Washington & Colorado Marijuana Cards Need Playing

With his second term secured by 1 A.M. on November 7th, President Barack Obama and his administration finally retired from campaign life in order to resume business as usual. Except some unusual business awaited the White House at their hour of victory. Having obtained the consent of Washington and Colorado's voters during both of his campaigns, Obama is now expected to respect their decision to legalize personal amounts of marijuana.

The successful margin exceeded pollsters' expectations in both states - close to 55% - and gave Obama a real mandate in the process.

Naturally the White House chose to respond with quiet caution, opening an enormous void of speculation that can be as confusing as it is helpful. A sizable portion of one argument traces back to Kevin Sabet, a former drug adviser to three U.S. administrations (including President Obama), whose reaction seemed to trickle into every story on Initiative 502 and Amendment 64. He explains that the government, "has multiple avenues. They can wait until it's implemented, take action before it's implemented, reiterate what federal law is, send warning letters."

The Justice Department has only remarked, "We are reviewing the ballot initiatives and have no additional comment at this time."

This waiting period is likely to continue for weeks, obstructing the possibility of near-term decision (an issue of this magnitude shouldn't be rushed anyway). For starters, the provisions that define the user's terms have yet to be certified into state law, giving the administration breathing room to formulate a comprehensive response. These lower-level provisions aren't expected to draw serious attention from federal agencies; their concern focuses on the states' regulatory plans, which are due in Colorado on July 1st and by 2014 in Washington. The negotiations between federal and state representatives will continue throughout these developments, leaving the public to feed on any information that falls from their table.

What's not obstructed is the general direction that Obama's administration should sail: resounding approval.

No reason exists to bar two American states from carrying out the decision of its constituents. Legalizing and taxing marijuana, if done properly, will turn a profit for the state and reduce the various expenses accrued by enforcing anti-marijuana laws (peoples under 21 remain in violation). Both Washington and Colorado intend to make a business out of marijuana, seeking to establish a licensing policy similar to alcohol regulation, and should come out modestly ahead in revenue. Due to the regulations behind this plan, the Obama administration is supposedly open (according to various insider reports) to cooperating with Washington and Colorado's officials. These sources, along with the public faces that led each state's measure, claim that the administration targeted California dispensaries because of the state's ambiguous laws, not decriminalization itself.

"The federal government could go in and arrest everybody and indict everybody for distributing marijuana," says Alison Holcomb, the campaign director for New Approach Washington. "They're not doing that."

Although individual political interests don't factor into the equation of morality, opposing two measures that are supported by a healthy majority also makes for bad politics. Counter-protests would be assured. To this end an interest in the collective will is maintained by ceding to the majority's decision, and freedom counts for more than dollar signs. For libertarian and humanitarian reasons, Washington and Colorado's populations should be spared from a federal crackdown and allowed to govern themselves as they see fit. Ruling against them declares that the federal government knows best, a false assumption that wrecks all sorts of havoc.

Or, as Michael Moore recently told Obama in an open letter, "END THE DRUG WAR. It is not only an abysmal failure, it has returned us to the days of slavery. We have locked up millions of African Americans and Latinos and now fund a private prison-industrial complex that makes billions for a few lucky rich people. There are other ways to deal with the drugs that do cause harm - ways built around a sense of decency and compassion. We look like a bunch of sadistic racists. Stop it."

Internationally, the effects of Initiative 502 and 64 fit into the international community's gradual decriminalization and the study of its results. Latin American leaders from Mexico, Belize, Honduras and Costa Rica wasted no time calling for a new review of public policy, hoping to bridge the gap between America's failed drug war and the emerging reality of decriminalization. Their argument is no different from Congressmen Ron Paul and Barney Frank's advice to the Obama administration: "allowing responsible state authorities to carry out those wishes will provide valuable information in an important national debate."

The opportunity to conduct a relatively controlled social experiment provides the foremost reason to accept Washington and Colorado's measures. This information can then be applied to other states, to Latin America and to Europe, where decriminalization of marijuana is accelerating faster than anywhere else. America and the rest of the world already know what the "War on Drugs" looks like.

Now it's time to see what an alternative looks like.

Mexico Pleads Ignorance After Lazcano Heist

The killing of Heriberto Lazcano must inevitably grow more bizarre before receding to some measure of normality. Los Zetas's deceased commander, as previously suspected, wasn't tracked down so much as bumped into by Mexican Marines last Sunday, according to multiple authorities. This information has become critical to the government's explanation of why Lazcano's body disappeared in the aftermath. In a series of Wednesday interviews, Rear Adm. Jose Luis Vergara said that Lazcano was left at a local funeral home in Progresso because the Marines believed him to be "just a common criminal."

“For us it was two more criminals, he told MVS Radio. "We had no indication that it was ‘Lazca."

The government would doublecheck its forensic tests after masked gunmen stole Lazcano's body and supposedly matched his fingerprints. However this process is hardly trustworthy. Why didn't a convoy of Marines recognize Lazcano's bodily appearance - one of the military's most analyzed targets? Police and government corruption runs so high that one cannot be sure of anything they say, or rule out any possibility. Suspecting corruption seems reasonable; depositing Lazcano at a local funeral home is akin to leaving Osama bin Laden's body in a Pakistani mosque. This scenario doesn't make sense with the current information. Furthermore, both the Navy and outgoing President Philipe Calderon have stopped short of unequivocally announcing Lazcano's death.

"Information was obtained after the first forensics tests were carried out that yielded indications that suggest that one of the bodies is Heriberto Lazcano," the navy's statement said.

Equally interesting is the Navy's confidence in Miguel Angel "Z-40" Trevino's ascension to Los Zetas's throne. Attempting to downplay fears of another violent turf battle, either inside or outside Los Zetas, Vergara told Reuters that the government is not expecting a dispute over the group's leadership. The hardened Trevino, he says, is a "natural" successor to Lazcano. Unfortunately a stable Los Zetas still means an unstable Mexico.

"We don't think that there will be violence due to a battle between them for power, since we think that Z-40 is definitely taking the lead," Vergara told Reuters. "From what we know, the most bloodthirsty of them was Heriberto Lazcano, there's no doubt about that. I think his downfall should help curb the violence in our country."

Mexico's Navy sits in an disadvantageous position after failing to immediately identify Lazcano and losing his body. These failures do not engender trust in the government's other analyses.

[Update: U.S. knew Zeta leader's identity before body stolen]

Massive Info-Battle Follows Lazcano's Execution

By now the world observer knows that Heriberto Lazcano, leader of Los Zetas crime syndicate, has been killed in a shoot out with the Mexican Navy. The observer also knows that his body was stolen overnight by unidentified gunmen, presumably Zetas, but the general oddities of Lazcano's death still warrant an organized account. 

Known as "El Verdugo," or the executioner, Lazcano was killed on Sunday after encountering a Marine patrol in the northern border state of Coahuila. The favorable advantage of saturation enabled the discovery of his location; an additional 1,500 navy, army and federal police were deployed to the area after the October 3rd killing of José Eduardo Moreira, son of the state's former Gov. Humberto Moreira. The Navy claims that a local tipoff identified a suspicious vehicle near Progreso, Coahuila, about 80 miles west of Laredo, Texas. After a brief exchange of gun and grenade fire, Lazcano's body was found lying in or near a baseball field.

This information, unconfirmed as it remains, appears more certain that the rest of Lazcano and Los Zetas's future. After all, Zetas have built their syndicate on disinformation and fabrication to counterattack the efforts of other drug cartels and government agencies (and recruit locally, nationally and internationally). Connected to Guatemalan commandos, El Salvadorian street gangs, the Italian mafia, FARC and, more dubiously, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, Los Zetas needs ambiguity to stay operational. Many members have been "killed" only to surface again, while Lazcano himself replaced Los Zetas's founder, Arturo Guzmán Decena, after the latter was killed in a 2002 shootout.

