The U.S.-Taliban Assassination Challenge

Assassination, whether internal or external, obviously isn’t a new phenomena in Afghanistan. Mohammed Zahir Shah, the “Father of the Nation,” began his four-decade reign in 1933 after a teenager gunned down his father, King Mohammed Nadir Shah. The Soviet Union would birth its war from a crucible of KGB bloodshed, taking down three presidents - Mohammed Daoud Khan, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin - between 1978 and 1979. Two days before 9/11, al-Qaeda gunmen would assassinate Ahmad Shah Massoud, a key Tajik mujahideen leader during the Soviet invasion and founder of the Taliban’s future enemy, the North Alliance.

Like Moscow's ill-advised invasion, America’s tireless gears of war have accelerated Afghanistan's grisly legacy. Hamid Karzai counts himself lucky to have survived four assassination attempts since 2002. His charismatic half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, ran out of fortune when a “trusted, anti-Taliban” bodyguard shot him in the head in his own office. The same death had greeted General Khan Mohammed Mujahid, Kandahar’s police chief, in April, but Ahmed’s assassination rocked the Greater Kandahar area. Many of the loose ends he had tied together through influence, cunning and brute force now attached themselves to a void inside Kandahar’s provincial council. Then, on the following Saturday, the Taliban only needed two operatives to deceive and eliminate Jan Mohammad Khan, Karzai’s strongman in the neighboring Oruzgan province.

All the while, with Reapers lurking overhead, U.S. and Afghan Special Forces have hunted Taliban day and night.

Yet in spite of this tactic’s familiarity, the Taliban’s latest assassination spree does indicate a new pattern; rather than a strategic shortcut to power, the insurgency has crafted a majority of its future strategy around premium targets. This “counter-assassination” campaign is synchronized with President Barack Obama’s surge to the degree that coincidence is improbable. As the insurgency’s shadow governors parallel the government to vie for control of the battlefield, parallel assassinations are designed to undermine America’s surge and cancel out their own high-ranking losses.

Death By Statistics

The Taliban only had to watch Obama’s short speeches to know that an onslaught was coming. While his surge’s intensity may have exceeded expectations - The Associated Press reports “mild concern” in the CIA over David Petraeus’s pattern of killing high-level commanders - America’s blitzkrieg invasion couldn’t have been forgotten after just 10 years. One must assume that the Taliban (roughly) expected a 40% increase in Special Forces operatives, raising their level above 5,000, and a 50% increase in operations.

In June Vice Adm. William McRaven, head of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), testified that 1,700 night-raids were conducted under Petraeus’s 13 months in Afghanistan, grabbing over 900 low and mid-level leaders. Coalition warplanes also fired their weapons on 5,831 sorties, a 65% increase from the previous 12 months. NATO’s figures for 2011 boast of an astronomical 2,832 special operations raids between April and July alone, resulting in the capture of 2,941 insurgents and killing of 834.

The AP notes, “That's twice the number captured or killed during the same period a year ago, when special operations forces captured more than 1,350 insurgents and killed 1,031 in roughly the same number of raids.” And with U.S. forces leaning more and more on counter-terrorism, The New York Times reported last week, “the military’s dependence on the night raids... may only increase as the United States reduces its troops over the next three years.”

So maybe the Taliban didn’t expect this level of intensity, or perhaps its ranks never experienced the full brunt. In June investigative reporter Gareth Porter recorded the Pentagon’s own statistics as showing 80% of some 5,000 captured “Taliban” had been released within two weeks due to a lack of affiliation. Many U.S. officials including McRaven defend their night-raids with 80%; targets are secured 80% of the time and 85% without a shot fired. Conflicting statistics from have fueled an endless debate over whether the Taliban’s rate of attack is dropping.

“This just means that they have less capacity; they have been degraded somewhat,” Petraeus said of the nascent downtrend. “This is the first real indicator — for the first time since 2006 — compared to the previous year, insurgent attack numbers are lower.”

For what it’s worth, annual U.S. casualties in June and July are down to 47 and 29 from 60 and 65. However these numbers are swallowed within the Afghanistan's overall narrative. The argument over the Taliban’s effectiveness will go on indefinitely, as the population is less secure and the government no stronger than 2010. According to Afghanistan's NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the Taliban launched 54% more attacks and killed or wounded 56% more U.S. troops from October 2010 through May 2011. Petraeus himself now claims that U.S. gains are “fragile and reversible.”

The Taliban could also maintain 20,000 fighters even after losing 10,000 if an estimated 30,000 in 2010 and 2011. The U.S. is betting that it can kill another 10,000-15,000 Taliban in the next three years (and that the group won’t be able to recruit when “losing”) while the Taliban is betting that it can erode the government quicker than the U.S. can deplete its forces.

Thus the Taliban’s own assassination campaign perfectly aligns with America’s strategy of strong-arming the group into favorable negotiations. While Petraeus and company busy themselves highlighting U.S. metrics, the Taliban continue to succeed undermining the government’s authority and credibility. Imitation is not a sign of flattery in war, but a piece of the battle-line between two enemies, each evolving its tactics and strategy in a never-ending war of adaptation. During 2011's spring offensive, the Taliban has inflicted its main damage not by retaking territory or piling up coalition kills, but by copying America’s surge in night-raids and drone strikes.

Karzai Faces Death's Reflection

Gunning down a police chief or provincial chairman seems like common sense from an insurgent’s point of view. However the Taliban is now running most of its narrative through political assassination, selecting each target for maximum impact. The first objective is simple enough: prove that the government is too weak to defend its own officials, let alone 28 million Afghans. Attacks on foreign aid workers and infiltration of the Afghan security forces disseminate this message at the lower levels, while high-ranking kills send shocks to the top. As U.S. officials have attempted to justify security through its kill count, so too has the Taliban used assassination to demonstrate the opposite.

A parallel assassination campaign naturally creates multiple parallels; the exact matching of U.S. and Taliban goals fully illuminates their assassination race. As the U.S. portrays the Taliban as weak, the Taliban has portrayed the government as weak. As the U.S. depicts the Taliban as fearful, exhausted and in disarray, the Taliban has accentuated the government’s frailty. Afghan opposition to night-raids will never fade and the Taliban wisely targeted a major source in Karzai and Khan, both of whom were subsequently accused of feeding information to U.S. Special Forces. Even Karzai’s assassin, Sardar Mohammad, was allegedly flipped from working with U.S. hunter/killer teams.

Mirroring these very units, the Taliban is bringing fear directly into the houses of government officials.

Local officials, businessmen and analysts alike now view Karzai’s inner circle in total disarray after losing his brother and Khan, who was considered a family warlord. It turns out that two Taliban tricked Khan’s entire guard before eliminating him. Masood Bakhtawar, a close friend of Khan’s, retold the story to Al Jazeera: "It is difficult to believe that two young students, from the mountains of Uruzgan, could put up a fight against an elite force for two hours.” The theory that the Taliban cannot replace its skilled operatives finally reflected onto Karzai’s inner circle - except his half-brother's death is more significant than Osama bin Laden’s within Afghanistan's particular theater.

The government's argument that the Taliban is too weak to fight back conventionally is ultimately negated by the insurgency’s strategy. Although operating in the open does indicate a higher level of strength, guerrillas aren't supposed to confront numerically and technologically superior forces. Transitioning to a distinct campaign of assassination offset internal loses without easing pressure on the government’s nerve system. This strategy forfeits the short-term for the long-term: cede the battlefield to foreign forces, undermine their progress by removing local and national leadership, then re-infiltrate territory as U.S. and NATO forces gradually withdraw.

Petraeus turned “we cannot kill our way out” into a brief catchphrase when he assumed command in June 2010. Then he tried to do just that. Now, with several pinpoint strikes, the Taliban have undone a year of “progress” in Kandahar and re-seized Afghanistan's narrative.

They had no need to out-bomb the Pentagon and CIA - the plan has always been to outsmart and outlast them.

Yemen’s Three-Way Transitional Council

After six months of peaceful protests and no end of the regime in sight, Yemen’s revolutionaries have announced three transitional councils since last Saturday. First Tawakul Karman, a member of Yemen’s Islah party, announced a 17-member “Youth Revolution Council” independent of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), to which Islah belongs. The JMP soon followed with its own “National Council for the Forces of the Revolution,” with the stated objective of uniting the Houthis, Southern Movement, civil coalitions and popular opposition groups. The JMP says a formal declaration will be issued on August 1st.

For the time being the youth coalitions have opted for their own platform, announcing a revolutionary council from Change Square on Thursday.

