Obama’s Plan: Destroy Foreign Policy

Many U.S. politicians claim to know that the domestic and foreign policies of a state are interdependent. Few seem to practice what they preach, as both of America’s fronts have eroded over the past decade. A weak economy now drives “cheaper” counter-terrorism operations across the globe, reducing the depth of America’s military footprint while increasing its outline.

The end result is equivalent hostility to U.S. foreign policy.

Politico’s front page spread - “Obama plan: Destroy Romney” - attracted our attention for more than its shocking propaganda, although the nauseating spin deserves its own personal examination. One “senior campaign adviser” revealed that President Barack Obama’s political machine has studied George Bush’s “takedown” on Senator John Kerry, hunting “for clues on how a president with middling approval ratings can defeat a challenger.” A “prominent Democratic strategist aligned with the White House” divulged to Politico, “Unless things change and Obama can run on accomplishments, he will have to kill Romney.”

Kill his financial record, character, jeans and possibly his Mormon faith under one political umbrella: Romney’s “weirdness factor.” Apparently Obama will now deflect his own “weirdness” onto his challengers.

The diversity of sources leaves no doubt that Politico’s story is based in fact. Truth isn’t lurking around every corner - the report itself could serve as the attack it describes - and the Obama administration may adopt a subtler plan during campaign season. However David Axelrod’s presence solidifies both the Obama camp’s mobilization and the depths it is preparing to sink to: “If you were to write the history of his political career, it would be called ‘Extreme Makeover.’”

“He was very, very good at making a profit for himself and his partners but not nearly as good [at] saving jobs for communities,” said Axelrod, Obama’s chief strategist. “His is very much the profile of what we’ve seen in the last decade on Wall Street. He was about making money. And that’s fine. But often times, he made it at the expense of jobs in communities.”

“It’s not just a matter of dodging the debate, not just a matter of flip-flopping and putting his finger to the wind — it is that he’s not comfortable in his own skin, and that gives people a sense of unease,” added a Democratic consultant “expected to be involved in the reelection campaign.”

Romney himself is irrelevant; this scandalous report says as much about Obama’s foreign policy as his domestic policy. With the White House’s propaganda machine deep in action, the administration has successfully blocked an ailing foreign policy with the U.S. economy. Israel and Palestine, supposedly a priority from day one, have been relegated to the basement. Iraq’s unexorcized war has turned to a ghost while Afghanistan pops up every six or twelve months. Once eclipsed by the White House’s response to the Arab Spring, summer attention was shifted back to Afghanistan after Muslim opinion rejected a biased policy towards tyrannical friends and foes. The economic crisis threatening America’s long-term health provided the latest convenient distraction, ensuring that foreign policy will never seize the national debate on Obama’s watch.

Diversionary propaganda is a vital tool in the White House. Taking full advantage of low public awareness, the Obama administration has set its pattern in concrete: systematically ignore foreign policy in favor of domestic challenges.

2012’s outcome can be inferred from this reality. First, the economy will continue to buffer attention from Obama’s unpopular response to the Arab Spring, an unpopular war in Afghanistan, a lingering war in Iraq, the increasing use of drones in general, Guantánamo Bay and deadlock over a Palestinian state. Romney strategist Stuart Stevens remarked, “They can try anything they want — but this race is going to be about the economy,” and Obama’s side wholeheartedly agrees.

Not only does the economy distract from a headless foreign policy, Obama can also blame 2012’s economic factors on Bush: "We do have a serious problem in terms of debt and deficit, and much of it I inherited.”

Thus it’s slightly odd how Obama stopped playing the “inherited” card in foreign policy, since he is normally eager to do so. This urge is presumably canceled out by the toxic mess of U.S. foreign policy, tagged as more risk than reward. Because America’s international problems run so deep, pinning Afghanistan, Palestine or Somalia entirely on Bush loses its impact. The Arab Spring intensified Obama’s foreign policy jitters, robbing him of his last shreds of credibility in the Muslim world. The mistakes he has committed while responding to mass revolution, in addition to a constant propaganda wash, are his administration’s alone.

Never has Obama displayed comfortability “in his skin” while addressing foreign policy, whether in his brief national addresses or passing remarks with network reporters. The Arab Spring's oppurunity was tailered to Obama's message of "change" and he's blown it

Yet foreign policy isn’t inescapable and, as the aforementioned “prominent Democratic strategist” suggests, Obama will need to run on his few accomplishments, meaning foreign policy will revolve around Osama bin Laden’s raid. What this proves isn’t clear - that he has the “guts” and “brains” to send a new drone wave into Yemen and alienate its people? No matter though, since many Americans don’t pay attention beyond the headlines. Obama will surely campaign on the low-budget, automatic counter-terrorism now being rolled out by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and CIA Director David Petraeus, but he will also shy away from explaining how this strategy will defeat al-Qaeda, win local support and preserve America’s values.

Obama has certainly tried to sell this policy, even expounding it during May’s “Moment of Opportunity,” but few are buying internationally. Fortunately for him a majority of Americans appear to approve for economic purposes, are generally uninterested in foreign relations and have already lost interest in the Arab revolutions. By focusing on bin Laden, Afghanistan’s “withdrawal” and nuclear arms, Obama will attempt to fly under the foreign policy radar as long as possible.

With GOP candidates just as disconnected from the Arab Spring and antsy to drone, foreign policy is bound to become a casualty of the 2012 election.

More Power To the Haqqani Network

By published first in The Jamestown Foundation and reprinted by Asia Times Online:

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban - TTP) seems to be slowly disintegrating as various commanders try to pull it in different directions.

