Al-Sadr Checks US Victory at Iraq's Door

The plan was to avoid Afghanistan. US officials cautiously eased themselves into the celebratory waters after Iraq held its national election on March 7th in relative peace. Here the danger wasn’t supporting a premature victor in Hamid Karzai, but stepping on the many fragments that constitute Iraq’s political system. The situation indicated that America would be lucky if a new government formed before August’s end, when all US combat troops are due out of the country.

Expecting a speedy process would only create undue and counterproductive optimism, as Afghanistan frequently demonstrates.

"While it will be a protracted period where there will be a lot of political horse-trading, we believe that they will be able to form a government," said U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill soon after the election, seemingly unconcerned that it would, “likely take months for the various political coalitions seeking power to work out a power-sharing deal.”

Of course US officials are getting anxious. Low intensity violence, while largely unsupported by Iraqis, shows no signs of extinguishing and a post-election power vacuum is the worst case scenario before August. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law Coalition attempted to block Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National Movement (INM) through legal maneuvers and Sunni politicians have been sporadically assassinated. Elsewhere the Kurds have suffered air-strikes from Turkey and Iran.

Hill would tell reporters less than two months later, “We are now approaching the two-month period [of waiting for final results] and we are concerned that the process is lagging. We have not gone on to government formation as of yet and we share the concern of those who believe that its time that the politicians got down to business and started forming a government.”

Facing Iraqi criticism that the White House had lost focus on the withdrawal, US Vice President Joe Biden landed in Baghdad on July 3rd to press al-Maliki and Allawi on “forming a government.”

137 days since the election, and neither Biden, President Barack Obama, nor any US official holds the key to keeping the US withdrawal on schedule. After Iraq’s election Obama reiterated that all US combat troops would exit by August, “and by the end of the next year, all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq.” He did so because doubts persist that Washington wishes to re-negotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) after a new government forms.

His own Defense Secretary has mused of a residual force.

As vivid evidence of poor US strategy, the fate of US forces may lie in Muqtada al-Sadr’s hands. The Shia cleric exiled himself to Iran to protect himself and speedily advance his ayatollah studies, also vowing not to return to Iraq until US forces withdrew completely. His grievances with the Shia al-Maliki, presumed his only realistic ally, gave the impression that he wished to stall the government’s formation. On the contrary, al-Sadr appears to have been driving up his demand in order to shut America out.

US officials, in addition to foreign oil investors, are believed to be working privately towards excluding the Sadrists from the new government. Not only does al-Sadr fiercely oppose extending the 2011 deadline, expected to be his political asking price, he’s also a leading detractor of oil contracts signed with the outgoing government.

al-Sadr would easily drop the latter condition to keep the former. It was no coincidence that he surfaced in Turkey and Syria last weekend, and he didn’t come for al-Bashir’s 10th anniversary either. al-Sadr met with Allawi during Damascus’s festivities, telling reporters afterward that Allawi was "ready to make concessions to put an end to Iraq's political crisis.” Al-Sadr promised he would do the same, implying a possible alliance against al-Maliki even as he claimed to forget “past differences.”

Thus al-Sadr has checked America by offering his services to Allawi, who also appears ready to use any means to supplant al-Maliki as prime minister. The two could theoretically piece together a government by mid-August.

Naturally al-Maliki and Washington will respond with countermeasures, but ostracizing al-Sadr won’t be easy - he has nowhere else to go if he chooses to return. Territory and religious authority protect him from being militarily ousted like al-Qaeda. He also grows more powerful over time while US influence wanes. al-Sadr is shielded by the basic fact that he’s Iraqi and politically accepted. Any US attempt to bar him would seal his checkmate.

America should focus on getting all of its work done now because there may be no 2012.

It then becomes especially obvious why al-Sadr has made his move now. Beyond his own political and religious agenda, Iran’s hand is visibly forcing America out of Iraq before a potential military strike on its nuclear program. Iraq’s democracy may succeed in the long run, but US officials will have a difficult time portraying victory if they withdraw under the enemy’s terms.

Just one more example of how ill conceived the Iraq war was.

Somalia's Strategy Headed Backwards

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, has unleashed a scorching critique of Washington’s internal workings on Somalia. Believing that the present strategy led directly to the Kampala bombings and that no change in strategy has followed, Weinstein concludes, “Washington has no policy, that is, no mediation between vision and tactics, no plan of action.”

While the bulk of his analysis mirrors our own, we aren’t so sure that Washington’s strategy isn’t changing in some form. Weinstein relates a senior meeting on July 14th. One official was questioned “whether there had been a policy shift in light of the bombings,” and responded that Washington will “take a look and see what it is that we need to do as a result of those attacks.”

The reality is that US strategy underwent immediate change after Kampala’s bombings. Whatever US officials said in public and private, the essential fact remained that Washington threw its support behind Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the rest of the AU. Copious praise flowed to Uganda in particular as it began ramping up its troop levels even higher than the current 5,000, with President Yoweri Museveni aiming for 20,000.

This isn’t a threat. AU forces, comprised solely from Uganda and Burundi, automatically went on the offensive after the Kampala bombings.

Ugandan army and Defence Ministry spokesman Lt-Col Felix Kulaigye warned, "We are one of the most efficient armies in Africa. We can defend our country from anywhere, even within Somalia. Anybody who brings war to us, we take back that war to them. We shall pursue Al Shabaab from Somalia in line with the wishes of the Transitional Federal Government.”

What’s relatively strange about US policy, though hardly surprising, is how much it admits to the wrong it’s committing. Officials claim, “any grander aim is going to take years to address because the problems that affect the country are systemic, structural.” Elsewhere a US official in London recently discussed the strategy to divide the nationalist al-Shabab from the internationalist al-Qaeda.

“We know nothing galvanizes Somalis like an outside influence...if we do something in an imprudent manner,” the official said in a briefing for reporters in London.

And yet this is exactly what’s happening now. Multiple stories from The Washington Post and Associated Press have already highlighted a spike in the AU’s indiscriminate attacks after Kampala. US officials downplayed the Washington Post while denial is also province of the AU. According to the AP, its own internal reports warn, “if indiscriminate shelling continues AMISOM will lose the support of the Somali population. A similar report in June said that AMISOM continues to underestimate the importance of being seen to address this critical issue.”

AMISOM spokesman Gaffel Nkolokosa responded that AU troops, “always avoid shelling of civilian areas. It is not involved in shelling civilian areas even if provoked by the other parties. AMISOM troops undergo thorough training in their home countries before deployment. They are conversant with relevant aspects such as international humanitarian law and as such would not shell civilian areas.”

Now the insanity is clearly displayed. It’s one thing to blame al-Shabab for operating within the civilian population, although blaming a guerrilla for being a guerrilla rarely works on the ground. A counterinsurgent’s mission is to wage a counterinsurgency, not conventional warfare, regardless of how the insurgent operates. Blaming al-Shabab equates to wholly blaming Hamas for the Gaza war.

But to deny any shelling “even if provoked” is so overtly over the top that it reveals exactly what’s happening in Mogadishu. Since Kampala, Ugandan troops are operating as advertised - on the warpath.

And right behind is tacit US support, regardless of the strategy Uganda deploys. All Africa reports that Uganda's neighbors “have pledged soft support should the country choose to go on the offensive,” and so has President Barack Obama. That’s one possibility for Washington, which in typical 9/11 fashion, “involves using the latest outrage to mobilize opinion in the UN Security Council in favor of changing the Amisom mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.”

"These attacks definitely help strengthen the resolve and rationale for a more robust and decisive action in Somalia," said James Mugume, the Permanent Secretary in Uganda's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The other strategy may be more realistic but also more destructive. Rather than the full-spectrum, international strategy or even a regional approach, Uganda has struck a bilateral deal with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to “bypass any limitations imposed by international conventions.” That means less oversight and more death.

We believe it’s safe to conclude a change in strategy is developing. Given that the TFG survives on US fumes, any agreement with Uganda has likely passed through a US green light. A change for the worst, but change nonetheless. Somalia is becoming more unilateral and more lawless in Kampala’s aftermath, ultimately making al-Shabab’s job to “galvanizing Somalis” against foreign forces that much easier. Additional foreign elements should flock too.

This certainly qualifies as action - minus a plan.

