Al-Shabaab Division On The Horizon

A mound of speculation finally appears to have sprouted genuine truth. Following months of divisive rumors between al-Shabaab's nationalist and transnationalist factions, Hizbul Islam chief Hassan Aweys has officially removed his group from al-Shabaab's umbrella after previously merging in December 2010. Spokesman Mohamed Moallim issued the announcement to BBC Somali Service on Monday, explaining that Hizbul Islam "is no longer al-Shabaab's partner as there are political and ideological differences with the group."

Aweys's decision has been interpreted as a near-deathblow to al-Shabaab amid the loss of territory and fighters to the African Union's national offensive, but one can argue that Hizbul Islam never joined al-Shabaab in practice. Moallim specifically told the media that his group "joined forces by mouth only, and now we have decided to withdraw our support." The nationalistic Aweys made his first move under the simultaneous pressure of al-Shabaab and AMISOM assaults, essentially forced into survival mode until a new political strategy could be developed. Later reports indicated that al-Shabaab's transnationalist boss, Moktar Ali Zubeyr "Godane," had directly threatened Aweys with assassination if he didn't join the group. Aweys's opposition to Zubeyr's alliance with al-Qaeda resulted in continuous personal friction between over the last three years, and Zubeyr further insulted Aweys by denying him the position of spiritual leadership.

Political analyst Ali Omar Mohamed told Sabahi Online, "The two groups, al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, were already divided from the beginning because al-Shabaab did not appoint any of the Hizbul Islam leaders to senior positions after the merger and al-Shabaab has also not put them on equal footing."

Aweys now feels confident enough to drop his front as al-Shabaab weakens under a prolonged AMISOM campaign, and he may take some of the insurgency's leadership with him. Previous reports claimed that al-Shabaab's nationalist leadership - namely Sheikh Mukhtar Robow "Abu Mansur" and Fuad Mohamed Qalaf "Shangole" - were coordinating a name change with Aweys's faction. Now their plan is being reported in a simpler form; al-Shabaab's clan-based members will "re-brand" themselves as Hizbul Islam. Moallim clarified that his group is "open to negotiations with all groups for the interest of Somalia."

"Hizbul Islam would enter into negotiations with the Somali government with the ultimate outcome of a peace deal that would pave the way for Al Shabaab fighters to join and indeed infiltrate the national security forces, which have been trained over recent years with considerable Western funding and technical assistance, through the AMISOM mission in Mogadishu," says one source involved in the back-channel negotiations.

This plan is allegedly being facilitated by Qatari and Turkish diplomats against the expressed interests of Washington and the Ethiopian government. According to Garowe Online, the same group that helped raise Qatari funds for new President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is advancing a political settlement with al-Shabaab's rank-and-file. Damul Jadid ("new blood" in Arabic) has positioned itself as a breakaway faction of Al Islah, Somalia's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and counts Mohamud and other leaders in his Hawiye clan as associates. Garowe describes Mohamud as operating independently from these Islamist groups while enjoying a wide circle of "friends" within their community.

Aweys has declared war on the new president but challenging his authority won't be easy; political negotiations are the likeliest course of action.

Al-Shabaab has yet to refute Hizbul Islam's decision in public, except for ambiguous Tweets declaring that the "Mujahideen remain united and indivisible." Whether its nationalist core had decided to ditch Zubeyr or merely rebrand itself for another cycle of warfare with the government remains to be seen.

King Abdullah Circling All Of His Chariots

Deep within the Saudi Kingdom lie the political blueprints of a spectacular offensive against democratic forces in the Gulf region and North Africa. Evidence of this plot is dispersed far and wide, but the latest proof has surfaced courtesy of Riyadh itself, where Prince Saud Al-Faisal just announced the Extraordinary Conference of Islamic Solidarity at the behest of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. The summit is penciled in for August 14-15, the prophetic "Blessed Night" (Lailatul Qadr'), with Mecca serving as a dramatic backdrop.

Saudi Arabia's King and Foreign Minister may have cooked up their most potent counterrevolutionary plot yet. 

Given no other details to analyze, observers are left to piece together the monarchy's probable thought-process. The Associated Press quotes one political analyst, Al-Yaum columnist Abdullah Al Shammri, to piece together a strategic explanation, but the truth is largely inferred by the Saudi conception of "Islamic diplomacy." Al Shammri claims that "everybody in the Arab world is getting more Islamist" and Riyadh doesn't want to "lose this chance" to "open the door" - even in "our house." More bluntly, the King and his royal family want to reassert their dominance amid a period of independent thinking, manipulate Islamic energies in the region and quell internal protests.

Immediate reactions to the "Extraordinary Conference of Islamic Solidarity" center around the urgency of Syria's revolution and Bashar al-Assad's ruthless crackdown. Beyond the material support that Riyadh is supplying to Syrian oppositional units, King Abdullah has also announced a national fund-raising campaign "to support our brothers in Syria," a development that stands to gain from the conference's venue. Having lost Mubarak's version of Egypt, Syria has ascended to Saudis' main priority as Riyadh attempts to inflict a counterstrike on Tehran. Gaining the upper hand, either through military means or influencing a political transition, would slow the Kingdom's blood-loss and reorient strategic boundaries in the region. By positioning the Kingdom as a defender of Islam and all Muslims, Saudi Arabia intends to mask the sectarian and totalitarian nature of its regional agenda. 

However Riyadh is preparing to fry every revolutionary fish at once. In May, Prince al-Faisal would don his Foreign Ministry hat at the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) 14th Consultative Summit to accelerate the bloc's unionization. The Prince was forced to cool his hand after several states balked at his pace, telling reporters that the GCC's leadership "expects the issue to take time," but his objective shined through: “I am hoping that the six countries will unite in the next meeting." Days later, the media adviser of Bahraini King Hamad Isa bin Al-Khalifa announced that an "extraordinary" GCC summit would be held in the "coming months." 

Two summits in one summer would be "extraordinarily" counterrevolutionary. 

The list of secondary targets beyond Syria feel endless. At the top sit Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain's democratic movements, each vigorously assaulted by GCC's collective actions but refusing to quit. Media reports suggest that Riyadh hopes to capitalize on the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power in Egypt, along with the Islamic coalition that took Tunisia's election, as if either forgot that Saudi Arabia plays a counterrevolutionary role. Riyadh did everything possible to salvage Hosni Mubarak, then sent Bahrain's King to powwow with Egypt's generals and float the idea of GCC membership.

Tunisia's request to extradite Zine El Abidine Ben Ali went ignored. 

The Kingdom also forcibly stamped a GCC-sponsored "transition" on Yemen, a non-GCC member, and presumably hopes to absorb it in the future. Many Yemenis reject this move as unrepresentative of their national interests. Bahrain's mad dash under the GCC umbrella is ridiculed by its opposition as a sign of weakness, but the kingdoms possess every intention of crushing the uprising into submission. Key states experiencing minor unrest, such as Algeria and Morocco, are also targeted for sustained counterrevolution as part of a wider effort to preempt new outbreaks in the region. Thus reality stands opposite of the Kingdom's expressed goal to develop "unity" in the Muslim Umma. Far from "fragmentation," the Arab revolutionary wave has spread a new sense of unity amongst Arabs and filled the gaps between Islam and democracy. 

What's standing in the way of unity is the Kingdom of the Two Holy Mosques. Wrapped head to toe in the language of Islamic liberation - as if covering revolution with a Burqa - King Abdullah's regime aims to divide the Muslim world against a proliferating awareness of self-determination and free expression.

