Pakistan Quarrels Over North Waziristan Operation

The near-fatal shooting that galvanized Pakistan's public into cooperative action against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also rekindled the explosive debate over a military intervention in North Waziristan. Following the assault on 14-year old Malala Yousafzai, a youth activist of women's rights and literacy, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani reportedly informed President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf of an emergency meeting between the chiefs of Pakistan's three branches at Joint staff headquarters.

At this point Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, announced to reporters, "The government and military leadership will decide if there is a need for an operation in North Waziristan."

Fast forward a week. Instead of capitalizing on popular sentiment to finally enter North Waziristan, the possibility of a large-scale military operation continues to spin its tracks in the mud. Various sources of information (and common sense) speculate that the decision hinges on the unanimous agreement of Pakistan's cabinet defense committee and its military, which controls the final green light. Thus Islamabad's civilian and military components seek to exercise as much authority as possible while also splitting the responsibility of failure. To this end a resolution has been crafted for Parliament's approval as a means of unifying the government's decision, for better or worse.

Except the motion has now run into resistance with the oppositional Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), effectively sending the decision back into Islamabad's civilian-military showdown. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) currently has no plan to submit the resolution even though the group holds the necessary votes. If the PPP does proceed, it will do so after receiving the go-ahead from above.

“We wanted to have consensus over the issue, but we will not press you (the opposition)… however, it will not disseminate a positive message,” said PPP leader Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah explained, adding that the resolution contained no mention of North Waziristan. “We do not want to divide the nation, therefore, will not table the resolution."

“For the time being there is no plan for military operation in North Waziristan," Rehman said on Wednesday. "But if needed, the decision would be taken by political and military leadership of the country in harmony."

However much the majority of Americans disagree - and possibly Pakistanis as well - Islamabad's decision-making process isn't wholly irrational. For starters, the TTP's origins lie in Afghanistan's invasion just as the Taliban emerged from Washington and Moscow's power games; the lack of contingencies in regards to Pakistani militants mushroomed the problem throughout Iraq's war. Deep resentment towards the lack of U.S. responsibility still hasn't been addressed to this day, and perceptions take on real politico-military significance. The Obama administration has made little personal effort to reverse this situation and the past four years speak for themselves. Operation Tight Screw, the latest joint-proposal for North Waziristan, is no less applicable to Pakistan's government.

Washington and Islamabad share the exact toxic feelings about each other: "do more."

This relationship is only capable of producing intermittent achievements. To achieve lasting results in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan must employ a combination of political and economic resources with public approval (both locally and nationally) and foreign support. Missing ingredients will generate new instability in the tribal provinces and potentially reignite the TTP's urban campaign inside Pakistan. Unfortunately Islamabad doesn't possess all of the factors necessary to launch an operation on North Waziristan's scale. Hardest of all is the socio-economic fight after the military battle; Pakistan has never been able to clear, hold and build on a consistent basis. An asymmetric military operation can only buy time and space for non-military action, and starts to become a liability when it can't afford anything else.

Equally problematic for Islamabad is distinguishing true allies from foes. The Pakistani military does seem to recognize the need to uproot al-Qaeda's influence, the extremist Punjabi Taliban and other groups with regional agendas. Hakilmullah Mehsud, the TTP's de facto chieftain, has allied himself with these unpredictable elements. Yet the TTP's other commanders, several of which have challenged for the TTP's scepter, do not pose the same type of threat to the Pakistani state. In particular, North Waziristan's own Hafiz Gul Bahadur has upheld his end of a truce with Islamabad and concentrates on Afghanistan's front. The Haqqanis have instigated a large number of problems for local Pakistanis as they solidify their presence in the FATA, but they too are militarily concerned with Afghanistan's war.

For this reason Washington wants them disposed of, and naturally Islamabad has balked at enthusiastically throwing itself against them. It would prefer to bring these figures into a regional agreement with the Afghan Taliban and foreign capitals. Their forces represent the least threat to Pakistan and still fulfill their proxy uses, generating the accurate impression that Washington wants Pakistan to do its dirty work for cheap. Counterarguing that Islamabad should fix its own state will make no difference on the ground. The real cost of an operation into North Waziristan exceeds the billions in U.S. aid, and Washington lacks the forces to synchronize a long-term border campaign. The Trench has also reported on the Haqqanis' diversification beyond North Waziristan, expanding the battlefield accordingly.

With the bulk of NATO forces scheduled to withdraw by 2014, Islamabad isn't going to destabilize its Western flank any more than it already is. Not without delivered incentives, at least.

Fitting Info-Battle Greets New ISI Chief In Washington

Dueling headlines have become obsolete in the face of single contradictory reports.