Clinton's Paradoxistan: Too Good to be True

It was a relatively flawless performance. With Washington stuck in its Afghan review and Pakistan’s cities under bombardment, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton touched down in a hostile Pakistan in October 2009 on a self-proclaimed propaganda mission. Greeted with bombs from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and treated with hard questions on the freshly signed Kerry-Lugar bill, Clinton left a foul impression after deploying her grating “do more” mantra on al-Qaeda’s leadership.

July 2010 would be different. No major explosions signaled her arrival, which Clinton attributed to Pakistan’s military success in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Drones have lost their controversial potency and US aid, always a third rail, grows increasingly palatable to an economically struggling Pakistan. Clinton beamed throughout her photo-ops and Pakistani leadership reflected the shine.

She even managed to accuse someone within the government of knowing Osama bin Laden’s location without drawing attention, having landed in South Korea by the time her Fox News interview aired.

From Islamabad Clinton triumphantly landed in Kabul for what she hailed as a “turning point” in Afghanistan: a six hour international conference that pledged $20 billion in aid and declared Afghan security forces would assume command of all provinces by 2014. The choreography went off as planned, which of course is the point when the show is too good to be true.

Like a bridge, errors in one part of the span expose other flaws and threaten to bring the entire structure down with it.

Though Clinton undoubtedly improved upon her last visit, charm can only beautify an ugly reality so much. Promises of aid were automatically linked to a military invasion of North Waziristan rather than Pakistan’s current strategy of negotiating with its hosts, Sirajuddin and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Clinton explicitly ruled out a dialogue with them, tagging US aid as conditional.

Already fearful of military servitude, it doesn’t help that US and foreign aid lacks the track record to inspire confidence among average Pakistanis. The Kerry-Lugar bill, President Barack Obama’s celebrated achievement in civilian aid, stalled in Congress due to fears of misappropriated funds; a trade bill designed for the FATA similarly gridlocked. Pakistan had to jump through hoops to receive long-delayed reimbursement from the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), while the Friends of Pakistan have delivered only $725 million of $5.6 billion pledged in April 2009.

So when Clinton announced “$500 million in several new development programs,” funded in part by the Kerry-Lugar bill, the many strings attached cast ominous shadows over her smiles. The attitude of Pakistan’s press was straightforward: “Given Pakistan's current plight, any assistance from the outside world has to be welcomed. The recognition by the US that policy cannot be focused only on security issues is also a step in the right direction.”

Whatever the strings and grudges, Pakistan simply isn’t in the position to turn down assistance.

But Islamabad’s endgame is roughly the opposite of Washington’s. While the White House believes its efficiency in delivering military and humanitarian aid determines success in Afghanistan, Pakistanis base success on the effectiveness of Pakistan’s leaders. These aren’t the same goals. America needs Pakistan to improve and thus assist in stabilizing Afghanistan so that it can remain in the region, but Pakistan wants to utilize US aid to regain sovereignty of the state and ultimately rid South Asia of America’s military presence.

“The hugely positive tone adopted by the Secretary of State will of course have brought smiles to the faces of Pakistani leaders,” wrote The News International. “But they must recognize that the relationship between Pakistan and the US is a complex one. Many believe it is in fact the root cause behind our militant problem and that this cannot be solved until the US withdraws from the region.”

Clinton may have missed this not-so-subtle difference, but the chances of her merely ignoring it are higher. While admitting that Pakistani’s negative perception of America “wouldn’t change overnight,” she raved about its new environment - “I could feel a change” - and Pakistani officials who, “really believe that the people are understanding that the United States wants to be a real partner to us and that it's not just killing terrorists.”

Pew Research Center listed Pakistani approval at 17% in June 2010, up 1% from last year but down from 19% in 2008. The News International warned upon her exit, “There is a very real risk that the latest aid offer will be seen as a kind of bribe intended to ensure that the fighting continues. The effort to persuade people that the war against militancy is Pakistan's has so far been a faltering one.”

The Dawn analyzed “Hillary’s iron fist in a velvet glove,” while a less generous Nation concluded, “It is time we broke off from the present US stranglehold that is suffocating Pakistan to death.”

But Clinton’s most telltale contradiction: passing the blame off to George Bush. "Of course there is a legacy of suspicion that we inherited,” she argues, when Pakistan is actually one of the Obama administration's favorite words - a “whole of government” problem. Anti-US sentiment has ran high for over 20 years and spans multiple presidencies, many staffed with the same officials that fill Obama’s cabinet and National Security Council. Pew still has Bill Clinton clocked at 22% in 1999.

Pakistan’s fate has always be decided by how the foreign chips fall, not how they stack up. America may uphold its obligations this time around, it just hasn’t before, and Afghanistan repeats the same story. The Huffington Post digs up the old bones of past “international conferences” and “turning points.”

Paradoxes in Kabul were equally numerous, for instance the massive quantity of foreign aid that may disappear. Karzai called for 50% to funnel through Afghanistan’s ministries by 2012, up from 20%, while dutifully promising to clean up corruption for Western ears. However, the conference followed a report from Integrity Watch Afghanistan that found corruption had doubled between 2006 and 2009. This story never seems to change, whether before or after Karzai's controversial election victory in 2009, and the West’s power to reform this gray area remains suspect.

Reintegration prospects are dwindling too. Reconciliation appears a non-starter in Washington despite its public support for reintegration, a stance that hinders reintegration. On top of UK reports that few Taliban are switching sides, the idea of transferring authority to Afghan forces by 2014 implies that the West still expects to be fighting the Taliban rather than reintegrating it. This tidal wave of uncertainty finally throws the 2014 deadline into upheaval.

When Karzai insisted, "Afghan national security forces will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our country by 2014,” he’s asking for the same three years Iraq needed after its surge.

Given that most deadlines in Afghanistan evaporate, history and the present offer no reason to define 2014 as realistic as NATO did. Marjah and Kandahar’s time-lines already protracted. Obama’s 2011 transfer deadline, if not postponed outright, will amount to a symbolic transition of power, and Vice President Joe Biden recently conceded “a couple thousand troops” is the likeliest withdrawal option. Clinton desperately tried to counter the slippery slope by arguing, “the transition process may be able to begin by the end of this year."

Yet believing in 2014, let alone Clinton’s new claim, makes no sense in a country where projects rarely start or finish on time.

The last few days in Afghanistan brought no surprises. The White House in particular is facing renewed criticism from the US Congress and media to clarify the war’s objectives, and Clinton’s tour was its answer. But instead of leveling with the US, Afghan, and Pakistani peoples and shunning unrealistic expectations, Washington rolled out more smoke and mirrors to conjure the image of success.

Being illusions, the deadlines are likely to vanish one by one and ultimately fail to break the West’s cycle of mission drift in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Ignoring the Enemy: Anwar al-Awlaki

No way he would stay silent - it’s his job to talk. Three days after America froze every asset of his that it could find, al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki unleashed a sermon on US President Barack Obama predicting his downfall. al-Awlaki is no ordinary cleric though. He may be “committed to carrying out deadly attacks on Americans and others worldwide,” and “involved himself in every aspect of the supply chain of terrorism,” but he also performs even more dangerous work: truth telling.

"America refuses to admit that its foreign policies are the reason behind a man like Nidal Hassan, born and raised in the US, turning his guns against American soldiers," said al-Awlaki of the Ft. Hood shootings.

Stifling a lunatic cleric is relatively easy for the US government compared to the cerebral al-Awlaki, who mixes sparing bomb threats with a large dose of self-reflection. This isn’t his first time warning America of its own sinking foreign policy in the Gulf and West Asia, for al-Awlaki realizes this track is far more penetrating than standard jihadism.

"Oh Obama, whether you admit it or not, Muslims have defeated you in Afghanistan and in Iraq and you will be defeated in Palestine, Somalia and the Arab Megrab," he said, referring to Islamic countries in northern Africa. "You will not be defeated militarily and economically but most important you will be defeated morally."

Now this isn’t completely accurate; the economic underpinning of al-Qaeda’s grand strategy is the only thing holding it together. America can survive as powerful and evil, just not broke. Conversely, the only way al-Qaeda remains in the war is by exhausting the West’s resources. al-Awlaki, playing his usual games, is fully aware.

"If George W. Bush is remembered as being the president who got America stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he predicts, “it's looking like Obama wants to be remembered as the president who got America stuck in Yemen.”