Senate Committee Drops Turbo Propaganda On Middle East

Days or even weeks are necessary to break down a massive propaganda assault released by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While the renewed emphasis on Kuwait's U.S. base has stolen the current headlines, a full reading of the document is certain to jolt anyone concerned with America's ongoing military complex in the Middle East. On a fundamental level, the report offers the latest evidence that U.S. policy in the region is irreversibly counterrevolutionary. 

A few points of observation on the Senate's Gulf Security Architecture with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 

• The Senate's report is openly framed as pro-GCC, anti-Iranian. This priority automatically skews U.S. policy along Sunni-Shia divisions and flips the recommendation to leverage America's "strategic position to be a steady force for moderation, stability, and nonsectarianism" on its head. 

• Numerous highlights of Israel's qualitative edge contrast sharply with the total absence of the Palestinian cause.

• Washington's unconditional support for Nouri al-Maliki (paralleled by Tehran) and the subsequent collapse of U.S. diplomacy in Iraq is masked by a "recommendation" to bring the country "into the Arab fold."

• Several of the identified "challenges" have already manifested in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, starting with Challenge 1: "While the United States has significant economic and security interests in the Gulf, it should not be seen as opposed to popular reform efforts." 

• Challenge 3 belatedly warns, "The United States must carefully shape its military presence so as not to create a popular backlash, while retaining the capability to protect the free flow of critical natural resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran."

• One recommendation: instead of limiting or suspending military aid in response to human rights abuses, use these incentives to reduce abuses. The Senate also "recommends" that U.S. equipment not be deployed against peaceful protesters, when this violation persists in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain (tear gas in particular).

• Conversely, the Senate heaps praise on the Obama administration and GCC's response to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Although the GCC provides Washington with an expanding outlet to address the Arab revolutions, Saudi Arabia's all-encompassing influence has played a key counterrevolutionary role in Egypt and Yemen. Both Washington and GCC's advances against Bashar al-Assad and his Shia regime have been stained by this double-standard. After being caught off guard by the first revolutionary fires, Washington and Riyadh have rallied to exploit the revolutions and pursue their own interests above democratic movements.

• The Senate's light warning on Bahrain is drowned out by Manama's 5th Fleet and its centerpiece relation to Washington's "lily-pad” deployments. Recommending a "dialogue" between "moderates" punts the issue down field, to be covered up again at a later date. 

Despite its redundant nature and plentiful disinformation, the Senate's report deserves an attentive read and a comprehensive search. Inside lies the blueprint of U.S. talking points that the Obama administration is using to veil a systematic counterrevolutionary offensive. The GCC has been labeled as the Gulf Counterrevolutionary Club for good reason, and Washington is proudly financing its investment into the future.

Who Is Responsible For Syria's Shock Bombings?

The latest double-bombing in Syria released physical and political shockwaves through the international sphere. The first explosion was reported around 7:30 A.M. near the government's Palestine intelligence branch, and followed by a second attack on an aviation headquarters. Most of the casualties and wounded - 55 and 370, according to the Syrian government - are civilians caught up in a revolutionary struggle with no end in sight. With all sides pointing fingers at a list of subjects, what is being unanimously described as a hellish scene has sent the Syrian populace and international community into a new tailspin. 

Syria's Formal Opposition

Each powerful blast that strikes a Damascus suburb triggers a culpability race between Bashar al-Assad's regime and Syria's formal opposition. State media invariably wins each heat, on scene with cameras to broadcast row after row of gruesome images. Government condemnation of "terrorists" soon follows, leaving the opposition to catch up to a well-oiled propaganda machine. Oppositional sources did take credit for a recent IED attack on Syrian forces, which reportedly missed a UN team by 100 yards, but the Syrian National Council (SNC) and Free Syrian Army (FSA) have both rejected any involvement in Damascus's series of high-profile explosions. Ausama Monajed, the adviser to SNC Chairman Burhan Ghalioun, explained, "This is a government-planned attack, and we are used to provocations using these tactics." 

“These bombs are not the work of opposition fighters,” added Brigadier General Mustafa al-Sheikh, chief of the FSA's military council. 

Taking all known factors into consideration, Syria's internationally-recognized opposition has no strategic incentive to commit these bombings.

Actual Terrorists and Radicals

A more realistic non-government source is a rogue actor bent on destabilizing Syria out of personal interests. This actor must be sufficiently advanced to carry out a relatively sophisticated campaign, to pack cars with thousands of pounds of explosives and smuggle them into a tightly controlled capital. General al-Sheikh argues that, "no other parties in Syria... are technically capable of making such a huge explosion, except for the regime itself." He explicitly ruled out the possibility of foreign terrorism, claiming, "Not even al Qaeda can do that." Many oppositional figures and protesters are inclined to agree, however the presence of internal and external rogue forces cannot be rejected either. al-Qaeda has years of experience moving between the Syrian-Iraqi border, and the group is motivated to suck America into another regional war that could distract from intensifying U.S. operations against al-Qaeda's branches. 

One retired Lebanese army major general, Hisham Jaber, told Al Jazeera that he isn't, "accusing al-Qaeda, but everybody knows there are groups from al-Qaeda or similar or belong to it or they have the same objective and belief. We do estimate the number of those groups, who came from Libya, Yemen, north Lebanon and Iraq, at about 800-1000. These are well-indoctrinated and well trained." 

The situation becomes even murkier at this point. Bill Roggio, the editor of Long War Journal, suspects that one of two radical groups operating in Syria carried out the Damascus bombings. Scant information is available on the Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant. An alleged product of al-Assad's vicious crackdown on Homs, the Al-Nusra Front has vowed to avenge the killing of Syrian revolutionaries with their own justice. A rogue Islamic group would normally view its own style of justice as beyond the secular world's ethics, but this faction still needs assistance to orchestrate its attacks. That leaves al-Qaeda elements to multiply the force of local radicalized groups and the regime to let them slip past. 

Opposition members suspect Al Nusrah to be a government front, citing al-Assad's influence over foreign fighters during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Others believe that the regime is ignoring advanced warnings in order to scapegoat Syria's revolutionary forces. Damascus has further twisted this possibility by concentrating on the arrival of foreign fighters, who aren't coming from Iraq but Libya, Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Syria's Permanent Representative to the UN, Bashar al-Jafari, blamed Syria's unrest of these actors while praising the UN's observer mission. 

"Therefore, we are talking about facts that cannot be denied regarding the involvement of foreign fighters in the events in Syria which is a very serious issue." 

To be as clear as possible, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive and could overlap to form a complete picture of the situation. Yet the fog of war is too thick to believe the government's versions of events. Netwar's ad hoc complexities appear to have fused extremist and terrorist cells with Damascus, two or three independent networks working in simultaneous cooperation and opposition. 

Al-Assad's Regime

The series of bombings that have shook Damascus and Aleppo share many attributes: their pairing, selection of targets, time of day, on-site placement of state media and political timing with UN or Arab League missions. UN observers were immediately ferried to two craters to inspect the blast site, just as the Arab League's monitors toured a double car-bombing one day after their arrival. These incidents are then thrown back to the international community as proof of the opposition's terrorism - funded by Western and Gulf states. Rami Abdulrahman, head of the British-based Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, has recorded 849 deaths (628 civilians/insurgents and 190 government soldiers) since a partial ceasefire took effect on April 12th. During this time al-Assad's regime has tried to destroy Kofi Annan's plan while avoiding blame - once again "terrorists" are taking the fall. Damascus also expects the UN to confront the Saudis and Turks, an unrealistic demand intended to gunk up the international community's response. 

