White House Drowning In Iraq’s Crisis

The standing of counterinsurgency suffered a heavy blow when 20+ U.S. Special Operatives landed in a modest “mansion” courtyard in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Up to this point the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan had grudgingly forced the Pentagon to think horizontally and non-militarily - to accept the political and social realities of asymmetric warfare. Iraq’s “surge” was launched with these principles in the minds of COIN proponents, such as CIA Directer David Petraeus, and President Barack Obama felt enough political pressure to affix a COIN face onto his counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

This front fell off in the jubilant aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death. Believing that America no longer had a reason to occupy Afghanistan, the majority opinion in mainstream and beltway circles has settled around cheaper, robotic counterterrorism to fight insurgents. Except COIN isn’t “dead” and cannot be killed. Systematically organized in the 1960s, the practice and its evolving theories simply phase through cycles of awareness in relation to current events. No coincidence is necessary to explain how COIN still determines the fate of U.S. policy in Iraq.

The country isn’t experiencing new instability due to a lack of U.S. troops, but a lack of political action from Washington.

Several days ago Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pushed his country another foot deeper into hostilities, taking the boycotting Iraqiya party off “leave” and formally suspending its nine ministers. Government spokesman Ali Hadi al-Moussawi downplayed the move by calling it a “vacation,” and the State Department would avoid going into details. According to spokesman Mark Toner, “In terms of the broader political situation in Iraq, we’ve continued to press on senior Iraqi politicians the importance of dialogue to work out their differences, and that continues to be our message to them.” However the Obama administration’s infrequent statements remain unchanged despite a sharp escalation in Iraq’s political crisis, creating the vivid impression that Washington is still favoring al-Maliki.

Either the administration doesn’t understand the need for open diplomacy or refuses to accept the responsibility, a dilemma with only one outcome. The less active the White House is publicly, the more publicity Iraq will receive.

Having ignored multiple advisories from Iraqiya chief Ayad Allawi, who warned in early December that “Iraq is not a democracy,” Obama greeted al-Maliki shortly afterward with the hope of turning Iraq’s page into history. The President’s approval of al-Maliki triggered a landslide of criticism from the Sunni opposition, starting with Deputy premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s assertion that al-Maliki is ruling like “a dictator.” Allawi subsequently urged the administration to act in an ominous op-ed to The New York Times; amid U.S. silence, one of its authors hit an IED outside Samarra. Finance Minster Rafe al-Essawi, a vocal opponent of the Premier, held al-Maliki's forces accountable for security lapses as officials denied the incident.

Undaunted, al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya finally called for al-Maliki’s removal after multiple attempts to arrange a national conference on even terms. U.S. officials shifted from no comment to telling Iraqiya that grievances should be kept out of the media.

Sunnis have resorted to their information campaign because of this reaction - because they have run out of political options for al-Awlaki and Washington - and Allawi isn’t finished attacking. Iraqiya’s chairman explicitly rejected the White House’s previous comments over the weekend, telling CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, “President Obama said very clearly that the United States have left Iraq as a stable and democratic country. It’s neither stable nor democratic, frankly speaking.” His interview was similarly brushed off by the State Department even though Allawi warned, “The terrorists are hitting again very severely. Al Qaeda is fully operational now in Iraq.”

His solution, though, has nothing to do with U.S. troops.

"I am not asking for the American forces to come back, but for the United States to use its diplomatic and other channels through the strategy agreement between the United States and Iraq to try and bring about sanity to the political process and inclusivity. And I think there should be frank and real discussions with the Prime Minister, between him and between the Administration, to make it very clear that what is happening in Iraq is not acceptable.”

These discussions have yet to occur due to the White House’s tepidness to confront al-Maliki, belying the widespread local support to do so. Iraqiya continues to discuss possible actions with the Kurds, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shia bloc and independent parties, citing a loss of faith across the capital. Still, Sunni officials remain undecided on their future course of action. After several Iraqiya members (al-Mutlak and spokesman Haidar al-Mulla) demanded the removal of al-Maliki before holding a national conference, Allawi alluded to the possibility while keeping his door slightly ajar.

"Iraq is at a crossroads and I say that Iraq needs forgiving leaders, who will raise above their personal hatred," he told a news conference in Baghdad. "This is not the state for which we battled the dictatorship. On the contrary it represents the return to square one by building a dictatorship in the clothing of the disfigured democracy left behind by foreign troops."

Certain that al-Maliki cannot lead a unified Iraq, but cautious of bearing responsibility for the security fallout, Iraqiya officials and their potential allies are wary of another volatile election. Spokesman Maysoon al-Damaluji also predicted, “Opposition means that we will be further targeted. Fabricated accusations will continue to go around; we will have no protection whatsoever." Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi (the third co-author of Allawi’s NYT op-ed) continues to favor “de-escalating” through negotiations. He envisions a three-tier position, starting with the full implementation of 2010‘s power-sharing agreement and depoliticalization of security forces. The second phase would lobby for a Shia replacement, and finally give way to a no-confidence vote and early elections. Nujaifi called the no-confidence motion “unrealistic” at the present time, saying, "There is not a sufficient majority for this."

One must assume that they will play this option once a majority is secured, as the other options would be theoretically exhausted. Mutlaq observed that Baghdad’s political equation isn’t ripe for withdrawing from the government, but “maybe there will be a time when we will do it. It's a possibility."

Overt political action from Washington, as counter-intuitive as it may sound, is precisely what Iraq needs at this juncture. Enough popular support exists to justify public intervention and the implementation of 2010’s power-sharing agreement; many political forces expect U.S. officials to act because al-Maliki is considered “their man.” Allawi must be awarded his seat at the head of a foreign council, and political parties in general must be allowed to act with relative freedom. Autonomy shouldn’t create excessive problems with a representative prime minister sitting in Baghdad.

In sum, Iraq must be engaged at all non-military levels to stabilize its security environment. COIN is no less applicable today than it was in 1967 or 2007.

Al Wefaq Endures Silent U.S. Counterattack

They didn’t fail due to lack of effort. Whether organizing rallies to condemn international silence or defending deceased individuals who are accused of having “psychological problems,” Al Wefaq officials actively direct global attention to the movement’s cause. Bahrain’s leading oppositional force has experienced struggle before and knows the stakes now; massive social events such as revolution are the product of countless individual actions.

However Al Wefaq’s initiative has failed to pay dividends in the short-term, and continues to advance Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement outside of the international spotlight that it seeks.

Following a week of international silence between the alleged beating Nabeel Rajab, head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa released another counterattack on Sunday to maintain his country’s blackout. Drawing exclusively from a failed “National Dialogue” and Bahrain’s “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), an internal investigation of the government’s own crimes, the King issued a number of “reforms” intended to finish Bahrain’s uprising. One amendment will substitute the parliamentary chairman as the deciding vote during joint meetings of the National Assembly, replacing the head of the Shura Council (upper chamber). Another change gives parliament members the “constitutional right to question ministers on the open floor,” along with the ability to hold a no-confidence vote. King Hamad is now obligating himself “to explain the criteria for appointing members of the Shura Council” and dismissing lawmakers. He’s also “limiting his ability” to dissolve the Lower House, impotent as the organ is.

"It is beyond doubt that the National Dialogue recommendations have outlined the shape of the reform that we are aiming to achieve and emanate from the solid base of our national experience,” he told his audience... “Our people have proven their desire for continuing with reforms. We complete the march today with those who have an honest patriotic desire for more progress and reform.”