Two perspectives split from these three groups. Unifying Yemen’s political opposition has been as challenging as expected, and internal competition may arise from their power plays. Karman’s council met initial opposition before the shock wore off (Yemen’s leading female activist is know to act on her own), while the unpopular JMP’s “counter council” has provoked new suspicions. Neither street council is as weak as U.S. officials claim, locking them in stalemate with political and tribal opposition. On Friday Khaled Al-Ansi, a founder of Karman’s council, said that most members had responded positively after their surprise announcement. The council had been dubbed “Towakil and Khaled al-Ansi’s council” by some protesters, and ensuing councils from the JMP and youth coalitions suggest a persistent divergence.

Conversely, separate entities might merge into a functioning construct that would protect their objectives and identities: the urban youth, tribal blocs and political opposition would check and balances themselves. They also need each other’s mass to outweigh the ruling General People’s Party (GPC) and resistant military officials. Karman’s council includes former president Ali Nasser Mohammed, former defense minister General Abdullah Ali Aleiwa and Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas, Prime Minister from 1990 to 1994 and a figure within the Yemeni Socialist Party. The JMP’s council will presumably include its own heavyweights.

Both groups need the youth’s vigor as much as the youth need their political and military muscle. Although gridlock could easily result, Karman’s goals suggest no weakening to the despised GCC initiative. Her council’s three priorities begin with the abolishment of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, followed by management of the transitional period to an election, and finally the prosecution of Saleh, his son, nephews and all other officials involved in human rights abuses against the Yemeni people.

The fluidity of events has limited information on these groups’ relations. We are working to clarify their interconnection and will update when a more accurate picture becomes available.

Winds of Change Rocking Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet

Press TV broke some “interesting news” on Thursday, as anchor Saeed Pourreza remarked when he appeared to receive an on-air update.

Whether he proceeded to break The Times’s story or vice versa, Pourreza announced that the Obama administration is scouting a new home for America’s Fifth Fleet, currently stranded in Bahrain. The Australian would pick the story up and run, giving “Capital Hill” too much credit for debating the issue “within days of the protests breaking out.” No part of the U.S. government has demonstrated foresight in the Arab Spring.

A story like the Fifth Fleet, though, was too big not to automatically trigger Washington’s denial mechanism. Late night an anonymous State Department official told The Huffington Post, “We are aware of these reports, which do not reflect the views of either the departments of State or Defense.” Just so that everyone was clear, Fifth Fleet public affairs officer Commander Amy Derrick-Frost told Gulf News, “The speculation in the London Times article about Fifth Fleet leaving Bahrain is false.”

The two officials then voiced identical support for King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa: “Diplomatically, we regard Bahrain as an important partner, while the U.S. Navy has a long-standing relationship of more than 60 years with Bahrain.”

No one can deny this fact. Many Bahrainis happen to view their government’s close relationship with Washington as part of their problem. But with the State Department official stepping too far out on a limb - “the United States continues to support all of the ongoing efforts that are necessary to promote reconciliation among Bahrainis and to advance necessary reforms” - the U.S. Navy’s bluster quickly dissipates. No plans exist to move the Fifth Fleet for the moment, only because no feasible options lie on the Persian Gulf’s horizon.

One thing is certain: the Naval Support Activity Bahrain affords the most advantageous placement of the U.S. Navy’s forward presence, specifically against Iran. The Navy also maintains full control over NSA Bahrain, a Guantánamo Bay that Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s governments actually welcome. No alternative of its kind exists; moving is a political and logistics nightmare because NSA Bahrain is the Fifth Fleet’s ideal base. Yet King Hamad’s regime has grown too shaky for the Pentagon to ignore entirely, reverberating a forceful denial in the opposite direction.

Two sites under consideration in the media - Qatar and the UAE - share pros and cons. Both states have experienced negligible unrest during the Arab Spring due to a combination of factors, including lower unemployment and poverty, and maintain extensive trade relations with America (a point of leverage for both sides). Each state also hosts U.S. personnel and logistics that could link up to their ports. Situated west of Doha, Al Udeid Air Base quarters the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (ACC) and several strike groups. Jebel Ali, the Middle East’s largest port, already refuels numerous U.S. Naval craft and has erected facilities to accommodate a supercarrier.

Neither port, however, is equipped for the Fifth Fleet’s total capacity, estimated between 30-40 ships and 16,000-30,000 personnel. Naval Forces Central Command lists its staff at 28,000.

Barring a complete meltdown in Bahrain and a reactive eviction, the Fifth Fleet won’t be moving until a personalized base can be established in the next 2-4 years. The practical considerations of relocating outweigh the existential threat that Bahrain’s monarchy finds itself under, bottlenecking a rapid solution. In case of emergency a patch-work strategy may split the Fleet between Doha and Dubai, while the U.S. Air Force would theoretically function as a stop-gap.

If worst comes to worst though, King Abdul Aziz Sea Port appears to be the most attractive alternative. Located right across the King Fahd Causeway, roughly 30 miles away in Ad Dammām, the Saudi port would make a natural home for the Fifth Fleet. Although the port may be insufficient to house the entire array of vessels, no state would be more accommodating that King Abdullah. His port could renew domestic unease in America and come with a hefty price, however the move makes sense logistically and geopolitically.

Once the dust cleared from Hosni Mubarak’s fall, Obama administration has eagerly adhered to Riyadh’s counter-revolution. As National Security Adviser Tom Donilon would tell you, America and Saudi Arabia share “fundamental, fundamental” interests.

For this reason discounting a move entirely is impossible. One of these shared interests happens to be Bahrain’s faltering “National Dialogue,” which both governments support in order to avert regime change. The move predictably backfired as King Hamad treated the dialogue as the political tool that it is. Unless he and his foreign strong-arms decide to hold a serious dialogue over Bahrain’s inequalities, his government will find itself confronted with a rising swell of opposition against the Sunni monarchy.

Trapped on the same island by the same problems, Washington and Riyadh don’t have many allies to turn to except each other.

Inside Washington’s Propaganda Factory

The U.S. Embassy in Sana’a has run the Senate’s hearing on Yemen through Washington's propaganda machine. Boasting of this monstrosity is the latest evidence of a disjointed White House:

Washington — Yemen is confronting an array of political, economic, social and security challenges, and the current crisis there is making other issues worse, a senior U.S. State Department official says.

The political crisis Yemen faces has worsened such issues as unemployment, the effects of a rapidly growing population, weak state institutions, declining government revenue, a growing scarcity of natural resources and violent extremism, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Janet Sanderson said at a U.S. Senate committee hearing July 19.

“Consistent with U.S. national interests, we have adopted a two-pronged strategy for Yemen: helping the government confront the immediate security threat represented by al-Qaida, and mitigating serious political, economic and governance issues that the country faces over the long term, the drivers of instability,” Sanderson said in prepared testimony.

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs met to evaluate the complex set of policy challenges facing the United States in Yemen, Subcommittee Chairman Robert Casey said. That examination comes amid five months of protests and political unrest in Yemen.

“During this historic period of sweeping change in countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, Yemen often gets overlooked,” Casey said. “However, as a result of the power vacuum caused by President [Ali Abdullah] Saleh’s departure to Saudi Arabia in June, there are serious concerns over the government’s ability to prevent al-Qaida from gaining a foothold or, I should say, a stronghold in the country, as well as broader concerns about the growing humanitarian and economic crises that are plaguing Yemen today.”

Casey said al-Qaida’s presence in Yemen is not new, but in the past several years it has grown increasingly worrisome both in the region and in the West. Saleh, who has ruled Yemen since 1978, was wounded in a bomb attack June 3 and was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia, where he is recovering from injuries sustained in the attack.

During her testimony, Sanderson, who is a deputy secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, said that while the situation in Yemen remains fluid, the solution must come from the Yemeni people with assistance from international partners such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Saudi Arabia. The GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

“Conditions in Yemen continue to deteriorate under the pressure of growing protests and increasing divisions throughout the country,” Sanderson said.

Yemen is buffeted by widespread inflation and the threat of a food shortage this summer, she said. These factors tend to indicate a potential economic crisis in the coming months.

“The goal of the U.S. and international efforts is a stable, secure, prosperous and effectively governed Yemen,” Sanderson said. But she conceded that it is an ambitious, long-term goal that demands a deep and ongoing coordination with the Yemeni government and its partners.

“We will be able to more effectively engage in Yemen once the Yemeni government initiates the political transition and identifies its way forward,” she said.

Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s counter-terrorism coordinator, said the Saleh government had been working closely with the United States in its struggle to curb efforts by the terrorist group al-Qaida. Cooperation has fallen off and terrorists have taken advantage of a lack of security in various regions of the country as a result of the political uncertainty and internal conflicts, Benjamin said.

“Our political efforts are just one element of our work in Yemen,” Benjamin testified. “We are implementing a multifaceted strategy designed to address the terrorist activity that threatens Yemen and the United States, as well as the causes underlying Yemen’s instability.”

The strategy seeks to improve the country’s overall economic stability, increase the sustainable and equitable delivery of services and improve local governance and civic participation, he added.

A part of the counterterrorism strategy is to build the capacity of Yemen’s security forces to counter al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Benjamin said.

U.S. Calls In German Strike on Yemen

After piling alleged “tough-talk” onto Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Jay Carney found himself confronted today for issuing only a passing mention on Tuesday. The White House’s spokesman has been justifiably consumed by America’s deficit crisis and the “Gang of Six,” except the administration’s poor handling of the Arab Spring is conspicuously blocked out of the U.S. debate. Told that the administration seems “relatively quiet on the subject of Syria as of late,” and asked whether he had any comment on recent developments, Carney answered as solidly as a shaky response could be.

“Simply that - I mean, we don’t have - I mean, not since the last time I addressed this. We continue to condemn the violence. We believe that President Assad has lost his legitimacy. He had the opportunity to lead the transition that the Syrian people are demanding, and he has not followed up or taken that opportunity. That’s regrettable, because there will be - there has to be a transition. The Syrian people are demanding that there be one.”

As usual, neither Carney nor his challenger paused to hear the deathly silence over Egypt, Bahrain or Yemen’s ongoing revolutions, three uprisings the Obama administration has come to fear and loath.

Despite a carousel of U.S. officials labeling al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as America’s new “greatest threat,” few areas are treated with greater silence than Yemen. While U.S. military operations continue to escalate, the White House and State Department have shut down on the political and information fronts. On Friday, when State spokesman Mark Toner last addressed the health of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, no further contacts had been made after John Brennan’s visit. Since then only two low-level officials have deployed to contain a whirlwind of transitional councils, anti-U.S. protests and government hostility, with an assassination attempt inside the eye.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must be too busy in Syria, or Libya, or India. Anywhere but Yemen, one of the weakest links in U.S. foreign policy.

The Obama administration’s systemic failure has led the White House to contract its dirty work to European Union, whose diplomats rigorously adhere to the U.S. line by co-sponsoring the Gulf Cooperation Council’s “30/60 initiative.” The deal, negotiated between Saleh’s regime and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) would grant Saleh and his family of commanders immunity in exchange for exile, while also rewarding his party with 50% of a transition council. Viewed as a flagrant violation of their revolution, protesters have denounced the GCC’s “power transfer” - and held more than one mock burial - since its birth in April.

Yet that hasn’t stopped U.S. or E.U. officials from declaring it “the only way forward in Yemen.” On Monday, in response to a transitional council announced by Tawakul Karman, UK ambassador Jonathan Wiliks warned that no international state would recognize the council. (Wonder who he’s talking about?) On Tuesday Janet Sanderson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, voiced full support for the GCC’s initiative, testifying to Congress, "We will be able to more effectively engage in Yemen once the Yemeni government initiates the political transition and identifies its way forward.” Washington remained silent as Saleh’s forces took a shot at Mohammed Yadoumi, a JMP leader, then summoned the Germans on Thursday for their turn on the front line.

According to reports from The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Michael Klor-Berchtold told Saleh in Riyadh, "the GCC initiative is currently the only way to prevent a possible escalation of tensions to armed conflict.”

As the head of Germany’s “crisis response center” at its Foreign Office, Klor-Berchtold later traveled to Sana’a for talks with government officials and the opposition, a “mission had been closely coordinated with Riyadh, Washington and key European allies.” U.S.-Saudi manipulation of whole episode is utterly transparent, a rare moment of clarity in their response. Klor-Berchtold’s visit follows a controversial German-Saudi arms deal agreed to sell 200 Leopard 2A7+ tanks, some of the most advanced on the market. Berlin’s participation in Washington and Riyadh’s counter-revolution is painfully obvious in Yemen.

Thursday unfolded like Monday in more ways than silence and a E.U. envoy too. Yemen’s government has announced a series of quick victories and AQAP casualties over the last week, all designed to prove Saleh’s worth against “terrorism.” Today another kill was claimed, Ayad al-Shabwani of Abyan governorate, who ranges from “a commander in Abyan” to a “senior commander in AQAP.” While his death may be true, the battle between the government and its sponsored militants, AQAP and local tribes is a tangled mass of proxies. Substantial evidence exists that Saleh’s regime has choreographed a takeover of southern Yemen to first scare the West, then demonstrate his cooperation against AQAP.

For example, the government claims that Zinjibar’s siege has just been broken - and with U.S. support no less. Somehow “a Yemeni army brigade composed of thousands of troops had been surrounded by militants for the past two weeks.” Estimated around 500 insurgents - many of which the government claims to have killed - AQAP’s the entire force is unlikely to congregate in one area. Only now though, after “weeks of pleas for support,” has the government sent its first reinforcements to break the “siege” around the 25th Mechanized Brigade. Local residents say the event, which began in late May, is largely manufactured and that many of the dead are either civilians, anti-government tribesmen or government-sponsored militants employed to copy AQAP’s specter.

Abdo al-Janadi, Saleh’s deputy information minister, revealed this much through his own propaganda, telling a news conference, "The American forces are helping Yemen in its fight against Al-Qaeda... They helped the army by bringing in food supplies when they were besieged by Al-Qaeda members.” U.S. airstrikes on militant bases also changed the battlefield, he said. Al-Janadi then insinuated that the JMP was responsible for the assassination attempt on Saleh, when many Yemenis suspect an internal plot amongst his family.

Whatever the circumstances in Zinjibar, al-Janadi’s remarks form a standard disinformation warhead.

Meanwhile the U.S.-trained Republican Guard and Central Security force continue to assault peaceful protesters, just as they have throughout six months of revolution. A statement on Islah’s website accused “a US-trained Yemeni counterterrorism unit” or killing over 40 tribesmen and wounding dozens more in Arhab, a district on the outskirts of Sana’a. The Republican Guard had sent a unit, “trained and supported by the United States and Britain,” with “full and modern equipment” to commit what they labeled “more crimes and abuses.” Elsewhere in Taiz, Yemen’s second epicenter of revolution, the Republican Guard attempted to disperse peaceful protesters with tear gas and live bullets, killing a child.

For months brutal acts such as these have been committed by U.S.-trained and funded soldiers. Each casualty has met silence in Washington, followed by an order for Saleh to sign the GCC’s initiative and “move the country forward.” Contrary to mainstream reporting, Saleh isn’t the only obstacle standing in the way of Yemen’s revolution. Washington is washing a finger, not its hands, of his regime.

U.S. policy has reached a despicable state in Yemen. As if Lord of War is stuck on repeat in the White House, the Obama administration continues to back the GCC’s initiative through European proxies while its Yemeni proxies assault AQAP and slaughter the innocent.

U.S., Saleh Shoot at JMP Leader

Last night the Obama administration leaked “new details” of its own assassination attempt in Yemen, an overt maneuver to justify ongoing military operations in the country. Today a real assassination attempt unfolded when gunmen opened fire on the car of Mohammed Yadoumi, head of the al-Islah party. Islah forms one of six components of the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), which has trapped itself between the regime and Yemen’s revolutionaries by approving the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) “power transfer.”

The JMP promptly responded that the shooting was an attempt to legitimize Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime through chaos, a warning that applies equally to al-Alwaki’s “near miss.” According a statement released by the group, firing on Yadoumi’s car marked, "an attempt at escalation and to reshuffle the deck, and push the country to civil war, under the illusion that this will enable them to remain in power.”

An official with the Interior Ministry told Xinhua that the attackers were hired by the Houthis, standard propaganda from the government.

Unlike the Obama administration's “leak,” however, a positive takeaway lies within today’s “near miss” (so far it is unclear whether Yadoumi’s life was actually threatened). Whereas al-Alwaki’s active hunt signals an endless cycle of Reapers and U.S. warplanes in the southern governorates, the JMP is one step closer to breaking with the GCC’s highly unpopular initiative. Or maybe it has now reached that point. Hasan Zaid, secretary general of the oppositional Haq party, condemned the act in universal terms.

“Any attack on any senior opposition leader is a direct attack at all the leaders of the JMP," said Zaid, who has also been detained by the regime.

