community and al-Qaeda's ideology. Each side is thinking in decades, not months or years, and U.S. drones will eventually be armed. Consider the force brought to bear in Yemen, a smaller and more accessible country that houses a similar number of al-Qaeda militants.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Everything is a matter of time in North Africa. A NATO intervention in Libya that, according to the opinion of U.S. intelligence, overwhelmed U.S. military planners in Mali is now being trailed by a spine of bases into the Sahara. Within the alleged chaos lies a chain reaction so precise and efficient that it belies the region's unpredictability.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-79683353329469715732013-01-28T14:14:00.000-08:002013-01-28T16:18:32.188-08:00Counting Down to 2014 in Afghanistan<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><b><a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175642/tomgram%3A_ann_jones%2C_the_afghan_end_game/">By Ann Jones, published at Tom's Dispatch:</a></b></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Kabul, Afghanistan -- Compromise, conflict, or collapse: ask an Afghan what to expect in 2014 and you’re likely to get a scenario that falls under one of those three headings. 2014, of course, is the year of the double whammy in Afghanistan: the next presidential election coupled with the departure of most American and other foreign forces. Many Afghans fear a turn for the worse, while others are no less afraid that everything will stay the same. Some even think things will get better when the occupying forces leave. Most predict a more conservative climate, but everyone is quick to say that it’s anybody’s guess.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />Only one thing is certain in 2014: it will be a year of American military defeat. For more than a decade, U.S. forces have fought many types of wars in Afghanistan, from a low-footprint invasion, to multiple surges, to a flirtation with Vietnam-style counterinsurgency, to a ramped-up, gloves-off air war. And yet, despite all the experiments in styles of war-making, the American military and its coalition partners have ended up in the same place: stalemate, which in a battle with guerrillas means defeat. For years, a modest-sized, generally unpopular, ragtag set of insurgents has fought the planet’s most heavily armed, technologically advanced military to a standstill, leaving the country shaken and its citizens anxiously imagining the outcome of unpalatable scenarios.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />The first, compromise, suggests the possibility of reaching some sort of almost inconceivable power-sharing agreement with multiple insurgent militias. While Washington presses for negotiations with its designated enemy, “the Taliban,” representatives of President Hamid Karzai’s High Peace Council, which includes 12 members of the former Taliban government and many sympathizers, are making the rounds to talk disarmament and reconciliation with all the armed insurgent groups that the Afghan intelligence service has identified across the country. There are 1,500 of them.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />One member of the Council told me, “It will take a long time before we get to Mullah Omar [the Taliban’s titular leader]. Some of these militias can’t even remember what they’ve been fighting about.”</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />The second scenario, open conflict, would mean another dreaded round of civil war like the one in the 1990s, after the Soviet Union withdrew in defeat -- the one that destroyed the Afghan capital, Kabul, devastated parts of the country, and gave rise to the Taliban.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br />The third scenario, collapse, sounds so apocalyptic that it’s seldom brought up by Afghans, but it’s implied in the exodus already underway of those citizens who can afford to leave the country. The departures aren’t dramatic. There are no helicopters lifting off the roof of the U.S. Embassy with desperate Afghans clamoring to get on board; just a record number of asylum applications in 2011, a year in which, according to official figures, almost 36,000 Afghans were openly looking for a safe place to land, preferably in Europe. That figure is likely to be at least matched, if not exceeded, when the U.N. releases the complete data for 2012.</span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175642/tomgram%3A_ann_jones%2C_the_afghan_end_game/">Continue Reading</a></span></span></blockquote>
James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-54145437173187104292013-01-26T20:13:00.000-08:002013-01-26T23:25:16.204-08:00Iraqi Protests Highlight U.S. Insensitivity To Asymmetry<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">If a government genuinely seeks to deescalate a political confrontation with its citizens, opening fire on a rally entitled "Friday of No Retreat" would not be part of its agenda. Iraq's Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, believes otherwise: that he has limited need for support outside his Shia base, and that he can maintain power through his second term regardless of the opposition massing against him. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">On Friday al-Maliki's security forces (he unconstitutionally holds the Interior and Defense Ministries) fired into an enormous anti-Maliki rally in Fallujah, killing five protesters and wounding at least 40. This dangerous omen of future events also extracted a small amount of "concern" from one of al-Maliki's foreign allies.