Politico-Military Battle For Kismayo Begins

Under the guise of night and the surveillance of Western intelligence, Kenyan forces seized the beaches of Kismayo on Friday in pursuit of Operation Linda Nchi's primary objective. The assault culminates an 11-month grind over some 120 miles and was supposedly planned at a level "never before seen" in African military history. What exactly is taking place in Kismayo depends on who's talking, but Kenya's government is clearly flanking al-Shabaab on Somalia's propaganda lines.

"Mission Accomplished," reads the front page of Kenya's Daily Nation.

Speaking from Kismayo rather than his usual podium in Nairobi, army spokesman Cyrus Oguna offered his version of the unfolding Operation Sledge Hammer and its run-up. He claims that Kenyan airstrikes and AU ground troops deceived al-Shabaab in preparation for a sea landing, an undertaking that required three days of clandestine mobilization up Somalia's coast. Four transport ships (including Nairobi's newly-restored flagship, KNS Jasiri) dropped their ground units five miles north of the city, to give Kenyan troops first dibs on Kismayo, with helicopter gunships and Northrop F-5 warplanes applying their own superiority on the ground. Oguna told reporters that the bulk of al-Shabaab's new casualties are attributed to Kenya's aerial and naval power. Aside from these forces, a contingent of Special Forces landed at Kismayo Airport (located south of the city) and is fighting to secure the area.

"Kenyan military planners duped Al-Shabaab into believing that a land invasion of their last remaining bastion of Kismayu was imminent before making an amphibious landing from the sea," the Daily Nation writes.

While the insurgency may have been unable to predict the final point of Kenya's assault, independent accounts from within the city paint a more fluid situation. Witnesses initially told the BBC, Associated Press and Reuters that Kenyan, AU and Somali troops have yet to enter the city, contrary to Oguna's claim that "we are controlling three quarters of the city." Al-Shabaab has responded with light resistance in Kismayo's northern sector and will likely employ mobile tactics from the surrounding forests. They cannot afford to skip a counterattack entirely. More disturbingly, Kenyan air-strikes have reportedly killed and wounded an undisclosed number of civilians; capturing Kismayo first entails protecting the population.

However there is no reason to doubt the majority of Oguna's information: “We have sufficient ground and naval forces in Kismayu as we speak." AMISOM has brought such a high level of force into the port that al-Shabaab cannot be expected to wage conventional warfare. Even unconventional warfare will present a challenge against AMISOM's superior force, which coordinates with several local militias and Kismayo's clan leadership. Among them, the Ras Kamboni Movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, a major player that held Kismayo's governorship for the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) before Ethiopian troops invaded the country in 2007. This loose end is one of many lingering uncertainties in the overall equation of Kismayo's post-Shabaab governance.

Days, weeks or months may pass before the city is truly cleared and, it should be noted, al-Shabaab has lost the port several times before. The latest reports have now cleared the city of militants, according to residents and a statement from al-Shabaab commander Sheikh Mohamed Abu-Fatma. He tells the AFP, "We got orders from our superiors to withdraw from the city... this is part of a broader military tactic we have set for the enemy."

Forfeiting the city will land another blow against the insurgency, especially when considering the relative organization of AMISOM's resources and political strategy, but al-Shabaab's nationalist core is more likely to reintegrate than disintegrate into Somalia's environment.

al-Shabaab Defections Inching Closer To Reality

For months the following rumor has been just that, but timing is beginning to push it into the realm of plausibility.

A slew of intelligence released by the Kenyan government is marching the African Union's Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) to the southern port of Kismayo, bringing its forces to the edge of the military and information battlefields. Kenyan troops are reportedly preparing their final advance on Kismayo and will enjoy significant air/naval cover as they encounter any resistance from al-Shabaab. To their south, Ugandan and Burundian units await orders to move out of their advance position at Harbole, located between Afmadow and Kismayo. This information has been offered freely with the intention of deterring an organized counterattack and broadcasting Kenya's achievements to the world, a tactic that is yielding success on both levels.

Government propaganda aside, independent and civilian reporting correspond to the account of Kenya Defense Forces spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna. Following last weekend's battles around Afmadow (Miido and ), al-Shabaab's local commanders had allegedly expected a pause in AMISOM's activities and found themselves surprised by the bloc's advance towards Kismayo. Losing two locals commander in an airstrike further disrupted the group's immediate decision-making, and the defection of 200+ fighters in Afmadow appears to have broken any semblance of resistance in Kismayo.

"We have information that the insurgents are fleeing towards the south by boat and by road. There is a lot of movement because they know that Kismayu must fall," Oguna said, who added that AMISOM is conducting aerial surveillance of their movements.

At this point an observer may begin to finally believe in the rumors that anticipate a split between al-Shabaab's nationalist and transnationlist leadership, which may or may not include a rebranding effort. Interestingly, two interlocking developments have been posited as the motivation behind a name change to Munadamat Ihyaul Somaliya. While Kenya's government attributes this possibility to al-Shabaab's military disarray, other sources claim that the leaking of Munadamat Ihyaul Somaliya is itself responsible for renewed hostilities between Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Sheikh Moktar Ali Zubeyr Godane. Robow, al-Shabaab's leading nationalist personality, has been attempting to disconnect from Zubeyr's transnationlist agenda for several years, yet he still distrusts Zubeyr's efforts to rebrand al-Shabaab on his own terms.

Zubeyr's deputy, Abdullahi Yari, also stands accused of only distributing funds to al-Shabaab's foreign fighters, a common grievance.