"The regime is behind this," says the SNC's Samir Nashar. "This is the only way for the regime to claim that what is happening in Syria is the work of terrorist gangs and that Al Qaida is expanding its presence in Syria." 

Forced to respond, the Obama administration and UN officials usually react by denouncing all forms of violence by either side, regardless of the motivation. The UN would fall head over heels into this trap on Thursday, issuing a sternly-worded statement and deploying its leadership (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan and Norwegian General Robert Mood) to the political fence. To its credit the Obama administration sidestepped al-Assad's plots by differentiating between Syria's revolutionaries and spoilers. "We do not believe this this kind of attack that you saw in Damascus is representative of the opposition," White House spokesman Jay Carey told reporters. "There are clearly extremist elements in Syria, as we have said all along, who are trying to take advantage of the chaos in that country, chaos brought about by Assad's brutal assault on his own people."

Problematically, Syrian state media is full of international condemnation loosely directed at Syria's opposition, including statements from the Obama administration and UN.

Whatever the case, no side stands to profit more from bombing government buildings than the government. This is al-Assad's plan to void Annan's ceasefire and pin its collapse on the opposition. Bombing one's people is irrational and inhumane, but al-Assad has no real connection to a large segment of "his people." His regime is willing to kill thousands of Syrian revolutionaries and sacrifice the same number of his own troops to remain in power. If Syria does collapse into open civil war between civilians, al-Assad would use all of his supporters as political and military bargaining chips against a foreign intervention. 

Why wouldn't he already be using them as pawns?

Unraveling al-Assad's Mind Games

Any silence is worth its own weight to people that have been shelled and shot at continuously for weeks. Syria's guns fell relatively silent on Thursday as 6 A.M. passed into uncertainty, with Bashar al-Assad's regime and the political opposition both taking credit for a nebulous ceasefire. The hazy situation has left everyone to anticipate what follows a rare moment of calm in Syria's revolutionary storm.

“A tentative or less than complete cease-fire is better than no cease-fire at all, but we could not call the current situation on the ground a full cease-fire,” White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters in Washington.

Even a brief ceasefire is somewhat surprising given al-Assad's recent behavior and psychological makeup, but the strongman was motivated to stop shooting at the very last moment. Viewing April 12th's international deadline an opportunity to kill over 1,000 Syrians in a span of weeks, al-Assad's regime continues to stake its claim as the only party to abide by Kofi Annan's diplomatic mission. This duplicitous plan has contributed to the regime's survival throughout months of negotiations with the Arab League, but al-Assad's schemes will begin to erode if a UN monitoring team can inject itself into the conflict. Any obstruction of the mission will push a UN peacekeeping force closer to reality, a possibility that the Arab League couldn't deliver.

Unfortunately Annan's six-point initiative is ripe for exploitation and al-Assad hasn't exhausted his tactics or desire to cling to power. Adib al Shishakly, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), criticized the regime and international community for diluting "the whole initiative into one thing: into the cease-fire only. What happened to the other five?" One of these five remaining conditions is the right to peacefully protest, which the opposition will test to its limit on Friday.

“We call on the people to demonstrate and express themselves," SNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun told the AFP on Thursday morning, "because the right to demonstrate is a principle point of the plan."

According to Syria's Local Coordination Committees (LCC), anti-government protesters have already emerged in the hotspots Idlib, Homs, Hama, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Aleppo and Damascus. Some were greeted with gunfire, while tanks and snipers continue to assert their presence as a means of deterrence. Having cheated the idea of a ceasefire by maintaining his forces' positions, al-Assad is now awaiting any sporadic attack to justify a disproportionate response. Manufacturing a bombing on an army checkpoint, oil pipeline or government building could be a possibility. Whatever the case, Syrians expect al-Assad to use every tactic available to impede mass demonstrations against his rule.

"While we call on the Syrian people to protest strongly," Ghalioun added, "we ask them to be cautious because the regime will not respect the ceasefire and will shoot."

al-Assad can also renege on the other components of Annan's plan, including the release of political detainees, by tying the issue into a legal knot and maintaining the status quo. Access for the international media remains limited and the ultimate end of a "political transition" is a powder keg waiting to detonate. Bashar Jaafari, Syria's ambassador to the UN, highlighted these discrepancies when he spoke with PBS's Charlie Rose on Wednesday. Fixated on Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, France and the U.S. as the source of Syria's instigation, Jaafari's rhetoric offers one of many reasons to doubt the long-term prospects of Annan's plan. The fundamental dilemma is that al-Assad's regime, the opposition and foreign powers still express contradictory versions of a political transition.

"We're encouraged that we do now have a cessation of violence in Syria," Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said. "We hope it holds. Everybody needs to behave with maximum prudence for that to happen. Frankly, there is one thing which Mr. Annan, I hope, is going to accomplish very soon — clear-cut agreement by opposition leaders to enter into dialogue with the Syrian government. This so far has not happened."

Meanwhile Syria's opposition demands that al-Assad step down before any dialogue is initiated with the government, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mixed the two options following the G-8's latest ministerial in Washington. Telling al-Assad that Annan's plan "is not a menu of options," she placed "the burden of fully and visibly meeting all of these obligations" on the regime. For a ceasefire to be "meaningful," Clinton says, "this apparent halt in violence must lead to a credible political process and a peaceful, inclusive, democratic transition." She then concludes by declaring "Assad will have to go, and the Syrian people must be given the chance to chart their own future." Still hoping to avoid military intervention while simultaneously influencing the political process, Western and Gulf countries envision al-Assad stepping down into Yemen's two-year transition "model" (even though the Arab League's original condition to delegate power to a vice president was scrapped from Annan's plan).

Conversely, Jaafari told Rose that al-Assad will accept the people's decision if he is voted out of office in 2014's presidential election. "The credibility of the Syrian government has been confirmed," he told reporters on Thursday, offering a mere taste of the vicious political battle to come. In the event that a military ceasefire does hold, the next round of political warfare will intensify and offer al-Assad all the reason he needs to restart his crackdown. The regime still doesn't accept the fact (at least publicly) that a revolution is occurring and governments only negotiate to avoid a total collapse (as Yemen's revolution demonstrates). Jaafari repeatedly blamed Syria's "crisis" on external factors, a common counterrevolutionary error that underscores the regime's resistance to Annan's proposal.

The pervading skepticism of Syria's ceasefire is unlikely to free the international community from the military hook. Another waiting period will be unacceptable to Syria's revolutionaries and Ghalioun, who urged "the countries that back the Annan plan to monitor its implementation in full, mainly the right to demonstrate... and to provide the means to protect the people if the regime violates the plan."

The UNSC must be ready to act, not talk, if Syria's ceasefire shatters.

Annan's Syrian Plan Circles Drain

Kofi Annan is presumably acting with good intentions. When he flatters Bashar al-Assad with the slightest expectations, Annan is speaking from a lack of options to end Syria's bloodshed. He must stay neutral or al-Assad could run off like a frightened deer - except al-Assad is no deer and Syria isn't experiencing a crisis to be resolved ASAP. Annan's conflict resolution has little immediate place in a revolutionary conflict. While Syria's revolutionaries continue to fight for their lives and future, the United Nations and Arab League are fighting to sell their failed proposal.