A clear indication of this process came when the TTP commander in Kurram Agency, Fazal Saeed Haqqani, announced that his group had seceded from the TTP.

Fazal Saeed Haqqani also announced the formation of a new group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP). Haqqani said his group was not happy with the TTP's policy of attacking civilian targets, a major reason for the split.

However, Haqqani and his group have been involved in the murders of innocent Shi'ites. In the very first statement to dissociate his new group from the TTP, Haqqani announced he would not carry out any attacks on the Pakistani security forces. He also announced that the United States was the TTIP's "main enemy".

The action of Fazal Saeed Haqqani has completely eliminated the TTP from Kurram Agency, as Haqqani vowed that he would not allow the TTP to operate there: "It is my area and I will ensure that no locals or outsiders oppose our policies and create problems for us in Kurram Valley."

Like Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is closely allied with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan, which desperately needed a foothold in Kurram Agency and which only Fazal Saeed Haqqani could provide. Jalaluddin Haqqani along with his son Sirajuddin lead the Haqqani network, which is based in the North Waziristan tribal area. It is considered one of the biggest threats to foreign forces in Afghanistan.

According to Mansur Khan Mehsud of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' research center, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is occupying a portion of the main road, the Thall-Parachinar road, connecting Kurram Agency with the rest of the country. While still a TTP commander, Fazal Saeed Haqqani did not allow Shi'ites residents to use that road.

Consequently, they had to go to Afghanistan first to go to other parts of Pakistan. With Fazal Saeed Haqqani in charge of that road, the Haqqani network and other Taliban militants can use Kurram Agency as their base to carry out attacks inside Afghanistan or to provide sanctuary.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan identified the Haqqani network as the group responsible for a brazen attack using nine suicide bombers against Kabul's luxury Intercontinental Hotel on June 28 that killed 20 people, including the suicide bombers.

Shortly afterward, the Haqqani network suffered a major blow when NATO troops and Afghan Special Forces mounted a raid on one of its training camps in Afghanistan's Paktika province. The July 20-22 operation killed more than 50 insurgents in a base said to be used as a staging point for Haqqani network and foreign fighters. A large stockpile of arms was seized in the operation, which NATO sources said was based on intelligence provided by disenchanted insurgents.

Nevertheless, Fazal Saeed Haqqani's rebellion against the TTP has immensely strengthened the Haqqani network while weakening the TTP. According to one report, TTP commander Hakimullah Mehsud has become more and more isolated over the past year. On June 27, he suffered a setback when unknown persons killed Shakirullah Shakir, a spokesman for the Fidayeen-e-Islam (suicide-bombing) wing of the TTP.

Shakirullah was to replace Qari Hussain Mehsud, who was killed in an October 2010 drone strike and was known as Ustad-e-Fidayeen (master - or teacher- of the suicide bombers).

Commander Tariq Afridi's Taliban group in Darra Adamkhel and Khalid Omar's Mohmand group are already operating independently of the TTP. Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber Agency, led by Mangal Bagh, is pro-army and does not accept TTP patronage.

The TTP breakup is a success for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, which has been working for some months to deliver Kurram Agency to the Haqqani network so that it could operate more freely in view of the emerging regional scenario. Distrust among TTP militants seems to be growing. According to another report, Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman rarely meet; when they do, they do not meet alone and only after making sure neither of them is carrying arms.

Fazal Saeed rebelled against the TTP on the eve of the military operation that started on July 3. Army troops moved into Kurram Agency from the town of Sadda and Tal area in Hangu district, backed by helicopters, tanks and artillery. The aim of the operation was to destroy the militants still loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud.

Although this military operation was ostensibly initiated against the militants, Shi'ite Muslim residents believe it is equally directed against them. A knowledgeable Pakistani columnist, Dr Mohammad Taqi, says that the operation is aimed at opening the Thall-Parachinar road for the Haqqani network and other pro-army jihadi groups.

More importantly, it is aimed at punishing those people in Kurram Agency who have resisted the Haqqani network and the Pakistan army's support for the Taliban.

The balance of power has shifted in favor of the Haqqani network for the first time with Fazal Saeed Haqqani openly on its side. Although several local Shi'ite leaders in upper Kurram vow to fight back, it is safe to say that they are losing the battle, at least for now.

Arif Jamal is a visiting fellow at the New York University and author of “Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir.”

The Myth of "U.S. Pressure on Saleh"

Yesterday local Yemeni reports hinted at U.S. pressure against Ali Abdullah Saleh. With the help of the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat, the U.S. media has blown this development out of proportion without a serious effort to understand it. Today the State Department could barely explain U.S. policy towards Yemen, Saleh and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), disproving any notion that Washington cares about the Yemeni people. Spokesman Mark Toner placed a heavy emphasis on not wasting any more time, when the latest “U.S. pressure” to remain in Saudi Arabia is nothing more than a new stall tactic to posture and reorganize.

Contrary to Toner's remarks, the Yemeni people do not support the GCC's initiative. Under its terms, half of a transitional council would go to Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC), violating the revolutionary council announced on July 17th and all those who have sacrificed their lives for freedom. Nor is Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi capable of controlling Saleh’s security apparatus or overseeing a transitional period. Washington wants to stash Saleh in a Saudi bank and keep his regime on life-support through snap-elections. Yemen’s people would be denied justice because Washington doesn’t want Saleh to snitch on U.S. military assistance.

A full report on the administration’s latest actions will be released tomorrow:

QUESTION: So on Yemen, there was a report today in Asharq Al-Awsat that the U.S. has persuaded President Saleh to remain in Saudi Arabia and not to return to Yemen. Is that correct?