Frequently commenting on the inability to reform “inside a vacuum,” King Hamad appears to have foreshadowed his own vacuous speech and misleading revisions. His proposal indicates just how authoritarian his rule is and how far Bahrain’s democracy has to grow. Al Wefaq has capitalized on popular dissent to transition from political and judicial reforms, including a reconfiguration of Bahrain’s parliament, to a full government overhaul. Another demand would replace the King’s uncle with a representative prime minister. Yet the prevailing fear is that Hamad has reached his limit to reform, missing a series of opportunities to repair the country’s divisions.

"People very clearly wanted an elected government, they want parliament that has actual power," said Rajab. "If we go into this detail, and go step by step... it's going to be 100 years before an elected parliament has power."

Unwilling to repeat its participation in the “National Dialogue” - Al Wefaq explicitly attended in order to disprove its credibility - the opposition met King Hamad with blunt force. A statement from Al Wefaq ridiculed the “insignificant trivia” of his reforms and expressed concern over his disconnect with Bahrain’s Shia majority. Sayyid Hadi Hasan al-Mosawi, one of the group’s resigned MP, told The New York Times, “His speech fell short of our expectations. The measures did not reflect any of the opposition or the people’s demands. The speech did not even tackle the core of the problem.”

Bahrain’s government and opposition are reading totally different books. While Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa was “drawing lessons” for the 1990’s uprising, Al Wefaq’s Ali al-Aswad told Al Jazeera, "Nothing was new. The opposition was expecting something like this from 10 years before. This is not the demand of the street. The demand is different now, after what has happened in all the Arab countries."

Keeping these demands at the forefront of its platform, Al Wefaq and political allies scheduled a "no to tyranny, yes to democracy" procession for downtown Manama. The Bahraini government rejected Al Wefaq’s proposal on Tuesday night, warning that the march will cause “traffic congestion and disturbance to embassies, commercial and government organizations.” Bahrainis were warned not to take part, and security forces crushed the pockets of activists who rallied on Wednesday. The monarchy’s excuses primarily appeal to Sunnis, many of whom are fed up with protesters, and international powers such as Gulf states and the U.S. (which defends Bahrain’s right to keep order).

The reality is that protests are often intended to disrupt, particularly during an uprising or revolution. King Hamad wants to return his island to “normal,” not fix Bahrain’s fundamental tensions that have resulted from unrepresentative rule.

As usual the Obama administration has issued no reaction to any of these events, instead following King Hamad’s lead and hiding behind the BICI. Both governments are producing parallel rhetoric, affirming Bahrain’s democratic values while lauding those reforms already undertaken. Washington has put up a wall that simultaneously absorbs criticism and reflects silence at the opposition; hollow initiatives such as the National Dialogue and BICI are then advanced to deliver military packages in accordance with U.S. law. On cue, King Hamad and Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa just received CENTCOM commander James Mattis for new security discussions.

This strategy is unlikely to change until the opposition forces Washington to alter its position through dynamic action, otherwise the King must commit a large-scale massacre to draw international attention.

Ignoring Bahrain’s uprising nevertheless remains a dangerous policy, one that has irresponsibly suppressed and ultimately increased dissent in the streets. What began as calls for reform evolved into widespread demands for regime change, generating an unsustainable political environment. Bahrain currently lacks pivotal moments to mark its trajectory - the fall of a tyrant, mass defection of troops - leaving the conflict to burn for years without the necessary response. However the country’s low intensity doesn’t eliminate the possibility of sporadic detonation. Another resigned MP, Matar Matar, predicted that the King’s speech, "won’t impact the situation, rather it could make things worse, reaffirming the idea that genuine reform is impossible for this regime.”

al-Aswad agreed: "If we accept this, we will have no power in the streets. We couldn't control the streets. The youth might go in a different direction now."

Potential Spectrum of Syrian Intervention

As the dominant powers in a regional asymmetric movement, Western and Gulf nations are inherently allergic to the concept of revolution. Their officials go to great lengths to avoid the word itself, and have fallen back on a guerrilla tactic to protect their interests: false negotiations. Unlike its necessary function in genuine democracy, “dialogue” becomes a kiss of death to revolutionaries rising up against a dictator and his foreign allies. Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans forced their rulers out of power through direct action, not negotiations, while internationally-sponsored “initiatives” are prolonging Yemen, Bahrain and Syria’s uprisings.

Believing that their present situation couldn’t deteriorate any further, many Syrian protesters and local activists were the first to approve an international aid corridor and corresponding no-fly zone. Grassroots support within the Syrian National Council (SNC) gave Riad al-Asaad, de facto commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), enough confidence to threaten a large-scale campaign amid the Arab League’s drifting mission. Western capitals are suspected of planning a no-fly zone - or ground intervention - with Turkey, whose southeastern Anatolia region now serves as the FSA’s rear base. Behind this possibility lurks a regional war with Bashar al-Assad’s allies.

Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took another step towards war on Sunday when he declared his support for intervention during CBS’s “60 Minutes.” Asked whether he favors Arab nations intervening in Syria, Sheik Hamad said that "for such a situation to stop the killing some troops should go to stop the killing." His statements predictably triggered a new verbal barrage from al-Assad’s regime, which has taken shots at Qatar throughout the League’s negotiations and observer mission. Barring a dramatic change of behavior from al-Assad, the opposition movement and foreign powers, Syria is trending towards an organized conflict with geopolitical impact.

The outcome appears to break down into three scenarios that will be explored over time.

Semi-conventional Assault

Foreign capitals challenging al-Assad to resign face a strategic dilemma that hasn’t been encountered by Western powers in decades - the risk of defeat. Washington in particular has expected victory in every war since World War II, heightening the shock of political stalemate and military losses on the battlefield. External powers rightfully fear Syria’s multiple scenarios and potential impact on regional stability, but the revolution demands a commitment to direct or indirect strategies. This dilemma is generating significant friction and hesitation between al-Assad’s international opponents.

"We haven't been looking at a no-fly zone," William Hague, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, told Sky News. "There is no serious prospect certainly at the moment of the United Nations Security Council agreeing any resolution at the moment, let alone agreeing a resolution comparable to anything that happened in Libya."

Hague presents several military observations to buttress his claim, arguing that “the Syrian regime had not been relying on air power to repress protests.” The intense urban nature of Syria’s conflict also reduces the effectiveness of air superiority below Libya’s level. These points aside, intervention will require air cover to shield oppositional fighters and international peacekeepers, and to protect humanitarian corridors and convoys. Any foreign operation, whether military or non-military, will create the need for air support.

In the event that ground troops are approved - this possibility is more realistic than Western officials publicly concede - the region’s strategic orientation points to an international task force masked by select Muslim states. This spear-tip would theoretically include Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey, along with any satellites that Riyadh could bring on board (Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Morocco). Israel might also increase its clandestine activities against al-Assad, or a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission could be approved.

"The Arab League and their monitors failed in their mission and though we respect and appreciate our Arab brothers for their efforts, we think they are incapable of improving conditions in Syria or resisting this regime," al-Asaad told Reuters. "For that reason we call on them to turn the issue over to the U.N. Security Council and we ask that the international community intervene because they are more capable of protecting Syrians at this stage than our Arab brothers.”

Infantry is essential to warfare regardless of the technological innovations designed to replace them, and foreign powers must decide if they believe Syria’s revolutionaries can fill the job. This question is admittedly challenging because the same military defectors and armed civilians will face a more determined enemy than Muammar Gaddafi’s hollow force. Another problem is the lack of Arab manpower against al-Assad and his remaining allies: Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq. Any of these states could decide to support a counter-operation in his favor, while Egypt’s heavyweight army is liable to remain neutral.

