"Even if we entered with them [the opposition] now into an understanding, the situation will be worse than it is now. We will cling to constitutional legitimacy and we will preserve the security, independence and safety of the Yemeni republic with all means possible."
“I think things are obviously, or evidently, very unsettled in Yemen... We’ve had a good working relationship with President Saleh. He’s been an important ally in the counter-terrorism arena."
“The general assumption is that his days are numbered. But he seems determined to decide the number himself... “We want to express support for a transition and concern about our security issues. But we don’t want to take sides.”
Another ordinary day in revolutionary Yemen. Rage buzzes in the streets and mountains, government officials discuss "security," back-channel talks hint at a political resolution, propaganda mixes with denial, anxiety and silence fill Washington’s air. The same chaos that makes a revolution unpredictable also makes it easier to predict.
The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who defected after last Friday’s massacre in Change Square, reached a tentative agreement to end the nation’s crisis. Both men are willing to resign but agree that they can't until the details of a transitional council have been established, according to government sources.
They hope to release a detailed plan by Saturday, after Friday’s scheduled march on the presidential palace.
Having held fast to its position that the opposition must negotiate with Saleh, the White House naturally greeted the development with approval (State Department went silent today). Defense Secretary Robert Gates sparked widespread concerns on Wednesday after admitting the White House “doesn’t have a plan in Yemen,” but this strategic error has been obvious since the revolution's beginning.
When questioned on Yemen, Press Secretary Jay Carney responded, “I think that we are focused on offering our judgment that in Yemen, as in other countries, force is not the appropriate response to the unrest, and we call on all sides to refrain from violence and we call on all sides to engage in a political dialogue, as President Saleh has indicated he wants to do. So we think that’s a positive thing, and we’re not going to prejudge the outcome of that dialogue.”
Carney also claimed that U.S. policy in Yemen doesn't hinge on one individual.
U.S. officials are clinging to “dialogue” like a literal life-line in rough seas. Rarely commenting on the crisis through high-level officials, "dialogue" is repeated as proof of America’s support for Yemen’s democratic movement. So is condemnation of violence against protesters, which Washington is always sure to warn both sides against. This delegitimization tactic has been combined with demands for "investigations," as if Saleh isn't responsible.
That support for Saleh's "dialogue" breaks down to open support for a despotic ruler - its own prejudice - also goes unmentioned.
“With respect to Yemen,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters yesterday, “we’re not going to make predictions about what will happen in Yemen other than to say that the people of Yemen have the same rights as people anywhere, and we support dialogue as a path to a peaceful solution to Yemen’s current political situation that includes genuine participation by all sides. And we are certainly making our views known on a regular and consistent basis both publicly and privately.”
It became immediately apparent after Saleh and al-Ahmar’s meeting that, as in the case of previous “offers,” Yemen’s opposition would reject their latest plan. Despite his shady history General al-Ahmar has tilted the scales further against Saleh, but he’s far from the opposition's representative for this same reason. As chief of Yemen’s military, al-Ahmar is considered an enemy of the Houthis for aiding in their suppression (Houthi statements have recently welcomed al-Ahmar’s support, likely as a political maneuver).
And al-Ahmar is too intimate with Saleh to negotiate on the opposition’s behalf; Saleh is clearly using al-Ahmar to oversee the transition. But he’s only a pawn in the opposition's game now, not the king.
Yassin Noman, head of Yemen's opposition coalition, dismissed Saleh's offer as "empty words,” while opposition spokesman Mohammed al-Sabry summed up their position as, "No dialogue and no initiatives for this dead regime.. This talk is aimed at delaying the announcement of the death of the regime. The opposition does not need to respond.”
Around 10,000 people did gather on Thursday morning, chanting slogans such as "Go, go, you coward; you are an American agent." Much of the opposition is busy formulating a transitional structure that will accommodate its many facets.
One needn’t rehash a month of government violence and insincere dialogue to understand the opposition’s level of distrust. Only yesterday Saleh orchestrated what’s left of his parliament to confirm state of emergency laws, an order he put into motion after last Friday’s bloodshed. A suspended constitution now allows security forces to arrest and detain anyone, although a constitution hasn’t stopped them from doing so already. Opposition leaders decried the move.
Furthermore, after reports surfaced of a political agreement, Yemeni state media released an account of Thursday’s meetings between Saleh and his remaining army commanders. According to Saba News Agency, “President Saleh blamed the Joint Meeting Parties, the opposition coalition, for the current political crisis and its impacts on the national security, unity and democracy practice... The committee discussed the suffering of the people amid lawbreaking and illegal acts committed by the Joint Meeting Parties, the opposition, and the Houthi Group.”
He's actually broadcasting this message to Yemenis and U.S. officials alike.
Saleh then commended army commanders for affirming their vow to protect the country’s “unity” and face “all projects aimed at destroying Yemen and harming its “security, social peace, democracy, and constitutional legitimacy.” He also offered amnesty to defecting troops, terming their defections as “foolish acts” perpetuated by foreign media. Blaming the media has become one of Saleh’s go-to moves during his final days.
It’s possible that no agreement exists with al-Ahmar in the first place. After all, why would Saleh offer to resign at any point before 2013 if Yemen’s crisis is a fabrication of the foreign media? Obviously some of his comments are pure propaganda, but he also appears to genuinely believe in his delusions. Either way Yemen’s opposition has no reason to trust this man, whether looking back over 20 years, two years, two weeks, or today. Saleh’s days are numbered by his own admission.
What happens next will unfold with incredible complexity and unavoidable chaos, but the outcome has been decided whether Washington likes it or not.
We’ve devoted significant attention to the disparity between U.S. policy in Libya and troubled allies such as Yemen and Bahrain. Instead of reflecting and reforming, U.S. officials have started defending their policy outright to counter widespread perceptions of a double-standard. But hypocrisy is a universal language.
Were the Obama administration to treat Libya and Yemen’s revolutions with equality, it would reduce the complaints in both countries.
Now African states are denouncing the double standard between Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, where acting president Laurent Gbagbo has refused to cede power to Alassane Ouattara. Earlier this week Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia accused the international community of neglecting abuses in the Côte d'Ivoire. Nigeria has worked diligently in the last few years to fulfill its political obligations as a regional hegemon, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took a strong stand on Côte d'Ivoire under the leadership of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.
Gbagbo began unleashing his military forces in February after relying heavily on paramilitary forces, and the four-month crisis has left at least 462 people dead with thousands more injured. Gbagbo’s government continues to deny using heavy weapons against civilians, and in turn accuses the UN and foreign media of spreading propaganda. These crumbling rulers must share authoritarian literature.
"I believe we can pass a resolution to request the United Nations to take a little more serious steps in the Cote d'Ivoire situation," Jonathan told a meeting attended by 12 of the 15 ECOWAS heads of state. "We must not make the mistake of underestimating the threat it poses to the peace and security of the entire sub-region."
However it’s unlikely that anyone is underestimating Gbagbo’s threat. Several holdouts such as Angola continue to side with him, but Western and African states largely agree that he must finally let go of power. They also appreciate the scale of Cote d'Ivoire’s endeavor. Although Gbagbo only controls a majority of the south, political authority and security must be implemented over a territory similar to Japan and Iraq, and larger than Britain or Italy. Lagoons and tropical forests along the coast increase the difficulty, and ECOWAS would have to secure roughly 21 million people compared to Libya’s seven million.
The delay in ECOWAS’s use of force, advocated under the cover of legitimization, cannot disguise the current reality that ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) lack the means to remove Gbagbo and secure Côte d'Ivoire. This is why they’ve also reached out the UN and Western states, hoping to increase sanctions and bolster the UN’s peacekeeping force in a slow crawl towards intervention. The AU had given Gbagbo a deadline of Thursday to step down.
"ECOWAS requests the U.N. Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the U.N. operation in Ivory Coast enabling the mission to use all necessary means to protect life and property and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power to Mr Alassane Ouattara," it said in Thursday’s communique.
Some reports mention something to the effect that ECOWAS is copying Libya’s international approval in Côte d'Ivoire. This may be true to a point, but Libya appears to be following the AU’s pattern in South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and Somalia. The AU is visibly over-stretched and bombarded by crises, but 2011 does offer encouraging signs of Africa’s modernization. Only three months ago Mubarak, Gaddafi, and al-Bashir conceded South Sudan to other AU members, going against a standing policy of territorial unity. Now Mubarak is gone and South Sudan is on the road to independence.