Now everyone in the underworld and law enforcement is speculating over Lazcano's fate. Will the loss of its entire original leadership lead to a formal schism in Los Zetas, which allegedly controls over 10,000 individuals from all sorts of political and military backgrounds? Los Zetas currently oversees criminal activities down Mexico's Gulf Coast and in the states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila and parts of Hidalgo, Puebla and Zacatecas. For the past two years, however, various media "rumors" have reported an internal competition for the group's leadership and over lucrative new territory, such as the Yucatan peninsula. This information falls in line with Los Zetas's increasing fragmentation, attributed to the systemic loss of its older leaders and the rise of their younger replacements.

Whether the new boss, former deputy Capo Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, can keep the organization in one piece will affect the entirety of Mexico's drug war. Morales is considered more rash and brutal than Lazcano and Decana, the most able of the three. If any of them is going to lose control, it's Z-40. Yet Morales should be estimated as no less militarily capable than his predecessors, and his independence was supposedly deep in progress by the time of Lazcano's death. Of the three options - unity, division and collapse - the organization is too big to fail even in a worse-case scenario. Nor has the criminal underworld been more entwined than now and many powers, national and international, need to keep Los Zetas alive. Lazcano's death could also force Morales to pursue deeper international relationships to maintain his authority.

Lastly, some Mexicans and observers still question the veracity of Lazcano's death and his body-snatching drove the speculation to new heights. The kill itself was an enormous development but the theft induces a surreal situation. New rumors of police corruption are fanning the theory that Lazcano somehow faked his death in order to undergo facial reconstruction surgery, as Amado Carrillo Fuentes infamously attempted and died from in 1997. The sequence of events resembles the overall status of Mexico's drug war: after a major takedown follows infiltration.

This war can only be managed, not ended, with a top-down approach that fails to sufficiently address government corruption and inefficiency.

Politics and Insurgency Don’t Mix

Last September Hillary Clinton found herself on the hot-seat for labeling Mexico’s war against drug cartels as “an insurgency.”

"We face an increasing threat from a well-organized network, drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into, or making common cause with, what we would consider an insurgency," Clinton said in response to a question at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. "It's looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago."

Her remarks drew immediate criticism from Mexican authorities, who argued that their war is nothing like Colombia’s existential threat from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). While the FARC has mobilized itself with the strict intention of overthrowing Colombia's political and economic system, Mexican cartels are simply concerned with profit. The lack of a political motive, so the theory goes, makes all the difference.

Even President Barack Obama intervened, telling La Opinion, "Mexico is a great democracy, vibrant, with a growing economy. And as a result, what is happening there can't be compared with what happened in Colombia 20 years ago."

Clinton later clarified her remarks by disavowing the comparison.

The flaws in this logic, however, sink deep into the endless fields, deserts, jungles, and mountains of insurgency. Just because Mexico's conditions diverge from Colombia's doesn’t invalidate its own insurgency, nor does Mexico’s “great democracy” and "vibrant economy." Obama and Clinton refer to Pakistan as a “democracy” in the same breath that they condemn its insurgency. U.S. officials have praised Colombia’s democratic and economic progress as its insurgency lingers on. Even a well governed country risks insurgency; one can argue that America’s homegrown gangs, often rooted in political marginalization and poverty, would qualify.

Now everyone is repeating these same mistakes after Joseph Westphal pulled a Clinton at the University of Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics.

“This isn’t just about drugs and about illegal immigrants,” the Undersecretary of the Army warned. “This is about, potentially, a takeover of a government by individuals who are corrupt.”

Defining Mexico’s war against the cartels as an insurgency, Westphal then suggested that U.S. troops may be needed to stem violence across the border. Like stepping on a land-mine.

"My comments were not and have never been the policy of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government toward Latin America," Westphal said in a statement the following day. "I regret that my inaccurate statements may have caused concerns for our partners and friends in the region, especially Mexico."

A serious case of déjà vu, the Mexican Interior Department "categorically rejected" Westphal’s comments, throwing the truth out in the process. One Mexican government official said that Westphal went “way beyond” Clinton's remarks because he speculated that the U.S. might deploy troops over the border, a political red line. As with Clinton’s colorful choice of words, Westphal’s controversy drowned out the very real dialogue over Mexico’s insurgency.

This isn’t something to sweep back under the rug. Perhaps Mexico believes the word “insurgency” makes no difference, but then why fear the word? And why is “war” or “drug war” any better? Insurgency doesn’t imply a legitimate cause any more than regular warfare. In both cases a force can possess legitimate or illegitimate causes.

"It's regrettable that this official makes statements... that do not reflect the cooperation that the two governments have been building," the Interior Ministry added.

The only inaccuracy was Westphal’s ill advised publicity of U.S. ground troops operating inside Mexican territory (contingencies obviously exist). A deciding factor in counterinsurgency is managing impressions over a long period of time; smooth public relations and a unified message in COIN are vital to a successful outcome. But Mexico’s insurgency isn’t nullified by building cooperation between governments. On the contrary, multilateralism is the prescription for combating a cross-boarder insurgency.

And yet Westphal backtracked so far as to say he, "mistakenly characterized the challenge posed by drug cartels to Mexico as 'a form of insurgency.'"

He should have stuck with his first answer. Corruption and chronic underemployment have exacted a grim toll over a populace who feels their daily lives are neglected by the government. Mexico does enjoy a democracy, but many recently questioned whether its revolution had failed during its 100th anniversary. To say that Mexico’s drug war is devoid of a political spark ignores the general resistance to these collective ingredients of insurgency.

Repeating its standard line from Clinton’s flap, the Interior Department argued that Mexico’s violence cannot be characterized as a rebellion. As organized crime, cartels “are not groups that are promoting a political agenda.” This takes a narrow view of insurgency. At least one of Mexico’s gangs, La Familia Michoacana, began with a political objective of protecting the populace, and gang members often hold the opinion that the state has failed them. “Choosing” a gang often comes without a choice.

Nor do all insurgencies have political motives.

Bard O Neill, an old-hand insurgency expert, classified nine different types of insurgents, including commercialists and preservationists. These groups don’t necessarily aim for direct political power, but often display every other symptom of insurgency. Both find it useful to corrupt and damage a country’s political, economic and social structures in order to maintain power. Commercialists aim to acquire profit, preservationists to uphold their threatened way of life. Some have begun to label Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as commercialists. Mexico’s cartels qualify as both.

Cartels seek a degree of territorial autonomy as a result, not outright secession but certainly a politically-tinged goal.

Insurgency isn’t just something that happens in Iraq or Afghanistan. A subset of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), insurgents have sprung up around an asymmetric world. Western militaries and intelligence agencies consider organized criminal networks as a primary non-state threat in the 21st century, due to their growing connections to traditional insurgents like the FARC, AQIM, Taliban, and Chechens. Just as 4GW blurred the line between military and civilian, the diversity of non-state actors is blurring the profile of a traditional, politico/religious insurgent.

Mexican cartels may not fit the usual description of insurgency, but COIN is a relatively new study in America to begin with. Fourth-generation warfare isn’t finished evolving. Some theorists even speculate that non-state spheres like globalized black markets and illicit virtual states are fifth-generation warfare in the making.

Ultimately the answers for Afghanistan and Mexico’s insurgency aren’t so different: clean up the government, efficiently employ the national workforce, improve education, reduce Western demand for drugs, and seal a porous, rugged border. Political strategy is the lifeblood of COIN, however playing politics with insurgency is an absolute violation of COIN. Best to clarify the concepts of insurgency and rectify the other controversy, rather than nuke the entire statement.

That's the fast, easy, and counter-productive way out of trouble - another violation of counterinsurgency.

The Reality of Mexico's Insurgency

President Barack Obama probably meant well when he sided with Mexico over his Secretary of State. Diplomacy is, after all, a key component of successful counterinsurgency and Hillary Clinton’s answer during a Q&A session at the Council on Foreign Relations touched off a brief firestorm. Clinton had suggested that Mexico’s drug cartels are fusing into an insurgency, comparing the situation to Colombia during the 1980’s and 90’s.

