Islamic Network Outpacing International Blocs In North Mali

Mobility is the essence of guerrilla warfare for all sides of an asymmetric conflict. Those actors that move fastest - on the military and non-military battlefields - emerge on top of their foe. The general objective for a smaller force is to outmaneuver, disperse, confuse and sever a larger force, which has resulted in the advanced technologies designed to track insurgents and terrorists. This arms race cannot be extinguished as long as conventional and unconventional forces enter the same spheres of influences, and each side enjoys advantages over the other.

In the case of northern Mali's Islamic trio, who have no use for international legalities, foreign powers are gasping to catch up as they dodge obstacle after political obstacle.

Last week the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), with assistance from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claimed victory over the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the northeastern border-town of Malaka. The assault was staged as part of a wider campaign to drive the MNLA out of every position MUJAO and AQIM can locate, before the MNLA can assist the international force that is scheduled to arrive sometime next year. The MNLA has yet to concede defeat, instead countering that it killed many MUJAO fighters, because the loss of Menaka is a substantial blow.

This same process has now repeated in Lere, situated on the opposite side of northern Mali, after MUJAO and Ansar Dine encircled the camp for a week. MNLA spokesman Mohamed Ag Attaye admitted that the group's fighters had finally retreated to a base north of the town, similar to the MNLA's withdrawal from Menaka. Where the MNLA's parts will head next is uncertain; they will likely be forced north until they can regroup and stage an effective attack on the Islamists. Reports of their reinforcements have become semi-regular occurrences, as AQIM and MUJAO are drawing from Africa's regional jihadist network to secure northern Mali's population belt.

Holding Menaka and Lere also grants the Islamists control of northern Mali's entry points, in addition to Mali's section of the Niger River. This environment can be used for all sorts of guerrilla operations, from smuggling recruits to moving equipment to staging ambushes, and opens the possibly of river warfare.

Equally important is Ansar Dine's participation in Lere's siege. The group has entered into preliminary negotiations with the MNLA, arranged by Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré on behalf of the United Nations and African Union, and even promised rid Mali of drug-trafficking, kidnapping "foreigners." However this outreach appeared hollow from the beginning, a basic guerrilla tactic to stall for time and influence Mali's overall narrative. To the point, AQIM commander Abu Mosaab Abdulwadood just released a videotape appealing to Malians and warning against intervention: "It can be solved internally, through reconciliation between Muslims, without having to shed a single drop of blood."

It's difficult to foresee any advance in negotiations after the simultaneous attacks on MNLA positions, meaning an international force likely to meet a three-headed hydra when it lands.

Western capitals are fortunate to enjoy relations with multiple political blocs in Africa. One wouldn't be totally wrong to speculate that the developing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo is beginning to suck oxygen from Mali's response time. The pace of Mali's international plans is already running sluggishly due to the country's internal disputes, and the external shortfalls created by Libya's intervention and Syria's contingency planning. Now the DRC is further splitting the UN and AU's attention. The resulting irony has limited America and Europe's capacity to act in the immediacy, contrary to their long-term political and military plans for North Africa. Washington in particular intends to build "training" relationships with governments in the Sahel, complete with support bases, but the scale of Mali's crisis exceeded U.S. expectations.

As the situations stand, Western capitals have tasked a member the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to mediate between the DRC and M23. That leaves the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to remain focused on northern Mali, but doesn't necessary alleviate the brain-drain on Western capitals or AU, which must respond to both crises. Meanwhile the Islamist network in northern Mali continues to freely expand and entrench, and victory is the best recruiting tool available to a foreign force. The locally-minded MNLA has fallen to Mali's losing side, overwhelmed by the same momentum that attracts fighters from across Africa and the Middle East.

These moves further increases the pressure on the UN, AU, ECOWAS and NATO to rush an already risky intervention.

Uganda Plays Major Bluff On UN, AU, US

Leaks and international blocs have a natural way of combusting, Thursday's developments in Uganda and Somalia being a typical example.

Following the discloser of a UN report that accuses Uganda of supporting the March 23 Movement, a military faction now at war with the Congolese government, Ugandan officials have threatened to pull roughly 6,000 troops out of Somalia and other neighboring states. Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi announced his decision to Parliament, describing the allegations as "baseless, unfair and malicious."

“Where is the evidence? Is it acceptable that an organ of the UN should falsely and carelessly accuse a member of the UN in this way, using either amateurs or malicious actors dressed up as experts?”

Mbabazi explains an alternative that, if roughly true, helps to understand Kampala's indignation. He claims that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the DRC's President Joseph Kabila and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region first requested assistance from Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni. Museveni organized four dialogue rounds and funded three in Kampala, a process supported by the UN and African Union. Mbabazi also attempted to clear the air over several cases of defected and refugee soldiers, saying that most were transported back to the DRC and a few remain imprisoned in Uganda. Whatever happened during the last seven months of M23‘s revolt, an emboldened Kampala has targeted "some actors in the UN system" that "do not understand that there can be principled actors in Africa, not looking for gold and other minerals, like the imperialists who invaded Africa, did."

Accordingly, Mbazai informed parliament on Thursday night, “We have now decided, after due consultations with our brothers in the AU and the region, to completely withdraw from these regional peace efforts; that is to say DRC, Somalia and others. It is no longer plausible for Uganda to assist and get malignment as the reward.”

Reporting from Kampala, the BBC's Catherine Byaruhanga says that Uganda's prime minister and security minister, Muruli Mukasa, have both called the decision "irreversible." This situation clearly poses a real challenge to the AU's mission in Somalia (AMISOM), however the threat of withdrawal doesn't appear to go beyond a high-stakes bluff. Rather, Kampala wants to clear its name in the DRC and seems to be angling for even greater influence with select Western capitals. Museveni currently enjoys the protection granted by spearheading AMISOM's ongoing military campaign, a deal similar to U.S.-Ethiopian relations. Ugandan troops are also cooperating with upwards of 100 Special Forces personnel searching for Joseph Kony around the Great Lakes Region.

Mbabazi himself clarified that Kampala would consider reversing its decision on two conditions. 1: “The UN must sort out the malignments against Uganda by bringing out the truth about Uganda’s role in the current regional efforts." 2: “Our African brothers in the region should quickly pronounce themselves on these malignments against Uganda.”

Somali and African officials express doubt in a full-scale withdraw. Still, one of the last problems that Somalia needs is friction between Uganda and the UN. No military interruption would be as devastating. The loss would certainly halt AMSIOM's momentum and threaten every territorial gain made over the last two years; beyond providing the most combat troops, Uganda also supplies AMISOM with air power and has fielded all of its leading commanders. AMISOM would implode without a replacement force of equal capabilities. This possibility is one of a few that gives al-Shabaab a genuine opportunity to reestablish itself in Somalia's west and south, and could threaten Mogadishu itself.

A back-room apology may soon go public with these interests on the line.

Politico-Military Battle For Kismayo Begins

Under the guise of night and the surveillance of Western intelligence, Kenyan forces seized the beaches of Kismayo on Friday in pursuit of Operation Linda Nchi's primary objective. The assault culminates an 11-month grind over some 120 miles and was supposedly planned at a level "never before seen" in African military history. What exactly is taking place in Kismayo depends on who's talking, but Kenya's government is clearly flanking al-Shabaab on Somalia's propaganda lines.

"Mission Accomplished," reads the front page of Kenya's Daily Nation.

