The pitch of their condemnation suggested that they can’t imagine Moscow’s state of mind, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and company surely understand the motivation behind its Syrian veto. They know that Russian officials from aspiring president Vladimir Putin to state arms dealers aren’t ready to let go of Bashar al-Assad’s strategically-placed regime. They also know, on a deeper level, that Moscow despises U.S. hypocrisy as much as Washington loathes Russian hardball.
The U.S. response to Bahrain’s uprising offers of one of many gateways into Moscow’s thinking in Syria. Although vastly divergent in casualties and social complexities, the Obama administration’s steadfast support for King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa (and other regimes that will be addressed shortly) has added to Russian obstinacy in Damascus. When UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin hastily met with PBS’s Charlie Rose after last weekend’s veto, he repeatedly deflected questions on Russian policy by pointing out the selective nature of U.S. foreign policy. Both parties are guilty of the offense they accuse each other of - Washington and Moscow united against Yemen and Bahrain’s uprisings - but that doesn’t stop Russian officials from venting their irritation into Syria.
With Clinton consumed by Syria’s events, the Secretary just reinforced America’s double-standard by sending a tag-team to pin down Bahrain’s opposition. Michael Posner’s comprehensive government tour softened the ground for his partner, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor slapped a well-known hand on the way out. Following Posner’s high praise of the King’s reform, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman reviewed “the development of historic relations” with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa. Feltman spearheaded the initial U.S. blackout following February 14th’s outburst.
He also arrived in Manama with a secondary objective: secure political, financial and possible security assistance for Syria’s opposition. Miles away, the house of Al Wefaq’s president came under fire from a tear gas barrage. “This is the state of most homes now days in Bahrain,” said Sheikh Ali Salman.
The sight and stench of tear gas will blanket the island nation as pro-democracy demonstrators intensify their actions around the February 14th outbreak. Periphery protests continue across the country as a larger crowd flocks to al-Muqsha’s Freedom Square, located four miles west of the capital. Al Wefaq and its political allies have staged daily rallies in al-Muqsha for the last week; while an open-ended permit wasn’t granted, the government is satisfied to contain the opposition’s energy outside of Manama. The gathering also falls under 24-hour surveillance, partly due to the fact that protesters always viewed al-Musqsha as a temporary base.
Saturday's demonstrations offered a glimpse of how Tuesday is likely to transpire. Under the guidance of Nabil Rajab, president of the Bahraini Center for Human Rights, several hundred people gathered at the Standard Charter bank for a one-mile westward march to Pearl Roundabout. Police officials immediately warned Rajab against his unauthorized protest, then proceeded to disperse the group with tear gas and stun grenades.
“Unauthorized protests” are, of course, a common tactic of political resistance and civil disobedience.
February 14th should unfold at a higher level of intensity despite the corresponding spike in Manama’s security precautions. One activist reported, "the roads leading into the centre of Manama were all blocked by police.” Instead of massing, protesters may gather in smaller flash mobs and converge on Pearl Roundabout from multiple directions (a trial run was attempted on Saturday). Splitting up into dozens of groups should increase the chances of one group reaching the site and undermining the government’s security measures, otherwise protesters will spread throughout sympathetic villages and spill into the more vacated areas of Manama.
Contrary to Posner and Feltman’s optimistic statements, Bahrain’s political outreach is decaying in proportion to government-induced deaths, injuries, arrests and elapsed time. Failure to restore confidence at the political level ensures rising tensions in the streets, trapping the island in a cycle of hostilities. The uprising’s spark cannot be forgotten or ignored, yet the monarchy remains bent on paving over February 14th’s aftermath as though the day were Pearl Monument.
These are the signs of accelerated instability, not progress, and their effects aren’t limited to Bahrain’s shores.
As if collecting red flags to emulate a twisted United Nations’ parkway, Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) hoisted two more flagpoles in anticipation of the revolution’s “Friday of Departure.”
One is forged from relatively new material. Facing down Washington over the status of several U.S.-funded non-government organizations (NGO) - and lying in the process - the SCAF and its political representatives continue to play hardball with the Obama administration. Weeks of pressure have failed to release 19 Americans (including Sam LaHood, son of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood), and Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri seemingly doused all hope for a legal or diplomatic resolution on Wednesday.
"Egyptian government won't back off in its criminal investigation into financial aid,” el-Ganzouri, a former prime minister under Hosni Mubarak, told a press conference following Wednesday's cabinet meeting. “Egypt will not kneel down to anybody and will overcome the crisis through unity.”
The SCAF posted a separate statement on Facebook in case anyone missed its message: "Since the great Egyptian judiciary started handling foreign funding for civil society organizations, a series of pressures, warnings and threats was being practiced by Washington against Egypt to the degree that Washington threatened Egypt to cut annual US military and economic assistance to Egypt, which is unacceptable.”
With an estimated 70% of Egyptians opposed to U.S. aid, the generals appear to be banking on this sentiment to cover its potential losses.
Despite the bluster and high stakes on both sides, political stalemate over NGOs should continue to benefit the Obama administration in the near future. After relying on Egypt’s parliamentary elections to divert attention from the SCAF’s grip on power, the administration has turned the status of 19 Americans into an inverse lightening. Their fate now serves as the focal point of U.S. criticism amid Port Said’s tragedy and the ensuing 10 days of demonstrations. Nearly all U.S. attention (political and media) has been devoted to the NGO crisis, conveniently ignoring the SCAF’s hostility towards pro-democracy protesters.
The tougher U.S. officials talk, the more obvious the Obama administration's front becomes. All eyes are directed towards the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, not the heavily-guarded Interior and Defense Ministries, where Egyptians gathered on Friday to demand the end of military rule. They also requested a cessation of violence against peaceful protesters, judicial reforms and a complete overhaul of the Interior Ministry, which has escaped genuine accountability. High-profile activist Asmaa Mahfouz tapped Al Jazeera to deliver her own message as she marched on the Defense Ministry, arguing, "Mubarak faces charges of instigating the killing of protesters during the revolution. So the SCAF should also be tried for the crimes committed under its rule."
"Whoever wants to know the truth should hit the streets," Mahfouz told Al Jazeera. "For those who say we're a bunch of thugs, we're not carrying any weapons and aren't damaging public property."
Feeling the pressure from Port Said, the Muslim Brotherhood has similarly escalated its anti-SCAF rhetoric in an attempt to neutralize its own negative perceptions. Last Friday the Brotherhood’s General Guide, Mohamed Badie, blasted the military during a speech televised by the group’s satellite channel. Badie would flip the SCAF’s script against the revolutionaries by accusing certain “individuals” of “plotting to burn this homeland and demolish its institutions.”
“They are trained for this,” he warned. “They are known to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the police, who are delaying bringing them to justice, which is totally unacceptable.”
While the Brotherhood isn’t acting in concert with the revolutionary movement, the two forces combine to apply significant pressure inside and outside of the established political system. Components of asymmetric networks often operate in isolation, and most of the SCAF’s backtracking has resulted from their joint-effort. After previously resisting popular calls during negotiations with the SCAF, a position attributed to establishing constitutional authority, the Brotherhood now seems committed to an accelerated transition to civilian rule. Deputy chairman Khairat al-Shater would follow al-Ganzouri’s Wednesday briefing by calling on Parliament to replace him.
"The government has failed in managing the country,” added Mahmoud Ghozlan, a Brotherhood spokesman. “In any nation in the world, such a disaster would force a cabinet to give up power... We cannot go on like this forever. Egypt needs a firm government that enacts the rule of law and that is serious about the transition.”
Naturally the SCAF perceived Friday’s demonstration and the Brotherhood’s rhetoric as threats to its power, and responded with the appropriate hostilities. al-Ganzouri condemned these “demands and strikes” for “aiming at bringing about State failure,” telling “those calling for the downfall of the military rule to remember the situation in Iraq.” The SCAF then released its own statement on state TV, but such threats don’t qualify as “news” anymore.
"We will be honest with you that our precious Egypt is subject to plots that aim to hit the revolution in its core and sow strife between Egyptian people and between them and their armed forces... Never will we bow to threats, nor succumb to pressures, nor accept ultimatums. We face conspiracies hatched against the homeland, whose goal is to undermine the institutions of the Egyptian state and whose aim is to topple the state itself so that chaos reigns and destruction spreads.”