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"We are concerned about the use of deadly force during today’s protests in Iraq," the State Department's Victoria Nuland <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/01/203286.htm">told reporters after Friday's shooting</a>. "We understand that the Iraqi Government has now issued a statement indicating that they are initiating a very prompt investigation into the incidents, and that they have called for restraint by security forces. We obviously stand ready to assist in that investigation if asked, but we would also say that as the government and government forces show restraint, the demonstrators also have a responsibility to exercise their right to protest in a nonviolent manner, as well as to continue to press their demands through the political process."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">More obvious is the fact that the White House wasn't prepared to respond unless prompted to, whereas the same outburst in neighboring Iran or Syria is liable to trigger a harsher critique. An established pattern of U.S. bias can be traced back <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/12/iraqi-opposition-turns-up-heat-on-al.html">to the start of Iraq's latest outbreak</a> of demonstrations, one determined by the Obama administration's personal relationship with al-Maliki - which connects a direct line of responsibility to Washington. As the White House has been unresponsive to Iraq's two-year crisis between al-Maliki and a diverse opposition of Sunni, Shia and Kurdish actors, so too has the Obama administration taken another pass on the protests that have sprung from this gridlock. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">At no point have protesting Iraqis been seriously addressed by the Obama administration or international community.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Instead they have been ignored, or else told to refrain from violence and engage in "dialogue" with the uncompromising Premier. Two weeks ago Martin Nesirky, spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, <a href="http://www.un.org/sg/spokesperson/highlights/index.asp?HighD=1/8/2013">told reporters</a> that Martin Kobler, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, had "called on the protesters to refrain from violence and to maintain the peaceful character of their demonstrations." Nesirky added that Kobler expects Iraqi security forces to exercise "the utmost restraint in maintaining law and order," and hopes that all sides “engage without delay in a peaceful and constructive dialogue... in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution and Iraqi law."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Nuland <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/01/202436.htm">stated on January 3rd</a>, "Again, I think I said that we have been concerned about incidents of violence that – by various parties. And so we are again making it clear that if protests are peaceful, that’s one thing, but if there are incidents that incite violence or that are violent on any side, that would take Iraq backwards.”</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This thinking is demonstrably backwards. While citizens generally have a responsibly to express their political beliefs and demands peacefully, Iraqis don't occupy an ordinary position. A majority didn't vote for al-Maliki's coalition and have no interest in his leadership, but are stuck with a tyrant until the opposition can remove him through political means. Al-Maliki's second term is a product of his savvy, the Iraqi opposition's inability to unify the necessary numbers to sideline him, and the foreign powers - mainly Washington and Tehran - that assisted in returning him to office. Iraqis have been shut out of Baghdad's political process and suppressed by their own government, therefore civil disobedience and low-intensity violence become legitimate political expressions. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In terms of dialogue, al-Maliki's unconditional grip on various Iraqi ministries, agencies and courts invalidates a dialogue "in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution and Iraqi law." As The Trench has repeatedly pointed out, these demands are non-negotiable and should not be treated as such by foreign diplomats. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Ceding his unconstitutional powers should be a precondition for a dialogue on national issues.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Attempts to compare protesters' actions with the governments' are similarly inaccurate; the responsibility to abstain from violence rests on the government before individual citizens. Diverging accounts explain why security forces began shooting, but both outcomes are inexcusable. Witness and government accounts claim that protesters began throwing rocks and other objects at Iraqi soldiers deployed to maintain order (and intimidate protesters), forcing them to defend themselves. Other Iraqis said that the soldiers opened fire after ordering protesters to stop filming their rooftop positions around al-Etisam Square.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In either case, oppressed citizens are within their natural rights to throw stones and don't deserve to be shot with live ammunition. Disproportionate force is a common tool - and a common weakness - of authoritarian regimes.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Efforts to equate two unequal levels of violence are more concerned with slandering anti-government protesters than maintaining peace and security. Al-Maliki would reinforce his counter-narrative by announcing that Fallujah's events didn't surprise him, and cited the "conspiracies" of regional intelligence services, Baathists and al-Qaeda's Syrian cohorts as the sources of instability. Anything and anyone except his own poor leadership. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">An anonymous official at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad also says that the Obama administration "expressed concern that the protesters' peaceful expression of their viewpoints must not be usurped by extremists trying to provoke violence."