With "Friends" Like Yemen's, No Enemies Needed

In early January 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in Sana'a to manage the autocratic habits of a useful ally in the war against al-Qaeda.

Having warned other allies (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria) of a youth bulge prior to the Arab uprisings, the Secretary now found herself just above the surface of a volcano as she mingled with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. U.S. policy needed his approval to facilitate an expansion of military and counter-terrorism platforms in the country, but that need required less antagonistic leadership atop the government. For Clinton, this meant walking Saleh away from a parliamentary proposal that would eliminate term limits and allow him to run indefinitely, which he eventually agreed to in return for Washington's political and military assistance.

“We support an inclusive government,” Clinton replied when asked how the Obama administration could support Saleh's government and human rights at the same time. “We see that Yemen is going through a transition. And you’re right: it could one way or the other. It could go the right way or the wrong way.”

Yemen's revolution would spark weeks after Clinton shook hands with Saleh and departed the capital, never to return. Despite her professed support for a representative government, the Obama administration first treated Yemen's uprising as an obstruction to be neutralized, fearing a loss of influence with the next government. During this time al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) capitalized on Saleh's distraction in the cities to expand its ranks and territorial control in Yemen's southern governorates; Saleh's U.S.-trained counter-terrorism forces aided the process by fighting Yemen's revolutionaries and tribesmen rather than terrorists. However this chain of events ultimately created an opportunity for Washington and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia and European partners, to replace the duplicitous Saleh with his vice president and continue their policies unimpeded.

President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, "elected" through the UN's single-candidate referendum in February 2012, doubles as a leading proponent of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen.

This hegemonic policy was displayed again on Thursday when the Obama administration released a two-part press notice from the White House and State Department. Lying to the American people when talking Yemen, unfortunately, is simpler and easier than stealing candy from a baby. The American majority lives in ignorance of Yemen's troubles and their government's own interference in the country. Chronic fear of al-Qaeda and a high degree of hostility, reminiscent of American attitudes towards Pakistanis and Iraqis, contribute to this detachment, which in turn allows the Obama administration to interfere in Yemen's affairs without domestic cost.

Lack of political incentives to support the Yemeni people have endangered them in multiple ways: undermining their quest for representative government, damaging property and life without legal recourse, and ensuring that AQAP retains a presence in their country. Such a defeat in the war for "hearts and minds" is especially tragic when considering Yemenis' fondness for Americans themselves.

Current U.S. policy presents a view diametrically opposed to Yemen's streets, where the actions of Washington and its allies have obstructed a continuation of the revolution.

"Over the past 15 months,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns told the latest "Friends of Yemen" Ministerial, "Yemen – with the support of all of its friends – has made important progress in implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Yemenis elected a new leader for the first time in three decades, launched a major reform of their armed forces, regained control of large areas of their national territory held by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and today stand on the cusp of an historic National Dialogue."

Burns' statements are constructed on the boundary of inaccuracy. Yemenis selected Hadi out of necessity and coercion rather than free will, while Hadi himself was tasked to clean up a mess made by Saleh and the foreign policies that supported him. The so-called GCC initiative also excluded the same youth that the White House claims to support. Instead, the power-sharing agreement granted immunity for Saleh's human rights abuses (some committed with U.S. equipment), as well as preserving military influence with the new government. That U.S. interests in Yemen have improved since Saleh's resignation is unquestionable, even as U.S. policy remains unpopular with everyone outside the GCC initiative: the independent revolutionaries, northern-based Houthi sect and secessionist-minded Southern Movement.

Yemen's youth received the least seats of all parties - nearly four times less than Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) - in the heralded National Dialogue.

Further complicating the situation, the GCC's power-sharing agreement obstructs deeply-rooted political causes in the north and south, as their autonomous designs threaten the central government's authority and, by extension, involved foreign powers. In mid-February the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released a statement warning against interference in Yemen's affairs, only this statement targeted Saleh to the extent that it isolated a former Vice President and current Southern activist, Ali Salim Al-Beidh. The statement had minimal effect on Saleh, who copied the UNSC's message (minus himself) during a speech to commemorate Hadi's promotion, but it did spark Southern protests that led to clashes with the government and oppositional Islah party.

Hadi eventually met with Southern leaders to ease tensions and coax them into the National Dialogue, but the movement's leaders and followers remain leery of participating under UN-GCC terms. While a national dialogue is needed to advance Yemen's revolution, the present environment could degenerate into political warfare between the ruling GPC, Islah and Hirak.

To some credit U.S. non-military assistance has increased since the revolution launched in January 2011. Problematically, the long-term reality in Yemen indicates that these measures serve as camouflage for widespread geopolitical interference. U.S. aid has risen above $100 million to keep pace with a similar figure in the military column, and this information is used to promote a comprehensive policy. Since military and counterterrorism spending is especially obscured in Yemen, one of Washington's biggest "small wars," State Department officials and CIA Director John Brennan can now claim with greater safety that non-military spending exceeds military spending.

However U.S. policy remains decisively oriented towards influencing Yemen's political and military spheres - economic development and humanitarian support furthers this goal.

Yemen's revolution is effectively over in the eyes of UN, EU and GCC powers, and they have stopped at nothing to control its "transition." In their world 2014's elections will continue the reforms started by Hadi and Yemen will be gradually integrated into the GCC with Western assistance. Far from genuinely helping its people, U.S. policy in Yemen currently amounts to a joint neocolonialist takeover with neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government rivals Washington and Tehran in unpopularity. All have worked tirelessly to prevent a national revolution in Yemen, while at the same time claiming to advance it.

"The transition is about to enter a new, critical, phase," Burns told his audience in London. "While Yemenis courageously work to rebuild their country, extremists and their patrons are working hard to tear it down. The Co-Chairs called on all parties to commit to the principle of non-interference and the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen. This is an effort we endorse in the strongest terms."

Rampant foreign interference is no secret amongst Yemenis and concerned observers. Burns' own statements demonstrate the oxymoronic forces at work: supporting Yemen's unity and territorial integrity, for instance, directly contradicts the principles of sovereignty and independence. Washington, Riyadh and their allies are not looking to create a new future based on self-determination, but to recreate Yemen's old hegemonic model using new tactics and materials.

These "friends" will sell anything except the truth to Yemenis and Americans alike.

"National Dialogue" Masks Foreign Interference In Yemen

UN envoy Jamal Benomar presents a distorted view of Yemen's situation and the GCC's power-sharing agreement via a Saudi daily: "The Yemenis have done this without any foreign dictates."