"The government must stop first and then discuss a cessation of hostilities with the other side," Annan spokesman Ahmad Fawzi told reporters on Friday morning, three days after al-Assad ”accepted" the former secretary-general's six-point initiative. "We are appealing to the stronger party to make a gesture of good faith... The deadline is now."

This reasoning is fatally distorted by the intense nature of Syria's burning revolution. Attempting to counter widespread doubts over the AL/UN proposal, Fawzi insists, "We expect him to implement this plan immediately." Where their expectation comes from (beyond propaganda and desperation) is a mystery. al-Assad's regime has intentionally scuttled the Arab League's diplomacy and "negotiations" with Annan were paired with assaults on oppositional territory. The Local Coordination Committees estimated that upwards of 50 people were killed on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. al-Assad is speaking through violence and has no intention of "making a gesture of good faith."

The Annan plan "specifically asks the government to withdraw its troops, to cease using heavy weapons in populated centers," Fawzi said. "The very clear implication here is that the government must stop first and then discuss a cessation of hostilities with the other side and with the mediator."

According to various media sources, al-Assad will deliver a speech next week that offers a ceasefire on the condition that Syria's rebels halt their operations first. He is almost certain to blame the opposition for all of the state's woes and vindicate the regime's "leadership." Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdessi gave a preview on Friday night, saying that military units won't withdraw from "any zone" until it "returns to normal life." Normal, to Makdessi, means the killing and taking of hostages by opposition forces, but his slander transcends the physical. Normal is simple code for prerevolutionary - the thought that Syria's revolution doesn't exist. In comments that are sure to be echoed by al-Assad, Makdessi declared on state TV, "The battle to bring down the state in Syria has already ended and the battle of reinforcing stability has started."

"The regime wants to send a message to the Friends of Syria that all is well and they have control of the situation, to break the morale of the revolution," said Wadi Jamal, a coordinator between the Syrian National Council (SNC) and Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Foreign powers are clearly stalling for time just as al-Assad is. Although many Western and Gulf officials doubted the sincerity of his latest response, the UN's rhetoric is gashed by a major disconnect with al-Assad's personality. The international community is currently adding to the opposition's division by pushing a divisive political initiative upon them, one that stipulates a dialogue with al-Assad despite his brutal insistence to remain in power. SNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun has yet to solidify his standing with local Syrians, but the exile may speak for many revolutionaries when he announced, "We have no illusions over the possibility of the mission's success because Bashar Assad and the Syrian regime have no credibility to engage in a political process. It will soon become obvious the regime won't even implement the first clause of the agreement."

The opposition's problems also distract from the reality that Western and Gulf states are divided on a course of action - they might not be able to decide on their scale of intervention even when given a transparent opposition. Meanwhile al-Assad remains flanked by a unified Moscow and Beijing, who supported Annan's shuttle diplomacy as a means of relieving pressure on al-Assad and themselves. They also expect to subvert Annan's proposal by shifting the burden of responsibility to Syria's opposition and involved foreign powers - a classic counterrevolutionary tactic. Before al-Assad had done anything at all, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov told reporters on Tuesday, "this is a step forward... Now it's the opposition's turn."

"We'd like to call on Syria's opposition to make responses as soon as possible to create conditions for opening dialogue and stopping violence," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei added on Friday.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is presently highlighting the divisions between Western and Gulf capitals as she attempts to close the gaps before Sunday's "Friends of Syria" conference. Stopping over in Riyadh en route to Istanbul, Clinton fulfilled one of al-Assad's stipulations by applying her brakes to King Abdullah's suspected arming of the opposition. Whether Washington genuinely or only publicly opposes a weaponization process remains unknown; a double game with Riyadh and its hegemonic arm, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is easily playable. According to media reports, Clinton responded "very well said" after Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal told her, "The arming of the opposition is a duty, I believe, because it cannot defend itself without weapons."

Washington and Riyadh have succeeded if their objective is to manufacture a legitimate cause to intervene. Otherwise a massive amount of pressure to arm Syria's revolutionaries is due to erupt on Sunday. Unimpressed with Annan's diplomacy and the international proposal that he represents, Ghalioun considers al-Assad's "acceptance" to be "another lie and a maneuver" to disguise his crackdown. Similarly, the Syrian Revolution's activists on Facebook reported to the Arab League's "national dialogue" by posting, "The Muslims and the Arabs have abandoned us ... but God is with us ... and our determination will carry us to victory."

Ghalioun says the council and its allies have "repeatedly called for the arming of the Free Syrian Army. We want the 'Friends of Syria' conference to live up to this demand."

Implementation of a "safe no-fly zone" into Turkey forms the other half of an asymmetric struggle to oust al-Assad's regime. His flirtation with Annan indicates an organized drive to pit his foes against each other, and the strongman will feed on discord if the SNC and its alleged friends cannot reach an agreement on Sunday. Syria's current narrative in the media is focusing on the lack of a "Plan B" and accompanying low expectations hovering over Istanbul, but the summit is packed with significance: the potential to force a strategic review in Washington.

Syria’s Revolution Enters UNSC Battleground

Two weeks ago The Trench speculated on the possibilities of intervention in Syria. One of these contingencies - organized insurgency against Bashar al-Assad’s regime - is already underway as oppositional representatives and commanders await further assistance from foreign powers. Those governments opposed to al-Assad’s rule can pursue this objective through their own volition, but direct military aid faces a stiff political battle in the UN Security Council. Walid al-Mouallem, Syria’s Foreign Minister, recently alerted the West of Moscow’s “red line."

“Russia cannot accept foreign intervention.”

This battle is set to commence after the Arab League decided to create space between the regime. Accused of cooperating with al-Assad and his security details, the League’s monitors were cornered by oppositional forces demanding material action and given no room for error. al-Assad’s tactical shifts left hundreds of protesters dead since mission commander and Sudanese General Muhammad Ahmed al-Dabi arrived in late December. At least 100 people were killed as the League met over the weekend, with government forces attacking multiple cities (Hama, Homs) from multiple directions. al-Assad also continues to organize mass rallies in praise of his “comprehensive reforms,” another sign that he has no intention of halting his crackdown.

A staunch defender of the regime and his mission, even al-Dabi is now forced to admit, “The situation at present, in terms of violence, does not help prepare the atmosphere” for negotiations. Violence has increased "in a significant way.”

Unable to broker a compromise with al-Assad, a divided League is increasing its pressure to maintain its own credibility with Syria’s opposition and Western capitals. Qatar currently leads the face of Arab intervention, with Riyadh looming in the background, and the withdrawal of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members helped push the debate into the UNSC. Turkey also hosted GCC foreign ministers in Istanbul to declare “unequivocal support” for the League’s decisions, including the recent suspension of its observer mission. This chain of events represents a modest victory for Syria’s opposition, but the UNSC’s battle could exceed the Arab League’s mission in length and casualties.

First circulated on Friday, a preliminary UN draft “calls on al-Assad to hand over authority to his deputy and calls for the formation of a national unity government.” The document also “condemns the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights" and demands an immediate ceasefire. al-Assad would be given 15 days to comply or risk new diplomatic and economic sanctions, with military force reserved for the political endgame. For now the UNSC is prepared to support Arab-led initiative “to facilitate... the transfer of power from the President and transparent and free elections.”