This language, however, is especially insulting to the revolutionaries when mixed with self-adulation, and the SCAF continues to praise its own “revolutionary” leadership. The council insists that “armed forces protected the revolution in its more critical time” and “stood as a supporter of the people." These statements were more accurate prior to Mubarak’s fall, when the army formed the last line of defense from state security, but are now mocked in the streets. The SCAF is thus delegitimizing Egypt’s revolutionaries - implying their participation in “conspiracies” - while using their cause to woo Egypt’s more traditional segments.
The generals are employing the same scheme towards Washington: targeting NGOs for “foreign conspiracy” despite the Obama administration’s unflinching support for a SCAF-led “transition.”
The possibility of severing $1.5 billion in U.S. aid remains open due to Congressional pressure, but a likelier outcome suggests the continuation of Egypt’s status quo. Washington cannot afford to lose its access to the SCAF and, even if aid is withheld, political cooperation will remain ongoing. The Obama administration lacks a sincere unease over the SCAF’s handling of protesters (aside from any impact on the SCAF’s sustainability), and is simply waiting out the NGO cases to normalize relations. Yet the SCAF’s actions from Mubarak’s fall to the present leave no doubt that the military will continue to exert a disruptive political influence after a civilian transition.
al-Shater’s warning bears repeating: “We strongly advise the Americans and the Europeans to support Egypt during this critical period as compensation for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship.”
Nearly two weeks have elapsed since Ali Abdullah Saleh entered New York City under the diplomatic immunity afforded to Yemen’s “President.” During this time the Obama administration has only made one passing reference to Yemen, a throwaway statement courtesy of Secretary Hillary Clinton, as foreign powers busy themselves imposing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s power-sharing agreement. Saleh’s presence at Central Park’s Ritz Carlton is also generating a corresponding blackout in the U.S. media, a seemingly unbreakable trend unless al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is somehow involved.
Low odds, though, won’t stop Yemenis from shining light on their cause, and the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) is committed to altering the long-term status quo in Washington. Last Sunday’s demonstration resulted in a rare Saleh spotting, complete with a blown kiss to those protesting his immunity. As usual the Obama administration ignored this inflammatory act, and YACC’s actions failed to elicit a response from the White House or State Department (a modest media reaction was triggered). However YACC represents the only force capable of producing an immediate reaction, leaving the vanguard no choice except to continue engaging. Ceaseless operations are vital to both militarized and non-violent fourth-generation warfare (4GW).
YACC’s latest attempt to raise the profile of Saleh’s visit - Friday’s “March for Justice” - took protesters over the Brooklyn Bridge to New York City Hall, where they vented their frustration at the Obama administration’s interference in Yemen’s revolution.
“Over 29,000 peaceful protesters has been murdered and injured in less than a year by Saleh’s security forces and Obama administration still rolled the red carpet for this dictator to enjoy a luxury near Central Park in recognition for the crimes against humanity Saleh committed against the People of Yemen.”
The march has yet to force the Obama administration into breaking its silence, but YACC has tied its next theme into the plausible reaction. Western and Gulf powers view the GCC’s agreement as a successful counter-revolution; Saleh is “removed,” a controllable figure from his regime sits in his place, the opposition is cornered by the ruling party and foreign powers, and the youth movement is now forced to choose between a single-candidate “election” and further political isolation. The GCC’s power-sharing was constructed from the ground up to prevent regime change, and this reality will become more apparent over the two-year transitional period.
YACC must take aim at the GCC’s proposal and all of the risks that it entails. The following letter was sent to President Barack Obama:
We write to you today as concerned American citizens, urging you to reconsider your policy of support for Yemeni dictator President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and adopt instead a policy toward Yemen that honors the principles that Americans hold dear – principles of equality, justice, and freedom from tyranny. Living in one of the most heavily‐armed countries in the world, Yemen’s revolutionaries could have overthrown the regime by force or through civil war. Instead, they affirmed their commitment to non‐ violent change and their aspiration for a peaceful, democratic system. In response, they were slaughtered by embattled President Saleh’s security forces and loyalists for months on end.
We understand that President Saleh’s immunity from prosecution in Yemen was a central component of the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement (GCC), signed by President Saleh and by representatives of the formal political opposition. And we understand that this agreement has ushered in a period of relative freedom from government‐sponsored violence for the hundreds of thousands of Yemenis who continue to hope for genuine change. But the GCC agreement was negotiated with and endorsed by senior level political elites only, and it does not capture the voices or reflect the interests of the most vital forces in Yemen’s protest movement, its youth. Among the youth’s demands, the most consistent and clear has been the call for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to be held legally accountable for the crimes he has committed against the Yemeni people. While the US‐backed GCC agreement traded away this essential demand in exchange for a short‐term end to the bloodletting, it is unsustainable.
We do not believe that the situation is beyond repair, but any process of genuinely‐inclusive national reconciliation must begin with accountability. We call upon your administration to reverse its position on Saleh’s legal immunity and withdraw his visa immediately. As American citizens, we see no reason why a man with as much blood on his hands as President Ali Abdullah Saleh should continue to enjoy the protection and support of the United States. As Yemenis look ahead to next week’s uncontested election of Saleh’s designated successor, they know that it will be an uphill struggle to repair and build genuinely democratic institutions in Yemen, butut they will try. At the very least, we believe that by denying President Saleh sanctuary in the United States, we can demonstrate to Yemenis in good faith that we affirm democratic principles in this country.
Saleh’s immunity isn’t a pure case of maintaining diplomatic protocol. Protected from U.S. prosecution, he will return to Sana’a and maintain influence under Washington and Riyadh’s pseudo-authority. Saleh currently possesses immunity at the national level (parliamentary approval in accordance with the GCC deal) and he will never step foot in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Refusing to implicate Saleh has nothing to do with “peacefully” removing him from power, and everything to do with politico-military cooperation and guarding secrets with his regime. The puppet show is thus extended from Washington and Riyadh to Saleh’s arms, VP, son, nephews, uncle and half-brothers.
Yemen’s revolutionaries don’t fight and die for this subservient (and unstable) outcome, but envision a Yemen free of internal and external tyranny.
As reported yesterday, Michael Posner is making his latest rounds with Bahraini officials in an effort to normalize U.S. relations and the island as a whole. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has met with Ali Al Saleh, chairman of the National Assembly’s powerful Consultative Council (Upper House), Health and Human Rights Minister Dr. Fatima Al Blushi, and now Lt-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa. Chief of Public Security Major-General Tariq Al Hassan was also present at Posner’s meeting with the Interior Minister.
On Thursday the Assistance Secretary released a lengthy statement that mirrors the Obama administration's superficial response to Bahrain’s opposition:
This is my fourth visit to Bahrain in the last 14 months, and I welcome the opportunity to be here. Bahrain is an important partner of the United States. We have a long-standing alliance based on shared political economic and security interests. Both countries benefit from stability and prosperity here, and from a society where all people here are able to contribute to the political process.
During my three days in Manama, I have met with a number of senior government officials, including the Crown Prince; the Ministers of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Human Rights; the Attorney General; and the head of the Shura Council. I also met with lawyers, journalists, medical professionals, human rights advocates, and members of political societies, including the opposition.
My discussions focused on the implementation of the recommendations made in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report. As my government has said, it is a great credit to King Hamad that he initiated the BICI process, accepted its recommendations and appointed a national commission to coordinate implementation of those recommendations. It is commendable for any government to invite and participate in an independent examination of its human rights record.
The government of Bahrain has taken many important steps toward the long-term institutional reforms identified in the report, such as removing arrest authority from the national security agency, drafting legislation concerning the investigation and prosecution of torture, and drafting a code of conduct for police based on international best practices. The government also has allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross access to its prisons. It has begun to rebuild religious sites, and engaged a team of qualified experts to advise on policing and legal reforms. These are signs of the government’s commitment to address the underlying cause of last year’s violence.