Rightfully viewing the shots on Yadoumi as Saleh’s response to its own transitional council, the JMP has pushed forward by announcing an August 1st deadline to name its members. The coalition may fail in uniting all of Yemen’s tribes, the Houthis, Southern Movement, urban and youth protesters - its stated objective - but its secondary mission is to “relaunch protests against Saleh.” The JMP also adhered to non-violent resistance by affirming that the government’s violent provocation will not distract the peaceful revolution.

"Committees have been set up to start dialogue with all the forces of the revolution including the [defected] military, political parties, the youth protesters, and all the forces inside and outside the country," said Mohammed al-Sabry, spokesman for the JMP's Common Forum. "Our objective is to unite all these forces to achieve the goals of the revolution and overthrow the rest of this regime."

How many revolutionaries will stick with the pariah remains uncertain, but the JMP is adapting quickly to situation at hand. Much quicker than the White House and Riyadh.

Naturally the Obama administration’s unsustainable policy in Yemen once again lands on the wrong side of democracy. Although the White House and State Department have yet to formally comment on the dual transitional councils (or Yemen’s revolution in any form), the State Department did send Janet Sanderson and Daniel Benjamin to sell what is predominately the Pentagon and CIA’s counter-terrorism to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Rather than back away from a toxic GCC proposal, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and the State Department counter-terrorism chief issued a joint-statement declaring, “We strongly support the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative which would lead to a peaceful and orderly political transition.”

Washington's vision of a "post-Saleh" Yemen would simply drop Saleh and keep his regime.

The Obama administration still believes the JMP (and all of Yemen’s revolutionaries) should accept the GCC’s initiative when Saleh’s personal forces just attempted to eliminate one of its party leaders. Furthermore, the Common Forum, "holds the national security leadership, the head of the Republican Guards, the head of the special guards and the leader of central security responsible for this criminal event.” All of these groups have been trained and armed by U.S. Special Forces and CIA personnel, units that the Pentagon openly boasts of training as they kill and maim peaceful protesters.

Now the Pentagon might have just shot the GCC’s initiative in the crossfire. We are awaiting more details on Yadoumi’s shooting, but the last 24 hours serve as a microcosm for the disastrous state of U.S. policy in Yemen.

U.S. Repackages al-Awlaki’s “Near Miss”

Anwar al-Awlaki, a cleric and operational commander within al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is back in the U.S. news for almost dying - over two months ago.

According to ABC News and Fox News, “briefed” at the same time by one or more anonymous officials, a Hellfire missile somehow hit the bumper of al-Awlaki’s truck without killing him. Except this “news” isn’t new; the near miss was recorded in May along with al-Awlaki’s vehicle swap. These reports contain nothing unknown, meaning they were launched with an ulterior objective. With U.S. policy under increasing fire inside Yemen for suppressing the revolution, the Obama administration is in urgent need of justification for expanding operations with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. No coincidence exists between the transitional councils announced on Saturday and Monday, silence from the White House and State Department, and now an artificial leak in the Pentagon.

Or perhaps these shadows were deployed by the newly-minted David Petraeus.

In the same way that al-Awlaki’s actual near-miss heralded the beginning of escalating U.S. air-strikes in southern Yemen, re-announcing a “near miss of inches” boldly declares that America will “get him next time.” Never-mind that over 20 air-strikes in June and July have failed to relocate him. al-Alwaki is being served up to validate continued support of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s “power transfer,” in order to widen military operations above Saleh’s remnants. These “reports,” if they can be called that, fit seamlessly into the U.S. pattern of opening, rather than closing, Yemen’s power vacuum to “take advantage of it.”

This advantage is an illusion. Citing a fear that the Houthis, major tribes and Southern Movement will pull the country apart without Saleh - every Yemeni party believes the opposite - Washington has ignored repeated advice that AQAP will enjoy no refuge in a democratic Yemen. Its revolutionaries are also united against U.S. and Saudi intervention. The Obama administration lacks a real strategy in Yemen, not even for counter-terrorism and certainly not for full-spectrum counterinsurgency. Otherwise there would be no need for such hollow propaganda.

A new policy would engage the revolutionaries instead of the tyrant they will eventually fell.

West, Saleh Unite Against Yemen’s Transitional Council

On the geopolitical surface, the Obama administration has yet to respond to Yemen’s revolutionary transitional council; both the White House and State Department failed to comment on Monday and Tuesday, adhering to its silent policy over six months of peaceful revolution. Except the surface isn’t where Yemen’s real action is found. Building on private warnings from U.S. officials, including White House counter-terror czar John Brennan, Britain's ambassador rejected the revolution’s council on Monday.

"Yemen is in need for a political change right now under its constitution which enshrined that the president should transfer power to his deputy in case the president is incompetent," said Jonathan Wiliks, who stressed “the importance of involving all political forces in tackling the current situation to achieve a positive political change.”

He added that “no country will support such a council.”

Once again Washington has tasked London to do its dirty work in Yemen, a consistent pattern that has witnessed the E.U. stick to the U.S. line at every point of the revolution. Sometimes E.U. ambassador Michele Cervone d'Urso is sent in to back the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), or else Catherine Margaret Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is deployed. Joseph Silva, the French ambassador, has accompanied U.S. ambassador Gerald Feierstein on numerous meetings with Vice President Abed Rabou Mansour Hadi, who remains a pawn despite their best efforts to label him as Yemen’s “acting president.”

In this case the UK’s Wilkes has been trotted out to spare the Obama administration from an immediately negative reaction, and to buy time to spin its response. Saleh’s new call for dialogue, though nothing “new” in itself, also employs identical rhetoric to Wilkes's statement.

Just last Friday, State spokesman Mark Toner reiterated U.S. support for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative through repeated use of the phrase “political reform.” Washington bluntly opposes a transitional council that would supplant its mechanism of control, the Saudi-dominated GCC. A great quantity of influence would be lost if this initiative was scrapped, as the GCC aims to keep the GPC in power and has granted the U.S. government immunity from supplying Saleh’s personal military forces. The Obama administration, like Saleh, demands that the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) obey the GCC instead of the revolutionaries, even though Saleh’s state media has repeatedly denounced the JMP for its “relations between al-Qaeda.”

According to Toner, the “future” “path forward” in Yemen is “the proposal put out by the Gulf Cooperation Council. He, his acting president, or Saleh should sign it and move the country – put the country squarely on a path that’s going to lead to political and democratic reform.”

This position is unlikely to have changed, leaving the White House scrambling for a reply.

Yet the EU cannot wholly substitute for a U.S. response either, only function as a stop-gap on the Western front. Prolonged silence from Washington will further encourage Saleh’s regime and the revolution to intensify their operations. Every other actor (except Riyadh) has now issued a formal response, starting with the government’s immediate rejection. Abdu Al Janadi, a spokesman for Mr Saleh’s government, said slandered the council as a “coup” that “pours gas on the fire.”

The Obama administration is clearly afraid to position itself on the wrong side of Saleh's regime, meaning it views the revolution as the wrong side of Yemen’s future. Washington ignores the fact that the GCC’s initiative renders its own arguments obsolete. The U.S. cannot warn protesters that their plan will lead to “chaos," then offer the GCC's initiative as the only alternative. This move amounts to a coup against the revolution - and will generate more instability. Nor can Washington claim that it’s leveraging Saleh out of power when the Pentagon is still supplying his murderous security forces. The GCC's initiative is simply a tool to maintain and potentially increase U.S. military influence in Yemen.

The JMP, on the other hand, appears to have chosen fear of the streets over the international community. Reacting quicker to the transitional council announced by Tawakkol Karman, the JMP hinted at its own council on Monday, citing interference from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. On Tuesday Mohammed al-Sabri, a JMP spokesman, said the “National Council for the Forces of the Revolution” would be announced within two weeks.

"Due to obstructions by Saleh's aides and the lack of seriousness of the Gulf mediators to press Saleh's followers to implement the GCC initiative and accelerate the power transition to Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi in accordance with the Yemeni constitution, it has been imperative for the opposition to form a transitional ruling council as soon as possible," the JMP said in a statement.

Saleh's regime naturally views the JMP's proposal as an equal threat to Karman's announcement. Janadi would further respond, “If those [people] want to announce a transitional council, they can do that in the sky or in any district, for millions of people still back up the president.” Tarik al-Shami, the GPC’s information minister, added that, "such council will not be recognized by the Yemeni government, nor by the international community, because President Saleh is still the legitimate leader of the country until 2013, and he will return within next few days to Sanaa to resume his duties as the president of Yemen."

al-Shami slandered the council as a “coup” against the GCC’s initiative.