Speaking from Kismayo rather than his usual podium in Nairobi, army spokesman Cyrus Oguna offered his version of the unfolding Operation Sledge Hammer and its run-up. He claims that Kenyan airstrikes and AU ground troops deceived al-Shabaab in preparation for a sea landing, an undertaking that required three days of clandestine mobilization up Somalia's coast. Four transport ships (including Nairobi's newly-restored flagship, KNS Jasiri) dropped their ground units five miles north of the city, to give Kenyan troops first dibs on Kismayo, with helicopter gunships and Northrop F-5 warplanes applying their own superiority on the ground. Oguna told reporters that the bulk of al-Shabaab's new casualties are attributed to Kenya's aerial and naval power. Aside from these forces, a contingent of Special Forces landed at Kismayo Airport (located south of the city) and is fighting to secure the area.

"Kenyan military planners duped Al-Shabaab into believing that a land invasion of their last remaining bastion of Kismayu was imminent before making an amphibious landing from the sea," the Daily Nation writes.

While the insurgency may have been unable to predict the final point of Kenya's assault, independent accounts from within the city paint a more fluid situation. Witnesses initially told the BBC, Associated Press and Reuters that Kenyan, AU and Somali troops have yet to enter the city, contrary to Oguna's claim that "we are controlling three quarters of the city." Al-Shabaab has responded with light resistance in Kismayo's northern sector and will likely employ mobile tactics from the surrounding forests. They cannot afford to skip a counterattack entirely. More disturbingly, Kenyan air-strikes have reportedly killed and wounded an undisclosed number of civilians; capturing Kismayo first entails protecting the population.

However there is no reason to doubt the majority of Oguna's information: “We have sufficient ground and naval forces in Kismayu as we speak." AMISOM has brought such a high level of force into the port that al-Shabaab cannot be expected to wage conventional warfare. Even unconventional warfare will present a challenge against AMISOM's superior force, which coordinates with several local militias and Kismayo's clan leadership. Among them, the Ras Kamboni Movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, a major player that held Kismayo's governorship for the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) before Ethiopian troops invaded the country in 2007. This loose end is one of many lingering uncertainties in the overall equation of Kismayo's post-Shabaab governance.

Days, weeks or months may pass before the city is truly cleared and, it should be noted, al-Shabaab has lost the port several times before. The latest reports have now cleared the city of militants, according to residents and a statement from al-Shabaab commander Sheikh Mohamed Abu-Fatma. He tells the AFP, "We got orders from our superiors to withdraw from the city... this is part of a broader military tactic we have set for the enemy."

Forfeiting the city will land another blow against the insurgency, especially when considering the relative organization of AMISOM's resources and political strategy, but al-Shabaab's nationalist core is more likely to reintegrate than disintegrate into Somalia's environment.

The Pre-Battle for Kismayo

Rumored for several days on Twitter and local media, dozens of news organizations are now proliferating local accounts of al-Shabaab's retreat from the Somali port of Kismayo. These reports, in the words of Kenyan army spokesman Col. Cyrus Oguna, hover between “partly true” and true. African Union and Somali troops are currently engaged in their "final military offensive on al-Shabaab's positions in the Kismayo corridor," with AMISOM'S main force prepared to advance from Birta-dher (24 miles west of Kismayo) at any moment.

Oguna wouldn't give reporters a "specific date for marching on Kismayo," only that "it will be soon and the assault will comprise of ground, air, and naval forces."

Due to these developments and the gradual encroachment of Kenya's air and naval forces, both civilians and al-Shabaab's officers have fled the city to other areas of southern Somalia. Eye-witnesses claim that al-Shabaab's younger recruits patrol Kismayo's streets under the distant guidance of leaders who are "fleeing toward various locations, some are going north, some are going into the forests." Commanders allegedly disappeared from their tea shops and took their radio transmitter with them. As a result, Oguna says that AMISOM is cautiously expecting minimal resistance from a leaderless force. al-Shabaab's overall leadership is also too divided to organize a spirited defense in the face of overwhelming numerical and technological forces. Snipers, boobytraps, and ambushes could mark the extent of a relatively short urban battle.

“We do not anticipate stiff resistance as we get into the city because the main commanders are leaving," Oguna told reporters. "We do not expect the junior forces to fight without their commanders.  So we expect minimal resistance as we get to Kismayo.”

For their part, al-Shabaab's Twitter feed denied all thoughts of retreat while a local commander told The Christian Science Monitor by telephone, “these are all fabrications that we are leaving.”

Whether or not al-Shabaab manages to hold out longer than expected, the battle for Kismayo's governance will exceed the military battle as local clan interests compete with regional influence (Kenya and Ethiopia). The inability to negotiate a quick resolution of Kismayo's authority would contributed to the delays in Kenya and AMISOM's schedule, and Somalia's new government must cooperate with or fend off external interests. As for al-Shabaab, Oguna theorizes that Kismayo's commanders are headed for Jilib, located across the Jubba river some 90 miles to the northeast. From here they will have to consult with the insurgency's leadership, which allegedly resides around Baraawe, and make a strategic decision on their future tactics and political position. The group can only operate freely in roughly 1/8th of the territory it possessed at the beginning of 2010 (a triangle between Jilib, Baardheere and Baraawe), nor should they attempt to earnestly hold the rest.

This situation is both similar to and diverging from Ethiopia's occupation between 2007 and 2009. al-Shabaab has far less credibility now than 2006, when it rallied a generation of jihadists around the promise of an Islamic state, or after Ethiopia's disastrous exit. The insurgency may not be able to recover in its present form, and a rebranding campaign and internal shuffle may precede a looser phase of guerrilla warfare. The most practical plan would likely attempt to exhaust AMISOM's financial and military capacities before Somalia's new government can restore national order.

Further observations of Kismayo's battle and its aftermath will be posted as more information becomes available.

al-Shabaab Defections Inching Closer To Reality

For months the following rumor has been just that, but timing is beginning to push it into the realm of plausibility.

A slew of intelligence released by the Kenyan government is marching the African Union's Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) to the southern port of Kismayo, bringing its forces to the edge of the military and information battlefields. Kenyan troops are reportedly preparing their final advance on Kismayo and will enjoy significant air/naval cover as they encounter any resistance from al-Shabaab. To their south, Ugandan and Burundian units await orders to move out of their advance position at Harbole, located between Afmadow and Kismayo. This information has been offered freely with the intention of deterring an organized counterattack and broadcasting Kenya's achievements to the world, a tactic that is yielding success on both levels.

Government propaganda aside, independent and civilian reporting correspond to the account of Kenya Defense Forces spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna. Following last weekend's battles around Afmadow (Miido and ), al-Shabaab's local commanders had allegedly expected a pause in AMISOM's activities and found themselves surprised by the bloc's advance towards Kismayo. Losing two locals commander in an airstrike further disrupted the group's immediate decision-making, and the defection of 200+ fighters in Afmadow appears to have broken any semblance of resistance in Kismayo.

"We have information that the insurgents are fleeing towards the south by boat and by road. There is a lot of movement because they know that Kismayu must fall," Oguna said, who added that AMISOM is conducting aerial surveillance of their movements.

At this point an observer may begin to finally believe in the rumors that anticipate a split between al-Shabaab's nationalist and transnationlist leadership, which may or may not include a rebranding effort. Interestingly, two interlocking developments have been posited as the motivation behind a name change to Munadamat Ihyaul Somaliya. While Kenya's government attributes this possibility to al-Shabaab's military disarray, other sources claim that the leaking of Munadamat Ihyaul Somaliya is itself responsible for renewed hostilities between Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Sheikh Moktar Ali Zubeyr Godane. Robow, al-Shabaab's leading nationalist personality, has been attempting to disconnect from Zubeyr's transnationlist agenda for several years, yet he still distrusts Zubeyr's efforts to rebrand al-Shabaab on his own terms.

