U.S. Drones Target TTP's Maulvi Nazir, Pakistani Negotiations

A vivid contrast between the light shone on civilian casualties and militant commanders reflects off a MQ-9 Reaper's wing. In Pakistan's case, this light often comes from the numerous intelligence sources deployed to see and hear everything in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Around 12:30 AM in Islamabad, a pair of U.S. drones fired four missiles at a compound located in South Waziristan's Angor Adda. The first international reports surfaced 4-5 hours afterward; less than 12 hours later, the target had been identified as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Maulvi Nazir and his deputies, Atta Ullah and Rafey Kkan. The Hellfire missiles struck Nazir's convoy in the Sra Kanda area as it was traveling from Angor Adda to the local capital of Wana. One Pakistani official said Nazir and his fighters were caught swapping vehicles after their "double cabin pick-up encountered a mechanical fault."

Nazir's death has reportedly been announced over Wana and Angor Adda's mosque speakers, while the TPP has yet to issue a statement as of this moment. One will presumably be released shortly.

Nazir's death, if confirmed, will yield positives and negatives for Washington, along with a bundle of negatives for Islamabad. He's certainly a veteran player in the TPP and a name to throw at Americans, if that counts for anything 11 years into Afghanistan's war. He also keeps in line with al-Qaeda's general ideology despite chafing under Uzbek influence; the Long War Journal notes that "Ilyas Kashmiri, Abu Khabab al Masri, Osama al Kini, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, and Abu Zaid al Iraqi were killed while being sheltered by Nazir." Now these types of personalities will need somewhere else to live and train. Moreover, Nazir enjoys relations with the Haqqanis and facilitates their movement through his territory.

Eliminating Nazir rather than his rival, TTP chieftain Hakimullah Mehsud, is the correct strategy for instigating the group's self destruction. Mehsud's divisive leadership has kept its regional commanders split into factions since assuming power in August 2009, and targeting him first would be counterintuitive. Instead, Nazir and those TTP commanders focused on Afghanistan - namely South Waziristan's Waliur ul-Rehman and North Waziristan's Hafiz Gul Bahadur - should be targeted in place of Mehsud until the group collapses on itself. Problematically, this strategy runs contrary to Pakistan's containment policy towards both branches of the Taliban.

Nazir also remains a second or even third tier target and his absence won't alter the battlefield in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Although a leading advocate of concentrating TTP resources on NATO forces in Afghanistan, his death alone is insufficient for drying up TTP activity along the border and largely turns another COIN into whack-a-mole. As a result, the Obama administration's handling of Afghanistan will see a negligible bump in U.S. polls, and the war's trend will continue as is.

A second strike in North Waziristan reportedly targeted an Uzbek commander, however civilian casualties have been reported after villagers closed around the scene.

Unless more high-level targets soon experience Nazir's fate, his assassination brings more risk than reward to Washington and Islamabad's tables as they attempt to negotiate a more solid grip on the region. Nearly all of Nazir's details remain to be shaked out over the coming days (perhaps Islamabad ran out of use for him) but the timing appears extremely volatile. Nazir had allegedly made enemies with Hakimullah's camp for keeping open relations Islamabad, which theoretically needed his presence within the TTP's council.  Now the government must explain through backchannels why Nazir was targeted during a potentially new phase of interaction with Hakimullah and Rehman.

The Obama administration and its supporters in Afghanistan have invested a noticeable amount of energy reviving their prospects on the back of Islamabad's recent diplomacy - Thursday's drone strike runs against this grain.

Waziristan: Doing More

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani has announced the end of Operation ah-i-Nija (Path to Salvation).

"The operation in South Waziristan is over," Gilani told reporters in televised remarks from the eastern city of Lahore. "Now there are talks about Orakzai."

He did not give any other details, but reports noted that air-strikes have been softening up Orakzai for several weeks. An estimated 40,000 people have since the South Waziristan offensive began, the U.N. said in a statement Friday.

The move is being interpreted as a sign that Pakistan, “did not deal the death blow it had intended against the Taliban.” The TTP’s total defeat was never in the realm of possibility, but the army expected to accomplish more before winter.