MR. TONER: Well, look, it’s – as all of you know, we’ve had conversations with President Saleh during his recuperation in Saudi Arabia. I can’t get into the details of those conversations. But our position has not changed, speaking globally. We’ve called for an immediate, peaceful, and orderly transition, and believe that’s in the best interests of the Yemeni people. And we’ve also said that this is something that cannot wait until a decision is made regarding President Saleh’s future, that we’ve got an acting president, and – in place, and they need to – they need to move towards this transition immediately.

QUESTION: Well, has there been any change in terms of his decisions to – whether to essentially stay long term in Saudi or to go back? I mean, are you aware of any --

MR. TONER: Well, again, we’ve – we have had – John Brennan from the White House is one individual, but have had conversations with President Saleh. But in terms of his future, that’s something I’d really have to refer you to him for.

QUESTION: When was the last time he had a conversation?

MR. TONER: I don't know, Matt. I’ll find out.

QUESTION: Is it your understanding, though, that he – it is now his intent to stay in Saudi Arabia or not?

MR. TONER: I don’t have an answer for you. I don't know.

QUESTION: Can you ask?

MR. TONER: Well, again, it’s – I’m not sure that it’s something that we would necessarily need to announce from here. That’s something ultimately that President Saleh needs to determine and announce, either through the Government of Yemen or through himself.

QUESTION: In this persuasion, if you succeed in persuading him to stay in Saudi Arabia, a sign that he’s letting go of his grip on power?

MR. TONER: Again, these are questions really best directed to President Saleh and to his inner circle that’s with him or to the Government of Yemen in Sanaa. All we can do is continue to press our belief that this transition needs to happen immediately, and cannot wait until a decision is made about his future.

QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up.

MR. TONER: Yeah. Sure.

QUESTION: So is it your understanding that his grip on power remains as it was?

MR. TONER: We – our understanding, we continue – our Ambassador Feierstein and Embassy personnel continue to meet with acting President Hadi as well as with senior government officials directly in order to move this process forward.

QUESTION: All right. Getting back to the original --

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- question, though, does the Administration think that it’s a good thing for him not to go back?

MR. TONER: Again, it’s – we’ve been through this before. What we think is a good thing is that Yemen move forward immediately on a transition plan that meets the aspirations of the Yemeni people --

QUESTION: Yeah. But --

MR. TONER: -- and that Saleh’s future is for Saleh to decide.

QUESTION: But with or without him in the country?

MR. TONER: Well, he’s not in the country right now, so we believe it can move forward without him.

QUESTION: Well, so do you think it’s a good thing – so it can move forward without him and you would prefer to see it move forward without him?

MR. TONER: I’ll say it can move forward without him.

QUESTION: But that’s what you want?

MR. TONER: Again, it’s not for us – it’s not what we want. It’s what the Yemeni people want.

QUESTION: No, no, no. Wait, wait.

QUESTION: You said you want it immediately.

QUESTION: Wait, wait. You just said --

MR. TONER: Yes. I’m --

QUESTION: And that means you want it without him.

MR. TONER: All I’m saying is –

QUESTION: You said this is something that --

MR. TONER: Yeah. You’re trying to make – you’re trying to have me make a determination about whether he stays in Saudi Arabia or not.

QUESTION: No. I’m not trying to --

MR. TONER: That’s his – okay.

QUESTION: No. I’m not asking you to make that determination. I want to know if that determination has been made by anyone in this building. I mean, the question was: Did the U.S. --

MR. TONER: It has not. This is a – that’s a decision for President Saleh.

QUESTION: So did the U.S. tell President Saleh that it would be a better idea for him to stay in Saudi and not to go – or just not to go home, whether he stays in Saudi or not, that it was best – it would be better for all concerned if he stayed out of the country?

MR. TONER: And again, that’s a decision, ultimately, he’ll make and talk about.

QUESTION: Of course.

MR. TONER: Our position is, whether he remains in Saudi Arabia or not, time is wasting in terms of seizing the opportunity, the GCC agreement, moving forward on a transition. So what we’re working on through our Embassy and our ambassador is trying to move the process forward now rather than wait.

QUESTION: But in the – in a previous set of questions, you said that the U.S. was pleased and heartened that the GCC and Arab League had come out with such strong statements about Syria. And you said that you had been talking to them about this, and that this – while it may not be the direct result of your talking to them about it, that that was a good thing. So is President Saleh, who you say you have talked to – is his staying out of Yemen a good thing?

MR. TONER: Again, it’s simply not our decision to determine whether he stays or goes.

QUESTION: Well, you have a position on it.

MR. TONER: We believe that, whether he stays in Saudi Arabia or comes back to Yemen, that Yemen needs to move forward now on these kinds of reforms and on this transition.

QUESTION: And Mark, when was the last time U.S. officials were in touch with President Saleh?

MR. TONER: I know. He asked me the same question. I’ll find out.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Mark, is it not fair to say, to follow up on one of Matt’s questions, that you do want the transition to go forward without President Saleh?

MR. TONER: Correct. We believe President – acting President Hadi is fully capable of moving the process forward.

Stepping Out of Afghanistan’s Shadows

Published in Truth-Out.org:

Like rotating blades hitting the dirt, propaganda spin from Afghanistan’s traumatic Chinook crash has destructively spiraled into U.S. policy. The 30 U.S. troops inside the helicopter, presumably a Special Operations-employed MH-47G Chinook, morphed into masked heroes overnight, their personal lives immediately reduced to political campaigning. To both U.S. policy-makers and the Taliban, Wardak’s wreckage is a symbol of their “success” and the need to “fight on.”