Obviously al-Awlaki would love to lure America deeper into Yemen and contribute to burning US assets. We’ve theorized numerous times that he’s actively baiting America into Yemen, this case being no different. One must seriously consider whether al-Awlaki, indispensable as he is to al-Qaeda, has prepared to sacrifice himself to start a war.

But he also raises a series of critical questions: is Afghanistan truly the epicenter of al-Qaeda? Has it moved to Yemen or Somalia, or has it always been relatively dispersed? Will defeating al-Qaeda permanently require Afghanistan-style intervention in Yemen and Somalia? Can al-Qaeda shift to new conflicts by the time a real US strategy arrives and will the US continue following? How long will this endless war last and how much will it cost?

al-Awlaki believes Washington is avoiding these questions - not that he cares - as do many Americans.

Trying to display its knowledge, the White House instead reveals the hole in its strategy: “President Obama supported a comprehensive and inclusive Yemeni national dialogue on economic, political, and human rights issues. They also discussed the continuing threat of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and international assistance to Yemen to support its counter-terrorism efforts.”

Though Obama supports a “comprehensive” strategy, theoretically a counterinsurgency, he’s only funding counter-terrorism at about $200 million annually, wholly insufficient for the task. The same decision has already boosted Somalia’s instability.

With Somalia and Yemen flaring up as they are, concluding that counter-terrorism will suffice when they host more al-Qaeda agents than Afghanistan and are similarly undeveloped is wishful thinking. Somalia and Yemen require counterinsurgency just like Afghanistan but receive a decimal fraction of the support, around $300-400 million in US aid (mostly military). Afghanistan or Iraq-level counterinsurgency throughout al-Qaeda’s lairs would cost upwards of $3-4 trillion, an extraordinary discrepancy in funds.

And, as the Taliban demonstrates, al-Qaeda’s potential defeat still leaves numerous insurgencies to suppress. Decoupled as they may become, survival will be easy if the states they inhabit don’t improve their standard of living. Washington tries to ignore this reality too.

Yet, as al-Awlaki observes, Washington shows every indication of digging deeper into Yemen. Selecting counter-terrorism over counterinsurgency ensured that Yemen’s latest contact with America began in flames. An airstrike supposedly aimed at al-Awlaki in December 2009 missed its target, resulting in high civilian casualties. Another airstrike on an al-Qaeda operative in May 2010 killed a provincial deputy. Infrequent as they are, there’s no reason to expect a stoppage when they’re touted as Obama’s commitment to destroying al-Qaeda.

Meanwhile Inspire, a new color magazine published by Yemen’s local branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is receiving more attention from the US government than potential recruits and jihadist websites.

“It is rather ironic that a publication that was deemed so important by the U.S. intelligence community that it was shown to President Obama as part of a national security briefing has fallen so flat with the people it sought as an audience,” says Thomas Hegghammer, a senior fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

Hegghammer says Inspire magazine's poor debut isn't necessarily AQAP's fault, claiming the jihadist media world is a harsh environment to operate in. The magazine was immediately corrupted when AQAP first posted it online, either by al-Qaeda’s own ignorance or “US government hackers.” But hyping the magazine was surely intentional, not ironic, pushing US attention towards Yemen to justify expanding military operations while trying to block potential recruits to al-Qaeda.

A clever move in one way, but one of many that draws America deeper into Yemen. By 2012 it’s possible that Obama will remain heavily invested in Afghanistan, knee deep in Yemen, and absent from what seems to be al-Qaeda’s future HQ in Somalia. al-Awlaki’s own trickery is fully revealed - baiting America away from Mogadishu and into Sana'a.

Although he would prefer Washington to intervene in both at once, a possibility that America may not be able to avoid forever.

Breaking the US Vice on Kashmir

Mounting unrest in Kashmir and the drivers behind it can appear endlessly complex. Simplification is needed for that reason alone, yet the conflict also breaks down naturally. The vast roots that disrupt Kashmir and Jammu were bundled together on July 8th by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security when it backed a “maximum crackdown” in Srinagar, the regional capital.

Omar Abdullah, chief minister of Kashmir and Jammu, argued, "I had to put a stop to this cycle of violence” - a futile fallacy.

Maximum protests ensued giving way to renewed violence and casualties. Nine months ago Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chairman of Kashmir’s leading political bloc, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, allegedly met with Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram in New Delhi to re-ignite the peace process.

Now he tells reporters from under house arrest, “People have lost faith. The constituency of peace is shrinking day by day... The peace process is in tatters.”

For this reason, ostensibly, India and Pakistan attempted to rekindle their strategic dialogue with foreign ministry level talks. Abdullah succinctly outlined the basic politics of Kashmir: "Whatever happens between India and Pakistan has a direct impact on Jammu and Kashmir. When relations improve, we see the benefits. After the Mumbai attacks, that was snatched away from us.”

But emergency negotiations are a double-edged sword; the same conditions that make them necessary also tear them apart. Pakistan and India are too cool to each-other to make headway on Kashmir or Mumbai, and talks quickly stalled as each side’s media ravaged the other. By the time Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna told reporters “I am hopeful” while leaving for his first meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the two states were already engaged in a literal rock fight.

India claims that Pakistan is funding stone-throwing, the new form of protests in Kashmir.

Pakistan has denied the charges, but on top of sympathy to Muslim Kashmiris, the low-cost strategy yields a high degree of pressure on India to engage Kashmir’s status. Muddying the waters further, Pakistan’s higher cost strategy was thrown onto the table on the eve of negotiations. Allegations that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had funded the Mumbai operation are nothing new, but G.K Pillai, India's home secretary, kicked off the talks by revealing, "They [ISI] were literally controlling and coordinating it from the beginning until the end."

Pakistan, in turn, accuses India’s intelligence agency, RAW, of provoking unrest in Balochistan as a countermeasure to Islamabad’s proxy militants in Kashmir, adding yet another hot-spot to the cauldron. Hypersensitive to Balochistan accusations, India preemptively rejected blame for the recent murder of Habib Jalib Baloch, secretary general of the Balochistan National Party.

Necessary as de-escalation is between Pakistan and India, these were no negotiations but an emergency call to put out a live fire. Islamabad reportedly demands that Kashmir serve as the focus point of the strategic dialogue, considering its limbo status the root of discord, while New Dehli won’t engage any other issue until Mumbai is resolved. Both cling to valid points obscured by their sins, creating the stalemate that presently exists.

"It is time for India and Pakistan to pursue the peace process, to put the peace process back on track," S.M. Krishna said. "We are handcuffed by history and chained by future.”

But they’re chained by Washington too.

It’s easy to blame both sides in Kashmir, and especially easy to blame America for trouble in Asia. The blame is earned in this case though and can be expressed in fundamental terms. A deadlock between two parties usually entails an arbitrator, but America as that arbitrator wants everything stacked its own way: silence on Kashmir and cooperation from Pakistan in Afghanistan. Naturally this course is pursued as ideal for US interests, but until the equation changes it will keep working against regional stability.

Kashmir may be the key to unlocking South Asia. For now it jams the system in silence, disturbed only by the violent rhythm between India security forces and Kashmiris that occasionally spills into the international media. US envoy Richard Holbrooke, arguably Washington’s toughest diplomat, is afraid to mention to word “Kashmir” in fear of aggravating India - and pushing it towards Russia or China. With the status quo favoring the heavyweight India, Pakistan lacks the power to challenge directly for Kashmir and resorts to proxy warfare.

The combination ignites the streets and relations between the two states, leading to competition and potential destabilization in Afghanistan.

Apparently America cannot have it all in South Asia. It cannot cry foul of Pakistan’s support for Kashmir militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), link them to Afghanistan, then refuse to speak the word Kashmir in public. The Kashmiri American Council has taken to petitioning President Barack Obama to address the crisis. There’s no doubt that Kashmir affects Afghanistan, and yet while the White House hails its “civilian surge” in Afghanistan, Kashmir’s streets are filled with stones, rage, and blood.

"This is a generation that is totally disillusioned with India's approach to Kashmir," Farooq warns. "They have aspirations and they're aware of what's happening in the world - in Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan. Today they are throwing stones. But if this continues, tomorrow they'll take up the gun."

It’s not surprising that Obama dropped Kashmir from his vocabulary after taking office when he raised the issue two days before election day, but the loss of time is tragic nonetheless and must be rectified as soon as possible. Having arrived in Pakistan in transit to Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s weightiest action may have been phone calls to the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministries, admonishing them for their public feud and urging “side-line talks” at Kabul’s upcoming conference.