According to Reuters, one of two things happened yesterday when Pakistan's Lieutenant-General Zaheer ul-Islam sat down in David Petraeus's office. Selected in March to lead Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), ul-Islam flew to Washington with general orders to maintain a degree of control, however loose, over U.S. military and intelligence operations inside the country. This "public preview" supposedly "displeased" U.S. officials even though Petraeus and the CIA have no intention of permanently halting drones inside Pakistani territory. What exactly happened remains open to interpretation, but not much is left to the imagination. "Sources familiar with the discussions" claim that Petraeus and ul-Islam aired their governments' "mutual grievances" without making "big strides on the main issues."

Equally telling, one U.S. official released a trite statement in an unconvincing effort to highlight U.S.-Pakistani relations: "The discussions today between General Zahir and Director Petraeus were substantive, professional, and productive. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work together to counter the terrorist presence in the region that threatens both U.S. and Pakistani national security."

The Obama administration plans to ignore Pakistan's parliamentary veto on drone strikes.

Chatter between two spy agencies is usually informative so long as one ignores their lines and reads between them. U.S.-Pakistani relations remain as frigid and transactional as 30 years ago, and the Obama administration has managed to keep America at Bush-like unpopularity levels. Regardless of how close the two countries must cooperate in the name of national security, their fractious relationship will never create permanent stability for the region or trust between capitals. In the near term, Washington desperately needs Islamabad to ramp up pressure on the Haqqanis, either militarily or politically, as more U.S. and NATO forces redeploy ahead of 2015. Afghanistan's prospects are uncertain even with their network dismantled, but a strong core would further destabilize a post-2014 landscape in both countries.

Multiple reports conducted by the U.S. government have found that the Haqqanis' arm of the Taliban network remains intact, presenting one of many threats to the success of President Barack Obama's strategy.

Petraeus has tried to eliminate these sanctuaries since taking command of CENTCOM in 2008, and presumably argued that Islamabad must crack down if it doesn't want the Reapers to continue firing into tribal areas. Recent Congressional efforts have introduced legislation asking Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to label the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. One source claims that Islamabad will not object to this move, and the government is still inclined to accept the occasional drone strike in North Waziristan, but American pressure is unlikely to completely sway the Pakistanis against the Haqqanis or other proxies. Cheap rhetorical tricks - "the U.S. supports the Pakistanis taking more responsibility for ridding the tribal areas of al Qaeda and its militant allies" - certainly won't work.

Due to the pervasive doubts over Washington's own strategy for the region, Islamabad is waiting out America's withdrawal (along with the Taliban) and remains content to engage the Haqqanis and other quasi-allies on its terms.

The Obama administration is simply asking Islamabad to do too much, too quickly in Waziristan, and the inability to restore America's public image in Pakistan is only making the situation worse. Speaking to the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Pakistan's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom spelled out the obvious root of evil that plagues U.S.-Pakistani relations. Wajid Shamsul would plausibly assert that "there are those in the US government who would still prefer to be dealing with a dictator," a belief reinforced by the CIA's interaction with the ISI.

"The United States if you look at Pakistan's 65 year history has always preferred to deal with one man rather than with institutions, he said. "They would never like a matter to go to the parliament, to be debated there, for issues to be accountable to the parliament and the people, they don't want that, they want one man."

A final question lurks at the bottom of North Waziristan's uncertainty: will Washington eventually deploy ground forces if Islamabad refuses to launch its own mission, as so many reports have alleged over the years? Such an intervention appears to possess the  power to further destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan, rather than generate a victorious Western endgame or peace for the local populations.

Hakimullah’s Loss Could Be TTP’s Gain

TTP deputy Wali-ur-Rehman lurks behind its chief, Hakimullah Mehsud

For the second time in as many years Hakimullah Mehsud has been reported dead at the tip of a Hellfire missile. Targeted by Predators on January 14th, 2010 after ordering a precision suicide bombing inside FOB Chapman, a CIA compound in Afghanistan's Khost province, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) chief would emerge four months later by taunting America. Now the CIA claims to have intercepted militants discussing the aftermath of January 12th’s drone strike near Miran Shah, the first since U.S. forces air-raided two Pakistani border camps.

"Six to seven TTP members were talking to each other through wireless radio in the conversations we heard, talking about Hakimullah Mehsud being hit by a drone when he was heading to a meeting at a spot near Miranshah," said one intelligence official.

Another official identified this spot as in Nawa Adda, a village in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Datta Khel is roughly 20 miles northeast of Miran Shah.

TTP spokesman Asimullah Mehsud quickly denied that the insurgency has lost its head, standard procedure during the heat of speculation. Hakimullah’s main spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, responded more colorfully by reasoning, "There is no truth in reports about his death. However, he is a human being and can die any time. He is a holy warrior and we will wish him martyrdom.” Ehsan’s bravado contains a large measure of truth for U.S. policymakers who presumably view Mehsud’s death as a small victory.