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">These political tactics are doomed to escalate Iraq's crisis, endanger lives and further weaken U.S. influence in the country, wasting any benefits gained by U.S. and allied forces. The Obama administration has no visible intention of providing responsive and unbiased mediation. U.S. policymakers simply wish that Iraqis would stop protesting, return home and allow al-Maliki to complete his second term uninterrupted.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-1738328177430555992013-01-24T23:04:00.000-08:002013-01-24T23:04:00.178-08:00Ansar Dine Split Clouds Mali's Netwar<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In their quest to create larger and more organized structures than their individual parts, non-state actors (both military and civilian) are driven by necessity to connect with like-minded groups and their own hierarchies. Unless commanded by strong central leadership at the network's hub, they generally assume flatter shapes that make them harder to kill but easier to divide - especially in insurgency environments where everyone has interests to pursue. The benefits of netwar can evaporate as quickly as one network breaks away from another, and time will soon tell how much Mali's Islamist alliance suffers from division.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Speaking to the Associated Press on Thursday, former Ansar Dine official Alghabass Ag Intalla has announced the creation of a new all-Malian Tuareg front: the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). Ag Intalla had initially chosen Iyad Ag Ghaly's newly-established Ansar Dine over the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) during their joint takeover of the north, locking down the Kidal region that both call home. The urgent question is whether Ag Intalla's intentions are sincere. Chafing under Ag Ghaly's authority would be natural for multiple reasons; Ag Intalla is considered a moderate Muslim and the heir to Kidal's tribal leadership. Just as the ambitious Ag Ghaly has involved himself in the Tuareg movement to the point of several failed takeovers, Ag Intalla doesn't want to take orders from someone else.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“We are neither AQIM or MUJAO,” he said, referring to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa. “We are a group of people from the north of Mali who have a set of grievances that date back at least 50 years.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Ag Intalla's actions are believed to be driven by French air-strikes in the Kidal region, the first phase of bombardment on AQIM's catacomb bases located along the Mali-Algerian border. This must be partially true if his loyalist forces reject fighting and dying for "al-Qaeda's war," but Ag Intalla is also working a deal with international mediators and seems to expect his terms to be considered. For months African and European diplomats had used him in their attempts to pry Ansar Dine away from AQIM and MUJAO, with the intention of jelling it back together with the MNLA. Except Ag Ghaly was <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/12/malis-islamists-toying-with.html">never serious about negotiating</a> - later deemed a "miscalculation" by foreign sources - and instead offered MNLA fighters <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/11/aqim-mujao-localize-with-tuareg-brigade.html">an ultimatum to join or die</a> before storming their last towns with AQIM and MUJAO's assistance.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Ag Intalla and his foreign handlers presumably reached out to each other when the French landed last week in Sevare, and the first details are now going public.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Accordingly, French officials say they are taking Ag Intalla at his word until his actions prove otherwise. They likely trust his immediate motivation to distance himself from al-Qaeda's flag, but they expect the type of rapid assistance that could shorten Mali's operation and win praise at home. Demanding that they "prove it on the ground," one anonymous diplomat said that Paris is looking for the IMA to "free up territory" and work with the Malian army in Kidal. Plugging into Ag Intalla's local network should ease the burden of fighting the Islamists' embedded positions in Mali's rugged north, so one can understand how eager the international community is to flip him.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">For his part Ag Intalla claims his men are prepared to fight Ansar Dine and its allies. Less clear is his willingness to cooperate with the MNLA; forming a new group suggests a loose relationship, but they may be forced together by the circumstances. Also uncertain is the long-term effects on the Islamist alliance. Can Ag Ghaly afford to target Ag Intalla and risk provoking his own Tuareg base? Does Ag Intalla possess enough strength to confront Ag Ghaly and his allies head on? Will other groups splinter off and create a web of networks operating on competing agendas, and will this patchwork facilitate or obstruct a political resolution to the north's conflict?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">And what if Ag Intalla wants what the international community isn't prepared to give any Tuareg: autonomy or independence? This current situation, like everything else in Mali, is shrouded in a fog of asymmetric warfare.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-75598475355775837632013-01-23T22:39:00.000-08:002013-01-23T23:47:04.978-08:00U.S. Closes Eyes To Iraq's Crisis<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The run-up to President Barack Obama's second inauguration triggered the usual landslide of puff pieces from mainstream media, some grading and others rounding up Obama's first-term achievements. Nearly all invariably listed the ending of Iraq's war as one of his foremost accomplishments; the tough-grading Washington Post <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-performance-on-campaign-promises/2013/01/19/d4eacce4-5e92-11e2-90a0-73c8343c6d61_story.html">counted as Iraq as one of few kept promises</a>.