To be fair to him, though, the general script of his interview was presumably written by those working above him:

Yemen is perhaps the most troubled state in the Middle East with a history of poverty, civil war and division. Uncertainty about its future following the instability that led to and followed the resignation of its former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has prompted regional and UN intervention in a bid to prevent the state from descending into chaos.

The first meetings of a conference that brings together political parties, regional factions, interest groups and civil society organizations from across the country will get underway soon, in a bid to stabilize the situation. Prompted by the UN and Yemen’s neighbors, Yemen’s quarreling groups will attempt to thrash out a settlement on elections and a new constitution among other issues, a settlement that many hope will allow Yemen to avoid secession and possible civil war.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to Jamal Benomar, an Assistant Secretary-General of the UN and the organization’s special envoy to Yemen, who has played an important role in the organization of the forthcoming National Dialogue Conference. Speaking by telephone, Benomar told Asharq Al-Awsat about his hopes for the conference, the obstacles it faces, and the efforts of the UN and Yemen’s neighbors to assist the process of a peaceful transfer of power in the troubled state.

Read Interview:

Zainab Al-Khawaja Ruling Disregards Bahraini Rights

The latest evidence of King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa's resistance to self-determination and denial of human rights couldn't be more blatant. 

Arrested on Tuesday during a protest for Mahmoud al-Jazeeri, Zainab Al-Khawaja found herself back in a holding cell only for the moments before she was whisked away to a court. Al-Khawaja had joined protesters in demanding the proper burial of al-Jazeeri - the government is keeping his body in an attempt to dictate the funeral's location - when arrested by security forces. She was immediately charged with obstructing traffic, violating a regime structure and damaging property.

Since February 2011 Al-Khawaja has been arrested multiple times, endured physical and mental abuse from Bahraini security forces, and faces over a dozen charges related to "illegal protesting." All of her protests have been conducted peacefully, and many by herself. She is simply too popular and symbolic to leave on the streets, and too defiant against King Hamad's personal authority to escape retribution. Al-Khawaja is known to chants slogans and craft placards against the King, and was picked up in Tuesday with a sign that read "your prisons we don't fear."

She is regularly jailed because Bahrain's monarchy fears peaceful protesters more than violent ones.

Now, after being acquitted from a separate charge of insulting a public official (Bahrain's judiciary throws out certain charges while keeping the more severe ones), the monarchy's Court of Appeals has overturned the ruling and sentenced her to three months in prison. She joins her father Abdulhadi, activist Nabeel Rajab and other oppositional figures in the unfriendly confines of Bahrain's political prison system.

A major security crackdown or political jailing in Bahrain is often accompanied by statements of support for human rights, and Friday's ruling adhered to this pattern when Human Rights Affairs Minister Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdulrahman met with UNHRC Ambassador Remigiusz Achilles Henczel in Geneva. Bahrain has slipped through the UNHRC's sessions with ease, demonstrating the UN's level of compliance in Bahrain and its inability to defend the rights of those who are being trampled on by a power-hungry monarchy. None of the monarchy's words should be believed when its own actions oppose them. Promotion of human rights is mainly a political and propaganda exercise.

"According to a statement issued by the Human Rights Affairs Ministry, Dr. Salah congratulated Mr. Henczel on the new post and lauded the advanced level of the communication and coordination relations between the Ministry and the Human Rights Council, asserting that Bahrain is among the main supporters of the UN mechanisms in all fields, especially the human rights one."

Al-Khawaja's ruling is self-explanatory in its counterrevolutionary nature. Unfortunately the U.S. response was mute as usual, a reaction that jars with the Obama administration's attempt to restart a National Dialogue between the monarchy and opposition. No debate of national proportions can lift off of the ground in the current environment, but the monarchy has taken great efforts to portray the National Dialogue as a success.

It will crash again soon if this denial continues.

Ali Saleh Mimics UNSC's Statement On Yemen

On February 15th the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a statement of support for Yemen's political transition and warned potential spoilers against interfering with the UN's diplomacy. Taken at face value, the UNSC's statement appears to spotlight former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and threaten him with financial sanctions. However Saleh's inclusion was primarily based on the art of concealment, as the UNSC couldn't aim at its real targets without first naming Yemen's duplicitous strongman. The other "spoilers" come next: former Vice-President Ali Salim Al-Beidh and the Iranian government.

Accordingly, Saleh has now attempted to blend in by pasting the UNSC's statement into his own rhetorical bag of tricks. Speaking to supporters at a rally organized to mark his transfer of power to Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, his vice president of nearly 18 years, Saleh demonstrated the notorious oratory and scheming mind that maintained his power for over three decades. Ignoring the hundreds of civilians killed by government forces during the first year of Yemen's revolution and his own refusal to resign, the former president claims that he "handed over power peacefully and willingly" to Hadi, and never turned to violence. He also called for "reconciliation, shaking hands and forgiveness of the past to build a new Yemen."

“Forget about the past and look at the future."

Saleh can afford to forget about the past because his crimes against the Yemeni people are insulated by the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing initiative, a U.S.-Saudi proposal that kept Saleh's ruling party in power and granted his family personal immunity. This agreement not only encourages Saleh to continue resisting the formation of a legitimate government, but to play along with the GCC and UNSC's diplomacy so as not to permanently sever the hands that protect him. The U.S. State Department refused to take a definitive stand when quizzed on the content of Saleh's speech, saying only that all parties should "play a positive role in Yemen's political transition."

According to U.S. and UN terms, Saleh is playing a positive role by supporting his former VP, rhetorically targeting Iran and opposing secession in the south - all actions undertaken by the UNSC. Washington and Riyadh both oppose the loss of influence that would result from the autonomous agendas of the northern Houthi sect and Southern Movement, and relevant international blocs have followed suit. All, of course, oppose Tehran's sphere of hegemony in Yemen.

"No to secession... Our people in the south are with unity," Saleh told supporters who had gathered in Sanaa's Sabiin Square. "A small minority which supports secession is funded from abroad... Those who receive money from Iran know that their days are numbered."

The Southern cause is rooted in Saleh's own misrule and operates independently of Tehran. Southerners regularly stage mass protests in favor of self-determination.

Whether viewing him as too much trouble or too useful to drop, international powers have yet to make any serious move against Saleh and are unlikely to do so unless he takes extreme measures that cannot be ignored. Only Washington and Riyadh wield the political power capable of uprooting him from Yemen's tense environment, but he is instead treated as an emergency asset and a loose end that must be guarded. Saleh is privy to U.S. and Saudi intelligence, along with the human rights abuses that he committed (against the Houthis, Southern Movement and independent revolutionaries) with their military assistance. 