The AU has also increased its tempo in Somalia with limited Western military support. And it realized it needed to make an example out of Côte d'Ivoire to uphold its stance in Sudan.
Good intentions aren’t enough to remove Gbagbo though, and ECOWAS may not be able to overcome its hesitations and military inadequacies. ECOWAS’s 6,000-man response unit doesn’t come close to fulfilling Côte d'Ivoire’s requirements, even alongside tens of thousands of UN peacekeepers. Gbagbo has given too much time to prepare, so much that he’s grown bolder in attacking civilians and immigrants from ECOWAS states.
"The civil war is almost there, warns AU chief Jean Ping. “If there is no possibility of a peaceful solution I'm afraid the use of force might intervene."
Gbagbo’s response to electoral defeat, his violation of ECOWAS policy, and his regional spill-over has already legitimized the use of force. Again, this force may be fundamentally lacking, and perhaps ECOWAS believes Gbagbo will become easier prey once international sanctions take their toll. But if ECOWAS truly believes in its mission and rejects international double-standards, it should regain the element of surprise and consider acting immediately. Another additional weeks or months may simply entrench Cote d'Ivoire’s stalemate.
Sun Tzu wouldn't fight a battle that he couldn’t win, but when is force necessary in Cote d'Ivoire if not now?
Odyssey Dawn, at least for now, is the first United States Africom war. The Pentagon, via Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, dispelled any doubts as he stressed that the "leading edge" is American. Homer is played by General Carter Ham, out of his headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany (no African country bothered to host Africom). And Ulysses - in what looks and sounds more like an Iliad than an Odyssey - is commander of Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn Admiral Sam Locklear, on board USS Mount Whitney somewhere in the Mediterranean.
The White House and the Pentagon war planners bet their "unique capabilities" on a mini-remix of the "shock and awe" of the Iraq war. The problem is Colonel Muammar Gaddafi appears to be neither shocked nor awed; he may be angry - as in his photo op this Tuesday at the Bab al-Aziziya compound - but he hasn't cracked up. And his regime is fighting back, not turning against the colonel.
Still, Washington is publicly projecting the illusion of being desperate to get rid of this war sold as a "limited mission". But communications are jammed. As in the masters of war having a hard time to, in Pentagon lingo, "transition it to a coalition command".
Washington should have evaluated the "optics" before evoking Homer. Forget about mission creep (ongoing), friendly fire (it will come), collateral damage (already happened), axis of evil (a perennial favorite); the new Beltway neologism of choice is "optics". As in US military types and pundits carping that the "emotional optics" of cruise missiles plus coalition briefings reminds everyone of Iraq 2003. Or widespread fears about the "optics of waging war" in yet another Muslim country.
Optical illusions
Even among the "allies", the "optics" is positively of the basket case variety. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an ungodly mess. Turkey wants dialogue - not bombs. Germany is against a NATO intervention - stressing only bombing won't do. France - clinging to neo-Napoleonic President Nicolas Sarkozy's megalomania - wants to keep the illusion it is in command.
Scared that France would usurp its place as Libya's prime trading partner and scrambling not to let Mediterranean policy be dictated in Paris, the Italian government of Gaddafi pal, Prime Minister Silvio "Bunga Bunga" Berlusconi, reluctantly joined the "coalition" (and now, in private, Bunga Bunga is viciously trashing Sarko). Italian energy giant ENI has invested US$50 billion in Libya; thus ENI is keen on getting rid of Gaddafi after the colonel threatened to open Libyan oil and gas to BRIC members Russia, India and China.
The top four BRIC members (South Africa is the fifth) wisely skipped the whole Odyssey. Brazil called for a ceasefire and dialogue. China expressed "deep concern" and warned of a "humanitarian disaster". India said "no external powers should interfere" in Libya. And Russia, via Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, dismissed the "allow everything" resolution.
The same applies for the 53-nation African Union (AU). The AU wants a diplomatic solution. Gaddafi has plenty of historical allies among AU countries. It helps that he pays most of the AU's bills.
Algeria - also a member of the Arab League - said the intervention was "disproportionate". In Chad, President Idriss Deby remains in power to a great extent due to Gaddafi's deep pockets. Deby returned the favor sending mercenaries and weapons to Tripoli. There's more; if the no-fly zone is not extended to southern Libya (it covers just the north and the Mediterranean coast), Gaddafi is still able to receive military and manpower help from Chad, Mali, Niger and Algeria (see Fly me a Tuareg on time Asia Times Online, March 8, 2011). It has not dawned on Odyssey Dawn's planners that a coalition without explicit AU support means the AU is free to keep helping Gaddafi's regime.
Then there's the meat in the coalition's kebab - the Arab League. Washington ordering the embattled kings of Morocco and Jordan and the wealthy emirs in Doha and Abu Dhabi to engage as "allies" - besides the astonishing grotesquerie of these dictators posing as humanitarian saviors of democracy - does not mean the Arab League is fully on board Odyssey Dawn.
Oh yes. Unless we count the then they were six, then they were four, now they're only two Qatar Air Force Mirage 2000 - plus a C-17 cargo plane - to be deployed probably this coming weekend as the glorious Arab League fighting contribution to the "coalition".
No endgame
The "coalition" never even came close to exhausting "all necessary measures" stressed by United Nations resolution 1953 to seek a diplomatic solution before the American Ulysses started Tomahawking Libya. What all these unwilling, no-coalition countries are essentially asking is for an international team - Arab League, African Union, United Nations - to go to Tripoli and negotiate a package; a real ceasefire, mechanisms to protect civilians, and a political process leading to elections.
As if the faulty "optics" was not enough, Odyssey Dawn is not a full success - apart from having prevented a hypothetical massacre in Benghazi. The horrible accounts from Zawiya and Misurata tell of civilians being attacked by tanks and armored vehicles, as well as militias - Gaddafi's "irregulars" - in jeeps and pick-up trucks. This proves that no-fly - which for the moment basically translates as shock and awe lite - is not protecting a whole lot of civilians.
United States President Barack Obama now seems to be sure he has successfully tweaked the "optics". The official spin is that Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Sarko have all agreed that NATO should play "a key role" in Odyssey Dawn. Like in projecting the "optics" that it won't be in charge of the military wing of no-fly - when it eventually will (the 28 NATO members must approve it unanimously). Such optical saturation leads to what was obvious from the beginning; this will "transition" from a "coalition of the three willing" (US, Britain, France) to a NATO war.
If the Pentagon really applied its fabled "unique capabilities", the whole Gaddafi regime would be reduced to rubble in minutes. But that's a "limited mission" conducted by a "coalition" - not "regime change", although that's exactly what the president, the Europeans and most Arab dictators want. Talk about an "optics" red alert.
The Washington establishment is beaming that for the first time "the Arab public" is supporting an American intervention. Beware of the "optics" you pick. The "Arab public" is also making the connection that if Gaddafi shoots his own people and then gets bombed by the West, why should not the same thing happen to the dictators in Yemen and Bahrain? The "Arab public" can also clearly identify which methods Washington and the Europeans are using to try to appropriate the great 2011 Arab revolt to themselves.
For the moment, with so much fuzzy "optics", no think-tank dares predicting what the "coalition" will come up with if no-fly does not stop Gaddafi. Arming the rag-tag but very brave and ultra-motivated "rebels" - something already in effect - is mandated by UN resolution 1953. Washington, London and Paris pray that soon the rebels may switch from defense to attack, march over Tripoli, topple the tyrant and provide everyone with a Hollywood ending.
It won't happen. The transitional council in Benghazi asked for a no-fly zone - not a foreign intervention. What Odyssey Dawn is providing is most of all heavy bombing of Tripoli - on the other side of the country. The people of Tripoli are starting to see this as the beginning of a new colonial war. This means that a post-Gaddafi political transition cannot possibly be peaceful. Perversely, Odyssey Dawn is laying the groundwork for the partition of Libya. Balkanization looms.
Any decent military analyst worth his single malt on the rocks knows nobody wins a war from the air. The humanitarian yearning is a smokescreen (why Libya and not Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza?) This is more like a new, very dangerous war theater in the Orientalist-named MENA (Middle East, Northern Africa), a warped Odyssey with no endgame and no end in sight. Now you see it, now you don't.
Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009)
THE release of Raymond Davis followed by a deadly drone strike in North Waziristan, which killed over 40 tribal people, shows not only the arrogance the US usually displays it also exposes dissimilitude in US-Pakistan relations in this so-called ‘war on terror’.
The public was already furious about the way in which Raymond Davis was released and whisked away within hours of completing the court proceedings and all the other formalities that citizens of this country face for years. The drone attack that then followed shook the people of Pakistan.
There was a perception that Raymond Davis was probably released as a result of a secret deal between the two governments or their agencies. This was not an unreasonable assumption considering that people’s emotions were running high and the media was very active over the issue. It was therefore a wise decision to conduct these complicated dealings behind the scenes.
Yet some elements suggested that the deal, with all the attendant risks for the government of Pakistan, may have placed the country in a better maneuvering position vis-à-vis the US and the CIA, and that it would have got assurances that the latter may cut down operations in Pakistan — that probably, Pakistani air space would no longer be violated by drone attacks.
However, such hopes appear to have been dashed by the New York Times March 17 report asserting that the CIA has not promised to scale down operations in Pakistan, and that it will not share its duty roster with the ISI. The missile strike in Waziristan was carried out the same day, within 24 hours of the release of Raymond Davis from the Langley headquarters. This can only be described as intimidation and bullying.
The statement issued by the Pakistan army chief that the security of the people is paramount, is not only timely, it is also meaningful. We can only hope that it doesn’t remain a mere statement. This is a very opportune time to revisit uneasy Pakistan-US relations. Pakistan needs to re-evaluate its role as a frontline US ally. All treaties, pacts, understandings and facilitations need to be re-examined.
At best, the US describes Pakistan as ‘frienemy’ and we should not hesitate to consider the US similarly. There is no room for emotion in state relationships. The US is fighting this war for its own national interests and Pakistan’s stance should be seen through the same prism. It is now an open secret that the US strategy in Afghanistan is not holistic; notwithstanding the rhetoric, its continued presence in Afghanistan is due to a range of strategic interests.
Pakistan must evaluate its options carefully to consider how it can achieve its own interests in the most judicious fashion and at the same time avoid attracting resentment towards Pakistan in specific or Muslims in general. It must weigh all the pros and cons of the options available as well as of the risks involved in exercising these.
All stakeholders at the level of the state, such as the president, prime minister, parliament, army and the intelligence agencies, must be on the same page in terms of formulating such a policy. The army chief has said that the security of our people is foremost, which is appropriate. Given that it is unusual for a person in such a position to make such a statement, and given the power structure in the country, it seems that a change in policy is inevitable.
Pakistan has the option of walking out of this alliance on terror and may consider announcing that it is no longer part of the US-led war in Afghanistan — that it will fight terrorism within its boundaries alone. It would also be appropriate to state that the tribes have the right to defend themselves. This would be significant because it would trigger a lot of other dynamics. That may reduce, to a large extent, acts of terrorism within the country. CIA and ISI cooperation should cease forthwith and both organizations should operate independently, within their own spheres.
The current ‘cooperation’ is constituted of one-way traffic only. Pakistan could also consider recalling all military or civil officers undergoing training in the US and similarly ask all US personnel being trained in Pakistan to leave. All these options have attendant risks which must be carefully evaluated before any concrete decisions are reached. If Pakistan intends to not act as a client state to the US, it must do away with its dependence on that country and follow a multilateral policy towards all states that are powerful at the global and regional levels.
Much is being said of Pakistan’s economic woes and its dependence on the US for financial assistance. However, no country can sustain itself forever on foreign aid and handouts. The country must learn to stand on its feet. Rampant corruption is amongst the dominant reasons for our economic difficulties. Until we can overcome this hurdle, the US or any other country cannot help us in governing our state.
Securing our borders against infiltration, creating a sense of security amongst our citizens — both economically and physically by improving the functioning of our law-enforcement agencies and the lower judiciary, and instituting a fair, across-the-board taxation system — should be our strategic objectives. We need to strengthen our institutions, foremost amongst them being parliament. Presently, people’s eyes are fixed on the judiciary, the army and the media.
The US, the world’s sole superpower, is writing the story of its own downfall by following inconsistent strategies and enforcing them through ruthless and arrogant force. It is not for Pakistan to correct the course the US is taking or to wage a war along with it. We should endeavor to maintain good state-to-state relations. Yet it remains our prerogative to chart our own course as a nation and as a state. Pakistan is caught in the eye of storm; yet there is room for hope. Nations go through turbulent times. It is the leadership that steers it to safe shores.
Mahmood Shah is a retired brigadier and formerly secretary and home secretary of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
If mass defections from the military, ruling party, and his own tribe didn’t opened Ali Abdullah Saleh’s eyes, they should have at least awakened America from its slumber. But as Yemen’s president continues to offer futile promises of a 2012 resignation, vainly hoping to oversee the transition process, U.S. policy also remains unchanged despite systematic violence from an untrustworthy government.
And with White House officials back in silent mode on Tuesday, State spokesman Mark Toner was once again fed to the wolves.
Reading from Washington's outdated script in Yemen, Toner tells reporters, “We want to see a political dialogue, first and foremost, where the opposition or the – is speaking with the government.” He also claims, “it’s not really for us to say what they should or shouldn’t do,” that “it’s not for us to say, ‘Yes, you should take President Saleh at his word,’ or, ‘President Saleh should do more.’ Both are going to have to meet in the middle; that’s how consensus is forged.”
Toner then defends Saleh’s attempt to compromise, insisting, “We believe he has made efforts to do so... We believe they’re – that he’s taking steps, that both sides should work towards meeting in the middle to advance the political process there.” But not before qualifying again, “it’s really up to the Yemeni people to respond to that.” So it’s not America’s place to say what it wants, that Saleh should do more, or that opposition should trust him.
But by the way, Saleh should do more and the opposition should trust him.
Interestingly, Toner does end with a hint of realism: “I don’t mean to sound like a broken record, even though I do – but it’s really not for us to say what the Yemeni people need to do.” Given that U.S. support for Saleh hasn’t left Yemen’s future to its people, the situation demands a change in policy so that it doesn’t sound broken. U.S. officials appear to understand this subconsciously, although it has yet to seep into public view.
One reporter finally asks, “I mean, you started off saying the same exact thing that you’re saying now in Egypt and in Libya, and then you kind of moved to he’s lost authority to lead and has to begin a transition. So where’s the tipping point when you’re going to say that about Yemen?”
“Unable” to answer the question, Toner once more replies, “I just can – all I can say is that we believe that both sides need to come together and create the necessary space and a political dialogue that resolves the situation.”
"We accept no initiative, no deals and no negotiations with this man," one opposition figure, Sultan Atwani, declared on Tuesday. "There are only hours left for him. All these promises are desperate excuses."
Saleh’s growing isolation over last weekend’s violence has further accentuated the status quo preferred by Washington; U.S. policy stands in vivid contrast to the Yemeni opposition and even Western governments that have begun conceding Saleh’s loss. After the White House’s message between Friday and Monday remained unchanged despite a bloodbath, U.S. media is finally covering President Barack Obama’s inaction and lack of moral support.
However Tuesday’s static response has infected U.S. policy with impression of going backwards. After Saleh’s Defense Minister vowed to protect the regime against a coup, Saleh met with remaining military officials before crying “civil war” and threatening to defend his "democracy." Instead he blamed foreign media for misleading the security establishment. Afterward came U.S. urges to negotiate with him - a clear downward spiral.
Yet de-evolution, like the Obama administration's information curtain in Yemen, is no coincidence. A new tactic of distancing itself from Saleh is being deployed. When asked today on Yemen’s revolution and whether Saleh should resign immediately, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates replied, "I don't think it's my place to talk about internal affairs in Yemen."
As the driving force behind Saleh's military assistance and political cover - both misused on forces other than AQAP - the Pentagon should know better than anyone else that America made Yemen’s internal affairs its own business. Washington owns Saleh whether it accepts responsibility or not, and the U.S. government saw few immediate problems in supporting Saleh before the revolution erupted. Shouldn’t the lack of military progress against AQAP concern Gates, if not the fact that U.S. policy contributed to Yemen’s political turmoil?