With China likely to maintain its life-line to al-Assad through soft power, the greatest danger appears to stem from the possibility of overt Russian and Iranian intervention. Moscow didn’t sacrifice Gaddafi without reason, but to save its bullets for the younger, useful al-Assad. Tehran is similarly connected to his Shia regime and its nerve system to Hezbollah and Hamas, and one Quds official just pledged material support beyond Iran’s current level. This contingency is keeping Western and Gulf powers at bay, wishing to fight Iran on their terms rather than Syria’s unpredictable battleground.

Sustained Insurgency

The FSA experienced a leadership transition over the last two weeks after Brigadier General Mustafa Ahmad Al Shaikh defected to FSA headquarters in Turkey. As a regional commander in northern Syria, Al Shaikh fled the country after witnessing what he called “the regime's ruthlessness and the killings.” His first order of business is establishing a military council to oversee operations against al-Assad’s regime, starting with the gradual conscription of 30,000 new fighters. His media adviser, Fahd Al Masri, specified, "It will also help organize defections within the army and will be in contact with officers in the regular army to encourage large-scale rather than individual defections.”

The second task after organizing Syria’s diverse revolutionaries is establishing lines of communication with supportive international powers, a relatively simple task so long as military command is established on the ground. Next comes the decision whether to directly arm or finance the opposition’s arsenal. The FSA’s ranks are estimated between 15,000-30,000, with thousands of civilians theoretically willing to fight for the revolution.

General Al Shaikh publicly expects the opposition’s struggle to take “at least a year, possibly a year and a half to topple the Syrian dictator.” His general plan appears to be sound from an insurgent’s point of view: organize all armed elements (civil and martial) and “deploy them in small six to seven person squadrons” to “employ tactics of a war of attrition.” Oppositional force ratios will be increased over time as they absorb recruits and technology from the West and sympathetic Arab states, until a presence is established across the country and around Damascus.

An insurgency-infused civil war is normal for revolutionary situations, and thus seems to be the most plausible scenario for Syria’s future. Low-intensity conflict requires the least amount of effort from international powers and limits the risk of conventional warfare, which could decimate Syria beyond the revolution’s objectives. Unfortunately for the opposition, foreign actors and Syrians caught behind the regime, waging an insurgency against al-Assad’s regime is likely to protract for multiple years. Syria’s army contains several hundred thousand troops who, unlike Gaddafi’s regulars, weren’t intentionally weakened out of fear. They operate thousands of tanks and field pieces, and don’t rely on tribal or nomadic mercenaries to fight their battles. Syria’s air force, navy and special forces are equally advanced compared to Gaddafi’s forces.

The unfortunate reality is that al-Assad may launch an efficient guerrilla campaign of his own; a full-scale unconventional war will yield a bloody spectacle in its own right, capable of lasting 5-10 years and damaging a significant portion of the country. This type of war still leaves the door wide open for those proxy agents that will flood Syria from all directions. Whether conventional or asymmetric, the possibility of extended warfare and mass casualties is too real for Western and Arab powers to currently stomach.

Coup/Assassination

The final military option trades victory for defeat. Given the lengthy time-line of either course, oppositional elements and international powers may review the possibility of assassination by ground or air. This option could be attempted before open hostilities are initiated - possibly as a precursor since al-Assad will react aggressively either way - or as a desperation move deeper into the war. However the expediency of assassination could represent the most chaotic option available, lacking the popular buildup that culminates a successful revolution. Even a decapitation strike across al-Assad’s leadership could leave a resilient force defended by a strong-willed minority.

Foreign powers will likely phase across the spectrum from unconventional to conventional operations, a sound approach in light of Syria’s complex circumstances. However risk cannot be separated from warfare, and a failure to commit the appropriate forces could result in the need for greater action in the long-term.

Guerrilla State of Mind: Stalemate or Death

As Washington attempts to spin its back-channel negotiations with the Taliban into a position of strength - masking an unreachable desire to eradicate the insurgency - Taliban officials have attacked Afghanistan’s political sphere with equal vigor. Spokesman Zabibullah Mujahid clarified the group’s position amid the fallout of urinating Marines, explaining, "This will not affect the negotiations with the Americans because they are only about the release of prisoners and the office in Qatar.”

"It is for this purpose and for bringing about peace and stability in Afghanistan that we have increased our political efforts to come to mutual understanding with the world in order to solve the current ongoing situation," Mujahid said in an emailed statement. "But this understanding does not mean a surrender from jihad and neither is it connected to an acceptance of the constitution of the stooge Kabul administration."

These comments strike an obvious contrast with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who recently assured Americans and Afghans that the Obama administration remains “committed to the red lines that we have consistently laid out”: renouncing violence, breaking from al-Qaeda, supporting the Afghan constitution and women’s equality. The combined rhetoric also demonstrates the illusion of private diplomacy during fourth-generation warfare (4GW); while U.S. and European diplomats hope to achieve a breakthrough out of the media spotlight, they are currently limited to increasing face-to-face familiarity between each side.

Afghanistan’s battlefield and international media function as an extension of the political back-room, an open arena where private leverage is competed for in public. Sincere as the Taliban is in pursuing a favorable settlement, the group is currently using negotiations to confuse and outmaneuver U.S. policymakers.

The insurgency has since followed up Mujahid’s statements by releasing a “formal proclamation of victory” on its website. Aware of Washington’s attempt to divide its lower ranks, the Taliban is feeling the pressure to defend its political feelers as battlefield tools. U.S. officials will surely scoff at the notion of victory after spending 2011 “breaking the Taliban’s momentum,” but the group’s latest statements paint an accurate image of its strategic mindset. Even if the insurgency’s momentum has been broken, a difficult claim to prove outright, this outcome is less noteworthy than U.S. officials acknowledge. By basing Afghanistan’s narrative on the fact that NATO was losing the battle as late as summer 2009, Washington is now justifying its march towards victory on an uphill stalemate.

Stalemate can become victory in the insurgent’s world - mere survival against overwhelming forces can become a triumph. The Taliban was nearly destroyed by Western firepower during 2001‘s invasion and left for dead, only to rebuild itself into a more lethal force of some 30,000 fighters. This network was strong enough to weather America’s surge without capitulating, and with Washington tacitly admitting that the Taliban cannot be destroyed politically or militarily, the insurgency is eager to capitalize on this concession.

“It is proved to the world that the Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted internally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic ummah. Militarily successful resistance against a gigantic international alliance, full presence on the whole soil and overall perseverance are the signs and secrets of the Islamic Emirate.”

According to Washington’s preliminary terms surrounding the release of Guantánamo prisoners, the Taliban’s high council was supposed to voice support for Afghanistan’s political process - which it did by declaring victory through the political process. Establishing an office in Qatar is being spun as another political victory and thus a display of strength, contrary to America’s demand that the Taliban use its office for non-recruiting purposes. The insurgency’s “victory” statement took numerous shots at “the international invasion.”

“The contractors of the international invasion can no more deceive the nation by their baseless talks. They used the word ‘peace’ as a propaganda fragment to deceive the people. But today as their guardians and supporters are fed up militarily and logistically with this war and are planning for retreat, they are giving contradictory statements which show their complete confusion and embarrassment.”