Tensions are boiling after the two sides again failed to reach a consensus on the insurgency's future. Beyond its usual problems, Zubeyr's faction has grown even more suspicious of Robow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in light of alleged contacts with the Somali National Army. The elder Aweys in particular is considered the most likely candidate to defect, having battled Zubeyr as an outright enemy before being coerced into joining al-Shabaab. He was likely left out of the State Department's "Rewards for Justice" program to keep him politically eligible, while Robow hopes that his clan ties will preserve his useful to Mogadishu.

Local analysts also suspect that Zubeyr "formally" merged with al-Qaeda in order to tarnish al-Shabaab's nationalist leadership, thereby disqualifying them from negotiating.

They may have to move fast if they truly expect to rid themselves of Zubeyr's authority, as each side is suspected of plotting assassinations against the other. Whatever they decide, Robow and Aweys will eventually be forced to choose between a rebranding campaign against the new government, and crossing over in exchange for favorable terms. Inactivity is not an option.

4th-Generation Battle Rages Around Afmadow, Somalia

Balancing the inherent long-term demands of counterinsurgency with the expensive threat of mission creep presents a leading challenge in COIN. Another challenge, geared more towards the observer, is sorting battle lines and troop movements on both sides. Afmadow, Somalia rests at the intersection of both dilemmas. Three months ago Kenyan and Somali forces seized the town with minimal resistance from al-Shabaab, roughly seven months after three Kenyan battalions entered southern Somalia. Problematically, Nairobi has yet to move out of Afmadow despite setting a now-expired public goal to reach Kismayo by August's end.

The town, which lies some 70 miles from Kenya's border and 50 miles west of Kismayo, is caught between waste and potential.

Targeted as the main stopover to Kismayo, the larger of al-Shabaab's two remaining ports, Afmadow was conceived as the midway to Somalia's coast. The town sits along the Lagh Dara tributary of the Jubba River, making it a natural choke point between Somalia's mid-region and Kismayo. From here Kenyan forces planned to stage a pincer assault in coordination with a southern unit moving up from Ras Kamboni. The country's second rainy season helped put an end to a speedy advance on both fronts, inducing domestic concerns over Operation Linda Nchi's timing.  Nevertheless, Kenyan forces still maintain a heavy advantage against al-Shabaab and have no choice except to gradually progress through southern Somalia. Failure to consolidate all cleared territory, including Afmadow, would play into the insurgency's advantage by maintaining active rear-lines.

For months Kenyan officials have searched for the correct moment to move out of Afmadow and towards their final destination, but al-Shabaab's lingering presence ultimately obstructed their public statements. Now recent events suggest that something is about to give: al-Shabaab's fortifications or the African Union Mission In Somalia's (AMISOM) time-line. Seemingly consolidating Afmadow's final pockets of al-Shabaab's territory before moving out, AMSIOM and Somali government troops advanced into Agah Libah and the Birta Dheer district last Wednesday, reportedly under the air cover of Kenyan warplanes and assault helicopters. The pro-government Raskamboni Movement also participated in the operation, demonstrating the three-headed network that AMISOM and Mogadishu have cast across the south.

Two days later AMISOM forces met resistance upon entering Miido, located 10 miles south of Afmadow.

"This was a brave and important operation conducted by the AMISOM forces in lower Juba," Force commander Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti. "Securing the strategic town of Miido will allow the local community to rebuild their lives free from the terror and tyranny imposed by Alâ-ÂShabaab. I pay tribute to the bravery and commitment of all the soldiers involved in this operation. AMISOM is committed to protecting hard won security gains to ensure Somalia continues on the road to a sustainable peace."

Although al-Shabaab received the worst of both confrontations and cannot fight effectively against AMISOM's level of force, the insurgency appears to be mounting a conscious counteroffensive under the realization that Kismayo is next. No town taken by Kenyan forces has been initially defended, but the port could be the one spot that al-Shabaab decides is worth fighting for. If so, proper depth would begin a counteroffensive away from Kismayo in order to slow an advance towards the city. Interestingly, these battles have unfolded just as viciously in the media and on Twitter, offering at least one window into the minds of both sides.

"Afmadow remains in the full control and security of AMISOM troops," Gutti responded to opposing rumors. "Al-Shabaab has issued untrue and baseless propaganda suggesting otherwise. It is a desperate attempt by Al-Shabaab, misrepresenting the realities on the ground where AMISOM troops are providing security and stability to allow the local population to carry on with their normal lives, free from the fear, intimidation and violence propagated by Al-Shabaab."

In coordination with AMSIOM's statements, Somali spokesman Adan Ahmed Hersi announced that Kismayo "would be captured in the coming days." Meanwhile Sheikh Hasan Yaqub Ali, the spokesman of al-Shabaab’s administration in Kismayo, predicted that the port's capture is "just a dream." The final outcome will likely fall in between, but Kismayo's battle could be as large as advertised and might begin this month (the latest reports indicate an operation before September 20th's presidential election). A high level of force and determination is being directed towards the area and neither will have any more space or time to give at the coast. All Africa's conclusion included The Trench's: "some military analysts have stated that the battle for Kismayo could be dragged on for quite some time due to miscalculations by the allied forces that have been battling Al Shabaab in southern Somalia since October 2011."

Nairobi's military situation isn't necessary disadvantageous. The development of Somalia's new government and Kismayo's stability were bound to require more time than foreign capitals allocated, and Somalia cannot shake its friction over several years. The more AMISOM's mission creeps, though, the more room opens for unstable factors.