The resulting policy allows him to roam relatively free within Yemen's politics, contrary to warnings from Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman, Yemeni activists and even the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

Saleh, in turn, has little reason to act out of line so long as he enjoys international protection. Although he has seen a number of relatives dropped from their political and military positions, Saleh has weathered the brunt of Yemen's political transition and remains a source of power. His mere presence creates a negative inference on foreign politics in the country, while his equally arrogant son Ahmed, former commander of the U.S.-trained Republican Guard, is set to be reassigned rather than stripped of his authority. Saleh's party, the General People's Congress (GPC), also received the most seats of any bloc for Yemen's upcoming National Dialogue, sponsored by the UNSC and GCC.

A gradual reacquisition of power forms the backbone of Saleh's long-term strategy and Wednesday's speech confirmed the planning of a worst-case scenario: the GPC intends to contest next year's parliamentary and presidential elections, and Ahmed has long been feared as an eventual contender.

Everything Saleh says and does obstructs Yemen's revolution, so anything less than international accountability equates to complicity.

Ongoing Mystery of Afghanistan's Post-2014 Force

When Hamid Karzai visited the White House in early January to discuss all things Afghanistan, a peculiar piece of disinformation awaited him at the doors of America's capital. Karzai had arrived to sort out the details of many issues, from prisoner treatment to NATO training and air strikes, but most Americans only concern themselves with one topic in Afghanistan: when all U.S. soldiers are coming home for good. Thus the White House exploited this singular concern and deployed its communications director to leak the unrealistic possibility of a "zero option" during Karzai's visit.

Barring a veto from Afghanistan's parliament or Karzai himself (or his potential replacement after 2014's election), the only zero in this plan is the zero possibility of implementation.

That the Obama administration desires a post-2014 military presence (U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta uses the phrase "enduring presence") in Afghanistan is no secret. Having watched Iraq regress into political deadlock and asymmetric warfare following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, the White House and Pentagon presumably realize that the scope of Afghanistan's challenges exceed its sister war and will not bow easily. They will push Karzai or his replacement to the limit of their political influence. Assuming they comply, the only certainty of a post-2014 force is a number higher than zero.

The mystery over President Barack Obama's final decision is fueling a repetitive cycle of media speculation, with no credible source venturing outside the 3,000-15,000 range. The latest estimate has emerged as NATO ministers meet in Brussels to discuss the war's options: between 8,000 and 12,000 NATO troops. This reasonable estimate was immediately struck down by the Pentagon as hearsay, suggesting that a force of similar proportions may be anticipated. Given the possibility of covert forces, though, the American and Afghan publics are unlikely to receive the full truth.

"First of all, that report is not correct..." Panetta told a press conference on Friday. "I don't want to go into particular numbers, because, frankly, we want - we want to be able to have the flexibility to look at a range of options that we ought to have for our enduring presence. But I want to make very clear that the range of options we were discussing was with regards to the NATO force."

Pentagon spokesman George Little added, "A range of 8,000 to 12,000 troops was discussed as the possible size of the overall NATO mission, not the U.S. contribution."

A "range of options," amongst other advantages on the battlefield, helps keep the Pentagon in control of policy rather than locked into a set exit. The DOD has privately and publicly resisted the White House's troop caps and deadlines, and the loss of a residual force would erode the Pentagon's grip on Afghanistan (as in Iraq). Whatever the relationship with NATO, whose participation is mostly due to appearances and politicking, Washington is certain to provide more troops than any other country.

The size of this force also nullifies any potential agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban, at least in theory. Rumors from within the insurgency's leadership have claimed that the Taliban's shura may be willing to accept a U.S. presence after 2014, but American troops will only stay to kill Taliban and train Afghan forces to kill Taliban. This policy will be sold as "counter-terrorism operations" against al-Qaeda "and its affiliates," largely meaning the Taliban itself and the elusive Haqqani network that serves as one branch of the movement. U.S. commanders were unable to conduct a planned operation in eastern Afghanistan and resorted to drone operations as a patch - they have yet to give up completely on a ground operation.

For this reason, a more plausible scenario will operate along Mullah Omar's lines and not accept the presence one U.S. soldier after 2014. Ongoing hostilities could then break down a political deal between Kabul and Islamabad, prolonging the war indefinitely.

U.S. forces plan to stay until 2020 and possibly beyond.

Lacking air power from NATO, how long will the fight continue between ANA troops, their U.S. trainers and the Taliban? Washington seems to expect a shorter time-line, and all U.S. officials shy away from the slightest negativity in Afghanistan (but not before cautioning against hard times ahead). Panetta told reporters that "expectations" set at last year's Chicago meetings were "truly exceeded": "The ANSF are now in the lead for nearly 90 percent of combat operations. And they are on track to step into the lead for all of these operations by this spring."

"Afghanization" offers the only hope for Washington's controlled withdrawal and has been highlighted over all other aspects of U.S. policy. To what degree desertion takes hold after 2014, and how often U.S. forces need to reinforce their Afghan counterparts, remains to be seen.

The Obama administration intends to leave 52,500 troops in the country until November, hoping to inflict more damage on the Taliban ahead of a political resolution. The insurgency has already survived the full brunt of Obama's surge and will not be significantly impacted by another summer of losses; while the group's foot soldiers may see a time of rest ahead, they are equally unlikely to surrender at this time. One final season (the last 34,000 troops will begin to withdraw after February 2014) may follow to keep the Taliban off-balance ahead of December 2014.

Yet two summers of fighting will simply reinforce Afghanistan's stalemate and leave a bad taste in both parties' mouths. Abruptly shutting off the conflict after more bloodshed is impossible. Considering the war's present conditions and future outlook, the U.S. and its NATO allies are preparing a recipe for ongoing low-intensity conflict that will stretch far past 2014 - when Obama will be tempted to replicate his policy in Iraq and declare an false end to the conflict. This lack of attention is feared by Afghans across the country, as evidenced by a question from Tolo TV Afghanistan.

"Sir, most of the Afghans believe that the U.S. will abandon Afghanistan again when the combat mission finishes in Afghanistan.  What type of guarantee you can give them, sir?  Because on one hand, Taliban still pose a serious threat to the Afghan government, and the peace process is also not going well."

"I want to make clear," Panetta answers, "that the United States and ISAF, the NATO -- the NATO countries that are involved in the ISAF effort, all of us are committed to supporting Afghanistan, not just now, but in the future. And that commitment is unwavering."

How these words translate into confidence amongst Afghans and Americans alike is much less certain.