Specific analysis of the League’s initiative will be published shortly. Copied from the GCC’s power-sharing deal in Yemen - an unpopular and unstable agreement - the Arab League’s plan threatens al-Assad and Syria’s opposition alike.

Its secondary target is Moscow, where the UN’s political battle will rage most intensely. Months of pressure from the Obama administration and European powers such as Britain, France, and Germany is gradually encroaching upon Russia’s red-line, generating an unpredictable outcome. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland responded to the UN’s Friday diplomacy by speaking to Moscow: “We now have all of the members of the E.U., the United States, Australia and the Arab League countries making very clear that it's time for Assad to step aside... our question to those who are still protecting him is whether Syria really can go forward under his leadership, given the violence that we've seen."

So far Russia’s response hasn’t been positive. Labeling the current draft “unacceptable,” Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov instead pointed out the “positive aspects” of stopping violence and launching a “national dialogue” to “persuade the Syrian opposition to start a process of reconciliation.” He said Moscow was seeking clarification over future punitive measures. As for al-Assad’s fate, “Any decision about a future political settlement in Syria must be made during the political process without... preliminary conditions, and the demand for Assad’s resignation is a preliminary condition.”

Gatilov insists, “We cannot support a call to support Assad’s departure in any UN Security Council resolution.”

On Sunday Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his own disapproval of the League’s decisions, lobbying for more observers and time to open negotiations with Syria’s opposition. Lavrov has been a vocal advocate of the GCC’s deal in Yemen, but the Foreign Minister is keeping his cards close in Syria. No draft should be formally considered, in Lavrov’s opinion, until the League’s observer mission submits a report later this week. He might even be going through the trouble of ignoring Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who will attend UN meetings tomorrow and has been trying to reach Lavrov for 24 hours. “He’s in Australia and apparently unavailable,” according to State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland.

Russian analysts also point out the realities of an election year, and Vladimir Putin’s desire to avoid being outmaneuvered by the West in Libya and Syria.

As mentioned earlier, Syria’s opposition is now in danger of being squeezed by international forces, a process that inevitably weakens the control over a democratic transition. Most oppositional forces - including Syria’s National Council (SNC) and Local Coordination Committees - support international intervention on various levels, either humanitarian (no-fly) corridors into Turkey or military assistance to the national resistance. After receiving assurances from Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal that the Kingdom will recognize the SNC “as the official representative of the Syrian people," the council expects action to eventually replace diplomacy.

Bassma Kodmani, a Syrian-French member of the SNC’s 10-member executive board, explained, “I grew up hating NATO. I was taught it was the devil. It was unimaginable for decades for any Syrian to even think about asking for [help] from the West... But now people on the ground want humanitarian intervention. They want to be rescued.”

However the SNC still faces resistance from the Syrian National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, which the group has unsuccessfully attempted to link with. Unlike the SNC, the NCC adheres to non-intervention and supports Russian diplomacy; spokesman Haitham Mannaa told the AFP “we hope to see Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi head to Moscow before New York.” Although Mannaa reasonably argues that “sidelining” Russia will increase its support for al-Assad, this policy relies on two authoritarian forces to reach a democratic outcome.

Giving Russia “a bigger role” in the political process will bring disaster upon Syrians of all backgrounds.

Conversely, Kodmani stands firm on the SNC’s demand that al-Assad “move out before the transition can occur… he has no intention of having dialogue.” She said the opposition rejects open dialogue, instead favoring “a discussion on the modalities of [Assad’s] departure.” As a counterweight to the NCC, SNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun is wooing Moscow to let go of al-Assad and continue its “historic relationship” with Syria’s people. At the same time, the SNC has allegedly rejected an invite to Moscow. Whether the SNC and LCC will accept one of al-Assad’s vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa or Najah Al-Attar, remains uncertain, but the streets may take the decision out of their hands. Popular revolutionaries across the region are committed to regime change, not “sharing power” with the regime.

Another executive minister, Abdel Baset Seda, just clarified, "I say clearly that our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad).”

The council’s plan is to move forward in the UNSC and hope “the Arab League has the clout to convince the Russians to change their position.” Kodami says that Syrians expect “a serious Security Council resolution that says the council looks to blame the regime and then sets a period of time after which it will take other measures.” Meanwhile the SNC is mapping, coordinating with, and financing military groups operating in Syria and Turkey. Defected military commanders and experts are busy “linking them into some form of command chain."

In short, preparations are being made to infuse a long-term insurgency with foreign assistance.

Potential Spectrum of Syrian Intervention

As the dominant powers in a regional asymmetric movement, Western and Gulf nations are inherently allergic to the concept of revolution. Their officials go to great lengths to avoid the word itself, and have fallen back on a guerrilla tactic to protect their interests: false negotiations. Unlike its necessary function in genuine democracy, “dialogue” becomes a kiss of death to revolutionaries rising up against a dictator and his foreign allies. Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans forced their rulers out of power through direct action, not negotiations, while internationally-sponsored “initiatives” are prolonging Yemen, Bahrain and Syria’s uprisings.

Believing that their present situation couldn’t deteriorate any further, many Syrian protesters and local activists were the first to approve an international aid corridor and corresponding no-fly zone. Grassroots support within the Syrian National Council (SNC) gave Riad al-Asaad, de facto commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), enough confidence to threaten a large-scale campaign amid the Arab League’s drifting mission. Western capitals are suspected of planning a no-fly zone - or ground intervention - with Turkey, whose southeastern Anatolia region now serves as the FSA’s rear base. Behind this possibility lurks a regional war with Bashar al-Assad’s allies.

Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took another step towards war on Sunday when he declared his support for intervention during CBS’s “60 Minutes.” Asked whether he favors Arab nations intervening in Syria, Sheik Hamad said that "for such a situation to stop the killing some troops should go to stop the killing." His statements predictably triggered a new verbal barrage from al-Assad’s regime, which has taken shots at Qatar throughout the League’s negotiations and observer mission. Barring a dramatic change of behavior from al-Assad, the opposition movement and foreign powers, Syria is trending towards an organized conflict with geopolitical impact.

The outcome appears to break down into three scenarios that will be explored over time.

Semi-conventional Assault

Foreign capitals challenging al-Assad to resign face a strategic dilemma that hasn’t been encountered by Western powers in decades - the risk of defeat. Washington in particular has expected victory in every war since World War II, heightening the shock of political stalemate and military losses on the battlefield. External powers rightfully fear Syria’s multiple scenarios and potential impact on regional stability, but the revolution demands a commitment to direct or indirect strategies. This dilemma is generating significant friction and hesitation between al-Assad’s international opponents.

"We haven't been looking at a no-fly zone," William Hague, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, told Sky News. "There is no serious prospect certainly at the moment of the United Nations Security Council agreeing any resolution at the moment, let alone agreeing a resolution comparable to anything that happened in Libya."

Hague presents several military observations to buttress his claim, arguing that “the Syrian regime had not been relying on air power to repress protests.” The intense urban nature of Syria’s conflict also reduces the effectiveness of air superiority below Libya’s level. These points aside, intervention will require air cover to shield oppositional fighters and international peacekeepers, and to protect humanitarian corridors and convoys. Any foreign operation, whether military or non-military, will create the need for air support.

