Prior analysis on North Waziristan’s military condition explained why a major invasion by the Pakistani army is relatively pointless: the Haqqani network has already moved out. Sometime between December 2010 and February 2011, a collective effort from the family brokered a truce with Shia tribes in the neighboring Kurram agency. Since then the Haqqanis have attempted to settle local grievances with rival Sunni tribes, hoping to ingratiate themselves enough that their host won’t mind the impending destruction.
They know U.S. Predators will follow them where the Pakistani military won’t.
On Monday Kurram witnessed its first strikes of the year, leading U.S. media to dredge up the Shia truce. The 35th and 36th strikes overall in 2011, Kurram reportedly saw only one strike out of 110 in 2010. The missiles struck the Khardand area in Lower Kurram, territory belonging to Haqqani ally Fazal Saeed. These appear be the first volleys of a larger barrage.
Complicating the situation is Pakistan’s shifting military, which has avoided a costly incursion into North Waziristan in order to protect loyal Taliban elements. Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik, commander of the XI Corps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was one of several Pakistani commanders who refuted rumors of North Waziristan’s operation. "We will undertake operations when we want to," he told reporters. "I can't undertake multiple operations at the same time."
He then cited a “full-scale operation” into Kurram as a major factor in his decision cycle.
Whether a potential operation into North Waziristan and Kurram serve to cancel each other out remains to be seen. Malik directly countered the Haqqanis’ truce by claiming an influx of militants has increased the violence Kurram’s Shia minority; it’s possible that Pakistan’s military will target Kurram first. The logic behind this move is to seal North Waziristan’s border for a future operation. Yet if an operation were undertaken in Kurram, North Waziristan may take additional years to recharge for.
By then the Haqqanis could have moved out again.
Malik says that he opposes U.S. drone strikes out of civilian casualties and local resentment. He would rather see the Pakistani army protect its own territory and people. The general explained, "Obviously there is some trouble brewing up in Kurram. I'd like to stabilize it.” At least two things are certain: Washington’s drones will travel where Islamabad can’t (or won’t), and they won’t stabilize Kurram by themselves.
June 20, 2011
June 19, 2011
No Stopping Yemen’s Counter-Revolution
No voice of reason, no matter how loud or how credible, can stop the bulldozer that is U.S. foreign policy in Yemen. Not when future chaos is viewed as a reason to continue a destructive response to its revolution. Add Washington to the list of actors - embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh, his son Ahmad, rogue General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - actively destabilizing the country for their own gain.Sunday bore all of the bad news that Yemenis have grown numb to under U.S. hegemony.
According to Hakim Almasmari, editor-in-chief of The Yemen Post, Vice President President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi finds himself under more pressure than he’s ever faced during his 17-year term. Writing for The National, Almasmari described a recent series of meetings between “acting president” Hadi, US ambassador Gerald Feierstein and EU ambassador Michele Chervonet d'Urso, along with Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) officials. Yemen’s popular coalitions have given Hadi an unspecified deadline to form a transitional council free of Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC).
Now the West and Saudi Arabia (through the GCC) have supposedly given Hadi their own two-week deadline - to form a “joint transitional council” between the GPC and Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). The “30-60” plan, which appears in effect even though it isn’t, grants the GPC 50% of a transitional government to the JMP’s 40%. Neither enjoy that degree of representation in Yemen’s streets.
In London, Yasin Saeed Noman also met with Saleh’s adviser and GPC secretary-general, Abdul Karim Al-Eryani, to discuss a joint transitional council. Noman, rotating president of the JMP and head of the Yemeni Socialist Party, is considered a future presidential candidate.
Suffocating domestic and foreign pressure has left the youth movement scrambling to crystallize a temporary political structure. Given Yemen’s stunted political growth, a product of Saleh’s regime, such a task is difficult enough without foreign interference. But if they lack the power to impose their will on Yemen’s political system, they might be sufficiently organized to resist the GCC’s proposal. A key dilemma is that Washington and Riyadh want to jam the political system in order to take advantage of Yemen’s vacuum, so a stalemate plays into their hands. Conversely, they don’t have to suffer through Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.
Despite putting on a nice face for the West, the “neutral” Hadi is saying all the wrong things and appears of no real use, much to Washington’s displeasure. The Obama administration seems to have hoped that he would hand over power immediately, entrusting the GCC’s proposal to keep power within the GPC. Although Hadi has met the JMP and various protesters at his residence, their dialogue has centered around, “banditry and road closures that led to acute shortages of fuel and cooking gas as well as sabotage are unacceptable and violate laws and morals," in Hadi’s own words.
He refuses to discuss a political transition until Saleh returns.
Just about everything is wrong with these meetings, starting with the fact that over two weeks have passed since Saleh “transferred” power to Hadi. The GCC allocated 30 days for this transition, a term automatically opposed by the revolution, yet this time is still elapsing inside the power vacuum. Months could pass if Saleh were to actually return, and if not his family’s personal power struggle will keep the country gridlocked. Saleh’s son Ahmed occupies the presidential palace instead of Hadi, who remains unable to control the GPC, and while he reportedly favors going ahead with a transitional council, he’s currently losing to Saleh’s loyalist faction.
Yemen’s revolutionaries oppose both outcomes, as the GCC’s proposal grants no direct power to the revolution. Many protesters also believe that food and fuel shortages were manufactured by the regime, similar to the security crisis. And “bandits” happens to be Saleh’s slang for the JMP and protesters, not al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Hadi says he’s working to return Yemen’s situation to “normal.”
Pro-democracy protesters don’t want to go back to what was considered normal.
It’s also impossible to ignore Hadi’s meetings with Yemen’s Russian and Chinese ambassadors; Moscow and Beijing has stood firmly on Saleh’s side throughout the nearly six-month revolution. True to form, Hadi “valued highly the friendly stances of Russia and China on Yemen and its unity, security and stability.”
As Yemen’s political situation continue to sink in a morass of domestic and foreign interference, one can forecast a steady stream of drones over the summer. On Sunday the 18th strike hit near Jaar in Abyan governorate, missing its target while injuring six civilians. This astonishing frequency is matched by silence in the U.S. media, which normally jumps on the latest Pakistani strike. Only two attacks in Yemen have been recorded, the missed shot on cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and the killing of mid-level commander Abu Ali al Harithi.
U.S. airstrikes during 2009 and 2010 killed and injured more civilians than militants, and the latest drone campaign is trending in the same direction. The Yemen Post reports, “Most of the attacks in Abyan have resulted in injuring wrong targets this month.”
So goes America’s counter-revolution in al-Qaeda’s “most dangerous” safe haven. An odd plan to win the peace, but that doesn’t appear to be Washington's plan at all.
Drunk Droning In Yemen
Rarely does U.S. foreign policy crash with such vicious impact, and rarely have so few people paid attention to the emergency. Those drones making regular scans over Yemen cruise inside a paradox, simultaneously exposed to the naked eye and veiled beneath layers of secrecy. Many observers debating their legality miss the local issues at hand, while a powerless minority cautions that Yemen is set to further destabilize under the Obama administration’s panic.
Watching the White House’s delayed response feels too similar to riding backseat with an intoxicated driver.
Libya’s legality isn’t overshadowing Yemen at random - anything to hide one of the weakest links in U.S. foreign policy. Locked behind the support of embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh, President Barack Obama issued his last personal statement three months ago, after the heinous March 18th sniper massacre in At-Taghir (Change Square). His “Moment of Opportunity” raised and dashed hopes with a single sentence. High-level U.S. official avoid Yemen like an epidemic, only entering briefly when its violence spikes, and the State Department's script remains unchanged despite Saleh’s proliferating war crimes. The only outreach runs through the proxy Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), manipulated by Washington and Riyadh to salvage Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC).
After months of stonewalling and two weeks of health watch in Saudi Arabia, White House spokesman Jay Carney could only mutter amid reports of his return, “Our policy on this remains the same, which is we believe that President Saleh needs to keep his commitment to sign the GCC-brokered agreement that would begin the transition immediately. We think that is in the best interests of the people of Yemen, and we continue to work with our partners in the region to help make that happen.”
He responded when pressed on Saleh’s future, “The issue isn’t about his return.”
Contrary to the standard U.S. line, Saleh never sincerely committed to the GCC’s favorable proposal, instead buying three extra months before escaping an internal assassination. Nor does Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, in a quest for total regime change, believe the proposal suits “their best interests.” The Obama administration assisted Saleh and Saudi Arabia in freezing Yemen’s revolutionaries out of the political process for this very reason. Saleh's "corrupt regime has used your initiative as a cover for its crimes against us,” warned a recent statement from several street coalitions.
Meanwhile "acting” president and current Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi refuses to discuss the proposal until Saleh’s “imminent” return, leading the popular opposition to reject any negotiations that don’t begin with his immediate resignation. A transitional council of six-to-nine months would give way to a national election, shunning the GCC’s unrealistic 60-day deadline.
Right now U.S. contact with the streets is near zero. All pro-democracy protesters know firsthand is that America has undermined their revolution in the name of al-Qaeda, a plan that fits into wider militarization of the region. They knew before anyone else that Washington is running drones right over their heads. MQ-9 Reapers are no secret. They are America’s public face in Yemen - the face of death.
"We knew the Yemeni government would allow US to attack our areas after the death of [al Qa'eda leader Osama] Bin Laden," said Salem Sakheer, a resident of the volatile Shabwa governorate. "We have a weak government now and the blood of Yemenis will be spilled without any questioning."
Ignoring a failed policy spanning over a decade, the Obama administration continues to force military escalation through the GCC’s proposal. Suddenly a future “anti-American government” - millions of revolutionaries - is being openly admitted and circumvented. Yemen’s next government will oppose U.S. military operations and potentially support al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and must be bypassed. Thus an “orderly transition of power” provides the only method of safeguarding counter-terror operations.
That U.S. support for Saleh caused this hostility is taken for granted.
Perhaps America could simply support Yemen’s peaceful, democratic movement instead of fear it; both the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and youth coalitions have vowed to fight AQAP. However this policy would compromise what Washington and Riyadh truly seek: unilateral operations rubber stamped by a compliant regime. The Wall Street Journal reported nothing out of the ordinary when it detailed this arrangement, except for the fundamental difference of an internal drone base. The longer version would finish under an unpopular Saleh or, if he actually followed through on his promise to resign, his son Ahmed, who serves as the Pentagon's liaison between Yemen’s murderous Republican Guard. Scheduled for completion within the next two years, the CIA reportedly accelerated its time-table to eight months.