U.S. officials including Arturo Valenzuela, assistant secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs, and Gil Kerlikowske, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, mobilized for damage control along with Obama himself. Unfortunately his disagreement with Clinton reflected a feeble counterinsurgency display.

Mexico may not be Colombia, but it does harbor an indisputable insurgency that evolved years ago, not recently. Even Mexican officials admit that similarities exist with Colombia. Beginning their formation in the 1960’s, Mexican cartels are now traversing the various shades of guerrilla warfare between terrorist and insurgent, much like the FARC. Insurgencies come in all shapes and sizes, leading insurgents to fight for reasons beyond the overthrow of a government. Thus it is critical to avoid defining an insurgency strictly by this objective.

While the FARC poses a classic egalitarian, traditionalist insurgency that must overthrow the government to fully profit, the Mexican cartels pursue an commercialist insurgency augmented by a backwards, preservationist need to maintain the status quo and continue business uninterrupted. Mexican cartels have yet to express the will to overthrow the government, instead aiming for another insurgency goal - subverting the government for personal gain.

Furthermore, Obama runs into major problems by arguing, "Mexico is a great democracy, vibrant, with a growing economy. And as a result, what is happening there can't be compared with what happened in Colombia 20 years ago."

Not only did Colombia’s economy grow during the 1990’s, despite periodic setbacks, but GDP growth makes for a poor warning of insurgency. States facing insurgencies often suffer economic regression, but China’s 9% growth in 2009 means nothing to the Uyghurs' fledgling insurgency in Xinjiang. India’s 7% is why the Maoists fight. Nigeria, another “rising economy,” also houses MEND, a well-armed guerrilla movement, while the CIA estimates Iraq’s economy grew by 4.5% in 2009. Insurgencies don’t discriminate between poor and wealthy states.

And though Mexico’s democracy is still standing after 200 years, it’s also plagued by corrupt politicians, judges, and policemen that have facilitated the cartels' havoc. The White House held up funding from the Mérida Initiative specifically because of torture allegations within the Mexican military.

Obama’s counterinsurgency would offer nothing to the Mexico’s situation if he weren’t attempting to sooth diplomatic tensions.

Clinton technically wins the debate by default, as her reasoning too is superficial. Mexican cartels aren’t “showing more and more indices of insurgency” - they initiated an insurgency years ago - and not simply because, “All of a sudden, car bombs show up, which weren't there before.” Clinton does begin to define an insurgency when she calls the cartels a “well-organized network,” netwar being a principle component of fourth-generation warfare, and observes that both the FARC and cartel have conquered territory within the state.

Judging by the casualty figures alone, Mexico doesn’t appear to have reached Colombia’s level - yet. While over 28,000 Mexicans have lost their lives, including nearly 1,500 policemen and soldiers, since President Felipe Calderon officially declared war in 2006, roughly 4,000 Colombian security forces have been killed since 2002. The civilian death-toll over 40 years of conflict is estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Nor do Mexico’s military resources match Colombia’s, although the cartels greatly outnumber the FARC’s numerical strength.

But while Mexico’s cartels don’t hold “nearly 40 percent of the country” as FARC did at its peak, they have no need to either; excessive territory usually becomes a hassle for insurgents to defend. Already possessing a rural base, the FARC exploited the 1980’s cocaine boom to boost their insurrection against the government. Conversely, the cartels used their proceeds to fend off the government’s intervention into the cartels’ turf war.

Their main targets are smuggling routes, not the capital.

Comparing insurgencies can lead to serious complications when done wrong. One must hope Obama privately understands that Mexico is every bit the insurgency as Colombia, fought in desert and urban sprawl rather than thick jungle. Each conflict splits a host of factions down ideological and blood lines, many of which routinely cross international borders seeking sanctuary, another insurgency staple. And both insurgencies employ all the tactical operations involved in terrorism and guerrilla warfare: propaganda, ambushes, assassination, hiding amongst civilians and donning government uniforms, corrupting officials, and ownership of legal businesses.

The Mexican cartels' numerical superiority compared to the FARC is a partial cause of what makes the insurgency so deadly in its own right. To augment their strength and tap directly into the US and Mexican streets, cartels have taken the natural step of recruiting US-Mexican gangs into their war, including the Mexican Mafia and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Some of these soldiers are US citizens, creating additional legal hurdles. America has militarized the Mexican border in response, with Obama sending drones to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia - and Texas.

And in accordance with insurgency law, the civilians of both conflicts suffer most.

At this point it should be clear, if not from the start, that Mexico suffers from a mature insurgency, however weakened by recent high-profile arrests. Obama has the right idea to placate Mexico’s displeasure, but actual counterinsurgency was lost in his rush to tone down Clinton’s remarks. Nearly every COIN text places a premium on clarity and managing expectations through realistic assessments, and the need for diplomacy mustn’t descend into semantics. Mexico is already paying the price of underestimating its insurgency.

Counterinsurgency also requires innovation and, with less than two months before California’s vote on Prop 19, which would decriminalize small amounts of marijuana, neither Obama nor Clinton appear willing to touch this third rail. Unfortunately America’s drug habit, as both have quietly admitted, is a main driver of Mexico’s insurgency. The Obama administration has allocated more resources to treatment, a trend that must continue to evolve, but Washington is also on the wrong side of the liberalization sweeping across Europe, South America, and into Mexico.

As with insurgencies in general, Mexico requires an international solution crisscrossing military and non-military spectrums. Whether Mexico is “on its way to Colombia” in the words of General Oscar Naranjo, Colombia’s police director, remains to be seen.

But apples and oranges are both fruit.

Calderon Puts Drug Debate in Obama’s Hands.

The toll of Mexico’s drug war weighs heavily around President Felipe Calderon’s neck. Leaking political fuel from a fatal milestone - 28,000 dead since 2006 - Calderon ended a three day conference on national security with what The Los Angeles Times described as “unscripted remarks.”

"This has become an activity that defies the government,” he warned, “and even seeks to replace the state. They are trying to impose a monopoly by force of arms, and are even trying to impose their own laws... Their business is no longer just the traffic of drugs. Their business is to dominate everyone else.”

Calderon’s evaluation of the cartels’ threat may be overblown. With the cartels showing no tangible indications of weakness, even after suffering key casualties, multiplying skeptics have left Calderon few choices other than to hype the threat. The fault isn’t his alone, as his task would overwhelm most anyone, but leading with the military in a counterinsurgency decreases stability over the long-term.

Though we’re less than certain, the cartels give off an impression of commercialist and preservationist insurgents - preserving the status quo for monetary gain. Before 2006 they enjoyed relative autonomy. Now, constantly under attack, the cartels’ seek to break the state’s will to fight in order to resume business. We interpret this as different from replacing the state outright or secessionism. The cartels desire quasi-statehood inside Mexico to prevent unrestricted foreign military aggression, basically any kind of regional autonomy to continue their drug operations.

It’s hard enough to believe the cartels would be able to supplant the Mexican government and conventionally defeat the military. The cartels have amassed a frighteningly high-tech arsenal, travel in state vehicles, and Kevlar is standard attire, but they would need to unite to have any real chance, an unrealistic possibility. Replacing the state is too much additional work. Hamas knows a thing or two about getting too deep in administration.

Of course Mexico’s cartels could seek the state’s destruction too. One cannot risk assumptions, they could dream of seizing military hardware and manipulating economic laws. But total domination doesn’t appear to enjoy high odds.

Nevertheless Calderon’s remarks included significant progress. The Los Angeles Times reports, “He acknowledged the need to significantly alter the drug war strategy to include education as well as addiction and jobs programs and to involve greater segments of society, including religious groups.”

This would be the start of real counterinsurgency, a welcome admission at a time when Calderon’s strategy (and America’s) is being accused of military centricity. Calderon lashed out at critics by claiming they want to give into the cartels, but what they really want is a holistic strategy that targets all aspects of society. Calderon has made similar statements before, but he grows more obliged to deliver a change in strategy as the bodies mount. And he must convince President Barack Obama to do the same.