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">However the President himself glided over the country and its sister in the "War on Terror" on Sunday, simply announcing, "A decade of war is now ending."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">More truth than meets the eye is captured in this short sentence. The outer core is utterly false, designed by the Obama administration to score political points with his Democratic base and conceal the fact that Iraq's war has yet to end. This tactic of simultaneous attention and distraction worked perfectly during his campaign, but the price has been extracted directly from U.S. policy in Iraq. As The Washington Post notes, "Since the drawdown, violence and political instability persist in Iraq." Only the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces is accurate, and Obama is technically correct when announcing the end of U.S. military involvement.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">A long war is over for Americans - just not Iraqis.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">How many lives have been lost since U.S. troops withdrew in December 2011 is subject to the competing estimates of government and media sources. They agree that multiple thousands of Iraqis have been killed, and many thousands more wounded, by an ongoing campaign of suicide bombings, IEDs and shootings. The last six months were particularly deadly; <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-30/iraq-violence-surges-amid-corruption-u-dot-s-dot-report-finds">in October 2012</a>, Washington's special inspector general to Iraq found that violence "during the last quarter rose to levels not seen for more than two years." 1,048 casualties were recorded in September, the highest total since 2010, and the proceeding months brought no respite. Iraq Body Count counted at least 230 fatalities in November and 250 in December, <a href="http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/recent/3/">raising 2012's total to 4,557</a>.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">As bombings and shootings continue to plague the new year - striking from Mosul to Fallujah to Baghdad - a recent wave of attacks have underscored the multi-dimensional conflict facing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government. Following Monday's shooting of a well-connected Turkmen, a suicide bomber infiltrated the man's funeral at the Sayid al-Khurmatu mosque in Tuz Khurmatu and detonated in the middle of a crowd. The death toll stands at 45 and could rise higher, pushing January's total above 250. Ali Hashem Oghlu, the deputy chief of the Iraqi Turkman Front and a provincial councillor in Salaheddin, was injured in the blast.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">“We demand to have international forces to secure us, for the Turkmen and our areas,” Faid Alla, the head of a Turkmen tribe, announced from the carnage. “We are being targeted and our existence in Iraq is very dangerous and we are under genocide. The central government is doing nothing for us.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">In terms of U.S. policy, assigning responsibility for Iraq's ongoing breakdown of diplomacy and security extends back to the war's beginning. While the current period of instability was easy to predict - al-Qaeda's front announced its intention to go underground, reorganize and emerge after U.S. withdrawals - America as a whole lacked the credibility to stay when the Obama administration needed to rework a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq's government. Such a task was impossible from the start, given that al-Maliki lacked the votes to pass an extension through parliament, and any attempt to force an extension would perpetuate attacks on Americans and Iraqis. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Yet the Obama administration is to blame for mishandling al-Maliki, misleading the American people, instigating and then disengaging from Iraq's crisis.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Beyond Iraq's regular violence lies a greater source of instability, a dilemma encapsulated by the gathering protests against al-Maliki and the Obama administration's lackadaisical response. The heated protests of Sunni, Shia and Kurd represent a enormous amount of energy accumulated by their collective marginalization, and are fueled by long-standing grievances of political and economic marginalization. Iraq's opposition has also made costly errors during its attempts to outmaneuver al-Maliki. At the same time, U.S. involvement in the recent handling of these grievances has further contributed to Baghdad's political gridlock. Having lobbied for al-Maliki's second term during the 2010 Irbil Agreement, which stipulated leadership positions for several Sunni officials (including Iraqiya chairman Iyad Allawi), the Obama administration failed to hold al-Maliki accountable for reneging on the agreement's terms.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">For starters al-Maliki has retained personal control the Interior and Defense Ministries, a luxury that foments the impression of his private militias and their sectarian targets. Allawi never received a position of national security. By the time that al-Maliki visited the White House in December 2011 to mark the withdraw of U.S. forces, Iraqiya was already knee-deep in a boycott of his cabinet <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2011/12/obama-caught-in-iraqs-4gw.html">when Obama welcomed him</a> as "the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq." Obama's remarks were promptly dismissed by Sunni and Kurdish officials, including Vice Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2013/01/u.html">and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani</a>, and the ensuing fallout would produce more tremors between al-Maliki and his opponents.