Zubeyr's deputy, Abdullahi Yari, also stands accused of only distributing funds to al-Shabaab's foreign fighters, a common grievance.

Tensions are boiling after the two sides again failed to reach a consensus on the insurgency's future. Beyond its usual problems, Zubeyr's faction has grown even more suspicious of Robow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in light of alleged contacts with the Somali National Army. The elder Aweys in particular is considered the most likely candidate to defect, having battled Zubeyr as an outright enemy before being coerced into joining al-Shabaab. He was likely left out of the State Department's "Rewards for Justice" program to keep him politically eligible, while Robow hopes that his clan ties will preserve his useful to Mogadishu.

Local analysts also suspect that Zubeyr "formally" merged with al-Qaeda in order to tarnish al-Shabaab's nationalist leadership, thereby disqualifying them from negotiating.

They may have to move fast if they truly expect to rid themselves of Zubeyr's authority, as each side is suspected of plotting assassinations against the other. Whatever they decide, Robow and Aweys will eventually be forced to choose between a rebranding campaign against the new government, and crossing over in exchange for favorable terms. Inactivity is not an option.

4th-Generation Battle Rages Around Afmadow, Somalia

Balancing the inherent long-term demands of counterinsurgency with the expensive threat of mission creep presents a leading challenge in COIN. Another challenge, geared more towards the observer, is sorting battle lines and troop movements on both sides. Afmadow, Somalia rests at the intersection of both dilemmas. Three months ago Kenyan and Somali forces seized the town with minimal resistance from al-Shabaab, roughly seven months after three Kenyan battalions entered southern Somalia. Problematically, Nairobi has yet to move out of Afmadow despite setting a now-expired public goal to reach Kismayo by August's end.

The town, which lies some 70 miles from Kenya's border and 50 miles west of Kismayo, is caught between waste and potential.

Targeted as the main stopover to Kismayo, the larger of al-Shabaab's two remaining ports, Afmadow was conceived as the midway to Somalia's coast. The town sits along the Lagh Dara tributary of the Jubba River, making it a natural choke point between Somalia's mid-region and Kismayo. From here Kenyan forces planned to stage a pincer assault in coordination with a southern unit moving up from Ras Kamboni. The country's second rainy season helped put an end to a speedy advance on both fronts, inducing domestic concerns over Operation Linda Nchi's timing.  Nevertheless, Kenyan forces still maintain a heavy advantage against al-Shabaab and have no choice except to gradually progress through southern Somalia. Failure to consolidate all cleared territory, including Afmadow, would play into the insurgency's advantage by maintaining active rear-lines.

For months Kenyan officials have searched for the correct moment to move out of Afmadow and towards their final destination, but al-Shabaab's lingering presence ultimately obstructed their public statements. Now recent events suggest that something is about to give: al-Shabaab's fortifications or the African Union Mission In Somalia's (AMISOM) time-line. Seemingly consolidating Afmadow's final pockets of al-Shabaab's territory before moving out, AMSIOM and Somali government troops advanced into Agah Libah and the Birta Dheer district last Wednesday, reportedly under the air cover of Kenyan warplanes and assault helicopters. The pro-government Raskamboni Movement also participated in the operation, demonstrating the three-headed network that AMISOM and Mogadishu have cast across the south.

Two days later AMISOM forces met resistance upon entering Miido, located 10 miles south of Afmadow.

"This was a brave and important operation conducted by the AMISOM forces in lower Juba," Force commander Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti. "Securing the strategic town of Miido will allow the local community to rebuild their lives free from the terror and tyranny imposed by Alâ-ÂShabaab. I pay tribute to the bravery and commitment of all the soldiers involved in this operation. AMISOM is committed to protecting hard won security gains to ensure Somalia continues on the road to a sustainable peace."

Although al-Shabaab received the worst of both confrontations and cannot fight effectively against AMISOM's level of force, the insurgency appears to be mounting a conscious counteroffensive under the realization that Kismayo is next. No town taken by Kenyan forces has been initially defended, but the port could be the one spot that al-Shabaab decides is worth fighting for. If so, proper depth would begin a counteroffensive away from Kismayo in order to slow an advance towards the city. Interestingly, these battles have unfolded just as viciously in the media and on Twitter, offering at least one window into the minds of both sides.

"Afmadow remains in the full control and security of AMISOM troops," Gutti responded to opposing rumors. "Al-Shabaab has issued untrue and baseless propaganda suggesting otherwise. It is a desperate attempt by Al-Shabaab, misrepresenting the realities on the ground where AMISOM troops are providing security and stability to allow the local population to carry on with their normal lives, free from the fear, intimidation and violence propagated by Al-Shabaab."

In coordination with AMSIOM's statements, Somali spokesman Adan Ahmed Hersi announced that Kismayo "would be captured in the coming days." Meanwhile Sheikh Hasan Yaqub Ali, the spokesman of al-Shabaab’s administration in Kismayo, predicted that the port's capture is "just a dream." The final outcome will likely fall in between, but Kismayo's battle could be as large as advertised and might begin this month (the latest reports indicate an operation before September 20th's presidential election). A high level of force and determination is being directed towards the area and neither will have any more space or time to give at the coast. All Africa's conclusion included The Trench's: "some military analysts have stated that the battle for Kismayo could be dragged on for quite some time due to miscalculations by the allied forces that have been battling Al Shabaab in southern Somalia since October 2011."

Nairobi's military situation isn't necessary disadvantageous. The development of Somalia's new government and Kismayo's stability were bound to require more time than foreign capitals allocated, and Somalia cannot shake its friction over several years. The more AMISOM's mission creeps, though, the more room opens for unstable factors.

AMISOM Gradually Encroaches On Kismayo

An early dawn operation conducted by the African Union's Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali auxiliary forces has finally liberated one of al-Shabaab's ports. "Captured" with limited resistance from the insurgency, Merca has now been placed under nominal government authority for the first time since 2008. The town is equally vital to policing Mogadishu's sphere of influence, as al-Shabaab's commanders would take refuge in the port, and to the AU's grander plans of clearing the entire Somali coast.

The fight for Kismayo could be just as light, given al-Shabaab's realization that it cannot wage conventional war against the African Union (AU). However the group's leadership may feel the urge to resist in the face of other defeats, and defend its main port with an intensity that has yet to be seen in its nation-wide withdrawal.

Weeks or even months might pass before anyone witnesses a tangible answer. Contrary to reports that Kenyan and other AU troops would begin assaulting Kismayo before the end of August, its residents must continue their anxious wait under a thickening fog of war. A battle was supposed to erupt at any point of the month, according to Kenyan officials, but Nairobi has been unable to synchronize actions with rhetoric since Operation Linda Nchi began in October 2011. At least one scheduled attempt to clear the port was aborted and AU reinforcements have been summoned for extra weight. The loss of three Ugandan helicopters tasked to support AU forces pushed the mission's nose further into the dirt, chewing up more time.

From Linda Nchi's beginning, The Trench observed that Kenyan forces entered as part of AMISOM's grand strategy to evict al-Shabaab from Somalia's urban centers. Unable to stretch its forces over the whole country before August's transitional process, Ethiopian and Kenyan units deployed in the west and south in a patch-work formation with AMISOM (Kenya has since joined while Ethiopia chooses to maintain operational independence). This positioning had the effect of reversing Kismayo's priority from first to last; instead of heading directly to the port, AU forces planned to capture all of al-Shabaab's urban territory before converging on one of Somalia's largest cities.