To remove oneself now is vintage Cold War shadow games, not the type of thinking that will fool protesting Yemenis or any sincere observer. At this point anything other than a yes to Saleh’s removal is a no. But Gates does add, "We are obviously concerned about the instability in Yemen. And so instability and diversion of attention from dealing with AQAP is my primary concern about the situation."
It shows - Yemen’s political and economic instability took a back seat to fighting AQAP. Now, instead of focusing on the social instability that drives AQAP, Gates has voiced concern that the revolution may distract Saleh from AQAP, concerns repeated ad nauseam by subordinate U.S. officials. Better leave him alone then! Apparently America’s place is to suppress the Yemeni people in AQAP's name, not to defend their freedom in an attempt to marginalize AQAP’s ideology and narrative.
Washington has until Friday to change course. Saleh may fall before then, but all bets may be final once the opposition marches on the presidential palace. The Obama administration cannot run from Yemen or distance itself from Saleh. America cannot stay out when it’s already in - in the way.
To argue "it's not for us to say" says a great deal.
If Obama cannot personally support the Yemeni people by Friday, he will be held accountable for whatever political and military gains AQAP secures. The Yemeni people must be free to decide their own future, and the best counter to AQAP’s rise is backing the people before it’s too late. One cannot blame their support for AQAP after U.S. policy pushes them together.
Denial is supposedly the first sign of a problem. Swimming against the revolutionary current overtaking the Muslim world, President Barack Obama has fought a dogged perception that U.S. foreign policy cannot focus on multiple areas, that he should have visited Cairo and sent his Secretary of State to Latin America. That his administration is simply overloaded.
The criticism echoed so loud that the White House is actively trying to drown it out.
“Even as the President maintains his focus on international crises in Japan and Libya, he discusses his trip to Latin America to open up markets for US products,” reads its website next to a thoughtful-looking Obama.
The sheer mass of ongoing events in North Africa and the Middle East cannot be denied as an overwhelming force. Evidence of a submerged Washington started to accumulate before the fall of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, as the White House, Pentagon, and Congress struggled to unify their policy and message. Fears of instability, often viewed through the Israeli lens, ran high and new revolutions were demanding attention before Washington could prepare.
The Pentagon, meanwhile, visibly enjoyed a sudden blackout in Afghanistan, drawing concern from the war’s opponents that Obama has completely ceded to David Petraeus’s authority. And Washington validated its distraction from Pakistan after the case of CIA spy Raymond Davis, which spanned from Egypt’s initial uprising to mid-March, ended in political chaos.
Then an 8.9 earthquake struck Japan’s coast, triggering a nightmarish spew of tsunamis and nuclear radiation. Tragedies collided: the plight of the Japanese, and the cold reality that they just diverted international attention and resources away from the Middle East. No time is good for a natural disaster, but the effects of Japan’s earthquake were literally felt around the world. Japan and Libya became a two-person show as the White House and global media shifted away from accelerating revolutions Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Clearly Washington isn’t immune to a system overload; the U.S. media fell equal victim to global demands. Already spread thin by budget cuts, structural change, geography and the political dangers of covering multiple revolutions, U.S. news organizations generally tend to follow Washington’s direction. Slow to respond to Egypt’s revolution, many U.S. journalists had no time to rest before shipping off to Libya. A ThinkProgress analysis of CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News conducted from March 14 to March 18 turned up 9,500 mentions of Libya, 1,500 for Bahrain, and 600 in Yemen.
The New York Times writes, “Despite extensive coverage of Libya and Japan, the television networks have had major blind spots. Last week, none of the broadcast networks had correspondents in Bahrain, where the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based, when security forces crushed the protest movement there, nor in Yemen when forces there killed dozens of protesters. The dearth of coverage of Yemen is largely because of its government’s refusal to grant visas to journalists.”
It’s certainly true that Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, deployed a media blanket over his country by limiting entry and deporting those journalists he can catch. Four journalists were famously deported last week but others predated their exit, and Al Jazeera correspondents were deported after catching Friday’s massacre on video. Only now is the world's attention returning to the Middle East, an inevitable result given protesters’ spirited persistence against state oppression.
However the demands of a revolutionary wave only explain half of Washington’s flawed and often sluggish response. That Yemen’s revolution unfolds under a political and media blackout in America is no coincidence. The White House is supposed to block the information curtain to its best ability - and deciding to enforce it completed a system failure.
Revolution in the Muslim world exceeds the ordinary power surge, but it also struck a U.S. foreign policy grid that was outdated and unprepared for an international emergency. A unique disaster didn't overwhelm the strictest precautionary measures. Instead, a lax system built on a crumbling foundation froze on the initial upheaval and has struggled behind the curve ever since. Predicting the revolutionary wave at this particular moment is admittedly difficult, but one could easily perceive the erosion of U.S. policy at an individual and regional level. The system hadn't updated before the power surge struck - wasn't ready for change to the status quo - and needs to be overhauled before a successful reset.
Duplicity and double-standards represent the primary constants in America’s response, not an appeal for universal rights as Obama administration officials insist. And even they are beginning to admit what many others already perceive as obvious: some countries experiencing democratic upheaval are treated differently than others. Libya’s government is treated as an enemy of America and rightly so, but Bahrain's continues to enjoy a cushy blanket. In fact, every threatened government besides Libya is treated leniently by comparison, as if Libya was the only country the West had truly prepared for.
And Saudi Arabia is singled out as the kingmaker, with America as its subservient queen.
"I think we have to be very careful to treat every country differently," Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen recently told ABC News. "Bahrain is in a much different situation than Libya. We haven't had a relationship with Libya for a long, long time. The Bahrainis and that country has been a critical ally for decades. So we're working very hard to support a peaceful resolution there, as tragic as it has been, and we certainly decry the violence which has occurred in Bahrain.”
The same argument has been employed in Yemen despite its failure to qualify for Mullen’s description. Washington’s relationship with Saleh cannot be labeled as sincere or historical, only critical, and now U.S. policy is about to be blown out the door. A leading Hashid in Saleh’s own tribe, Sadeq al-Ahmar, joined the opposition movement after Friday’s bloody massacre left over 50 people dead.
Speaking to Al Jazeera (who else), al-Ahmar explained, "The demands of the protesters are the demands of the Yemeni people. I can no longer fool myself, it is not the custom of men or tribes to do so... I mediated with the president to bring change, but it seems that the authority was not that serious... The president's inner circle are not good people for him or the Yemeni people. They are liars, so I have joined the revolution and I support its demands."
So far Washington is still fooling itself in states like Yemen - a gem that fell into an abyss and now lures its greedy hunters to their doom. Yemen managed to make news in the White House and State Department on Monday, but only after being forced upon them by shocking violence. Obama continues to let his spokespeople do his talking and repeat the need for a political dialogue, demonstrating no policy shift over the weekend.
“I think in Yemen you saw some changes in the government that were made yesterday,” replied Ben Rhodes, deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications, when confronted with Sunday’s army defections and a fired cabinet. “I think our view is that there’s clearly going to have to be a political solution in Yemen that includes a government that is more responsive to the Yemeni people. That has been our consistent message to President Saleh. John Brennan actually spoke with President Saleh yesterday to discuss developments in Yemen.”
By this time Yemen's Defense Minister, Mohammed Nassar Ali, had vowed to defend “democracy” against a “coup.” When Saleh consistency rebuffs the message, it’s time for a new message.
The White House stands out all the more in Saleh’s lonely corner after a government exodus delivered its new message. Worse still, U.S. officials appear visibly uncomfortable when addressing Yemeni policy. With Obama and Clinton staying off record and Brennan limiting himself to the backroom, Rhodes and the State Department's Mark Toner were left to fend for themselves in a foreign realm. Toner’s response in particular flopped like a fish out of water.
A lengthy discussion on Libya eventually gave way to Yemen when reporters questioned the double standard: vocal and active versus silent and inactive. One journalist listed the White House's private calls to Saleh and wondered why the U.S. continues to support him when he's stopped listening. Toner essentially repeats the question before stating, “any government has to support political change that meets the aspirations of the Yemeni people," when they’re calling for his immediate exit. Toner also urged Saleh to follow through on an investigation into Friday - as if he had nothing to do with the killings.