Problematically, the JMP’s decision also appears to target the popular council announced by Karman. Yahya Abu Osba, an official in the JMP, said that while the group is “tired of waiting for the international community to support the revolution,” a transitional council “will come with a hefty price.” This could mean a military response from Saleh but also international criticism. Sure enough, reports are now surfacing of Congressional testimony from Janet Sanderson, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. Since Jeffrey Feltman met widespread opposition against his recent visit to Sana’a, why not sacrifice his own assistant?

“We strongly support the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative which would lead to a peaceful and orderly political transition,” Sanderson and State Department Counterterrorism chief Daniel Benjamin said in a joint statement. “Only the GCC initiative was put into writing and signed by both the ruling General People’s Congress party and the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties... We believe that political dialogue is essential to unravel this set of knots that the Yemeni political process finds itself in. And we believe that Saleh's role in that is going to be critical."

Although Sanderson's remarks on Yemen are her first since the revolution began, this "expert" ignored recent attacks on peaceful protesters while asserting of Saturday's transition council, "It seems to us that at this point this council does not have a lot of traction, but the political environment in Sanaa remains quite fluid.” Given that the low-level Sanderson has been tasked to quietly patch U.S. policy, her testimony is designed to both undermine the revolution’s credibility and relieve pressure on the White House.

As several members of the JMP were included in Karman’s council, and Karman herself belongs to the JMP through al-Islah, it remains unclear whether JMP’s council will subvert or subsume the streets. But the JMP’s objectives appear two-fold: negate Western (and local) resistance while holding its pole position for the transition. That leaves the revolutionaries, whose council is beginning to take shape, to continue protesting until their demands are fully met. On Tuesday countless protesters massed to protest U.S.-Saudi interference, tearing apart pictures of Obama and King Abdullah.

Judging when Yemenis will lose all trust in America is a challenging prediction; despite rising anti-Americanism under the Obama administration's militaristic policy, Yemenis were still ready to accept U.S. support against Saleh. Many would have forgiven the Obama administration if the right decisions had been made. Even now, six months and hundreds of deaths later, the time might not be too late. However Yemen’s popular sentiment will reach an irreversible level at some point in the near future. For all the trouble Pakistan’s trust deficit is still giving Washington, the Obama administration is primed to repeat the same mistakes in Yemen.

Having criticized the revolutionaries and political opposition for being too divided - who are instead more united against Saleh - the international community is guilty of personal insecurity. Behind America, Europe and Saudi Arabia’s surface unity lies the real divided alliance.

Transitioning To Democracy In Yemen

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Update on Yemen’s Transitional Council

Over the weekend Yemen’s revolutionaries announced a transitional council to undermine the remnants of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. This news was only lightly covered by the Western and international media for two reasons: U.S. and foreign press has ignored Yemen’s revolution since February, and the new council announced itself without sufficient public buildup.

After speaking with numerous Yemenis on Saturday, the council appeared to lack the broad support necessary to survive Yemen’s turmoil. Declared by Tawakul Karman, Yemen’s leading female activist and a member of the oppositional Islah party, many protesters were caught off guard by the council’s formation. Western and Yemeni reports soon surfaced alleging that some members weren’t expecting Karman’s decision either. Known to act on her own agenda, the opaque manner in which Karman unveiled the council allowed the revolution’s enemies to pile on.

A government spokesman for Saleh’s regime, Abdu al-Janadi, denounced the move for pouring "gas on the fire,” and reaffirmed Saleh as "the legal, democratically elected president, and an alternative will only come though elections, not through an illegal coup." The Obama administration has also rejected the council in private and will likely repeat its support for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative on Monday.

Trapped between a perceived friend and foe, the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) also rejected the council for circumventing its own political maneuvers (anonymous officials have released conflicting statements). The JMP has negotiated with Saleh’s regime and U.S. officials at great cost to its street credibility; it cannot afford to be frozen out of power. In addition to several civil coalitions, the council also met opposition from the northern Houthi tribe for running the risk of new fighting.

“Declaring a transitional council before the collapse of the regime will only repeat the Libyan experience," the group said, according to The New York Times.

Opinion has improved since the initial shock wore off and the council is working towards announcing a 501-person “national assembly,” which would be tasked with rewriting Yemen's constitution and holding a national election. Many of its representatives do check out, but local participates say the council was formed prematurely and without full consent from the revolutionaries. Ahmed Saif Hashid, head of the Civil Coalition of Youth Revolution (CCYR), clarified, “we never criticize the council or its members, rather we are protesting the way the council was formed.”

In this sense the council is a step forward, a sign of movement to break the stalemate but also a warning of caution to plan ahead and secure formal allegiance. The council holds a dual function of generating political authority inside Yemen and political awareness outside, and crying wolf is a quick way to lose international attention.

For now we await more concrete evidence of a national council, along with the U.S. reaction. The following is an excerpt from Press TV's interview with Mohamed Qubaty, Saleh’s former adviser and head of the foreign affairs committee of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC).

Press TV:You spoke about the devil or a negative entity; which entity are you the most concerned with?

Qubaty: I meant anybody. You see, we know of reports that the United States, at one time, thought that this stalemate would give a chance so that they can use the force, they are using their drones, the question of sovereignty is not there. They have been hitting different parts of the country, and there was no objection from the ruling power there, so there isn't a sovereign government there. I meant any could use the vacuum and use for its own purpose and interest, not the interest of Yemen, whether it could be the United States or any other power in the region, anybody who has got an agenda with this youth.

I meant that at the time the youth were disillusioned, the youth are frustrated. On the BCC yesterday it was speaking about the danger of the Islamists moving within the youth. Yes, I said that if the youth feel they are frustrated, and if they are going to suffer, the world and region will suffer with them.

But let me point out to the important thing, the interim council now has got to be the ruler. The central power is not there, the central government is not there. And we could run into chaos and anarchy there, because there are war lords now who are distributing the public goods, they are distributing fuel and so on.

So, we want this interim council to be the real caller of the shots and the real organizer of power in those areas, that the day to day needs of the people have got to be shown that these people, who are from the council, are going to take care of those with the formation of the new government, with the formation of the new national council for drafting a new constitution. They have got to be obvious, short-term, mid-term and long-term objectives, which the council has got to look for and try to implement as soon as possible.

Press TV: How confident are you that this council will be able to do what you have just said?

Qubaty: Well, I think it was a good starter, because it was formed as I have said, and I have mentioned, its formation was declared by the youths, and it includes most of the sectors of the opposition. I was worried that Houthis were not represented but somehow Abdul-Malik [Badreddin al-Houthi] and his party, the so-called revolutionary forces party, they could represent them. But I think on the ground now, these people could have some confidence to go and help the local council. There are local communities now all the way across the country, and they need to be supported by this interim council, by this transitional council, so that things can be organized, but we have got to move and try and get an area. We have got to show the world that this council is actually ruling, so it has got to delineate and say this is my land, and I am ruling.

Al Wefaq Completes Successful “Dialogue”

Today, as expected, Al Wefaq dropped out of political negotiations with Bahrain’s government. The group’s delegates had gathered after Thursday’s session to submit their decisions to their leadership, exhausted by two weeks of anticipated resistance from King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. In a sign of how threatened the King is feeling, his “National Dialogue” systematically obstructed the opposition from every direction, degenerating what was already a pageant into a complete waste of time.

Khalil Al Marzooq, the Shia bloc’s spokesman in the negotiations, voted to withdraw along with Syed Hadi Al Mousawi, Sayed Jameel Kadhem and Bushra Al Hindi. On Sunday Al Marzooq told reporters that Al Wefaq had “tried multiple times to change the process,” leaving it no choice except to pull out altogether. Although the Shia bloc holds 18 of parliament’s 40 seats, Al Wafeq was allocated only five out of the 300 delegates participating in the “National Dialogue.”

Meanwhile pro-democracy protesters have endured continual suppression as they denounce the talks, instead calling for regime change. Al Marzooq admitted that the group is losing supporters by jeopardizing their political demands and lives.

"The Wefaq board decided to pull out of the so-called National Consensus Dialogue and submitted its decision to the Wefaq Shura council (upper council) for ratification," Al Marzouq told Reuters. "Wefaq tried with all seriousness to offer political solutions and it was always responded to with rejections, or it was ignored. We were a majority group in parliament, no longer present at their dialogue. Any dialogue without Wefaq doesn't have real value.”

In sum, the “National Dialogue” represents a decisive victory for Bahrain’s opposition.