AU forces still have a ways to go before reaching Kismayo. With Merca now behind them, they must advance another 100 miles south to al-Shabaab's other secondary port of Barawe, where resistance could be heavier. Locals claim to have spotted the group's leadership in the area, namely Sheikh Mukhtar "Abu Mansur" Robow Ali, Sheikh Fuad "Shangole" Mohamed Qalaf, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubeyr "Godane" and his in-house rival, former Hizbul Islam commander Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. As the commander of al-Shabaab's transnationlist faction, Al-Zubeyr has reportedly established roadblocks and stocked desert training camps with local recruits, along with those foreign fighters that haven't fled to Yemen, Mali or other safer areas.

Another 100+ miles separates Barawe from Kismayo. Barring a surprise attack, a clearing operation must wait until September at the earliest and possible the one-year mark of Kenya's entry into Somalia.

Silver lining can be found in this delay though. Taking Kismayo before a new government can establish itself poses a greater risk to Somali civilians and AMISOM's strategy, and AU forces might not reach their positions until Mogadishu sorts out its political process. The capital is experiencing predictable growing pains as Somali politicians, clan elders, businessmen and warlords attempt to influence the selection of a new president and parliamentary speaker. However, now that August 20th has already passed, AMISOM can forgo its schedule and delay an operation until Somali's new government begins to officially coalesce. Removing the imposed deadline can free up the operation's unrealistic pace, allowing AMISOM to gather an appropriate level of force and minimize the risk of prematurely governing Kismayo.

Otherwise the area, which will remain saturated with al-Shabaab, could fall victim to local factionalism or political ambitions stemming from the pursuit of an autonomous Jubaland (also known as Azania).

"The capturing of Kismayo and, more importantly, returning it to proper Somali authority other than al-Shabaab is an important objective," David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia, recently explained. "I am not in a position to judge the likelihood of this happening in the coming months. It was an early Kenyan objective last year but did not happen. I doubt that Kismayo will be taken easily; it is equally important to identify appropriate Somali forces who can then keep al-Shabaab from retaking it. Long-term occupation of Kismayo by foreign forces is a bad idea."

Downed Ugandan Helicopters Postpone Kismayo Assault

In preparation for the African Union's (AU) long-awaited offensive on Kismayo, the largest Somali city still operating under al-Shabaab's authority, Kenyan naval forces have commenced a new phase of bombardment on the port. The latest shelling by an "unidentified naval ship" left three civilians dead and four injured, triggering UN warnings of an imminent battle for the contested delta.

“We have anticipated this one could be one of the larger battles and again, there's a large civilian population, there's a large IDP [Internally Displaced People] population and they are very likely to get caught up in that fighting,” said Justin Brady, head of the U.N. Office for Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] in Somalia.

Problematically for AU powers and the transitional government that they are trying to defend, the assault on Kismayo just suffered another delay and is unlikely to commence before the target date of August 20th. The AU's plans have already bogged down in the friction of conventional and asymmetric war; Somalia's second rainy season literally sunk Kenyan armor into the mud soon after Operation Linda Nchi launched in October 2011. The ripple effect forced Nairobi to miss a planned offensive in February, timed to Ethiopia's entry on Somalia's western front, and Kenyan soldiers have also inherited the humanitarian care of Somalis now living in their rear-lines.

A lack of funds presents another obstacle to capturing and holding Kismayo (Kenyan officials have requested Western financial assistance), while plans to establish a new political authority remain incomplete.

Now an air-block threatens to further delay the AU's offensive. Last week Lt. Moses Omayo, spokesman for the Uganda Air Force, informed Reuters that combat helicopters had been deployed to provide cover-fire over Kismayo. According to African and Western news sources, the Ugandan military spent three months preparing the aircrafts and their support system for operations in southern Somalia, more evidence that Nairobi requires extensive AU assistance to secure Kismayo. Unfortunately for all involved, Ugandan and Kenyan officials have confirmed that three Russian Mi-24s crashed en route to their destination. The helicopters went down in the vicinity of Mount Kenya's numerous peaks, above the Mi-24’s 4,500 meter ceiling, and they could bring Kismayo's assault down with them. The fourth air-craft of the unit, an Mi-17 transport helicopter, landed safely in the Kenyan border town of Garissa, but "commanders organizing the operation have since been recalled to the Kenyan capital Nairobi to rework plans for the long-awaited attack."

"Government will re-examine itself and assess its capacity as to whether to continue with the deployment," General Odongo Jeje told reporters.

Al-Shabaab naturally gave credit to Allah: "They planned, and while they perceived not, Allah destroyed them and their old, reconditioned helicopters."

Given the strategic need to wrestle Kismayo from al-Shabaab, and now Uganda's urgent political need to demonstrate its military capabilities, the AU's plans remain green-lit despite repeated setbacks. Most available evidence indicates that an offensive will begin after Ramadan, sometime at the end of August or beginning of September. Months of military buildup and naval shelling will intensify in accordance with the ground assault, but one Kismayo resident told Voice of America that "there is no sense in the town that a major battle is about to happen." Separately, a spokesman for the Kenyan-allied Ras Kamboni militia argues that the AU's assault was delayed over "political reasons" rather than military shortages.

"We are avoiding a situation where we capture a town and people fight over what clan should be in charge of a specific area," said Abdinasir Serar. "We are working closely with clan elders to avoid clan clashes. You don’t want a situation whereby al Shabab is taking advantage of disorganization in an area. We have to move very carefully so that al Shabab won’t have any opportunities to exploit."

Serar's advice is fundamentally sound. For years Kismayo's clan leadership has resisted al-Shabaab, going so far as to evict the group before Ethiopian troops could arrive. Yet the inefficiency of Somalia's government has left the port at the mercy of al-Shabaab, whose commanders vacated the city under the realization that they can return with ease. Recent reports also suggest that the group's commanders moved out of the area and left the resistance to their subordinates. They will likely mount a limited counteroffensive inside the city before taking the battle into its jungle outskirts, although eyewitnesses claim that the group is ordering clan elders to donate hundreds of recruits. Other sources claim that al-Shabaab is preparing another withdrawal and a heavier shift into guerrilla warfare.

Whatever the case, clearing the city won't be as difficult as administering it; the AU must ensure that an organized local force awaits al-Shabaab's return.

The most practical near-term strategy for governing a post-Shabaab Kismayo is a local transitional council, but this arrangement will consume a great deal time and may turn out lopsided in the end. Serar's statements thus hit the COIN mark, highlighting a key factor that is infrequently discussed in the media. He can't diminish the collateral of Uganda's crashed Hinds, however his promise to begin an offensive before the end of the month sounds doable. Nairobi in particular can't afford to wait much longer.

One year in Somalia and no Kismayo won't play well on the home front.

Info-Battle Over Somalia’s “Roadmap”

On the third day of Hillary Clinton’s nine-day Africathon, the Secretary of State dedicated a part of her stopover in Nairobi to Somali President Sheikh Ahmed Sharif and other members of the expiring Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Clinton would praise the government’s progress towards meeting “all the requirements of the roadmap by the August 20 deadline,” including the formation of a new parliament and constitution. Many Somalis and analysts, however, don’t share the view of foreign powers who they accuse of interfering in Somalia’s national affairs.

These counterarguments encapsulate many of their observations.

Somalia: The consequence of a cooked constitution

By Dr. Sadia Ali Aden, published in NewsTimeAfrica

Indeed nations need constitutions; a social contract to establish rule of law and become the foundations for needed legislations to protect the individual rights as well as the nations from greedy and corrupt politicians that may abuse the power vested in them. Furthermore, constitutions are needed to outline the domestic boundaries of authority and safeguard the sovereignty of the state. Constitutions are not always perfect; however, under such circumstances they are not entirely replaced. They are simply amended, but not in Somalia.