No "Winning" In Yemen With Brennan

On Thursday, February 7th, a relatively quiet affair will unfold at the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington DC.

His path to the top finally cleared by marital scandal, John Brennan is set to assume the CIA's Directorship after what should be a smooth confirmation before the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence. President Barack Obama's counterterrorism coordinator has been lauded as a tireless model of integrity, portrayed by the U.S. media as one of the President's closest advisers, and delivers the cost-efficient counterterrorism favored by the majority of Congress. Some Senators promise hard questioning - particularly in regards to torture policies, foiled terror plots and the constitutional legality of killing U.S. citizens in foreign countries - but Brennan and the Obama administration expect minimal objections to his promotion.

"There's no indication of any trouble," National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor said Monday.

Accordingly, few Senators are likely to challenge Brennan too deeply on the future of U.S. counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda's remaining networks (dubbed al-Qaeda 2.0), and this outcome is especially probable in a country where Brennan's unpopularity rivals al-Qaeda's. Never mind that his confirmation hearing is scheduled to revolve around the targeted assassination of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, whose case just resurfaced in the form of a Justice Department "white paper" that backs the use of lethal force. This topic, although highly relevant in general, skims right over al-Awlaki's Yemeni homeland and conceals the many gaps that prevent U.S. policy from establishing sustainable relations with its people.

This attention deficit will similarly disregard Brennan's personal approval in Yemen, a reckless way of overseeing an expanding "small" war that was never formally declared by Congress. The systematic bombing of Yemeni territory and any resulting civilian casualties - Brennan estimates few - has been attributed to his hands, and Yemenis rightfully expect the worst from his future actions. Speaking to The New York Times in August 2011, Brennan defended the accelerated use of drones by claiming, "for more than a year, due to our discretion and precision, the U.S. government has not found credible evidence of collateral deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan or Iraq."

If this statement was accurate, and independence evidence suggests otherwise, the argument still functions as a temporal loophole in Yemen. Dozens of civilians (including women and children) were killed by the administration's initial Tomahawk and drone strikes following the attempted Christmas bombing in December 2009, christening the front against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in disastrous fashion. Amnesty International later published evidence of U.S. cluster bombs and their lethal bomblets, and the Yemeni journalist investigating this event was jailed indefinitely under pressure from the Obama administration.

Brennan has repeatedly argued that U.S. counter-terror operations succeed when the U.S. "supports good governance that addresses people’s basic needs, when we stand up for universal human rights."

Human rights didn't make the agenda on October 14th, 2011, when al-Awlaki's 16-year old son Abdulrahman (a U.S. citizen with no proven involvement in terrorism) was assassinated following his father's execution on September 30th. Abdulrahman's death has never been fully acknowledged, investigated or explained beyond an "outrageous mistake." More civilian casualties would follow up to the present, including one high-profile bombing of a bus in Rada'a, and many Yemenis question the veracity of official statements announcing the deaths of "suspected militants." The New York Times recently published an account of the August 2012 strike that killed Ahmed bin Ali Jaber, a cleric that denounced terrorism only to be bombed when AQAP came looking for him.

Suffering from a total lack of credibility, the latest uptick in Yemen's drone strikes has created the impression that Brennan is padding his stats before confirmation, a charge he that surely denies but cannot erase. In coordination with Brennan's hearing, Yemenis are organizing a Twitter protest - #NoDrones - to express their advice and ignored feelings to the Obama administration.

Furthermore, Brennan played an integral role in negotiating David Petraeus's secret arrangement with dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, which opened Yemen's skies to drones under corrupt and obscure terms. The unstable interchange between Saleh and the Obama administration manufactured numerous coverups (Saleh infamously promised Petraeus that he would take credit for U.S. air strikes, but exploited the collateral when things went wrong) and a "secret" drone base along the Yemeni-Saudi border, and seeded the ground for political hegemony during Yemen's revolution. Brennan was later deployed to assist the equally unpopular Gerald Feierstein, Obama's ambassador in Sana'a, in orchestrating the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement between Saleh's ruling party and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

This agreement, among other injustices, offered immunity to Saleh for the very crimes committed jointly with the Obama administration.

Perhaps worst of all is Brennan's public and egotistical indifference to these issues, as this attitude suggests a continuation of the present course. At first the Obama administration's counter-terrorism team would ignore the rancor bubbling up from inaccurate drone strikes and local resentment, whether in Yemen or Pakistan. Following the triumphant killing of Osama bin Laden, the administration elected to take the offensive and began a media rollout of its legal argument for targeted assassinations, led by Brennan and Attorney General Eric Holder. During this phase Brennan rejected a cautionary letter authored by Yemenis and foreign observers, demonstrating his inflexibility by arguing that drone strikes don't cause as much hostility as believed.

"Contrary to conventional wisdom," he told the Council on Foreign Relations in August 2012, "we see little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits for AQAP."

Accompanying this statement were outlandish claims of a relationship that few Yemenis would recognize. Of course Brennan would never speak of his own role in the undermining of Yemen's revolution, and won't touch Abdulrahman al-Awlaki's death. He appears to have convinced himself that U.S. policy fully addresses Yemen's non-military needs, and supports the Yemeni people in their quest for political representation and universal rights. Flatly denied is the "suggestion that our policy toward Yemen is dominated by our security and counterterrorism efforts." Nor does Brennan acknowledge the widespread negativity directed towards Riyadh, Washington's partner in crime in Yemen.

"Whenever I go out to Yemen, I invariably will go to Saudi Arabia, sometimes before and as well as after my visits there, because what the Saudis and the Yemenis want to do is to make sure that we're working this together."

As a result, the Obama administration's public stance towards Yemen's people gives the impression that the White House is viewing an alternate reality, or else weighs political and military access with Yemen's transitional government above local sentiments. Left over is the pervasive feeling that U.S. economic support increased as a counterbalance to political interference and military operations; up to this point Brennan and the Obama administration remain unresponsive to Yemen's revolutionaries, activists, tribal authorities, common citizens and whole political blocs. Brennan and U.S. commanders of Special Forces go so far as to claim that "great progress" has been made in Yemen, and that "the corner" is finally being turned against AQAP.

Several questions immediately leap to mind, questions that won't be asked at the Senate's confirmation hearing. First, what happens if transitional President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi follows through on his public intention not to run for president in 2014? Will the U.S. lose operational access due to a less cooperative government, strong-arm this new government into submission or fly over its head? Will Hadi remain in power at the urging of Washington, and would another cooperative government pose the same threat to democracy as relations with Saleh's regime? More to the point, how can the solution to a problem be as problematic as the problem itself?