However, more needs to be done in several key areas. First, there are hundreds of pending criminal cases stemming from the events of February and March, including a substantial number where individuals remain in detention. The BICI report recommends that the government drop charges against all persons accused of offenses involving political expression. The government should fully comply with this recommendation. Also in this area, the government continues to prosecute 20 medical professionals. Though we are not privy to all the evidence in this or other cases, we suggested that alternatives to criminal prosecution be considered in the cases of the medics.
Second, while the Ministry of the Interior is taking steps to enhance the professionalization of the police, it needs to do more. Escalating violence in the streets points to the need for steps that will begin to integrate the police force, as recommended in the BICI report, so that Bahrain can build a police force that reflects the diversity of the communities it serves.
Third, with regard to the issue of dismissed workers, we urge the government, the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions and the private sector through the Tripartite Commission to continue to clarify and verify dismissals and reinstatements to the same or comparable positions. All parties should redouble their efforts to reach a resolution through a social dialogue and collaborative approach.
Finally, we call on the government to continue to prosecute those officials responsible for the violations described in the BICI report.
The United States views the BICI report and its follow-up as a bold measure by the government to begin to rebuild confidence with the Bahraini people. Implementing these recommendations is not an easy task, and we commend the efforts undertaken so far to realize the goals of the BICI process. Ultimately, the goal of the BICI and implementation of its recommendations is to create a path toward genuine political dialogue and national reconciliation.
In the days leading up to February 14, we call on all Bahraini citizens to refrain from violence. We also urge the government to permit peaceful demonstrations and the right of all citizens to express their political views.
We condemn the violent street actions that have escalated in recent months and that have included attacks on police with Molotov cocktails, metal projectiles and other instruments of harm. Such violence undermines public safety and further divides society.
At the same time, we continue to receive credible reports of excessive force by police, including widespread and sometimes indiscriminate use of tear gas. We urge Bahraini authorities to ensure compliance with international doctrines of necessity and proportionality.
Next Tuesday will mark the one-year anniversary of the first demonstrations in Bahrain. The days and weeks surrounding the anniversary are a moment for all Bahrainis in all segments of society to come together to move beyond the pain of last year and begin to forge a more peaceful, prosperous future through genuine dialogue.
We renew our call on all parties, including the government, political societies and others to engage in dialogue and negotiation in which all elements of society have a real voice. This must be a process led by Bahrainis themselves. It will not be easy. And it can only succeed by building a greater degree of mutual respect and mutual trust.
As a longtime friend of Bahrain, my government stands ready to support you.
The propagandist nature of Posner’s rhetoric is self-evident not only in its wording, but also the fact that King Hamad utilized his statement for propaganda. According to Bahrain News Agency, “A US official today lauded His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa for taking the initiative to establish the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, describing the panel as a ‘source of pride.’”
Posner’s statement generated a mutated good cop/bad cop by emphasizing the former and minimizing the latter. The majority of his word count is devoted to praising King Hamad’s reforms, especially his Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which the Secretary labels a “great credit” and “bold measure.” This setup allows him to include obligatory concerns over human rights abuses, and briefly address the integration of Bahrain’s security apparatus. The BICI serves as Washington’s main crux in its defense of the monarchy.
Posner’s focus is directed towards putting 2011 behind Bahrainis and moving towards “national reconciliation,” but his recommendations will simply fuel the pro-democracy uprising. Although Al Wefaq and its allies initially welcomed the BICI for admitting government abuses, the streets and political opposition ultimately rejected its attempt to scrub accountability from the top. Posner plays directly into this narrative by praising the King for investigating his own crimes and doing little about them. He also “condemns” the violent actions of street protesters while “receiving credible reports” of the government’s excessive force - a not-so-clever line that shields the government and delegitimizes the opposition.
When one reporter inquires into the status of Bahrain's arms package, Posner ignores the question by urging Al Wefaq to control urban demonstrators.
Nothing is said about the presence of foreign police and ex-military (Saudi, Jordanian, Pakistani) in Bahrain’s security force. Meanwhile Jeffrey Feltman, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs (and a frequent guest of King Hamad) “has been dispatched to Morocco, France and Bahrain” to gather the “Friends of Syria.” Syrian security forces allegedly operate within King Hamad’s foreign police unit.
More disturbingly, the Secretary’s political falsities exceed his distortion of Bahrain’s security environment. Brief meetings with oppositional representatives are vastly outweighed by his roll-call consultations with the monarchy, and the effects show in Posner’s statement. His message to Al Wefaq, its allies and pro-democracy protesters is no different than the government's: stop protesting and enter a “dialogue.” After enumerating the King’s reforms (“long-term institutional reforms,” police conduct, human rights access), Posner insists “these signs of the government’s commitment to address the underlying cause of last year’s violence.”
Except the underlying cause of Bahrain’s uprising has yet to be addressed, and the King’s “institutional reforms” are avoiding Al Wefaq’s demand for parliamentary reconstruction. No confidence has been rebuilt in the streets - instead the credibility gap with the King and Washington is accelerating. Yet Bahrain state media writes, “Mr. Posner lauded the Ministry of Interior for its close cooperation with the opposition, represented by Al-Wefaq Society...”
Posner also ignored those journalists who were denied access for the February 14th anniversary, a move that Al Wefaq condemned. Various representatives of the group criticize the Obama administration's bias and silence on a regular basis; the White House hasn’t mentioned Bahrain since the BICI’s release in November and Obama personally skipped over during his State of the Union address. The State Department last addressed Bahrain on January 5th, when a reporter asked whether the country had fallen off the administration’s radar screen. State spokeswoman Victoria Nuland answered in the defiant negative - and has yet to mention the island since.
Al Wefaq will not engage in dialogue under U.S. terms, and will not allow the monarchy to sweep Bahrain’s uprising into the Gulf sea.
Signs of massing demonstrators are everywhere. On the capital’s outskirts, oppositional groups rehearse for D-Day as protesters resist government orders to disperse and fight off the stench of tear gas. Some engage in more violent behavior by picking up Molotovs and blocking traffic. Elsewhere, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifacontinues to meet with foreign leaders in an effort to maintain normality on the unstable island. Media visas to certain personalities - Nick Kristof and Adam Ellick of the New York Times, Gregg Carlstrom of Al Jazeera, Cara Swift of the BBC and Kristen Chick of the Christian Science Monitor - have been denied.
Shaikh Fawaz Bin Mohammad Al Khalifa, chief of Bahrain’s Information Affairs Authority (IAA), says the Kingdom hopes to receive them in the future.
"The Information Affairs Authority (IAA) has received an unusually high number of media visa requests for the period February 11 - 18 and had been processing them accordingly over the last month once visit dates had been specified... However, media that did not specify exact dates with their requests, or those who were late in applying, were asked to delay their visit, in order to insure their safety and their chances of securing interviews with key figures."
There is, of course, nothing abnormal about the number and timing of international media requests. Although Fawaz attempts to reason, “We wanted to make sure we had a wide range of international media here during this time, rather than having five to ten journalists from the same organization,” the perception of many Bahrainis and observers is trending in the opposite direction. Perhaps Kristof (who was briefly detained “by accident” in December) and company will secure their interviews “with key figures” at a later date, but they will miss the one-year mark of Bahrain’s uprising and all corresponding demonstrations.
Just another square in King Hamad’s veneer of normality.
Pearl Roundabout may or may not come under occupation when February 14th dawns on Bahrain. For months government security forces (bolstered by foreign police and ex-military) have swatted pro-democracy protesters away from the quarantined square, which remains on a high state of alert. The volume of security precautions indicates that protesters should consider themselves lucky to get anywhere near the void of Pearl’s razed monument. Enough to make international headlines are likely to try.
For now the oppositional Al Wefaq party is currently rallying protesters to al-Mughsha, a small village lying four miles outside Manama. An unstated rehearsal for retaking Pearl, the week-long demonstration at “Freedom Square” began last Friday after Al Wefaq was unable to secure approval for an open-ended demonstration. The Interior Ministry further announced that protesters could only demonstrate for two days, yet they continue to gather for their “steadfast rally” as the 14th approaches. Security units remain on Freedom Square’s periphery to monitor protesters and activists, helicopters fluttering overhead.
"The sit-in is the determination of the people to not go back to what the country was before Feb. 14,” Al Wefaq’s Secretary-General, Shaikh Aai Salman, told the crowd on Wednesday. "As we were in the Pearl Roundabout, we are here in Freedom Square, welcoming all to attend and confront dictatorship.”