The journalist then rephrases her question once more: “Why is the U.S. trusting someone who has committed these apparent acts of humanitarian violence against his own people? Does it come down to the assistance provided against AQAP?”
Toner mumbles something about, “Our assistance is based on trying to address the inequities that exist and trying to build a prosperous economy. Beyond that, it’s not a quid pro quo or anything.”
Except U.S. assistance only recently increased its humanitarian funds after a military-centric policy drew widespread criticism, locally and internationally. Yemen was set for $250 million in military assistance and around $150 million in humanitarian aid when the revolution struck, with talks of $1.6 billion in military funds over six years. U.S. weapons have been employed on protesters, the majority of which are protesting because no one alleviated their political and economic inequality.
Nor does Toner explain why Washington still trusts Saleh when few do in his own country. He even repeats Obama's standard phrase, “This is about the Yemeni people... it’s not about what the U.S. wants to see.” But until now the U.S. wanted to see Saleh in power, and the connection between political support and military assistance is glaringly obvious.
One reporter finally remarks “the silence is deafening,” prompting Toner to defend Obama as outspoken. This response elicits muffled objection from the involved reporters, now irritated with Toner’s non-responses. They know Obama has only issued several brief statements on Yemen, opting to hide behind counter-terrorism and national security officials who have no business delivering a political message on the current scale. Another reporter ultimately compares Yemen's silence to Egypt, and a short discussion ends inconclusively with a lead-in to Japan.
All in all, an accurate impression of U.S. policy in Yemen: contradictory, ambiguous, and fading away.
A case-by-case response appears to make some sense on the surface. People cannot be expected to behave the same among friends and enemies, and some countries may require a different remedy than other. However, this thinking contradicts the ideal of universal freedom and human rights. Varying reactions to similar crises has created an overt double standard and increased the difficulty in responding. And by removing himself under the false excuse “this is about them,” Obama has ceded whatever charisma he possesses and muddied America’s overall image.
Perceived at a deeper level, the politically effective and morally sound response takes a universal stand behind democratic movements. Simplification enables an easier response without simplifying the problem. A sharper message creates real consistency, not the false consistency preached by the White House, and would eliminate the doubt consuming its energy. Additional eyes won't correct flawed policy, and Obama only has a short time to ask himself whether he wants Saleh’s downfall to end like Mubarak’s - on the fence.
Is that the consistency he wants to be remembered for?
Trying to leverage their unique coverage of revolution in the Muslim world, officials from the news organization’s fledgling English channel spent the last month pitching themselves to U.S. cable providers, including Comcast, Time Warner, and Cablevision. The 24-hour channel is only available in roughly three million households, with partial airings on Link TV (provided by Direct TV). And despite Al Jazeera’s accelerated online growth, cable companies remain on the fence as to whether the channel is viable in the long-term. Clinton’s words should help change their minds if they want to flourish in the new media age.
But the debate over Al Jazeera extends far beyond its quality versus the quality of U.S. news, as supporters of both sides tend to gravitate around. Only twenty years ago “the CNN effect” of America’s vast media apparatus was considered critical to shaping domestic and global perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. Now, as more Americans tune to international news out of necessity - not just for a wider opinion - at one point does America’s media become a strategic liability?
What about right now?
Clinton’s statements obviously didn’t play well with U.S. media officials; representatives from CNN, ABC, CBS and NBC declined comment for days after she addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2nd. And their point of view is partially understandable from a business angle. In their eyes Clinton hit below the belt when she deemed them “fake news,” true or not.
“In fact viewership of Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because it’s real news,” she told Senators. “You may not agree with it, but you feel like you’re getting real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and, you know, arguments between talking heads and the kind of stuff that we do on our news which, you know, is not particularly informative to us, let alone foreigners.”
The media’s collective reaction, however, reveals the exact illness plaguing U.S. news organizations and cable providers. Somewhat surprising is how quickly Clinton’s venue became an afterthought in the ensuing controversy. She hadn't sidetracked a random function or condemned America’s media before a group of journalists, but outlined national priorities to Congress. And a diamond of truth lies concealed in her remarks. “We are engaged in an information war and we are losing that war,” she warns, and information warfare is a vital component of fourth-generation warfare (4GW).
4GW, which splices the political and military, government and civilian beyond separation, also happens to be the type of warfare America faces in its current wars, proxy wars, and near-term threats. And media executives tend to make poor 4GW analysts.
Fox News Channel's Michael Clemente, senior vice president for news, provided an example of ignorance by breaking silence: "We've got leadership issues there, the safety of people, the safety of our own people. Some big issues. All of a sudden there are headlines about Al Jazeera versus the news in this country? It's just surprising. Curious more than surprising."
Spoken like someone not just on the defensive, but holding a weak grasp of 4GW and the significance of perceptions. U.S. news is consumed globally, not nationally, and should be produced as such. Like Al Jazeera.
The state of U.S. media during a historic period like the 2010s is a big issue, and finding an answer is Washington’s problem. America's mainstream media has stumbled into a business environment that it doesn’t fully understand - bad business as it is. Now executives are forced to make political decisions on the Middle East’s long-term trajectory, despite their own news organizations' struggles to keep up with events. Believing Al Jazeera English may be perceived as a “niche” channel and concerned that Americans will eventually lose interest, they ask whether the revolutionary spirit will subside over the year or surge across the decade.
“This is strictly a business decision,” says a Comcast source.
But Al Jazeera isn’t just business if the White House has to get its news overseas. Al Anstey, managing director of Al Jazeera English, argues with good reason, “we’re watched by the president, by the White House; why are we not being seen by people across the United States of America that want to watch us?”
At a time when the global information war assumes a national priority, the U.S. media has become a disadvantage in projecting America’s foreign policy at home and abroad. Al Jazeera English is no temporary fad, and the Muslim world’s monumental shift towards democracy and expression will produce far reaching effects in space and time. After spiking near CNN levels (the highest ranked U.S. news source online), Al Jazeera's website traffic in America returned to a stable level below major sites like The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Time. However America still supplies 17% of Al Jazeera's online views, roughly equivalent to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria combined, placing the site within the U.S. mainstream. It has also pulled near Fox News.
If worst comes to worst, what’s so wrong with a “niche” channel that provides educational benefits? And why are capitalists suddenly afraid of a little competition? Diversity and outside opinion aren’t supposed to be negative influences in a free society.
On the up side, the Middle East and North Africa could be resetting after hundreds of years of colonial intervention, a process that might span a number of decades. And Al Jazeera is poised to capitalize on this historic period, having generated a mutual network by bridging the West and Muslim world. The U.S.'s media lag is becoming more pronounced because, even as it learns another language, it cannot surpass Al Jazeera’s inherent multilingualism and cultural awareness. This disadvantage also leaves no time for the U.S. media to delay expanding their operations, programming, and understanding of the Muslim world.
Clinton doesn’t sound any happier about the current state of U.S. media than Fox News. She isn't catering to the left; on the contrary, she believes Al Jazeera’s rise has forced America’s hand in states that conservatives wish to leave alone (Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen). Grim in delivering her assessment and repeating the phrase “love or hate it,” Clinton simplified the information war as “us or them.” America is “losing that war” - and “Al Jazeera is winning.”
This is the wrong way of thinking.
She then speaks correctly when arguing of the Muslim world, “I mean we think they know us and reject us, I would argue the really don’t know very much about who we are.” While Al Jazeera isn't free of viewing the information war as a polarity, and its parent network’s programming often targets U.S. policy, its core philosophy also aims to share information with America and Europe. This is key to why Western populaces increasingly perceive Al Jazeera English as friendly, whereas the Muslim world perceives the U.S. media as hostile.
In contrast to America's current media blanket, a diverse media and educated populace favors U.S. national interests, and Al Jazeera can assist in this regard. More informed voters elect more qualified officials, then hold them accountable, a process that theoretically translates to sounder policy at home and abroad (maybe that’s part of the push-back against Al Jazeera).
Furthermore, the U.S. media must represent a deeper portrait of American society, and encourage information and cultural exchange with the Muslim world. Although wars cannot be prevented simply by “winning” the information battle, familiarization can help reduce political and social friction that enables conflict between two cultures. The objective should be to humanize instead of dehumanize. To illuminate the unknown.