U.S. Building African Proxy Armies

New rays of light are being increasingly cast on America's operations in Africa, specifically across the continent's upper half, as U.S. foreign policy chases al-Qaeda into the shadows. "Secret" bases, overflights, security contractors and renditions have gone as mainstream as possible. Less developed is the wider strategic picture that connects Washington and an assortment of receptive African capitals, as shadows can only do so much fighting. The Trench's previous analysis observed that the U.S. is hoping to use northern Mali's crisis to build combat experience in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

This arrangement is based on mutual needs: African capitals need Western air and logistics support, intelligence and financing for all of it, generating a natural control over the continent's largest proxy armies.

Today The Los Angeles Times recapped most of this blueprint's designs in Somalia. Although the Times reports that the Obama administration "has not disclosed much in public about its role... because African Union officials do not want their force seen as a Washington puppet," almost none of the presented information is fresh. In addition to financially injecting Somalia's government, the U.S. and European powers (such as France and Italy) have been training AMISOM forces to defeat al-Shabaab since the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in 2009 under UN guidance. Wafula Wamunyinyi, deputy head of the African Union mission, described the assistance of "quite enormous," and Washington is deeply involved in every level of operations.

In terms of payment, U.S. funds are covering the costs of lethal aid as EU pays out checks to AU soldiers in the field, a historically debilitating problem. Western trainers and/or contractors also assist/lead a 13-week basic training course and oversee specialized programs for engineers, intelligence personnel and medics. Recruits receive combat gear (uniforms, weapons, night vision devices, communications, medical aid and other supplies) and sometimes deploy to the field in Western-purchased armored personnel carriers. A large package that include RQ-11 Raven drones was delivered to Uganda in 2011, but this supply chain likely extends to multiple partners.

While U.S. officials claim that no military personnel are deployed to Somalia with African troops, independent evidence indicates the opposite. Shadow wars also demand skepticism rather than the inclination to believe government accounts. Michael Bittrick, a State Department official who oversees U.S. policy in the area, says that private firms hire "retired foreign military personnel" to advise in the field, except U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives are unilaterally embedded around Somalia's frontlines (French agents allegedly operate as liaisons by directly coordinating with AU units). According to the investigative reporting of The Nation's Jeremy Scahill, the CIA maintains a detention facility in the remnants of Siad Barre's torturous prison in Mogadishu, dubbed Godka or "The Hole." Here the CIA keeps Somali intelligence personnel on a private payroll due to government corruption, and arranges interrogations of national and foreign suspects.

"They support us in a big way financially,” a senior Somali intelligence official told Scahill in 2011. “They are the largest [funder] by far.”

Special Forces and CIA personnel also operate aerial missions (including drones) out of Mogadishu's Aden Adde International airport.

The only new information offered by The Los Angeles Times is an itinerary of the Sierre Leone battalion in transport to Kenya, where it will be picked up by vehicles paid for by Washington and imported from ally South Africa. The soldiers will then be driven into southern Somalia and link with three Kenyan battalions "who have been bogged down" for months. Launched in late October 2011, Operation Linda Nchi ran straight into Somalia's second rainy season and has yet to reach its stated objective: clear al-Shabaab's port stronghold, Kismayo, before the TFG dissolves in August. The AU must eventually take the port or risk jeopardizing its ongoing national offensive.

The Los Angeles Times simply paints a picture of near-absolute control over AMISOM and Somalia's fledgling defense forces.

"Officially, the troops are under the auspices of the African Union. But in truth, according to interviews by U.S. and African officials and senior military officers and budget documents, the 15,000-strong force pulled from five African countries is largely a creation of the State Department and Pentagon, trained and supplied by the U.S. government and guided by dozens of retired foreign military personnel hired through private contractors.”

The positives of this strategy are evident. Combining all of the lessons learned from past errors, AMISOM's present force is cheaper and more relatable than an American or Ethiopian intervention. Now U.S. forces can operate freely out of Mogadishu with 10,000 AU soldiers patrolling the city and its surroundings, a vivid contrast from 1993's isolated mission. General Carter Ham, the chief of AFRICOM, implies that Somalia's model can be replicated in response to other African crises: "We think that's an ideal role for the United States — not a large U.S. military presence… but rather applying the resources that we do have to help those countries who are willing to contribute to this effort.”

Costs, on the other and, are already being felt outside of Somalia's battle zone. In return for their "generous" services, dictatorships in Uganda and Ethiopia maintain healthy relationships with Washington just as U.S. counterterrorism operations work in the Algerian government's favor. Those governments that pair with the U.S. and EU are encouraged to "reform" and "promote democracy," but manipulation of this arrangement is inevitable. Uganda's minor protests, for example, were crushed with minimal objection from the Obama administration. Higher still, the manipulation of political blocs could affect entire regions of people.

How solid U.S. military influence grows in Africa, along with any potential backlashes and human rights controversies, remains to be seen.

Ethiopia Feigns Withdrawal Before Assault On Kismayo

The explanation didn't sound right in the first place and, in the end, may not have existed at all.

Two months ago Ramtane Lamamra, the African Union's (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, announced that several Ethiopian battalions would redeploy out of Somalia by the end of April. The announcement left many questions unanswered and defied Ethiopia's recent gains against al-Shabaab, including February's capture of Beledweyne and Baidoa. Having opened an enormous front involving hundreds of trucks, armored personnel carriers and tanks, Addis Ababa would risk its advantages by transferring near-term control to green AU reinforcements and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Its pincer assault was so immediately successful that many Somalis welcomed the arrival of their historic enemy, and some demand that they stay for the foreseeable future.