Al Wefaq and its political allies continue to channel the reality that many street protesters demand more from the opposition than initially requested. The first embers of Mohammed Bouazizi wasted no time escalating their demands straight to regime change, leaving Al Wefaq behind the emerging curve despite its rapid merger with Pearl Square. The group still called for dialogue with King Hamad after boycotting September’s assembly election, settling for parliamentary and judiciary reform. Al Wefaq’s leadership eventually increased its focus on neutralizing the monarchy’s power after King Hamad’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) revealed and concealed government abuses in one sweep.
Naturally, government officials and complicit media figures blame Al Wefaq and Bahraini protesters for the island’s unrest, arguing that King Hamad has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to reform. Protesters are too disorganized, relying on nothing more than democratic slogans, while Al Wefaq and its allies are political opportunists. Or worse, agents of Iran. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, a senior adviser in the IAA, warns, "We definitely see an escalation from the radical elements of the protesters. We see their use of homemade weapons that have hurt our policemen in a bad way. The door is still open... but don't give me preconditions and don't give me that the government has to resign."
Part of this statement is true. Vanguard groups such as February 14 Youth Movement and February 14 Revolution participate non-violently within Al-Wefaq’s political organization, but most oppositional violence stems from youthful and energetic protesters. Allied cleric Shaikh Isa Qassim intensified his fiery rhetoric throughout 2011, raising the height of his lightning rod in the process. However these factors represent the edge of fourth-generation warfare (4GW): multiple governments vs. mobilized civilians. Particularly destructive acts such as police assault and arson have no formal use in a non-violent uprising, but these acts inevitably result from the suppression that accompanies non-violent uprisings.
The protesters’ more radical behavior and Al Wefaq’s refusal to engage on the King’s terms are both products of the government’s hollow appeasement. Throwing rocks doesn’t justify disproportionate force, nor are protesters responsible for the government's reaction - the frequent gassing of funeral processions, for example. Similarly, King Hamad’s failure to satisfy the urban resistance has left Al Wefaq no choice except to multiply its political demands (and thus social tensions). Worse still, the superficial manner in which he conducted all of his “reforms,” “dialogues” and “investigations” has generated a wider gap between the opposition. The tone of King Hamad’s speeches inflicts damage, while accusing the opposition of serving Iran’s interests could be the most inflammatory slander of all.
"We've been hearing this rhetoric for many years,” said Farida Ismail, a senior member of the Waad party. “Whenever there's a movement with political demands they play this song.”
Robert Taber called this song the “conspiracy theory.” One of the more astute revolutionary journalists to emerge during the 1960s, Taber would accompany Fidel Castro's small guerrilla force as it entered Havana in 1959. He proceeded to write extensively on the topic of national liberation movements - from Vietnam to South America - and the response of global powers. In the first chapter of his seminal War of the Flea (1965), Taber cautions against believing a guerrilla nucleus is “made up of outsiders, conspirators, political zombies... who somehow stand apart from their social environment...”
“On the more naive level, it seems to be assumed that people would scarcely choose the revolutionary path of their own accord; certainly not if the revolution in question were out of joint with the political traditions and ideals held dear by Americans.”
Bahraini officials and their foreign allies either refuse to admit this environment, or else hope that protesters will eventually tire. The Interior Ministry recently issued a full denial of Nabeel Rajab’s alleged run-in with Pakistani, Jordanian and Syrian personnel, presumably to Washington’s approval. Several low-ranking U.S. officials voiced concern over Rajab’s claims, but their attention quickly dissipated and the Obama administration has since broken down an arms package to avoid Congressional customs. U.S. officials such as CENTCOM’s General James Mattis and Michael Posner, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labour, continue to meet with royal officials on a regular basis. All to create the impression of normality in Bahrain.
They can try to blackout February 14th, but they will merely add oxygen to the revolutionary spirit.
As inherent elements of human interaction, hearsay, speculation and rumor-mongering are unavoidable byproducts of national and international politics. Developing any sort of ranking is complicated by the universality of gossip. However Yemen’s political scene is held to a high standard by Yemenis and non-Yemenis alike, and the internal/external coverage of its revolution challenges all observers to separate truth from fiction.
Ali Abdullah Saleh’s six-week odyssey from Sana’a to New York City (he first declared his intent to travel in late December) is a recent example. Saleh would emerge, as rumored, from Central Park’s Ritz Carlton on Sunday. He is scheduled to return to Sana’a before February 21st, when the international community will stage an election to promote his long-time vice president and newly-anointed Field Marshall, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi.
Two other disturbing rumors that surfaced over the last three days also deserve greater attention than they received. The first traces to a local NewYemen interview with Hassan Zaid, secretary-general of the oppositional al-Haq party. Zaid’s Shia-oriented group forms one of many cogs in the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Yemen’s established but unpopular political opposition. Hoping to squeeze Saleh’s family out of power and fill his void, JMP leaders cooperated with the regime and involved foreign powers (U.S. and Saudi Arabia) by signing a power-sharing agreement known as the Gulf-Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative.
The deal is considered a success by Saleh, the JMP, Washington and Riyadh, rendering it highly unpopular in Yemen’s streets and outlying governorates.
Taking into consideration the deep-rooted international interests at stake, Zaid’s claim that certain powers threatened the JMP to sign or face “liquidation” still appears unrealistic. Saudi tanks are frequently “spotted” encroaching from the north, movement that has yet to develop on the ground. Zaid would compare the situation to Saudi Arabia’s invasion of Bahrain, a reaction infused by his personal involvement with the northern Houthi’s “national project.” The Houthis have waged an asymmetric conflict against Saleh’s regime for the last eight years, dragging Saudi and U.S. forces into the battle against their autonomous movement, and this conflict continues to intensify through Saudi (Salafi) proxies. Conversely, the suppression of Yemen’s capital proposes an unlikely escalation in warfare that would ultimately fuel the revolution.
The U.S. and international response to Yemen’s revolution has been consistently hostile from the beginning, but Zaid’s claim is exploring the limits of speculation.
The JMP also hedges its political stance through double-talk, and Zaid’s comments imply that the JMP “had no choice” except to sign the GCC’s unpopular initiative. After predicting that “some factions of the Shi'ite movement” will perceive February 21st’s “election” as "negative" - the Houthis express unilateral resistance to the GCC’s deal - he believed that Hadi “will gain legitimacy” through the internationally-approved transition. Hadi, the consensus candidate of Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP, launched his victory lap on Tuesday, declaring, "This election represents the best way out of the political crisis that could have turned into a civil war.”
His rhetoric emulates the international community’s false choice between sharing power and civil war, between security and democracy. This platform is literally anti-revolutionary - the revolution cannot be allowed to occur at all. Some Yemeni protesters have resigned themselves to moving the revolution forward through this process.
Many others continue to protest its imposed terms and debate the consequences of a boycott.
The hearsay of an anonymous Yemeni official, on the other hand, must be taken at face value until further notice. This minister claims that Washington “will not tolerate” attempts to “upset” Hadi’s selection, an assertion with mountains of evidence to provide confirmation. Whether the official takes orders from the GPC or JMP isn’t reported under the condition of anonymity, but he told Reuters after meeting with U.S. officials, "The American administration told representatives of (both sides within the unity government) that... the U.N. Security Council will strongly confront any attempts to keep Hadi from being elected as the country's president.”
Given that Western and Gulf forces did drop the GCC’s power-sharing initiative onto Yemen’s revolutionaries, this rumor has already graduated to truth-hood. Many sources and factors indicated that the JMP knew it would jeopardize its international influence by opposing the GCC’s deal. This pressure reduced any incentive to reject favorable terms for the bloc.
Add the fact that Reuters has connected to Saleh’s circle, and no reason exists to doubt its reporting in this particular case. Washington and Riyadh need Hadi too much to allow another candidate emerge from within the JMP (such as Islah heavyweight Hamid al-Ahmar) or off Yemen’s streets. They arranged this transition from the beginning, first proposing Hadi’s ascendance in April, in order to maintain political hegemony and keep their military channels online. The UN is now going through the “trouble” of staging a one-man election, when millions of dollars is a bargain to pull Yemen’s levers. If Hadi were upset by some fluke, the international community is liable to intervene and restore the status quo.