A stalemate, in other words.

The downed Chinook means little to either side from an isolated military vantage; Wardak province stands the same tomorrow as it did yesterday. However the impact may have noticeable effects on Afghanistan's tactical and propaganda realms, opening a strategic opportunity for the Taliban. Of initial consequence, the Taliban may have finally resorted to a U.S. cache of FIM-92 Stinger missiles, which Iran allegedly supplied new batteries for. These reports remain sketchy though, and a standard rocket-propelled grenade probably brought down the Chinook. However the question remains whether insurgents are adapting to heli-borne raids, and if they will grow bolder in firing easily traceable RPGs.

One emerging theory contends that, as U.S. and NATO forces increasingly rely on air-raids in eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban will attempt to transfer its IED’s to the air - and a downed helicopter creates a bigger shock wave than an exploding Humvee. This strategy would mirror a high-ranking assassination campaign back on the ground. Spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid admitted that Taliban fighters had no idea 22 SEALs and three Air Force combat controllers occupied the Chinook, only that they assumed Special Forces dropped in on them for the 3,000th time. The Taliban will continue to escalate its aerial tempo after witnessing Tangi Joy Zarin’s aftermath.

A senior Afghan official has since told AFP that Qari Tahir, a Taliban commander, lured U.S. forces into the valley: "The Taliban knew which route the helicopter would take. That's the only route, so they took position on the either side of the valley on mountains and as the helicopter approached, they attacked it with rockets and other modern weapons. It was brought down by multiple shots."

As President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and General John Allen eulogized the fallen Americans and their Afghan comrades, sorrow only partially explained their motivation. The politically correct decision morally aligns on this specific occasion; Obama staked his presidency on SEAL Team Six and he owed its members his gratitude, even though none had been to Abbottabad. Yet beyond honor lies the administration’s ulterior objective, which violates the very ideals U.S. troops supposedly uphold as they fast-rope into an Afghan village in the middle of the night.

“At this difficult hour," Obama said, “all Americans are united in support of our men and women in uniform who serve so that we can live in freedom and security.”

Because 20 members of SEAL Team Six lost their lives in battle, “all Americans” are now supposed to rally around the war in Afghanistan. A war that many Americans don’t believe any SEALs, Marines or National Guards should be fighting in. Many others remain undecided, perpetuating a stalemate that favors the insurgency. That the U.S. public remains apathetic but skeptical of the Pentagon’s repetitious “progress” helps explains why tragedy is being manufactured into triumph. The SEAL team sent a quake through the White House after the thrilling success of Osama bin Laden’s raid, but administration officials also realized the negative psychological impact. Multiple bodies then jumped on the news to blunt a momentum swing back to the Taliban.

Thus Afghanistan’s latest sign of deterioration mutated into progress when Panetta announced, “We will stay the course to complete that mission, for which they and all who have served and lost their lives in Afghanistan have made the ultimate sacrifice.”

Problematically, “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda” still doesn’t clarify America and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. At first no one was sure of SEAL Team Six’s latest mission either, although its reputation gave the impression of a high-ranking Taliban target. Mujahid said the Chinook landed on a complex where insurgents had gathered, suggesting an ordinary meeting. Later reports revealed a rescue operation after an Army Ranger unit became pinned in a firefight. Regardless, the target was Taliban rather than al-Qaeda, insurgents and a commander who may rule ruthlessly but forget attacking Americans outside of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the crash site is a “particularly dangerous area... where many of the attacks that take place in the province are planned.” U.S. and NATO forces have doggedly raided the Sayd Abad district, which locals say is equally anti-U.S. and anti-Taliban. Night-raids and other collateral damage have created enough sympathy to sustain the Taliban’s presence, a self-fulfilling cycle. Wardak's Deputy Gov. Ali Ahmad Khashai told reporters, "Even with all of the operations conducted there, the opposition is still active."

Apparently U.S. officials want to keep dropping into areas like Tangi Joy Zarin until locals accept the coalition’s presence, which too often fails to reward them enough for their life-threatening risks. Speaking at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, Penatta would tell his audience, "As heavy a loss as this was, it would even be more tragic if we allowed it to derail this country from our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan. Instead, we will send a strong message of American resolve."

The administration's rhetoric makes sense only through a jingoist prism; defending the war’s present course with SEAL bodies is illogical and shameful. These particular men would surely urge their brothers to fight on and “protect the Afghan people from bad guys” - or "fight for the American dream," in Panetta's words - but their personal characters cannot dictate U.S. policy in the region. When President Obama solemnly declares, “their deaths are a reminder of the extraordinary sacrifices made by the men and women of our military and their families,” it becomes fair to question whether the White House actually drifted away from Afghanistan. Was the war out of mind because of debt haggling, or because “only” two or three soldiers die each day? What about every Afghan soldier and civilian caught in the middle of U.S. and Taliban troops?

In attempting to “remember” the fallen with grandiose rhetoric, U.S. officials have expressed a faux shock of Afghanistan’s war zone. President Obama should be familiar with the term “cynicism.”

Were a positive influence to flow from SEAL’s loss, U.S. officials would reassess Afghanistan’s strategic mission and the over-reliance on night raids, America’s most unpopular practice. These raids only succeed 85% of the time (95% without a shot fired) in the Pentagon’s collective mind; independent reports suggest a large number of wrongful arrests and cover-ups. Even when a Taliban cell is active in the village, every resident suffers a disproportionate terror that isn’t easily forgotten or disassociated from America. High-flying, night-stalking Special Forces also reduce the local contact necessary in counterinsurgency.