Many of these criticism hit their mark despite the Taliban’s outlandish rhetoric. Regional actors and observers view U.S.-Taliban negotiations as a hollow platform, a stalling tactic by both sides that lacks serious input from Kabul and Islamabad. Although Clinton and U.S. officials “have repeatedly said publicly that any reconciliation effort must be led by the Afghans themselves,” Washington seeks to negotiate directly with the Taliban in order to retain control of the terms. Kabul and Islamabad are viewed with mutual suspicion, equally capable of strong-arming the Taliban or reducing U.S. influence after the war ends.

Both capitals are trying to jump into negotiations at their preliminary stage instead of waiting for Washington to produce its own results. Islamabad, for instance, allegedly wants the U.S. to drop its preconditions, while Kabul holds the opposite position. M K Bhadrakumar of Asia Times Online adds that Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara representatives oppose negotiations until more conditions are met - such as their inclusion. U.S. officials speak of developing “confidence” with the Taliban, when the surrounding environment is experiencing a rampant crisis of confidence.

This disconnect applies friction across America and Afghanistan’s public spheres, further reducing the odds of a political settlement by 2014.

Washington’s military superiority is mirrored by its irreversible political weaknesses, generating an unfavorable dilemma as Western powers attempt to extract themselves from counterinsurgency. Erasing America and Taliban’s “red-lines” through compromise verges on the impossible; Washington demands an end to violence and a post-2014 task force, a condition that the Taliban’s leadership flatly opposes. So what if they don’t agree to Washington’s demands? Will Obama halt a withdrawal that is overwhelmingly popular with Democrats? Will a GOP candidate recommit to an unpopular war?

Accepting the fact that U.S. forces can raid Afghanistan day and night for the next 10 years, the Taliban’s leadership has adhered to guerrilla warfare by exhausting America’s political and economic capital at home. This is the definition of a stalemate, and it spells victory to the insurgent who should have been wiped out years ago.

Hakimullah’s Loss Could Be TTP’s Gain

TTP deputy Wali-ur-Rehman lurks behind its chief, Hakimullah Mehsud

For the second time in as many years Hakimullah Mehsud has been reported dead at the tip of a Hellfire missile. Targeted by Predators on January 14th, 2010 after ordering a precision suicide bombing inside FOB Chapman, a CIA compound in Afghanistan's Khost province, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) chief would emerge four months later by taunting America. Now the CIA claims to have intercepted militants discussing the aftermath of January 12th’s drone strike near Miran Shah, the first since U.S. forces air-raided two Pakistani border camps.

"Six to seven TTP members were talking to each other through wireless radio in the conversations we heard, talking about Hakimullah Mehsud being hit by a drone when he was heading to a meeting at a spot near Miranshah," said one intelligence official.

Another official identified this spot as in Nawa Adda, a village in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Datta Khel is roughly 20 miles northeast of Miran Shah.

TTP spokesman Asimullah Mehsud quickly denied that the insurgency has lost its head, standard procedure during the heat of speculation. Hakimullah’s main spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, responded more colorfully by reasoning, "There is no truth in reports about his death. However, he is a human being and can die any time. He is a holy warrior and we will wish him martyrdom.” Ehsan’s bravado contains a large measure of truth for U.S. policymakers who presumably view Mehsud’s death as a small victory.

“We will continue jihad if Hakimullah is alive or dead,” he promises. “There are so many lions in this jungle and one lion will replace another one to continue this noble mission."

Having reached the temporarily conclusion that low-level militants aren’t worth the political cost after Salala ridge, U.S. officials clearly knew who they had in their sights as the Predators swarmed above Miran Shah. Taking out Mehsud was personal, as the jihadi warlord battled Washington with the same mindset. After orchestrating the bombing at FOB Chapman through Jordanian double-agent Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi - and drawing a quick missile strike by boasting - Hakimullah proceeded to inspire Faisal Shahzad’s unsuccessful Times Square bombing. Beyond his status as an enemy of America, the Pentagon and CIA make a special point of killing those who style themselves as invincible.

Removing the TTP’s chief should also benefit Islamabad by eliminating the group’s most hostile personality, a move that could help stabilize U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Passing up a high-value target like Hakimullah is generally inadvisable, however his final dividends in Afghanistan appear to swing in the opposite direction. The TTP chief’s relative isolation within his own group suggests that he’s wanted dead. Although serving as deputy to former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, the young and brash Hakimullah antagonized TTP commanders by overseeing the group’s relative decline. Too many Pakistani institutions and civilians had been targeted by Mehsud, the TTP’s most fervent al-Qaeda ideologist, and his forces are increasingly coordinating with rogue splinter groups.

Pakistan’s military response resulted in a significant reduction in tribal support by displacing over 300,000 people from Waziristan.

Anticipating the internal demand for Hakimullah’s death is a safe bet; regional commanders Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Faqir Mohammed all want him expelled from the TTP’s hierarchy. Rehman in particular believes that he should lead the TTP as a loyal branch of the Afghan Taliban, and has campaigned for the job since Baitullah was killed by drone in August 2009. Bahadur (the commander in North Waziristan) removed himself from the TTP’s umbrella in protest of Hakimullah’s behavior - he doesn’t enjoy the “emir” riding around his own territory.

All of these figures (and elements in Pakistan’s ISI) want the TTP to devote its focus towards U.S. troops in Afghanistan, not Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Mehsud stands as a main block in the pipeline between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Given that Hakimullah’s death remains conjecture, a more detailed account of the situation and the TTP’s reaction should await his confirmed demise. The strategic environment, though, is relatively basic. Removing Hakimullah would eliminate a dangerous disciple of al-Qaeda’s original core, potentially reducing the TTP’s campaign inside Pakistan. Replacing him with a “friendly” proxy - Rehman or Bahadur - should boost Islamabad’s leverage to minimize drone strikes and shift the TTP’s focus across the Durand Line.

A more daring strategy would allow Mehsud to walk while continuing to target his pro-Taliban deputies.

Unraveling Mysteries In Bahrain’s Black Hole

Deftly wielding his influence abroad, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has managed to keep a low profile throughout the Arab revolutions. The island nation is fiercely guarded by Riyadh and Washington, an alliance with far-reaching benefits in the international community and media, and King Hamad’s image as a model reformer continues to stand on his “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI). Months after rejecting Al Wefaq’s request for an observer mission, the Arab League's Nabil Al Arabi arrived just in time for Hamad’s “keynote speech” on Sunday.

The King has no reason to fear the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose Peninsula Shield was deployed in March to “protect” the monarchy from an “Iranian uprising.”

While their role hasn’t changed for hundreds of years, political allies are essential to surviving a revolution in the 21st century. They supply material and financial aid (arms, oil, cash) when needed, limit international condemnation, manipulate foreign organizations, block hostile measures and orchestrate media campaigns. However no government is immune to the publicity of killing its own people. Here the King has excelled beyond his unstable counterparts - Mubarak, Gaddafi, al-Assad and Saleh - by abstaining from their mechanized assaults. Instead the monarchy has played to its strengths by mobilizing its police force, deploying non-lethal tactics, recruiting ex-soldiers and police from friendly states (Pakistan, Jordan, UAE), and calling in armor from Riyadh.

As a result Bahrain has witnessed the lowest number of casualties amongst the sustained uprisings - more people were killed during a single day of Libya or Syria’s initial protests. This low-intensity strategy is King Hamad’s “key” to masking his presence on the international radar.