Most positive is Calderon’s concession that the debate on legalization be thrown open. While Calderon insists he remains opposed to legalization, Mexico already decriminalized small amounts of drugs and mulled legalization. Several officials at the national security conference had raised the issue, citing California’s decriminalization bill among other evidence, prompting Calderon to warn that Mexico’s youth could be endangered.

But Calderon's office issued a statement late Tuesday saying that he no longer opposed a debate - a debate that terrifies most US officials.

“Belying his traditional reluctance to accept any questioning of the military-focused offensive,” in The Guardian’s words, Calderon admitted, "It is a fundamental debate. You have to analyze carefully the pros and cons and key arguments on both sides."

Calderon qualified the economic impact of legalization with valid points: potential decreased prices and exporting to the international market. Price fluctuation was recently addressed in a RAND analysis that predicted up to an 80% drop in marijuana prices and a 50-100% increase in consumption. Economic impact would be minimal under these conditions, an estimated $300 million in revenue. RAND notes at the end that its analysis is inherently unpredictable, and there are reasons to doubt such a minimal impact.

A price drop doesn’t favor the cartels either.

Realistically legalization is not the answer to the American drug war, which is a more proper name for a theater that stretches from Peru to Canada. But decriminalization of marijuana in America, the major consumer, and Mexico, accompanied by social health programs, is one aspect of full-spectrum counterinsurgency. As the insurgent attempts to induce death by a thousand cuts, so too must the counterinsurgent bleed the insurgent dry prick after prick.

The White House has lauded its “new” civilian approach to Mexico when military still outpaces non-military spending. America isn’t ready for decriminalization, but it must at least prepare for the debate.

The Cartel Rubix Cube

To wage counterinsurgency one must first identify the type of insurgency. Insurgency’s spectrum encompasses terrorism to popular guerrilla warfare, with many variances in between, and each style aims at different objectives.

Determining the goal shapes what type of counterinsurgency to apply.

Mexico’s drug cartels have proven themselves tougher than imagined by a stalwart but worn President Felipe Calderon. Though the cartels may appear criminal organizations they have come to qualify as an insurgency, globalization having blended the terms together. But it’s also too easy to write off the cartels as anarchistic or apocalyptic - “like al-Qaeda” - in the absence of a visible political, economic, or religious platform.

Like al-Qaeda, the cartels hope to establish order through chaos. What kind of order and where are the next questions.

Certainly they aren’t the common image of insurgency. That would be the Taliban. But as al-Qaeda embodies the transnational insurgency and the Taliban a prototypical traditionalist, Mexico's cartels represent the extreme form of organized crime - commercialist insurgency. COIN expert Bard O’ Neill comments in Insurgency and Terrorism, “Their main aim appears nothing more than the acquisition of material resources through seizure and control of political power.”

That seems to fit the cartels' mold.

Yet many insurgencies possess multiple objectives too, which O’ Neill warns of, and to consider the cartels as pure capitalists ignores subtler social aspects. The concept of a smuggler’s code that many believe is under attack, specifically by the paramilitary group Los Zetas, has divided the cartels and set them at war. Jesús Malverde and ancestry links factor into the equation.

The cartels also operate as preservationists - they seek to maintain the status quo. This designation, at least theoretically, eliminates the possibility that the cartels are secessionists. Such a connection would be easy to make given their battles with each-other and the government over territory, or that Los Zetas has set up training camps not so far from the US-Mexican border. Fear of a failed state and civil war stem from these threats.

The cartels appear to desire none of these outcomes.

First they have nowhere to secede, as they would isolate themselves between Mexico and America. Civilians would flee en masse, opening the territory to the full might of a conventional military attack. Second, and more importantly, the cartels base their intelligence operations on corrupt Mexican authorities, and thus stand to lose everything by seceding.

“The cartels don't seek a failed state. Rather they want ‘dual sovereignty’ – that is, to pay off public officials in return for their closing their eyes to criminality,”explains George W. Grayson, a Mexico counternarcotics expert and professor of government at the College of William & Mary.

Cartels want nothing to happen tomorrow and are employing violence to preserve what used to be the status quo before Calderon officially launched his war in 2006. They want the turf wars to end and for everyone to just go about their normal business of using drugs.

This objective makes the cartels exceedingly difficult to combat than if they assumed another form of insurgency. For anyone wondering why the cartels aren’t easier to crush, Los Zetas’s political and military connections allow them to trump the Mexican police and rival its special forces through real-time intelligence. They in particular have become a legitimate quasi-state that, like all cartels, would rather stay in its host state.

Mexico is forced into a political/judicial/economic response, its weakness, instead of its strength in a pure military reaction. The cartels surely wish to avoid US intervention as well. The cartels as a whole already near quasi-statehood, each functioning like a province. Hundreds of billions have been locked away over the decades, with the only real expenses being arms, logistics, and bribes.

No surprise then when a fully-functional submarine turns up in an Ecuadorian lagoon, nor if a collection of Mexican cartels funded the project. Although plenty of drug organizations in South America possess the necessary bankroll, either way Mexican forces are involved. Said DEA Andean Regional Director Jay Bergman, "Now that the Loch Ness Monster has been found, the interdiction community is going to retool their search patterns and how they conduct business.”

Expect the same from whoever made the sub. It won’t be the last.

All of these events, including discouraging Mexico’s recent election, fits into the idea of dual sovereignty and quasi-statehood, and the need to violently defend it. The question remains what to do with a preservationist insurgency flush with cash, loaded with arms, and possessing sovereignty over vast tracks of Mexican territory. Beyond internal government reforms to combat the culture of corruption, economic opportunity must be expanded to mitigate the cartels and reforming US drug laws remains inescapable.

Security is unlikely to deliver the decisive impact Mexican and US officials hope for.

No short or easy solutions exist, but as in any test counterinsurgency benefits from a process of elimination. The cartels don’t have many political demands, making negotiations improbable. They don’t seek to overthrow Mexico’s government and don’t want to fight a civil war. They want to corrupt the present system, preserve it, make their money, and enjoy the sun.

That makes them far harder to defeat and pushes any feasible time-line beyond 2020.

Greater Threat: KGB or Cartel Spies?

Naturally a cartel hit-man must be treated with a heavy filter. Jesus Ernesto Chavez claims that Lesley Enriquez, a US embassy employee murdered in Juarez, Mexico last March, was no innocent by-stander. US officials ignore his confession that she somehow helped a rival gang obtain US visas. Enriquez reportedly worked a position uninvolved with the process.

Says the AP, “A U.S. federal official familiar with the investigation said Friday that after the killings, U.S. officials investigated possible corruption involving Enriquez and found none.”

Without being too conspiratorial, this is exactly what US officials would say if a cartel had in fact infiltrated the consulate. Analyzing spy-craft and infiltration demands abnormal skepticism, and in the wake of a Russian spy-ring why would Mexican moles be any different? Government infiltration is one of the cartels’ specialties, it allows them to thrive.

They have a greater need than Russia.

Maybe Enriquez has no connection to any cartel. Chavez has a dozen reasons to lie - but so do US officials. And if not Enriquez why not someone and somewhere else? The cartels have so much money they don’t know what to do with it. While the US government and security forces are harder to turn than their Mexican counterparts, believing America is inscrutably impenetrable would be an arrogant defensive lapse.

As President Barack Obama stalls on immigration reform and the cartels continue operating at will, albeit ran by a younger, lesser skilled cadre, no signs suggest the Drug War ravaging the Americas will improve in the near and mid future. The long term outcome won’t be any brighter without the proper political and social response centered on economic programs and public health.

And opportunities for infiltration will persist.

Drug War Demands California Revolution

As the White House unveils “new policy” after “new policy,” a pattern develops resulting from the same small circle of authors.

The Afghanistan review was supposed to fundamentally alter the way America operates - and why - but strategically the mission remains perforated with impossible demands, unclear goals, exaggerated expectations, and artificial time-lines. The 2010 National Security Strategy dresses up world-wide militarism with sensible "whole-of-government" and sensitive multilateralism.

And the “War on Drugs,” though declared over, is anything but.