In the event that ground troops are approved - this possibility is more realistic than Western officials publicly concede - the region’s strategic orientation points to an international task force masked by select Muslim states. This spear-tip would theoretically include Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey, along with any satellites that Riyadh could bring on board (Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Morocco). Israel might also increase its clandestine activities against al-Assad, or a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission could be approved.

"The Arab League and their monitors failed in their mission and though we respect and appreciate our Arab brothers for their efforts, we think they are incapable of improving conditions in Syria or resisting this regime," al-Asaad told Reuters. "For that reason we call on them to turn the issue over to the U.N. Security Council and we ask that the international community intervene because they are more capable of protecting Syrians at this stage than our Arab brothers.”

Infantry is essential to warfare regardless of the technological innovations designed to replace them, and foreign powers must decide if they believe Syria’s revolutionaries can fill the job. This question is admittedly challenging because the same military defectors and armed civilians will face a more determined enemy than Muammar Gaddafi’s hollow force. Another problem is the lack of Arab manpower against al-Assad and his remaining allies: Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq. Any of these states could decide to support a counter-operation in his favor, while Egypt’s heavyweight army is liable to remain neutral.

With China likely to maintain its life-line to al-Assad through soft power, the greatest danger appears to stem from the possibility of overt Russian and Iranian intervention. Moscow didn’t sacrifice Gaddafi without reason, but to save its bullets for the younger, useful al-Assad. Tehran is similarly connected to his Shia regime and its nerve system to Hezbollah and Hamas, and one Quds official just pledged material support beyond Iran’s current level. This contingency is keeping Western and Gulf powers at bay, wishing to fight Iran on their terms rather than Syria’s unpredictable battleground.

Sustained Insurgency

The FSA experienced a leadership transition over the last two weeks after Brigadier General Mustafa Ahmad Al Shaikh defected to FSA headquarters in Turkey. As a regional commander in northern Syria, Al Shaikh fled the country after witnessing what he called “the regime's ruthlessness and the killings.” His first order of business is establishing a military council to oversee operations against al-Assad’s regime, starting with the gradual conscription of 30,000 new fighters. His media adviser, Fahd Al Masri, specified, "It will also help organize defections within the army and will be in contact with officers in the regular army to encourage large-scale rather than individual defections.”

The second task after organizing Syria’s diverse revolutionaries is establishing lines of communication with supportive international powers, a relatively simple task so long as military command is established on the ground. Next comes the decision whether to directly arm or finance the opposition’s arsenal. The FSA’s ranks are estimated between 15,000-30,000, with thousands of civilians theoretically willing to fight for the revolution.

General Al Shaikh publicly expects the opposition’s struggle to take “at least a year, possibly a year and a half to topple the Syrian dictator.” His general plan appears to be sound from an insurgent’s point of view: organize all armed elements (civil and martial) and “deploy them in small six to seven person squadrons” to “employ tactics of a war of attrition.” Oppositional force ratios will be increased over time as they absorb recruits and technology from the West and sympathetic Arab states, until a presence is established across the country and around Damascus.

An insurgency-infused civil war is normal for revolutionary situations, and thus seems to be the most plausible scenario for Syria’s future. Low-intensity conflict requires the least amount of effort from international powers and limits the risk of conventional warfare, which could decimate Syria beyond the revolution’s objectives. Unfortunately for the opposition, foreign actors and Syrians caught behind the regime, waging an insurgency against al-Assad’s regime is likely to protract for multiple years. Syria’s army contains several hundred thousand troops who, unlike Gaddafi’s regulars, weren’t intentionally weakened out of fear. They operate thousands of tanks and field pieces, and don’t rely on tribal or nomadic mercenaries to fight their battles. Syria’s air force, navy and special forces are equally advanced compared to Gaddafi’s forces.

The unfortunate reality is that al-Assad may launch an efficient guerrilla campaign of his own; a full-scale unconventional war will yield a bloody spectacle in its own right, capable of lasting 5-10 years and damaging a significant portion of the country. This type of war still leaves the door wide open for those proxy agents that will flood Syria from all directions. Whether conventional or asymmetric, the possibility of extended warfare and mass casualties is too real for Western and Arab powers to currently stomach.

Coup/Assassination

The final military option trades victory for defeat. Given the lengthy time-line of either course, oppositional elements and international powers may review the possibility of assassination by ground or air. This option could be attempted before open hostilities are initiated - possibly as a precursor since al-Assad will react aggressively either way - or as a desperation move deeper into the war. However the expediency of assassination could represent the most chaotic option available, lacking the popular buildup that culminates a successful revolution. Even a decapitation strike across al-Assad’s leadership could leave a resilient force defended by a strong-willed minority.

Foreign powers will likely phase across the spectrum from unconventional to conventional operations, a sound approach in light of Syria’s complex circumstances. However risk cannot be separated from warfare, and a failure to commit the appropriate forces could result in the need for greater action in the long-term.

Syrian Opposition Stuck Between AL, UN

Protesters feel the bullets whiz above their heads - if they’re lucky - as they dodge between streets and allies. Higher above them snaps the fire of international powers as they vie for control of Syria’s potential transition, and finally the deafening cannon of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the Arab League’s generally accepted failure in stopping widespread bloodshed, the bloc’s mission is fulfilling another purpose by gradually breaking down relations with Damascus.

Sadly this dissolution comes with high casualties and increased polarization. The League’s current cycle has been stuck on repeat since November, when the bloc first introduced a transitional initiative to end Syria’s revolution. Last week encapsulated the previous two months: political maneuvering, inconclusive weekend meetings and daily death tolls. Monday began with another reported massacre in the Khalidiyeh neighborhood of Homs. Local activist Omar Homsi claimed that “Syrian security forces fired at protesters after noon prayer,” and that an AL delegation fled the scene without documentation. al-Assad is also amending his tactics to include more crowd-control measures (tear gas, water cannons, and nail bombs).

Syrian activist Amal Hanano submitted a blueprint of Damascus’s “new” gameplan to Foreign Policy: “The observers' arrival changed the rules of the game. The regime sends spies to take pictures of the protesters who dare speak to the observers. Before every excursion, the streets are secured in any way necessary, by bullets or arrests (for the safety of the observers or to preserve what's left of the regime's tarnished image?). The streets of Deraa have to be scrubbed clean of its people, silencing their voices and erasing any sign of dissent, to present an image of control, safely guarded by snipers lurking on rooftops.”

Unsatisfied with Cairo’s conclusion that Damascus “only partly implemented” the League’s initiative - protesters contend that none of the League’s demands have been met - Syria’s opposition launched their latest media offensive to seize the country’s narrative. Pledging to increase the number of monitors from 165 to 200 remains a futile attempt to boost confidence in the League’s mission, given that 1,000 monitors could still be guided by Syrian authorities. Quoting a protester from Deraa, where one AL monitor sparked a furor after spotting or not spotting snipers, Hanano explains how the mission couldn’t visit a funeral because no transportation was available.

Reporting from inside the mission’s media bubble, CNN’s Nic Robertson observed, “the Arab monitors who are here... are largely seen as ineffective. The language that they use, they do not criticize the government here even though the government hasn't met what the Arab League is telling it to do in terms of pulling weapons and troops off the street.”

This pervading lack of confidence has rendered the League’s mission dead in the water, leaving its monitors to float through al-Assad’s carnage until their overview is submitted on January 19th. Syria’s opposition cannot afford to wait another 9 days without any political motion, as time equals lives and the potential for wider conflict. One particular group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), has already lost faith in the League’s mission and publicly expressed its intent to attack (with arms purchased from multiple sources) if the UN doesn’t assume observer duties. Most Syrian groups seem to be coalescing around these terms in the absence of new political action and clarification. Rami Abdulrahman, head of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, warned against "giving the regime more time to deal with the Syrian revolution.”