What this strategy won’t accomplish is the absolute suppression of death, injury and the desire for political freedom. The last 72 hours have produced two murky deaths, one a 24-year old found on the reclaimed Amwaj islands. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry denied any knowledge of the case, saying that an autopsy concluded death by drowning. Al Wefaq released an opposing version of Yousif Ahmed Abbas’s final hours, claiming that his parents were notified by authorities after his detainment. They suspect that he was tortured.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry promptly responded, "The father of the missing man stated that his son suffered from psychological problems, sometimes going to the beaches in the area and requiring assistance in returning home.”

Apparently “psychological problems” serves as this weekend’s special excuse. Challenging the circumstances of each death, Bahrain’s government places the burden of responsibility on protesters rather than national and foreign security units. The same goes for funerals, which are “legitimately” dispersed after they evolve into anti-government rallies. On Saturday a 59-year old woman succumbed to burns inflicted when she lit herself on fire. One Gulf report said the woman “suffered from psychological problems,” but local sources claim that she had “fallen ill” after her son’s arrest in April. He was still being held when she self-immolated on her roof.

Bahrain’s media blackout can only minimize these cases, not hide them completely. Nor can an information campaign disperse Bahrain’s opposition movement on the ground - Al Wefaq has simply turned the international community’s inaction into a central theme. On Tuesday thousands of protesters flocked to the UN’s office in Manama, where security forces allowed them to rally under the alleged specter of U.S. criticism. A more likely explanation: King Hamad realized the counter-productively of attacking a demonstration in the UN’s presence. U.S. officials expressed polite concern over the beating of Nabeel Rajab, head of Bahrain’s Center For Human Rights (BCHR), and the Obama administration immediately returned to the familiar silence that greets protesters on a daily basis.

Al Wefaq also dismissed a recent trial of two Pakistani policemen accused of “beating to death” Ali al-Saqer and Zakeriya al-Asheeri. “Torture is not just systematic,” the group said in a statement. “It is now a policy of the state.”

Undaunted, Al Wefaq held a “No Withdrawal” protest in Manama on Friday to express its determination and rally new supporters. Former parliamentarian Mattar Ebahim said authorities injured at least 13 people when they attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas, batons, stun grenades and sound bombs. Like the horror stories from Egypt’s November clashes, Ebahim claims that police are “targeting the protesters directly with tear gas canisters.” Several of the latest deaths have been attributed to injuries sustained from U.S.-made gas canisters.

None of these events are truly “mysterious.” All are products of Bahrain’s political marginalization, security crackdown and media blackout - the hardware and software of oppression.

White House Lost In Iraq’s Political Crisis

Seven Iraqi monitors allegedly deserted the Arab League’s mission in Syria this week, transcending the significance of their removal beyond Syria’s borders. As the League’s walls close around Bashar al-Assad’s regime at a glacial rate, Damascus has attempted to divide the League’s decision-making between its opponents and remaining allies. Among those still pushing for a mild political transition - U.S. ally and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Except al-Maliki has bigger things to worry about - his own grip on power.

Tasked with the duty of international awareness, Saleh al-Mutlaq recently passed along Iraqiya’s message to Washington through The Associated Press. Iraq’s Deputy premier also defended his response to President Barack Obama’s cordial meeting with al-Maliki, telling CNN that he was “shocked” to hear Obama praise him as a democratic partner. al-Mutlaq proceeded to caution the White House that al-Maliki’s political ambitions threaten Iraq’s security after the U.S. withdrawal.

“Why should I regret it?” he asked on Friday. “I only said the truth.”

al-Mutlaq then took another leap of truth. Predicting that Iraq could enter a new cycle of sectarian violence with al-Maliki at the top of Baghdad’s power struggle, or possibly experience a unified uprising against his government, al-Mutlaq warned, "The longer al-Maliki stays in power, the higher the possibility of a divided Iraq.” These statements form the latest wave of information directed at al-Maliki’s “sectarian autocracy”; a NYT op-ed from Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi reads like a manifesto on al-Maliki and U.S. policy.

The party currently rests in a suspended state, its ministers placed on leave by al-Maliki as they temporarily boycott his government. Securing a fair trial for Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi, who faces charges of funding a Sunni death squad, and protecting al-Mutlaq from a no-confidence motion represent urgent demands. More important, though, is reversing 2010’s failed power-sharing agreement, which left al-Maliki in control of the Interior and Defense Ministries. Allawi was never given a position of oversight as promised, resulting in accusations that al-Maliki is politicizing Iraq’s security and intelligence agencies.

These factors (and many interrelated affairs) have inflated the demand for a national conference above al-Hashemi’s individual case. With al-Mutlaq addressing the U.S. media, Iraqiya spokesman Haidar al-Mulla told the London-based Asharq al-Awsat that, "no national reconciliation meeting can take place in Iraq whilst Nouri al-Maliki is prime minister... Maliki does not want any conference that could potentially remove him from office to take place.”

al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya aren’t the only actors operating under this tense state. On Tuesday Turkish Prime Minister Turek Erdogan phoned al-Maliki to “voice his concern over Iraq's political stand-off,” drawing a sharp rebuke from his counterpart.

Contrary to the shining “opportunity” left by U.S. soldiers and diplomats, Iraqis find themselves swamped in foreboding reports and rumors, bombings and the all-encompassing fear of new conflict. The country is drifting through an uneasy “post-war” period, simultaneously experiencing the “end” and continuation of America’s occupation. Worse still, al-Maliki is conjuring visions of Saddam Hussein (to al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist, among others), breaching America’s last line of political defense against a misguided invasion. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to rebuild their lives in peace, but the country is in no position to extract itself from a perpetual state of warfare.

The Obama administration continues to misread Iraq’s public sphere as it loses control over the image of U.S. policy. With Deputy Secretary of State William Burns en route to Baghdad through Turkey, U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey defended al-Maliki several days ago by telling Reuters, "I believe that he is trying very hard to bridge the gaps that currently exist with his partners.” Asked about al-Mutlaq’s latest interview, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland responded, “We don’t think it’s helpful for Iraqi politicians to be hashing out their differences in the media. We’d much rather see them sit down together.”

Such statements render the White House guilty of going public in al-Maliki’s favor.

In one way Obama should be personally thankful for al-Hashemi’s warrant and his ensuing flight to Kurdish territory. Iraq’s ongoing crisis traces to deep sources, however al-Mutlaq’s original statements run directly to Obama’s praise for al-Maliki - a public display of strength. The politicized debate on America’s withdrawal is shielding him from more deserving criticism, mainly Washington’s near-unconditional support for al-Maliki. As Baghdad’s present conflict drags into its second month, the White House is still calling for “all parties to enter a dialogue” when no confidence has been established.

“What we are continuing to do,” Nuland tries to explain, “as we’ve said a number of times in the last few days, is to impress upon senior Iraqi politicians the importance of direct dialogue with each other to resolve their differences and to work towards a solution that represents the interests of all Iraqis for an inclusive government and that’s within the Iraqi constitution.”

al-Maliki’s confidence crisis has spilled across Iraq’s private and public layers, and ultimately into the international media. It cannot and should not be kept private. Nor would the Obama administration devote as much attention to the problem without Sunni officials going public. The reality is that Iraqiya feels exhausted of options to influence Iraq’s political process and distribute power away from al-Maliki. Party officials must also force al-Maliki into a national conference on favorable terms; the premier wants to decide the location and conditions on his terms. The administration seems to be glossing over these considerations, instead coddling al-Maliki and blocking any sources of provocation.

This approach tacitly admits that he will respond aggressively to challenges against his rule.