“Because America has invested so heavily in Yemen’s security forces, it now seems that a transition to democracy will depend on whether Washington believes that investment will remain secure,” Tawakkol Karman, Yemen’s preeminent female activist, warned in The New York Times. “The establishment of a new government will therefore be contingent on American officials’ approving the country’s new leaders. Sadly, it seems likely that the United States will support figures from the old regime rather than allow a transitional government approved by the people to take control of Yemen.”
“This would be a grave mistake.”
The base’s shorter time-frame and all subsequent operations now hinge on maintaining influence through the GCC’s proposal, and propping up an authoritarian regime in the process. Instead of rethinking this policy after being forced off course, the Obama administration has belligerently accelerated a one-dimensional response. Within Yemen's power vacuum, according to one official, drones have struck 15 times in the Shabwa and Abyan governorates since June 1st. Beyond local opposition, U.S. strategy also remains mixed up in the GPC and JMP themselves.
GPC spokesman Tareq Shami told reporters, "The Yemeni government did not allow the US to conduct random attacks in the country, though it has agreed to cooperate in the fight against al Qa'eda.”
Two months of fighting in southern Yemen proved beyond doubt that Saleh exploits AQAP’s presence to manipulate foreign powers. He’s also running proxy militias that battle other militants in the area, both of which are then hyped as AQAP. Saleh's regime survives by denial and routinely switches sides. His standard policy denounces America for popular consumption while accepting Western aid and political protection. He accused Obama and "Tel Aviv" of fomenting “creative chaos” as Yemen’s revolution picked up speed in early March; not long afterward he began feeding new information on AQAP commanders, including the misfire on cleric Anwar al-Awlaki (or so Saleh claimed).
Locally to internationally, drone operations have jammed Yemen's political process at every level. Hadi and the GCC’s proposal are now being exploited to restart counter-terror operations, which the Pentagon briefly interrupted after Saleh’s U.S.-supplied crackdown drew too much attention. Yet his son and nephews continue to target protesters and refuse to cede power, invalidating U.S. claims of a transition to Hadi. Worse still, the JMP has avoided condemning drone operations out of fear that the administration will cut its thin life-line.
The White House and Pentagon are conspiring with an untrustworthy GPC and blackmailing the JMP to suffocate the youth’s revolution, grid-locking Yemen’s crisis in order to justify future hegemony. This toxic combination of political opposition and military escalation is sending negative shock waves throughout the revolution.
Yemenis had more than enough of “divide and conquer” under Saleh. They don't need U.S. policy to validate every strain of anti-Americanism: security and economic interests over democracy, supporting semi-friendly dictators in order to preserve the status quo, an endless war against al-Qaeda. With Saleh’s regime manufacturing conflict and enabling AQAP through strategic withdrawals, the Pentagon is going in bigger than the individual conflict demands. Yemen is caught in the grander scheme of terrorism and geopolitical security - and Saudi Arabia’s counter-revolution - to the point that its people’s freedom is disregarded as a burden. That’s why al-Qaeda mocked America’s self-induced fall while honoring Ayman al-Zawahiri: “We encourage the people of Islam to rise up and continue the struggle, persistence and devotion until all the corrupt and oppressive regimes imposed by the West are gone.”
In choosing security over democracy, U.S. policy will produce neither for a people who desperately deserve both.
The door hasn’t completely shut on the GCC’s proposal. The immediate problem is that few Yemenis know what it entails after multiple rewrites. Many popular coalitions might be willing to accept if the GCC grants the pro-democracy movement's legitimate demands. The JMP is also threatening to “let the people do what they want,” according to spokesman Mohammed Qahtan, if the U.S. doesn’t push for Saleh’s immediate resignation and his family’s trial. This will require a 180 degree shift in the U.S.-Saudi position, which continues to harden behind the remnants of Saleh’s regime.
“The Americans and Europeans wanted to hastily close the Yemeni file and move on as if it was Tunisia or Egypt,” Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, the country’s trade and industry minister, employing reverse psychology to The Financial Times. “Our response: ‘Not before the president’s return,’ and we shot millions of bullets in the air on Wednesday to make this message clear. They got the message.”
Is the Obama administration conscious enough to get its meaning though?
June 16, 2011
Post-Kayani Could Nuke U.S. Policy in Pakistan
He doesn’t come close to answering, yet an indirect response often reveals as much as a direct one. We ended our last post by speculating on a post-Kayani U.S.-Pakistani relationship, an admittedly basic question that everyone is asking. During today’s Pentagon briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Michael Mullen found himself staring down this exact dilemma.“You have developed, of course, a personal relationship with General Kayani,” the reporter prefaces. “Are you concerned that he may be headed out the door? And what would be the meaning for the military cooperation with Pakistan if he were no longer in the picture?”
Having obviously read The New York Times’s article himself, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs responds cooly and collectedly, “From my perspective, nothing's changed in terms of the criticality of the relationship, which is one of the reasons that I've worked it so hard. And certainly, I have a very strong personal relationship with General Kayani, and I consider him a friend. But it's not just the personal relationship, because I have a very strong professional relationship. Nor is mine the only relationship in our military-to-military relationship between the two countries.”
Mullen’s non-denial denial, like any of its type, appears strongest on the surface before degrading into ambiguity. The friendly nature of Mullen’s tone represents a root problem between the U.S. and Pakistani governments - General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, is under domestic fire for being too friendly with Washington. Clearly Mullen isn’t the only Pentagon official with relationships across Pakistan’s military, a fact that has nothing to do with the question at hand. Mullen is already on the way out, to resign in September.
Those relationships with Kayani’s peers form the real crux of the dilemma.
Responding to rumors of rising anti-Americanism within Pakistani’s military leadership and rank-and-file, Mullen spun an ever-widening trust gap as well as he could. At least if no one was really paying attention, a condition that propaganda depends on. His answer doesn’t shed any real light on the situation. Labeling the Pakistani military’s one-sided schism against expanding U.S. operations as “considerable introspection based on recent events,” Mullen confidently declares, “That makes a lot of sense to me. They've got some questions.”
Such a response runs on bravado more than logic; introspection is hardly the word to describe Pakistan’s review of U.S. military and intelligence relations. Islamabad is contemplating how to comply with new U.S. demands while retaining a shred of independence. Pakistan’s military isn’t debating whether to increase U.S. cooperation, especially if Kayani is the only American bulwark, but how to decouple and still receive aid benefits. The military is also plotting new methods to spare its loyal militant groups, the same ones that Washington wants eliminated.
Because Obama bin Laden compromised its sovereignty, Pakistan must now cede even more sovereignty or risk a complete loss - constant unilateral U.S. operations. Thus its military has chafed under this potential arrangement. Mullen concludes. “I know General Kayani well enough to know - what he cares about the most is not himself: What he cares about the most is his institution. And leaders in -- throughout the world, and certainly in this case, you know, we share that with him.”
Until he backtracks on a campaign in North Waziristan, or fails to cooperate with a joint-intelligence team tasked to kill the Taliban’s “Quetta Shura.”
Although Mullen claims to, and may enjoy, friendly relations with Pakistan’s military, he has achieved no progress in befriending the Pakistani people. Expressing exasperation when confronted with persistent anti-American feelings - a sense of bewilderment that remains clueless to a solution - Mullen follows Gates’s lead and chalks them up to “difficult times,” or “ebbs and flows.” Both realize the seemingly impossible historical chasm between America and Pakistan.
“First of all,” says Gates, “I would say that the long history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has had its ebbs and flows. They have regarded over the decades that we have abandoned them on at least four occasions: two wars with India, when the Soviets left Afghanistan, and then after the enforcement of the Pressler amendment. So it's a -- it's a relationship both sides have had to work on.”
Yet neither appear capable of legitimately resolving these differences.
“First of all,” Washington has also supported a series of unpopular governments in Islamabad; the Musharraf era can be counted as simultaneous engagement and abandonment. The Zardari era, despite its democratic trappings, hasn’t seen much of an improvement either. Dominated by U.S. interference and subservience, the idea of overlording a democratic government is nearly as perverse as supporting an autocracy. Asked if he regrets how he handled U.S.-Pakistani relations, Gates brushes the question aside: “my view is that this is a relationship where we just need to keep working at it.”
However Washington has a great deal to regret throughout the decades, and the last two years alone are full of errors. After all, how can U.S. relations possibly be described as improving when Pakistani disapproval has risen under President Barack Obama? Why would he fall below than George Bush if his “new” policy of engaging Pakistan was truly succeeding?
Beyond drones and Afghanistan's unpopular war, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have played a key factor and here Mullen makes his gravest error (one he routinely makes). As Gates compiled a short list of reasons to stay in the region - namely regional stability - the ongoing Chairman echoed his remarks before ending on Washington’s obsession of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Perhaps regional stability includes the well-being of Afghans and Pakistanis, but Gates and Mullen never actually clarify local populaces as their primary motivation to stay.
“I would just re-emphasize the last point,” Mullen says after Gates brings up nuclear weapons. “It's a country with an awful lot of terrorists on that border. Obviously the links that we've got with -- in the Afghanistan-Pakistan campaign, if you will, which is what it's been for me from the beginning -- it's not about one country or another; it's about the region. And those things that I fear in the future, it's the -- it's the proliferation of that technology and it's the opportunity and the potential that it could fall into the hands of terrorists, many of whom are alive and well and seek that in that region. And that's of great interest, I think, to our country and certainly to the rest of the world.”
To be clear the threat of nuclear proliferation to a terror cell is real. However Mullen and Gates are also hyping a notorious bogeyman in Pakistan, raised whenever U.S. defense officials need to scare the U.S. establishment into supporting their hegemony. The Defense position would rather absorb Pakistan’s blows at the cost of retaining deep influence, rather than become outright enemies (many U.S. law-makers are openly hostile to Islamabad) for the sake of unilateral activity. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons provide an inarguable reason to maintain the status quo.
They also happen to be one of the most inflammatory issues a U.S. official can raise, more controversial than drones and unilateral raids. The latter merely fits into this grander scheme. While Gates and Mullen claim to have no regrets of their relationship with Pakistan’s military, they should have nothing but regrets in relation to the Pakistani people. And if their heavy-handedness positions a more anti-American general atop Kayani’s throne, we suspect the Pentagon will silently lament their failure underground.
Before returning to the surface and acting like it’s just another “ebb,” rather than an unchanging reality.