Brennan represents the antithesis of democracy in Yemen and offers an ideal villain for AQAP's propaganda - so how can his image or strategies defeat al-Qaeda's ideology?

U.S. Accelerates Cycle of War In Yemen

Hopefully U.S. officials will demonstrate a greater understanding of low-intensity conflict 100 years from now.

With the tide of war seemingly turning for the better in Somalia and Yemen, two long-standing sources of concern for Washington, the National Defense Industrial Association’s 24th Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium provided a fitting venue to tout the effectiveness of U.S. counter-terrorism. Anchoring the event were two heavyweights of America's Special Forces - Navy Adm. William H. McRaven of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict - who reviewed the “innovative, low-cost approaches” being rolled out by the Obama administration.

This hybrid strategy of "small American footprints” and "building partner capacity" is widely praised by U.S. General Carter Ham, commander of AFRICOM, as the future of America's global counter-terrorism operations, and is currently being unveiled around Mali.

One assumes that the Pentagon expects eventual success against the militant alliance dug into northern Mali, given that Sheehan sees "good results" in Somalia and Yemen. Recent developments in Mogadishu are admittedly significant and, if nurtured, could present a genuine opportunity to decelerate the country's vicious mixture of clan warfare, insurgency, terrorism and foreign intervention. As for the evolution of U.S. policy, the aftermath of Black Hawk Down would necessitate adaption and serve as the mother of invention. Proxies needed to be applied instead of U.S. ground troops, inside and outside Somalia, and within the multilateral framework demanded by multinational insurgencies.

Once Ethiopia's U.S.-supported invasion failed to pacify the country on their terms, the African Union finally took over and scaled up its mission with Western financing.

Three years of hard fighting, punctuated by U.S. drone strikes and Special Forces raids, have now driven al-Shabaab out of its urban bases and into a weakened state. Despite numerous outstanding political issues, such as clan representation and the territorial status of southernly Jubaland, a new government is in the process of jumping from transitional to legitimate. Of course America's (and the European Union's) "small footprint" has been stamped on Somalia for years: Special Forces on the ground, CIA manning Mogadishu's "secret" interrogation center, PMCs training Somali soldiers, flotillas along the coast and drone bases at its corners.

This network also comes with the "small" price of Ethiopia and Uganda's heavy assistance, reinforcing the non-democratic elements of partner building. However these issues have escaped the American majority and pose no real threat to Somalia's portfolio, hence the general success.

Equally unconcerning to the majority of Americans (but no less frightening) is an opposing scenario across the Gulf of Aden. Here Shehaan appears to be even more bullish about the prospects of U.S. special operations, using phrases that few Yemenis outside the government would apply to their country's situation. For years they have watched U.S. policy in Yemen revolve single-mindedly around the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and seen the group's influence expand over the same period of time. Yet the Assistant Secretary of Defense claims that, after several years of interrupted operations, U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel have finally helped Yemen's government “turned the corner" against AQAP.

“A year ago in Yemen," Sheehan told his receptive audience, "al-Qaida had taken over vast swaths of territory... and was really threatening the state in Yemen, and also threatening to re-establish some capabilities that were very problematic. Over the past year, we’ve made great progress in Yemen.”

Denying the progress of intergovernmental relations between Washington and Sana'a is impossible. Until this past year, U.S. policy remained hitched to the corrupt and duplicitous behavior of strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh, who traded drone strikes for U.S. favoritism and shared intelligence only when his interests needed protecting (or his enemies needed bombing). He was even known to utilize local jihadists for his own ends, paying them or arresting (and later releasing) them in order to create artificial instability and secure U.S. funds/weapons. The Obama administration managed to replace Saleh with his vice president, Abd Mansur Rabbo Hadi, in response to a nation-wide revolution, and U.S. operations have smoothed since he assumed command in February 2012. 

The time between December 2009 and 2012 verged on calamity though, and Washington's “partner building” would have failed spectacularly if continued under Saleh's regime. The Obama administration, in the end, lucked out during Yemen's revolution, but a sustainable partnership with its people remains absent.

What McRaven and Sheehan didn't explain to their audiences is how U.S. policy contributed to AQAP's influence in the jihadist world and its local support with Yemen's tribes, brought on by unaccountable military operations in their lands. The Obama administration would ramp up vertically in response to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed bombing on Christmas 2009 and never look back. From the civilians killed by initial cruise missiles and drone strikes to Ma'rib's deputy governor Jabar al shabwani, to Anwar al-Awlaki's 16-year old son and younger civilians, the administration has struck with impunity during its hunt for AQAP leadership. All of these strikes were enabled by a secret agreement between Saleh and former CIA Director David Petraeus, then commander of CENTCOM, who passed along the arrangement to his nominated replacement, John Brennan. 

Amid Yemen's revolution, construction of a drone base along the Saudi border was also reportedly accelerated from two years to eight months.

McRaven says that all U.S. Special Forces are invited by foreign governments and don't operate without their permission - except this process can error militarily and trample over democracy along the way. The outbreak of Yemen's revolution would compel Saleh to distort the situation with AQAP, creating a false analogy that now serves as the driving rationale of U.S. policy. Beyond leveraging access to Yemen's air-space in return for political protection, Saleh relocated some of his U.S.-trained "counter-terrorism" forces to kill protesters and ordered others to stand down, which enabled AQAP's takeover of "vast swaths of territory" in Yemen's south.

Now the two governments must take back the same territory that they just lost due to incompetence, short-sightedness and greed.

While greater cooperation with Yemen's government has been attained in the aftermath of Saleh's resignation, U.S. policy has also reached the depths of unpopularity with Yemeni civilians, activists and tribes. How much these factors offset military achievements is difficult to gauge, but the chain reaction is visibly evident. Yemenis universally cringed as President Barack Obama promoted a public enemy to bomb their country. They reject foreign interference from Washington and nearby Riyadh, as does, coincidentally, AQAP. It's true that America is leaving smaller footprints in Muslim countries, only these boots are still relatively large and obtrusive, and they cannot defeat al-Qaeda's ideology without the help of Yemen's people. The Pentagon's argument is thus circular: U.S. counterterrorism is both poison and cure, but ultimately perpetual rather than remedial.

A recipe for low-intensity conflict in Yemen.

Taliban "Rift" Conceals Similar U.S. Divisions

As some parts of the Obama administration explore safe passage out of Afghanistan and Pakistan's harsh battlefields, other parts must remain on the offensive in their campaign against the Taliban network. This asymmetric task naturally extends beyond the military battlefield to global media, where the battle for Afghanistan is waged just as fiercely by the Taliban and NATO forces.