Somalia had one of Africa’s first democratically ratified constitutions. In 1961 the constitution of the newly independent nation was ratified by an overwhelming popular support of the citizens of a newly formed Somali nation state. So, one might ask, what prompted the new “provisional” constitution that was passed on August 1, 2012?

Anyone who has been following the Somali political saga even from a distance knows that there has been a huge controversy that surrounded the new constitution. He or she would also know the force and urgency that instigated, drove, and made it mandatory item in the Road Map was the international community (IC), or more specifically, the Ghost-lords or the elements within the IC who benefit from business as usual. While the fanfare in certain circles is somewhat fathomable, the absence of local and international media scrutiny is appalling.

This latest constitution does not only raise red flag in the outrageously pricey $60 million that the UNDP claims to have spent on it, but it affords the platform to further polarize the Somali society and aggravate the existing wounds that could give rise to renewed conflict. This is simply a reinvention of the status quo.

To give the new constitution certain domestic authenticity, Ghost-lords outsourced its plan to a few corrupt Somali politicians who were motivated by money, prestige, or political survival. Their task was to repeat what they were dictated to, without questioning its legitimacy, and convince the unsuspecting populace of that the new constitution was for their protection as people and a nation, and that it was essential for lasting peace. Since, as they say, the devil is in the details, the new constitution was shrouded in mysteries of secrecy for a long while. When the constitution was finally endorsed there were several versions or drafts that kept the average person in a state of confusion and frustration.

Moreover, according to BBC Somalia analyst Mary Harper, the constitution appears to exist in a parallel universe, a fantasy land, when compared with the reality on the ground in Somalia, with universal access to education and the end of female genital mutilation unlikely to happen anytime soon...

Somalia: Will corrupted MPs elect a genuine leader? 

By Osman Jabane, published in Horseed Media

Somalis currently discuss leadership qualities in every social setting. The question of leadership has emerged as the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) mandate is coming to an end in this month. The TFG agreed to hold an election while there is no efficient electoral commission in place that can conduct free and fair election. Most of the Somalis are highly skeptical and believe that this election will be the toughest in the history due to the presence of many candidates including corrupted ones.

It is obvious that the parliament cannot produce a genuine leader that can make a difference to the country unlike the current ones who have their own selfish interest. Most of the MPs whose list have been submitted to represent their constituent or clan, what so ever, cannot represent the Somali people. They are tribal affiliated rather than common citizenship. Some of them are not academically competent and to make it worse, they did not complete secondary school education which is the least education qualification one can have. There is wide spread rumors that some individuals are making fabricated secondary school certificates or equivalent experience so as to apply and qualify the position. Therefore, the question that we all supposed to ask is that, will corrupted Member of Parliament who came through tribalism, nepotism elect a genuine Somali president? I leave the answer to the Somali people but we need to learn a lesson from the past. Back 2004, we have witnessed a historic moment where most of the warlords became legislators, and we thought this was the end of lawlessness in the country but due to many factors there are still no functioning institutions in the country, and it can be said that the situation got worse and worse by the day and all that trial ended in vain.

On the other hand, front-runners of the current presidential elections are doing their best to convince members of the parliament in a different ways, some are concentrating on getting alliances that can campaign or do the hard work for them, some are approaching directly to parliamentarians, while others are contesting for the race in order to capture the media attention with a view to becoming a member of the new cabinet. It is evident that no candidate can win the election without the support of parliamentarians; therefore, candidates are aware of the importance of MPs as they are making the ultimate decision. But the problem is that neither 275 parliamentarians nor others who are currently involving the process are demanding to scrutinize candidates’ reasons of wanting to lead the nation. Without accountability or scrutiny, candidates will have the opportunity that they wished from the first place, hence the increase of candidates...

Imminent AU Assault On Kismayo?

The first hint came months ago, when Kenyan policymakers finally green-lit Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011. Despite the absence of a public time-line or an initial explanation of Kenya's role within the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Nairobi's intentions in southern Somalia were telegraphed by both countries' urgent political environments. The logical assumption of Kenya's best-case scenario: clear al-Shabaab from its territory and the port of Kismayo before August 20th, when the UN-mandated Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is set to expire, and transfer the city's authority to Somalia's new government. Kenyan troops would hold the area until AU reinforcements arrive, or else embed  themselves with the populace until the government can send enough national troops and police.

A variety of factors emerged to lower the speed of Kenya's advance and throw its time-line into doubt. While al-Shabaab has yet to mount an organized resistance of any urban territory, a combination of guerrilla warfare and cross-border terrorism placed a premium on Kenya's rear lines. The speed of three battalions has suffered from al-Shabaab's tactics, the mud of Somalia's second rainy season and the need to help tens of thousands of Somalis as they advance through a relatively large area. Statements of securing all of Jubaland, an area nearly three times the size of the targeted Lower Juba, were realistically curtailed by months of hard fighting. On top of these problems, al-Shabaab has forcefully encouraged Kismayo's residents to fight with them and amplified the danger of storming a city.

February gave way to the first tangible anxiety of Kenya's neighbors when, according to Ethiopian commanders, Nairobi aborted a synchronized offensive on the port. Ethiopian convoys had rolled into Somalia's western flank to throw al-Shabaab into deeper disarray, and eagerly remain on standby if their armor is needed.

Yet Nairobi, realizing the significance of August 20th in regards to Somalia and its own power projection, still refuses to give up on its objective. Two months ago Prime Minister Raila Odinga repeated his promise to reach Kismayo before the 20th. Over 4,000 Kenyan soldiers were later absorbed into AMISOM, sealing the multi-year campaign that Nairobi has now signed on for, as Defense Minister Yussuf Haji declared "we cannot stop fighting in Somalia." Several weeks ago, The Los Angeles Times reported that a battalion from Sierre Leone was headed into southern Somalia (on America's dollar) to accelerate Kenya's march on the port. Now comes the latest assistance: Ugandan helicopter gunships.

Lt. Moses Omayo, spokesman for the Uganda Airforce, tells Reuters, "We have sent helicopters which will provide air cover for combat troops, escort convoys, conduct rescue missions and airdrop forces."

Omayo claims that the helicopters will "conduct operations only in areas in which troops that include those from Burundi and Djibouti are deployed," but neither country has deployed troops into the southern Somalia. Djibouti has yet to publicly move into Baidoa to relieve Ethiopian troops, as reportedly planned, so the country is unlikely to enter Kismayo in the near future. The Ugandan combat and support helicopters are more likely to cover an AU force of Kenyans, Ugandans and Ethiopians, with TFG soldiers and the proxy group Ras Kamboni serving in auxiliary or police roles. Reuters reports that a "combined force in Somalia is planning an onslaught on Kismayu... before August 20."

In addition to Ugandan and Kenyan air support, Odinga says that he has repeatedly requested naval assistance from Western powers operating in the region.

The least-worst scenario has dogged Nairobi across southern Somalia; instead of clearing Kismayo, it must be content to reach the port by the 20th and hope that al-Shabaab forfeits. However the militancy remains a constant threat in the cities that it has openly ceded, and the lucrative Kismayo occupies ground worth fighting for. The city has also exchanged hands numerous times due to the central government's inability to govern, a possibility that cannot be eliminated despite the progress made in Mogadishu. To their credit (and the help of Western governments), AU capitals have devised a pronged strategy to knock al-Shabaab out of its urban environment and create space for a new government to fill. That Kismayo's future, like Somalia's other war-torn cities, depends on a stable government (central or local) is no secret to any Somali or Somali observer.

When AU and Somali forces finally reach Kismayo, and how long the area takes to clear and hold, remains fogged by war clouds.