Pressure on Kayani Cripples North Waziristan Operation
Although we factored the internal pressure within Pakistan’s military into North Waziristan's pseudo-invasion, the situation is even more dire than originally forecast. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pentagon’s main (and evidently the only) conduit to Islamabad, is reportedly facing extreme pressure to correct his “pro-American” ways. The New York Times reports:
As we outlined on Tuesday, North Waziristan hosts one of Islamabad’s loyalist militant commanders, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, along with patches of the Haqqani network. Those Pakistani officials questioning Kayani’s policy would see little benefit in stirring up North Waziristan, as neither the Haqqanis nor Bahadur targets the Pakistani state. U.S. officials have, of course, pushed hard for an operation on these units and employed drones to circumvent Islamabad’s strategy. If Pakistani officials opposed the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, they would all the more oppose an operation in response to his execution.
Kayani himself reversed direction several weeks ago on North Waziristan, now a clear effect of the pressure he’s facing.
The major take-away then becomes: what happens if Pakistan’s military does install an anti-American general at the top? Will joint operations simply be limited, or will U.S.-Pakistani relations undergo a radical transformation?
“The Pakistani army is essentially run by consensus among 11 top commanders, known as the Corps Commanders, and almost all of them, if not all, were demanding that Kayani get much tougher with the Americans, even edging toward a break, Pakistanis who follow the army closely said.Citing Pakistani and US officials, the Times adds that, “Kayani had already become a more obstinate partner, standing ever more firm with each high-level US delegation that has visited since the raid to try and rescue the shattered US-Pakistani relationship.” The arrested CIA informants offer the latest example, while Kayani also pushed back against unilateral operations requested by CIA Director Leon Panetta. Another delay for North Waziristan’s invasion falls into the same pattern.
Washington, with its own hard line against Pakistan, had pushed Kayani into a defensive crouch, along with his troops, and if the general were pushed out, the United States would face a more uncompromising anti-American army chief, the Pakistani said.
To repair the reputation of the army, and to ensure his own survival, Kayani made an extraordinary tour of more than a dozen garrisons, mess halls, and other institutions in the six weeks since the May 2 bin Laden raid, trying to rally support among his rank-and-file troops, who were almost uniformly anti-American, according to participants and people briefed on the sessions.”
As we outlined on Tuesday, North Waziristan hosts one of Islamabad’s loyalist militant commanders, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, along with patches of the Haqqani network. Those Pakistani officials questioning Kayani’s policy would see little benefit in stirring up North Waziristan, as neither the Haqqanis nor Bahadur targets the Pakistani state. U.S. officials have, of course, pushed hard for an operation on these units and employed drones to circumvent Islamabad’s strategy. If Pakistani officials opposed the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, they would all the more oppose an operation in response to his execution.
Kayani himself reversed direction several weeks ago on North Waziristan, now a clear effect of the pressure he’s facing.
The major take-away then becomes: what happens if Pakistan’s military does install an anti-American general at the top? Will joint operations simply be limited, or will U.S.-Pakistani relations undergo a radical transformation?
June 15, 2011
Obama Administration Rewards Big Donors
From ABC News:
President Obama launched his campaign in 2007 promising a change in the way business is done in Washington, DC, but today a report from the Center for Public Integrity says that when it comes to major campaign donors scoring plum administration positions, it’s business as usual.Just like CIA bases in Yemen are "hardly a story."
The report says that 184 out of 556, or about one third of 2008 Obama campaign “bundlers” -- donors who agree to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for a campaign – “or their spouses joined the administration in some role. But the percentages are much higher for the big-dollar bundlers. Nearly 80 percent of those who collected more than $500,000 for Obama took ‘key administration posts,’ as defined by the White House.
The Center points out that candidate Obama suggested that big moneyed interests would not have as prominent a role in DC during his administration.
"The cynics, the lobbyists, the special interests who've turned our government into a game only they can afford to play,” said then-Sen Obama in his February 2007 announcement speech. “They get the access while you get to write a letter…The time for that kind of politics is over."
The White House today pushed back on the Center report, saying it’s “hardly a story” and insisting that donations play no role in these plum jobs.
"The people who got those positions got them because of their credentials," said White House Press Secretary Jay Carney. "They also happen to be donors in some cases. ... Being a supporter does not qualify you for a job or guarantee you a job, but it does not disqualify you."
It's essentially the same explanation the Bush administration gave.
"We make no distinctions about people on the basis of whether they've given or not," said White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer in January 2001.
Tom Perrelli raised $500,000 for Obama in 2008 and is now associate attorney general. Charles Rivkin did the same and is now ambassador to France, so did Donald H. Gips, ambassador to South Africa, and John Roos, ambassador to China.
Carney insisted that all bundlers given these positions were qualified, but earlier this year, the Ambassador to Luxembourg, Cynthia Stroum -- who also was a half-million dollar Obama bundler -- resigned right before a State Department report was issued calling her "aggressive, bullying, hostile and intimidating."
Schulte, Senior Reporter with the Center, says that there is a difference between the Bush administration and the Obama administration.
“We did look at the administration of George Bush which was widely criticized for appointing donors to these kinds of posts, and they had about the same number in four years that the Obama administration has had in two years,” Schulte said.
And according to the American Foreign Service Association, President Obama has nominated more “political” appointees for ambassadorships versus foreign service candidates than any president in at least the past 20 years. A full 36.2% of Obama’s ambassadors are political, while just over 30% of Bush’s were political. Former President Clinton, 27.82% were political, for President George H.W. Bush, 30.3% were political.
Quote of the Day
"With Yemen’s embattled government on the brink of collapse, Obama administration officials are concerned that a future government might not support American operations. By putting the operations under C.I.A. control, they could be carried out as a 'covert action,' which can be undertaken without the support of the host government."
- The New York Times, capturing the total breakdown of U.S. policy in a single paragraph. The White House and Pentagon are eager to ignore why Yemen's pro-democracy movement might not support America.
- The New York Times, capturing the total breakdown of U.S. policy in a single paragraph. The White House and Pentagon are eager to ignore why Yemen's pro-democracy movement might not support America.
Looming Political Showdown in Somalia
As reported over the weekend, Somalia’s Prime Minister is taking his resignation exactly has his numerous supporters expected: by fighting back. The freshly signed Kampala Accord temporarily axed Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed after Uganda brokered deal between President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of Parliament. The Kampala Accord exchanged Aden’s demand for a national election with a one-year extension to the Transitional Federal Government’s mandate, due to expire on August 20th.Realizing the political dishonesty involved, Mohamed was dropped in the process after refusing to cave to Ahmed and Aden’s scheme. Others suspect that he had grown far too popular for Ahmed and Aden’s liking, both of which suffer from low approval in Mogadishu. Buoyed by the largest popular show of support in years and Parliament’s decision to vote on his term, Mohamed declared his intention to remain in office until removed during a Tuesday press conference: "I will respect the wish of the Somali people who want me to stay in office, rather than implementing the Kampala accord.”
“I would resign only after the Somali parliament and Somali people decide to take my post,” he told reporters in Mogadishu... “I decided to wait for the decision of the parliament and to stay in office... I'll continue my work as prime minister.”
Far from a negative development, Mohamed’s pushback is exactly what Somalia needs. Allowing the political system to work itself out could prove empowering to the Somali people, and would retain the TFG’s most effective official for the critical year ahead. However a political stalemate that refuses to budge Ahmed or Aden holds the potential for widespread disaster. None of the men operate under good terms and are unlikely to resolve their power differences. Then two or more rifts would be left unresolved.
The three must either reach a peace and move on, or else, in the more likely scenario, one must be removed.
Aden appears particularly vulnerable after extending his own term, much to the international community’s displeasure, and challenging the popular Mohamed. Ahmed cannot be discounted though, as his governing may have worn out over a brutal two and a half years. Only when Mohamed came into the picture in October 2010 did the TFG begin to right itself from a tailspin.
Ahmed has unwisely condemned the thousands of protesters (students, soldiers, government officials) in Mogadishu, blaming them on corrupt parliamentarians. Many protesters have also been arrested while new protests are being obstructed by government forces. Facing intense popular opposition to his backroom dealings in Uganda, Ahmed recently told reporters during his own press conference, "The political disputes of the Somali leadership had been solved in the Kampala meeting.”
Mohamed and many Somalis now await a showdown of even higher stakes.
June 14, 2011
North Waziristan’s Phantom Invasion
One of the main reasons the White House is entertaining thoughts of a “significant” drawdown after July - between 10,000 and 30,000 U.S. troops could redeploy from Afghanistan over the next 18 months - lies in the mountains of Pakistan. Several weeks ago Islamabad had voiced its intention to launch a long-anticipated campaign into North Waziristan, a gesture to visiting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Michael Mullen, outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
An air roll-out would soften the agency for some 40,000 Pakistani troops, just in time for mid-July. These forces would theoretically neutralize the Haqqani network, a well-trained arm of the Taliban estimated at 4,000 fighters.
Any immediate withdrawal over 5,000 U.S. combat troops stretches the limits of military plausibility. For starters these units take weeks and months to move, so a July decision won’t reach the ground until August or September. 10,000 appears preposterous given the “fragile” state of coalition gains, and U.S. troops have gone on record in expressing the need more troops. 30,000 only provides a rough estimate for the next 18 months and, if all goes as plans (which never happens in Afghanistan), 70,000 troops will continue the ground war as planned.
A “substantial” withdrawal, or whatever buzzword the White House gravitates around, loses further credibility as North Waziristan recedes into the shadows again.
There’s nothing coincidental about an operation during July; such a move aligned with President Barack Obama’s next major address. That the administration likely realized Islamabad had duped it again adds to the suspicion surrounding U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Speculation of an “invasion” into North Waziristan started on an unstable base and never looked back. Timed to please high-ranking U.S. dignitaries, Islamabad took advantage of a retaliatory string of bombings from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to leak the operation’s pre-planning.
The announcement’s pattern immediately revealed a feint designed to placate U.S. pressure after Osama bin Laden’s fallout. Initial reports elaborated on how the Haqqanis would be spared for posing no declared threat against Pakistan. Last year the ISI tasked Sirajuddin, son of Jalaluddin, to retrieve the legendary Colonel Imam from rogue TTP chieftain Hakimullah Mehsud, who had taken the Colonel hostage and eventually executed him. Only the most extreme TTP elements, mainly Hakimullah and his suicide squad, would be targeted in North Waziristan, where his circle relocated to after the 2009 invasion of South Waziristan. Allies would be protected by negotiations through a tribal jirga.
If an operation is launched at all, that is. An invasion into North Waziristan, the one sanctuary that Islamabad has avoided at all costs, is always “in the works.” According to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s military chief and a U.S. favorite, the army is, “following a well thought-out campaign plan and is under no pressure to carry out operations at a particular time."