Nuland lacks the information to clarify whether U.S. officials will monitor or facilitate Iraq’s national dialogue, but this offer should be readily accepted if proposed. Due to understandable political impressions and the inexcusable distraction of Afghanistan, the Obama administration has shirked from involving itself too deeply in Iraq’s political affairs. The aftermath of 2010’s parliamentary election was initially abandoned before U.S. officials launched a belated (and ill-advised) push for al-Maliki’s coalition, and the administration continues to avoid Iraq’s crisis as it sells Obama’s withdrawal. So far Washington has produced minimal results with private pressure, keeping al-Maliki on the edge but failing to walk him back.

The hour for private diplomacy has expired. Now is the time to stick both hands into Baghdad - inaction will only prolong the crisis and keep Iraq in the headlines.

“We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness,” writes Allawi. “But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.”

Removing al-Maliki from office obviously poses a greater risk to Iraq’s security and the influence retained through him. The administration must hope that Allawi’s party is attempting to leverage its dissatisfaction, starting with al-Maliki’s resignation and negotiating until receiving its allocated ministries (and various political terms). Yet moving against him, whether to back him down or remove him, will find support amongst Iraqiya, the Kurds and even anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who views al-Maliki as a personal enemy.

al-Mutlaq claimed, “The Kurds are getting more convinced that continuing to support the al-Maliki government is a mistake... and maybe boycotting Parliament is one of the ways to pressure the government to change.”

Other analysts speculate that the Kurds could exchange al-Hashimi for political concessions from al-Maliki, but President Jalal Talabani appears to be pursuing an alternative course: bring national attention and power to Kurdish territory. His chief of staff, Dr. Fuad Hussein, denied that al-Hashimi evaded his warrant, hinting that Baghdad wasn’t safe for a fair trial. Talabani added, "He does not disagree with attending court. All he asks... is to transfer the place of trial from Baghdad to Kirkuk and he is ready to go to court in Kirkuk. This is an Iraqi city which belongs to the central government."

Washington and Baghdad’s mutual dilemma doesn’t revolve around a lack of U.S. troops, whose presence would inflame popular grievances, force another government dispute, play into Iran’s narrative and embolden al-Maliki’s consolidation. Relying on U.S. troops to patch Iraq's long-standing issues completely ignores the theories of COIN and fourth-generation warfare (4GW), which demand a non-military emphasis. The real mistake is giving al-Maliki free reign to squeeze Iraqiya out of the highest levels of power, a consequential trend for all segments of Iraqi society. Limiting his power would undermine Iran’s influence and appease Riyadh - potentially salvaging U.S. influence - so Washington’s inaction comes as a modest surprise.

Iraqis don’t need another strongman to lead the country from war to democracy. They need a statesman.

Syria Devolving Into Total Chaos

The Arab League’s mission in Syria has finally sprung a tangible leak. Whether Bashar al-Assad and his remaining allies in the League can plug this hole will be revealed shortly, as the mission cannot last much longer at its present rate. Amid a UN report that counted 400 dead in the last two weeks, the first monitors have begun to scurry off of Sudanese General Mohamed al-Dabi’s ship.

"Two monitors have excused themselves, an Algerian and an Sudanese," Syria operations chief Adnan Khodeir said at League headquarters in Cairo.

Anwar Malek presumably expected to find himself under immediate attack as the first deserter. Asked to estimate the ranks of his sympathizers, Malek would tell Reuters, "I cannot specify a number, but many.” When you talk to them their anger is clear.” The Algerian quickly attracted hostile fire from the Arab League and his own government, both of which denied his gruesome account of Syria’s cities. In a League statement, “Gen. Mohammed Al-Dabi, the head of the Arab monitors’ mission to Damascus, has confirmed that what the Malek said to a satellite channel does not relate to the truth in any way.”

“Since he was assigned to the Homs team, Malek did not leave the hotel for six days and did not go out with the rest of the team into the field giving the excuse that he was sick.”

The fallacy of this defense is easily demonstrable. First, Syrian protesters remark that anyone with eyes can see the conditions in oppositional cities; Malek could have looked outside and witnessed abuses in Homs. The conditions he reported match non-government accounts: "The snipers are everywhere shooting at civilians. People are being kidnapped. Prisoners are being tortured and none were released... The mission was a farce and the observers have been fooled.”

Meanwhile Secretary-General Nabil al-Arabi is alternating between bailing water and conceding his mission’s failure. After defending the League for increasing the number of protesters, removing military vehicles from cities and pushing violence pushed “to the outskirts,” as if this reaction was a positive development, al-Arabi confirmed the general content of Malek’s version. “The Syrian government isn’t acting in good faith,” he said, even telling Egyptian TV that he’s receiving “extremely worrying” reports from Dabi.

Thus Malek’s report cannot be as “baseless” as the Sudanese general labeled it.

More than one monitor is also jumping ship, burying the excuse that Malek remained inside during his deployment. New deserters include a Moroccan legal specialist, an aid worker from Djibouti and an Egyptian. Another observer told Reuters that he plans to leave on Friday, saying, "there are some people who are concerned about their safety... Some, from a professional perspective, feel they are not achieving anything." Mousab Azzawi of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights identified 11 more observers as candidates: seven Iraqis, two Kuwaitis and two Emiratis. The group had reportedly witnessed Syrian security open protesters in Deir el-Zour.

These events follow the death of French journalist Gilles Jacquier, who was killed during a grenade barrage in Homs. al-Assad’s regime naturally accused Syria’s National Council (SNC) and “terrorists” of the crime. Oppositional groups would return the accusation, and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe tacitly blamed the regime by announcing, "It's up to Syrian authorities to ensure the security of international journalists on their territory.” Although the League’s monitors aren’t necessary supposed to do anything more than watch, the impression of an untrained and ill-equipped force has poisoned the confidence that their final report will yield political action.

Facing a massive crisis of confidence, the League’s mission will struggle to survive its last week and the potential 30-day extension without an emergency response. Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani, told reporters after meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "I could not see up until now a successful mission, frankly speaking. We hope we will solve it, as we say, in the house of the Arabs, but right now the Syrian government is not helping us." Washington feels the same way, hoping for Arab solution that comes with the lowest regional price, yet this price is inevitably rising with al-Assad’s destructive behavior.

One League official in Cairo defended the organization’s lack of options, arguing, "This is not a problem with the Arab League. This is a problem with the international system. Who is willing to send in troops? Who is willing to send in a fighting force?... What is this team going to do? This team is not there to stop the violence. It is not there to pull back the military. It is not there to free prisoners. It is to verify. It is not a peacekeeping team.”

The natural barrier of deploying an inexperienced monitoring team into a conflict zone is yielding one overriding conclusion: the military option. Several League officials have acknowledged the possibility in recent days, only to argue that an operation requires 6-8 weeks to mobilize - too long for Syria’s opposition to wait. A political and military campaign can, of course, be organized simultaneously, however the League’s ideal response would maintain control of Syria’s political transition. More understandably, the League’s cumulative militaries seek to avoid al-Assad’s well-trained army in the field. Such a conflict will dwarf the battle against Gaddafi’s ragtag force and potentially draw foreign actors into a regional war.

In Moscow, Russian Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed to possess “information that NATO members and some Arab states of the Persian Gulf, acting in line with the scenario seen in Libya, intend to turn the current interference with Syrian affairs into a direct military intervention.”