Both sides follow the rule of Propaganda 101: lead with truth and end in falsity.

Speaking to Jim Michaels, USA TODAY's military editor, on the topic of Mullah Omar's "code of conduct," Pentagon official David Sedney says that Omar's order to avoid civilian casualties has agitated the foot soldiers that rely on IEDs and suicide vests to attack U.S. and Afghan convoys. This order was first given in response to the Obama administration incoming surge, as part of its own PSYOPS for Afghan "hearts and minds," but the operational side of Omar's tactic didn't fit with the Taliban's style of fighting. Unarmored guerrillas need explosives to counter NATO armor and penetrate security countdowns, and the constant nature of IEDs inevitably outpaces the civilian casualties from U.S. air-strikes and raids. 

Sedney, a deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, paraphrased the thought process of an average Taliban gunman: "'You're telling us to keep fighting and we have no choice but to use those methods.'"

"That's creating a lot of tension."

The Pentagon is obviously motivated to announce its interpretation through the U.S. mainstream (and in a brief report with no alternative viewpoint). Faced with a disbelieving, war-weary public and the sobering reality that the Taliban isn't near capitulation, the Obama administration must pry inside the insurgency in order to generate negotiating leverage in 2013 and 2014. Effectively spreading division amongst the Taliban's long-term strategists could be a quick means of bringing pragmatic individuals into Kabul's political fold, or at least driving some foot soldiers into reconciliation programs.

"It's already clear that some parts of the Taliban are interested in a political solution," Sedney explains.

However the Taliban are likely to unite against any Pentagon official, and Sedney's rhetoric appears to be aimed at Americans before Afghans. His points of friction are common knowledge to the Taliban and foreign observers alike; The Daily Beast and other U.S. media have covered the issue in relative detail by tracking down players in the Taliban's mid-level and senior leadership. The "very large losses" endured by foot soldiers is frequently cited as a main source of contention, and one can imagine the feelings of disgruntled or tired guerrillas as they question Mullah Omar's alleged home inside Pakistani territory. 

Sedney and the Pentagon may be correct to assume, "The contrast between that and the life of the leaders who are staying in Pakistan has become even greater." Yet the Taliban remains operational and potent to this day - U.S. officials are engaging in PSYOPS precisely because the insurgency has maintained a resilience beyond Washington's public expectations. Unless the Taliban's leadership makes an exceptionally rash decision, few guerrillas out of some 25,000 will ultimately choose Kabul's authority and the presence of American soldiers over "The Commander of the Faithful." Most soldiers fight far from their supreme commanders anyway, and managing to assassinate Omar wouldn't guarantee their surrender. 

Additionally, Omar's shura should be interested in a political solution because the Taliban lack the strength needed to openly defeat a conventional army. Stalemate is victory and political power the prize.

Omar's dilemma lies in the terms that Washington, at this point, refuses to give him: the withdrawal of every last American soldier, spy and war plane. Thus the Taliban is compelled to wage war until 2014 at the earliest, when its actions may force the U.S. into a smaller post-2014 role, and possibly beyond to secure control over its traditional territory. This policy could create the same political threat to U.S. influence that Muqtada al-Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah pose in their respective countries.

Nor is the U.S. position towards Afghanistan's hazardous negotiations any surer than the Taliban's. Three years after President Barack Obama's first surge troops landed in Kandahar and Helmand provinces - with the intention of "breaking the Taliban's momentum" and strong-arming Omar to the negotiating table - Ambassador James Cunningham recently told reporters that the “process that hasn’t even really begun.” Washington as a whole remains split over its options: negotiate soon or continue fighting until the Taliban's leadership softens its terms over a long-term U.S. presence.

The White House and Pentagon are also locked in disagreements over how many troops to leave, who to leave, how long to leave them, and the types of missions they will be assigned. This decision was initially expected in December 2012 and later discussed during President Hamid Karzai's stateside visit in mid-January, when an implausible "zero option" was floated for political purposes. A final decision on the extension of U.S. forces hinges on a wide variety of competing factors in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad. The result is two opposing scenarios of equal instability: the U.S. will lose its military presence in the end, as in Iraq's case, or keep a military-intelligence force and continue fighting indefinitely until one side concedes politically.

Iraq's ongoing insurgency suggests that Afghanistan's war won't be ending when Obama says it will.

UN Face Masks US-Saudi Counterrevolution In Yemen

Yemenis march against Saleh's immunity agreement with the GCC and UNSC

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently landed a team in Yemen to assess the country's political situation and lend support to a planned National Dialogue, which has been delayed several times since its scheduled opening in November 2012. The busy delegation would hold its own council with many of Yemen's political actors, including President Abd Mansur Rabbo Hadi's transitional government, the country's Military Committee and National Dialogue Technical Committee, and representatives of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

"We believe that President Hadi's leadership has been instrumental in driving forward the reforms necessary to make Yemen a more stable and prosperous country," British representative Mark Lyall Grant said as foreign sponsors met to discuss the progress of the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement.

The UN's representatives surely arrived in Sana'a with good intentions to aide Yemenis during a time of crisis and hardship. Assisting their new president has become the pillar of international efforts to prevent civil strife between Yemen's array of political actors, re-energize the country's crippled economy, and roll back the influence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). To his credit Hadi has performed beyond expectations in his quest to achieve independence from his former boss, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and is gradually nudging the dictator's relatives out of their political and military positions. Without Hadi's perceived neutrality, Yemen's diverse set of actors would struggle to find an individual capable of guiding the country through a National Dialogue.

However this same earnestness doesn't apply to the powers that these individuals represent, and rarely has a UN mission been dominated by so few powers. In reality the UNSC is minimally involved with Yemen's crisis. The political transition that its officials speak of originated in the back-channels of U.S.-Saudi relations, conceived with the intention of salvaging the useful remains of Saleh's regime and the influence they amassed within Yemen's government. The GCC's power-sharing deal was initially crafted by U.S. and Saudi diplomats in conjunction with Saleh's GPC and the equally unpopular JMP, as a means of splitting power amongst themselves.

Left out of the equation were the civil revolutionaries that forced Washington and Riyadh to intervene against their cause of a sovereign Yemen.

This private agreement was eventually passed along to the GCC itself and signed by Saleh in Riyadh, far from Yemen's street demonstrations, before undergoing final ratification in the UNSC. Unlike in Syria or Libya's geopolitical war zones, the UNSC's five permanent members had already unified around the U.S.-Saudi position in Yemen and approved the measure unanimously, adding the final veneer of international law to the GCC's "initiative." Among those conditions endorsed by the UNSC: immunity for Saleh and his family, the powers responsible for mismanaging Yemen and attempting to violently suppress the country's revolution.