The White House’s enthusiastic introduction of Bahrain's “National Dialogue” and Al Wefaq’s inclusion violated logic on multiple levels. First, negotiations were prepared to fail and destined to sink the U.S.-Saudi position into a deeper hole. Yet instead of keeping expectations low and building on incremental signs of progress, the Obama administration adhered to its usual rhetorical pattern by starting high and finishing downward. The White House then ignored the message Al Wefaq delivered before talks began: the group only joined to silence Washington’s call for dialogue.

“We entered the dialogue to help the country, to try to reform it from inside,” Al Marzooq explained on Thursday. “But now we believe that we have enough evidence for the international community that the authorities are not serious in reform... Nobody is responding to us. We cannot continue this, fooling ourselves and fooling the people and fooling the international community that this is a solution.”

The group’s last minute entry, hailed by the White House, “was calculated to avoid becoming a scapegoat for the failure of dialogue.”

This isn’t to say the U.S-Saudi line is about to slacken. Once the “National Dialogue” formally collapses, a whole new round of political maneuvering will cycle through international capitals, Manama and Bahrain’s streets. However Al Wefaq has played its hand wisely, choosing a deft international block and refusing to linger any more than its credibility could withstand. All sides are neutralized to a degree; Washington and Riyadh have been repeatedly exposed while King Hamad’s temperature continues to rise, allowing Al Wefaq to repair its image with the base and independents.

“The people are fed up,” said Al Marzooq. “We took a very brave decision to enter the dialogue while most of our people they don't believe in this dialogue. It’s too hard for you, if you are not convinced, to try to convince someone.”

Revolution is a grinding process, though, and victory can be short-lived. Al Wefaq and the rest of Bahrain’s opposition now face an unknown menace in the government’s response, and will confront new pressure from Washington and Riyadh. Although securely positioned to advance its platform, Al Wefaq is caught up in America and Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical chessboard. As Yemen’s revolution tumbles through Western interference from Jerusalem to Beijing, so too is Bahrain’s revolution outweighed by U.S. strategic interests.

Egyptians, Syrians, and Yemenis have already learned firsthand not to touch a murderous government’s “dialogue,” especially if sponsored by the U.S. Bahrain's example won’t teach them anything that haven’t already learned: revolutions are not “solved” by “political resolution.” Nevertheless, the Arab Spring’s revolutionary wave is riding a herd mentality. One of the movement’s main strengths, each revolution has found inspiration and guidance in the others, creating a unifying field of solidity. Given that Washington is exploiting “dialogue” as a means of control throughout the Arab Spring, rejection at any point of influence threatens the imperialist system.

With Syrians, Yemenis and Bahrainis rallying against government negotiations and foreign interference, Al Wefaq’s decision symbolizes a minor victory for the revolutions.

America’s Open War Against Yemen’s People

He may not be aware of it, but President Barack Obama recently received a letter from Yemen’s Coordinating Council for the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC). One of the leading street coalitions demanding freedom and equality in a country divided by its ruler, the nebulous Ali Abdullah Saleh, CCYRC celebrated America’s Independence Day and wished prosperity on “his excellency” Obama. Yemen’s revolutionaries, CCYRC counseled, seek the same freedom that American revolutionaries fought and died so valiantly for.

The coalition then warned Obama to get help or get out of the way of regime change.

“The people of Yemen had really expected that the President, Government and people of the United States will recognize these genuine aspirations of the Yemeni people,” read CCYRC's letter, dated July 6th. “On the contrary, the White House and concerned Administration departments seem to totally and almost deliberately avoid taking account of the great sacrifices made by the protesting masses of Yemenis.”

The White House and State Department passed the next three days in silence, then Leon Panetta took the stage in Kabul. Telling his audience that al-Qaeda is “on the run” and “close to defeat,” Obama’s new Defense Secretary pointed the Pentagon and CIA’s lasersights directly at Yemen. Given that its revolution is being suppressed in order to escalate military operations in the region, the drone-happy Panetta delivered what amounts to an open declaration of war on Yemen’s people.

“There’s no question when you look at what constitutes the biggest threat in terms of attacks on the United States right now, more of that comes from Yemen and people like Awlaki,” Panetta said. “There are a number of operations that are being conducted not only by the Defense Department, but by my former agency to try to focus on going after those targets. I would say that’s one of our top priorities right now.”

A lesson in gradual escalation

That Panetta issued such a declaration is only exaggerated by the fact America’s war gears are already in motion. Maintaining strict counter-terrorism after al-Qaeda bombed the U.S.S. Cole in Aden harbor, the Bush administration’s one-dimensional policy helped set the conditions for future destabilization. When al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) directed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to blow up a plane over Detroit nine years later, U.S. policy escalated from sustenance aid for Saleh’s regime to widening air-strikes and extra Special Forces and CIA trainers, active since 2002. One week before U.S. warplanes and cruise missiles struck suspected al-Qaeda targets in the southern province of Shabwa, the northern Houthi tribe claimed that U.S. airstrikes targeted their own forces.

Both attacks triggered local protests after slaughtering dozens of civilians, and both were subsequently justified by the Obama administration as striking al-Qaeda operatives. WikiLeaks would later reveal that Washington, in addition to funding Saleh’s campaign against the secessionist Southern Movement, also equipped Yemeni and Saudi security forces to combat the Houthis. The Zaidi Shia sect had been deemed a hassle to Saleh’s cooperation against AQAP and an irritation to neighboring Saudi Arabia. Undaunted by a corrupt, untrustworthy partner and rising anti-Americanism, the White House crafted a new “secret” agreement with Saleh to exchange military cooperation for a billion dollars in aid.

Yet the suppression of Yemen’s revolution blew past all previous levels of foreign exploitation. Once a series of government massacres forced the White House to distance itself from Saleh, the Saudi-influenced Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was deployed in April to manage a power transfer through the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC). Its initiative, in CCYRC’s words, “may be regarded as the best legal and political package, which any dictator has ever gotten, enjoying an unprecedented full immunity from legal pursuit for all the crimes inflicted against the Yemeni people.”

Protesters naturally rejected the GCC’s interference as a violation of their revolution, only for Saleh’s ensuing “chaos” to justify continual U.S. military operations through his murderous security apparatus. Drone strikes escalated in June and July, killing a number of civilians in between AQAP and local militants, and construction of a regional hub was duly shortened from two years to eight months.

“Time and again, the United States mistakenly provides the Saleh regime with sophisticated equipment, which your Administration knowingly knows or should know that Saleh and his cronies used and continue to use to clamp down on peaceful protesters in most of the cities of Yemen, or in waging wars against northern and southern protesters against the oppression that has characterized the Saleh regime. The White House policy on Yemen has mistakenly persisted on the assumption that American security concerns can only be dealt with by the Saleh regime.”

Washington’s politico-military campaign

On July 4th, one month after Saleh landed in Riyadh to receive medical treatment for assassin-related injuries, U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein promised Yemenis that America stood by them “in their pursuit” of “universal rights.” Unfortunately for Yemenis, U.S. officials have spent most of their time meeting with Saleh’s regime and legitimizing the negligible authority of Vice President Abd al-Rahman Mansur al-Hadi. Days earlier millions of protesters rallied against U.S. and Saudi interference, demanding total regime change and a transitional council of their choosing. CCYRC advised shortly thereafter, “The Revolution of Yemen, as may be erroneously perceived by members of your distinguished Administration at times, is not a dispute between a ruling party and a collection of opposition parties and/or some social dignitaries.”

As if to soften Panetta’s blow the following week, John Brennan also met with Saleh in Riyadh and urged him to sign the GCC’s initiative - Yemen's "way forward,” as U.S. officials call it. Contrary to mainstream reporting on the Western front, the White House’s counter-terror chief sanctioned Saleh’s regime with his every move. Deploying a military official (twice) to do a civilian’s job is inherently contradictory, although U.S. policy is viewed primarily through the security lens. Brennan’s visit was also heavily manipulated by Saleh’s regime, which triggered al-Qaeda’s alarm and warned the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties’ (JMP) against further “escalation.” Washington's inaction has emboldened Saleh to continue overseeing Yemen from his Saudi refuge, but Brennan went so far as to inform the opposition that their nemesis would “return soon.”

"It is has been three months since the ambassador's promise and Saleh is still in power," said one youth representative, who met with Feierstein in April and asked to remain anonymous. "The US is stabbing the youth in the back and the youth will not forget this US stance."