The Pentagon disingenuously argues that air-strikes are less precise, and plans to leave Special Forces inside the country past 2014. Ignoring the politically incorrect truth about night-raids and U.S. strategy in general, a feeling of shattered invincibility overwhelmed the Obama administration into safety-mode. Special Forces deaths aren’t rare, only classified. Saturday’s death toll launched a hidden reality into public consciousness, accelerating the impact from 0 to 100. U.S. policy must follow these fallen soldiers into the light of transparency and reexamination - and opponents of the war must step out of the shadows in greater numbers.

“Staying the course” on the domestic and foreign fronts will lead straight into an Afghan mountainside.

Straightening Gerald Feierstein’s Twisted Logic

Robert Ford and Gerald Feierstein could be worthy of Plutarch’s “Parallel Lives.” Operating from different beginnings towards the same end, America’s ambassadors to Syria and Yemen have worked diligently to manage “peaceful and orderly transitions” from the current regimes. Neither has succeeded. In Syria, U.S. policy requires Ford to meet openly with popular revolutionaries and defy the regime’s orders, even though the Obama administration initially supported “dialogue” and has yet to cut President Bashar al-Assad’s final strings.

In Yemen, America’s “national security interests” necessitate total subservience to the regime, superficial meetings with youth representatives, unfulfilled promises and denial of human rights abuses.

All in a day’s work for Feierstein.

With reports of Ford’s Friday departure hanging over the State Department’s press corp, spokesman Mark Toner was asked point-blank, “Did the Administration give any thought to not sending Ambassador Ford back?” Toner replies that “his presence there in Syria is in our national interest,” a true statement. The reporter had asked because of a House letter opposing his trip on the grounds of legitimizing al-Assad’s regime: “So that means no, there was no consideration given despite the calls from the Hill?”

“I thought I answered it pretty directly,” Toner repeats, “saying we continue to believe his presence in Syria is in our national security interest.”

While U.S. policy and Syria’s opposition are both advanced further with Ford on the ground, at least Congress is applying some pressure on the Obama administration’s neurotic response. In Yemen, supposedly of great national security interest, Feierstein continues to toil in anonymity. Standing side by side with Ali Abdullah Saleh during every failed attempt to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) biased initiative, Feierstein’s activities rarely pop up on U.S. media due to the wider blackout over Yemen’s revolution. The ambassador, sadly, is no more than a government official in the eyes of protesters.

Feierstein expended the last two months lauding Vice President Ali Abd Rabo Mansour Hadi as Saleh’s crackdown continued (and still continues) on protesters and anti-government tribesmen. Regularly meeting with ruling party officials and military commanders, the ambassador has entertained a singular policy almost universally opposed in the streets. Most of these meetings are only covered by state and local media, magnifying the government’s spin. The ambassador has yet to alter his cue card in any perceivable way despite the fact that Saleh is openly resisting his resignation.

Now, as Ford gets back to isolating Syria’s regime, Feierstein has denied supporting Saleh before reaffirming U.S. support for the GCC’s “power transfer.” His explanation? Yemen “isn’t as bad as Syria.”

Responding to a question on why Syria is different than Yemen, Feierstein twists logic through the warped prism of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern hegemony. Syria's regime, “unlike” Yemen’s, practices oppression and commits atrocities against the people. In Syria, unlike Yemen, more than 2,000 people have been killed, over 150 in a day. No, “only” 1,000 Yemenis are estimated to have paid the ultimate price of revolution. Not enough thousands have been wounded. Not enough people are suffering from a humanitarian crisis and a basic lack of necessities.

Syria’s regime is now offering “free” parliamentary elections, likely to be opposed by the White House on the advice of Syria’s opposition. Yemen, on the other hand, must adhere to “dialogue” through the GCC’s initiative, which stipulates a government-supervised election in 60 days. Thus one regime must be overturned and the other must be preserved - how devoid of freedom and compassion.

The scene and numbers out of Syria are certainly horrific, but Yemen’s atrocities are no less dreadful or severe because of external suffering. To diminish the 50 Yemenis who died from a hail of sniper bullets because 100 weren’t killed is shockingly cruel. To distinguish between protesters and anti-government “tribesmen” is prejudice; many Yemenis belong to a tribe. Nor does Feierstein factor in the government’s manufactured humanitarian crisis or Saleh’s unflinching duplicity. Why Syria is different from Yemen is simple: Washington has equipped Saleh’s private security forces and trained them with U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives.

UN sanctions in Yemen aren’t a matter of getting Russia and China on board, but of spilling U.S. complicity to Saleh’s host of crimes. Of compromising “secret” military bases, a flotilla in the Gulf of Aden, strategic waterways and Saudi Arabia's border. The difference between Ford’s hero status and Feierstein’s villainous role is elementary: the Obama administration has decided to support Syria’s revolutionaries and suppress Yemenis.

However both policies are united in their desire for perpetual control of the Middle East.

Predicting Somalia’s Chaotic Winds

Have Mogadishu’s clouds just parted or is the capital merely passing through another eye of an undying storm? That is the question African Union commanders are scrambling to answer after al-Shabaab abruptly vacated its positions in the city. Witnesses on the outskirts of Mogadishu cheered the exit of “at least nine battle wagons full of Al-Shabab fighters” moving out early Saturday morning. Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM’s spokesman would only respond, "We are verifying reports of a withdrawal,” and warned that “it could be a trap.”