Lamamra, himself an Algerian diplomat, did qualify his statements by predicting that Ethiopian troops will remain in central Somalia if they can be "re-hatted" like Kenya's, making them eligible for AU funding. This clue tipped off the probable reality that Addis Ababa never intended to withdraw, only secure international funding and deceive al-Shabaab's leadership, and its troops are headed for the same destination as Kenyan troops. On Saturday an Ethiopian Major General involved in the Somali campaign announced, "Truthfully Ethiopia has fulfilled its mission in Somalia, and it is not a problem for our military to liberate the port city of Kismayo." Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly ruled out a withdrawal soon afterward, congratulating Ethiopian troops and promising to "take over more key strongholds."

Determining the exact cause behind Ethiopia's actions from the outside is impossible, but its motivation combines a number of factors. If the government wasn't employing deception from the start, military officials on the receiving end of positive local feedback may have convinced their political superiors to keep advancing into Somalia. Both parties would have experienced second thoughts about leaving a vacuum along Ethiopia's border and straining the TFG's capacity.

Another distinct factor is the slow pace of Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, which has yet to reach Kismayo since its launch in October 2011. The TFG and AU's ideal strategy planned to secure all major population centers before August's presidential election, an event that will theoretically end the UN's current roadmap and established a more representative government. Kenyan forces were supposed to besiege Kismayo by February, according to Ethiopia's Major General John, but they remain locked in peacekeeping operations between the port and their border. Some observers attribute Kenya's pace to poor military planning, inexperience or a cautious approach, in contrast to Ethiopia's blitzkrieg movements. Garowe Online tackled this issue directly, reporting that Kenya ”has made little progress against Al Shabaab compared to Ethiopian troops.”

The likeliest explanation fuses all factors together.

As is the case with general war strategy, summoning Ethiopian troops to finish the job generates a matrix of risk and reward. The TFG-AU conceived a three-prong battle plan to restore an image of national stability to Somalia, deploying an influx of AU reinforcements to Mogadishu as Ethiopian and Kenyan troops advance from the west and south. The three forces would expand their area of operations until they overlap, then gradually turn local authority over to the TFG, but the plan appears to be taking longer than anticipated. Armored and ready for new battles, Ethiopian troops could be the only force capable of dislodging al-Shabaab from Kismayo before August and speeding up the AU's designs. By seizing all of the insurgency's strongholds (Beledweyne, Baidoa, Bardahaarrey, Baardehere, Kismayo, Afgoye), the AU hopes to flush al-Shabaab out of its remaining water, sever its economic network and dismantle the group into smashable pieces.

Clearing space for August's election is also vital to Somalia's stability; al-Shabaab has already interfered with clan leaders headed for Mogadishu and is expected to disrupt the election on the politico-security front. [Update: due to security concerns, the UN has decided to elect Somalia's next president through a centralized parliamentary vote in Mogadishu.]

However racing to Kismayo may not be possible before July. Deep as Ethiopia has treaded into Somalia, a 200-mile journey and multiple river crossings separates Baidoa from al-Shabaab's southern port. This distance will stretch Ethiopia's supply lines far from its border, making them more susceptible to ambushes and IEDs, and remove Ethiopian troops from an established comfort zone. The army did travel towards Kismayo in 2007, forcing tribal elders to evict the Islamic Courts Union (al-Shabaab's predecessor), but a formal incursion is likely to trigger more resistance. 2007’s eventual outcome must also be avoided: Somali militants have been forced out of Mogadishu and regional centers numerous times, only to re-infiltrate them when no government entity stood up on two legs. Although Ethiopia presumably has a plan to clear Kismayo, its plan to govern is likely no more advanced than Kenya's.

Capturing individual cities, even a string of them, represents a specific type of mission. Holding all of Somalia's south-central territory presents its own challenge, one that time may force the AU and TFG to break up into pieces.

AU Plans Next Operational Phase In Somalia

Three weeks ago al-Shabaab's central garrison of Baidoa fell in undramatic fashion. Following a pincer movement along Somalia's western border, launched in December to capitalize on Kenya's operation in the south, Ethiopian troops and tanks rolled into the city as the militants blended into the surrounding grasslands and fled south. Brigadier-General Johannes Woldegiorgis, the commander who led a mechanized force on a 140-mile assault through 10 towns, quickly summoned foreign journalists to tour the city.

"They are history," he declared of al-Shabaab.

Confident in the progress of its soldiers, the Ethiopian government recently announced a near-term withdrawal after meeting with representatives of the African Union's (AU) troop contributors. Beyond an open admission that Addis Ababa doesn't want to overstay its welcome, the decision has a sizable financial component built into its status within Somalia's AMISOM. Ramtane Lamamra, the Commissioner of the AU Peace and Security Council, told reporters on Friday, "The decision up to now is that it is essentially Baladweyne and Baidoa (for Ethiopia) and they have to be handed over to AMISOM and then Ethiopia will withdraw its forces to its own national territory."

"It provides for Djiboutian forces to be deployed in Beledweyne by the end of April at the latest. Two thousand five hundred troops from Burundi and Uganda will also be deployed in Baidoa by the 30th of April at the latest."

Lamamra held the door open for continual military assistance inside Somalia's western border, seemingly expecting to negotiate a "support package" for Ethiopia's military. The government is currently fighting on its own dollar, though Washington has provided political and financial compensation in the past (including payment for the drone base in Arba Minch). Bringing both Kenyan and Ethiopian troops under the AU's financial umbrella would streamline AMISOM and increase its long-term viability after the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) UN-sponsored mandate expires in August. The AU's national campaign to recapture central and southern Somalia, lost to al-Shabaab after Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009, cannot succeed without Ethiopian firepower.