Yet real progress may find its way to the Drug War faster than Afghanistan or al-Qaeda’s many lairs. Unlikely a coincidence, the difference stems from where the American people exert the most power. Foreign policy is out of our hands except for public opinion polls, and even they only slow Washington’s march into foreign states.

But Californians can choose its own destiny and potentially effect all those caught up in a hemispherical drug war. Were they to pass the Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act of 2010 and decriminalize marijuana, the federal showdown would offer the first concrete indication of whether President Barack Obama is turning the “War on Drugs” into a public-health issue as promised.

Or reveal the contradiction of shifting minor funds into Mexico’s legal system while continuing to pump it with arms.

Many present and past US officials, including John Negroponte, and several experts went before Congress last Thursday to push the conversation from military aid towards government reform. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobsen told a Congressional hearing, "We are moving away from big ticket equipment" and towards “Mexican capacity to sustain adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights.”

Their testimony followed an interview with Gil Kerlikowske, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, who declared the “War on Drugs” over in May 2009.

“In the grand scheme, it has not been successful,” he told the Associated Press almost exactly a year later.“Forty years later, the concern about drugs and drug problems is, if anything, magnified, intensified."

But like how US Special Forces infiltrate hot spots around the world even as the “War on Terror” no longer exists, the “War on Drugs” keeps ticking in Washington and the US media’s actions. Ironic given that the media aims to sell Obama’s new policy. A Christian Science Monitor editorial, like many in the press, praises Mexico and particularly Jamaica for courageously standing up to drug lords at the behest of US extradition.

Interchanging America’s “War on Drugs” with Mexico’s very real drug, one linked to a wider regional war, CSM reveals how deceptively interchangeable these terms are. Though it would claim otherwise, the White House’s strategy remains fixated on law enforcement. Jamaica’s drug lords, like Mexico’s cartels, are ingrained in the political system.

Going after the biggest fish possible bears resembles to steroids - and their aftereffects - an ancient paradox between counter-terrorism (military operations) and counterinsurgency (non-military operations).

To be clear all efforts to bolster Mexico’s political and legal system must be made, otherwise unlimited military aid won’t create a lasting impact. And Obama’s public rhetoric, to “reduce drug use and the great damage it causes,” is a step above the total oppression US drug users have been living under. The”War on Drugs” is manufactured repression against the American people, born by Richard Nixon’s need to distract from Vietnam and counter the countermovement.

Every president who followed him took up the torch. One mistake to cover another, all the burden fell on the American people. No wonder the “War on Drugs” failed so spectacularly.

Of the estimated $1 trillion spent in the last 40 years, according to the AP’s count, $20 billion went to fight the drug gangs in their home countries. $33 billion went to marketing "Just Say No"-style messages to America's youth and other prevention programs (the AP notes, “High school students report the same rates of illegal drug use as they did in 1970”).

Meanwhile $49 billion went to law enforcement along America's borders, $121 billion to arrest more than 37 million nonviolent drug offenders, “about 10 million of them for possession of marijuana.” The estimate to incarcerate all offenders in federal prisons alone: $450 billion.

A battle itself is being waged over whether the “War on Drugs” is over. The White House has changed the language, as usual, but the numbers produce a clearer image. Counter-terrorism still triumphs over counterinsurgency.

Obama is looking to blow by the 50% mark, his rhetoric ultimately fatal if the plan is more law enforcement seasoned with token non-military aid. The AP reported, “most of the $310 million that the Obama administration seeks for Mexico in its 2011 budget request is aimed at judicial reforms and good governance programs.”

“Nevertheless, his administration has increased spending on interdiction and law enforcement to record levels both in dollars and in percentage terms; this year, they account for $10 billion of his $15.5 billion drug-control budget.”

Reality drifts closer to false than true change. It would seem the White House, having loaded up on law enforcement, is now covering its tracks with supplementary aid to Mexico’s government. The AP reports are full of various NOG officials hailing Obama’s change in tone - and fretting over his paper trail.

But he may soon face a real test.


Unfortunately preliminary indications from Washington lean towards yet another battle, this time with Californians. Surely Obama is praying they vote down the decriminalization of marijuana; both he and his officials hate getting near the issue. The Congressional hearings have been dubbed "Beyond Merida,” which would seem perfect for November 4th, 2010, but not even in Kerlikowske’s world is this the case.

When chosen the Seattle Police Chief was hailed by The Seattle Times as scientific and apolitical.

“When Seattle voters were considering a ballot measure in 2003 to make marijuana possession a low law-enforcement priority, President George W. Bush's drug czar flew across the country to condemn the proposal. Don't expect a similar ‘war on drugs’ approach if Seattle Police Chief Gil Kerlikowske takes over the job after being nominated Wednesday by President Obama.”

Think again. He may not fly to San Francisco on the 4th, but Kerlikowske’s no fan of decriminalizing, taxing, or regulating marijuana either. The Obama administration is “very much opposed” to taxing and regulating marijuana he told The Washington Post, a stance he’s repeated since taking office.

Hillary Clinton has been known to strike down reporters’ questions of decriminalization with a flat “no.”

America's federal system will shine though if California votes yes. The pivotal moment could set off a chain reaction to Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, where lax marijuana laws already trend towards decriminalization. Other states are likely to take a serious look if California can generate a sizable tax revenue and contribute to reviving its depressed economy.

Reducing crime would be the second trend to monitor. Benefits theoretically reach into California’s judicial and penal system. Total influence on middle schools, high schools, and colleges remain unknown, but marijuana is already freely accessible. New laws can be enforced just like public intoxication.

Such a reaction ultimately creates the overriding benefit of reconfiguring how America debates, legislates, and regulates drug use and abuse. California would become the default experiment to see whether it could work.

As for Mexico’s drug war, decriminalizing marijuana is by no means a panacea, but rather one step in the right direction. Only one source of the cartels’ revenue would dry up. Decriminalizing methamphetamines, opiates, and cocaine is infeasible in a country as large as America; the environment will be far less controlled than Portugal. These drugs supersede marijuana and demand their own solutions.

The horizon would be wider though.

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have taken a baby step in admitting the obvious - America’s demand for drugs is the root of Mexico’s drug war. Yet they offer, and likely possess, no practical solution to actually lower this thirst. If America can't control demand, the next best option appears to be controlling supply. The conflict demands a statesman’s leap.

Californians should pass the Tax Cannabis of 2010 Act and discover how serious Obama is in ending the “War on Drugs.” And how much power the people can take back.

Mexico's World Drug War

For years the Mexican government has battled drug cartels for sovereignty of the state. Finally a reprieve might be near. Not for the Mexican people, 23,000 dead and still exposed to the crossfire, but for police and military units on the front lines. Yet a general rule of politics and war is that a situation can always turn worse than it already is.

Mexico’s next cycle of violence could eclipse the last as quick math suggests 2015’s death-toll could breach 50,000.

The battlelines, reforming for months and possibly years, only recently become international headlines: Cartels Team Up to Destroy Hit Men Gang. Those hit men are Los Zetas, a paramilitary/drug cartel created for protection by the Gulf Cartel that eventually morphed into an enemy.

DEA officials laid out the reconfigured landscape last week in Texas, a distribution hub and primary battleground among the cartels.

"The Zetas have been trying to wage war on everybody for a while," said Will Glaspy, head of the DEA's office in the border town of McAllen. "It's been well-documented that the Gulf cartel has formed alliances with the Sinaloa cartel and [La Familia] to wage war against the Zetas."

While Los Zetas’ dominance, ruthlessness, and conquer-mentality are partial causes of this new alliance, the larger picture is fleshed out by high-ranking Gulf Cartel leader Jorge ‘El Coss’ Eduardo Costilla Sanchez. Sanchez had ordered the murder of Victor ‘Concord 3’ Pena Mendoza, a Zeta captain, back in January.

“After he died on 18 January, the Zetas' number two in command, Miguel ‘El Cuarenta’ Triveno, demanded that the Gulf Cartel hand over the killer. When that didn't happen, the event snapped tension that had built up since September 2008.”