The depths of the UNSC’s duplicity is revealed in its latest statement, what amounts to a silent proclamation of Hadi’s “rule.”
“We the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU), wish to reiterate to the people of Yemen our full commitment to the political transition process taking place on the basis of the November 2011 GCC Agreement and in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011). The 21 February Interim Presidential Elections are an important step. We call upon all the political parties, military authorities, tribal and regional leaders, youth and non-governmental civil society actors to work together to ensure that the elections are as inclusive as possible and take place without violence and in a constructive spirit of cooperation.
International pressure on the JMP is real, just as it crushes Yemen’s persistent revolutionaries. A more urgent question is gauging the degree that foreign actors are willing to interfere.
They obviously realize the magnitude of events at work. Potential conflict between Israel, America and Iran could reshape the Gulf, but for now the topic dominates international media spheres like no other global issue. By this point everyone who wants to throw their “informed” opinion into the arena has done so. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli military officials are leaning on the inevitably of conflict to justify any future operation, while U.S. officials have been scrambling to muffle their sabers throughout January (while still flexing in Hormuz).
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was recently forced to deny his own thoughts, paraphrased by Pentagon insider David Ignatius to the effect that Panetta’s “biggest worry is the growing possibility that Israel will attack Iran over the next few months.”
Choosing Super Bowl prime time as his venue, President Barack Obama once again caught up to Israel’s war machine and attempted to pull back on the throttle. He’s also trying to reign in the Pentagon and GOP frontrunners in an attempt to regain control over the international debate. Obama had just used his State of the Union to tell the world, “a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better; and if Iran changes course and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations.” Now, after telling NBC’s Matt Lauer that he doesn’t believe Israel “has made a decision on what they need to do,” he reminded its leaders of the wider fallout from a preemptive military strike on Iran’s nuclear targets - a mess that U.S. and Gulf forces would have to clean up.
"Any kind of additional military activity inside the Gulf is disruptive and has a big effect on us," he said. "It could have a big effect on oil prices. We've still got troops in Afghanistan, which borders Iran.”
Not long ago David Petraeus, as Afghanistan’s ranking general, allegedly complained that Israel’s behavior could put U.S. troops in danger, comments he quickly denied once they became public.
Whether Israel has committed to preemptive action remains hotly debatable, but any warning of regional chaos is self-evidently true (this specter already hangs over Syria). The Trench advocates diplomacy over military operations whenever pragmatic, and Obama appears to have temporarily succeeded in halting Netanyahu’s rhetoric. More likely, the premier was angling for additional measures from the West, and Obama promised to accelerate a cycle of oil sanctions that are supposed to break Tehran’s political will.
“We have mobilized the international community in a way that is unprecedented. And they are feeling the pinch, they’re feeling the pressure, but they have not taken the step that they need to, diplomatically, which is to say we will pursue peaceful nuclear power; we will not pursue a nuclear weapon.”
Unfortunately Obama’s interview is hardly diplomatic to the core, a dilemma that underlines the entirety of U.S. policy towards Iran. Despite offering an “open hand” at his inaugural address, the Obama administration has generally treated Tehran with a backhand and closed fist. Token diplomacy is mixed with jingoism to avoid appearing overly soft, and the resulting “cart and stick” diplomacy has jaded Iranian policymakers more than anything else. Many aspects of Tehran’s behavior cannot be excused, but Washington’s disproportionate “dual-track” and the Gulf-enabled "nuclear umbrella" are escalating tensions on both sides.
What U.S.-Iranian relations truly need is a political solution, not a mere diplomatic solution. The Obama administration, Israel, Western and Gulf capitals essentially demand that Iran trade its nuclear ambitions for economic rewards, when nuclear weapons extend to all areas of national policy. Iran’s opponents will not succeed in dissuading its nuclear program without altering the strategic environment around Iran; the international community’s thinking borders on surrender, not an equitable political resolution to the region’s militarization.
Some regional problems are wholly owned by Tehran, but the Obama administration has failed to engage in fair negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. After giving into most of Israel’s terms except for settlements, an issue that Obama’s critics used to wrongfully brand him as pro-Palestinian, Tehran continues to view U.S. foreign policy as an unbalanced influence in the region. Washington is equally responsible for Iraq’s current problems. The Obama administration has also managed to salvage or save pro-U.S. regimes Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, creating a double-standard that Tehran constantly refers to when protecting Bashar al-Assad. Iran is morally and strategically sunk in Syria, but these developments weigh on its leaders minds.
Obama’s NBC interview reads just like his State of the Union: a peaceful conclusion doused with references to the strength of U.S-Israeli military bonds. Many GOP critics accuse Obama of appeasing Tehran or the Palestinians, but he sounds eager to appease the hawks flying over U.S.-Israeli relations. By referencing the closest “military and intelligence consultation” that the two countries have “ever had,” Obama assures his audience, “We are going to be sure that we work in lockstep as we proceed to try to solve this - hopefully diplomatically."
“We’re not taking any options off the table,” he promised. “I’ve been very clear that we’re going to do everything we can to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and creating an arms race, a nuclear arms race, in a volatile region.”
Naturally Obama says nothing about the nuclear weapons that Israel already possesses, one of many reasons that Iran may be seeking its own.
Unless all involved parties genuinely desire a peaceful resolution, the odds of large-scale conflict will continue to hang over Gulf throughout the decade. No force can stop a determined Israel from pulling the trigger and starting a global proxy war. An apparent majority stands ready to stop a gung-ho GOP candidate, but so long as America and Israel’s narrative remains dominated by war, U.S. officials are unlikely to convince their Iranian counterparts to defer their nuclear ambitions.
Fresh off the success of Thursday’s press briefing, the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) struck again on Sunday as they rallied outside Central Park’s Ritz Carlton hotel. YACC is currently leading the street campaign in an effort to draw awareness to Ali Abdullah Saleh’s presence in New York City. The Yemeni strongman’s arrival went announced by the Obama administration (aside from a premature clarification that he remains president), and few media outlets have mentioned his stay over the past week.
Keeping in mind the relativity generated from Yemen’s blackout, Thursday’s protests took the coverage from zero to two, with the AP dispatching a brief report and The New York Times devoting a blog post to YACC. These reports are now multiplying again; sequential protests increased media coverage by upping the tempo of political activism and creating an inventory of events to reference. YACC’s persistent actions also yielded the best case scenario on Sunday: an antagonistic sighting of Saleh. He would emerge later in the day on Central Park South, wave at the protesters and blow a kiss in their direction, infuriating protesters to the point that one unsuccessfully rushed him.
Saleh is rumored to be receiving treatment from a June assassination attempt at the NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center. This information, though “unconfirmed,” may be as true as Saleh’s room at the Ritz.
YACC already intends to keep organizing until Saleh exits New York - a march from the Al-Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn to New York City Hall is scheduled for next Friday - but protesters are now sensing political blood. Saleh’s sighting added provocation to the demonstrations and ensnared him in their ambush, ultimately increasing the demand for a U.S. response. The Obama administration is liable to rehash previous statements in support of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing deal, which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton briefly alluded to on Saturday. The White House might even ignore Yemeni demonstrations as it has throughout the revolution.
At the same time, any rise in political pressure and awareness can deliver unpredictable benefits, and the White House won't comment unless forced to. Non-violent fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is no different from militarized asymmetry: both require ceaseless operations and ambushes to confuse and divide a superior opponent.
Sam LaHood has fallen prey to causality. In charge of the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Egypt program, LaHood and a handful of his comrades (and possibly his wife) are currently holed up in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo as they await a legal ruling. On Friday Sameh Shoukry, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, told Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood that his son’s case would “hopefully” be resolved soon, but until then he cannot leave the country.
Just another manifestation of Egypt’s ongoing counterrevolution.
Politicized by U.S. and Egyptian officials alike, LaHood’s high-profile and 17 other Americans’ personal experiences have generated an accurate reflection of Washington’s siege mentality towards revolutionary Egypt. The battle over U.S.-funded NGO’s is certainly significant within the revolution’s arc; viewed as an assault on Egypt’s nascent democracy, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) is simultaneously mining nationalistic propaganda and testing the limits of Washington’s aid. Beyond the 17 individuals banned from traveling, Egyptian groups are being targeted by an investigation into the initial raids.