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Obama administration largely ignored Iraq's crisis throughout 2012, breaking silence only when forced by the circumstances and rejecting personal responsibly. Except this policy, if it can be called such, cannot hide from the country's destabilization at the security and political levels. The two areas are interconnected: effective leadership by al-Maliki, not an extended deployment of U.S. troops, was the best medicine to reduce the country's violence. In the absence of representative and impartial leadership, al-Maliki's concentration of power and preoccupation with his opponents has encouraged al-Qaeda's attempts to divide Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">His sweeping arrest of the bodyguards serving Rafi al-Essawi, Iraq's Finance Minister, served as the catalyst for Iraq's ongoing wave of demonstrations.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The facts surrounding al-Essawi's case leave nothing to mystery. One of the most vocal opponents of al-Maliki's rule, the Finance Minister would join Allawi and Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi in authoring a New York Times hit-piece on the Premier. Wasting no time <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/12/al-maliki-fires-new-shots-at-iraqs.html?m=1">after his chief bodyguard was arrested</a> for conspiring to murder Shiites, al-Essawi immediately called for mass protests and found a ready body in Iraq's diverse population. Although Sunnis would form the backbone of protests in Anbar province, Kurdish and Shia leaders quickly rallied to al-Essawi's defense as they picked up the banners of their own causes. Of course Sunni tribes have provided the sheer numbers needed to compliment the protesters' diversity.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">This trend became evident at the end of December 2012 when the Dulaim tribe, Iraq's main Sunni body, <a href="http://hadalzone.blogspot.com/2012/12/iraqi-opposition-turns-up-heat-on-al.html?m=1">joined the action</a> and rallied its network to Samara. Haitham al-Haddad, head of the Ashraf tribe, <a href="http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=56481">now claims</a>, "All the tribes of Samarra are participating. There are 25 tribes from Samarra, and 10 to 15 of their allied tribes."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Any easy way out of Iraq's crisis is a mirage - too many Iraqis hold al-Maliki personally responsible for their marginalization and low standard of living. Protesters have denounced the exploitation of anti-terror laws by al-Maliki’s Shia officials and demanded the release of thousands of political prisoners. Al-Maliki has started here to relieve pressure on his government, deploying Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani to apologize and release nearly 2,000 prisoners (half on bail). Problematically for him, protesters refuse to be appeased and have instead pressed forward, calling for the release of all Sunni political prisoners and the non-negotiable resignation of al-Maliki.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The positive sign is that Shia, Sunni and Kurd appear ready to cooperate under more responsive leadership, but al-Maliki can only be removed by a no-confidence vote and new elections. The chaos of this option is feared by both sides of the conflict, negating the possibility in the near future. What is needed from the Obama administration is more truthful and public diplomacy. Calls for dialogue and private U.S.-Turkish diplomacy has led nowhere since the proper environment hasn't been cultivated, and the administration's refusal to take ownership of its mistakes applies more friction to U.S. policy.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"Obviously, we’re concerned about increased political tensions inside Iraq," the State Department's Victoria Nuland <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/01/202738.htm">told reporters on January 11th</a>. "We have continually met with people on all sides, calling on them to exercise restraint, to respect the right of peaceful expression, to talk to each other, to engage in a broad national dialogue on the issues that divide them, and particularly that all parties ought to avoid any actions that subvert the rule of law or that provoke ethnic and sectarian tensions or risk undermining the significant progress that Iraq has made or the Iraqi constitution, which is obviously very carefully and delicately balanced. So we will continue the advocacy efforts in that direction that Ambassador Steve Beecroft makes every single day with Iraqis of all stripes."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">These types of statements are half-aimed at Iraq's protesters, when in this case Washington must intervene directly; instead of "negotiating" with al-Maliki, his hands must be pulled off the Interior and Defense Ministries. The current arrangement violates the U.S.-mediated Irbil Agreement and poses an unconstitutional threat to Iraq's democracy, thereby leaving nothing to discuss with the opposition or foreign diplomats. From here al-Maliki's opponents may be able to be defang him, or else his resistance will provide further justification to oppose his rule.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Unfortunately the Obama administration remains unwilling to let go of its dictatorial partner or the myth that Iraq's has ended.