No leadership was killed that we know of, and the army only counted 580 kills out of an estimated 12,000 fighters. It was looking like at least 1,000 would be removed from the battlefield, but operations began to slow the last three weeks.

The ratio doesn’t look good when added up: 79 dead Pakistani soldiers, 240 injured, over 500 civilians killed and thousands injured. True guerrilla warfare this is not, but successful asymmetrical warfare it is.

Now the army must turn north to Orakzai, and another agency when the TTP shifts again to a new territory. Its leadership is hiding out in North Waziristan, causing the Predators to pound it with missiles aimed both at the TTP and Pakistan’s government. Pakistan has shown no indication of invading North Waziristan, but the TTP was simply go somewhere else anyway.

“Do more.” 10,000 fighters remain dispersed around South Waziristan or lying low inside. “Do more.” Pakistan is being led by the drones, much to its resentment. This is more akin to guerrilla warfare, spreading out to avoid the strong, regrouping where the strong becomes weak, playing allies against each other in the process.

The latest installment of Waziristan - Pakistan’s plan to hold territory - is in development and will be released soon.

[Update: Either Gilani got his facts wrong or the military/US government reversed his position. Not many options in between.]

Waziristan: Preparing to Storm

Although the Dawn reported that Operation Rah-i-Nija (Path to Salvation) entered its second phase two weeks ago, the other day produced a more accurate account. Regardless, the Pakistani army overwhelmed the TTP and holds the higher hand - literally.

One official boasted, “We have beaten them at their own tactic. This has been the classic Mehsud tactic, encircling and ambushing the enemy from the ridges and commanding features and we did the same to them. They were not prepared for this.”

The first phase, reportedly aimed to capture all major TTP towns in South Waziristan, is nearing completion. 450 militants have been killed in 21 days, according to Major General Athar Abbas. Sherwangi, Kotkai, Kaniguram, Sararogha, Karama, and Ladha Fort have fallen, and the army is preparing to storm Mehsud’s regional HQ in Laddah, the final act of phase one.

Pakistani soldiers are busy clearing mines and funneling into Makeen from Razmak to the north. Troops captured Sheen Sar and the Hanrai Tangi area near Sararogha, and Panj Plorai and Ashkar Kot from the Razmak side. Makeen is the next target and the field is being prepared for battle.

The TTP is not looking good. After putting up stiff resistance initially, Pakistani officials are mocking the TTP’s retreat. Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi told reporters, "The operation so far has been very successful. The resistance that we were expecting initially did not come with the same swiftness we were expecting.”

“We have broken the myth of Taliban’s invincibility and we have also broken the myth that South Waziristan is a no-go area,’ a senior military officer bragged.

The TTP has lost the first of its battles if true. Losing towns isn't as important as putting up resistance. Territory can be retaken, but reputation, once spoiled, is hard to rebuild. The battle is far from over and the TTP might have something up its sleeve, but it’s losing the battle of perception.

In a positive but uncertain sign, no massive attacks have occurred for a week, only the failed assassination of Brigadier Sohail, the third since Waziristan was invaded. Obviously, a week of peace in a modern society like Pakistan demonstrates the opposite view. More attacks are likely coming, it’s just a matter of when.

More than its performance on the conventional battlefield, “victory” to the TTP is won through unconventional attacks on the state. It cannot afford to go silent, especially since it's waging an ineffective guerrilla war in the traditional "fish in water" sense. Political administration officials say almost 99% of the Mehsud population left South Waziristan, leaving the army to attack at will.

If the TTP is permanently crippled then it could be defeated once the tribes return, but anything less will fail to fully capitalize on this opportunity.

Two questions going into Laddah. The government and TTP are locked in a fierce propaganda war, each trying to paint the other as cowardly. The government reports, in addition to taking most militant strongholds with relative ease, fleeing Taliban leaving ammunition caches behind.

Feeling the heat, Hakimullah Mehsud told his fighters in a radio address, “Remember this is the commandment of God that once fighting starts with the enemy, you cannot leave the battlefield without permission from your commander, and don’t look for excuses to run away from the fighting. Of those, who do run away, such people will go to hell.”