Yet this act, seemingly important as it is, falls short of Kashmir’s demands and merely protracts its crisis. Washington guides India and Pakistan’s strategic dialogue from behind the curtains, trying to keep the two in line and from colliding, but it never brings them into line either. Hence they stay parallel and mired in the status quo. All issues aside, America still appears the best mediator to Kashmir’s conflict given its relationship with both states. But if Clinton leaves the region without broaching Kashmir and if Obama stays silent as Srinagar intensifies, the time will ripen for international mediation.

That seems to be where Farooq is headed.

Kashmir does emulate Palestine in many ways: two deadlocked states, one occupier and one guerrilla, tied together and disrupted by America’s bias, waging a low-intensity conflict with regional implications and no end in sight. Srinagar as Gaza. Even India’s lobby is beginning to rival Israel’s, and hampering US actions accordingly.

Now, just like Palestinians and Arabs have grown impatient with Washington and are taking their cause to the UN, Farooq recently wrote to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, “It is high time when the UN should adopt a proactive course of diplomatic maneuver to compel India, while taking genuine Kashmiri leadership on board, to initiate talks for the settlement of the conflict."

And it may be the only way to pry America’s silent grip off Kashmir’s neck.

Hypocrisy Bites Obama in Somalia

US President Barack Obama had one task in the aftermath of Kampala’s bombings - keep the narrative anywhere except US strategy in Somalia. Blasting al-Qaeda for “racist,” cannon fodder tactics wasn’t just from the heart, but a calculated political tirade to absorb the media’s attention.

"What you've seen in some of the statements that have been made by these terrorist organizations is that they do not regard African life as valuable in and of itself,” Obama told the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). "They see it as a potential place where you can carry out ideological battles that kill innocents, without regard to long-term consequences, for their short-term tactical gains."

Obama then compared the visions of South Africa and al-Qaeda - hope and death - in an analogy designed to transfer the World Cup’s excitement to Ugandan soldiers. Implying that the African Union would bring stability to Somalia, Obama offered not a word on the conduct of AU troops in Mogadishu. He did, however, vow to support Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, and any other nation that decides to bolster the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - statements that don’t seem to regard African life as valuable.

A steady stream of analysis, mostly from outside the US media, has cropped up after Kampala warning against escalating militarism. Fortunately the Washington Post also did some dirty work and monitored Uganda’s response in Mogadishu. Obama promised to increase aid to AMISOM, but the only noticeable affect so far is more destruction. Predictable given that no new political strategy has been formulated.

Somalis claim the AU, “has killed, wounded and displaced hundreds of Somali civilians in a stepped-up campaign against Islamist militants,” since the Kampala bombings.

Though spokesman Gaffel Nkolokosa claims, "AMISOM has never shelled indiscriminately at civilians," Somalis are no fools of war. They know the sounds of al-Shabab and AU guns and their positions, and are certain that government and AU forces indiscriminately shell their homes.

"When one kilogram of mortars are fired by al-Shabab, AMISOM replies with 100 kilograms of artillery," said Abdulqadir Haji, director of a volunteer ambulance service. "It is America and the West who support them. America and the West are the silent killers in Somalia's war."

Mohammed Jimal, a government military commander, “indifferently” explained, “Whenever the enemy are gathering on the front lines, they shell the area. It helps the government. There are civilian casualties. No one can deny this.”

When asked for comment, Mark Zimmer, a public affairs officer for Somalia at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, said Washington is "proactive" in trying to retrain AU soldiers from "inadvertently targeting civilians and increasing their sensitivity to avoiding civilian casualties." He argued that "al-Shabab has increased attacks of late, forcing AMISOM to respond."

So goes AU and US policy in Somalia.

The reality is that Zimmer’s logic, which is no different from Obama’s or most US officials, is illogical to many Somalis. All of a sudden Washington needs counterinsurgency 101 again: al-Shabab’s attacks don’t justify retaliatory fire into unverified civilian targets. Somalia isn’t any different from Afghanistan, where protecting the population is job one, and shelling the enemy’s front lines doesn’t help the government except to stave of its death.

To say al-Shabab operates in a civilian environment is simply redundant. Somalia hosts a guerrilla war and the AU/US challenge is to wage counterinsurgency, not stick futilely to conventional warfare.

"The people are saying, 'What is the difference between AMISOM and al-Shabab?'” said Hassan Elmi, a peace activist who lives near the airport where he hears between 200 to 300 shells fired each day. "You are killing me. And they are also killing me."

Somalis don’t see so big a difference between AU and al-Shabab soldiers as US officials do. Even Sunni militia and former government ally Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, who hates al-Shabab with equal passion, derides AU troops as lazy, greedy, and too quick with the trigger.

The AU’s indiscriminate fire destabilizes US strategy from top to bottom. Playing into al-Shabab’s hands, Uganda and those willing to expand AMISOM face an impossibly hostile environment to stabilize, while the US’s image wallows in the gutter. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) similarly bleeds its credibility. And civilian damage spirals out of control when the victims happen to be clan leaders and elders, widely considered the vital link in any practical resolution to the conflict.

“It was the Ugandans," declared one clan elder, Omar Sharif, as he stood in the blood-spattered rubble of a collapsed building. In a separate incident, neighborhood leaders demanded compensation for their losses but neither the African Union nor the government sent an official to visit their neighborhood.

"Our lives have no value," said Ali Amin Hadji, a clan elder. "We have been forgotten."

And not just by al-Shabab and al-Qaeda. The AU, and by extension the US, often operate “without regard to long-term consequences, for their short-term tactical gains." More troops and more denial will only add to Somalia’s chaos. It's already happening.

Abbas Offers Sweet Deal to Netanyahu

Benjamin Netanyahu will prove whether he really wants peace in the coming days. Obstinate as the Israeli Prime Minister is, even he must realize both the sweet nature of the Palestinians’ latest offer and the potential backlash from Israeli moderates. Hawks too. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s new preconditions for direct talks are probably as favorable as they’ll get for Israel.

"We have put forward to the Israelis our position on different final status issues, and especially on borders and security," Abbas told Al-Ghad, a Jordanian newspaper. "We have said that the borders need to be on a 1967 basis, with agreement on land swaps equal in value and size, and we gave our vision regarding security, which was agreed on previously, in Olmert's days. If they agree, we will consider that progress... and this would prompt us to go to direct negotiations.”

He also said Jordan and Egypt approved of his plan, a prerequisite for gaining the Arab League’s consent.

On the surface Abbas has given both parties what they want. By zeroing in on the borders, as Israel often argues, settlement zones theoretically become mappable and remove the condition of a settlement freeze. In practicality this situation favors Israel’s heavy presence on the ground.

NATO forces are similarly favorable to Israel. Many reports note that “Israel wants to maintain a presence in the Jordan valley along the West Bank's eastern border,” thus Netanyahu could reject Abbas’s offer. But Netanyahu is open to an international force and has referenced a NATO force before, as have many pro-Israeli officials in Washington, so in a way Abbas is disguising this compromise as a precondition so as to not appear weak.

Perhaps the most favorable opening Abbas created is shifting the onus back on Netanyahu.

Which way the dominoes fall will make or break his position. Frozen borders could create a de facto settlement freeze by allowing Israel to continue building in its own territory, so long as Israeli settlements in Palestinian land are deconstructed. The plan could also turn to chaos by stalling. Due to uncertainty in Israel, Abbas has no room to water down his offer any further without losing the necessary political and popular support. Fresh pushback against direct talks is already in motion.

Read any Arab newspaper and you’ll see numerous columns on “blackmailing the Palestinians,” Washington’s softness, and not giving in to the duplicitous Netanyahu. They’ve just witnessed Israel’s latest games in the flotilla probe and new settlements in East Jerusalem. US officials now wish to arm Israel to its limit, believing this helps Netanyahu make “tough decisions.” Palestinians, and Muslims in general, have no faith in America’s ability to retrain Israel if necessary. Meanwhile the EU leads Gaza’s crusade.

Speaking to local media on Friday, Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan said Abbas’s offer had been relayed to US envoy George Mitchell and that they were awaiting the US/Israeli response. He also voiced deep skepticism of Netanyahu and Obama.