Corps Commander Peshawar Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik, who oversees military operations in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and adjacent tribal regions, added, “There has been a lot of media hype about the operation... I have no such plans as far as I am concerned. We will undertake operations when we want to do it, when it is militarily and otherwise in the national interest to undertake such operations."
As if to head off these public doubts, U.S. and Pakistani officials released a joint-intelligence team supposedly planned for months. In addition to al-Qaeda’s new head, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, four other big fish were released on a kill or capture list, including Taliban chief Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis. Except this list diverts attention away from the cracks within U.S.-Pakistani relations, rather than patching them up. None of these figures (especially old-school jihadists like Omar and Jalaluddin) have targeted or support attacks against the Pakistani state and its people, and expecting Islamabad to compromise them is idealistic.
The U.S. and Pakistani versions of North Waziristan simply gaze in different directions, Washington at the Haqqani network and Islamabad at Hakimullah’s hostile cell. Normally strategic objectives cannot be forced to match up.
These doubts temporarily subsided after the termination of Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the ISI-affiliated Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). Kashmiri allegedly arrived in South Waziristan from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only weeks before a Predator took out his meeting with Punjabi Taliban. Numerous Pakistani officials initially vouched for his death, evidence that Islamabad hoped to play up its intelligence sharing, but conflicting statements from government and militant sources left his outcome unverified.
Kashmiri’s status illustrates the ambiguity surrounding U.S.-Pakistani intelligence operations. Even if his death is ultimately confirmed, Kashmiri’s meeting with the Punjabi Taliban indicates that Islamabad was willing to get rid of him. The Punjabi Taliban operates semi-independently within Hakimullah’s network, and is believed to have either gone rogue from the ISI or received funding from a radical ISI faction. Islamabad seeks to remove this particular faction, not the Afghan Taliban or loyal elements of the TTP, including North Waziristan chieftain Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
A “disappointed” Robert Gates and his replacement, current CIA director Leon Panetta, recently chastised Islamabad for sharing intel of two militant compounds. Two soon-to-be-empty compounds.
The same course of action must be expected in regards to the Haqqanis, given that this strategy is already underway. Locals report that select army checkpoints were removed to let militants slip out of Miranshah. Nevertheless Islamabad’s own actions aren’t the sole factor involved. As Washington and Islamabad have plotted a campaign for months, so too has the Haqqani network. We were told by our sources as early as 2010 that the Haqqanis had already diversified into the neighboring agencies. In February 2011 a truce was worked out between the Haqqanis and local tribes, allowing them to start moving into neighboring Kurram agency en masse.
The Haqqanis are said to be long gone by now, relatively speaking; they will always maintain a presence. The ultimate takeaway is that they’ll move to wherever the Pakistani army isn’t, basic guerrilla strategy enabled by a friendly government and populace.
Not long ago the Pentagon insisted it couldn’t defeat the Taliban without shutting down North Waziristan - a political concession to extract an operation - only to reverse course after being shut down. Despite major efforts by U.S. regular and Special Forces to wear them down, the resilient Haqqani network remains a primary threat to U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan. And despite frequent engagement with U.S. officials, both Pakistan’s government and people remain disconnected from America. Obama will surely exploit Osama bin Laden's death to portray success in Afghanistan.
He might want to think twice before stepping into North Waziristan.
An air roll-out would soften the agency for some 40,000 Pakistani troops, just in time for mid-July. These forces would theoretically neutralize the Haqqani network, a well-trained arm of the Taliban estimated at 4,000 fighters.
Any immediate withdrawal over 5,000 U.S. combat troops stretches the limits of military plausibility. For starters these units take weeks and months to move, so a July decision won’t reach the ground until August or September. 10,000 appears preposterous given the “fragile” state of coalition gains, and U.S. troops have gone on record in expressing the need more troops. 30,000 only provides a rough estimate for the next 18 months and, if all goes as plans (which never happens in Afghanistan), 70,000 troops will continue the ground war as planned.
A “substantial” withdrawal, or whatever buzzword the White House gravitates around, loses further credibility as North Waziristan recedes into the shadows again.
There’s nothing coincidental about an operation during July; such a move aligned with President Barack Obama’s next major address. That the administration likely realized Islamabad had duped it again adds to the suspicion surrounding U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Speculation of an “invasion” into North Waziristan started on an unstable base and never looked back. Timed to please high-ranking U.S. dignitaries, Islamabad took advantage of a retaliatory string of bombings from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to leak the operation’s pre-planning.
The announcement’s pattern immediately revealed a feint designed to placate U.S. pressure after Osama bin Laden’s fallout. Initial reports elaborated on how the Haqqanis would be spared for posing no declared threat against Pakistan. Last year the ISI tasked Sirajuddin, son of Jalaluddin, to retrieve the legendary Colonel Imam from rogue TTP chieftain Hakimullah Mehsud, who had taken the Colonel hostage and eventually executed him. Only the most extreme TTP elements, mainly Hakimullah and his suicide squad, would be targeted in North Waziristan, where his circle relocated to after the 2009 invasion of South Waziristan. Allies would be protected by negotiations through a tribal jirga.
If an operation is launched at all, that is. An invasion into North Waziristan, the one sanctuary that Islamabad has avoided at all costs, is always “in the works.” According to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s military chief and a U.S. favorite, the army is, “following a well thought-out campaign plan and is under no pressure to carry out operations at a particular time."
Corps Commander Peshawar Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik, who oversees military operations in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and adjacent tribal regions, added, “There has been a lot of media hype about the operation... I have no such plans as far as I am concerned. We will undertake operations when we want to do it, when it is militarily and otherwise in the national interest to undertake such operations."
As if to head off these public doubts, U.S. and Pakistani officials released a joint-intelligence team supposedly planned for months. In addition to al-Qaeda’s new head, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, four other big fish were released on a kill or capture list, including Taliban chief Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis. Except this list diverts attention away from the cracks within U.S.-Pakistani relations, rather than patching them up. None of these figures (especially old-school jihadists like Omar and Jalaluddin) have targeted or support attacks against the Pakistani state and its people, and expecting Islamabad to compromise them is idealistic.
The U.S. and Pakistani versions of North Waziristan simply gaze in different directions, Washington at the Haqqani network and Islamabad at Hakimullah’s hostile cell. Normally strategic objectives cannot be forced to match up.
These doubts temporarily subsided after the termination of Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the ISI-affiliated Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). Kashmiri allegedly arrived in South Waziristan from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only weeks before a Predator took out his meeting with Punjabi Taliban. Numerous Pakistani officials initially vouched for his death, evidence that Islamabad hoped to play up its intelligence sharing, but conflicting statements from government and militant sources left his outcome unverified.
Kashmiri’s status illustrates the ambiguity surrounding U.S.-Pakistani intelligence operations. Even if his death is ultimately confirmed, Kashmiri’s meeting with the Punjabi Taliban indicates that Islamabad was willing to get rid of him. The Punjabi Taliban operates semi-independently within Hakimullah’s network, and is believed to have either gone rogue from the ISI or received funding from a radical ISI faction. Islamabad seeks to remove this particular faction, not the Afghan Taliban or loyal elements of the TTP, including North Waziristan chieftain Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
A “disappointed” Robert Gates and his replacement, current CIA director Leon Panetta, recently chastised Islamabad for sharing intel of two militant compounds. Two soon-to-be-empty compounds.
The same course of action must be expected in regards to the Haqqanis, given that this strategy is already underway. Locals report that select army checkpoints were removed to let militants slip out of Miranshah. Nevertheless Islamabad’s own actions aren’t the sole factor involved. As Washington and Islamabad have plotted a campaign for months, so too has the Haqqani network. We were told by our sources as early as 2010 that the Haqqanis had already diversified into the neighboring agencies. In February 2011 a truce was worked out between the Haqqanis and local tribes, allowing them to start moving into neighboring Kurram agency en masse.
The Haqqanis are said to be long gone by now, relatively speaking; they will always maintain a presence. The ultimate takeaway is that they’ll move to wherever the Pakistani army isn’t, basic guerrilla strategy enabled by a friendly government and populace.
Not long ago the Pentagon insisted it couldn’t defeat the Taliban without shutting down North Waziristan - a political concession to extract an operation - only to reverse course after being shut down. Despite major efforts by U.S. regular and Special Forces to wear them down, the resilient Haqqani network remains a primary threat to U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan. And despite frequent engagement with U.S. officials, both Pakistan’s government and people remain disconnected from America. Obama will surely exploit Osama bin Laden's death to portray success in Afghanistan.
He might want to think twice before stepping into North Waziristan.
CIA Increasing Yemeni Drones Amid U.S. Policy Meltdown
On Monday night, with the White House nearing its heated July deadline, PBS’s Charlie Rose hosted a relatively shallow debate on the war in Afghanistan. For 20 minutes Martha Raddatz of ABC News and Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post glossed over options for July’s withdrawal, belying their insider credentials. A taste of things to come in the U.S. media.Only when Raddatz added her personal take on President Barack Obama did the interview assume new meaning. Something to the effect that authorizing Osama bin Laden’s execution made Obama into a foreign policy man.
Raddatz isn’t the first pundit to make such a claim; she carries no significance herself. This widely disseminated notion that Obama suddenly grew into an experienced commander, however, must be countered with a dose of reality. Consumed with the months-long effort to pinpoint bin Laden’s Abbottabad hideout, the Obama administration responded sluggishly to every uprising during the Arab Spring, and chose the wrong side of multiple revolutions. His leadership void hampers what could be a more successful operation in Libya. His “Moment of Opportunity,” delivered under rising Muslim opposition, became an immediate afterthought as Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, hijacked the U.S. Congress. Syrian troops haven’t stopped firing on peaceful protesters. Bahrain remains in limbo.
And then there’s Yemen, where the White House has undermined the youth’s revolution while simultaneously escalating military operations. Because Obama knows so much about national security now - as if national security is equivalent to foreign policy.
Our next report on Yemen’s revolution (coming later today) factored in U.S. military escalation before The Wall Street Journal revealed the CIA's latest drone activity. Secrecy is impossible regardless of the U.S. media’s actions; most Yemenis are acutely aware of foreign military operations inside their country. Such is the predictable nature of U.S. policy, and many protesters opposed to President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime believe America is intentionally destabilizing Yemen to justify military intervention. Many more believe that Saleh manipulates al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to secure political protection and military aid from the West.
The CIA’s new drone program set embattled Saleh at the helm - an overt lapse in judgment - and will “coordinate with Yemen’s government.” As if this assurance is a sign of confidence.