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1571201204115952544.post-56459474126394852532013-01-22T19:02:00.000-08:002013-01-22T17:21:03.610-08:00Info-Battle Over the Playstation Generation of War<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">That war is first taught as a game is no secret. For thousands of years young males have been introduced to war through figurines, wooden swords, wrestling, races and similar means developed by their fathers, whose own war games train themselves for the real thing. More recently, 20th century flight simulations and technological advances have blended with consumer electronics to transmit war onto a screen, both outside and inside the battlefield.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"It's a joy for me because I'm one of those people who loves playing PlayStation and Xbox, so with my thumbs I like to think I'm probably quite useful," Britain's Prince Harry said during interviews <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/harrys-not-dirty-hes-crazy-taliban/story-fnd134gw-1226559649253">released upon his return from Afghanistan</a>.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Explaining his four-month role as co-pilot of an Apache attack helicopter, Harry described the thrill of emergency response and the weapons systems he controlled in the gunship's two-man cockpit: Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, rockets and a 30-millimetre gun. Such statements are hardly surprising or shocking, but asymmetric warfare is fought along information lines and consumes anything in its path. Despite being cleared by the Ministry of Defense, Harry's comments quickly attracted negative press (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/prince-harry/9818680/Prince-Harry-must-muzzle-himself.html">targeting his princely qualities</a>) and spurred a few grimaces on the MOD's own face.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"I'm not going to second guess whether he should or shouldn't have said it," spokesman Jim Murphy told the Guardian. "He's obviously a young and brave man. He was candid. Perhaps he may have been more candid than the Palace may have wished."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">The Taliban naturally pounced on Harry's statements after failing to kill or capture him as promised. Spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid announced that, "49 countries with their powerful military failing in the fight against the mujahideen, and now this prince comes and compares this war with his games, PlayStation or whatever he calls it." Easily assailing the Prince for the flippant perception of his comments, Mujahid's counterattack appealed to any Afghan who loathes the notion of Afghanistan being treated as a game board for Westerners - from Britain and Russia's "Great Game" in the 1830s to the Soviet and NATO invasions nearly 200 years later. In this sense the disrespect of a "game" is very real in Afghanistan.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">"This is a serious war, a historic war, resistance for us, for our people," Mujahid says.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">However Harry's interviews are unlikely to make any immediate impact in Afghanistan. His testimony only confirms a new technological phase of an established pattern in war, and most Afghan civilians won't react as though he just murdered an innocent family or burned a Quran. Efforts to connect Harry's "mental problems" with the prolonged nature and brutality of Afghanistan's war may have more effect in Western countries than Afghan villages. Even Mujahid admits, "we don't take his comments very seriously, as we have all seen and heard that many foreign soldiers, occupiers who come to Afghanistan, develop some kind of mental problems on their way out."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">More dangerous is the impetus to stage new Taliban attacks on Western targets in Kabul or elsewhere, which will be attributed to Harry's statements. Another factor to monitor outside Afghanistan is the public opposition of American video games set in foreign countries. These war games strike a cord with a variety of individuals, both the politically liberal and religiously conservative, who don't relate to the glamorous gamer side of war. The Trench has spoken with Yemenis who view Black Ops II's use of their country as gratuitous (<a href="http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=yemen%2C+this+week&oq=yemen%2C+this+week&gs_l=youtube.3..0j0i5l3.674.3364.0.3622.16.16.0.0.0.0.148.1171.9j6.15.0...0.0...1ac.1.mg4PYnSuMDM">try searching Yemen on YouTube</a>), and some Pakistanis are beginning to <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/pakistan-bans-call-duty-medal-honor-article-1.1245152">organize a boycott against Call of Duty</a>. Although the influence of these games on actual battlefields is minimal, public perceptions are crucial in counterinsurgency's wider scope and cannot be ignored at any size.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Any American force that generates anti-Americanism in a counterinsurgency environment is cause for concern.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Most disturbing are the long-term potentialities of advanced technological warfare: namely the gradual removal of humans from the killing process. Advocates of automated warfare argue that humans maintain control of the machine, a defense that is largely true for the moment but could break down over time. Drones may be more or less corruptible to enemy actors than humans; the process of this military experiment should be chaotic. Ultimately, whole fleets of drones could be concentrated in the hands of a small group or even one individual, further removing the human element from war. Drones could also be armed with weapons of mass destruction in the future.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;">Dehumanization is a constant theme of war - humanity might not be able to kill as it does without it. Problematically, all of these concerns and many others won't be eagerly addressed by Western governments or mainstream media.</span>James Gundunhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16141055666432969361noreply@blogger.com1