“We will continue jihad if Hakimullah is alive or dead,” he promises. “There are so many lions in this jungle and one lion will replace another one to continue this noble mission."

Having reached the temporarily conclusion that low-level militants aren’t worth the political cost after Salala ridge, U.S. officials clearly knew who they had in their sights as the Predators swarmed above Miran Shah. Taking out Mehsud was personal, as the jihadi warlord battled Washington with the same mindset. After orchestrating the bombing at FOB Chapman through Jordanian double-agent Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi - and drawing a quick missile strike by boasting - Hakimullah proceeded to inspire Faisal Shahzad’s unsuccessful Times Square bombing. Beyond his status as an enemy of America, the Pentagon and CIA make a special point of killing those who style themselves as invincible.

Removing the TTP’s chief should also benefit Islamabad by eliminating the group’s most hostile personality, a move that could help stabilize U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Passing up a high-value target like Hakimullah is generally inadvisable, however his final dividends in Afghanistan appear to swing in the opposite direction. The TTP chief’s relative isolation within his own group suggests that he’s wanted dead. Although serving as deputy to former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, the young and brash Hakimullah antagonized TTP commanders by overseeing the group’s relative decline. Too many Pakistani institutions and civilians had been targeted by Mehsud, the TTP’s most fervent al-Qaeda ideologist, and his forces are increasingly coordinating with rogue splinter groups.

Pakistan’s military response resulted in a significant reduction in tribal support by displacing over 300,000 people from Waziristan.

Anticipating the internal demand for Hakimullah’s death is a safe bet; regional commanders Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Faqir Mohammed all want him expelled from the TTP’s hierarchy. Rehman in particular believes that he should lead the TTP as a loyal branch of the Afghan Taliban, and has campaigned for the job since Baitullah was killed by drone in August 2009. Bahadur (the commander in North Waziristan) removed himself from the TTP’s umbrella in protest of Hakimullah’s behavior - he doesn’t enjoy the “emir” riding around his own territory.

All of these figures (and elements in Pakistan’s ISI) want the TTP to devote its focus towards U.S. troops in Afghanistan, not Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Mehsud stands as a main block in the pipeline between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Given that Hakimullah’s death remains conjecture, a more detailed account of the situation and the TTP’s reaction should await his confirmed demise. The strategic environment, though, is relatively basic. Removing Hakimullah would eliminate a dangerous disciple of al-Qaeda’s original core, potentially reducing the TTP’s campaign inside Pakistan. Replacing him with a “friendly” proxy - Rehman or Bahadur - should boost Islamabad’s leverage to minimize drone strikes and shift the TTP’s focus across the Durand Line.

A more daring strategy would allow Mehsud to walk while continuing to target his pro-Taliban deputies.

Mullah Omar Makes Latest Power Play

Hakimullah Mehsud sits with Wali-ur-Rehman

A guerrilla’s weakness is usually converted to his strength: a lack of armor or infrastructure. The cell-based structure of netwar offers the same double-edged sword, diversifying an insurgency’s hierarchy and preventing its wholesale destruction. The price of this natural reaction often comes out of the insurgency’s chain-of-command and its potential to escalate operations.

The Taliban’s branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently negotiating with al-Qaeda’s remaining leadership to correct this organization flaw, according to leaks from two recent summits. Confronted with America’s relentless blitzkrieg and waning popularity inside Pakistan, the commanders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hosted meetings on November 27th and December 11th to realign with their Afghan overseers. The audience included TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud and deputy Wali-ur-Rehman (commander in South Waziristan), Maulvi Nazir (South Waziristan deputy) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (commander in North Wazirstan).

Sirajuddin Haqqani, one half of the border-straddling Haqqani network, supposedly chaired the meeting at Mullah Omar’s request. Senior al-Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi, now acting as the group’s number two, also attended to deliver a special message:"For God's sake, forget all your differences and give us fighters to boost the battle against America in Afghanistan.”

These developments are sure to spin in both directions. Some mainstream media hedged their bets appropriately, questioning whether the outreach “indicates that the militants are struggling... or conversely, that they want to make sure they hit U.S. forces hard as the Americans accelerate their withdrawal this year.” The reality is that both networks suffered extensive territorial, numerical and leadership losses heavy losses over the last three years. Unfortunately for Washington, the Taliban’s regional umbrella remains a potent guerilla force with little immediate need to seize territory or launch large-scale operations (intense activity remains ongoing in the eastern provinces).

Nor should the TTP be labeled as weak when divided, then weak when attempting to unite.