“We cannot live in a world where a story like Egypt - which has consequences for the whole world - is unfolding and your audience doesn't know anything about it or enough about it,” says Abderrahim Foukara, Al Jazeera's Washington bureau chief.
Can U.S. foreign policy survive in this world? And most importantly, do Americans want to live in it?
As the dust and blood from Friday’s mayhem began to settle, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the White House essentially shared a script in asking “who did it?” Protesters at Sana’a University never doubted for a moment that Saleh ordered gunmen to disperse the gathering masses. They wouldn’t believe his denial anyway after weeks of direct conflict, but reality became even clearer upon examining the victims.
Many bodies bore wounds to the chest, neck, and forehead, marks of professional or semi-professional gunmen.
Saleh’s hold on Yemen loosened by another finger on Saturday as protesters poured into the streets, more determined than ever to overthrow a regime that has ruled for 32 inefficient years. A violent, choreographed crackdown has solidified the opposition's unity and its resentment towards Saleh, who has futilely mixed Mubarak’s tactics with Gaddafi’s threats of civil war. Emboldened by Washington’s silence, his primarily political and military ally, Saleh accelerated his own demise through disproportionate force, falling prey to the opposition’s civil disobedience and low-intensity violence.
Inciting the government to overreact in order to destroy its political and moral position is a main objective in fourth-generation warfare. And Yemen’s opposition has the leverage to uproot him.
But Saleh’s reaction to his own security forces suggests that he could be losing more than his control over Yemen. Sources within the government claim Saleh saw a green light in Bahrain’s crackdown, yet they also claim he doesn’t take the revolution seriously. He refuses to believe the majority of Yemenis oppose him, and thus believes he can weather the storm through the usual methods of propaganda, bribery, intimidation, and force. This suggests an element of delusion.
So while his latest propaganda is certainly just that, one must wonder how much Saleh actually believes his own denials. The confusion orchestrated by his security forces ticks with methodical precision, the type of calculation found in a cold-blooded assassin.
Reports from Yemen generally paint the same picture of Friday’s events, an image confirmed by rapid counter-propaganda from state media. Forced to pick between government forces or “loyalists” shooting protesters and protesters shooting themselves, we are inclined to choose the first option. Protesters were finishing their mid-day prayer when gunmen opened fire with assault rifles from buildings at the Iranian Hospital Square, roughly half a mile from Sana’a University. Uniformed members of the Central Security specialized police forces "were watching without any reaction," according to witnesses. Roughly an hour later security forces sprayed water cannons at the buildings, and protesters stormed the buildings.
Central Security has since withdrawn from “Change Square,” for now.
Soon after the killings, Saleh “expressed his sorrow” during a public address and accused the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) of targeting protesters, a common denial to recent attacks. Promising a “neutral committee” would investigate Friday’s shootings, as he has the entire month, Saleh declared the peoples’ right to protest while denouncing the opposition’s refusal to negotiate. Notice that his reaction matches the U.S. script until the state of emergency. Saleh issued a curfew on armed protesters, one last delegitimization tactic, and as his finishing move took credit for his own “martyrs” by declaring a day of mourning.
The fallen are indeed martyrs - to those opposing Saleh. He made a few more on Saturday after storming protest camps in Aden, and next week will repeat the cycle barring any change to it.
Saleh’s regime is doing everything possible to incite Yemen’s opposition - Houthis, Southern Movement, tribal networks - to open hostilities. The relative peaceful nature of a diverse opposition, compared to the danger assigned by Saleh and the West, demonstrates a high level of organization and self-restraint. They realize that Saleh and the West will exploit potential violence against them as “proof” of civil war.
But at some point the opposition may fight back against brutality with real arms, not stones. Saleh believes their escalation will justify a harsher crackdown, except that could bring the finishing blow.
Yemen's opposition presents a workable alternative and Washington cannot fall victim to the false choice of “Saleh or al-Qaeda.” The delay caused by flawed reasoning has wrought a self-fulfilling prophecy; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is upping its tempo against distracted and out-maneuvered security forces. Now Saleh appears to be losing his mind as his allies gradually jump ship - even his own tribe has called for his removal.
Sticking with him transfers the insanity to the White House and Pentagon.
If Saleh chooses Gaddafi’s endgame over Mubarak's, the safest strategy for containing AQAP and avoiding deeper military intervention is outright support for the revolution. Opposing some delusional dictators while supporting others doesn’t equate to a sustainable foreign policy, but is doomed to crumble in the new Middle East. Just like Saleh’s regime.
Soldiers and generals alike confront the eternal pull between bravery and recklessness. Few gains can be secured without chancing a degree of risk, but peoples and nations also prematurely exhaust themselves with imprudent maneuvers. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its allies struggled with this strategic dilemma throughout 2009 and 2010, ultimately ceding southern Somalia to al-Shabab at the expense of government territory in Mogadishu.
And their dilemma remains unchanged despite recent military success over al-Shabab.
The ongoing offensive against al-Shabab launched with a core deficiency: perpetual instability within the TFG and between its regional neighbors, Somaliland and Puntland. Rather than solve political and social problems first, the TFG and African Union (AU) expect a political solution to emerge from military victory. Their thinking reflects U.S. operations to separate the Taliban from the Afghan people, a basic tenet of counterinsurgency. Yet this strategy, while sensible and courageous to those on the ground, borders on recklessness when employed in an environment that cannot be permanently stabilized.
This is especially true when the counterinsurgent operates on scarce resources, as in the TFG's present condition. Efficient COIN clears and expands on territory that can be held and governed, instead of draining resources in areas beyond reach. The TFG fell victim to this dilemma before receiving reinforcements in July 2010.
In most counterinsurgencies, a single track emphasizing either military or non-military conditions is prone to negate whatever progress is secured. Varying shades of COIN aside, counterinsurgency aims to distribute itself simultaneously across the politico-military spectrum. In Somalia’s particular case, Western governments and Somali President Sharif Ahmed both realize the problematic nature of campaigning in political turmoil. The TFG's urgency is driven by August 20th, the day its mandate expires, with its leadership auditioning for the next government. Nor was Sharif pleased when Somalia’s parliament, widely considered the TFG’s least effective body, extended its term another three years. And it did so without delivering a new constitution, a key demand in the UN’s mandate.
"While taking into consideration the rule of law, the country's current political status, security and economy, I have decided to reject the decision by the parliament," he warned last month. "Somali government and International Community, which has enormously shown concerns over the extension, should be considered.”
However a personal element also exists within Sharif’s opposition. Somalia’s president spent the last six months persuading parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan to extend his own term, which Adan refused on the grounds of holding an election. Sharif interpreted Aden’s extension as more than an affront to Somalis and the international community. This was a challenge to his rule.
“The President and the Speaker have been ex-friends and now it seems that there is greater rift between them,” explains one MP, Mowlid Macane.
Now that Adan announced a presidential election will be held before the August deadline, their relationship is primed for higher tensions that could have far-reaching consequences on the TFG and AU’s military strategy. Awad Ahmed Asharo, head of parliamentary committee for information affairs, released a statement explaining, “There will be a committee that organizes the presidential elections,” including the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and UN.
A host of problems present themselves, starting with these organizations’ opposition to parliament’s self-extension. It may have to submit to elections in order to win their support.
Next comes the question of whether an election can be held at all, even locally in Mogadishu. The TFG and AU envision a cleared capital by August, but five months may not afford enough time to secure the city from al-Shabab. Even if the group is largely evicted, an election provides an easy target for disruption. And as Afghanistan demonstrates, al-Shabab’s real threat stems from the political corruption seeking to take advantage of a security vacuum.
Holding an August election gives the impression that the TFG is biting off too much. Already embarked on a national offensive before clearing Mogadishu, the political stress of an election is likely to prove overwhelming. TFG officials continue to promise the destruction of al-Shabab, opening up a front along the Ethiopian border to pressure the group behind its lines. Berhan Jipkirist, Ethiopia’s state minister for foreign affairs, recently dismissed reports of troops operating inside southern Somalia. Ethiopian units have been spotted entering Beledweyne, Doolow, and Beled Hawo, and were also outed by the Kenyan military.
Months ago we noted that Ethiopia’s strategy, when employed temporarily, allowed its military to support TFG operations without running cross-country logistics or antagonizing the Somali people. This advantage erodes the deeper Ethiopian support becomes. Obviously the government itself remains concerned about its perception. But Jipkirist added, “Ethiopia could answer if IGAD or TFG asks urgent support for the military.”