“The Americans have failed to get Mr. Netanyahu to answer the Palestinian questions and now they want Mr. Mitchell to tell the president on Saturday to go to direct talks,” said Dahlan, leader of Fatah in Gaza. “We should tell Mitchell on Saturday to give these answers and not to jump into unknown and indefinite talks.”

Mitchell described his Saturday meeting with Abbas as candid and productive: "We are heartened by the discussions that we had here today and in the past several days." Said Dahlan, “Mitchell did not present any new Israeli answers."

This is Israel and America’s second to last chance at restarting direct talks before the UN Security Council convenes in September to debate Palestinian statehood. The Palestinians aren’t planning to decide on direct talks until early August, leaving one final attempt in the 11th hour, but Abbas’s dangerous position between US and Arab walls impedes his maneuverability. Obama must accept how low Netanyahu’s trust is instead of trying to sell him, and should be working furiously to persuade him into agreeing.

Not that Netanyahu should need motivating with Abbas’s terms - if he really wants peace.

Afghanistan's Relationship Paradox

They questioned him again and again. What are the objectives in Afghanistan? What does the end game look like? Is Washington still trying to do too much, or are its efforts not enough?

"Many people are asking whether we have the right strategy,” Senator John Kerry, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointedly opened. "Some suggest this is a lost cause. This is the time to ask hard questions about the progress we are making toward our objectives of defeating al-Qaeda and bringing a measure of stability to Afghanistan."

"We need a better definition of exactly what the definition of success is in Afghanistan."

"There are a lot of people in this country who are very confused,” added Jim Webb, Senator from Virginia and respected foreign policy authority. “There's a real need here in my view for clarity in terms of what actually can be accomplished.”

Richard Holbrooke, US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, didn’t have much to say other than, "I do not want to give an optimism/pessimism report to you. I think there are significant elements of movement forward in many areas but I do not yet see a definitive turning point in any direction."

Holbrooke offered the usual: train local forces, support the central government, reintegrate “10 dollar” Taliban. Negotiations with Taliban leadership remains off limits, as the blacklisting of Haqqani's network telegraphed. But Holbrooke did insist that President Barack Obama’s civil and military teams are peacefully co-existing, as if there was any doubt that General David Petraeus would seamlessly assume command. He’d been prepping for the job longer than they let on.

"We are absolutely on the same page when it comes to the overall strategy and working together," Holbrooke promised.

Senators remained skeptical of his visible attempts to dodge their questions. The central issue of strategy is a war’s ultimate objectives and they clearly doubted the stones that form the arch: Afghan President Hamid Karzai, slow progress in Marjah and Kandahar, the speed and quality of training Afghan security forces, "sporadic" reintegration, and a deadline that doesn’t fit.

Holbrooke presumably returned to the White House to relay the Senate’s displeasure. Maybe some high-level dialogue followed after which Afghanistan’s strategy was clarified. But giving them the benefit of the doubt requires a large enough leap of faith as it is, based on Obama’s strategy since assuming office, and his silent transfer to Petraeus suggests he won’t be clarifying anything soon.

Already suffering from a relationship gap with his own base, the gap between Washington and Afghanistan is every inch their 7,000 mile distance.

“There is a serious ‘relationship gap’ between the international community and the Afghan communities we intend to assist and protect,” says Norine MacDonald QC, President and Lead Field Researcher of ICOS. “The international community is failing to effectively meet the needs of the local population or understand their world view. We are also failing to explain ourselves or our objectives to the Afghan people. This provides clear opportunities for Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda against the West and has resulted in high levels of negative attitudes towards our troops on the ground.”

In a report released Friday, the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) interviewed males in Kandahar and Helmand provinces during June and yielded the following results: “70% believe military operations in their area are bad for the people, 74% believe that working with the international forces is wrong, 55% believe that NATO is in Afghanistan “only for their own benefit, to destroy or occupy the country, or to destroy Islam,” 75% believe foreigners disrespect their religion and traditions, 68% believe that NATO forces do not protect the local population, 61% believe that more Afghans are joining the Taliban compared to 2009, and 64% believe their government administrators are linked to the Taliban.”

Meanwhile, “the Taliban has inserted itself into the local society and created an effective political narrative: much more than an armed guerrilla insurgency, the Taliban today is a political force and a political player.”

The ICOS’s conclusion: “The international community does not understand or meet the basic needs of ordinary Afghans, and they in turn do not understand the reasons for our presence.” They lack an understanding of Washington’s strategy just like the majority of Americans, US Congress, NATO populaces, Muslims and non-Muslims alike - and oppose the war in similar numbers.

Obama may be able to parry the Senate without addressing Afghanistan’s drift and secure his surge’s funding, but ignoring Afghan perceptions spells doom.

Bridging multiple gaps won’t be easy though. Explaining the war in full requires a deep understanding of Afghanistan, its people, and their role in the region, something Obama has yet to demonstrate. The ICOS released a negative report on Marjah in April and included amendments for Kandahar. Though the US military operation toned down in response to local opposition, it’s obvious that the ICOS, at least, doesn’t believe enough political precaution was taken.

And the ICOS deduces what many long suspect: America and NATO still don’t know their friends or enemies as well as they need to. The gap is more a paradox than a straight equation, rendering its solution a greater challenge than clearing the air.

The ICOS finds “some successes,” but they double as links in the paradox. 55% of those interviewed believe NATO is winning the war, while 72% would prefer their children to grow up under an elected government rather than the Taliban. The evidence that Afghans prefer self-rule has always existed, but the means are forever a burden to overcome.

No matter how much Afghans want stability and an end to Taliban rule, the presence of US and NATO troops will always clash with this future. Afghans in the south believe a stalemate is inevitable, as 65% of those interviewed believe that Mullah Omar and the Taliban should join the national political process. Another paradox is thus formed: loathed as it is, 80% believe Al Qaeda will return if the Taliban maintains control of its territory.

So roughly half of Afghans support US and NATO military operations but two thirds don’t trust them. Most want an end to Taliban rule and al-Qaeda influence, but also think negotiations are the war’s only exit, and that al-Qaeda may return if the Taliban survives. We wish President Obama best of luck in untangling this knot.

There’s a worse condition though than failing to understand, and that’s failing to listen. When the rogue Afghan soldier who killed 3 UK troops phoned the BBC and AP to explain his rationale - he had recently witnessed NATO forces killing a 5 year old - US officials brushed off his motive as unclear.

No wonder they’re unclear on the war’s direction too.

Somalia's Tone Indicates Chaos

The moments after Turkey and Brazil secured their own nuclear agreement with Iran illustrate a basic political principle: tone counts. No sooner had America deemed the agreement insufficient and brushed aside Turkey and Brazil’s efforts that a counter-reaction began to form.

Though the agreement didn’t meet the international community’s standard, the general consensus from those states seeking to avoid military confrontation with Iran faulted Washington’s overly negative response to key developing powers. Its tone could have praised Turkey and Brazil for engaging the process instead of shutting them down, then looked for ways to combine their proposal with the West’s. US officials adopted softer language after facing this criticism (and Turkey’s increasing significance vis-à-vis Israel), but they were too late.

No fundamental difference existed in the two reactions except for the very first moments, critical in geopolitics and not to be missed.

A similar example is playing out in Somalia to deadly effect. Spikes in political activity could have followed the aftermath of Kampala’s bombings; leading through diplomacy requires only a change in mindset. But with West and Africa’s initial tone fixated on militarism, the opportunity for a full-spectrum counterinsurgency is being lost in the rush to “stabilize Somalia.” Thus it should be especially unsurprising when the conflict further degrades into a regional free-for-all with international reach.

Understanding the futility of Uganda’s 2,000 emergency forces is crucial - they lack decisiveness and thus generates instability - but swinging from one extreme to the other won’t solve the problem either. Today Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni declared, “Therefore this force... will be expanded and the African Union will be able to clean up this place.”

He’s urging the AU to send 20,000 troops “as soon as possible.”

"We are now going to go on the offensive and get these people,” Museveni vows. “We were in Mogadishu on the African Union mission to guard the port, airport and state house. But now they have mobilized us to look for them. In the past we were not involved in Somali affairs, now we are taking a big interest in these groups."

Though he may mean well Museveni’s threat is preposterous. The current AU force of 6,000 undertakes offensive operations against al-Shabab, not just retaliatory fire, both of which are notoriously heavy-handed. “Getting these people” translates to mere counter-terrorism when Somalia demands an intricate counterinsurgency. Drones aren’t the cure in such an undeveloped state.