U.S. Building African Proxy Armies

New rays of light are being increasingly cast on America's operations in Africa, specifically across the continent's upper half, as U.S. foreign policy chases al-Qaeda into the shadows. "Secret" bases, overflights, security contractors and renditions have gone as mainstream as possible. Less developed is the wider strategic picture that connects Washington and an assortment of receptive African capitals, as shadows can only do so much fighting. The Trench's previous analysis observed that the U.S. is hoping to use northern Mali's crisis to build combat experience in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

This arrangement is based on mutual needs: African capitals need Western air and logistics support, intelligence and financing for all of it, generating a natural control over the continent's largest proxy armies.

Today The Los Angeles Times recapped most of this blueprint's designs in Somalia. Although the Times reports that the Obama administration "has not disclosed much in public about its role... because African Union officials do not want their force seen as a Washington puppet," almost none of the presented information is fresh. In addition to financially injecting Somalia's government, the U.S. and European powers (such as France and Italy) have been training AMISOM forces to defeat al-Shabaab since the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in 2009 under UN guidance. Wafula Wamunyinyi, deputy head of the African Union mission, described the assistance of "quite enormous," and Washington is deeply involved in every level of operations.

In terms of payment, U.S. funds are covering the costs of lethal aid as EU pays out checks to AU soldiers in the field, a historically debilitating problem. Western trainers and/or contractors also assist/lead a 13-week basic training course and oversee specialized programs for engineers, intelligence personnel and medics. Recruits receive combat gear (uniforms, weapons, night vision devices, communications, medical aid and other supplies) and sometimes deploy to the field in Western-purchased armored personnel carriers. A large package that include RQ-11 Raven drones was delivered to Uganda in 2011, but this supply chain likely extends to multiple partners.

While U.S. officials claim that no military personnel are deployed to Somalia with African troops, independent evidence indicates the opposite. Shadow wars also demand skepticism rather than the inclination to believe government accounts. Michael Bittrick, a State Department official who oversees U.S. policy in the area, says that private firms hire "retired foreign military personnel" to advise in the field, except U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives are unilaterally embedded around Somalia's frontlines (French agents allegedly operate as liaisons by directly coordinating with AU units). According to the investigative reporting of The Nation's Jeremy Scahill, the CIA maintains a detention facility in the remnants of Siad Barre's torturous prison in Mogadishu, dubbed Godka or "The Hole." Here the CIA keeps Somali intelligence personnel on a private payroll due to government corruption, and arranges interrogations of national and foreign suspects.

"They support us in a big way financially,” a senior Somali intelligence official told Scahill in 2011. “They are the largest [funder] by far.”

Special Forces and CIA personnel also operate aerial missions (including drones) out of Mogadishu's Aden Adde International airport.

The only new information offered by The Los Angeles Times is an itinerary of the Sierre Leone battalion in transport to Kenya, where it will be picked up by vehicles paid for by Washington and imported from ally South Africa. The soldiers will then be driven into southern Somalia and link with three Kenyan battalions "who have been bogged down" for months. Launched in late October 2011, Operation Linda Nchi ran straight into Somalia's second rainy season and has yet to reach its stated objective: clear al-Shabaab's port stronghold, Kismayo, before the TFG dissolves in August. The AU must eventually take the port or risk jeopardizing its ongoing national offensive.

The Los Angeles Times simply paints a picture of near-absolute control over AMISOM and Somalia's fledgling defense forces.

"Officially, the troops are under the auspices of the African Union. But in truth, according to interviews by U.S. and African officials and senior military officers and budget documents, the 15,000-strong force pulled from five African countries is largely a creation of the State Department and Pentagon, trained and supplied by the U.S. government and guided by dozens of retired foreign military personnel hired through private contractors.”

The positives of this strategy are evident. Combining all of the lessons learned from past errors, AMISOM's present force is cheaper and more relatable than an American or Ethiopian intervention. Now U.S. forces can operate freely out of Mogadishu with 10,000 AU soldiers patrolling the city and its surroundings, a vivid contrast from 1993's isolated mission. General Carter Ham, the chief of AFRICOM, implies that Somalia's model can be replicated in response to other African crises: "We think that's an ideal role for the United States — not a large U.S. military presence… but rather applying the resources that we do have to help those countries who are willing to contribute to this effort.”

Costs, on the other and, are already being felt outside of Somalia's battle zone. In return for their "generous" services, dictatorships in Uganda and Ethiopia maintain healthy relationships with Washington just as U.S. counterterrorism operations work in the Algerian government's favor. Those governments that pair with the U.S. and EU are encouraged to "reform" and "promote democracy," but manipulation of this arrangement is inevitable. Uganda's minor protests, for example, were crushed with minimal objection from the Obama administration. Higher still, the manipulation of political blocs could affect entire regions of people.

How solid U.S. military influence grows in Africa, along with any potential backlashes and human rights controversies, remains to be seen.

Ethiopia Feigns Withdrawal Before Assault On Kismayo

The explanation didn't sound right in the first place and, in the end, may not have existed at all.

Two months ago Ramtane Lamamra, the African Union's (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, announced that several Ethiopian battalions would redeploy out of Somalia by the end of April. The announcement left many questions unanswered and defied Ethiopia's recent gains against al-Shabaab, including February's capture of Beledweyne and Baidoa. Having opened an enormous front involving hundreds of trucks, armored personnel carriers and tanks, Addis Ababa would risk its advantages by transferring near-term control to green AU reinforcements and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Its pincer assault was so immediately successful that many Somalis welcomed the arrival of their historic enemy, and some demand that they stay for the foreseeable future.

Lamamra, himself an Algerian diplomat, did qualify his statements by predicting that Ethiopian troops will remain in central Somalia if they can be "re-hatted" like Kenya's, making them eligible for AU funding. This clue tipped off the probable reality that Addis Ababa never intended to withdraw, only secure international funding and deceive al-Shabaab's leadership, and its troops are headed for the same destination as Kenyan troops. On Saturday an Ethiopian Major General involved in the Somali campaign announced, "Truthfully Ethiopia has fulfilled its mission in Somalia, and it is not a problem for our military to liberate the port city of Kismayo." Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly ruled out a withdrawal soon afterward, congratulating Ethiopian troops and promising to "take over more key strongholds."

Determining the exact cause behind Ethiopia's actions from the outside is impossible, but its motivation combines a number of factors. If the government wasn't employing deception from the start, military officials on the receiving end of positive local feedback may have convinced their political superiors to keep advancing into Somalia. Both parties would have experienced second thoughts about leaving a vacuum along Ethiopia's border and straining the TFG's capacity.

Another distinct factor is the slow pace of Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, which has yet to reach Kismayo since its launch in October 2011. The TFG and AU's ideal strategy planned to secure all major population centers before August's presidential election, an event that will theoretically end the UN's current roadmap and established a more representative government. Kenyan forces were supposed to besiege Kismayo by February, according to Ethiopia's Major General John, but they remain locked in peacekeeping operations between the port and their border. Some observers attribute Kenya's pace to poor military planning, inexperience or a cautious approach, in contrast to Ethiopia's blitzkrieg movements. Garowe Online tackled this issue directly, reporting that Kenya ”has made little progress against Al Shabaab compared to Ethiopian troops.”

The likeliest explanation fuses all factors together.