What probably began as diversionary measures appear to be accelerating into full-blown holding operations. Omar Aden Hassan, a Somali MP, recently met with military officials and subsequently declared the whole Hiiraan region would be liberated. Hiiraan is a sizable territory containing Beledweyne, Somalia’s third largest city, and sits too far from Mogadishu to hold without Ethiopian support.
That the TFG, AU, Ethiopian military, and proxy military Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a can supplant al-Sbabab from its major towns remains a possibility. Never has al-Shabab faced such unified military cohesion, relatively speaking. The alliance had to launch an assault at some point, having poured 5,000 AU troops into the country since July 2010, and losing momentum may prove costly. But to clear and hold Somalia’s border, take back the central region, and seize Mogadishu in time for an August election appears impossible.
Several suggestions for the TFG and its international support: postpone the TFG and AU’s mandates by one year to accommodate the transition to a new political structure. Rather than change over just when the TFG is beginning to stabilize, the new government should be allowed additional time to gel and respond together. The TFG needs to focus politically, yet its current deadline drives a risky military offensive, one with a good chance of stalling before its conclusion.
Given an additional year, the TFG must ensure that its national offensive doesn’t obstruct the task of securing Mogadishu. The capital must remain the first priority in order to hold an election, and though a difficult task, moderate success will boost the TFG's credibility. Encroaching upon al-Shabab from all sides is a tempting maneuver, but these gains remain impermanent in the absence of political authority.
Judging by ongoing operations another battalion or two may be in the AU’s pipeline. Until then, the TFG must constantly weigh the risk and reward of securing Mogadishu at the expense of the countryside, and of distracting themselves far from the capital. Impression and expectation management - promising only what can be delivered - is crucial to success in counterinsurgency.
"Sending tanks to the streets is a sign that the regime is in a state of panic. But Yemenis are determined to move forward with their peaceful revolution until the fall of the regime."
PESHAWAR: A grand jirga representing major tribal clans of North Waziristan Agency of northwest Pakistan has pledged it would avenge the killing of over 40 tribesmen in missile strikes by US spy planes by carrying out suicide attacks on Americans.
"We will take the revenge for our near and dear ones and announce a jihad against the Americans. We will allow our youths to carry out suicide attack on US citizens," tribal elder Malik Jalaluddin told the media at the Peshawar Press Club on Friday.
He was accompanied by other tribal leaders of North Waziristan Agency.
"We will show how we take revenge. We announce a jihad against the US and her allies sitting in our country," said Malik Jalal Sarhadi Qat Khel.
"We will avenge our tribesmen at any cost, even if it takes a hundred years," he added.
Over 40 people, a majority of them members of a jirga and personnel from a government militia force, were killed in drone strikes in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan yesterday.
Islamabad has lodged a strong protest with Washington on the issue and announced it is pulling out of a trilateral meeting with Afghanistan and the US scheduled for later this month.
The tribal elders claimed the US had stepped up its adventurism in Pakistan's tribal belt following the release of arrested CIA contractor Raymond Davis, who was freed on Wednesday after over USD two million was paid as "blood money" to the families of two men he killed in January.
The elders claimed that on the pretext of targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban elements in Waziristan agency, the US was killing only "innocent children, women and elders" in drone attacks.
"There are no al-Qaida or Taliban militants in the agency," Malik Jalaluddin claimed.
Flanked by members of the grand jirga, including Malik Faridullah Saifli Kabal Khel, Malik Daaraz Mada Khel Wazir and Nek Daraz Khan, Malik Jalaluddin said the US actions amounted to "barbarism and complete injustice against innocent tribal people".
"The Pakistani government has never taken any action against incursions by the US unmanned planes. But we are not like people of Lahore who pardoned Raymond Davis, the killer of two Pakistanis, for dollars. We are determined to avenge our tribesmen and the world will see it," he said.
"Time and again, President Saleh promises he will stop attacks on peaceful protesters and yet the number of dead keeps rising. The United States should back up its words condemning the carnage with action, and halt military aid to Yemen."
So Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh has finally declared a state of emergency in Yemen. Not many options remained after renewing his assault on protesters in Sana’a, killing over 40 people and wounding hundreds more.
Now protesters have been forcefully ordered inside under the penalty of injury, or worse: "The national security council announces a state of emergency across Yemen, and a curfew is set upon armed people in all Yemeni provinces. And the security forces with the army will take responsibility for stability.”
The statement is the latest attempt to pin the blame on opposition protesters for shooting themselves. Government officials denied that security forces had been involved and promised a full investigation. Not surprisingly, their denial mirrors the position taken by the U.S. government over the last month. Issuing his first comment in over 40 days, President Barack Obama released a one-paragraph statement “strongly” condemning the latest violence, and declaring, “Those responsible for today’s violence must be held accountable.”
Clearly the two parties responsible - Saleh and Washington - aren’t going to hold themselves accountable. And by avoiding Saleh’s state of emergency, the White House has tacitly backed the ongoing crackdown and its potential escalation. Breaking silence only for a moment makes the information wall stand out that much more.
The statements coming out of the White House ring completely hollow after countless attacks on pro-democracy protesters. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued her own brief statement claiming, “I have repeatedly and unreservedly condemned the use of violence against protesters in Sana'a and other cities, and the loss of life.” However Clinton, like Obama, hasn’t addressed Yemen for weeks and made no mention of last week’s collective violence as she traveled Egypt and Tunisia.
Probably because America is responsible for Yemen’s violence on every level.
Supporting an errant policy that further alienates the Yemeni people from Saleh's regime, Washington’s “counter-terrorism” against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is cited as a main factor in aggravating political and tribal tensions. Whether failing to spur Saleh into serious economic reform or suffering on the wrong end of U.S.-trained counter-terrorism units, Saleh and Washington have blurred into the same image. Some tribal networks have been pushed closer to AQAP. Nor does the White House support the protesters’ right to demonstrate in reality, only in theory. Its policy has consistently stated, even after today's crackdown, that the opposition must negotiate under a hail of bullets, and that “street protests don’t solve anything.”
Neither does insincere dialogue with a ruthless dictator.
“It seems like people saw what happened in Bahrain and thought you could do the same here,” said one high-ranking Yemeni official, who said he did not know who was responsible for the outbreak.
That Obama and Clinton continued to hammer away at a non-existent “open and transparent process” offers the latest evidence of Washington’s disconnect and clueless understanding in Yemen. That they keep accusing protesters of inciting violence, or else looking the other way with Saleh, offers a second piece of evidence. While calling for Saleh to uphold his promise to protect them, Clinton said the White House is “seeking to verify reports that this is the result of actions by security forces.”
Their remarks also demonstrate ignorance of fourth-generation warfare.
By calling on the opposition to refrain from low-intensity violence, the White House is trying to stop the disproportionate reaction that oppressive regimes are so susceptible to. Rather than call off Saleh’s violence or threaten to halt U.S. military support, officials have tried to get protesters off the street. But Saleh doesn’t even believe the revolution is real, according to sources near him, and considers it an aberration of society that will eventually go away if he suppresses it long enough.
The White House has acted in a similar fashion.
We’ll have more updates as what should be a bloody night and weekend unfolds. But the overriding conclusion is elementary: If Washington can’t trust Saleh, why on Earth would Yemeni protesters?
It may seem that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refused to answer out of sensitivity. Stonewalling on the payment of $2.3 million to the families of Raymond Davis’s victims, Clinton possibly wished to keep silent until the immediate aftermath in Pakistan had passed. The more likely scenario is that Clinton refused to answer out of insensitivity - that she was fully aware of the backlash triggered by Davis’s sudden release and ducked.
Islamabad has declared “high alert” for a week due to protests and possible violence from religious parties or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The U.S. Embassy will be closed Friday until further notice.
Clinton’s strategy committed a fatal flaw in losing control of America’s message at a pivotal and unstable moment. Better to confront and clarify the situation, instead of abandoning America's image to rumors of coercion and the anger of innocence. Her denial and lack of remorse amplified the tense standoff between the Pakistani people, their government, and the U.S. government. Explanations do exist, but Pakistanis probably won’t like what they hear. Although Islamabad chose the practical route by paying diyat and billing Washington later, this strategy only appears to form half of the plot.