The Taliban and TTP have experienced chronic fragmentation since the 2004 death of TTP forerunner Nek Muhammad Wazir, America’s first drone kill inside Pakistan. While TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud initially attempted to assist the Afghan Taliban as Muhammed intended, Mehsud’s increasingly radicalized attacks on the Pakistani state eventually turned the TTP’s sympathizers against the group. The loss of force, provocation of the Pakistani army and alienation of local tribes prompted Mullah Omar to stage numerous interventions, including a high-profile attempt in 2009.

Yet divisions persisted when Hakimullah, Baitullah’s deputy, seized power after his boss's death-by-drone in August. Rehman and Gul Bahadur would vie for the TTP’s leadership before reluctantly ceding to Hakimullah, who styles himself as a fearless field commander. Although his charisma may be perfect for his job, most of the TTP’s sub-commanders have endured relentless operations (Pakistani and U.S.) due to his shift into North Waziristan. Radicalized by al-Qaeda beyond the other players, Hakimullah alienated some of his own lieutenants by attacking mosques and purely civilian targets, and angered older jihadists by participating in the 2011 killing of Colonel Imam.

The TTP’s incongruous stance towards Islamabad has also produced diverging accounts over whether a ceasefire was recently declared, and by whom. In retrospect December’s information battle coincides with the Taliban’s first meeting in late November. According to Pakistani media, “Following the intervention of one-eyed Omar, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban formed a joint five-member shura or council with other Pakistani militant groups on Sunday to oversee an end to attacks on Pakistani forces.”

Since the TTP’s numerous branches haven’t operated in sync for years, any increased cohesion can produce quick dividends on the Afghan battlefield. If its leadership truly aligned politically and militarily, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (and terrorist nodes across the region) will ensure a stalemate when U.S. forces march into 2015. Mullah Omar also remains the only Taliban figure that could patch the political, ethnic and territorial differences in the TTP.

Somewhat oddly, Hakimullah is the only actor refusing even though he’s the most hardened al-Qaeda ideologist.

“Yes, we signed an accord with three other major Taliban groups of Maulvi Nazeer, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and an Afghan Taliban faction to avoid killing of innocent people and kidnapping for ransom, but we did not agree with them to stop suicide attacks and our fight against Pakistani security forces," said TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan in response to Monday’s reports.

One TTP commander spilled the real juice: Hakimullah and Waliur “were at each other’s throats.” Although Rehman pledged his loyalty to al-Qaeda in 2010 and quickly countered “there are no differences between us,” South Waziristan’s commander reportedly “ordered his fighters to kill Mehsud because of his increasing closeness with al Qaeda.” A Taliban favorite, Rehman's cool headed temperament also clashes with Hakimullah’s brash personality.

As the Taliban’s equation stands, Mullah Omar still presents a fundamental dilemma for the U.S. because he is viewed differently than Osama bin Laden. Killing the Taliban’s undisputed leader by drone or raid would alienate too many Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, and Washington needs Omar to preserve any semblance of a negotiated settlement after 2014. A potential truce within the TTP, even if temporary, would also give Islamabad leverage to reclaim its sovereignty, as the government has used U.S. drones to deplete Hakimullah’s ranks.

Washington, in turn, is determined to attack those groups - Rehman, Gul Bahadur and Nazir - that remain loosely allied with Islamabad. Pakistani officials may begin to react differently if these groups focus their energy into Afghanistan, creating leverage to declare a ceasefire on U.S. drones.

The odds of a total shift in the TTP’s operational direction remain low due to these challenges and many more, however Mullah Omar’s latest attempt to connect the TTP’s hydra with his own cannot be underestimated. The stakes are rising as 2014 approaches and most of the TTP wants to concentrate on Afghanistan. Hakimullah may be eliminated and replaced within the next 1-3 years, increasing the Taliban’s influence. November’s meeting also coincided with NATO’s November 28th raid on Salala ridge, a belligerent act that might have inspired the Taliban to close ranks as Washington and Islamabad separate.

As unpopular as the TTP is, America remains Pakistan’s public enemy due to the Obama administration’s politico-military interference and abysmal diplomacy.

"From here on in we want a very formal, business- like relationship," military spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas told The Associated Press from Rawalpindi. "The lines will be drawn. There will be no more of the free run of the past, no more interpretation of rules. We want it very formal with agreed upon limits."

These vast networks appear to be drifting in opposite directions: the Taliban and TTP inching closer together, America and Pakistan shaking apart. Washington’s relationship with Kabul remains tenuous beyond the security realm, while its alliance with NATO will gradually unravel over the next three years. In this type of stalemate, a substantial increase in the Taliban’s organization could dictate the terms of a post-2014 settlement with the U.S.