"It is one of the frontlines of the revolution," says Nasser Amin, Director General of the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP). "It is the counter revolution that is attacking us."
The status of 17 Americans assumes an understandable priority in the effort to resolve their legal obstacles and obtain their freedom. However the Obama administration’s emphasis on the NGO scandal has served a useful purpose by minimizing the SCAF’s other flaws. Egypt’s grander scheme continues to play out in Cairo’s streets, where thousands vent their bottomless distrust for SCAF and Interior Ministry. Fresh off Port Said’s tragedy - an incident that the administration has yet to politically react to - Egyptians gathered for a “Friday of Anger” that left at least 5 people dead and 1,400 wounded. These casualties added to Port Said’s estimated total of 74 and boosted anti-SCAF sentiment in the process.
"We believe this is something that has been well-organized," said Khaled Mortagy, a member of Al-Ahly's governing board. "I'm sure there are some hidden hands behind this, but we cannot really see, or we cannot really confirm, who is behind all that."
The general conspiracy alleges that police were ordered to stand down as part of the SCAF’s “us or the revolutionaries” campaign. Gen. Ismail Osman, an SCAF member, told Mehwar TV on Thursday that the military and police were not responsible, counter-arguing that fans instigated hostilities throughout the match. “Our policemen tried to contain them but not engage.” Osman may have valid points - soccer fans can be notoriously wild - but few involved Egyptians are inclined to listen after a year of active counter-revolution. Al-Ahly fans are especially inflexible after participating in the revolution; one pamphlet from the group declared, "The crimes committed against the revolutionary forces will not stop the revolution or scare the revolutionaries.”
While expressing sympathies over Port Said’s disaster, the Obama administration prefers to devote 24/7 coverage to Cairo’s U.S. Embassy rather than its Interior Ministry. Here the low-intensity evidence of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is scattered across an urban battlefield: rocks, tear gas canisters and bird pellets. Some protesters took the initiative of besieging government buildings, with their eyes trained on the Interior Ministry, but an overriding goal of 4GW is triggering disproportionate force and the ensuing political fallout. Egypt’s police predictably obliged, and social media would document Friday’s chaos in semi-real time.
"It was like a war," said a young doctor attending the wounded in Tahrir Square. "We didn't sleep at all. In just this tent, we had 500 people in eight hours. It started with tear gas, then wounds from stones. And after that it was shotgun pellets."
Activists claim that Port Said’s events are drawing previously-inactive Egyptians into the revolution. The White House and State Department have yet to respond to the weekend’s protests.
Although U.S. officials are leaning on SCAF at various pressure points, their weight is calibrated to preserve U.S. interests rather than advance the revolution’s cause. The SCAF has reacted by deploying a military team to Washington, leading to extensive meetings within Congress, the State Department and Pentagon (access the revolutionaries lack). Their efforts to influence Congress’s vote on a $1.3 billion bill also appear partially successful. As the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee in charge of foreign aid, Senator Patrick Leahy threw down Washington’s terms to the SCAF: free and fair elections, due process of law and freedom of expression, association, and religion.
"We want to send a clear message to the Egyptian military that the days of blank checks are over. We value the relationship and will provide substantial amounts of aid, but not unconditionally,"
Leahy didn’t speak clearly enough though. First, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton can overrule Congress’s decision by citing “US national security interests,” so long as she notifies Congress. Her main conditions reportedly center around NGOs and the prosecution of those policemen who assaulted Mona El-Tahawy, a “falsified” incident in Tantawi’s opinion. Leahy also preoccupied himself with NGO raids rather than the SCAF’s daily suppression of revolutionary energy. The same goes for President Barack Obama, who phones Tantawi on occasion to voice his concerns - before praising the SCAF’s guidance.
“The democratic transition in Egypt is hanging in the balance,” Khairat El-Shater, deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, warned from the group’s headquarters. “We strongly advise the Americans and the Europeans to support Egypt during this critical period as compensation for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship.”
Yet figures such as Clinton and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon continue to vouch for the SCAF, lavishing praise on its handling of Egypt’s election. One of many officials to defend the SCAF and General Hussein Tantawi, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta explicitly outlined Washington’s priorities on his way to NATO’s ministerial in Brussels. He says he told Tantawi, “you're making progress in Egypt, you've gone through the elections, you've taken off the emergency law, you're on a path towards establishing a democracy there, it's extremely important that we maintain the relationship and continue to work together to provide for your security, but our ability to maintain that relationship is being impacted by how this matter is being handled.”
Panetta’s comments fully expose Washington’s counterrevolutionary effect, mixing ambiguous remarks like “you’re making progress” with falsities such “taking off the emergency law.” Tantawi only lifted parts of the emergency law and used his platform to slander the revolutionaries as “thugs.” Panetta also claimed that the SCAF “obviously has to deal now with the parliament” and “an independent judiciary,” when the latter remains under SCAF control. All U.S. officials ignore the overall lack of trust that continues to swell (due to political interference and de facto immunity for the Interior Ministry), preferring to enumerate the SCAF’s achievements. Fortunately Tantawi does have to “deal with parliament;” although the SCAF is coordinating with the Muslim Brotherhood, the group is equally willing to inverse its rhetoric.
“It has now become evidently clear to everyone that there are individuals who are plotting to burn this homeland and demolish its institutions,” Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie said in a televised speech on Friday. “They are trained for this. They are known to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the police, who are delaying bringing them to justice, which is totally unacceptable.”
Washington has muted calls to accelerate the civilian transition, but Egypt’s non-binding advisory council is now issuing “a revolutionary plea.” One member, Sherif Zahran, told Reuters, "The advisory council will consider halting its meetings if the military council does not respond.”
What Panetta ultimately describes is a recipe for maintaining U.S. relations with Egypt’s SCAF: don’t obstruct elections, coerce the victors, minimize the revolution’s demands for civilian oversight. Whether by luck or design, falling into bed with the SCAF turned out to be Washington’s best contingency - a marked improvement over Omar Suleiman. Despite its sporadic hostilities, the SCAF provides Washington with the most cooperative partner available, resulting in mutual appreciation and a hardened counter-revolution.
"There are going to be differences of opinion,” argues Pentagon spokesman Captain John Kirby. “There were before the popular revolution there... Part of what makes a relationship a relationship is the ability to continue to discuss and try to find a way to move forward even beyond the differences you might share.”
Sadly Cairo and Washington’s politico-military leaders share an unbreakable bond: the desire to obstruct and divert Egypt’s revolutionary wave.
Leon Panetta’s skills as a bureaucrat have been lauded by the Obama administration, various Washington players, and the U.S. media, but his limited knowledge of counterinsurgency and fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is once again on display. Speaking to reporters on his way to NATO’s ministerial in Brussels, the Defense Secretary hyped America’s progress in Afghanistan to such a degree that he’s now actively contributing to its instability. Panetta would adhere to President Barack Obama’s line (he did, after all, help author and popularize it) by labeling the Taliban as a broken insurgency, giving rise to the possibility that America’s “combat role” could wrap up by “mid to late 2013.”
“2013 becomes an even more critical year, more critical because we'll be going into the final transitions, final tranches, and those'll be some of the most difficult areas. But nevertheless, you know, our goal is to complete all of that transition in 2013 and then, hopefully, by mid- to the latter part of 2013, we'll be able to make -- you know, to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role, which is basically fulfilling what Lisbon was all about. 2014 then becomes a year of consolidating the transition and making sure that those gains are in fact held, so that we can move towards a more enduring presence beyond 2014.”
On the surface, Panetta is proactively containing the fallout of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s political agenda. Rocked by the deaths of four French soldiers (killed by a Taliban infiltrator in the army) and his political opponent, who promises a rapid withdrawal of 3,900 troops if elected, Sarkozy recently convened with President Hamid Karzai to accelerate the security transition to Afghan forces. The two agreed to “ask NATO to consider a total handling of NATO combat missions to the Afghan army over the course of 2013.”