The Obama administration’s response to Yemen lacks any semblance of good judgment. Rather than learn from Egypt and back the popular movement, Washington has negotiated with Riyadh to maintain the status quo at the cost of the youth’s revolution. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) proposal is condemned by the popular opposition - now organizing protests against the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and Obama himself - and poses a danger to the country. 10 days have passed since Saleh’s assassination attempt and the administration acts as though power transferred to Vice President al-Hadi, when real power remains in Saleh’s family. These are the same relatives that the CIA will supposedly "cooperate" with.
Saudi intelligence, another despised foreign influence, will also play a role in the operation. Evidently one unpopular security agency isn’t enough to inflame Yemen’s populace.
Supporting Saleh has and will continue to boost AQAP. U.S. policy has intensified Yemen’s political crisis, necessitating drone strikes which are then spun to the U.S. public as “taking advantage of the security vacuum.” Launching a new military campaign isn’t a sign of knowing what to do, but not knowing what to do. Although counterinsurgency implies a long, expensive ground campaign, it necessitates full-spectrum warfare with an emphasis on non-military operations. Not all COIN requires nation-building, and America doesn’t need to build Yemen so much as support its people over a tyrant.
Yet U.S. policy has sacrificed the political, economic and social spheres, a counterproductive equation that trades COIN for militarily-monolithic counterterrorism. Killing bin Laden didn’t accomplish anything in Yemen and neither will unilateral drone strikes. The only real casualty is U.S. foreign policy.
June 13, 2011
Geopolitical Breakdown Of Saleh's Assassination Attempt
Usually assassination attempts are obsessed over and broken down by media. Perhaps this would be the case had Ali Abdullah Saleh been killed immediately and not left to lie in a Saudi hospital for weeks, keeping all eyes on his health and the chaos that ensued from his evacuation. But this outcome only explains part of why an inside job is somehow flown below the radar.As is generally the case with assassinations and conspiracies, both Saleh’s ruling General People’s Party (GPC) and the Obama administration have reason to bury the real story.
Scott Stewart, Vice President of Tactical Intelligence at STRATFOR, broke down the assassination attempt on Saleh’s presidential compound in a recent (though already dated) analysis. His straightforward account of the situation requires no elaboration. Pictures from inside and outside of the presidential mosque bear evidence of an implosion and not an external mortar “or tank-guided missile,” contrary to the initial government reaction. Stewart speculates from the blast residue and “shattery” explosion that a military-grade explosive was used in the IED, likely planted within the compound's walls.
Meanwhile local witnesses allege that government accounts of a rocket attack don’t match the assassination attempt’s timing.
With this basic crime scene in mind the task becomes extrapolating its political implications, which STRATFOR and most news sites fail to follow through on. (This Foreign Policy analysis was just published but doesn’t go deep enough, in our opinion). Although the probability of an inside job has finally surfaced in Western reporting, many Yemenis suspected an internal plot or foreign conspiracy from the start. U.S. and Israeli conspiracies were thrown into the mix, reasoning they needed to silence their murderous ally before he snitched on them. A mob killing also held the possibility of triggering new chaos, which some Yemenis don’t believe America is averse to.
The U.S. government is commonly believed to seek destabilization in order to justify an escalating military presence in the region.
While this theory is truer in relation to Yemen’s overall condition, we do not believe Washington orchestrated the attack on Saleh and his senior officials. The attack did set in motion a false transfer to Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, corresponding with U.S. demands to preserve the ruling GPC. An elite team of U.S. operatives could even scapegoat the blast on opposition figures or tribal rivals. The idea of infiltrating the presidential compound unnoticed simply sounds implausible.
Just as implausible is a mortar or rocket attack from the al-Ahmar tribe, the government’s immediate target. Its chieftain, Sadiq al-Ahmar, suddenly found his house and neighborhood under attack three weeks ago, after Saleh decided to manufacture a tribal conflict to spook Washington and Riyadh (mission accomplished). Nevertheless, the odds were slim enough that al-Ahmar’s militia landed a precision shot inside Saleh’s mosque. Sadiq explicitly denied responsibility, then a possible feint but now a realistic outcome.
It also appeared obvious from the start that the GPC used al-Ahmar as political and military cover. Several of his brother’s houses were shelled soon after the blast, as were positions of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. Inner chatter soon switched to Yemen’s leading rogue general and commander of the defected Armored 1st division, turning Sadiq into a decoy. Except Ali Mohsen appears to be nothing more than another decoy.
On June 8th an FBI forensics team landed in Sana’a at the request of Saleh’s government. This team quickly deduced the reality behind the explosion, and listed al-Qaeda as a potential suspect to divert attention from Saleh’s inner circle. Such a plan, if that was the idea, didn’t work. According to a Yemeni official, “They are concerned about how the attack was carried out. Everyone is a suspect.”
Rather than the al-Ahmars or a rogue military agent, the most plausible source of assassination appears to reside within Saleh’s inner circle. Stewart writes for STRATFOR, “One other thing to consider is, as we look at the placement of this device, it was done by someone who knew Saleh’s routine. It was done by someone who knew the compound.” A rogue faction remains a possibility; Hadi and acting foreign minister Abu Bakr al- Qirbi, among others, supposedly moved to vote Saleh out of office before backing down to ruling GPC officials. They potentially stood to gain if the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) actually implemented its power-sharing initiative.
However they are unlikely to have chosen an extreme measure, knowing that Saleh’s family would automatically assume command.
One member, though, has fallen under particular suspicion. With several individuals now in custody, speculation has turned from one half-brother (Ali Mohsen) to Saleh’s other half brother, Ali Saleh al-Ahmar. Related through Saleh’s mother's second marriage, Ali Saleh led the Republican Guard until being replaced by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2000. He also suspected Saleh of killing his nephew, leading many Yemenis to believe he finally carried out his revenge.
Yemen Online reports, “officials who were at the scene said they heard that the attack was a revenge by the president's half brother Ali Saleh al-Ahmar who was arrested later in the presidential palace over short clashes.”
Even now the decoy process continues. In light of these arrests and connections to Ali Saleh, the government has released counter-propaganda against Yemen’s political opposition. Apparently interrogations had revealed “important, grave” facts “related to Al-Mushtarak” – an Arabic term for the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). Clearly this division and disarray is responsible for jamming the GPC. Not only is Saleh’s party facing “food, oil and electricity shortages,” all of which impede a dialogue with the JMP, the GPC is turning on itself.
The end result is a continual breakdown in U.S.-Saudi negotiations between the GPC and JMP. Saleh’s absence itself has created enough chaos, yet Washington and Riyadh refuse to drop the GPC in pushing for a “unity” government. Weeks could pass amid sporadic negotiations, the popular revolution will be pressured to escalate its opposition to the GCC, and Yemen’s humanitarian crisis will pile up. Contrary to the “opportunity” afforded by Saleh’s medical leave, the likelihood of an inside job has heavily obstructed a transition process and widened the security vacuum.
One conspiracy begets another, and the Obama administration possesses every reason to hush an assassination that it played no part in.
Obama, Gates Battle Over Afghanistan's Withdrawal
The next major review of the Afghanistan War is progressing similar to the Obama administration's first. Under intense pressure from the right and left (and the Taliban), the White House needed extra time to find the middle ground between no surge at all and 60,000 troops. Rumors of 30,000 circulated for months before confirmation in December 2009, much to President Barack Obama’s personal vexation.
Even the middle road was considered too expensive politically, and his allies justifiably believed that the Pentagon publicly handcuffed them as the war spiraled out of control.
With an unspecified number of weeks still remaining before Obama’s next address, planned to center around a withdrawal time-frame to 2014, voracious rumors have attempted to peg the concrete details of July’s drawdown. The administration has kept quiet for 18 months to keep its options open, feeding the information vacuum just as 2009’s lengthy review did. However the White House wants to capitalize on Osama bin Laden’s death and is pushing for a big deduction in time for the 2012 campaign season.
Estimates range from the Pentagon’s ideal zero to the White House’s 10,000.
Now Leslie H. Gelb, a former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has leaked the latest option - a plan designed to politically shock and awe. Drawing on his connections, the current president emeritus of CFR wrote for The Daily Beast, “By July 15, President Obama will unveil a plan to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan by upward of 30,000, but to withdraw them slowly under military guidance over 12 to 18 months, according to administration officials.”
“In sum,” says Gelb, “the quick exiters get the big 30,000 or so number, and the die-harders get one last year-plus at near full strength to weaken the Taliban.”
Without knowing how Gelb extracted this information, the clique headed by Obama and Vice President Joe Biden appears to have preempted the Pentagon’s hard-line. After suffering repeated leaks in the past, the White House is shifting all the pressure on Gates and the Pentagon, daring them to oppose their drawdown while simultaneously raising their bottom line. Obama has drawn heavy criticism for bowing to the Pentagon, and appears determined not to be bullied out of July.
This political gamesmanship also adds clouds the withdrawal process by hedging against it.
30,000 troops theoretically signals the middle ground that Obama feels most comfortable in, a position intended to “satisfy those pushing for a quick exit and the diehards determined to stay the course.” This may not be the case though; the Obama administration also loves its rhetorical deception. While the immediate drawdown after July remains to be decided in the coming weeks, no more than 10,000 are certain to redeploy. 3,000-5,000 troops, many of them non-combat units, represent the plausible ceiling given stiff Pentagon resistance. Perhaps no combat troops will leave for the next three to six months.
30,000 is a false sticker price. The withdrawal can start at any time and won’t end until 2013, leaving 70,000 troops in the country until January 2015.
Gimmicks aside, the administration’s drawdown is prepared to sustain the war in Afghanistan. Negotiations with the Taliban cannot fully progress so long as U.S. forces show no intention of leaving. The White House’s time-line could further expand if a reduction in U.S. and NATO troops allows the Taliban to regain lost territory. Although al-Qaeda may have given up Afghanistan for greener pastures around the world, the Taliban remain a potent fighting force despite a relentless blitzkrieg from U.S. Special Forces. Judging by Iraq’s security forces, the Afghan national army and police force won’t be able to operate independently for at least a decade. Afghan President Hamid Karzai remains powerless to purify his corrupt regime and Pakistan’s invasion of North Waziristan is already sliding off-track.
Unlike coalition troops which are gone for good, the Taliban can put more troops back into the battlefield.
This outcome assumes a full 30,000 U.S. troops will withdraw by 2013. The Pentagon will fight hard for a cap, reported at 15,000. Unwilling to challenge the White House openly, Gates will seek a compromise that minimizes the 30,000 figure and back-loads the withdrawal. As for the White House’s insistence that all U.S. troops will exit after 2014, the Pentagon fully expects and will probably receive a substantial force. Gates’s legacy is staked to Afghanistan and he won’t resign (on June 30th) without a fight. He appears to realize that Iraq’s precipitous fall in violence is further away than Obama’s time-frame allows.