"The initial report is too vague, and it essentially buys the regime more time," said Rima Fleihan, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC). “We need to know what the League will do if the regime continues its crackdown in the presence of the monitors. At one point it needs to refer Syria to the U.N. Security Council."

Syria’s Local Coordination Committees (LCC) proposed its demands as follows: "Immediately announcing that the Arab observers have failed in their mission, referring the Syrian file to the UN Security Council, paving the way for imposing a no-fly zone and establishing a safe corridor for protecting the military defectors."

Accordingly, a spokesman for the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) continues to strike a more optimistic tone, saying the League’s presence has “reinvigorated” Syria’s revolution and “decreased the number of protesters killed.” These points, though true, come with substantial qualifiers. Protesters are massing to prove their existence and dare al-Assad to shoot in front of the League -and he hasn’t blinked. Dozens of dead and wounded have been documented daily since the observers arrived on December 23rd.

“Any talk of foreign intervention is an illusion, the Arab League initiative is the only way forward,” Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir said after meeting with AL Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby in Cairo.

Ideally, Syria’s opposition must reach a compromise before the League receives its full report. However the middle ground might have been destroyed by al-Assad’s bombardment, and closing the schism between the NCC and SNC, LCC and FSA essentially requires the NCC to cede its position. The NCC may feel more comfortable with UN oversight if Syria’s other networks can provide guarantees of political leadership, a task that the SNC has failed to accomplish. Somewhat reassuringly, SNC spokeswoman Basma Kadmani argued, "There is no major difference on foreign intervention... we have agreed on a joint formulation of what foreign intervention means and how it should come about if it were to come about."

Regardless of their alignment, counter-proposals from every network must be shared and ready for immediate broadcast.

The possibility of UN intervention has created a parallel gap within the Arab League, applying considerable friction to its relations with al-Assad (which may benefit the opposition by accelerating a transfer). Al Jazeera counts Elaraby as a believer in his own mission, explaining his close relations with the NCC. Meanwhile the “anti-Assad” capitals, led by Qatar, are giving him ammo to criticize the League’s mission and potentially shut it down on his terms (another potential accelerator to the UN).

"If the report comes out saying the violence has not stopped, the Arab League will have a responsibility to act on that," Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told a news conference in Cairo.

With the League’s mission set to continue relatively unchanged, al-Thani’s statements cut to the short-term endgame. Perhaps some benefit will be produced if the monitors return with reams of evidence and a complete picture to report, and if al-Assad’s non-compliance results in punitive action. Yet al-Thani, tough as he acts, has issued similar warnings for months. al-Assad shouldn’t be too concerned if Qatar poses his biggest threat. After al-Thani urged the detached dictator to “take a historic decision,” Syria’s Permanent Representative at the Arab League blasted him for “speaking on behalf of the Syrian people.”

al-Assad drowned out his officials on Tuesday with a hard-line, two-hour speech at Damascus University: “The Arab League failed for six decades to protect Arab interests. We shouldn’t be surprised it’s failed today.”

Blaming Western powers, the Arab League and “hundreds of media outlets” for instigating their revolution could form the glue that sticks Syria’s opposition together. Claiming that “external conspiracy is clear to everybody” sounds like a natural bond, and any skeptic of al-Assad’s violent mania should realize that he has no intention of ceding power. “We will declare victory soon” equates to a death sentence (al-Assad says no orders were given “for anyone to open fire on any citizen”). As the situation currently stands, the Arab League and Western powers have yet to break from al-Assad’s regime and his Eastern connections. However these counter-revolutionary forces are drifting away from each other, necessitating unity amongst Syria’s pro-democracy movement.

“The divisions are getting bigger, and I think we can expect the situation here - at the moment, stable - to deteriorate in the future,” Robertson concludes. “That's the direction it's going in.”

Libyan Revolutionaries Creep Towards End Game

Some backhanded compliments are worth accepting. Despite sweeping across the country against heavy odds and displacing Muammar Gaddafi from Tripoli, many foreign analysts continue to doubt the abilities of Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC). First the council’s fledgling military capabilities were mocked; now its political clout continues to shrink as political and military actors compete for their share of power. Some observers expect that NTC to fall during its attempt to restore authority and services.

That Libya’s revolutionaries are now expected to govern demonstrates how far they’ve traveled in eight months - from insurgent to counterinsurgent. The good kind of mission creep, realistically speaking.

Libya’s revolution is nowhere near its end. Only when the entire country has been neutralized of Gaddafi’s loyalists, and a representative government is elected through a fair election, will Libya exit its combat phase, a process that could take another year to complete. Nevertheless, the NTC remains on a stable path after pressing forward after Tripoli’s seizure in late August; time hasn’t been wasted during the operations to capture Sabha, Bani Walid and Sirte, home to Gaddafi’s conventional last stand. Like Bani Walid, Sirte has yet to be captured in full, remaining encircled by NTC fighters as they infiltrate the city. A month-long waiting period reduced some of Sirte’s population as NTC officials negotiated with its residents, but many held out until the final days of fighting.

"There is heavy fighting going on in the streets of Sirte right now," one NTC fighter, Drisi Mayar, told reporters three days ago. "The enemy is besieged from the south, east and west but it's still in possession of highly sophisticated weapons and a large amount of ammunition."

Mayar also told AFP, “We have no oxygen, no medicines. Wounded people die even before reaching the hospital. Many people have broken open the pharmacies in the city to bring medicines to the hospital but even that is exhausted now."

At this point NTC forces had taken control of the city's port, airport and a military base before advancing towards the city center, where they met heavy resistance and retreated. Mustafa al-Rubaie, a field commander, explained how Gaddafi loyalists maintain strategic positions in the city’s core, placing snipers in high-rise buildings to supplement their artillery. al-Rubaie explained that, “the eastern and western forces will meet in the middle of Sirte. When we reach this point, we will celebrate the liberation of Sirte."

News of a “final assault” drove thousands of additional civilians out of town, including scores of unattended wounded. Bouhadi neighborhood, home to many Gaddafi supporters, had been captured days earlier after being abandoned, and a Reuters crew concluded that those who recently fled had left “in a hurry.” Some NTC fighters “set about looting and trashing their empty homes,” many of them decorated with green Libyan flags and portraits of Gaddafi. Reuters added that “there was little evidence” of the wealthy lifestyle that Sirte’s residents were accused of.

Sirte’s ongoing situation is certainly jarring and unforgiving; although the NTC has tried to minimize civilian casualties and open a path to the hospital, the rules of engagement are naturally lax. Both Gaddafi-loyalists and NTC fighters have targeted the hospital, according to local medical officials. NATO has also attracted heavy criticism for its bombing runs. The NTC faces limited options to chose from though, and Sirte’s hardened core of loyalists have no interest in recognizing the new government. They must be removed and removed quickly, in order to keep the NTC’s political process moving forward. Mahmoud Jibril, Libya’s interim prime minister, has promised to step down before an election is held, a promise many suspect that he’ll break.

If so he remains eager to declare an end to combat operations, and on Monday pledged to resign after full control of Sirte was established. He explained that Bani Walid “wouldn’t stop the democratic process, but instead “be dealt with as a renegade region.” A new interim government would lead the country to elections.