Hakimullah also challenged the perception that he was retreating. TTP commanders, The News reported, claim, “their withdrawal from their former strongholds was tactical and that they were planning to launch scattered attacks on security forces.”

The question, then, is what he’s planning to do. Has the TTP been routed, shocked by the Pakistani army scaling mountains, and retreating? Is it tactically withdrawing from towns, assuming it can retake them, and preparing hit and run guerrilla warfare? Or is it attempting to stall until winter?

Qureshi told CBS that Pakistan would go as far as it could until mid-December.

“We would want to achieve our objectives as much as possible before the winter sets in,” he said, “and it seems, as things are going on, that we might be able to do so ... I can't give you a date but that area becomes very cold (by late December). We want to operate and establish our foothold before that."

Maybe the TTP is combining two or more strategies. It’s lost the momentum and the TTP must reverse the swing, but the Pakistani army will fight relentlessly until it no longer can. Surviving may take precedent, which Pakistan must then be vigilant of. Security officials claim Uzbek fighters have relocated to North Waziristan, where Hafiz Gul Bahadur enjoys a truce.

That means they’re waiting to fight.

Secondly, for all the conspiracy theorists, Information Minster Qamar Zaman Kaira and military spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas finally gave them something real to chew on. Abbas said at a press briefing that a large quantity of Indian arms and ammunition, literature, medical equipment and medicines had been recovered from Sherawangi area, near Kaniguram.

India denied the report, as if it would ever admit to the charge. We don’t believe that RAW, along with the CIA and Mossad, funded the TTP to spark a war with Pakistan that would lead to its self-destruction; Hakimullah didn’t need additional motivation to launch his bombing spree.

That said, reports from the field indicate the TTP's arsenal of guns is modern, not cobbled together from relics of past conflicts. Either someone’s importing them or stealing them, or both. Waziristan is a nightmare in reality, but a political scientist’s ideal experiment.

We’re about to see a reaction.

Waziristan: Closing the Circle

Stage 1 of operation Rah-i-Nijat in Waziristan progressed mostly as expected and has transitioned into stage 2. The biggest question, how much resistance the TTP will put up, has been answered for now - it intends to fight hard but sporadically. Retaking Kotkai wasn’t an option, the TTP had to retake Kotkai to bolster the image of resistance.

Though the operation is still in its infancy, the TTP is already beginning to look like it will withstand the storm. Casualties are naturally running high as militant targets are pounded by artillery and air-support, not to mention US drones. The score stands at 157-19. The TTP will never win the kill ratio or the type of battle Pakistani forces are mounting.

“I'm obviously encouraged by the Pakistani operations,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters. “We obviously are very supportive of what the Pakistanis are doing. But it's very early yet.”

At the same time, Pakistani officials have admitted stiff resistance and that ground forces are proceeding with extreme caution. Bombs are set wherever Pakistani soldiers can walk or tanks can roll. Refugees speak of a fortifying Taliban and limited Pakistani troops. What they’re seeing is an envelopment of advance air strikes with a time-delayed ground assault.

The TTP cannot defeat the Pakistani army in this battle. If it chooses to fight head on then it will be massacred. Yet it must put up resistance, not just at symbolic locations but in the entire territory. The TTP knows it must fight in order to attract new recruits, so it has to balance this need with staying alive. It cannot “win” the land battle, but surviving requires resistance. Running away isn't an option.

While Swat has been used by Pakistani officials as an example of what they’ll do in Waziristan, Swat is more an example why the same outcome is unlikely. The TTP had its hands in Swat, but the subsequent invasion was an overreach. Swat was a balloon puffed up beyond its true environment, an artificial limb. Waziristan is a rock that won’t deflate, the heart of the beast.

Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, and Kurram would serve as better examples of Wazirsitan’s reality. The Pakistani army has engaged militants in these agencies for many months with limited success. Stacks of militants have died, yet new soldiers take up the arms of the dead. Nation-building is non-existent.

The TTP will ride a propaganda wave if it survives past winter, but its real damage will be dealt outside the conventional battle-zone.