Panetta confidently declared that, with “more work,” al-Qaeda can be brought to the brink of strategic defeat, and eliminating the 20 leaders remaining on the Pentagon’s hit-list would deal a severe blow. However new leadership always emerges and al-Qaeda’s ideology will survive if U.S. foreign policy fails to correct itself, particularly in regards to the Arab Spring. Current U.S. strategy will never succeed in Yemen; backing Saleh’s regime has forfeited all spheres - political, economic, social - to preserve military influence. Despite America’s omnipotent appearance, some hundred CIA and Special Forces trainers (still increasing in number), a fleet of drones and a heavy naval presence in the Gulf of Aden mark the extent of U.S. influence.

As usual Washington has created the anti-American hostility that it fears on the ground, and intelligence gathering will suffer as a result. Except Yemen’s operations are reportedly shifting deeper into the CIA’s shadows, around Congressional red-tape, in order to keep its campaign off grid. A war-weary and debt-laden Congress supports "cheaper" counter-terror operations anyway, and provides no oversight to an immoral, illogical and illegal war. While al-Qaeda is America's alleged target, the group has only flourished as Yemen’s people suffer.

CCYRC lamented, “The United States Government continues to draw up its foreign policy on Yemen with a blind eye towards all these violations of human rights and the horrendously extreme corruption that characterized the Saleh regime.”

Yemen’s real “way forward”

Calling for honest support of Yemen’s revolutionaries underestimates the meltdown of U.S. policy in their country. America must first end its naked war of aggression against the Yemeni people; supporting their revolution becomes a secondary condition. Lifelines to Saleh’s entire regime must be severed and, instead of telling the opposition to prepare for his return, the Obama administration must assist in Saleh and his family's detention. Termination of the GCC’s initiative must follow. Already a knot of demands, time-lines and expectations, Saleh and his GPC officials are pushing for new “dialogue” that would adhere to “the constitution,” codewords for more political stalling. A fresh agreement must be drafted to transition through Yemen’s revolution, one written by and favorable to the pro-democracy movement.

“To put it bluntly,” says CCYRC, “the Yemeni protesters are against all interferences and interventions in Yemeni domestic political affairs... We call on Saudi Arabia and the United States not to intervene in the affairs of Yemen and the abortion of popular revolution... as we condemn and strongly condemn all their positions recent efforts to dilute the demands of the rebels... and prevent the establishment of a democratic system based on justice, freedom and equality.”

After affirming a revolutionary transitional council, Washington must back away from military and financial aid, two strings with lengthy expectations attached. Speaking to Obama on behalf of every protester, CCYRC “assures you that it is a paramount goal of the Revolution work towards eliminating all facets of terrorism and all terrorist activity in Yemen.” Many Yemenis believe that Saleh exaggerated AQAP's presence, that his regime is the main source of terrorism and that, once removed, al-Qaeda will pose less of a threat than it already does. The Obama administration cannot expect to defeat AQAP using Saleh’s old method.

Costly counterinsurgency is out post-bin Laden and cheaper, faster counter-terrorism is in under Panetta. Neither, though, will succeed in Yemen without popular support - support that cannot emerge until its revolutionaries free their country from tyranny and foreign interference.

The U.S. & Internationalism

By Brian Cloughley, published in The News International:

At least we now know Pakistan’s standing with the US government: slightly above Burkina Faso but below Outer Mongolia. Recent statements about Pakistan by central figures in Washington have made it clear that the US demands and expects nothing but total obedience and subservience from those nations unfortunate enough to be associated with it. It’s similar to the way Rupert Murdoch has treated successive British governments – with a combination of insolent menace and patronizing disdain.

US international influence is immense, but Washington chooses to ignore the fact that power should involve responsibility. It is apparent that internationalism is acceptable to the US government only if America’s authoritarian dominance is unquestioned.

On July 10 the New York Times reported that “the Obama administration is suspending and, in some cases, canceling hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to the Pakistani military, in a move to chasten Pakistan for expelling American military trainers and to press its army to fight militants more effectively.” The story was fed to the NYT by the usual anonymous sources who were “congressional, Pentagon and other administration officials granted anonymity to discuss the politically delicate matter.” In other words, the campaign of anti-Pakistan invective has the direct authorization of Mr. Obama and Congress. The gloves are off, and outright bullying is official policy.

But the discarded gloves of Washington are somewhat bloodstained. Take, for example, the case of the CIA ‘contractor’ Raymond Davis who went free after murdering two Pakistani citizens. This squalid affair encapsulated Washington’s attitude to internationalism and to Pakistan in particular. Imagine what would have happened if an ISI employee – or any foreigner – had shot dead two Americans on the streets of New York. There would have been hysteria throughout the country, and not the slightest possibility that the killer might ever be released. The frenzy of the media and Congress would have equalled the post 9/11 passion. But the CIA can, with impunity, kill people on the streets of a nation which the US treats as a petty puppet, even going so far as to proclaim that the Pakistan Army does not fight militants “effectively”, which is not just grossly insulting, but also sheer nonsense.

Since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001-2002, before which Pakistan had no suicide bombings and no insurrection in the tribal areas or Taliban terror attacks in its cities, the army has suffered the deaths of over 3,000 soldiers at the hands of extremists, which is double the number that the US has had killed in Afghanistan. And now Pakistan has over 140,000 troops in the west of the country fighting a war that was caused directly by the influx of militants from Afghanistan after the US Crusade.

The current instability in Pakistan is almost entirely the responsibility of the US whose politicians and generals whine that Pakistan is “not doing enough” and which intends to “press its army to fight militants more effectively.” (The Pakistan army’s decisive defeat of the Taliban in the Swat region in 2009 is ignored because it doesn’t fit in with the propaganda.)

The insults don’t stop at accusing Pakistan’s soldiers of incompetence. The senior military figure in the US, Admiral Mullen, appeared intent on denigrating the country’s leaders with his bizarre declaration that the vile murder of Saleem Shahzad, the brilliant investigative journalist, “was sanctioned by the government” of Pakistan. This is a statement with grave implications of criminality. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has made a public proclamation to the effect that the government of Pakistan authorizes murder. To make such an important pronouncement requires solid intelligence, so incontrovertible evidence must exist that details precisely how and by whom Saleem Shahzad was killed, and on exactly whose orders the murder was committed.

The crime has international connotations, in that one country has declared another responsible for an action that is patently in violation of the principles of International Law, because the alleged offending nation, Pakistan, could be guilty of a crime against humanity. So International Law and procedures should now be invoked, and the evidence that has been gathered by the United States must be produced to the world at large.

The problem is that the US detests internationalism. The International Court and the United Nations Organization are anathema to Washington which does as little as possible to further their objectives. Take, for example, UN peacekeeping.

Pakistan has 9,582 soldiers serving with UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. Guess how many the US has on such duty. Go on -10,000, perhaps? That would be a reasonable number. But perhaps it’s not quite so many. Maybe half that would be a better guess, given American troop deployments at over 800 bases all round the world. So could we suggest 5,000? We could, but we would be wrong, because the United States of America, with military forces totaling 1,477,896, contributes exactly thirteen uniformed personnel to UN global peacekeeping. This, alone, is a clear indication of Washington’s approach to its international responsibilities.

But in spite of the US attitude, let there be an independent UN inquiry into the death of Saleem Shahzad. It could run concurrently with an International Criminal Court investigation of the murders committed by Mr Ray Davis. That would demonstrate real international accountability by all concerned. Are you holding your breath?

Brian Cloughley has studied South Asian affairs for thirty years and is South Asia defense analyst for Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk. Visit his website at www.beecluff.com.

Also see H. D. S. Greenway’s parallel op-ed, The Downward Spiral, published in The New York Times - now forced to shield itself from its own blowback.

Arab Attitudes: Obama Cracking the Ice

President Barack Obama’s rapid descent from his “New Beginning” in Cairo is a globally accepted fact. In May the Pew Research Center found that his administration’s response to the Arab Spring had further eroded America’s image in the Islamic world, a highly-publicized goal of Obama’s campaign. Other polls resulted in similar conclusions - or else one could listen to the millions of protesters dissatisfied with Obama’s inaction.

Yet the sheer shock of Zogby International's Arab Attitudes: 2011 is enough to overwhelm rational thought and preexisting empirical evidence. According to James Zogby, “American democracy [seems] a lot like damaged goods to many Arabs… U.S. policy in the region has increasingly undermined Arab attitudes toward America as a global model.”

Unfortunately many sources are only summarizing Zogby’s findings, ignoring the full real truth behind his numbers. Our reaction is two-fold: perpetual anti-Americanism stems from Obama's own decisions, and Zogby’s poll results are worse than they appear.