Meanwhile Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) pounced on al-Shabaab’s movements as certain retreat. President Sheikh Shairf Sheikh Ahmed attempted to steal the AU’s thunder by welcoming, “the success by the Somali government forces backed by AMISOM who defeated the enemy of Shabab." Declaring the news a “golden victory for the Somali people,” government spokesman Abdirahman Omar Osman attributed this development to “the end of the last phase of clearing al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu.’’

al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamed Rage countered by telling the group’s Andalus radio station that the forces in question are repositioning for a counter-attack. Al Jazeera's Peter Greste added that al-Shabaab officials "insist that this is not a retreat but an adjustment of tactics and they will not abandon Mogadishu.” Sheik Rage vowed in Terminator fashion, “We will be back soon.”

The truth probably lies in the middle of this haze, complicating TFG/AU efforts to seize the opportunity.

AMISOM’s latest assault began last Thursday with the stated intention of preempting al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive. Surrounding the Bakaara market on the west, south and east, AU units moved through Hawl Wardag on their way to Wardhigley, where al-Shabaab had fortified Mogadiscio stadium. That AMISOM generated increasing pressure on the insurgency’s remaining positions is evident in its troop movements. Only a year ago al-Shabaab was launching its offensives straight out of Bakaara towards Villa Somalia, whereas the AU has now secured the notorious arms bazaar in addition to Mogadiscio stadium.

However the known facts don’t appear to indicate a pure retreat. Somali Defense Minister Hussein Arab Esse accurately remarked from the stadium, "It is of major significance, but the war is not over yet.” First, the government’s held eight districts still represent the capital’s smaller half; a wide front and al-Shabab’s remaining districts occupy vast expanses of lowly-populated terrain (many Somalis have relocated to TFG territory). Although the open tracks mean a loss of civilian cover, this type of territory can still sustain a prolonged urban battle. Several al-Qaeda strongholds are rumored to be embedded within Abdi Aziz and Karan, on the other side of Mogadishu. al-Shabaab also vacated Huriwa district, to the north, in preemption of oncoming AU forces.

The heavy battles that supposedly drove al-Shabaab from its remaining territory occurred on contested ground, in Bondhere, Hawl Wardag and Wardhigley. Rage explained that al-Shabaab has finally decided to change its “fighting strategy into hit and run attacks, where the mujahideen will attack on the spot wherever government and African Union forces are based.” Referring to Somalis, “Every one of you will feel the change in every corner and every street in Mogadishu. We will defend you and continue the fighting."

Leaving al-Shabaab’s futile “hearts and minds” campaign aside, Rage’s description represents more than a tactical reorganization of units, positions, weapons and maneuvers. In switching from holding territory against numerically superior forces (a violation of guerrilla warfare) to mobile warfare based out of distance, al-Shabaab hopes to undergo a strategic shift in Mogadishu. The strategy enjoys several benefits, including the basic concept of avoiding direct battle with conventional forces. Entrenched positions only offer the appearance of strength to an insurgent, and allowing the AU to converge its forces on sequential positions has robbed al-Shabaab of the all-important initiative.

Ceding its remaining districts before the AU nears them suggests an acceptance of their mistakes; mobile warfare throughout Mogadishu’s 16 districts regains some operational independence, and could thin AMISOM’s forces as it attempts to control the whole capital. One Somali official also downplayed leadership splits to Long War Journal, theorizing that al-Shabaab couldn’t have executed a surprise withdrawal without a functioning hierarchy.

Most importantly, the TFG must now fill al-Shabaab’s vacuum before total lawlessness takes hold. President Ahmed has already declared Somalia’s two enemies - “al-Shabaab and looters” - and police are reportedly moving into the districts. Yet lightly armed units will be no match for al-Shabaab, and the TFG will presumably struggle to expand its authority and services. How the government responds to this event will shape long-term perceptions, for better or worse.

That being said, al-Shabaab will further expose itself while rearranging its forces inside and outside Mogadishu. Losing the capital, even briefly, is a major psychological blow and will propel the TFG/AU’s momentum. al-Shabaab will also lose whatever revenue it was generating in its districts, which may not be substantial if the group is truly low on funds. Mobile warfare also needs bases to operate and unless the insurgency bases itself completely out of Mogadishu (a process complicated by TFG/AU checkpoints), al-Shabaab must take roving shelter inside the city. Cadres should be able to run in cycles but not indefinitely; losing its final ounces of popular support comes with heavy consequences.

“It is time to harvest the fruits of peace,” declared President Ahmed. “I call on the Somali people to help and to support their soldiers and point out any Shabab member hiding in homes."

While al-Shabaab has chosen a strategy that it should have reverted to months ago, a down-grade occurred by definition. al-Shabaab had reached the final phases of insurgency, relatively speaking, by massing in the capital and nearly toppling the TFG. Insurgencies make or break themselves at this point and al-Shabaab broke, necessitating a de-evolution to reorganize its structure. The group can only stall for time now; defeating the government is no longer possible. Soon another 3,000 AU troops may land in Mogadishu, pushing AMISOM’s total to 12,000, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is eager to deploy more so long as the West wires the cash. Mogadishu can still engulf a force of 15,000, however al-Shabaab would likely face too much resistance to operate effectively.

"We need more troops now than ever before,” Ankunda said. “The area has become too big for the force to cover.”

Conversely, al-Shabaab’s strategic shift extrapolates to its entire territory. Once Mogadishu is lost, the TFG and AU will almost certainly encounter mobile warfare in al-Shabaab’s southern regions - and loads of al-Qaeda manufactured IED’s. Rage insisted that no similar pullout has taken place in the group’s other cities, when the inverse may be occurring: cede Mogadishu in order to maintain control of the south. As the TFG, Ethiopian troops and Ahlu Sunna have pinned down al-Shabaab's rear to free up Mogadishu, the insurgency could shift to diversionary measures in the capital to obstruct an invasion into the south.