As is the case with general war strategy, summoning Ethiopian troops to finish the job generates a matrix of risk and reward. The TFG-AU conceived a three-prong battle plan to restore an image of national stability to Somalia, deploying an influx of AU reinforcements to Mogadishu as Ethiopian and Kenyan troops advance from the west and south. The three forces would expand their area of operations until they overlap, then gradually turn local authority over to the TFG, but the plan appears to be taking longer than anticipated. Armored and ready for new battles, Ethiopian troops could be the only force capable of dislodging al-Shabaab from Kismayo before August and speeding up the AU's designs. By seizing all of the insurgency's strongholds (Beledweyne, Baidoa, Bardahaarrey, Baardehere, Kismayo, Afgoye), the AU hopes to flush al-Shabaab out of its remaining water, sever its economic network and dismantle the group into smashable pieces.

Clearing space for August's election is also vital to Somalia's stability; al-Shabaab has already interfered with clan leaders headed for Mogadishu and is expected to disrupt the election on the politico-security front. [Update: due to security concerns, the UN has decided to elect Somalia's next president through a centralized parliamentary vote in Mogadishu.]

However racing to Kismayo may not be possible before July. Deep as Ethiopia has treaded into Somalia, a 200-mile journey and multiple river crossings separates Baidoa from al-Shabaab's southern port. This distance will stretch Ethiopia's supply lines far from its border, making them more susceptible to ambushes and IEDs, and remove Ethiopian troops from an established comfort zone. The army did travel towards Kismayo in 2007, forcing tribal elders to evict the Islamic Courts Union (al-Shabaab's predecessor), but a formal incursion is likely to trigger more resistance. 2007’s eventual outcome must also be avoided: Somali militants have been forced out of Mogadishu and regional centers numerous times, only to re-infiltrate them when no government entity stood up on two legs. Although Ethiopia presumably has a plan to clear Kismayo, its plan to govern is likely no more advanced than Kenya's.

Capturing individual cities, even a string of them, represents a specific type of mission. Holding all of Somalia's south-central territory presents its own challenge, one that time may force the AU and TFG to break up into pieces.

AU Plans Next Operational Phase In Somalia

Three weeks ago al-Shabaab's central garrison of Baidoa fell in undramatic fashion. Following a pincer movement along Somalia's western border, launched in December to capitalize on Kenya's operation in the south, Ethiopian troops and tanks rolled into the city as the militants blended into the surrounding grasslands and fled south. Brigadier-General Johannes Woldegiorgis, the commander who led a mechanized force on a 140-mile assault through 10 towns, quickly summoned foreign journalists to tour the city.

"They are history," he declared of al-Shabaab.

Confident in the progress of its soldiers, the Ethiopian government recently announced a near-term withdrawal after meeting with representatives of the African Union's (AU) troop contributors. Beyond an open admission that Addis Ababa doesn't want to overstay its welcome, the decision has a sizable financial component built into its status within Somalia's AMISOM. Ramtane Lamamra, the Commissioner of the AU Peace and Security Council, told reporters on Friday, "The decision up to now is that it is essentially Baladweyne and Baidoa (for Ethiopia) and they have to be handed over to AMISOM and then Ethiopia will withdraw its forces to its own national territory."

"It provides for Djiboutian forces to be deployed in Beledweyne by the end of April at the latest. Two thousand five hundred troops from Burundi and Uganda will also be deployed in Baidoa by the 30th of April at the latest."

Lamamra held the door open for continual military assistance inside Somalia's western border, seemingly expecting to negotiate a "support package" for Ethiopia's military. The government is currently fighting on its own dollar, though Washington has provided political and financial compensation in the past (including payment for the drone base in Arba Minch). Bringing both Kenyan and Ethiopian troops under the AU's financial umbrella would streamline AMISOM and increase its long-term viability after the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) UN-sponsored mandate expires in August. The AU's national campaign to recapture central and southern Somalia, lost to al-Shabaab after Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009, cannot succeed without Ethiopian firepower.

"For now, it's mission accomplished and AMISOM would be able to take over in both places," Lamamra said.

This situation represents the day to Ethiopia's previous invasion, a dark episode that killed thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians and opened a vacuum for al-Shabaab's rise. Both missions unfolded with similar speed - Ethiopian battalions seized Baidoa, Beledweyne and Mogadishu within a week of entering Somalia in December 2007 - but troops are now greeted with reserved optimism. During the two years following Ethiopia's exit, Al-Shabaab became its own worst enemy by engaging in the systematic destruction of local life and drying up the last of its water. When Kenya and Ethiopia finally entered the battlefield in relative unison, the popular scales tilted to the TFG and AU's advantage.

Even minor improvements in governance and social laws could have buffered popular resistance against the group, but years of hard line rule (including the use of child soldiers) turned the despised Ethiopian military into a friend. Although he condemned al-Shabaab for brainwashing children into jihad, Captain Mahamoud Yissak admitted from Baidoa, “At that time people liked Al Shabaab, there was a lot of support for them."

The positive takeaway is an increased acceptance of Ethiopian aid and the possibility for sustainable cooperation. One local MP, Mohamed Habselleh, said he believes, “We need Ethiopia’s long presence here." Most residents appear to believe that al-Shabaab's reign in Baidoa is over, but expect the militants to return when the Ethiopians leave. Other reports indicate that Somalis from al-Shabaab's remaining territory have requested Ethiopian armor, giving Addis Ababa plenty to think about in the weeks and months ahead.

While al-Shabaab mounted no initial resistance in Baidoa, the group has staged multiple bombings and attacked Ethiopian troops in nearby areas. The latest 3-hour battle near Yuktow, situated halfway between Baidoa and the Ethiopian border, is connected to al-Shabaab's counterattack; Ethiopian military sources claim that they preempted an ambush on a nearby unit. Both sides have reported substantial casualties (above 70), but neither side gives accurate information about their losses.

"They engaged our troops after regrouping in tiny pockets outside our area of control," Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesman Dina Mufti told Reuters. "Al Shabaab rebels sustained heavy casualties and have retreated... the battle scene is littered with the bodies of dead enemy combatants. "It's a statement of survival, a desperate attempt. All claims are false."

The negative takeaway is that al-Shabaab remains determined to mount a resistance outside of its main urban centers. The decision to defend most of its threatened territory could exhaust the group and leave it vulnerable to a decapitating blow, but al-Shabaab's guerrilla tactics will distort the AU's time-frame. Its leadership appears to be satisfied with outlasting the Ethiopians - the latest attack was immediately spun as a sign of retreat - and taking their chances with the incoming Burundians and Ugandans. Even in a weakened state, al-Shabaab could exceed the AU's planned force levels and keep Ethiopians inside the country.

In order for the AU's strategy to gain traction outside of Mogadishu, TFG representatives must move in with AU troops and begin their work immediately to restore confidence in the Somali government. Western pipelines into the UN and AMISOM cannot afford to fail political and military personnel in the field. Now the TFG must fill every space that Ethiopians and Kenyans clear, forming a triangle of security between Mogadishu, Beledweyne and Baidoa. From here they must expand across the rest of the country, an area more than double the size of the territory in question, and they need to move fast despite the risks of rushing their advance.

"You know the character of al-Shabaab," explained regional governor Abdifatah Mohammed Ibrahim. "They like to fight, hit-and-run. So I think they will be back. They are [just] hiding here, under trees."

Kenya, Ethiopia Grind Deeper Into Somalia

Over three months have elapsed since Nairobi made the executive decision to launch Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for Protect the Nation). Depending on the individual - a Kenyan commander, Somali official or civilian, al-Shabaab gunman or Western observer - Kenya’s military campaign is trending towards victory or quagmire. Reality likely falls in between two extremes, but foreign capitals are entering a slippery phase of their politico-military campaign.

Last month Colonel Cyrus Oguna asserted that “Al Shabaab is halfway in the pit.” Whether Kenyan, Ethiopian and African Union (AU) troops can complete their mission may be determined over the next three months.