UN officials have argued otherwise at infrequent points, claiming that those responsible for human rights abuses should face justice, but that argument invalidates itself. UNSC Resolution 2014 accepts the GCC initiative and all of its conditions as the basis of the UN-sponsored "political transition," a term used by foreign officials in lieu of revolution. While Resolution 2014 "stresses that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable," its legal wording is theoretical rather than practical - Saleh and his crew "should" or "must" be held accountable, but they won't be. Instead UN and U.S. officials surface on occasion to remind certain "spoilers" that sanctions could be levied on them, but only if they don't obey the powers in control of Yemen's transition. The strongman and his relatives possess too much information on U.S. and Saudi to see an international court or endure Western-Gulf sanctions.

Coordinating their actions with the UN's, Yemenis rallied over the weekend to hammer their objective into diplomatic minds and repeat their demands to prosecute Saleh for crimes against humanity.

A letter written by Yemen's Nobel Laureate, Tawakkol Karman, delivered the following message to the UNSC's delegation: "Though the GCC-brokered deal, its implementation mechanism and UN Security Council resolutions envisaged the departure of Saleh and his family from power and politics in general, and despite the fact the deal has granted him immunity from prosecution, Saleh is still leading the General People's Congress (GPC) to take revenge at the political and public life in Yemen. Our people and great youth are waiting for your resolutions to openly bind Saleh not only to step aside as the chairman of the GPC, but also to quit politics once and for all, or else the transition will either fail or stall at best."

To this end Karman has urged Hadi to quit Saleh's GPC and form an independent party.

The Saleh family's immunity isn't the GCC and UNSC's only transgression. These blocs conveniently arranged for Hadi to replace his boss after serving for nearly 18 years as his vice president, a suspect trade-off in itself. After being selected by foreign powers to maintain their relationships, Hadi was then "elected" by a single-candidate referendum and tasked to lead the country through a two-year political transition, culminating in true elections in 2014. This policy continues to carry its positives and negatives into the future, as Hadi has utilized every ounce of strength and intelligence to hold the country together. Problematically, he also serves as an obvious tool of Washington and Riyadh, and has opened the skies to U.S. drones in an effort to secure influence with the Obama administration.

The controlled transition that is supposed to prevent civil war serves a double purpose of maintaining Yemen's status quo.

Yemen's National Dialogue has also been delayed for multiple reasons and, in the best case scenario, won't be held until months after its original date. On one hand a conference of this magnitude cannot begin until positive conditions are established, but a handful of delays could impact future electoral time-lines and reform policies. The main cited problem is the exclusion (or inclusion, depending on the viewpoint) of Yemen's Southern Movement, whose split leadership cautiously approached the process and has yet to make a final decision. UN and GCC officials have spent most of their energy trying to secure the South's participation, and for good reason since a National Dialogue goes nowhere with half of a country. Except the UNSC's position is determined by powers that oppose South Yemen's secession and refuse to allow self-determination; among the motivating factors is a loss of control over al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in the south.

UNSC Resolution 2014 begins by, "Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen." Responding to the UNSC's delegation, protesters gathered in the southern port of Aden to reject its coercion and chant, "The decision is ours."

Additionally, the JMP has publicly refused to participate in the National Dialogue if Saleh represents his GPC party, and the JMP in turn has interfered with the youth's efforts to be represented. The most seats went to Saleh's party, Southerners and JMP - in that order - leaving the youth and women's movements with leftover crumbs (60 combined seats out of 565). As a result, Yemen's civil movement has encountered disagreements over how deeply to participate and receives little attention from the international community. The country's northern-based Houthi sect has remained similarly ambivalent about a National Dialogue; its thirst for autonomy mirrors the outright hunger in Yemen's south.

A national summit is badly needed and clearly preferable to violence, but its current state is likely to inflame tensions and divisions rather than alleviate them. Yemenis must also be left to their own choices rather than be forced by foreign hands.

Yemen's present situation combines the local dilemmas of sharing power with the international dilemma of hoarding influence, and cannot move forward until numerous preconditions are established. Otherwise a dialogue stands a high chance of collapsing or becoming irreparably corrupted by self-interests (think Bahrain), at which point Yemen will continue along a dangerous course until 2014's wildcard elections. According to UNSC Resolution 2014, the implementation of the GCC's power-sharing agreement "is essential for an inclusive, orderly, and Yemeni-led process of political transition." Unfortunately this statement fails to conform with reality or else the whole initiative would be altered - or it may not exist to begin with.

Until Washington, Riyadh and their proxies elevate sovereignty to the top of Yemen's agenda, long-term hegemony will cast a destabilizing shadow over the country's future.

Info-Battle Over the Playstation Generation of War

That war is first taught as a game is no secret. For thousands of years young males have been introduced to war through figurines, wooden swords, wrestling, races and similar means developed by their fathers, whose own war games train themselves for the real thing. More recently, 20th century flight simulations and technological advances have blended with consumer electronics to transmit war onto a screen, both outside and inside the battlefield.

"It's a joy for me because I'm one of those people who loves playing PlayStation and Xbox, so with my thumbs I like to think I'm probably quite useful," Britain's Prince Harry said during interviews released upon his return from Afghanistan.

Explaining his four-month role as co-pilot of an Apache attack helicopter, Harry described the thrill of emergency response and the weapons systems he controlled in the gunship's two-man cockpit: Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, rockets and a 30-millimetre gun. Such statements are hardly surprising or shocking, but asymmetric warfare is fought along information lines and consumes anything in its path. Despite being cleared by the Ministry of Defense, Harry's comments quickly attracted negative press (targeting his princely qualities) and spurred a few grimaces on the MOD's own face.

"I'm not going to second guess whether he should or shouldn't have said it," spokesman Jim Murphy told the Guardian. "He's obviously a young and brave man. He was candid. Perhaps he may have been more candid than the Palace may have wished."

The Taliban naturally pounced on Harry's statements after failing to kill or capture him as promised. Spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid announced that, "49 countries with their powerful military failing in the fight against the mujahideen, and now this prince comes and compares this war with his games, PlayStation or whatever he calls it." Easily assailing the Prince for the flippant perception of his comments, Mujahid's counterattack appealed to any Afghan who loathes the notion of Afghanistan being treated as a game board for Westerners - from Britain and Russia's "Great Game" in the 1830s to the Soviet and NATO invasions nearly 200 years later. In this sense the disrespect of a "game" is very real in Afghanistan.