Both Ahmed and Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali have already cast their gaze on “the rest of the country,” which “will soon be liberated too.” The New York Times mentions the 2006 retreat all the way to Kenya’s jungles, and locals report al-Shabaab movements towards Merka, nearly 65 miles south of Mogadishu, and Brava another 80 miles down the road. Troops were also reported in Afgoye, 20 miles west of Mogadishu, and to the northern Middle Shabele region.al-Shabaab could be setting up a new line of defense in these outlying towns.

The above distances also provide a relative impression of the vast territory under al-Shabaab’s de facto control. Kismayo, the group’s main southern stronghold and port, lies 250 miles from Brava and and Kenya 125 miles in the distance. Doolow, a border town on the western flank, runs a 300 mile gauntlet back to Mogadishu, while al-Shabaab continues to operate as far north as Galguduud region. These dimensions multiply to 100,000+ square miles. Due to rising popularity the TFG and AU possess an opportunity to restore a semblance of order, but their task isn’t much easier than al-Shabaab’s. Rural warfare outside of the capital will be brutal.

As for the opportunity in Mogadishu and its surrounding area, where IDP camps continue to struggling with feeding the starving masses, military expansion continues to hover in AU minds. Major General Nathan Mugisha, AMISOM’s former commander, recently offered the AU’s protection to aid organizations, manifesting the AU’s previous claim of opening aid routes through Mogadishu. In reality the AU used this pretext to sweep through Bakaara, but guarding aid routes would provide a foothold as AMISOM expands beyond the capital.

The immediate problem is that political affiliation increases the risk of approving and distributing aid in al-Shabaab territory. Mark Bowden, the U.N.'s top official in charge of humanitarian aid in Somalia, quickly shot down the idea: "Humanitarian responses in Somalia must be civilian-led. In the highly politicized context of south-central Somalia, relying on military assistance will not be effective. It is important that aid is seen as being impartial and independent of all political action.”

Despite the TFG’s supportive position on military intervention, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also ruled out the possibility during a meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird. Attempting to place Somalia and al-Shabaab “in the broader context,” the Secretary told reporters that “millions of people are suffering, and those millions of people are in Ethiopia and Kenya; they are in parts of Somalia that are not controlled by al-Shabaab. So there is more than enough work for the international community to do to help save lives without even having to worry about the al-Shabaab controlled areas.”

While this statement is true enough, it would not be surprising to see a few well-placed air-strikes attempt to find al-Shabaab’s weak points.

In the end, though, al-Shabaab wasn’t run out of Mogadishu by drones and the loss of senior leadership. The TFG’s attempts to change its image and behavior, coupled with the AU’s conventional force, applied sufficient pressure to al-Shabaab’s weaknesses. Traces of genuine COIN, not single-minded counter-terrorism, are responsible for any tangible gains, thus failure to institute authority will erode them.

This is the real lesson from Mogadishu’s battlefield.

Evicting Yemen’s Drone Base

Published at CounterPunch.org:

The Washington Post recently published a controversial report about the future of al-Qaeda "2.0" and U.S. operations against the network. The ensuing narrative speculated whether the Pentagon and CIA are now manufacturing war after Osama bin Laden’s death, or whether news organizations should conceal a “secret” drone base inside Yemen.

Lost in the media haze is the base itself, a pillar of U.S. resistance against Yemen’s revolution.

Ultimately The Washington Post added little to previous reporting from The Wall Street Journal and Associated Press. By the time this “secret” base was outed in June, MQ-9 Reapers had already increased their patrols over Yemen and begun to search for targets after a year-long slowdown. U.S. Hellfire missiles had terminated the deputy governor of Marib in May 2010, killed while allegedly meeting an informant from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). CIA Director David Petraeus, then CENTCOM commander, negotiated these joint-strikes under Ali Abdullah Saleh’s table, only for Yemen’s strongman to flip after a tribal revolt.

When U.S. warplanes and drones again increased their activity "to exploit" the power vacuum opened by Saleh, the besieged president had actually begun passing new information to Washington, starting with AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Saleh’s tactics haven’t changed before or after Yemen’s revolution and neither has U.S. policy.

The Wall Street Journal’s key piece of information was an acceleration to this base’s construction from two years to eight months, a response to Yemen’s “instability.” Similarly, The Washington Post reported one vital piece of information: the base is scheduled for completion in September. Planning for a post-Saleh world became unavoidable and the Obama administration needed to finish its base before Yemen’s revolutionaries accomplished their own mission. The timing synchronizes with the revolution, eight months from February to September. Instead of supporting Yemen’s people, the White House’s first order of business was to further militarize their country at the hands of a delusional tyrant.

Speeding up the building process wasn’t a matter of adapting to security concerns but of overriding sovereignty. Throughout six months of peaceful protests, hundreds of civilian casualties and a government-induced humanitarian crisis, this one asset has overruled the Yemeni people’s support.

The drone paradox appears endless; Washington requires a base to hunt al-Qaeda operatives, when U.S. policy has boosted AQAP’s growth beyond what it would have obtained through its personal means. A base wouldn't be necessary if America enjoyed the people’s support, but the administration opted to pump military equipment and economic aid into Saleh’s corrupt regime. U.S.-trained "counter-terrorism" units deployed against the Houthis, Southern Movement, tribal militias, revolutionaries and finally AQAP. When the revolution began, world powers labeled it a “political crisis” and summoned the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to negotiate a biased settlement for the regime. As protesters have refused to submit to foreign intervention, the past three months yielded a combination of U.S. air-strikes on AQAP units, anti-government tribesmen and civilians.