"For now, it's mission accomplished and AMISOM would be able to take over in both places," Lamamra said.

This situation represents the day to Ethiopia's previous invasion, a dark episode that killed thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians and opened a vacuum for al-Shabaab's rise. Both missions unfolded with similar speed - Ethiopian battalions seized Baidoa, Beledweyne and Mogadishu within a week of entering Somalia in December 2007 - but troops are now greeted with reserved optimism. During the two years following Ethiopia's exit, Al-Shabaab became its own worst enemy by engaging in the systematic destruction of local life and drying up the last of its water. When Kenya and Ethiopia finally entered the battlefield in relative unison, the popular scales tilted to the TFG and AU's advantage.

Even minor improvements in governance and social laws could have buffered popular resistance against the group, but years of hard line rule (including the use of child soldiers) turned the despised Ethiopian military into a friend. Although he condemned al-Shabaab for brainwashing children into jihad, Captain Mahamoud Yissak admitted from Baidoa, “At that time people liked Al Shabaab, there was a lot of support for them."

The positive takeaway is an increased acceptance of Ethiopian aid and the possibility for sustainable cooperation. One local MP, Mohamed Habselleh, said he believes, “We need Ethiopia’s long presence here." Most residents appear to believe that al-Shabaab's reign in Baidoa is over, but expect the militants to return when the Ethiopians leave. Other reports indicate that Somalis from al-Shabaab's remaining territory have requested Ethiopian armor, giving Addis Ababa plenty to think about in the weeks and months ahead.

While al-Shabaab mounted no initial resistance in Baidoa, the group has staged multiple bombings and attacked Ethiopian troops in nearby areas. The latest 3-hour battle near Yuktow, situated halfway between Baidoa and the Ethiopian border, is connected to al-Shabaab's counterattack; Ethiopian military sources claim that they preempted an ambush on a nearby unit. Both sides have reported substantial casualties (above 70), but neither side gives accurate information about their losses.

"They engaged our troops after regrouping in tiny pockets outside our area of control," Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesman Dina Mufti told Reuters. "Al Shabaab rebels sustained heavy casualties and have retreated... the battle scene is littered with the bodies of dead enemy combatants. "It's a statement of survival, a desperate attempt. All claims are false."

The negative takeaway is that al-Shabaab remains determined to mount a resistance outside of its main urban centers. The decision to defend most of its threatened territory could exhaust the group and leave it vulnerable to a decapitating blow, but al-Shabaab's guerrilla tactics will distort the AU's time-frame. Its leadership appears to be satisfied with outlasting the Ethiopians - the latest attack was immediately spun as a sign of retreat - and taking their chances with the incoming Burundians and Ugandans. Even in a weakened state, al-Shabaab could exceed the AU's planned force levels and keep Ethiopians inside the country.

In order for the AU's strategy to gain traction outside of Mogadishu, TFG representatives must move in with AU troops and begin their work immediately to restore confidence in the Somali government. Western pipelines into the UN and AMISOM cannot afford to fail political and military personnel in the field. Now the TFG must fill every space that Ethiopians and Kenyans clear, forming a triangle of security between Mogadishu, Beledweyne and Baidoa. From here they must expand across the rest of the country, an area more than double the size of the territory in question, and they need to move fast despite the risks of rushing their advance.

"You know the character of al-Shabaab," explained regional governor Abdifatah Mohammed Ibrahim. "They like to fight, hit-and-run. So I think they will be back. They are [just] hiding here, under trees."

Kenya, Ethiopia Grind Deeper Into Somalia

Over three months have elapsed since Nairobi made the executive decision to launch Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for Protect the Nation). Depending on the individual - a Kenyan commander, Somali official or civilian, al-Shabaab gunman or Western observer - Kenya’s military campaign is trending towards victory or quagmire. Reality likely falls in between two extremes, but foreign capitals are entering a slippery phase of their politico-military campaign.

Last month Colonel Cyrus Oguna asserted that “Al Shabaab is halfway in the pit.” Whether Kenyan, Ethiopian and African Union (AU) troops can complete their mission may be determined over the next three months.

Nairobi’s confidence in reaching Somalia’s main southern port begat heightened expectations at the start of Linda Nchi, and the combination of Kenya’s swift incursion and al-Shabaab’s tactical withdrawal gave rise to the possibility of reaching Kismayo in the near future. However the majority of Kenyan troops haven’t advanced more than 50 miles during a month-long rainy reason, remaining at their mud-locked positions around Bur Gaavo and Afmadow. Bur Gaavo’s delta lies on Somalia’s coast, roughly 40 miles from Kenya’s border and 60 miles south of Kismayo, while Kenyan commanders predicted they would take Afmadow last month.

The bulk of Kenya’s ground forces remain tens of miles away from Kismayo, one of al-Shabaab’s main strongholds and a key military-economic gateway. They have yet to create the buffer zone envisioned by Nairobi; grenade, mine and IED attacks continue to disrupt life across Kenya’s border. Villages behind Afmadow, such as Tabda and Badhaadhe, are still being fortified as assault preparations are made on the strategic town. Even Defense Minister Yusuf Haji added to Somalia’s confusion in early December, telling reporters, "I don't know where this objective came from. We have never stated at any time that Kenya was going to Kismayo.”

"All we said is that we were pushing Shebab away from our boundary and securing our border, and we will go as far as we will go.”

Kenyan commanders have since clarified that their units are, in fact, still headed for Kismayo. They insist that Haji simply meant that their troops won’t occupy the port, only secure and transfer authority to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Major Rashid Seif explained from Bur Gaavo, "Our conduct of operation here is basically in conformity with the other troops that are in other sectors, the northern sector and the central sector. So basically the ultimate objective is the capture of Kismayo, so it is building up to that.”