"This is a serious war, a historic war, resistance for us, for our people," Mujahid says.

However Harry's interviews are unlikely to make any immediate impact in Afghanistan. His testimony only confirms a new technological phase of an established pattern in war, and most Afghan civilians won't react as though he just murdered an innocent family or burned a Quran. Efforts to connect Harry's "mental problems" with the prolonged nature and brutality of Afghanistan's war may have more effect in Western countries than Afghan villages. Even Mujahid admits, "we don't take his comments very seriously, as we have all seen and heard that many foreign soldiers, occupiers who come to Afghanistan, develop some kind of mental problems on their way out."

More dangerous is the impetus to stage new Taliban attacks on Western targets in Kabul or elsewhere, which will be attributed to Harry's statements. Another factor to monitor outside Afghanistan is the public opposition of American video games set in foreign countries. These war games strike a cord with a variety of individuals, both the politically liberal and religiously conservative, who don't relate to the glamorous gamer side of war. The Trench has spoken with Yemenis who view Black Ops II's use of their country as gratuitous (try searching Yemen on YouTube), and some Pakistanis are beginning to organize a boycott against Call of Duty. Although the influence of these games on actual battlefields is minimal, public perceptions are crucial in counterinsurgency's wider scope and cannot be ignored at any size.

Any American force that generates anti-Americanism in a counterinsurgency environment is cause for concern.

Most disturbing are the long-term potentialities of advanced technological warfare: namely the gradual removal of humans from the killing process. Advocates of automated warfare argue that humans maintain control of the machine, a defense that is largely true for the moment but could break down over time. Drones may be more or less corruptible to enemy actors than humans; the process of this military experiment should be chaotic. Ultimately, whole fleets of drones could be concentrated in the hands of a small group or even one individual, further removing the human element from war. Drones could also be armed with weapons of mass destruction in the future.

Dehumanization is a constant theme of war - humanity might not be able to kill as it does without it. Problematically, all of these concerns and many others won't be eagerly addressed by Western governments or mainstream media.

Near-Zero Odds For Afghanistan's "Zero Option"

Keeping the enemy in the dark is a relatively straightforward task. Hiding information from a populace that has funded 12 years of seemingly endless warfare becomes murkier business, although governments have conducted their activities in such fashion for thousands of years.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has arrived in Washington for three days of consultations with the Obama administration, and a hazy beginning portends a hazy end. Since the main reason for his arrival cannot be obscured - Karzai and President Barack Obama are both under pressure to make a decision on America's post-2014 operations - the inner workings of their summit have been fogged to create political breathing room. There's certainly something positive to be said about negotiating bilaterally, and privacy may be the only means of reaching a compromise between governments.

However the U.S. and Afghan governments have told so many lies, and manipulated so much information for so long, that neither enjoys credibility with either populace.

Rather than face Americans and Afghans honestly, both of their governments continue to dance behind private doors as they seek the best outcome for themselves. Karzai, for his part, wants and needs a continual U.S. military presence to stay on his terms. The White House likewise hopes to supplement America's political presence with military capabilities, while simultaneously tamping down its military profile as low as possible. At least 30,000 U.S. and NATO troops are expected to remain in the country after 2013's withdrawals, meaning at least two more years of hard combat. The longer Afghanistan's bloodshed continues with minimal results from the central government, the more Americans will oppose a long-term military presence in the country.

Problematically, a post-2014 Afghanistan needs U.S./NATO forces to continue training, overseeing, patrolling, raiding and generally providing a "visual presence" in the country. They, in turn, need the funds and attention that come with U.S. military operations; Iraq has already fallen down the list of priorities after U.S. combat troops withdrew in December 2011, a loss of focus that contributes to the present stalemate between Nouri al-Maliki and an oppositional alliance of Sunni, Shia and Kurd. The Obama administration also believes it needs a military presence to leverage during negotiations with the Taliban, whose leadership expects a share of Afghanistan's power regardless of Washington's plans. Hostilities will be difficult enough to stop with an agreement, let alone without one.

Despite the optimistic rhetoric employed by the Obama administration and Pentagon in particular, many Afghans expect their country to enter a new period of instability and uncertainty following the exit of U.S. troops.

“Let’s be honest,” Mohammed Omar Barakzai, a senior shura member in Helmand province, told The New York Times. “The Afghan government is like a generator. The foreigners have provided enough fuel so that it will run until 2014. If they don’t refill the fuel tank, it will stop working.”

Now, instead of simply owning up to this inevitability, the Obama administration has dropped a "zero option" into the media to temporarily relieve pressure around Karzai's visit and mislead the American public. Knocked down from the 20,000 troops that the Pentagon hoped to leave behind, the White House was reportedly considering force-level options of 3,000, 6,000 or 9,000 before Tuesday's leak polluted the waters. All of these figures represent more realistic assessments of Afghanistan's ground conditions than the Obama administration's present rumor.

"That would be an option that we would consider," deputy national-security adviser Ben Rhodes answered when questioned during a conference call on Tuesday. "The president does not view these negotiations as having a goal of keeping U.S. troops in Afghanistan."

Stripping away the "zero option's" political skin leaves a naked scam, one intended to placate U.S. opposition to an open-ended commitment and deflect the Taliban's recent claim that it will hold the U.S. responsible for the war's continuation. This conundrum runs to the heart of Afghanistan's war: the U.S. wants to maintain a politico-military presence past 2020, but cannot realistically expect to mediate a political agreement between the Taliban, Kabul and Islamabad if U.S. forces remain in the country indefinitely. The Taliban mean what they say when opposing a post-2014 presence - one U.S. soldier or a thousand will justify their position. Nevertheless, the Obama administration is certain to leave troops behind if a deal can be struck before Karzai's term expires. Thus the U.S. headlines accurately capture this scenario: White House "floats zero option."

Float, as in bait for guppies.

Afghanistan's "zero option" rests at the opposite end of the truth spectrum and shouldn't be swallowed whole as the White House intends. The administration seeks to avoid the overwhelming situation that it currently faces in Iraq, and surely anticipates the political fallout of a chaotic Afghanistan. The only reason that U.S. troops and air vehicles won't remain in the country after 2014 has already played out in Iraq: Karzai, as Nouri al-Maliki did before him, opposes the renewed immunity for U.S. soldiers. This factor is especially critical since the Washington expects to continue Special Forces raids on Afghan villages.

The Obama administration's "zero option" exists by default, not choice or design, and will be forced upon rather than decided by Washington.