Acknowledging the dangers of premature victory, the loss of Sirte and Bani Walid would end the conventional phase of Libya’s revolution. Gaddafi is left with even fewer options after the last centers of resistance fall under NTC control. He can either begin genuine guerrilla warfare and completely eschew conventional tactics, hide indefinitely and bide his time, or flee the country (possibly to Niger). Mobile warfare doesn’t resolve Gaddafi’s widespread loss of popular support; the spy network that he once applied to Libyans has been reflected onto him. He's also unlikely to undermine the NTC’s security to any significant degree. Last minute negotiations are also out of the question, as too many people have lost their lives under Gaddafi’s guns. Exile would prolong Gaddafi’s resistance while simultaneously weakening it through the removal of his charisma.

The NTC’s best-case scenario would have Gaddafi burn himself out fighting, rather than store his remaining reserves for a later date. At least one man believes this outcome may come to pass. Sitting in a Tunisian prison, Gaddafi's former Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi recently exchanged questions with Reuters through his lawyer. al-Mahmoudi suspects that Gaddafi remains inside Libya and “that he is fighting with his weapons and alongside his men.”

"He will not give up and he will not lay down his weapons until the end.”

The NTC’s need for greater political organization and representative adds to the imperative that military operations end as soon as possible. Its political campaign forms the meat of Libya’s revolution and requires full attention from its various components. Sirte and Bani Walid’s operations fall into the same category as Tripoli’s undetermined status, where militias are busy competing for authority and influence. This problem isn’t insolvable with fair arbitration, but it serves as a greater sources of division that Sirte.

Abdelhakim Belhadj, emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), touched off the latest controversy by calling for unsanctioned militias to disarm and withdraw from Tripoli. Suspected of commanding an al-Qaeda sleeper cell, others accuse Belhadj of fronting for the Qatari government, which the money trail validates. Qatar currently poses a greater threat to the NTC’s independence than al-Qaeda, but for now Belhadj doesn’t appear headed for war with Tripoli’s factions. One group, the Tripoli Revolutionist Council (TRC), “pledged to co-operate with Belhadj while accusing his militia of carrying out arbitrary raids.” The deputy of another group, the Zintan Brigade, told CBS News that, “we do not recognize Abdul Hakim Belhadj, he wasn't appointed by anyone."

He also claimed they were prison “friends.”

The competition for Tripoli’s streets mirror the negotiations over the NTC’s future cabinet and allocation of power. Western media has extensively covered what are perceived as deadlocked negotiations, as leaders from Benghazi, Misurata, Zintan and other cities “argue that their suffering or their contributions during the revolt entitle them to a greater voice.” A complex obstacle, to be sure, as it potentially stunts the return of services and normality to Libya, but these are revolutionary growing pains. That each side is competing for power is a very odd criticism - Western democracy quickly becomes an Islamist takeover in the Middle East.

Most Libyans would rather be dealing with these problems instead of how to survive under Gaddafi’s regime. Ultimately one must play the geopolitical game to reach its end game.

Winds of Change Rocking Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet

Press TV broke some “interesting news” on Thursday, as anchor Saeed Pourreza remarked when he appeared to receive an on-air update.

Whether he proceeded to break The Times’s story or vice versa, Pourreza announced that the Obama administration is scouting a new home for America’s Fifth Fleet, currently stranded in Bahrain. The Australian would pick the story up and run, giving “Capital Hill” too much credit for debating the issue “within days of the protests breaking out.” No part of the U.S. government has demonstrated foresight in the Arab Spring.

A story like the Fifth Fleet, though, was too big not to automatically trigger Washington’s denial mechanism. Late night an anonymous State Department official told The Huffington Post, “We are aware of these reports, which do not reflect the views of either the departments of State or Defense.” Just so that everyone was clear, Fifth Fleet public affairs officer Commander Amy Derrick-Frost told Gulf News, “The speculation in the London Times article about Fifth Fleet leaving Bahrain is false.”

The two officials then voiced identical support for King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa: “Diplomatically, we regard Bahrain as an important partner, while the U.S. Navy has a long-standing relationship of more than 60 years with Bahrain.”

No one can deny this fact. Many Bahrainis happen to view their government’s close relationship with Washington as part of their problem. But with the State Department official stepping too far out on a limb - “the United States continues to support all of the ongoing efforts that are necessary to promote reconciliation among Bahrainis and to advance necessary reforms” - the U.S. Navy’s bluster quickly dissipates. No plans exist to move the Fifth Fleet for the moment, only because no feasible options lie on the Persian Gulf’s horizon.

One thing is certain: the Naval Support Activity Bahrain affords the most advantageous placement of the U.S. Navy’s forward presence, specifically against Iran. The Navy also maintains full control over NSA Bahrain, a Guantánamo Bay that Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s governments actually welcome. No alternative of its kind exists; moving is a political and logistics nightmare because NSA Bahrain is the Fifth Fleet’s ideal base. Yet King Hamad’s regime has grown too shaky for the Pentagon to ignore entirely, reverberating a forceful denial in the opposite direction.

Two sites under consideration in the media - Qatar and the UAE - share pros and cons. Both states have experienced negligible unrest during the Arab Spring due to a combination of factors, including lower unemployment and poverty, and maintain extensive trade relations with America (a point of leverage for both sides). Each state also hosts U.S. personnel and logistics that could link up to their ports. Situated west of Doha, Al Udeid Air Base quarters the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (ACC) and several strike groups. Jebel Ali, the Middle East’s largest port, already refuels numerous U.S. Naval craft and has erected facilities to accommodate a supercarrier.

Neither port, however, is equipped for the Fifth Fleet’s total capacity, estimated between 30-40 ships and 16,000-30,000 personnel. Naval Forces Central Command lists its staff at 28,000.

Barring a complete meltdown in Bahrain and a reactive eviction, the Fifth Fleet won’t be moving until a personalized base can be established in the next 2-4 years. The practical considerations of relocating outweigh the existential threat that Bahrain’s monarchy finds itself under, bottlenecking a rapid solution. In case of emergency a patch-work strategy may split the Fleet between Doha and Dubai, while the U.S. Air Force would theoretically function as a stop-gap.

If worst comes to worst though, King Abdul Aziz Sea Port appears to be the most attractive alternative. Located right across the King Fahd Causeway, roughly 30 miles away in Ad Dammām, the Saudi port would make a natural home for the Fifth Fleet. Although the port may be insufficient to house the entire array of vessels, no state would be more accommodating that King Abdullah. His port could renew domestic unease in America and come with a hefty price, however the move makes sense logistically and geopolitically.

Once the dust cleared from Hosni Mubarak’s fall, Obama administration has eagerly adhered to Riyadh’s counter-revolution. As National Security Adviser Tom Donilon would tell you, America and Saudi Arabia share “fundamental, fundamental” interests.

For this reason discounting a move entirely is impossible. One of these shared interests happens to be Bahrain’s faltering “National Dialogue,” which both governments support in order to avert regime change. The move predictably backfired as King Hamad treated the dialogue as the political tool that it is. Unless he and his foreign strong-arms decide to hold a serious dialogue over Bahrain’s inequalities, his government will find itself confronted with a rising swell of opposition against the Sunni monarchy.

Trapped on the same island by the same problems, Washington and Riyadh don’t have many allies to turn to except each other.