While Arab Attitudes: 2011 reveals a depressing portrait of Obama’s personal standing and America’s image in the Muslim world, Zogby neutralizes his venom by arguing that Obama received a bad hand from George Bush. His own conclusion is partially justified on the results of his polling, which align with many polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). Bush had run the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the ground and ended by green-lighting the Gaza War, necessitating Obama to promise that he would engage both parties “from day one.” Afghanistan was neglected in favor of Iraq and Pakistan was just expelling the U.S.-allied Pervez Musharraf.

Zogby summarized, “Obama's performance ratings are lowest on the two issues to which he has devoted the most energy: Palestine and engagement with the Muslim world.”

We agree that Bush’s spillover entangled Obama’s foreign policy in Palestine and Afghanistan. However the second part of Zogby’s conclusion contradicts the notion of blaming Bush, an excuse that lost its validation between 2009 and 2011. At some point the current president must accept responsibility for the decisions of the U.S. government; all administrations are encumbered by their predecessors and a Congressional tug-of-war. George Bush didn’t promise what Obama couldn’t deliver, isn’t telling him to adhere to Israeli policy and isn’t blinding him to the Arab Spring.

Many of his former supporters also base their opposition on Obama’s war-mongering tendencies - often believing him to be Bush-lite - and are thus unlikely to believe his problems are the last administration's fault. When the CIA's Raymond Davis shot and killed two Pakistanis, his administration manhandled Islamabad like Bush’s White House.

Nevertheless, Zogby writes in Foreign Policy, “To his credit, the President understands the dilemma America confronts across the Arab World. He began his term in office with the right intentions and sent signals he would move in the right direction. But, as I have noted, on Inauguration Day Barack Obama did not receive a magic wand. Instead, he was handed the shovel that George W. Bush had been using to dig deep holes all over the Middle East. Getting out of those holes has been harder than he imagined. In addition to confronting the worst domestic economic crisis in generations, the President had to face down two failed wars, an incorrigible and manipulative Israeli leader, a divided and dysfunctional Palestinian polity, and a wary but hopeful (maybe too hopeful) world that expected him to deliver on promised change.”

This type of thinking excuses Obama from one of his main faults: promising far more than he could deliver. He deserves more blame, not less, for intentionally raising Muslim expectations out of political self-interest. The Obama administration has also played a direct and delusional role in the Arab Spring. Many insider accounts portray him as believing he supports the revolutions, in apparent ignorance of the outside world. Obama is more aware of his disapproval than he lets on, but he’s notoriously aloof, over-reliant on rhetoric and slow to make his foreign policy decisions.

Even then he often chooses wrongly. Aside from stopping Libya’s onslaught at the last moment, Obama has exhibited a distinct pattern of suppression in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, a policy that runs straight through Saudi Arabia’s counter-revolution. Obama’s popularly is falling specifically because he promised not to be like Bush and failed to deliver. He had publicly built himself into the perfect man to transition through the Arab Spring.

Instead he became a very real part of the problem.

One particular area of suspicion is America’s ever-expanding drone fleet, another trend that Obama not only borrowed from Bush but evolved of his own volition. A majority of Americans are pleased that automatized warfare represents the next phase in U.S. military operations; Obama and numerous Defense officials are busy crusading drone effectiveness in hostile environments. Part of this decision is traced to America’s debt and the need for cheaper warfare, but drones also satisfy Washington’s long-standing quest to increase the duration of aerial missions and reduce military casualties. A healthy U.S. minority and a weighty international majority believe the Obama administration is committing many moral and strategic violations through the short-term use of drones.

Of grave significance, “The killing of bin Laden only worsened attitudes toward the U.S... The prevailing view is that the killing of bin Laden will not appreciably improve the region.”

Zogby’s single digit approval stands in vivid contrast to U.S. opinion, which generally believes that Osama bin Laden’s death will improve America’s security. By the same token Obama’s personal divergence continues to widen; bin Laden’s raid and a faux drawdown from Afghanistan have boosted Obama’s sagging foreign policy numbers above 50%. New leeway has further enabled Obama to pursue a disastrous policy in the Middle East, such as his response to Yemen's revolution, with negligible domestic consequences. The good news is that, “majorities in every country say that the killing of bin Laden makes them view the U.S. less favorably. Given that overall favorable ratings are already so low, this should not make a substantial difference in the ratings.”

Because of these factors, the bottom-line of Zobgy’s poll likely drops below the 10% favorable rating he tracked in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These countries are among the most favorable Muslim countries, along with Indonesia. Libya and Syria’s ratings may be on a gradual upswing, but Obama’s image would be undoubtedly gloomier were Zogby to add the Palestinians, Yemenis, Bahrainis, Turks and Pakistanis. While Zobgy concluded that Obama is skating on thin ice, he might be forced to concede that the ice is already cracking.

And the Obama administration will eventually plunge into freezing waters if it fails to correct its response to the Arab Spring.

Egyptians Vow to Complete Their Revolution

Today Hosni Mubarak decided to bring the last of his regime down. Egypt’s former president had already made this decision throughout his 30 year reign, and again when he ordered a futile crackdown on the Egyptian masses. Now, in legal transcripts obtained by Al-Dustur and confirmed by Egyptian officials, Mubarak has denied any responsibility for the thousands of casualties Egyptian security forces produced over a brutal two weeks.

"These accusations are not true at all,” Mubarak told investigators. “I would never participate in the killing of Egyptian citizens. I gave orders to deal with protesters without violence, peacefully, without the use of weapons, or bullets or even carrying weapons during the protests.”

He added of his staggering corruption charges, ''I would never seize state money and I have never acquired anything illegally.”

Not that they needed any more motivation to harden their resolve, but Mubarak’s defiance has already rallied Egyptians to Tahrir Square. Protesters couldn’t have asked for a better kickoff to their “Friday of Last Ultimatum.”

While the swelling of protesters in Tahrir may be new for this week, the Square has remained a hive of activity since Mubarak’s fall on February 11th. Predictions that Egypt’s revolution has stalled or run out of energy are overblown. Revolutions do hit walls and come to a crawl. They are also protracted conflicts by nature, a fact lost in the modern Western idealism of instant gratification, and Egypt’s revolution accords to the preparation and struggle necessary for total revolution. Having witnessed an improper transfer to a military council, Tahrir has experienced periods of quiet without ever going completely silent.

Their struggle for total regime change won’t end in the coming days, but Egyptians will march closer to their ultimate goal over the weekend. After raising a series of protests against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a de facto government body that has retained control of Mubarak’s security apparatus, Egyptians have built sufficient pressure to openly challenge the military. A general lack of accountability and responsibility has left many revolutionaries to conclude the SCAF, once considered semi-trustworthy, is now their main obstacle in securing their freedom.

Last week many began to demand the resignation of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who heads the SCAF.

Noticeably feeling their heat, the military responded with a pronged assault of token reform and warnings against political escalation. On Tuesday Interior Minister Mansour Al Essawi fired 600 police officers involved in Mubarak’s crackdown, in addition to transferring another 4,000 to new assignments. A national election was also postponed to October or November, as demanded by most protest groups requiring organization. Only these meager measures failed to satisfy Egypt’s hunger for self-determination - most officers won't be tried - then further combusted after the government warned protesters against escalating their demonstrations.

Mohsen al-Fangary, a spokesman for the Armed Forces Supreme Council, told Egyptians on Tuesday night, “the military is supported by the people’s trust and will not tolerate a hijacking of power.”

al-Fangary’s vaguely threatening remarks left protesters infuriated and resolved to continue their revolution to the end. Ahmed Maher, founder of the April 6 Youth Movement, had responded earlier in the day, "It's good that they pushed back elections. That was one of our demands. But they met us partially. We need them to meet our full demands." To that end Friday’s “Last Ultimatum” will demand a time-table for completing Egypt’s revolution, centered on replacing the SCAF with a voter-approved transitional council. Protesters will also reaffirm their demands for justice, from Mubarak’s head to the fingers and toes of those who committed his abuses.

The ex-dictator’s logic is obviously lacking; he generated the very security environment that he now claims to have lost control of.

Far from a cause for negativity, Egypt’s revolution is a beacon of courage, intelligence and perseverance for protesters across the region. In Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, revolutionaries understand from their own circumstances that a long fight lies ahead of them. However they also cite Egyptians as a driving influence in their own quests. “Immediate,” “peaceful” and “orderly” only exist on Washington’s teleprompters and flash cards.

The real world is found in Tahrir Square.