Regardless of how many troops the White House withdraws in 2011, 2012 is unlikely to see a reduction in Afghan bloodshed. The last 18 months have created some progress after years of counter-productively. However we aren’t expecting any miracles during the next 18.
June 12, 2011
Updating Somalia’s Fluid Dynamics
Fallout from the Kampala Accord is descending at an accelerated rate:
Inner workings of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government
It appears safe to conclude that the resignation of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, Somalia’s Prime Minister, remains in limbo. While the Kampala Accord is backed by Uganda and Ethiopia, the two major African powers involved in Somalia, and accepted by the international community, the document was quickly swept up in residuals of the Arab Spring. Foreign interference and a history of failed political deals have jaded the Somali people to the point where many refused to accept Mohamed’s loss.
The majority of emerging information continues to damage the Kampala Accord’s credibility. Under heavy pressure from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and the UN, President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden agreed to sacrifice Mohamed to save themselves. Tied to Sharif and Aden, Uganda and Ethiopia are suspected of preserving their own status quo regardless of the effects on Somalia. According to sources in Kampala, Mohamed voluntarily resigned after refusing to cede half of parliament’s seats to Aden’s political allies, or to participate in any foreign settlement of the TFG's grievances.
As neither the President nor Speaker governed as effectively during Mohamed’s nine-month tenure, this shady deal sparked more popular opposition than anticipated.
Facing intense public protest in Mogadishu from civilians and government officials, Somalia’s Parliament has now succumbed to voting on Mohamed’s resignation. This move could diffuse tensions but also throw the Kampala Accord into new disarray if either Sharif or Aden feel threatened. Our predictions going forward are based on past failures to resolve political feuds, and dumping Mohamed will in no way repair the damaged relationship between Sharif and Aden. However the flip side this chaos does hold a bright outlook: any civil reaction should be considered a positive development.
If the TFG manages to reach a compromise that allows Mohamed to stay, a demonstration of governance could work wonders on Somalia’s civilian front. Mohamed has come along way from being perceived as too green, and no standing official has more credibility to oversee the critical year ahead. Such an outcome, though seemingly far-fetched, would add real political momentum to the African Union’s (AU) military progress in Mogadishu.
The UN mission in Somalia
Like Mohamed’s double-edged sword, the potential firing of Augustine Mahiga breaks down into diverging outcomes. The UN’s Special Representative is rumored to sit on the chopping block after “the collapse of public confidence in his policy to Somalia.” With the UN temporarily abandoning its humanitarian work amid a severe drought, Mahiga struggled to keep the TFG on-track throughout a prolonged debate on its August 20th mandate. The UN Envoy insisted on elections before August, a position that conformed with Aden’s but few Somalis or AU officials, until eventually caving.
Exasperated by political gridlock, Mahiga proposed a ridiculed power-sharing agreement that Sharif and Aden continued to oppose, each demanding more than they were offered. Once Museveni threw his weight behind a year-long extension, Mahiga was forced to surrender and back the Kampala Accord. The entire situation put him on the wrong side of Mohamed, and appears to have cost him the last of his credibility in Somalia.
Mahiga’s exit may prove beneficial, though, if the UN can reorganize under new blood. Turning disadvantages into advantages is difficult work, but it can - and must - be done during a time of war.
Saif al-Adel's shadow
The death of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed has cast a short-lived cheer over Mogadishu. More than a tactical boost, Somalis are feeling a boost of momentum that could carry over into the battle against al-Shabab. A significant drop off in operations is less evident. According to various reports, Mohammed has already been replaced by the equally clever Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian trained in explosives.
As a veteran of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, a member of AQ’s religious council (majlis al shura) and a leading strategist, al-Adel is speculated as a successor to Osama bin Laden. Contrary to claims that Mohammed was the last US Embassy plotter, al-Adel is also believe to have participated in the planning.
The arrival of al-Adel can also split one of two ways: either al-Shabab rallies around or becomes further alienated by their new commander. Far from global jihadists, a large percentage of al-Shabab’s foot soldiers want little to do with al-Qaeda. The presence of foreigners has sparked numerous in-fights between the group’s leaders, to the point that al-Qaeda has (for now) ceded to the nationalist Mukhtar Robow. If al-Adel takes a firmer stand than Mohammed, who choose a softer tact to avoid tensions, his presence could further destabilize al-Shabab’s alliance.
Either way his deployment would signal a strong play in Somalia. Risk comes with reward, and U.S. Special Forces already operating in the country will surely be on the hunt after missing Mohammed. However diversifying its leadership rather than centralize it in Pakistan brings its own benefits of strengthening al-Qaeda’s global web. Somalia is no demotion for al-Adel but a pivotal piece on al-Qaeda's board, and allows Ayman al-Zawahiri to carry on as normal.
al-Adel’s potential arrival is all the more motivation for the TFG to pull itself out of its tailspin. Mohammed’s respite probably won’t last for long.
Inner workings of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government
It appears safe to conclude that the resignation of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, Somalia’s Prime Minister, remains in limbo. While the Kampala Accord is backed by Uganda and Ethiopia, the two major African powers involved in Somalia, and accepted by the international community, the document was quickly swept up in residuals of the Arab Spring. Foreign interference and a history of failed political deals have jaded the Somali people to the point where many refused to accept Mohamed’s loss.
The majority of emerging information continues to damage the Kampala Accord’s credibility. Under heavy pressure from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and the UN, President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden agreed to sacrifice Mohamed to save themselves. Tied to Sharif and Aden, Uganda and Ethiopia are suspected of preserving their own status quo regardless of the effects on Somalia. According to sources in Kampala, Mohamed voluntarily resigned after refusing to cede half of parliament’s seats to Aden’s political allies, or to participate in any foreign settlement of the TFG's grievances.
As neither the President nor Speaker governed as effectively during Mohamed’s nine-month tenure, this shady deal sparked more popular opposition than anticipated.
Facing intense public protest in Mogadishu from civilians and government officials, Somalia’s Parliament has now succumbed to voting on Mohamed’s resignation. This move could diffuse tensions but also throw the Kampala Accord into new disarray if either Sharif or Aden feel threatened. Our predictions going forward are based on past failures to resolve political feuds, and dumping Mohamed will in no way repair the damaged relationship between Sharif and Aden. However the flip side this chaos does hold a bright outlook: any civil reaction should be considered a positive development.
If the TFG manages to reach a compromise that allows Mohamed to stay, a demonstration of governance could work wonders on Somalia’s civilian front. Mohamed has come along way from being perceived as too green, and no standing official has more credibility to oversee the critical year ahead. Such an outcome, though seemingly far-fetched, would add real political momentum to the African Union’s (AU) military progress in Mogadishu.
The UN mission in Somalia
Like Mohamed’s double-edged sword, the potential firing of Augustine Mahiga breaks down into diverging outcomes. The UN’s Special Representative is rumored to sit on the chopping block after “the collapse of public confidence in his policy to Somalia.” With the UN temporarily abandoning its humanitarian work amid a severe drought, Mahiga struggled to keep the TFG on-track throughout a prolonged debate on its August 20th mandate. The UN Envoy insisted on elections before August, a position that conformed with Aden’s but few Somalis or AU officials, until eventually caving.
Exasperated by political gridlock, Mahiga proposed a ridiculed power-sharing agreement that Sharif and Aden continued to oppose, each demanding more than they were offered. Once Museveni threw his weight behind a year-long extension, Mahiga was forced to surrender and back the Kampala Accord. The entire situation put him on the wrong side of Mohamed, and appears to have cost him the last of his credibility in Somalia.
Mahiga’s exit may prove beneficial, though, if the UN can reorganize under new blood. Turning disadvantages into advantages is difficult work, but it can - and must - be done during a time of war.
Saif al-Adel's shadow
The death of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed has cast a short-lived cheer over Mogadishu. More than a tactical boost, Somalis are feeling a boost of momentum that could carry over into the battle against al-Shabab. A significant drop off in operations is less evident. According to various reports, Mohammed has already been replaced by the equally clever Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian trained in explosives.
As a veteran of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, a member of AQ’s religious council (majlis al shura) and a leading strategist, al-Adel is speculated as a successor to Osama bin Laden. Contrary to claims that Mohammed was the last US Embassy plotter, al-Adel is also believe to have participated in the planning.
The arrival of al-Adel can also split one of two ways: either al-Shabab rallies around or becomes further alienated by their new commander. Far from global jihadists, a large percentage of al-Shabab’s foot soldiers want little to do with al-Qaeda. The presence of foreigners has sparked numerous in-fights between the group’s leaders, to the point that al-Qaeda has (for now) ceded to the nationalist Mukhtar Robow. If al-Adel takes a firmer stand than Mohammed, who choose a softer tact to avoid tensions, his presence could further destabilize al-Shabab’s alliance.
Either way his deployment would signal a strong play in Somalia. Risk comes with reward, and U.S. Special Forces already operating in the country will surely be on the hunt after missing Mohammed. However diversifying its leadership rather than centralize it in Pakistan brings its own benefits of strengthening al-Qaeda’s global web. Somalia is no demotion for al-Adel but a pivotal piece on al-Qaeda's board, and allows Ayman al-Zawahiri to carry on as normal.
al-Adel’s potential arrival is all the more motivation for the TFG to pull itself out of its tailspin. Mohammed’s respite probably won’t last for long.
Fazul Mohammed's Fleeting Counter-Terrorism Victory
Nothing attracts U.S. officials like a fresh al-Qaeda kill. With U.S. Special Forces nowhere to be found around the crime scene, removing the usual veil of secrecy, White House officials descended on Fazul Abdullah Mohammed’s corpse like buzzards. The mastermind of the 1998 Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya was confirmed dead on Saturday after a June 8th shootout in Mogadishu."We congratulate our army for killing the head of al-Qaida operations in East Africa,” said Information Minister Abdulkareem Jama. “They have shown their effectiveness."
So effective that Somali troops appear to have caught Mohammed sleeping.
Al-Qaeda’s ring-leader in East Africa found himself back in Somalia after the 2009 killing of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, eliminated by a helicopter-borne SEAL team outside of Mogadishu. However in contrast to a high-risk raid, Mohammed was riding in a stocked luxury car (cash, weapons, GPS) when stopped at a government checkpoint in the capital. A lethal gunfight ensued after Somali police discovered a pistol, and Mohammed was mistakenly buried as a “South African.” His cache sparked enough suspicion to exhume the body and confirm his death through photo and DNA identification.