Nairobi’s confidence in reaching Somalia’s main southern port begat heightened expectations at the start of Linda Nchi, and the combination of Kenya’s swift incursion and al-Shabaab’s tactical withdrawal gave rise to the possibility of reaching Kismayo in the near future. However the majority of Kenyan troops haven’t advanced more than 50 miles during a month-long rainy reason, remaining at their mud-locked positions around Bur Gaavo and Afmadow. Bur Gaavo’s delta lies on Somalia’s coast, roughly 40 miles from Kenya’s border and 60 miles south of Kismayo, while Kenyan commanders predicted they would take Afmadow last month.

The bulk of Kenya’s ground forces remain tens of miles away from Kismayo, one of al-Shabaab’s main strongholds and a key military-economic gateway. They have yet to create the buffer zone envisioned by Nairobi; grenade, mine and IED attacks continue to disrupt life across Kenya’s border. Villages behind Afmadow, such as Tabda and Badhaadhe, are still being fortified as assault preparations are made on the strategic town. Even Defense Minister Yusuf Haji added to Somalia’s confusion in early December, telling reporters, "I don't know where this objective came from. We have never stated at any time that Kenya was going to Kismayo.”

"All we said is that we were pushing Shebab away from our boundary and securing our border, and we will go as far as we will go.”

Kenyan commanders have since clarified that their units are, in fact, still headed for Kismayo. They insist that Haji simply meant that their troops won’t occupy the port, only secure and transfer authority to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Major Rashid Seif explained from Bur Gaavo, "Our conduct of operation here is basically in conformity with the other troops that are in other sectors, the northern sector and the central sector. So basically the ultimate objective is the capture of Kismayo, so it is building up to that.”

Although Nairobi’s timeline isn’t publicly available, a sensible prediction would circle August 2012 as Kenya’s target date to exit southern Somalia. The TFG’s UN mandate is finally set to expire after several delays, and involved foreign powers are demanding presidential and parliamentary elections before the UN’s mandate dissolves. As a result, involved members of the African Union (AU) have lobbied to increase AMISOM’s force ceiling from 12,000 to 15,000-20,000). Nairobi presumably feels the same rush and attempted to synchronize its military campaign with 2012’s political roadmap.

Kenya’s operation functions as one part of the TFG, African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) national strategy, with AU reinforcements envisioned in Mogadishu and Kismayo. As Kenya clears al-Shabaab from the south and the TFG expands its presence out of the capital, Ethiopia would exert its influence along al-Shabaab’s western flank. This strategy theoretically covers Somalia proper without stretching any single force over the country - and potentially breaking it. Ethiopian troops cross the border on a regular basis in their pursuit of al-Shabaab and other armed elements, but upwards of 1,000 troops are now operating inside Somalia.

Ethiopian forces recently took control of Beledweyne, a strategic city located over 400 miles from Kismayo, and are moving into al-Shabaab’s Bay stronghold.

Yet the strategic obstacle for Kenya, Ethiopia and the TFG remains as is: opening up a wide front. Even a piece of Somalia is hard to clear, hold and restore TFG authority to. Ethiopian troops recently cleared Baidoa, one of al-Shabaab’s main strongholds in Somalia’s central Bay district, and could move on Garbahaarey and Baardheere (Gedo’s largest cities) as well. While striking into Baidoa and Baardheere could send al-Shabaab scrambling across its territory, the long-term battle for Bay, Hiiraan and Gedo will entail harder fighting than Kenya’s intervention into Lower Juba.

Restoring TFG authority is also the primary goal of any national offensive, and seizing more territory than the TFG’s reach can handle will create extensive friction on the ground. Ethiopia has “dismantled” al-Shabaab before, only for the group to re-inflate itself and fill the ensuing security vacuum.

Ethiopia’s wild-card image poses a secondary concern in a mission that depends on positive perceptions. According to various sources (including American), Ethiopian troops have been thrown into the battlefield because African leaders consider to be more proficient than their Kenyan counterparts. The good news is that local Ethiopian approval is being reported at higher levels than in the past. In accordance with practical sentiments towards America and Kenya, some Somalis are willing to stomach any foreign intervention in order to escape al-Shabaab’s rule. However many accounts note the long-standing animosity between neighbors, and Ethiopian support could flip overnight in the event of mass collateral damage.

While al-Shabaab is suffering casualties and facing enemies on all sides, the insurgency doesn’t appear to be panicking at the level described by African officials. Its commanders rejected local reports of a name-change - to Imaarah Islamiya (Islamic Authority) - and avoided the initial blitzkrieg that could have knocked al-Shabaab on the permanent defensive. Nor is the war “almost half lost,” in the words of Colonel Oguna. Kenya’s army spokesman argues that al-Shabaab is “now facing serious challenges as far as command and control is concerned and logistical support,” but these terms are more applicable in conventional warfare.

Ultimately, the roots of Somalia’s political friction must be destroyed in order to permanently defeat al-Shabaab. Military victory could recede into a political collapse, facilitating al-Shabaab’s restructuring.

In a related development, Western and African capitals maintain extensive concerns over the TFG’s ability to implement the UN’s roadmap. Modified in June under heavy pressure from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the Kampala Accord extended the TFG’s mandate for one final year by sacrificing Prime Minister Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed. This outcome allowed President Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Aden to shelve their rivalry (each has tried to force the other out of power) until November, when Somalia’s parliament was ordered to reach a vote on Kampala’s revisions.

Except the vote never occurred and Hassan now finds himself mired in a no-confidence vote. He suspects that President Ahmed is pulling the political strings.

Given that any AU mission cannot succeed in the long-term without a stable Somali government, Ahmed and Aden’s unresolved feud is pulsing throughout Somalia’s neighbors and international financiers. Nairobi’s strategy explicitly outlined the following sequence: “enter southern Somalia, drive away Al-Shabaab, create a buffer zone to allow the fledgling Transitional Federal Government to take control and increase its capacity to retain it.” Although military gains can be secured independently from Somalia’s political factors, combining the two spheres represents the primary objective of counterinsurgency.

Lindsay Kiptiness, Kenya's Foreign Affairs spokesman, cautioned, “A new round of political conflict would affect the transitional process eight months away.”

Fundamental divisions within the TFG’s structure pose a grave threat to the AU’s mission. Destabilization inside Mogadishu’s political core affects the country as a whole, thus impacting Kenya and Ethiopia’s semi-independent operations. Operation Linda Nchi may have been conceived two+ years ago, but Nairobi launched its military campaign within AMISOM’s national campaign. This strategy builds on AMISOM’s gains in Mogadishu by allocating Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to Somalia’s south and west, creating a patchwork grid across the entire country. Additional AU and TFG troops will then deploy to Kismayo and central Somalia.

"As more territory is liberated,” predicts UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “the federal government must strengthen its outreach to the local population and form new regional entities in line with the Transitional Federal Charter. On the military front, we must not exclude the incorporation of new forces and the expansion of Amisom.”

These troops have no chance of landing until the TFG’s political crisis is untangled and permanently settled. A lack of confidence in the TFG impacts donations to the UN and AU, in turn delaying deployment of AU forces and over-stressing Somalia’s nascent security forces. In January the UN and AU urged “the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions, parliamentarians and to all stakeholders [to]… avoid any statement or action that could exacerbate the already tense situation and further aggravate the crisis.” A fist-fight later broke out over Hassan’s unresolved status.

al-Shabaab can only stall Operation Linda Nchi and the AU’s coordinated assault, but the TFG can stop Kenyan and Ethiopian armor in its tracks.