This scenario may rest in the relative distance, but it’s also growing closer with each passing death, conspiracy and political breakdown. In fact al-Arabi just told Egypt’s Al Hayat, "Yes I fear a civil war and the events that we see and hear about now could lead to a civil war.” Patrushev speculated that “the main strike forces will be supplied not by France, Britain and Italy, but possibly by neighboring Turkey,” adding that Washington and Ankara are currently discussing a no-fly zone. Arab League officials have thrown Pakistan, a country familiar with UN peacekeeping missions, into a potential Arab coalition. These forces would theoretically link with the SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA) to conduct precise air and ground operations.

At this point Syria becomes too chaotic to predict with any realistic expectation of accuracy, save for the profuse bloodshed of open warfare between al-Assad and his opponents.

Three Myths of Ali Saleh’s Immunity

Although instrumental in drafting the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing agreement in Yemen, including an immunity clause for Ali Abdullah Saleh’s extensive family, the Obama administration has advanced the unpopular deal in determined silence. Offering limited information since mobilizing the GCC in April, the White House and State Department eventually guided a ratification process over objections from the UN's Human Rights Council and through the Security Council. October’s Resolution 2014 would reaffirm the GCC’s initiative in full, while adding “that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.”

The distance between “will be” and “should be” equals Saleh’s immunity.

That the U.S., European powers and Gulf states support the continuation of Saleh’s regime over Yemen’s revolutionaries is well documented. Never, though, had the Obama administration explicitly articulated America’s support for the GCC’s immunity clause until Monday, when the State Department’s Victoria Nuland coolly defended Saleh’s special privileges.

“I think you’ll remember that as part of the GCC transition initiative, which President Saleh ultimately signed and which Vice President Hadi and the opposition are working together to try to implement now, there was a provision of immunity for President Saleh and those who worked with him during the period of his government. However, that had to be put into law, so that’s what they’re working on now. This is part and parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be able to move forward towards a democratic future.”

The influx of information over Saleh’s status requires extensive disassembling.

1. Immunity is the quickest way to end Yemen’s revolution

The White House’s public argument remains unchanged despite an increasing level of exposure: Saleh and dozens of relatives must be coaxed out of power to “move Yemen forward.” Immunity is critical to uprooting Saleh’s network and implementing the GCC’s terms before February 21st’s presidential election. Perhaps immunity remains the “quickest” way to end Yemen’s “crisis,” however this possibility isn’t as indisputable as the Obama administration argues. The natural counterargument is that immunity encourages Saleh’s destructive behavior, as it has since the Saudi-bankrolled GCC launched its initiative in May.

The GCC’s protection is trending towards the opposite end of the White House’s stated goal: “giving these guys confidence that their era is over.” Instead Saleh has been provided with an internationally-legitimized tool to stall his exit and maintain influence afterward. Confident that his regime survived the GCC’s “transition,” Saleh has taken Western and GCC leniency as his cue to act as he sees fit, whether inside or outside of Yemen. The strongman invited himself to New York City, then “postponed” his trip after suspecting that he wouldn’t be received as President (returning didn’t appear to be an issue). Twice he has returned from Saudi Arabia, rumored as his new vacation spot, and he will almost certainly return again before February 21st.

A minority of protesters remain open to Saleh’s immunity and exile so long as his regime follows, but this deal is preemptively compromised by other aspects of the GCC’s initiative. Saleh has already ignored a 30-day deadline to transfer executive power to his Vice President, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi; this “power struggle” is now being sold by Western capitals as political cover. Hadi did reach a combative state with Saleh’s family, primarily his son Ahmed, while filling in during Saleh’s medical leave to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s 17-year VP also submitted an immunity draft covering “all those who worked with him [Saleh] during his presidency across all civilian, military and security apparatuses.”

Saleh still expects to lead Hadi’s campaign as a consensus candidate between his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). He has no intention of turning apolitical during the ensuing two-year transitional period.

The theory that Saleh will accept immunity over his loss of power commits a dangerous psychological error by appealing to reason. Washington as a whole publicly alternates between acknowledging Saleh’s renowned duplicity and pleading ignorance, leaking a story about "getting played" amid conditional approval for an American visa. His behavior suggests that he would rather be dead than powerless, a level of stubbornness mirrored in the Obama administration’s refusal to let go of his regime. Western and Gulf capitals continue to minimize Yemen’s revolution as a “crisis” to be resolved ASAP, demanding an end according to their time-lines and interests.

Saleh and his foreign allies want the revolution over fast, not done right - a mindset that has prolonged low-intensity conflicts throughout the last half-century. Yemen's Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) recently advised, "The GCC Initiative, with or without its Implementation Mechanism, was not and could not be answerable to the genuine legitimate demands of the Yemeni people, in the immediate future or after a hundred years."

2. Immunity is necessary to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

The complimentary theory to immunity centers around AQAP, now described as al-Qaeda’s most evolved branch and one of America’s greatest threats. This theory contends that, by removing Saleh and his inner circle from Yemen’s equation, the country can “return to normal”; counter-terrorism units can switch from killing protesters to militants in the southern governorates. This theory may be true to an extent, since Saleh grew adroit at manipulating AQAP’s growth and allegedly funding proxy jihadists. The intense battle for Yemen’s Abyan, Aden and Ma'rib governorates is a byproduct of his misrule, and Saleh's own general admitted to being abandoned over the summer. Other U.S. technology and ammunition was redeployed against Yemen's Southern Movement (SM) or shifted to the Houthis' northern front.

If a government comes into power with no need to blackmail the international community or divert military assistance away from counter-terrorism, the U.S. could finally join a capable partner in defeating AQAP.

Unfortunately this theory isn’t much tighter than Saleh’s immunity, essentially weighing Yemen’s military sphere above its political and social levels. The battle against AQAP is more ideological than physical, and removing Saleh through a legitimate process would inflict greater damage than cushioning his downfall. International headlines now read “U.S. defends Saleh’s immunity,” the literal manifestation of al-Qaeda’s ideology. Only a handful of Yemenis have joined AQAP - revolutionaries want nothing to do with al-Qaeda - but many recruits must have America's support for Saleh at the front of their minds.

These fighters could be turned upside-down and isolated (or reconverted) by defending Yemen’s democratic movement, but their ideology is currently validated by Washington’s cooperation with the regime. Prolonging Saleh’s rule through the GCC’s initiative also ensures that the south remains unstable, and that his opportunistic military partnership will continue. Yemen’s uprising and AQAP are viewed independently, as if one must end to combat the other, when AQAP should be disintegrated within a just conclusion to the revolution.

Congress appears more concerned with the star power of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP’s former cleric and propagandist, than the recruiting power of U.S. policy.

3. Immunity in the name of democracy

Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, made modest headlines last week after warning Yemen’s GCC-approved “unity government” against granting immunity for crimes against humanity. Pillay’s comments may appear honest, but directing criticism at the remnants of Saleh’s regime is grossly manipulative; the UNSC is guilty of violating its own “international human rights obligations.” Hadi, the GPC and JMP are simply doing what the UNSC ordered them to do in October.

No aspect of the GCC’s initiative is truly democratic. Organized by Saleh and his foreign allies, GCC negotiations intentionally circumvented Yemen’s youth and civil movement through the unpopular JMP. Transparency is lacking across the GCC’s proposal, from its extensive negotiations to Saleh’s signature in Riyadh, to February’s ambiguous election and oversight of Yemen’s military command. No official copy of the GCC's initiative has been released, forcing protesters to guess what happens next, nor is Yemen a GCC member. All parts of the initiative, especially its power-sharing and immunity terms, are designed to confuse and divide Yemen’s opposition.