A ghastly attack at International Islamic University was followed by Qari Hussein declaring “all of Pakistani is a war zone.” Then Brigadier Moeen-ud-Din Ahmed and his driver were killed in a driveby shooting, a rare attack that saw both assailants escape alive. The latest bomb struck an entrance to Kamra Aeronautical Complex facility, rumored to be involved in Pakistan's nuclear program, and now a letter has been sent to officials warning of suicide attacks on PML-Q offices.

The TTP has a far higher chance of success fighting asymmetrically, and these small gains parlay into media victories. Pakistani officials admit the battlefield has expanded beyond their predictions and that they aren’t prepared for such crudely sophisticated attacks. Pakistan's army may be supreme on the battlefield, but the Pakistani state itself is weak, the exact perception the TTP is hoping for.

Reports from outside the battlefield itself aren’t flattering either. At this point every negative story is a positive for the TTP. Rahmatullah Mehsud, who fled to a refugee camp, told reporters. “We came here for bread, but the police beat us up. There the Taliban were messing with things and the army was showering bombs. Here we have to bear the clubs.”

Mehsud’s perspective doesn’t have to be accurate to prove its point. As bad as the Taliban is, disapproval doesn’t translate into support for the government. Pakistan cannot win the war without acting above the TTP. It cannot be on the same level or even a notch above, but far above the TTP’s behavior.

Initial signs aren’t encouraging. Angry refugees are one thing, but Maulvi Sher Mohammad is another. The founder and leader of an anti-Taliban militia "thundered" in an interview, “The government has used the people like toilet paper, used them and thrown them away. We cannot fight alongside the army because my people do not yet know whether the army and the Taliban are friends or enemies. When we see the army crush them, then we'll believe.”

Thus we return to the battlefield, where the TTP must put up a good fight without fighting too much to win, and the Pakistan army “must crush them” to win. In a rare piece of good news, an Afghan Taliban commander expressed sympathy for the TTP, but said, “There will not be any support from us. Our aim was, and is, to get the occupation forces out and not to get into a fight with a Muslim army.”

Problem is, the TTP may not need support. It can probably handle this specific phase by itself, and by attracting and deflecting the blow, will leave the rest of its umbrella intact. Pakistan’s deals with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir naturally irked White House and Pentagon officials; the drone strike into Bahadur’s territory wasn’t coincidence.

But Army spokesman Majorj General Athar Abbas defended the strategy, conceding, “When the state is seen to have turned out the biggest bully from the area, it has defeated that and it is seen by everyone around to have done that, then it creates vibes all over the place. It radiates effects all around and, therefore, what we expect is that since we have broken the centre of gravity, we have made them see this bully has been defeated, the terrorist organisation, this network has been dismantled and thereby the effect, which is natural, sees others re-adjust to this new existing reality."

US officials don’t want “others” re-adjusting though, they want Haqqani, Bahadur, Nazir, and Mullah Omar dead.

"We would like them to extend the offensive," said Stephen Biddle, a military historian and defense analyst with connections in the US government. "But we would also like them to hold what they clear. It might or might not be a good call for them to add territorial goals, when it is most important for them to hold what they take."

Bold analysis. We’ll stick our neck out - making deals with militants isn’t a good call. Realistically Pakistan has no choice. It barely has enough power to uproot the TTP’s heart and the odds of success would drastically reduce if every arm of the TTP was attacked simultaneously. This strategy also fosters an impression that the Pakistani army cannot defeat the TTP in its entirety.

Stay tuned for weeks of war slogging.

Wamirroristan

Proponents of the Afghan war offer up a buffet of reasons to escalate US troop levels: General McChrystal’s review, 9/11, woman’s rights, strategic positioning in Asia.

Now Pakistan, who doesn’t have many fans in Washington or mainstream America, is our new best friend and we can’t leave it behind. American officials only care about two things in Pakistan, but both are persuasive enough for President Obama to justify another deployment into the region.

While American officials milk the nuclear threat for all it's worth, a more realistic pretext for additional troops is about to unfold in Waziristan, a shadowy mirror of Afghanistan.

The Pakistani army is finally prepared to enter what it calls “the mother of all battles” after numerous delays, barring another abort. Troop and equipment shortages pressed pause on a previous operation in July, but in light of Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud's death, waiting until after winter is simply not an option. Worried of losing the initiative, one Pakistani official grumbled, “the operation should have been launched three months ago.”