“The U.S government did not pay compensation, and the U.S. position has been vindicated that Raymond Davis had immunity to prosecution,” Embassy spokesperson Alberto Rodriguez told The Nation on Thursday.
Apparently Washington has no intention of copping to Davis’s compensation, but of reviving his immunity status. Diyat would have admitted some level of guilt, subverting Washington's claim to immunity. Because the White House “didn’t pay,” Davis is once again a full blown diplomat. And why would U.S. officials investigate or try him now? What stops him from disappearing with the rest of his team?
This chain of events will generate more disorder in Pakistan, and the consequences of Clinton’s information vacuum predictably manifested in the Pakistani media and public. Which, by the way, demonstrate a deeper understanding of fourth-generation warfare than Washington.
Frankly, if it were just games between states, it wouldn’t matter that much. Locked in a mutually suspicious and distrustful relationship, they will constantly seek to extract their pounds of flesh and bend the other to their will. Boys will be boys.
The problem: it isn’t just a game between states.
Raymond Davis may have given the ISI an opportunity to push back against the CIA/US and our spies may well have got their way — for now.
But if 10 years into an uneasy relationship, the boys over here still see fit to foment public unrest or to churn the political waters over every little disagreement with the US, at what point does the mess here become totally unmanageable?
Raymond Davis is gone. But the bitterness and hate and propaganda the episode spawned will linger on.
Kerry-Lugar, drone strikes, Aafia Siddiqi, Raymond Davis — why can’t the establishment here fight its battles with the US without making this place a little more dangerous, a little less stable each time?
Davis has escaped his self-induced Pakistani nightmare, leaving behind his unhappy hosts to fight various sets of incongruous realities. In a democracy, a high-profile murder suspect has been allowed to get away without the rulers feeling the need or having the strength to share with the people their understanding of the compelling circumstances. As public perceptions go, these rulers are subservient to the wishes of the real powers that risk crudely breaking a few minor rules of their own. They are readying themselves to live up to the US prediction of even more friendly ties with `Pakistan` — at a growing distance from the Pakistan comprising shades of people with various wishes and grievances. The two Pakistanis are not easy to reconcile. The Davis episode has made reconciliation more difficult.
The questions that have arisen from the manner in which the affair was handled continue to highlight many doubts and concerns. What agreements have been reached behind the scenes? Who was involved in finalizing them and who was responsible for detaining the lawyer for the heirs of the victims? The central government has refused to provide any answers. There has been no comment from the prime minister or president and even the weekly briefing given by the Foreign Office as a matter of routine each Thursday was canceled. The federal information minister has merely said the release came under Shariah law; the judge who delivered the verdict is reported to have gone on leave – ostensibly for security reasons. There is an element of mystery surrounding the role the Punjab government may have played or where the Rs 200 million paid as blood money actually came from. The US has denied making any payments and there is conjecture that the sum was removed from Pakistan’s own exchequer.
What we are left with, is a government which stands more discredited than ever before and a further erosion of our standing as an independent nation.
Most people forget that Pakistan is a client state and the stakes for both the US and Pakistan were very high. They both badly needed to get out of this impasse. Pakistan cannot function without military and financial aid from the US. As long as we are financially dependent on other countries, crying hoarse over our lost sovereignty sounds like a plaint in the dark.
Davis may have left Pakistan, taking with him the answers to these and many more questions. However, the answers will still be sought. At least four young Pakistanis are dead, two murdered, one run over and the widow of a dead man committed a suicide. There can be no national interest outweighing these lives, and all that Pakistan has got from its cooperation in the USA’s War on Terror is the USA deciding that the skin of one of its citizens, almost certainly one of its CIA contractors, is worth more than these lives.
Much of this material also predates the latest drone strike in Datta Khel. The two incidents will mix like a chemical reaction.
Hoping to predict the chaotic outcomes of love and war, or at least gain an advantage over their opponents, humans have pursued countless methods of divination throughout the millennium.
Adhering to one theory of the Pythia, these auspices could often be explained by science rather than prophesy. Whether Thales forecast an eclipse or not, he wouldn’t have found himself in awe like Medes and Lydians soldiers at Halys. Methane may have induced the Pythia’s visions, but Delphi's vast exchange of political and military knowledge is considered to be of greater significance. And when Greek and Roman augurs hailed the flight of an eagle before war, one can imagine a subconscious, psychological conditioning taking over.
Mimicking the augurs of old, a modern political scientist can observe the Predators hovering over Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and glimpse visions of the future.
The latest update on Washington’s drone barrage in Datta Khel doesn’t require much analysis. At least 30-40 civilians were killed after four Hellfire missiles targeted a meeting between local elders, a massacre that impacted Pakistani relations across the board. According to the local tribesmen, they had gathered to discuss a land dispute over the ownership of chromite deposits in the area. Interrupting this process is, in itself, a deep violation of counterinsurgency. Next comes the negative publicity at the local level, then the national level.
“In complete violation of human rights, such acts of violence take us away from our objective of elimination of terrorism,” General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s military chief and a vital U.S. ally, warned the White House. “It is imperative to understand that this critical objective cannot be sacrificed for temporary tactical gains. Security of people of Pakistan, in any case, stands above all.”
The innocent death at Datta Khel comes less than 24 hours after a Pakistani court released the CIA’s Raymond Davis. This “back to business as usual” attitude would be enough to further aggravate Pakistanis, let alone another civilian slaughter. Although inaccurate intel may explain Washington’s miscalculation, the combination of Davis’s release and the rest of U.S. activity in Pakistan makes America appear even more insensitive and clueless in a foreign region.
Sparking a new controversy moments after incompletely burying another confirms how little Washington learned from Davis’s near-trial. Impression management remains low on the priority list. Kayani pointedly labeled Thursday’s attack "careless and callous,” a view likely shared across Pakistani society. Needless to say, events in Datta Khel qualify as a COIN disaster.
The pure military consequences of Datta Khel require additional explanation. Before the victims’ identities emerged, the original targets were believed to be agents of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the TTP's commander of North Waziristan. This fact evidently melded with the wider tribal meeting to produce two versions of reality, as one local witness claimed, "One of Bahadur's commanders, Sharabat Khan, was also present at the meeting as he is also a local elder, but they were discussing business."
U.S. officials claim that Khan was traveling in the vehicle targeted by the first missile, before three more struck the meeting itself. His status remains unknown, with sources taking contrary positions on his survival.
Either option gives rise to the same possibility. Targeting Bahadur may represent a shift from unilateral attacks on the Haqqani network, possibly because it’s degraded or because the U.S. wishes to apply pressure on both groups. Haqqani and Bahadur, who was nominated for the TTP's leadership after Baitullah Mehsud's death, both operate under truces with Islamabad, promising to concentrate their attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan rather than on Pakistan's cities. But Bahadur has also promised war if Pakistan's military invades North Waziristan, as requested by Washington.
Given that Islamabad has so far refused, the White House and Pentagon likely believe they can’t wait any longer before July to renew their assault on North Waziristan. So to target Bahadur's commanders isn’t simply to degrade his network, but to provoke in order to justify future attacks. This ploy could yield unintended consequences such as increased friction with Islamabad and hostility at the local level, especially since Bahadur's other commanders also double as local elders.
Observing the movements of Predators provides one means of reading Washington's intentions. Drone strikes tend to lead the Pakistani army wherever Washington wants it to go, whether it follows or not. Drones ceased firing after Davis was arrested, then flared up again before his trial as if to taunt Islamabad. An attack so soon after his release seeks to prove that CIA business is back to normal, that Washington is still gunning for North Waziristan, and that the U.S.-Pakistani relationship remains intact.
Thursday's errant drone strike is the latest proof that this relationship, while "intact," can strain to the breaking point at any moment.
“The United States, along with others in the international community, has deep concerns that President Aristide’s return to Haiti in the closing days of the election could be destabilizing. President Obama reiterated that view in a call with President Zuma the other day that address a range of global challenges, along with his belief that the Haitian people deserve the chance to choose their government through peaceful, free, and fair elections March 20.”
- Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the United States National Security Council
"We can't hold him hostage if he wants to go."
- South African Cabinet Minister Collins Chabane
We would like to know what other countries, besides France, support the exile of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. An expedient statement to make without providing further details.