Roughly when Los Zetas turned on its Gulf creators.

According to Salem News contributors Samuel Logan and John P Sullivan, “Concord 3 (Mendoza) was the linchpin that held together a shaky truce. His death on 18 January marked the end of the relationship held together by mutual necessity since Osiel Cardenas agreed to hire a group of highly trained mercenaries to watch his back. When the Gulf Cartel kidnapped Concord 3, it was marking a decision to separate from its former cadre of elite bodyguards. It was war.”

A recent report by Excélsior, one of Mexico’s oldest newspapers, claims the new bloc includes: the Sinaloa Cartel headed by Joaquín Guzmán Loera (‘El Chapo’), the Gulf Cartel, La Familia Michoacana, the remnants of the Milenio/Valencia Cartel, and with a separatist faction of the Arellano-Felix organization (Tijuana Cartel).

They call themselves The New Federation.

These combined forces present a staggering level of power arrayed against Los Zetas, and with the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels being former rivals it’s hard to blame that angle of the story for attracting attention. The problem is that Los Zetas’s operations disappeared into the shadows - where the real story begins.

Alliances are often zero sum, interchanging allies and enemies as the environment demands. As cartels realign against Los Zetas, others must align in its favor. We aren’t witnessing one cartel supergroup teaming up on Los Zetas, but two supergroups lining up for a grand battle.

"We had six cartels, if you want to call them cartels, in Mexico,” said DEA agent Greg Thrash. “What we're seeing now is they're combining, and they're warring amongst one another.”

Los Zetas alone, as the most military sophisticated cartel, will be hard to destroy. One cartel clearly wasn’t enough and no tangible evidence exists that two are. The mission's improbability rises as Los Zetas equips and trains its own alliance: the Beltran Leyva organization, Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes organization (Juarez Cartel), and the Arellano-Felix organization (Tijuana Cartel).

The Beltran Leyva Cartel in particular switched sides from the Sinaloa Cartel in 2009.

While the cartels’ demand that the Mexican state stay out of their fight may relieve pressure on Mexican forces, a favorable long-term outcome is hard to imagine. There’s always a chance that the war, being so hot, could burn itself out, but we predict otherwise. In comparison to the storm already ravishing the state, Mexico is headed for a super-storm.

Our ultimate concern is Mexico becoming a lottery for the international crime syndicate. Its internal conflict has always been regional in nature, from the drug production fields in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, to Central American banks, to Mexico’s distribution routes and America’s streets.

But this regional conflict could swell to dangerously international proportions.

The pool of power - money, drugs, territory, weapons, political clout - is growing in proportion to the war. Before each cartel was competing four or five ways. Now the winner takes all and whoever comes out on top will hit an indescribable jackpot. Los Zetas would have plenty of spare billions to offer the world’s underbelly.

Both cartel groups would.

Reality must generate theory, which must leap back to reality. Los Zetas is comprised of former Mexican military commanders, who in turn recruited more commanders and soldiers. Its nature is to train up and Los Zetas’ has been raising an army since its formation: 1 to 10, 10 to 100, 100 to 1,000 and 1,000 to 10,000. That’s why its tactics are so advanced and uniform, why cartels copying Los Zetas operate in similar fashion.

Thus Los Zetas will require more recruits, and the first contacts have already been established by none other than Los Zetas itself. Originally the Gulf Cartel had cultivated ties with Ndrangheta, an ancient Italian crime syndicate, to open cocaine routes into Europe. Los Zetas took over the connection once it split with the Gulf.

Beltran Levya then brought in their connections to Norte del Valle Cartel, one of Colombia’s leading cocaine cartels.

Meanwhile Mexican cartels have already infiltrated most US street gangs, both Latin and African American. Sinaloa recruited MS-13 to counter the Gulf Cartel’s formation of Los Zetas. Since the Tijuana Cartel aligned with the Mexican Mafia, Los Zetas stands to absorb that organization into its army. Others are following.

Los Zetas also realized the need to replace itself by turning to ex-Kaibiles - Guatemalan Special Ops - to fill their previous role as special forces. It would seem unlikely for Los Zetas not to train its eyes on new government pipelines. After that a whole world of prospects await.

Why not another Italian crime syndicate, or the Russian mob? Reports have Los Zetas feeling around western Africa and its cocaine trade, home to al-Qaeda operatives and other militant groups allegedly involved in trafficking into Europe. Or what about the remnants of FARC, even the PKK or CIRA?

Any of these groups would be hard pressed to provide significant assistance to Los Zetas, but the intention may simply be to combine as many smaller parts as possible. This strategy would be no different than how the cartels already move drugs, money, and weapons across the US-Mexican border.

Agent Thrash compared the cartels to army ants. Well, army ants have spread globally.

Increasing the odds of this outcome further is US assistance to the Mexican military. As the war intensifies America will have no choice but to escalate own its military activity - equipping, training, and possibly fighting. The door then opens for PMCs like Blackwater, if they aren’t already in the state.

This would further invigorate Los Zetas’s own pursuit of foreign mercenaries.

Mexico, even with US assistance, cannot defeat the collective force opposing it, at least not in the next decade. The cartel’s total ranks number in the hundreds of thousands - over 100,000 drug suspects were arrested since 2006 alone - and they stand to swell as the jackpot rises.

This battle must erupt and Mexico has winner. The increasingly real question is whether it can survive the coming battle and the one after it.

US Must Expand Mind on Drug War

The venue may not have been the most appropriate. Still, it’s hard not to be disappointed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s press conference with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa. Though the US delegation has days to pitch its revamped strategy for Mexico and the Drug War, Clinton didn’t leave much room for a true comprehensive solution.

Headlines misleadingly read that officials admit US demand is the root of conflict. Clearly US drug demand is key to the delegation’s PR. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano told reporters in flight to Mexico City, “We need to keep focusing on that drug demand reduction issue.”

Clinton too acknowledged that US drug demand is a top priority for the White House, but she was far less eager to explain how that demand will drop.

Impressing upon her audience America’s sober concern about its drug use, Clinton informed her audience, “The Obama Administration’s new drug policy is going to be released very soon. And it will include specific recommendations about how to decrease demand... we’re going to be doing a joint study about drug consumption.”

“We want to make sure we understand everything that is going on in both of our countries.”

These were encouraging words until she was asked how exactly US demand could be reduced.

“Madam Secretary, you spoke about looking at anything that works in this problem. I’m wondering, has there been any discussion of decriminalizing drug as one strategy for undercutting the power of the cartels?”

“No,” replies Clinton, an odd answer for someone with an alleged open mind.

Mexico, along with a growing list of South American states, has already decriminalized lesser narcotics, making America, the state with the biggest problem, look like the biggest obstacle. And observe the wording of the question. We’re not talking about stone laws, simply “any discussion,” implying US officials aren’t willing to debate the issue at all.

The underlying message America sends is that decriminalization has no potential positives - that it won’t work - even as more states contemplate drug reform. Instead Clinton claims, “Our Secretary of Defense and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs... were very complimentary about what the military is doing.”

While we cannot deny the need for increased military operations, Mexico’s strategy hasn’t produced the most desirable results. Are Mexican soldiers and police courageous? Surely. Are they committed? In most cases. But emphasis on military action and law enforcement has escalated the overall war.

And why is a US super delegation in Mexico City in the first place? Because Mexico’s military strategy has stagnated and will be overwhelmed without a change.

The Drug War requires a full spectrum strategy, civil and martial, as every US official will tell us over the coming days. We can’t say for sure, indeed no one can, what effects decriminalization would have on the drug war, but reducing foreign demand for drugs over the long term appears to be a viable prescription to consider. Demand might not drop so much as demand can be regulated.

The business and revenue potential of decriminalization is a completely seperate sphere, yet filled with potential opportunities as well. Thus to exclude decriminalization from the discussion entirely is likely an action of ulterior motives, either political or business, more than real strategy.