That same sentiment inhabits neocon corners in America, where Republicans are going crazy as President Obama enters his “strategy review strategy." They should take heart at the parallels in Waziristan - and those who oppose the war should take notice. Pakistan’s army is about to cement Obama’s decision. Once it enters Waziristan he will have no choice but to send more troops.

The run-up to the operation isn’t far from America’s own troubles. Pakistan is faced with a daunting enemy holed up in their own territory. Initially ill prepared for the final fight, the army was forced to delay until it repositioned itself accordingly. Forces have been gathering around on the border since June, maintaining an economic blockade of Waziristan while waiting for the go ahead. Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani visited the troops and raised pay by 20%.

Pakistani officials now worry that public support for such a massive operation is waning as the Taliban regroups; launching an assault preempts both these concerns.

“If we don’t take the battle to them, they will bring the battle to us," a senior military official said. “The epicenter of the behemoth called the Taliban lies in South Waziristan, and this is where we will be fighting the toughest of all battles.”

Supporters of the Afghan war are hoping for the same outcome from President Obama. They will get it.

Pakistani officials weren’t alone in their displeasure for delay; American officials, the true barometer, have pushed the Waziristan operation for months. Why would they pressure Pakistan into this course of action if Obama isn’t planning to deploy more troops? Why would the Pakistani army invade Waziristan only for Obama to maintain, drawn down, or withdraw his forces in Afghanistan?

The answer is obvious - he's planning to send more troops to coincide with Pakistan’s operations, or he was until Afghanistan's election trainwreck. Waziristan will take months to clear in optimum conditions and America must secure the other side of the border to ensure maximum effectiveness. Intelligence won’t be enough - more troops are the only option when McChrystal is so limited that he’s withdrawing into the cities.

Leaving Pakistan out to dry would be suicidal after intense lobbying for this very operation.

Pakistan’s decision also rejects narrow goals in Afghanistan and Vice President Joe Biden’s “offshore” strategy once and for all, after its internal disagreement mimicked America’s. The same official that wanted an earlier operation claimed, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan as a monolithic organization remains no more... Baitullah is dead and his group seems to be in some form of disarray. And this provides the best opportunity to go after them.”

His admission verifies that eliminating the leaders of an insurgency isn’t enough to end it. A second official came to the same conclusion, albeit from the opposite direction.

“We thought that Baitullah’s death would unravel the Mehsud militant group and galvanize the tribe to stand up to the people they have suffered from,” the official said. “It didn’t happen.”

Thus ground operations are necessary either way; the army claims to have run out of targets for drone strikes due to intelligence problems. Pakistan has prepared at least 40,000 soldiers for the inevitable showdown against an estimated 15,000 Pakistani Taliban and 4,000 foreign militants, mainly Uzbeks. General Kayani recently called Waziristan an intelligence black hole. "We have to move in,” he said.

Sound like Afghanistan? The battle certainly will. Said one official, “It will not be a walkover. This is going to be casualty-intensive hard fighting. The nation will have to bear the pain.” Said another, “They are as much ready for the battle as we are.”

"If the Pakistan army tries to launch any offensive, it will face severe resistance, tougher than in the past," Hakimullah Mehsud told reporters at his press briefing.

And like Afghanistan, the battle is just the beginning of the war. Assume for theoretical purposes that Pakistan manages to clear Waziristan. The reward is years of political, economic, and social development, without which the situation is likely to revert back to its ugly self. The needs of Pakistanis demands more from government than battling the Taliban, and failure to capitalize on military gains will jeopardize the sacrifice.

Nation-building is still necessary in Waziristan no matter how successful the army is.

But perhaps the most powerful persuasion is perception. America and Pakistan have been sitting in the same boat for months: growing militancy, inconclusive drone strikes, lack of resources, weary public. Imagine Pakistan laying it all on the line while America backtracks. President Obama can’t stand still while Pakistan soldiers ahead - a toxic visual.

For the longest time Pakistan has been forced to keep up with America in the “War on Terror.” Now America must match the pace.