Although Nairobi’s timeline isn’t publicly available, a sensible prediction would circle August 2012 as Kenya’s target date to exit southern Somalia. The TFG’s UN mandate is finally set to expire after several delays, and involved foreign powers are demanding presidential and parliamentary elections before the UN’s mandate dissolves. As a result, involved members of the African Union (AU) have lobbied to increase AMISOM’s force ceiling from 12,000 to 15,000-20,000). Nairobi presumably feels the same rush and attempted to synchronize its military campaign with 2012’s political roadmap.

Kenya’s operation functions as one part of the TFG, African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) national strategy, with AU reinforcements envisioned in Mogadishu and Kismayo. As Kenya clears al-Shabaab from the south and the TFG expands its presence out of the capital, Ethiopia would exert its influence along al-Shabaab’s western flank. This strategy theoretically covers Somalia proper without stretching any single force over the country - and potentially breaking it. Ethiopian troops cross the border on a regular basis in their pursuit of al-Shabaab and other armed elements, but upwards of 1,000 troops are now operating inside Somalia.

Ethiopian forces recently took control of Beledweyne, a strategic city located over 400 miles from Kismayo, and are moving into al-Shabaab’s Bay stronghold.

Yet the strategic obstacle for Kenya, Ethiopia and the TFG remains as is: opening up a wide front. Even a piece of Somalia is hard to clear, hold and restore TFG authority to. Ethiopian troops recently cleared Baidoa, one of al-Shabaab’s main strongholds in Somalia’s central Bay district, and could move on Garbahaarey and Baardheere (Gedo’s largest cities) as well. While striking into Baidoa and Baardheere could send al-Shabaab scrambling across its territory, the long-term battle for Bay, Hiiraan and Gedo will entail harder fighting than Kenya’s intervention into Lower Juba.

Restoring TFG authority is also the primary goal of any national offensive, and seizing more territory than the TFG’s reach can handle will create extensive friction on the ground. Ethiopia has “dismantled” al-Shabaab before, only for the group to re-inflate itself and fill the ensuing security vacuum.

Ethiopia’s wild-card image poses a secondary concern in a mission that depends on positive perceptions. According to various sources (including American), Ethiopian troops have been thrown into the battlefield because African leaders consider to be more proficient than their Kenyan counterparts. The good news is that local Ethiopian approval is being reported at higher levels than in the past. In accordance with practical sentiments towards America and Kenya, some Somalis are willing to stomach any foreign intervention in order to escape al-Shabaab’s rule. However many accounts note the long-standing animosity between neighbors, and Ethiopian support could flip overnight in the event of mass collateral damage.

While al-Shabaab is suffering casualties and facing enemies on all sides, the insurgency doesn’t appear to be panicking at the level described by African officials. Its commanders rejected local reports of a name-change - to Imaarah Islamiya (Islamic Authority) - and avoided the initial blitzkrieg that could have knocked al-Shabaab on the permanent defensive. Nor is the war “almost half lost,” in the words of Colonel Oguna. Kenya’s army spokesman argues that al-Shabaab is “now facing serious challenges as far as command and control is concerned and logistical support,” but these terms are more applicable in conventional warfare.

Ultimately, the roots of Somalia’s political friction must be destroyed in order to permanently defeat al-Shabaab. Military victory could recede into a political collapse, facilitating al-Shabaab’s restructuring.

In a related development, Western and African capitals maintain extensive concerns over the TFG’s ability to implement the UN’s roadmap. Modified in June under heavy pressure from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the Kampala Accord extended the TFG’s mandate for one final year by sacrificing Prime Minister Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed. This outcome allowed President Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Aden to shelve their rivalry (each has tried to force the other out of power) until November, when Somalia’s parliament was ordered to reach a vote on Kampala’s revisions.

Except the vote never occurred and Hassan now finds himself mired in a no-confidence vote. He suspects that President Ahmed is pulling the political strings.

Given that any AU mission cannot succeed in the long-term without a stable Somali government, Ahmed and Aden’s unresolved feud is pulsing throughout Somalia’s neighbors and international financiers. Nairobi’s strategy explicitly outlined the following sequence: “enter southern Somalia, drive away Al-Shabaab, create a buffer zone to allow the fledgling Transitional Federal Government to take control and increase its capacity to retain it.” Although military gains can be secured independently from Somalia’s political factors, combining the two spheres represents the primary objective of counterinsurgency.

Lindsay Kiptiness, Kenya's Foreign Affairs spokesman, cautioned, “A new round of political conflict would affect the transitional process eight months away.”

Fundamental divisions within the TFG’s structure pose a grave threat to the AU’s mission. Destabilization inside Mogadishu’s political core affects the country as a whole, thus impacting Kenya and Ethiopia’s semi-independent operations. Operation Linda Nchi may have been conceived two+ years ago, but Nairobi launched its military campaign within AMISOM’s national campaign. This strategy builds on AMISOM’s gains in Mogadishu by allocating Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to Somalia’s south and west, creating a patchwork grid across the entire country. Additional AU and TFG troops will then deploy to Kismayo and central Somalia.

"As more territory is liberated,” predicts UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “the federal government must strengthen its outreach to the local population and form new regional entities in line with the Transitional Federal Charter. On the military front, we must not exclude the incorporation of new forces and the expansion of Amisom.”