Gen. Abdikarim Yusuf Dhagabadan, Somalia's deputy army chief, subsequently declared, “It is a victory for the world. It is a victory for Somali army.”
U.S. officials obviously agree, but for reasons that stretch beyond 12 American lives and their families. Shortly after the news broke, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton solemnly marked Mohammed’s death as, “a significant blow to Al Qaeda, its extremist allies, and its operations in East Africa. It is a just end for a terrorist who brought so much death and pain to so many innocents in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and elsewhere - Tanzanians, Kenyans, Somalis, others in the region, and our own embassy personnel.”
"We commend the efforts of the Somali government forces, whose actions against Fazul struck a significant blow against those in the region seeking to carry out terrorist attacks," added John Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism chief.”
Now back to reality in Somalia.
Only days ago the fragile state’s condition looked particularly dire. Although African Union (AU) troops have slowly overtaken al-Shabab’s territory in Mogadishu during five months of grueling urban warfare, a constant anxiety lingered over the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Fears that the TFG’s governance couldn’t keep up with AU gains fully materialized in May, when the TFG and UN entered a protracted debate on the TFG’s controversial mandate. Due to expire on August 20th, UN and Western donors bluntly expressed the need to address the TFG’s corruption and lack of political coherence.
Topping the list was a feud between President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament. The two have quarreled endlessly over each other’s terms, a national election and a new constitution, gridlocking the TFG and obstructing the UN’s oversight. Months of intense buildup erupted in a series of UN Security Council meetings in May, during which the TFG found itself under intense criticism. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni then threatened Western governments that he would pull his 5,000 troops out of Mogadishu without a one-year extension to the TFG’s mandate, a position aligned with Sharif’s.
The resulting Kampala Accord, signed on June 9th in the presence of Museveni and UN special representative Augustine Mahiga, granted the Ugandan strongman’s wish. Western governments had no choice except to trade an immediate transition for flimsy assurances of reconciliation; an election would be pushed back 12 months to allow a complete AU offensive. Museveni triumphantly declared, “I am delighted that we have managed to overcome the deadlock in such a constructive way.”
The cost, however, appears extraordinarily high: the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, Somalia’s most popular statesman in years.
This outcome brewed throughout TFG/UN discussions. After weeks of political wrestling, Mohamed realized that Sharif was preparing to sacrifice him in exchange for an extension to the UN’s mandate - and his own term - which Aden opposed. Never a fan of each other, Mohamed refused to meet Aden privately in early June, preferring to settle their differences as a “national issue.” Days later the Prime Minister clarified: “The speaker is not sincere while 90% of the parliament members are good people.”
Given the foreign coercion and popular opposition involved in the Kampala Accord, many Somalis and observers agree that the TFG’s political crisis just escalated. The agreement lacks legitimacy due to its back-room politics, especially after the conference was derailed from being held in Mogadishu. Sharif and Aden’s relationship remains contentious after delaying major decisions on the TFG’s future transition (they refused to agree the day before Museveni made them), and the electoral commission said it would go ahead as planned.
A new battle over the Prime Minister’s office is also expected. Greeted with thousands of supporters, Mohamed has yet to definitively signal that he will resign after the allocated 30 days. Mohamed told reporters before being summoned to Uganda, “You know the national leaders are currently holding talks in Kampala and as we were going the talks took new face... We will not accept any bargaining condition on Somalia’s peace.”
Many Somalis would rather see Aden or Sharif leave. While Parliament has earned a reputation for inaction and corruption, Mohamed was viewed as the opposite. An active face in the Western media during AU military operations, the U.S.-educated Prime Minister moved immediately to shrink the TFG’s bloated cabinet and secure paychecks for its soldiers (who hadn’t been paid in eight months). His connection with the Somali people triggered a backlash that few officials are capable of producing. Mohamed did urge his followers to stop protesting after several deaths, but he also added, “You are part of the decision making — what you want must be heard.”
Contrary to “resolution," the Kampala Accord remains suspended in the doubts of past failed systems. The present TFG, with Mohamed sitting at the top, finally created a glimmer of hope. Many Somalis fear the next government could devolve.
The death of Mohammed cannot be minimized entirely. A computer expert trained by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and ingrained in al-Qaeda’s culture, Mohammed used his savvy to secure the allegiance of al-Shabab’s rank-and-file. Many fighters turned on their former transnationalist leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr, in December 2010, replacing him with the nationally oriented Mukhtar Robow. It was eventually revealed that al-Qaeda’s leadership approved his exit.
Although Mohammed leaves behind a circle of highly-trained operatives, his personality could reopen a schism in the ranks if his successor draws a harder line. His overall void will also take time to fill on the battlefield, as he supposedly oversaw al-Shabab’s military operations. The problem is that someone will replace him, and experience is good for al-Qaeda as a whole. Describing Mohammed’s death as “another huge setback to al-Qaeda,” Brennan and Clinton echoed a third anonymous official within the Obama administration, who called Mohammed’s death "very big deal.”
Adam Smith, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services terrorism subcommittee, used the same terminology back in 2009: an ambiguous “significant blow.” Smith had confidently declared. "We've had concerns about the degree to which Al Qaeda was trying to do training and maybe plan operations out of Somalia, and this will unquestionably undermine their efforts to do that.”
At this point al-Shabab was already gaining momentum and diverting recruits away from Afghanistan and Iraq. Mohammed soon arrived and al-Shabab proceeded to storm all the way to Villa Somalia (the presidential palace). al-Qaeda had established a “little Afghanistan” in Mogadishu, yet the story remained Nabhan’s execution. Somalia itself was forgotten as usual - just like now.
Highlighting Mohammed’s death falls into the grand scheme of hyping assassination of ranking Al-Qaeda officials: concealing weaker political strategy with impact kills. Bin Laden’s death cannot align U.S., Afghan and Pakistani interests; in many ways he was only reacting to their unhealthy relationship. The targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki several weeks afterward was intended to demonstrate action in Yemen - and distract from a policy meltdown. This same pattern is now being exploited in Somalia.
Given Western resistance to the present TFG and General David Petraeus’s personal attention, the Obama administration played some type of role in backing down to Museveni. They simply cannot afford to lose his troops. Except sacrificing Somalia’s Prime Minister reverts a budding counterinsurgency back into counter-terrorism. No matter how many AQ leaders are killed in quick succession, they will proliferate so long as Somalia’s conditions remain unchanged. The justice of an Embassy bomber only stimulates the taste of victory.
Losing Mohamed the day after is a bigger blow to U.S. strategy.
June 11, 2011
Yemen: Peace Is More Than A Slogan
by Wasim Alqershi, published in The Guardian:
Yemen's popular youth revolution faced a unique set of circumstances among the contemporary revolutions of the Arab spring: a despotic regime; armed tribes; and an al-Qaida presence under the official auspices of the regime. But faced with all this, the youth insisted on achieving a comprehensive transformation by peaceful means. And millions of Yemenis responded to this invitation, descending on protest squares across the country.
The challenge of inviting the tribes of Yemen to join in with a revolution that was peaceful was significant; they represent a major segment of the population; and weapons are a part of their makeup. So when they began to pitch their tents in the squares, stripped of all weapons, it was a surprise and an indication of the desire by all Yemenis to move towards a modern democratic state.Wasim Alqershi is a member of the organizational committee of the people's youth revolution in Yemen, and a former president of the Yemeni student union.
Now, after spending 120 days in the squares, during which time we have suffered intense violence from President Saleh while the international community has spared him, no one has the right to condemn us for any step that we take. Because the world was only concerned with preventing civil war in Yemen, it allowed Saleh to continue his violence, despite him giving guarantees he would cease. Meanwhile, we were required to exercise self-restraint.
Safeguarding the peaceful nature of the revolution has become like grasping hot coals. Then Saleh's palace was bombed. It did not kill him, but lost him continuity as leader. The youth of the revolution believe Saleh is finished and that his presence in Saudi Arabia for treatment is to help the arrangement of post-Saleh conditions. It is also being used to get round our demands for radical changes, that the representatives of the regime be brought to trial, and that Yemen be ruled by a transitional presidential council committed to the goals of the revolution. However, the youth have the stronger card: the protests will not cease until all their demands are achieved.
Those who did not share in our sacrifice today will share our country with us. So the opposition political parties and the remains of the ruling party are to share the political authority, while the US controls the security services, and the Saudis are protected from the "revolutionary plague." Meanwhile, we are shot at by the remnants of Saleh's people, who America appears keen should remain in power. The US is ignoring the fact it may lose the co-operation of the Yemeni people in the fight against terrorism because the people hate those who stand at the head of the security forces – the same forces that killed hundreds of peaceful protesters.
Our young people felt optimistic about the international community but this has turned to frustration, as the community which claimed to stand for freedom, justice and democracy abandoned them to be killed without protection for the sake of these values. Rather than removing the cover of international legitimacy from the killers and freezing Saleh's assets, they gave him legal immunity.
These values could be mere slogans for western powers but the young people of the Yemeni revolution have demonstrated to the world true commitment to them. The youth opposed their country being seen only as an economic burden or a refuge for terrorism. Our frustrations over the international community will not distract us from our beliefs. Rather it will teach us to follow them while acting in the interests of our country. Today that interest lies in building a modern civil democratic country with a robust economy and a just legal system which renounces violence and terrorism and extends the hand of peace to all the world.
June 10, 2011
U.S. Propaganda Flooding Yemen’s Revolution
Typical surface-level propaganda
Anyone paying serious attention to Yemen’s revolution is aware of the double-standard in place. Many observers who glance over on their way to another uprising also realize the depth of Western hypocrisy. Even U.S. officials tacitly admit to their “selective democracy” between Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, evidenced by their scripted defense to counter these impressions. Yet this double-standard continues unaltered.
Propaganda can transform into an unstoppable force of nature.
Yemen’s current situation in the U.S. media, though tragic, is relatively easy to explain. A biased policy guilty of supporting Ali Abdullah Saleh and his murderous security forces needed to be hidden. A silent White House quieted an already subservient and unaware Western media (U.S. and European alike) during the revolution’s formation. The media then shifted into exaggerating Yemen’s “tribal civil war” and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) once this silence shattered.
Nevertheless, widespread apathy within the U.S. public continues to allow the Obama administration to freely subvert Yemen’s pro-democracy movement. A small cadre of Western “experts” willing to echo the U.S. script has monopolized the media, further eroding public awareness. Combined with Saudi misinformation, these conditions have generated a perfect storm of propaganda over Yemen’s revolution.