The GCC's papers are also stained by the blood of thousands of protesters, generating and whitewashing their deaths in the same cycle. Yemen’s revolutionaries are left without any semblance of justice - and with a gruesome impression of international law.

On a shadowy level, the Obama administration is using the GCC’s initiative to conceal ongoing military support for Saleh’s regime. Drone strikes have killed an undisclosed number of civilians along with their intended targets, including al-Awlaki's 16-year old son Abdulrahman, and the U.S.-funded Republican Guard and Central Security Organization continue to spearhead Saleh’s urban crackdown. Backing immunity admits these crimes by default, but Washington still hopes to avoid the spectacle of a trial and Saleh’s inevitable snitching.

Granting his immunity has nothing to do with genuine democracy, only the political expediency of external powers.

Syrian Opposition Stuck Between AL, UN

Protesters feel the bullets whiz above their heads - if they’re lucky - as they dodge between streets and allies. Higher above them snaps the fire of international powers as they vie for control of Syria’s potential transition, and finally the deafening cannon of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the Arab League’s generally accepted failure in stopping widespread bloodshed, the bloc’s mission is fulfilling another purpose by gradually breaking down relations with Damascus.

Sadly this dissolution comes with high casualties and increased polarization. The League’s current cycle has been stuck on repeat since November, when the bloc first introduced a transitional initiative to end Syria’s revolution. Last week encapsulated the previous two months: political maneuvering, inconclusive weekend meetings and daily death tolls. Monday began with another reported massacre in the Khalidiyeh neighborhood of Homs. Local activist Omar Homsi claimed that “Syrian security forces fired at protesters after noon prayer,” and that an AL delegation fled the scene without documentation. al-Assad is also amending his tactics to include more crowd-control measures (tear gas, water cannons, and nail bombs).

Syrian activist Amal Hanano submitted a blueprint of Damascus’s “new” gameplan to Foreign Policy: “The observers' arrival changed the rules of the game. The regime sends spies to take pictures of the protesters who dare speak to the observers. Before every excursion, the streets are secured in any way necessary, by bullets or arrests (for the safety of the observers or to preserve what's left of the regime's tarnished image?). The streets of Deraa have to be scrubbed clean of its people, silencing their voices and erasing any sign of dissent, to present an image of control, safely guarded by snipers lurking on rooftops.”

Unsatisfied with Cairo’s conclusion that Damascus “only partly implemented” the League’s initiative - protesters contend that none of the League’s demands have been met - Syria’s opposition launched their latest media offensive to seize the country’s narrative. Pledging to increase the number of monitors from 165 to 200 remains a futile attempt to boost confidence in the League’s mission, given that 1,000 monitors could still be guided by Syrian authorities. Quoting a protester from Deraa, where one AL monitor sparked a furor after spotting or not spotting snipers, Hanano explains how the mission couldn’t visit a funeral because no transportation was available.

Reporting from inside the mission’s media bubble, CNN’s Nic Robertson observed, “the Arab monitors who are here... are largely seen as ineffective. The language that they use, they do not criticize the government here even though the government hasn't met what the Arab League is telling it to do in terms of pulling weapons and troops off the street.”

This pervading lack of confidence has rendered the League’s mission dead in the water, leaving its monitors to float through al-Assad’s carnage until their overview is submitted on January 19th. Syria’s opposition cannot afford to wait another 9 days without any political motion, as time equals lives and the potential for wider conflict. One particular group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), has already lost faith in the League’s mission and publicly expressed its intent to attack (with arms purchased from multiple sources) if the UN doesn’t assume observer duties. Most Syrian groups seem to be coalescing around these terms in the absence of new political action and clarification. Rami Abdulrahman, head of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, warned against "giving the regime more time to deal with the Syrian revolution.”

"The initial report is too vague, and it essentially buys the regime more time," said Rima Fleihan, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC). “We need to know what the League will do if the regime continues its crackdown in the presence of the monitors. At one point it needs to refer Syria to the U.N. Security Council."

Syria’s Local Coordination Committees (LCC) proposed its demands as follows: "Immediately announcing that the Arab observers have failed in their mission, referring the Syrian file to the UN Security Council, paving the way for imposing a no-fly zone and establishing a safe corridor for protecting the military defectors."

Accordingly, a spokesman for the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) continues to strike a more optimistic tone, saying the League’s presence has “reinvigorated” Syria’s revolution and “decreased the number of protesters killed.” These points, though true, come with substantial qualifiers. Protesters are massing to prove their existence and dare al-Assad to shoot in front of the League -and he hasn’t blinked. Dozens of dead and wounded have been documented daily since the observers arrived on December 23rd.

“Any talk of foreign intervention is an illusion, the Arab League initiative is the only way forward,” Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir said after meeting with AL Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby in Cairo.

Ideally, Syria’s opposition must reach a compromise before the League receives its full report. However the middle ground might have been destroyed by al-Assad’s bombardment, and closing the schism between the NCC and SNC, LCC and FSA essentially requires the NCC to cede its position. The NCC may feel more comfortable with UN oversight if Syria’s other networks can provide guarantees of political leadership, a task that the SNC has failed to accomplish. Somewhat reassuringly, SNC spokeswoman Basma Kadmani argued, "There is no major difference on foreign intervention... we have agreed on a joint formulation of what foreign intervention means and how it should come about if it were to come about."

Regardless of their alignment, counter-proposals from every network must be shared and ready for immediate broadcast.

The possibility of UN intervention has created a parallel gap within the Arab League, applying considerable friction to its relations with al-Assad (which may benefit the opposition by accelerating a transfer). Al Jazeera counts Elaraby as a believer in his own mission, explaining his close relations with the NCC. Meanwhile the “anti-Assad” capitals, led by Qatar, are giving him ammo to criticize the League’s mission and potentially shut it down on his terms (another potential accelerator to the UN).

"If the report comes out saying the violence has not stopped, the Arab League will have a responsibility to act on that," Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told a news conference in Cairo.

With the League’s mission set to continue relatively unchanged, al-Thani’s statements cut to the short-term endgame. Perhaps some benefit will be produced if the monitors return with reams of evidence and a complete picture to report, and if al-Assad’s non-compliance results in punitive action. Yet al-Thani, tough as he acts, has issued similar warnings for months. al-Assad shouldn’t be too concerned if Qatar poses his biggest threat. After al-Thani urged the detached dictator to “take a historic decision,” Syria’s Permanent Representative at the Arab League blasted him for “speaking on behalf of the Syrian people.”

al-Assad drowned out his officials on Tuesday with a hard-line, two-hour speech at Damascus University: “The Arab League failed for six decades to protect Arab interests. We shouldn’t be surprised it’s failed today.”

Blaming Western powers, the Arab League and “hundreds of media outlets” for instigating their revolution could form the glue that sticks Syria’s opposition together. Claiming that “external conspiracy is clear to everybody” sounds like a natural bond, and any skeptic of al-Assad’s violent mania should realize that he has no intention of ceding power. “We will declare victory soon” equates to a death sentence (al-Assad says no orders were given “for anyone to open fire on any citizen”). As the situation currently stands, the Arab League and Western powers have yet to break from al-Assad’s regime and his Eastern connections. However these counter-revolutionary forces are drifting away from each other, necessitating unity amongst Syria’s pro-democracy movement.

“The divisions are getting bigger, and I think we can expect the situation here - at the moment, stable - to deteriorate in the future,” Robertson concludes. “That's the direction it's going in.”