Panetta, in turn, jumped on the possibility as though it were a live grenade.
U.S. and NATO are now spinning this trend as a decision of strength - the surge will conclude successfully, the Taliban will remain broken and Afghans can assume the lead in security operations. Although caught in a 4GW vortex, Panetta’s remarks have admittedly been flipped upside-down by the narrow focus over NATO’s time-line. Most of his interview is expended on the progress of Obama’s surge: “We have weakened the Taliban. We've made good progress in going after them. The level of violence is down. It continues to be down.”
Questioned whether his comments reflect a shift in U.S. strategy, Panetta explicitly responds, "In the Lisbon discussions, it was always clear that there would come a point which we would make that transition and then be able to hopefully consolidate those gains in 2014. So the bottom line is: No, this isn't a new strategy. It's basically implementing what Lisbon is all about."
Except the overall perception appears irreversibly negative.
For starters, active parties in Afghanistan are clearly experiencing public and private disarray as they sort out France’s new position. The Obama administration failed to sufficiently coordinate Panetta’s remarks internally or externally, with Voice of America remarking, “Since Panetta spoke on Wednesday, American and NATO officials have been trying to explain the new prominence of 2013.” Fox News observed that he “may have gotten ahead of the administration on this.” Ben Rhodes, Obama’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communication, called Lisbon’s time-line the “framework of record” and said “we will need allies to remain committed to that goal.” A senior NATO official attempted to explain, “He said the combat role will come to an end. But he also said combat will continue, and that's exactly what I'm saying."
Back in Washington, CIA Director David Petraeus attempted to rescue his partner by making “bunny ears” to the House Intelligence Committee. Panetta’s replacement appealed to the same reasoning that other U.S. and NATO officials are holding onto, explaining the nature of a “progressive transition” between 2013 and 2014. Combat operations - especially night-raids and air-strikes - will not cease during this time-frame. Petraeus reasonably argues, “If you’re going to have it completed totally by the end of 2014, obviously somewhere in 2013 you have had to initiate that in all of the different locations...”
Only Panetta’s comments weren’t obvious enough to keep him from clarifying himself: “I want to be clear. Even as Afghans assume the security lead, ISAF (international forces) will continue to have to be fully combat-ready and we will engage in combat operations as necessary.”
As politically savvy as Petraeus may be, accusing the media of "overanalyzing” Panetta’s interview illustrates a chronic misunderstanding of the war’s politico-information sphere. The Pentagon is appealing to its own reason by spacing its transition to Afghan forces, when the potential run on NATO withdrawals has psychologically overwhelmed this narrative. That most NATO members (UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia) and their populations want out in the expedient future is no secret. Now, in the process of drawing on America’s strength, Panetta is exuding weakness by drifting behind France’s political wake. Afghanistan’s non-military spheres are burning with ambiguity and indecisiveness, undermining the desired stability of NATO’s transitional plan. Petraeus downplayed the U.S. media’s definition of a “stalemate” by arguing that the word never surfaces in a word search of NATO's leaked report.
Nor does it need to for Afghans, Americans, Europeans and Muslims in general to feel this way after 10 years of warfare.
The Taliban will naturally pounce on Panetta’s self-induced sensationalism to generate its own display of strength, and propaganda could become secondary to a field morale boost headed into 2013. These events dovetail straight into NATO’s report compiled from 27,000 interrogation sessions from 4,000 captured Taliban. According to an excerpt of the report, "Taliban commanders, along with rank and file members, increasingly believe their control of Afghanistan is inevitable. Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding and tactical proficiency remains intact.”
Demonstrating the depths of Panetta’s confusion, Afghan officials were also caught off guard despite Karzai’s support for Sarkozy’s accelerated time-line. One senior official told Reuters, "The transition has been planned against a timetable and this makes us rush all our preparations. A “former” government official who maintains contacts in the presidential palace said Karzai was “rattled” by Panetta’s comments, and predicted that the “real damage” will hit the negotiating table on both sides. With Taliban leadership already motivated to outlast the foreign coalition, “the palace in Kabul will... distrust U.S. intentions even more.”
Yet another danger - a constant during counterinsurgency - has manifested in the GOP’s political cycle; Panetta’s comments further politicized the U.S. debate over Afghanistan (what debate exists). This trend, though ongoing throughout the war, will increase its destructive potential as 2014 approaches.
As U.S. officials continue to jump on Pandora’s box, the Obama administration and NATO members will likely spread the propaganda fire by injecting oxygen. The more they attempt to “clarify,” the more confused they appear. White House spokesman Jay Carney echoed Panetta and Petraeus’s comments by saying the transition “could be moved up to 2013. But he was not making an announcement about a decision that had been made, simply about the consultations that would be taking place in Brussels and from Brussels forward to Chicago.”
Thus the administration intends to go high profile by putting the situation in Obama’s hands; Rhodes called Chicago’s summit “a chance for everybody to come back together, make sure we're aligned in our planning for our drawdowns and our transition." However this plan has already fallen victim to the impressions of another political maneuver. Obama’s personal credibility is sorely lacking in Afghanistan, as revealed by his State of the Union declaration that the Taliban’s momentum “has been broken.”
The Taliban must be starting to think the same about NATO’s coalition.
Asymmetric warfare just crystallized into a raw street performance fitting of New York City. Put up by a global power, Ali Abdullah Saleh had visitors Thursday as the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) descended upon Central Park’s Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Yemen’s besieged “President,” as the Obama administration helped him, is lavishly recuperating from an assassination attempt as he gears up for Yemen’s upcoming “election.”
Already vexed by America’s deaf response to their revolution, Yemeni-Americans have taken Saleh’s presence as an unforgivable sucker-punch.
"We are so disappointed that Saleh is staying in one of New York city's hotels," said Nobel laureate Tawwakel Karman, who led Thursday’s press conference in spirit (through a cell phone) by delivering a defiant message to the White House. "Saleh should be held accountable and referred to the International Criminal Court."
With the U.S. media generally tuned out of Saleh’s visit, YACC is pursuing a combination of political activism and citizen’s journalist to alter Washington’s hardened status quo. No amount of force has been able to generate sufficient leverage in the short term - U.S. policy is currently steamrolling over Yemen’s revolution with relative ease - but the prolonged nature of revolution favors ceaseless asymmetric operations. YACC embodies the force ratio, development and technological drive of netwar, uniting civilian activists and community leaders to confront the actions of multiple governments. These nodes also form around Karman’s hub.
The youngest Nobel laureate has been graciously welcomed - and shamelessly ignored - by many Western leaders since winning her award in October, starting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
YACC directly targets the argument that appeasing Saleh will help stabilize Yemen, including U.S. relations with Yemen’s government and people. The administration and those who lobby its policy have rallied around this false premise, defending his stay as integral to Yemen’s transition of power. The White House indirectly countered through the U.S. media with a sinister line of propaganda, something to the effect that it “doesn't want to be seen as harboring a leader considered by his people to have blood on his hands.” 66% of Americans allegedly support drones strikes in Yemen, a position that inhibits political change, but many Yemenis and Americans alike have refused to bite.
“To provide Saleh with immunity or safe haven after he oversaw countless crimes against Yemenis, and while security forces headed by his sons, nephews and other family members continue to retaliate against the victims’ families and peaceful protesters, is an affront to accountability efforts in Yemen and will be seen by the people of Yemen as making the U.S. a partner in his crimes. Whatever the United States’ intentions may be, the symbolism in Yemen and the Arab world will be crystal clear: the U.S. is siding with repressive rulers rather than with the Arab people in the ongoing struggle for democracy and justice in the Arab world.”
Part of Washington’s meltdown in Yemen is pure image. Having invested 2010 in publicly highlighting its relationship with Saleh, the Obama administration cannot rhetorically escape political reality. Bringing him into America, even for 24 hours, generates an unavoidable “with us or against us” impression that Yemen’s revolution has lost. Although image can become king in asymmetric warfare, the larger half of Washington’s dilemma is policy-centric, as YACC makes clear.
“We also call on the Obama administration and the international community, especially Arab Gulf countries, to respect the Yemeni people’s legitimate calls for justice and democracy and support their right to choose and determine their next leaders, instead of imposing the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiative, which gives Saleh immunity for criminal acts, blocks accountability and transparency, and undermines the rightful demands of the Yemeni people.”