The ultimate irony is that drug use is primarily a public health issue. A more politically progressive society would have debated decriminalization in relation to health care. Granted America is a centrist society, but decriminalization has gained steam since the Crack epidemic and is already underway internationally.

While universal health care is of obvious importance, it's also necessary to proactively prevent disease and substance abuse. Obama speaks often of doing so. US officials in Mexico spoke of every recourse except decriminalization, but this option must be explored in a true comprehensive strategy.

Mexican War Limiting US Policy

The Mexican Drug War is a drug war in name only. Somewhere the war transcended drugs, sectioning them off into their own sphere while continuing to climb up the spectrum of territory and power. A war, plain and simple, rages 20 feet away from America.

In a drug war, when orchestrating a hit, a ground of armed men will collectively blast at their target after close observation and preparation; sometimes the hit isn't planned. In a war, an organized military unit will most often secure the rear, flank out, condense on the target, and withdraw through a calculated exit.

The second case occurred at a high-school sports party in Ciudad Juarez, site of Mexico's latest massacre. Authorities discovered through background checks that none of the 16 teenagers killed were connected with drugs. Many of them were exceptional students. The mayor, and likely the police, suspect the shooting was random.

But shock levels are so high that one wonders whether the assailants actually meant to send a message of random terror. And buried under the Juarez massacre lies further realization that “The Mexican Drug War” has become “The Mexican War.”

In a drug war the participants usually seek to avoid the law, only firing on enforcement officials when cornered or for emotional goals like pride, honor, and spite. In a war, participants intentionally target security installations as part of a broader offensive campaign.

The AP and Al Jazeera report in the bottom paragraph that another attack occurred 800 miles south in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacán. Officials say, “heavily-armed gunmen riding in trucks threw grenades and fired assault rifles at the outpost, killing three people - a police officer, and a mother and her son who had come to pay a fine.”

In a drug war the participants might, but very rarely, execute simultaneous heavy weapon attacks across long distances. In a war these occurrences are routine, as they are in Mexico.

Los Zetas, a military organization, operates in both cities so it’s not unreasonable to assume they were behind both attacks, leading to another critical difference. In a gang war, the participants are usually civilians. In a war the participants are soldiers - and Los Zetas is a paramilitary army, a brigade of commanders and highly trained soldiers.

Under their command, the Gulf Cartel and its allies have demonstrated unbelievable tactics for a “drug cartel” beginning in 2008. Their vehicles and bodies are armored and marked with police gear. Armed with military-grade weaponry, they move in small unit tactics and operate in an organized command structure.

It’s more than likely that Los Zetas is training its foot soldiers to become real soldiers and we’re witnessing the results. An arms race among the other cartels could follow, meaning Mexico might in bigger trouble than previously thought. If that’s possible.

With over 2,600 murders in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico saw more death in 2009 than Afghanistan. Afghan civilian deaths cleared 2,400 in the entire country. 317 US troops and 863 Afghan security forces also lost their lives in Afghanistan, below the thousands of Mexican police and soldiers who fell in battle.

Over 7,000 people are estimated to have died of “drug-related violence” in Mexico during 2009. And the numbers only tell part of the story. Decapitations, mutilations, RPGs - these are manifestations of war. Juarez isn’t the most violent city outside a war-zone, it’s the most violent city inside a war-zone.

The point of this potentially redundant analysis is that America must start treating Mexico like Afghanistan, like a war instead of a drug war, by moving it to the top of national security. This needs to become one of Obama’s highest priorities because Mexico is handcuffing US foreign policy.

The US military has already realized and begun planning for Mexico’s potential collapse and aftermath. Concern lies in the combination of cartel armies and their influence over Mexico’s political and legal system. As the threat increases in probability, US commanders must sink additional resources into contingency planning.

Consider if America had two secure borders instead of a potential failed state containing 110 million people, millions of arms, hundreds of thousands of gang/paramiltary members. America would operate more freely throughout the world - militairily, politically, and economically - with a stable Mexico protecting its flank.

The question remains how. As previously mentioned Mexico needs to move up America’s list of things to do. Relatively speaking, Mexican chaos is a heavyweight threat to US national security compared to lightweights like Iran, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

Problematically US forces aren’t of as much use offensively during total war within Mexico. Several hundred thousand troops will likely be required to seal the US-Mexican border in event of an emergency, while a more limited amount would aid Mexican forces against the cartel armies.

US Special Forces will roam free, but the Zetas are no slouches.

Legislation may prove more effective with timely and informed governance. The White House and Congress have passed the Mérida Initiative, along with gun-control and narco-sub laws, but these motions can consume time. Gun laws have grown less useful as the cartel’s stockpiles rise.

The White House and Congress must move with the swiftness of post-9/11 legislation. This includes immigration reform.

Naturally a regional approach must be adopted by the entire drug chain, from Canada, America, and Mexico through Central America, to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, even Brazil and Venezuela, the jump-off point to West Africa. Gauging by the growing calls for decrimilzation and treatment of drug use as a public health issue, America might be able to make its greatest impact here.

Today President Obama’s YouTube garnered more than a few questions on decriminalization. Instead of taking these questions in partial jest, afraid to touch the rail for real, he must engage completely as national security implications demand. The Mexican War demands new thinking, to the point that America could potentially use cartels as wholesale importers to supplement registered dispensaries.

It’s past the time to start thinking differently about Mexico.

As America heads into the 21st century, it cannot be weighed down globally by a potential black hole in its backward, one already creeping northward.

al-Qaeda's Future Front: Mexico

US-Mexican border at San Diego County

Mohamed Ahmed Kheire has a strong will. Everyone in his boat has one, and stronger motivation to traverse 11 countries on three continents with almost no money and a family in danger. Kheire had fled Somalia willing to do to anything necessary to reach US soil.

If he could, what's stopping al-Qaeda or al-Shabab from shadowing his trail and turning Mexico into a future front in America's "War on Terrorism?"

Kheire had been deposited in San Diego, California, where officials say hundreds of Somalis applied for political asylum in 2009. Most are rejected, though they aren’t immediately deported because of the difficult return trip. After all, should America really fly Somalis back to a war zone or dump them on the beach?

"The U.S. has closed most of the doors for Somalis to come in through the refugee program so they've found alternative ways to get in," said Mark Hetfield, senior vice president for policy and programs at the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. "This is their new route.”

But many end up languishing in an immigrant detention center, like Kheire, while they await a judge for their case. Kheire carried no identification and had lost contact with his family who could vouch for him. His full story was only heard once he shuffled into an immigration court.

After selling his taxi and jumping to Kenya, a smuggler arranged fake documents for Kheire to travel to Dubai, then Cuba. He then traveled to Ecuador and Colombia, “where he boarded a small boat with about 20 African migrants,” until they reached Costa Rica. Their demanding voyage took a week. They only traveled by night, forced to hide during the daytime in mangroves and other vegetation along the shoreline, and bailed out water as they drifted along.

In Nicaragua, “Kheire was herded into the back of a sweltering truck container for 18 hours, fearing he would die of suffocation or be caught by police.”

He then crossed a river from Guatemala into Mexico, where he was held for 12 days until ordered to leave the country within a month. The end of the journey proved easiest - Kheire took a plane to Tijuana and a taxi to San Diego. Said Bob Montgomery, director of the San Diego office for the International Rescue Committee, “I always call it the back door.”

The American people are well aware of Mexico’s porous border. The question is when the government wake up: before or after the attack?

It’s within possibility that al-Shabab could ironically exploit Kheire’s route, one used to flee Somalia's chaos. At some point flights will be necessary, but not to America or Europe and much of the crossing will be done by shanty boat up the South American coast. Taking the long way to America could dramatically reduce attention.

"To get a flight from Africa to Europe is very hard,” said Yahya Idardo, a Somali who fled last year after his family was killed. “The easiest place to go is America. Africa to Latin America is easy... when you are going to Latin America, no one is concerned about you, no one is asking, so it is easy to go there and cross all these countries."