These troops have no chance of landing until the TFG’s political crisis is untangled and permanently settled. A lack of confidence in the TFG impacts donations to the UN and AU, in turn delaying deployment of AU forces and over-stressing Somalia’s nascent security forces. In January the UN and AU urged “the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions, parliamentarians and to all stakeholders [to]… avoid any statement or action that could exacerbate the already tense situation and further aggravate the crisis.” A fist-fight later broke out over Hassan’s unresolved status.

al-Shabaab can only stall Operation Linda Nchi and the AU’s coordinated assault, but the TFG can stop Kenyan and Ethiopian armor in its tracks.

Updates From Somalia’s Fronts

African Union Schedules Drought Conference
Organizing a global summit requires an unavoidable amount of time and effort. Already confronted with a regional drought stretching over an estimated 12 million people, the African Union has circled August 9th to address Somalia’s humanitarian crisis. The announcement was made after Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), visited Mogadishu to coordinate with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Unfortunately for starving and roofless (and now drenched) Somalis, the next nine days will feel like 90.

As the U.S., UN, TFG and al-Shabaab point fingers at each other, only a combination of factors can fully explain Somalia’s aid controversy. Remove al-Shabaab and the task of feeding over three million people would certainly accelerate. However it remains to be seen where al-Shabaab is responsible, and where a lack of infrastructure poses the real obstacle. The African Union wisely adopted the drought as a political shield, but danger lies in scapegoating al-Shabaab, potentially creating a backlash between Washington, UN and TFG.

The AU claims to have foreknowledge of al-Shabaab’s next Ramadan offensive, which will supposedly target internally displaced (IDP) camps and food distribution centers in Mogadishu. For this reason AU units launched their new offensive “to push the militants' front line farther back from the camps.” al-Shabaab is very capable of attacking IDP camps out of spite for leaving their territory - to send a warning - and highways through Mogadishu must be cleared to reach those still trapped in al-Shabaab territory.

At the same time, the TFG asserts control over 80% of Mogadishu’s population. Why must AU units secure the whole city to feed the majority of inhabitants, to utilize the capital’s port near the airport, or to begin moving supplies south? The AU can have good intentions and still excuse its looming invasion of the Bakaara market, al-Shabaab’s most lucrative stronghold, on “protecting aid agencies.”

Offensive and Counter-Offensive

The AU has eyed Bakaara since landing in Mogadishu and, with momentum finally at its back, is perched to crash upon the market from three sides. This pre-emptive strategy didn’t stop Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM’s spokesman, from releasing a statement explaining, "Our troops have dealt with specific security threats in a short tactical offensive operation.” The assault around Bakaara, he said, was to “ensure that aid agencies can continue to operate and get vital supplies to internally displaced persons.”

It’s true that Wadnaha Road, a key highway fronting the Bakaara market to the south, recently opened to civilians after being locked down by al-Shabaab. Problematically, moving through Bakaara and the rest of Wardhigley will create more IDPs. António Guterres, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, warned, "An offensive on Thursday by pro-government forces in and around the important Bakara and Balcad markets has increased the risk for Mogadishu's citizens as well as the estimated 100,000 internally displaced people (IDP) who have fled drought and famine in neighboring regions in recent months.”

AU troops moved all the way up to Ali-Kamin junction, a mile north near Mogadishu stadium, before retreating under heavy insurgent fire. Feeding the starving and protecting aid workers are surely priorities, but the AU appears most concerned with taking advantage of al-Shabaab’s vulnerability under the cover of moving aid. While time is running out for many Somalis, the AU’s offensive may be self-defeating if new casualties are created on the way to their rescue.

al-Shabaab Claims U.S. Kill

Somalia’s insurgency has fallen on hard times since last Ramadan. After failing to topple the government as promised, the AU counter-attacked in Mogadishu as TFG, Ethiopian and Ahlu Sunna forces assaulted al-Shabaab’s western and northern fronts. Coupled with a November-December leadership dispute and an epic drought, and al-Shabaab is now being written off by a number of analysts. Although the group may eventually die out, insurgencies are known to survive longer than anticipated despite a loss of popular support and financing.

The TFG and AU are now sharing the Afghan government’s pain of “controlling” territory, only for al-Shabaab to infiltrate and strike behind enemy lines. In Mogadishu, the insurgents hold actual districts rather than maintaining an active underground presence across the city. Once these maze-like districts are seized, they can still strike into government territory and destabilize security. On Sunday gunmen killed a TFG parliamentarian in Hamarweine, home to many government buildings and usually controlled by the AU.

If al-Shabaab learns from last Ramadan and adopts a more realistic goal of holding its districts, the odds of political assassination likely outweigh attacks on IDP camps or aid centers. The group has also allowed access to "non-political" groups such as the International Red Cross and Kuwaiti-based International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO).

In another piece of counter-propaganda, Sheikh Abi-aziz abu Mus’ab held a press conference in Mogadishu to declare that a senior U.S. official had been killed in Hodan district. “The man used to train AMISOM and he was also a senior advisor,” said Mus’ab, an al-Shabaab spokesman, adding, “We will soon display his identity and all other documents we have to make it proof.” Although the insurgency is liable to produce disinformation at any time, U.S. trainers likely have more duties than interrogation and maintaining drones.

Jeremy Scahill’s exclusive reporting to The Nation infers a deeper arrangement, one that routinely circumvents the TFG by paying its own agents or outfitting the AU. 30 CIA agents supposedly operate at Mogadishu’s detention center/drone base, and some presumably work in the field training Somali intelligence officials or AU personnel. The Pentagon already “approved plans to send $45 million worth of military equipment to Uganda and Burundi, the two major forces the AMISOM operation.”