Most problematically, 20,000 troops are as unlikely to prove decisive as 2,000. For reference Somalia is roughly the size of Afghanistan, still about half the size without Somaliland and Puntland, and its long coast obstructs an effective blockade. al-Shabab’s estimated fighting strength numbers around 5,000, al-Qaeda’s between 300-1,000. If Museveni wants to talk numbers he would need 100,000 +, a force both unrealistic in principle and likely impossible to control.

The AU, along with the West, still lacks a viable strategy to run military operations through.

Yet America appears eager to throw itself behind Uganda’s boasts, as if it wants to sink into Somalia and Afghanistan at the same time. One US official gave CNN the standard, “al-Shabab’s agenda is very similar to al Qaeda's agenda.” Frequent interactions with the Taliban and Hezbollah, which led to funding from Iran and Syria, are cited as key evidence, yet the flaw is evident. Hezbollah, connected to every major militancy on Earth, harbors no intent to strike any target except Israel.

Bruno Schiemsky, who authored the UN report in 2006, told TIME, "In 2004, I obtained strategy documents from within the Shabab which indicated their transnational agenda. Their long-term view is first control Somalia, then Yemen, then Saudi Arabia.”

But is al-Shabab’s final objective really to conquer Saudi Arabia? This seems far-fetched.

Though al-Qaeda obviously seeks international jihad, al-Shabab has only shown national and regional ambition. It needs international support to complete its national goal of an Islamic caliphate; there’s no guarantee that al-Shabab will strike outside its borders if it comes to rule. The threat stems from al-Qaeda turning the state into its new Pakistan, paralleling its relationship with the Taliban. This distinction has landed America in deep trouble in Afghanistan and Kampala is replaying like 9/11.

Rumors speculate that the White House opposes expanding AU troop levels, but U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley’s praise of Uganda after Museveni's 20,000 hints at a widening war.

"We commend the critical role that Uganda and Burundi continue to play to bring regional security to the unstable areas in east and central Africa,” he told reporters, “particularly through their leadership of the A.U. mission in Somalia.”

Somalia reached its current tipping point under Uganda and Burundi’s watch, though the fault is hardly theirs alone, and their plan to deploy up to four times as many troops on the ground will hasten the collapse of a dying star. The nation will fall into new despair and jettison exploding matter into neighboring states. al-Qaeda’s "Saleh Nabhan Brigade,” named after their fallen commander, has apparently been tasked with that singular assignment.

"I say to the Ugandan president what has happened in Kampala was only the beginning,” al-Shabab chief Sheik Muktar Abu Zubayr warned in a new audio tape. “We shall do more as AMISOM (the peacekeeping force) continue massacring our people. I would like to tell people of Mogadishu that Al-Shabab mujahideen will take revenge on your enemy AMISOM and do the same thing they do to you.”

Voice of America claims, “Security analysts say al-Shabab is hoping that by targeting residents in Kampala, the Ugandan leader will be pressured to withdraw his offer and all Ugandan troops from Somalia.” We predict the opposite - that al-Shabab and al-Qaeda are baiting Africa and ultimately the West into a war they can’t win. Everything traces back to al-Qaeda’s economic warfare.

While US President Barack Obama is busy condemning al-Qaeda and al-Shabab as “racists” who only create hatred, he would be wise to remember how low the AU’s popularity is in Somalia. Iraq’s mistaken plan to “be greeted as liberators” cannot be repeated despite al-Shabab’s low popularity, as foreign forces still enhance their strength. It doesn't matter that al-Shabab is using civilian casualties as an excuse - Somalis have no confidence in foreign soldiers operating without direction or oversight.

Obama’s rhetoric for public consumption may differ in private, but the danger of him believing himself remains high based on Washington's reaction. The bare truth is that AU soldiers aren’t trained for such daunting counterinsurgency. Allowing only the AU to engage in indiscriminate fire justifies more external attacks in al-Shabab’s eyes, hastening the region’s expanding militarization and speeding up the cycle of violence.

“We will keep revenging what your soldiers remorselessly did to our people,” Abu Zubayr continued. Your tanks destroyed the remains of our buildings in Mogadishu and we will also revenge that. What is called AMISOM has committed a nasty massacre in Mogadishu, worse than the ones committed before by the Ethiopians and Americans: constant shelling at poor civilian populations, tanks leveling what remained of Mogadishu buildings and machine-guns shot at public vehicles. All those were the habits of AMISOM.”

Obama clearly wishes to avoid this reality by targeting al-Qaeda. He later admits that Somalia does require a multi-national effort yet with US support to the TFG already failing, Obama still wants to leave the conflict in the AU’s hands when the conflict is beyond its power to resolve. A lack of urgency persists. Without an international, full-spectrum counterinsurgency equivalent to Afghanistan, the only certainty 20,000 AU troops bring is more death and destruction.

And US policy is listing towards that storm.

Israel’s Confidence-Destroying Measures

Despite Israel’s perceived strength it really isn’t in a position to bargain. America is now the only dependable ally, having lost Europe after the Gaza war. Turkey has renewed the diplomatic vigor against Israel’s hostility towards Iran and unilateral actions in the Palestinian territories while the Arab League, sensing blood, is circling the waters.

The Palestinians hold a strong hand and don’t need to rush into direct talks. Nor is the traditional fear of obstructing direct talks as high with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu squeezed internally from both sides and masquerading around “peace." It would seem extra unwise, then, to try and bluff at a time like now.

Sadly Israel’s latest behavior is no surprise.

Many opportunities to build true confidence were presented to Netanyahu after leaving Washington last week. But having “reset” his relationship with President Barack Obama before outmaneuvering him at the pro-Israeli Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Netanyahu erroneously believed he held the leverage to pressure the Palestinians into immediate direct talks. The topic would dominate his trip to Washington and the following days.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who Netanyahu personally criticized in New York, naturally objected to such arm-twisting. The PLO accurately predicted that Netanyahu’s popularity would soon fade after leaving America and that the Palestinians would retain the advantage into September, when the UN is due to consider Palestinian statehood. Their cool reply left the door open for direct talks - as long as Netanyahu proves he means peace.

But Netanyahu abruptly declared that he won’t extend a settlement freeze in the West Bank beyond its September deadline, let alone consider a freeze in East Jerusalem. Talk of ending select IDF operations in the West Bank, an evasion tactic, didn’t get far. Their high numbers place these operations at checkpoint status; Palestinians want to get rid of them, but this isn’t the issue in question.

With the Gaza blockade relaxed as far as Israel will go, its probe into the Freedom flotilla raid offered the best alternative to level with the Palestinians. The incident resonated so broadly that rectifying it could have provided the necessary goodwill to cover Abbas. As the situation stands a Haaretz editorial is blasting Netanyahu for cowardly avoiding the probe and hanging Israeli soldiers out to dry.

So imagine how Muslims and many non-Muslims are feeling.

The Eiland team and Turkel Committee ultimately concluded, “There were mistakes, also on the high military levels, but happily, they were not the result of negligence.” Headlines paradoxically smashed together “flotilla raid flawed,” “killings justified,” and “commandos praised.” Israeli officials claimed the investigation was held to the highest international standard. Turkey swiftly dismissed it as insufficient and the Arab League is likely to follow suit.

Additional investigations remain a possibility, but Israel is unlikely to follow through based on its prior behavior.

In what appears to be Netanyahu’s old but new hardball tactic, “Israeli bulldozers destroyed six buildings, including at least three homes, in contested east Jerusalem on Tuesday, resuming the demolition of Palestinian property after a halt aimed at encouraging peace talks. The municipality said none of the structures razed were homes, and that all had been illegally built and were not populated... Palestinians disputed those claims, saying three of the demolished structures were homes and one was a warehouse.”

“Since October, no houses had been demolished in the eastern sector of the city until Tuesday,” reports the Associated Press. “The demolitions seemed to indicate a move away from the unofficial freeze on them, which Israel imposed after much criticism from Washington.”

The bulldozers came one day after Jerusalem’s municipal committee gave preliminary approval to 32 new apartments in a Jewish neighborhood in east Jerusalem, “rolling back a decision earlier this year to quietly put new projects on hold.” Construction of existing projects is ongoing, meaning direct talks remain off. The Arab League condemned the approval and Saeb Erekat, chief negotiator for the Palestinians, deplored, "This government of Israel has been given the choice between settlements and peace and it is obvious that it chose settlements.”