An al-Qaeda or al-Shabab sleeper cell would certainly have skill, awareness, determination, and motivation to attempt a South American transit. Of course they would secretly cross the Mexican border rather than taxi into the San Diego city limits. The Mexican border has always been vulnerable, the problem for al-Qaeda has been getting there.

Some reverse engineering demonstrates just how real the threat could be.

Last September Mexican authorities claim they seized a weapons shipment from Los Zetas, Mexico's premier paramilitary drug cartel, to José Manuel Hernandez and his Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). The EPR, which formed in response to the Aguas Blancas Massacre in 1995 that left at least 17 Mexican farmers dead at the hands of policemen, is currently directing attacks on Mexican oil infrastructure.

Los Zetas is also said to be moving on the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel after two brothers, Arturo and Carlos, were killed and captured by Mexican forces. The Beltran Leyvas had increasingly relied on Los Zetas for protection and now that the brothers are down to two, the Zetas know they have the muscle to take over.

It’s all an attempt to stir up trouble elsewhere as distractions to President Felipe de Jesús Calderón’s expanding drug war.

SinceLos Zetas has more use for internal chaos, there’s little reason to believe they would arm a potential terrorist attack or aid al-Qaeda's infiltration. Raising the alarm on the border would be counterproductive to their goal of smuggling drugs into and guns out of America. Then again, these are militant drug lords and thus hard to predict.

We also know that all Mexican cartels are in contact with the FARC and other cocaine traffickers in Colombia, shrinking as that relationship may be under US military and surveillance operations in Central America and the Caribbean.

And the FARC has just been linked to al-Qaeda.

"As suggested by the recent arrest of three alleged al Qaeda operatives, the expansion of cocaine trafficking through West Africa has provided the venue for an unholy alliance between South American narco-terrorists and Islamic extremists," said Jay Bergman, DEA director for the Andean region of South America.

Several months ago the three West African men in question were arrested for attempting to purchase drugs from an undercover DEA agents posing as a FARC member. This fact alone suggest the link is tentative and no connection has actually been made, but that's all the more reason to be on guard.

America can’t wait for the connection to be made or before the bomb goes off to respond to this potential alliance. Bergman added, "For trafficking organizations to survive, they first and foremost have to be flexible and make adjustments quickly to law enforcement efforts. West Africa is that current alternative."

Flexibility and adaptation are al-Qaeda’s strengths, and it could very well make contact with the FARC if they're both trying to link up. Bergman said all big Colombian cocaine traffickers are using Africa - al-Qaeda territory - to reach Europe including the FARC. He added that Mexican cartels import chemicals from Africa, creating the potential for a narco-terrorist underground highway between the two continents.

al-Qaeda to the FARC, to Mexican cartels, and under or over the US border.

By then it would be too late for America to respond properly. Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab and his Yemen backers caught Obama by surprise, with the result being typical overreaction. Instead of maintaining composure, Obama spawned protests in over half the countries he ordered to deploy extreme airport security measures, gaining little and losing much in the process. Now average Yemenis are worried about becoming the next Afghanistan.

A 9/11 reaction on the Mexican border would be disastrous. Border lock-down would jam immigration flow, leading to a multitude of unintended consequences. Economics will be disrupted, new walls will go up, US troops might be deployed, and countries like Venezuela, the FARC's staging ground for flying cocaine into Africa, might come under threat of US intervention.

All because of one breach.

To be clear a working alliance between Los Zetas, the FARC, and al-Qaeda is a distant possibility that will take years of gradual development to evade law enforcement. Patience is another al-Qaeda virtue though, and the ultimate goal of counterterrorism is to disrupt potential connections before they securely link up.

But this goal is limited. President Obama must place counter-terrorism and immigration within a global, full spectrum counterinsurgency.

The ultimate goal of US national security is to prevent fronts from opening and conflicts from ever occurring. Obama must befriend all of South America, instead of divide it with a creeping military influence, to shore up weak entry points. He must develop an alternative solution to America’s “War on Drugs,” which South American nations are calling for. He must be proactive, not reactive.

This strategic responsibility is Obama's, not the US military, FBI, or CIA's. America simply cannot allow the Mexican border to become a future front in the "War on Terrorism." The reaction would erode both country’s ways of life exactly as al-Qaeda planned.

Drugs "R" Us(A)

The annual “Three Amigos” conference between America, Mexico, and Canada has shined the spotlight on intercontinental trade, and President Obama will likely keep it there. He’s safer debating free trade than Mexico’s drug war, which shows no signs of abating. The road to recovery is inward and unlikely to be walked by Obama.

He can’t be blamed though, individual blame is nonexistent. The Mexican drug war is collective havoc, a chain reaction touched off in the Andes, fueled through Central America, and detonated in America. Addiction, greed, desperation, aggression - these are the real enemies of America and Mexico in their nebulous war against the drug cartels. But how to combat them?

Military operations certainly haven’t been as successful as Mexican President Felipe Calderón had hoped. Initially committing 6,500 troops to combat drug-related violence, Calderón has ballooned deployments to over 45,000. He recently ordered another 5,000 to Ciudad Juárez, one of the most dangerous cities on earth, right across the US border. The continuing rise of drug violence suggests more troops are being readied.

During its military operations Mexico killed dozens of high-ranking cartel leaders, but eager replacements are available in a war involving at least eight cartels with international connections, several with military wings. Those put in jail find a whole new market to exploit. Monitoring a 2,000 mile border with manned and unmanned vehicles produces daily seizures, but no lasting results. Cartels hire or extort immigrants to farm marijuana in America’s National Parks, exemplary of the risks they're willing to take.

Mexican authorities admit cartels are adapting and reorganizing to the new enforcement methods.

The failure of physical means to end the drug war bodes ill for the Mérida Initiative, a $1.6 billion security agreement between America and Mexico to prevent drug trafficking. Of the $400 million allocated for 2008, $300 million has been delivered while $100 was held back because of Congressional concerns over Mexican torture allegations. These concerns have delayed appropriating the money for 2009 and 2010, but what good is a few hundred million?

The Obama administration signaled that it wants to keep the money flowing. National Security Adviser James Jones, accompanying Obama to Mexico, said, “I think the Calderón government has, in fact, performed very courageously in the face of these cartels, and I think we have to do everything we can to be a helpful neighbor and partner.”

Too bad the full $1.6 billion is dwarfed by an estimated $30 billion drug cartels annually bank. Without an equivalent infusion of cash, the cartels won’t be outspent or outgunned. Mexico's GDP suffers an estimated 1% due to the drug war, roughly $15 billion, further shrinking the Mérida Initiative. Linking drug enforcement to human rights is similarly erroneous. Now isn’t the time to teach moral lessons when the root cause of the Mexican drug war is an “insatiable American demand for drugs,” as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once remarked.

President Obama can't escape the fact that America is the world's largest market for cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. America is the personal Wal-mart for Mexican cartels, the distribution end of a complex, intercontinental supply chain. But attacking physical mechanisms - growers, financial networks, traffickers, kingpins - leaves demand untouched. Fundamentally the Mexican drug war is a retail war, not an insurgency or terrorism. Chasing drug runners is futile.

President Obama, if he is to truly help President Calderón on the drug front, must pursue an inward solution to the problem. America needs to personally reform in order to “be a helpful neighbor,” and limiting consumption is the only remedy. Naturally the debate turns to decriminalization, legalization, regulation, and taxation of illegal drugs as the means to control demand and allocate resources from crime to public health.

Yet these options aren't the answer even if Obama considered them. Only marijuana would be legalized and store prices must stay below the street to discourage an aggressive underground trade. While America could make billions from taxation, the pie has room for both store and street dealers in regards to marijuana. And legalization can't be applied to meth, heroin, or cocaine, the main exports of cartels into America.

Mexico isn't being defeated by drug cartels, but by the American people. Obama could implore the million teenagers who sell drugs, the tens of millions who find drugs easy to buy, and the adults who join them to halt their recreational activities, but he’ll be met with the same indifference that greeted past presidents. Drugs are part of the American lifestyle.

President Obama, the unwitting manager of the world's drug emporium, is of no use to President Calderó unless he can close the store.