Scahill also mentions a draft of a defense spending bill approved in late June by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Another $75 million in U.S. counterterrorism assistance would escalate AMISOM’s budget, specifically because the Somali military cannot “exercise control of its territory.”

Facing enemies on all sides, al-Shabaab hopes to raise the U.S. flag and provoke new local hostility. We believe that, barring civilian casualties, Somalis are too absorbed in their survival to hate the West. Regardless, a U.S. response often follows these types of casualties so the possibility warrants consideration. While some TFG officials have mused over international military action, Washington seems to have its hands full with green-lighting donations.

When, though, does the Pentagon and CIA waste an opportunity to strike?

Spinning the Pentagon’s Counter-Terror Roulette: Yoweri Museveni

According to the entire world media, West to East, counterinsurgency has been run out of U.S. foreign policy. Now counter-terrorism is in again. Yet COIN was never really in, and CT never truly out. The Obama administration didn’t decide to ramp up military operations in Somalia, Yemen and North Africa only last week.

The Pentagon is simply exploiting an unwanted withdrawal from Afghanistan to justify the global expansion of Special Forces and CIA operations.

Compared to the $6.7 billion America spends each month on Afghanistan, shipping $45 million to Uganda and Burundi must seem a bargain to those fed up with U.S. nation-building abroad. In some ways it is. Documents obtained by The Associated Press reveal a $145.4 million package that Pentagon officials submitted to Congress last week, a fraction of the $117 billion proposed for Afghanistan's 2011 fiscal year. AMISOM’s recent momentum against al-Shabab is further maximizing the Pentagon’s latest aid: four RQ-11 Raven mini-drones, body armor, night-vision systems, communication gear and construction equipment. An additional sum in the hundreds of millions (the exact tally is unknown because of unfulfilled commitments and local corruption) goes to training Somalia’s fledging army and sustaining AU troops in Mogadishu.

When combined with U.S. Special Forces and a heavy naval presence off the Horn of Africa, Washington has managed to keep the rest of its troops off of deadly ground. This is the way most Americans prefer their government to address al-Qaeda’s threat.

However limited funding has produced a similar outcome as Afghanistan’s heavy lifting: a corrupt government, regional confusion and military stalemate. To be clear proxy funding is a necessary component of counterinsurgency. Problems arise when this dimension overtakes the political sphere. Nation-building from the ground up - Afghanistan and Somalia being prime examples - may be impossible in practice, except counterinsurgency doesn’t necessitate nation-building so much as frequent contact and sensitive understanding to the local populace. Above this local response lies the national and international response, which supersede military operations in successfully applied COIN.

Afghanistan never witnessed such a strategy emerge from General David Petraeus’s “anaconda,” a flow-chart outlining the various ways to squeeze insurgents.

It is assumed that U.S. troops have no business in Somalia. True or not, the West needs to do more than ship equipment to fix Somalia. June experienced severe political turbulence as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) gained one more year on its mandate - and lost its popular Prime Minister in the process. Signed in Uganda under pressure President Yoweri Museveni, the Kampala Accord met fierce popular opposition in Mogadishu and continues to jam the TFG. Although Mohamed Abdhullahi Mohamed has been succeeded by his equally skilled deputy, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, President Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Aden remain locked in political combat.

Over a third of the Transitional Federal Parliament has also lobbed a series of petitions at Aden. After the Speaker refused to hear a motion against the Kampala Accord, MPs drafted a new letter accusing him of treason. A vote of no-confidence is currently in the works.

Supporting Museveni militarily thus creates two fundamental risks. First, Museveni is perceived of intervening in Somali political affairs to protect military gains, a strategy that could backfire. Ugandan troops have avoided being tagged as foreign occupiers, but this risk increases if the Kampala Accord is left unresolved - or if Uganda again intervenes in the TFG’s internal politics. The Obama administration also hailed the agreement and urged Somali officials to move forward, only to find itself swamped in local politics. Washington is stuck on the wrong side of the Kampala Accord and must plug into the national debate.

At a geopolitical level Washington continues to ignore the lessons of the Arab Spring. Clearly the Pentagon believes that it can fund any regime with impunity; they can be dropped once their use expires. Although the AP reports that a record U.S. aid package to Yemen was put on hold, U.S. Defense and State officials claim that support is ongoing. None of the $200 million in military aid has been distributed, according to the AP, but it would follow $155 million that helped Ali Abdullah Saleh suppress his political opponents.

Conversely, a wiser Pentagon would have accepted the reality that unpopular regimes aren’t functional building blocks in the “War of Terror.” The Obama administration has managed to keep Saleh’s ruling party and security apparatus online, but this policy stands a high chance of collapsing in the end. While the current unrest facing Museveni isn’t extensive or organized to a point of existential threat, Uganda’s uprising appears resilient enough to create significant distortions in the country’s political fabric. Continue the crackdown and add another election cycle - all through the AU’s battle with al-Shabab - and the West will find itself chained to another unpopular dictator in an al-Qaeda haven.

This dependency is already running at a dangerous level in Somalia, where 5,000 of the 9,500 AU troops stationed in Mogadishu deployed from Uganda. The West needs Museveni too much and he’s acutely aware of this reality. He didn’t flinch in backing down the UN on the TFG’s mandate, nor does he hesitate to demand Western funds for his troops. America’s lack of alternatives isn’t the only reason that Museveni feels strong enough to crack down on Uganda’s uprising; his political position isn’t as weak as Gaddafi, al-Assad and Saleh’s.

Yet Museveni would need to be blind to miss the Pentagon’s support for unpopular regimes.