Manufactured by Washington and Riyadh, the GCC’s power-sharing agreement has created a false sense of progress and normality that all involved foreign powers are eager to continue. The deal itself took eight months and upwards of 1,000 lives to finalize, with Saleh signing under UN witness in Riyadh to avoid mayhem in Sana’a; the above privileges were internationally legitimized without input from Yemen’s pro-democracy movement. The GCC’s deal is widely opposed in Yemen’s streets, including its provision to transfer Saleh’s executive power to his vice president of 18 years.
This situation presents the exact "false choice" between security and democracy that the Obama administration claims to avoid. Before he left for America (via Oman), Saleh would send himself off by declaring, “We will inaugurate Abdo Rabbo Hadi as head of state after February 21st in the Presidential Palace.” He also told the youth to “return home,” and Saleh will implode the administration's argument if/when he returns to Sana'a.
YACC has deemed this undemocratic process as a “selection” of elite world powers: “As stipulated by the GCC initiative, on February 21st, 2012 elections will be held in Yemen. “Only one man will stand for election, the hand-picked successor of President Saleh, Abdo Rabo Mansour Hadi, a military man who has served as Saleh’s Vice President since 1994. Again, this is a provision accepted by the JMP to end the killing, but it is an embarrassment to the idea of a democratic Yemen. The is a selection, not an election, and will allowing Saleh’s regime to continue its dominance and repression.”
YACC instead advocates a policy of cooperation with Yemen’s people, not Saleh’s regime. Protesters, activists and observers have unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Obama administration of making this change, but giving up isn’t an option during revolution. YACC advises, “The U.S. should see the peaceful uprising in Yemen as a golden opportunity to promote a strong relationship with the Yemeni people and to forge a new relationship with the next generation - the youth of Yemen who make up three quarters of the population.”
Neither the White House nor State Department responded to today’s events or Yemen’s revolution in general, a normal day for U.S. policy. For now America continues to make enemies in the home of al-Qaeda’s fastest-growing branch, a simultaneous failure of diplomacy and counter-terrorism.
After boycotting Nouri al-Maliki’s government for the last six weeks, Iraq’s Sunni-aligned Iraqiya List returned on Tuesday to participate in Baghdad’s parliamentary session. Immediately billed as a confidence-building measure that could “ease” Iraq’s political crisis, both Iraqiya and U.S. officials say the decision paves the ground for Baghdad’s looming “national conference.” Except a major caveat obstructs Washington’s efforts to spin progress out of a crisis that it helped generate.
As his organization announced its future political plans, Ayad Allawai cautioned, “if there had been an active Parliament and Government, and a real partnership, there would have been no reason for the holding of the National Conference.”
Iraqiya’s formal re-engagement merits an uptick in optimism, but not for the reasons cited by Washington. The administration's defense has remained unchanged since President Barack Obama welcomed al-Maliki to the White House, a controversial move that added fuel to Baghdad’s meltdown. U.S. officials argue that, by not resorting to violence, Iraqis are building their democracy through the political process. This reasoning, while true in a vacuum, inadvertently dehumanizes Iraqis by assuming them to be violent; most stand ready to rebuild their country through non-violent means. Some were unforgivably suppressed during the Arab Spring’s initial stage.
By turning the present crisis into an “opportunity,” the Obama administration has steadfastly ignored al-Maliki’s centrality to Iraq’s discord. The answer to every Iraqiya plea is “dialogue.”
U.S. policy might end up on its feet once Baghdad’s national conference, an event pushed hard by Washington, finally convenes. Weakening the divisive al-Maliki through Iraq’s political system offers a means to improving America’s strategic relationship inside (with Sunnis, Kurds and Shia) and outside (against Iran) of the country. Yet the breakdown between March 2010 and January 2012 suggests the opposite scenario: Washington is reacting to the consequences of favoritism towards al-Maliki. Consumed by Afghanistan’s surge, Iraqi officials accused the administration of checking out during the country’s parliamentary election. U.S. officials such as Vice President Joe Biden eventually increased their involvement over the summer by throwing their weight behind al-Maliki’s coalition, going so far as to accept his Iranian ties and Muqtada al-Sadr’s 30 seats.
Allawi was offered a national security post that he never received, and the Sunni-Shia chasm failed to dispel while transitioning to Iraq’s political battlefield. Prolonged friction has resulted in security lapses, inefficiency and a general lack of confidence in the new government.
The Obama administration now hopes that President Jalal Talabani can patch al-Maliki’s government into a more stable form. Biden would again phone al-Maliki, Allawi and Talabani over the weekend to stress “the importance of resolving outstanding issues through the political process.” Iraqiya possesses limited motivation to withdraw from al-Maliki’s coalition, as some officials of the bloc have threatened, due to the loss of power. A new election would be necessary, scaring away most representatives, and Iraqiya must hold onto this option as a last resort. Thus Iraqiya is coming to battle al-Maliki at Baghdad’s “national conference,” not reconcile with him. Allawi sees nothing to reconcile - Iraq’s Prime Minister must cede the powers (including the Interior Ministry) that he agreed upon in November 2010.
Iraqiya spokeswoman Maysoon al-Damluji listed several other priorities, starting with a resolution to Vice President Tariq Hashimi’s case. Currently awaiting his future in Kurdish territory, Hashimi has been accused of running a Sunni death squad that targets Shia politicians. Iraqiya plans to block Maliki’s request to dismiss Vice Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, who responded to Obama’s praise of al-Maliki by calling him a dictator; al-Maliki subsequently threatened a no-confidence motion. Iraqiya also wanted to convene over the nation’s budget and amnesty program. The bloc has yet end its boycott of al-Maliki’s cabinet sessions, and nine ministers failed to show on Tuesday. Ultimately, some Iraqiya members (including Allawi) view a national conference as the door to kick al-Maliki out of.
This situation doesn’t resemble the sunny glow of U.S. rhetoric: “we are encouraged by the decision of the Iraqiya bloc to end their boycott and to return to work at the Council of Representatives and also by the statements of other key blocs inside Iraq welcoming that decision.”
The Washington Post observed “it is unclear what Iraqiya has accomplished” through its boycott, but the results are beginning to add up. Iraq’s democratic obstacles would remain unaltered, with minimal pressure applied to al-Maliki as U.S. combat troops complete their withdrawal. Forcing the U.S. to respond at all, even in al-Maliki’s corner, is no small feat in itself. Had Iraqiya done nothing, al-Maliki would continue Iraq’s status quo indefinitely.
"What sort of Iraq we are talking about?" Hashimi wonders in response to Obama’s quasi-victory statements. "How the Americans will feel proud? How the American administration is going to justify to the taxpayer the billion of dollars that has been spent and at the end of the day the American saying, 'Sorry, we have no leverage even to put things in order in Iraq'?"
Separately, the State Department’s fleet of surveillance drones has produced another inadvertent error in the middle of a political crisis. These drones were downplayed as non-lethal by none other than Obama himself: “I think that there’s this perception that we’re just sending in a whole bunch of strikes willy nilly. It is important for everybody to understand that this is kept on a very tight leash.” Many Americans and Iraqis understand this distinction exactly. What Obama may not understand, judging from his rhetoric and potential use of private contractors, is the overwhelming power of perception.
Iraqis also value their sovereignty and privacy just like Americans.
Coupled with the Pentagon’s urgency to advance Iraq’s security relationship with al-Maliki, drones create the vivid impression that Washington remains primarily concerned with protecting its own interests, not Iraqis. This policy is not conducive to the country’s stability, but instead prolongs its politico-security vacuum. Now the White House must await Baghdad’s next storm with everyone else - and dividing Iraqiya or rescuing al-Maliki could shatter Iraq’s relative peace.
The pitch of their condemnation suggested that they can’t imagine Moscow’s state of mind, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and company surely understand the motivation behind its Syrian veto. They know that Russian officials from aspiring president Vladimir Putin to state arms dealers aren’t ready to let go of Bashar al-Assad’s strategically-placed regime. They also know, on a deeper level, that Moscow despises U.S. hypocrisy as much as Washington loathes Russian hardball.