“I want to note one example, from today, that vividly illustrates many of the themes I discussed in that speech,” Salon’s Glenn Greenwald wrote on Thursday, referring to a May speech at FAIR's 25th anniversary. “It is found in the following passage from this Reuters article on Obama's escalation of the covert war in Yemen and his targeting of U.S. citizen Anwar Awlaki for assassination:
A U.S. official confirmed to Reuters that a U.S. strike last Friday killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, a midlevel al Qaeda operative, which followed last month's attempted strike against Anwar al-Awlaki, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”As Greenwald points out, al-Awlaki is indisputably not the leader of AQAP. Whether Reuters innocently spaced or intentionally lied to justify U.S. militarism in Yemen isn’t verifiable, but Greenwald doesn’t harbor any doubt. Rather than “covering the weighty issued raised by this assassination program,” he denounces Reuters for explicitly, “doing exactly the opposite: they're ending the debate before it even begins by ‘reporting’ - falsely - that Awlaki "is the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula."
“So instead of raising vital questions about Obama's extraordinary conduct, Reuters suffocates those questions by disseminating false fear-mongering propaganda on behalf of the U.S. Government (he's the leader of Al Qaeda!!) to justify what the administration is going. Overwhelmingly, that's what the role and function of the establishment media is. This isn't the most significant or notable example ever: to the contrary, it's depressingly common, and I note it only because it happened to occur on the very day that I was preparing to post this speech about how the U.S. media subserviently disseminates and amplifies government propaganda, the very antithesis of what they claim to do and were intended to do.”
Greenwald’s conclusion can be extrapolated to all areas of U.S. policy in Yemen: the Obama administration has backed away from Saleh’s regime, U.S. policy supports the pro-democracy movement, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power transfer is the “only way forward.” None of these policies are seriously questioned, instead taken at face value since no established Western officials or analysts are willing to challenge them.
More than the U.S. media is guilty of drowning out Yemen’s revolution. Obviously Reuters is a British outfit, and The Telegraph and Independent have produced similarly careless headlines and reports. The EU and NATO follow U.S. policy blindly rather than realize the numerous strategic errors being committed, taking their medias down with them. Even Al Jazeera repeatedly labeled Saleh’s artificial conflict as “civil war.” Somehow the U.S. media, long a target of the international media, has set an unquestioned tone.
Instead of covering Yemen’s unique pro-democracy movement, the majority of attention is driven towards manufactured violence and exaggerated threats of AQAP.
Now Western propaganda is flowing into the idea that the Obama administration is “exploiting Yemen’s power vacuum.” This statement can be found throughout the U.S. media, mainstream and alternative. The Long War Journal erroneously remarked, “The US is said to be taking advantage of the security vacuum in Yemen to step up attacks against AQAP's top leaders and its network.”
Far from this optimistic spin, the Obama administration enabled Yemen’s power vacuum through political inaction and is now manipulating drones to appear active. First supporting Saleh unconditionally, then backing the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) over the popular opposition, ensured a protracted stalemate. Facing reports that Saleh’s son Ahmad has taken over his palace, relegating al-Hadi to the pawn that he is, U.S. officials continue to withhold any information on Yemen’s situation. This vain effort to maintain influence in Saleh’s regime is holding the vacuum open for his return.
With the White House ignoring Yemen entirely on Friday - but still releasing a separate statement on Syria’s violence - State spokesman Mark Toner allocated a single paragraph: “The government in Yemen needs to – in Sana’a needs to move forward with – along the lines of the GCC agreement and start this reconciliation process.”
Although the Obama administration continues to force the GCC proposal on all of Yemen’s actors, as of this moment Vice President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi insists that Saleh will return. Contrary to the U.S. version that he is “acting” president, Hadi possesses no power relative to Ahmad and high-ranking officials still loyal to Saleh. Deputy information minister Abdo Al Janadi repeated on Thursday, "It is impossible to talk about a transition of power before the return of the president.”
Fundamentally, the youth revolution opposes the GCC’s initiative in full, instead demanding a transitional council to supplant the entire regime. On Friday hundreds of thousands chanted for Saleh's trial, rejecting the GCC's family immunity package. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (among other officials) has falsely declared their support for what is widely considered a U.S.-Saudi plot.
Several street coalitions, including the Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), tell us they have no contact with U.S. diplomats.
Even The New York Times, a key media player in suppressing Yemen's revolution, is now forced to admit, "They deeply oppose the political solution advocated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, which grants Mr. Saleh and his family immunity from prosecution and is likely to preserve more of the status quo. They say the proposal — which Mr. Saleh repeatedly refused to sign before he was wounded last week — misses a golden opportunity for meaningful change and leaves Yemen’s direst problems unaddressed."
Few Yemenis actually believe Saleh is stable enough to return. Some believe they can stop him if he tries. However they fear his regime is now consolidating power and will refuse any political overtures, either from the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) or the streets. The mystery surrounding Saleh’s health - and the fact that U.S. and Saudi officials won’t provide details - has increased the distrust surrounding the GCC’s proposal. With the power vacuum widening under U.S. policy, the Pentagon is being forced to strike almost solely for appearances.
Thus “active” engagement in Yemen first targets the American public as propaganda, then AQAP physically.
No real advantage is being gained on the ground through U.S. air-strikes; progress can only be secured through political engagement with the youth and civil opposition. Yet aside from their legality, the effects of unilateral military operations remain unchallenged in the U.S. media - just like the rest of Washington's narrative. Yemen’s revolutionaries could build their country into a paradise if they received a dollar for every piece of propaganda spit out by the West.
Saleh’s Son, Nephews Reign in Yemen
This Washington Post report confirms our documentation of the futility afflicting U.S. policy in Yemen. The Obama administration is dreaming if it believes Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi can wrest power from President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and is more likely scheming to preserve influence with the ruling party.
Now, will a news organization listen to its own reporting after repeatedly backing the GCC proposal?
Now, will a news organization listen to its own reporting after repeatedly backing the GCC proposal?
When embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh abruptly left over the weekend for Saudi Arabia, he handed the reins of government to his vice president. But the real power remains in the hands of those Saleh trusted most to protect his 33-year rule: his eldest son and nephews.
The son, Ahmed Ali, has moved into the presidential palace, while Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the acting head of state, remains in his office and rarely visits the palace, U.S. and Yemeni officials said. Neither Ahmed nor his three cousins, who together control much of Yemen’s military and security forces, have left their positions to visit Saleh in Saudi Arabia, where he is being treated for severe burn and shrapnel wounds sustained from an attack on the palace Friday.
For many Yemenis, that has sent a clear signal that Saleh and his relatives are intent on preserving his rule in his absence, even as calls mount from opposition groups and the international community for a swift transition of power.
“Power, wealth and intelligence are all in the hands of the president’s son and nephews,” said Muhammed Qahtan, a senior opposition leader. “They are the reasons that are preventing the vice president and the government from firing the president.”
The rising profile of Ahmed and his cousins has handcuffed Hadi’s ability to run Yemen at a critical and volatile time, forcing the vice president into a delicate balancing act to avoid overstepping boundaries set by Saleh’s family.
“The president’s son’s move into the office sends a signal to both the opposition and loyalists that Saleh’s regime will not cede power,” said Katherine Zimmerman, an analyst with the American Enterprise Institute’s critical threats project in Washington. “Any attempt to challenge the regime will likely provoke a military response.”
Ruling party officials said that before he left for Saudi Arabia, Saleh instructed his son and nephews to follow Hadi’s orders, adding that they were complying with those directions. “The state follows the orders of the vice president,” said Ahmed al-Sufi, a spokesman for Saleh. “And that includes the son and nephews of the president.”
But Yahya al-Arasi, a media adviser for Hadi, said the vice president had a good relationship with the president’s son and nephews and that they listened to him. But Arasi also conceded that there would be real limits to the vice president’s power if he wanted to accede to growing calls by opposition leaders to move Saleh aside by creating a transitional presidential council.
The president’s many backers would make any such transition very difficult, Arasi said. “If we go in this direction, his supporters will burn everything.”
Before the political upheaval that broke out in Yemen this year, Saleh had been positioning Ahmed to take over as his successor, a plan that the Yemeni leader has since renounced.
But Ahmed remains head of the country’s Republican Guard and special forces. Amar, Saleh’s nephew, is deputy director for national security, while Yahye, another nephew, is head of the central security forces and the counterterrorism unit. Yet another nephew, Tarik, leads the Presidential Guard. Other relatives are in charge of the air force and in key political and diplomatic posts.
The influence of Saleh’s son and nephews can be seen all around this sprawling capital, where Republican Guards and other security units stand watch at checkpoints and patrol neighborhoods. On Wednesday night, a barrage of fireworks and gunfire, including heavy weaponry typically used by soldiers, pounded the sky for two hours celebrating a report that Saleh’s health was improving. The falling bullets injured scores of people.
The celebration was widely seen by Western diplomats and analysts as ordered by Ahmed Ali as a show of strength. But Arasi called it a “spontaneous expression of support for the president.”
One Yemeni security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said all military and security affairs were now being run by Ahmed and his cousins as well as Ali al-Anisi, the chief of national security. Hadi was handling the administrative issues of the government, the official added.
Ahmed Ali Saleh is widely seen as having a good relationship with senior ruling party leaders; Tarik is also seen as very influential and is considered a hard-liner. They have urged ruling party leaders not to discuss a transfer-of-power proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of Yemen’s neighbors led by Saudi Arabia, until Saleh returns to Yemen, according to Yemeni officials.
The GCC proposal, which calls for Saleh to officially hand over power to the vice president who then will create a transitional unity government until elections can be held, is widely seen by the United States and its allies as the best option for a peaceful transfer of power. Saleh has thrice agreed to sign the proposal but has reneged every time.
Some opposition leaders say that have yet to receive any response from Hadi regarding the GCC proposal, suggesting that leaders of the ruling party will not take such a step without the approval of Saleh’s sons and nephews, who in turn await instructions from him, said opposition leaders and diplomats.
“The president’s son and nephews want the situation to remain unchanged until the president comes back,” said Abdulqawe al-Qaisi, a spokesman for the Ahmar family, who lead Yemen’s largest tribal confederation and are Saleh’s main opponents.
Qahtan, the senior opposition leader, said drastic measures are needed to press forward. “The international community should tell the sons and nephews that the vice president is now the legitimate authority and that if he asks for international support, it will come, even military support,” he said. “And so they will be targeted.”
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