Israel’s actions, self-destructive as they are, inevitably harm those around it as well, and this is the larger picture now. Forced into protesting, US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley insisted, “We continue to oppose and will make clear to the government of Israel that we oppose unilateral actions that prejudge negotiations.”

Crowley may believe he’s fulfilling repeated promises to "hold Israel accountable" for unilaterally provocative actions, yet Washington isn’t even doing too little, too late. It’s never been enough and may never be enough. How can America oppose and clarify to Israel any more directly than meetings between Obama and Netanyahu? The US military or Congress aren’t realistic solutions especially with Congressional elections on the horizon.

Once again America is unable to control Israel in the slightest, reducing confidence in both Netanyahu and Obama going into the pivotal months ahead. Confrontation at the UN seems inevitable.

The Palestinians have heard the direct talk: "The US has made it clear that it disagrees with some government of Israel actions in Jerusalem that affect Palestinians in areas such as housing, including home demolitions, and has urged all parties to avoid actions that could undermine trust.”

Still no direct action in sight.

Blackout In Somalia

Somalia has finally “surprised” and “shocked” the world - predictability doesn’t make the obtuse international reaction any easier to digest. The bombings in Kampala are atrocious, but with inane reports like “Who is al-Shabab” and “al-Shabab wants to topple government,” the setup is clearly on too.

The lights have been switched off.

Reporting from the Western media is dangerously blacked out, distorting Somalia’s instability to generate the appropriate reaction in their populaces. Africa’s media offers a more complete account although it’s trending in the same direction. The possibility of military retaliation has quickly arisen as Western governments orchestrate the media machine to their best ability.

"The links between al Qaeda and al Shabaab are stronger," according to some brilliant analysis by David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and “an expert on al Shabaab.”

Using public relations to deflect reality ends in futile strategy. Rather than illuminating Somalia, the Kampala bombing is being exploited like a mob fire. Why single out al-Shabab and al-Qaeda when so many other factors are equally to blame? “Evil terrorists" only explains so much. All the blame is being pinned on them in the heat of the moment.

All the blame is being pinned on them in the heat of the moment.

Thus Little attention has been given to the weak Transitional Federal Government, whose commendable attempt to survive has merely funneled US arms to al-Shabab. African experts recently testified to Congress that supporting the TFG without any oversight is doing more harm than good. Corruption remains rampant. No mention of child soldiers wielding US arms or heavy-handed, unpopular African Union (AU) troops untrained in counterinsurgency and responsible for plenty of indiscriminate civilian deaths.

The name “Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan,” al-Qaeda’s chief in Somalia, comes up sparingly and only to invoke the SEAL strike that killed him in September 2009. That al-Shabab and al-Qaeda officially allied together in February 2010 is left out - it's useless for people to know that targeted assassinations have minimal effect.

And scant reporting has downplayed Uganda’s recent deployment of 2,000 emergency troops to Mogadishu last week, as requested by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Uganda’s story runs deeper than being one of two contributors (Burundi being the other) to the AU force and the deployment sparked fears that Ethiopia, generally disliked in Somalia, is on deck. Specific references that Somalia had reached a tipping point are just as scarce, usually the same copy-and-paste biography. Blackhawk Down hasn’t been referenced much either. None of Washington’s sordid history in Somalia is.

All the back-story to Kampala has been edited out, leaving it the hollow shell of a “pointlessly brutal” al-Qaeda attack. Just a freeze frame of the explosions and blood soaked American teenagers for Western consumption.

The tragedy in Kampala isn’t isolated, but orbits the larger tragedy in Somalia. This is an ongoing war. Uganda deployed more troops without a real strategy and al-Shabab retaliated. More troops beget more violence, as they’ve already started to do. One cannot expect Uganda or other African nations to deploy troops without consequence when blood has stained everyone's hands. Nor can one blame al-Qaeda for outmaneuvering America from Afghanistan into Somalia.

Unfortunately President Barack Obama has already pledged "any support and assistance" to Uganda. FBI teams are just the beginning, thus his decision will likely make the situation even worse. Lt. Col. Felix Kulaigye, the army spokesman for Uganda, told reporters, "Al-Shabab is the reason why we should stay in Somalia. We have to pacify Somalia.”

That type of mindset has brought and will continue to bring chaos to Somalia.

Glints of truth can be spotted amidst the smoke of Kampala. William Braniff, an instructor at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, advises, "Regionalization of the conflict is a rational strategy for al Shabaab. They are stronger when there are foreign boots on the ground, and weaker otherwise.” We wonder where he is at a time like now.

Afyare Abdi Elmi, another al-Shabab expert, predicts of the bombing, “It will invoke an interventionist mood in the region and within the international community. This might create an atmosphere where Somalia is a free for all and a number of troops are invited and come and go."

Many Somalis themselves, much as they fear al-Shabab, also fear an overreaction from the West or Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia - all US allies.

Unfortunately none of this seems to matter. The world’s strategy up until now and its subsequent reaction offers few reasons to expect a sound counter-response. In fact the main possibility is that very overreaction. Washington officials closely monitoring the US and international media understand the threat of military retaliation is highly anticipated. But al-Shabab and al-Qaeda’s actions suggest that its bombing possesses dual motives: deterrence against additional forces and bait into the trap.

Either outcome serves their purpose. They expect retaliation and will strike US allies if attacked by US forces.

The West can keep blaming al-Shabab and al-Qaeda, but that won't stabilize the conflict. Though the temptation may be to perceive AU or US troops as liberators, given that al-Shabab’s popular support is low, they would likely be throwing dynamite in the fire. Going in is easy. Somalia needs a full-spectrum exit strategy.

The smart political play is thus amazingly the best counterinsurgency: fusing international an regional diplomacy into a tone-down reaction that doesn’t further inflame the region. We can only hope this paradox stems what could be the beginning of an international disaster.

Bush’s Gift to Obama: the AUMF

Love him or hate him, but Fox News legal analyst Andrew Napolitano zeros on a core root of chaos in US foreign policy with his usual bluntness. He’s not the first to attack the AUMF and his CSPAN interview with Ralph Nadar is a month old, but these particular words transcend time (33:20):

“After 9/11, President Bush didn’t ask for a declaration of war. He asked for an ‘authorization for use of military force’ (AUMF). And the authorization for use of military force basically said to President Bush and his successors, ‘go after anybody you want and use any means at your disposal.’ Well that’s an open ended war. There’s no one to surrender, no target identified.

President Bush never lost the powers given to him by Congress under the AUMF. President Obama inherited them and as long as that monstrosity is on the books, every one of their successors will have this absolute power to wage any war they want, anywhere they want. That’s not what the Framers intended, that’s not what the constitution says.”

Task Force Somalia

For so long Somalia has remained in the shadows of the US media, kept on life support by the international press but even then swept away by a turbulent world. Reporting in Somalia is roughly as hard as reporting on it. Disaster sells but people like answers, not problems.

Somalia won’t stay worlds away forever though.

These days have a particular now-or-never feeling. With al-Shabab, the main insurgency, in firm control of the southern region and gaining ground in Mogadishu, a counteroffensive by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) flopped at the worst possible time. The TFG, caught in an endless loop of infighting, has failed to pay its soldiers for months causing some to storm the parliament building and others to defect to al-Shabab. EU training programs outside the country aren’t readily available for combat.

With its back to the wall the TFG had no choice except to activate the Sunni militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, al-Shabab’s enemy who controls the northern territory. Five minister positions were offered to Ahlu Sunna in March in exchange for their relatively advanced military support, a creation of Ethiopian and US backing. Ahlu Sunna managed to knock al-Shabab off balance in coordinated strikes in Mogadishu and the south.

Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, was safe for now.

Yet Ahlu Sunna’s official entry into the war triggered a new phase in al-Shabab’s strategy. It swiftly moved on the central region of the state, seizing numerous towns held by its lesser rival Hizbul-Islam along with the key city of Beledweyne, which borders Ethiopia. Some of Hizbul-Islam’s units were assimilated and with leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys holed up in Mogadishu under TFG protection, Hizbul-Islam stood a better chance of joining than beating al-Shabab.

Apparently Aweys has realized this much and emerged from hiding to discuss a new alliance with Abdi Mohamud Godane, code-name Abu-Zubeyr, chief of al-Shabab. Sources say al-Qaeda operatives attended.

Even if Hizbul-Islam stubbornly fights to maintain independence, the reality remains that al-Shabab is steadily adding Somalia’s central region to its southern stronghold. This strategy’s primary objective is a pincer attack on Ahlu Sunna’s northern cities, Dhuusamarreeb and Abudwak, just as soon as al-Shabab captures Mogadishu. Preliminary attacks on Dhuusamarreeb have already begun.

But the real tipping point came less than two weeks ago and only relates indirectly to al-Shabab. Doubts had dogged Ahlu Sunna’s merger with the TFG since March, a marriage by necessity that found each side inwardly distrustful of the other. Finally Abu Yusuf Al-Qadi, the spiritual chief of Ahlu Sunna, declared its agreement with the TFG “collapsed.”

The TFG attempted to spin the issue. Dr. Khalid Omar Ali, state minister of the Prime Minister’s office, claimed a reshuffling of the cabinet fulfilled the agreement with Ahlu Sunna. This prompted Al-Qadi to reiterate days ago, "We hear people have checkpoints in some of the neighborhoods of Mogadishu. We hear people claiming Ahlu Sunna got posts. This is impossible. So we like to clear that for the Somali people.”

He says the posts went to warlords who bought their way into the government.

Now that relations between all parties have broken down, Somalia currently embodies a state of equilibrial free-for-all between al-Shabab, Ahlu Sunna, the TFG, and external forces. While TFG officials claim to have retaken neighborhoods in Mogadishu, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was worried enough to deploy 2,000 emergency Ugandan troops to the capital.

The escalation has met protests from both al-Shabab, who vowed retaliation against Ugandan diplomats, and elements inside the TFG.

The result is that Somalia has never posed a greater threat to the West. This is no fear-mongering, but the reality of al-Qaeda’s strategic and economic warfare. With al-Qaeda operating temporary camps across al-Shabab territory and more foreign fighters being diverted to Somalia, including Afghans and Pakistanis, it seems only a matter of time before they attempt to strike a Western target.

al-Qaeda may be “on the run,” but it’s also outmaneuvering Washington. Its plan all along was to shift from failed state to failed state, ditching Afghanistan and working into the Arabian peninsula and Africa, where America has a much weaker political and military presence. The point of this fear is to drive a responsible preemptive solution instead of waiting to react militarily.

The West may not believe it has the time and resources for Somalia, but the failed state is at least on par with Iraq or Afghanistan and possibly exceeds them. Identical amounts of time, energy, and resources are necessary. Yet Somalia is still treated half-way, or not even that, thus the West will only have itself to blame if it fails to act appropriately. Though it has seen many during its history, Somalia once again finds itself at the crossroads.

The countdown for a solution is running out.

What’s needed to avert a military catastrophe is a grand political solution - an international Task Force for Somalia. Not only does this appear to be the most realistic solution to the conflict (despite its apparent idealism), nearly every actor is calling for international intervention. Last week President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed took to the front lines armed with an AK-47 to rally the nation.

He told Reuters after returning to the capital, "Things have gone beyond a level we can tolerate so there is an urgent need for international or regional help. My government can do little to forge its institutional duties because of constant attacks.”

The same demand is coming out of Ahlu Sunna, now isolated in its own dangerous position. Abu Qadi, after denouncing the TFG, added, "We are requesting from the international community to know and see that the government had violated the deal signed.” He wants international assistance too.

As do Uganda, who reluctantly deployed its forces without an exit strategy, and Kenya.

Abukar Arman, Somalia’s special envoy to America, claims help is around the corner: “Unlike the failed policy of the previous administration that was entirely based on counter-terrorism and military power, the soon to be announced policy of the current administration is expected to rely on soft power and building relationships.”

However Kenya’s Foreign Minister, Moses M. Wetangula, argues, "The levels of engagement of the United States, the levels of commitment, have been below our expectations. America, remember, enjoys the status currently of the only superpower, expected to have the capacity to do some of the things countries with limited capacity like ourselves cannot do, including enforcing Security Council resolutions.”

Now add in General David Petraeus’s Special Forces directive that authorized expanded operations in Somalia, plus the SEAL raid on al-Qaeda commander Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, an event which solidified al-Qaeda and al-Shabab’s alliance. Despite a change in rhetoric, it seems that America’s response remains military-centric.

Wetangula illuminates what a potential Task Force may look like: several US officials to act in the UN, EU officials to oversee regional initiatives, a heavy African component composed of high-level officials from all of Somalia’s neighbors, and representation from Somaliland and Puntiland to exercise regional authority with TFG. A dozen or so members could compose the team, with America operating from the back and Africans up front.

The first task would be to restore the TFG to working order, either by reforming it or disbanding and replacing it with a more solid structure. This would involve a deep level of participation from Somalia’s local power-brokers, which must play an active role in the Task Force. A bottom-up strategy will never succeed without assistance from the top, making it critical to promote diplomats who understand they serve the bottom.

Among many secondary issues to address is a full investigation into the TFG’s use - and America’s arming - of child soldiers, for obvious reasons, along with an investigation into missing journalists who reported on the story. And at the top of the list: a regional construct for Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland, a peace treaty with Ethiopia, piracy (which will never be solved at sea), and proxy negotiations with militant groups.

The ultimate purpose of a Task Force, as politics won’t completely resolve the conflict, is devising an all-encompassing political framework to run potential AU/EU/US military operations through, or a UN peacekeeping mission. This isn’t advocation of those operations, only the acceptance of their inevitability. The Task Force must minimize the need for military action and ensuing negative reaction through the appropriate political and cultural knowledge.

And it must act before al-Qaeda strikes a Western target out of Somalia. Before Ethiopian or US brigades are forced to storm Mogadishu and other al-Shabab positions. Before the war is lost for good.

[Update: Or maybe it's already too late. The Ugandan bombing bears all the marks of al-Qaeda. We would have warned the government of an imminent attack if we could. This bomb carries the explicit message that it takes days, not weeks, to strike the capital of Kampala. The explosives were likely smuggled in from Kenya.

Though tragic, the US media through no coincidence leaves out the most important detail of the story in its reporting. Uganda doesn’t just contribute troops to the African Union mission in Somalia, it recently deployed an emergency force of 2,000 to Mogadishu. Parts of Somalia’s government, already in danger of collapsing, have objected; so has the Ugandan press, an important factor if the government lacks public support. Nor do many Somalis welcome the addition of more foreign troops. al-Shabab's strict rule aside, they know foreign troops will only bring more chaos.

A blackout has eliminated this piece of reality.

Will the Kampala bombing be used as a catalyst for political or military action? Mike Hammer, spokesman for President Barack Obama's National Security Council already pledged that Washington is "ready to provide any assistance requested by the Ugandan government." Now reports indicate at least one US citizen has been killed.

This is a major decision of US foreign policy, one hard to believe that will be made wisely.]

Direct War of Words

"On Tuesday, I will meet President Mubarak in Cairo. It will be our fifth meeting in the space of a year. I hope to work together with him to promote direct talks with the Palestinians.”

- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, following a cabinet meeting

“We’re under pressure to agree to direct negotiations with Israel. Such a move requires the approval of the Arab League. If the Arab League says it’s okay, we will go along.”

- anonymous Palestinian Authority official, commenting on repeated phone calls from the White House to enter direct negotiations

“If there is no progress in the proximity talks, what would be the benefits of moving to the direct talks? The direct talks will be then absurd and useless, therefore, we had informed all the international parties that we want to achieve a progress first. These are our ideas and we wait to hear from the Israeli side."

- Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who also said direct talks would be "futile" if they began now

The Palestinians are obviously using the Arab League as cover, having no incentive to enter direct talks under Netanyahu’s terms. Enormous pressure will be applied, but it’s improbable that Abbas, the PLO, and the Arab League will give in without getting something back. President Barack Obama does everything for Israelis whether they know it or not. The situation has always depended on what Obama can do for Palestinians - and especially their leaders - if not freeze settlement approval and construction in both the West Bank and Jerusalem.

His options are few and still be defined by Netanyahu in his attempt to avoid a settlement showdown. Closing IDF operations “in a number of Palestinian cities in the West Bank” sounds nicer than it probably is, but a start nevertheless.

Pushing “absurd, futile” direct talks on Abbas though is a certain dead end.