Since these collective measures resulted in deep hostility against U.S. policy, a base must now be constructed against their will. How does this equation make any sense? Most Yemenis and some observers firmly believe that Saleh and Washington are using each other to create chaos, a vain attempt to justify their illegitimate authority. Coolly rational, yet utterly deranged.

Half of Washington’s rationale involves Special Forces and CIA trainers currently active in Yemen; Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA’s Special Activities Division are running white (training) and black (field) ops on the ground and aerial operations from Djibouti. A portion of these forces would presumably relocate to a concealed desert strip, revealing its full dimensions. The CIA’s base serves as Petraeus's keystone to expanding Special Operations across the region, from the Persian Gulf to Somalia and all the waterways in between. Yet on the side of madness, any Yemeni believing that AQAP is enabled by Saleh would be frightened to know that, “the Obama administration is bolstering the CIA’s role in Yemen, seeking to replicate its pursuit of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.”

As if U.S. foreign policy is flourishing in Islamabad.

Worse still, the agency “is expected to work closely with Saudi Arabia to exploit its tribal ties,” developed to undermine Saleh’s patchy rule in the north. Although some tribal figures continue to take Riyadh’s handouts, Saudi Arabia may be the only foreign entity more unpopular than America. Even the powerful al-Almars, leaders of the Hashid tribe, are slowly losing their connection to Riyadh as the revolution overtakes their political ambitions. Newsweek reacted oddly to the notion of “Pakistanization," writing in a profile of Petraeus, “Yemen, now on the verge of civil war, is hardly the ideal model for future operations, but it has been a critical proving ground.”

Thus failure has been proven and the administration's response is to fail harder. Pakistan’s “system” and all of its mistakes are being duplicated: alienate the populace through a combination of abandonment, support for an unpopular government and unilateral militarism.

This spiral of death has brought misery upon Yemen’s people and weakened America’s national security, rather than erode AQAP. What if Saleh is then tossed out or brought to trial? What if al-Qaeda dries up? What purpose would this base serve? Such neocolonialism hollows out client states into U.S. zones of autonomy - into a base predicated on the knowledge that Saleh’s regime will crumble. However a unilateral base inside Yemen will become a liability after the revolution topples him, an immoral and militarily questionable strategy.

Perhaps the Pentagon and CIA desire their creation at any cost to America’s interests, or to the brave revolutionaries fighting for a democracy that America should be nurturing. Eventually, though, both the Yemeni people and Washington may be wondering how to conjure away a white elephant in the desert.

Realist Channel Launches on Twitter

After Tweeting on less political matters and eventually going inactive to concentrate on analysis, I have opened a new account to disseminate continual briefings from various insurgencies and revolutions. This move is overdue but will assist in handling the increased flow of global information, as well as promote discussion on the Arab Revolutions.

Visit Twitter.com/RealistChannel for 24 hour updates.

Obama Deploys Pentagon Official to Sana'a

Yesterday Gerald Feierstein called on Yemeni Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi to begin an “immediate transfer” of power. The U.S. ambassador to Yemen has issued such a “demand” since April, when Washington and Riyadh invoked the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to orchestrate a false power transfer, and he repeated this “demand” to Hadi on Sunday. Apparently expecting Hadi to ignore him, Feierstein greeted Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirb on Wednesday to “discuss aspects of joint cooperation.”

The ambassador received a quick reply from Abdullah Ghanim, a senior official inside Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC): "President Ali Abdullah Saleh is still Yemen’s legitimate President until presidential elections are held. A authorization to Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi does not mean the transfer of power."

As Saleh’s personal security forces and a government-induced humanitarian crisis refuse to abate, Feierstein has made himself widely unpopular to the revolutionaries for vigorously backing the GCC’s “30/60” initiative. Constant meetings with ruling officials have reinforced the impression that Feierstein is legitimizing the regime. However most of the blame can be attributed to a disastrous U.S. policy, which threw him to the wolves and employed White House counter-terror chief John Brennan as a leading diplomat. Under on Saleh’s terms (negotiated by U.S. and Saudi interlocutors), the GCC would grant familial immunity for a catalog of human rights abuses, hand 50% of a transitional council to the GPC, and give him another month to officially resign (even though Saleh shows no indication of doing so).

This document, “may be regarded as the best legal and political package, which any dictator has ever gotten, enjoying an unprecedented full immunity from legal pursuit for all the crimes inflicted against the Yemeni people,” remarked Yemen’s Coordinating Council for the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC).

The Obama administration remains aloof of these developments, denying false government reports that the U.S. Embassy supports Saleh’s return. Ting Wu, the economic officer in Sana’a, then repeated U.S. support for an “immediate transfer of power” through the GCC initiative - even though Saleh is gifted another 30 days. Yet Saleh’s regime continues to veto these terms, now preferring to talk about the GCC in loose rhetoric. Feierstein issued his latest comments after al-Qirbi returned from a European tour, where foreign ministers ordered him to begin the GCC’s transfer. Western media misinterpreted EU statements as support for the revolutionaries, when al-Qirbi took them as tacit support for the government.

Now the GCC provides only a base whose mechanism requires further “dialogue,” all codewords for more stalling. Nevertheless, Feierstein is sticking to his “demand” that Saleh transfer power “immediately,” when al-Qirbi declared that Saleh will only transfer power “constitutionally,” warning that 60 days is too soon to hold an election.

Therefore the regime wants to stage one as soon as possible.


The juxtaposition between Feierstein and Michael Vickers’s position ends on the surface. Following Feierstein’s meetings and the announcement of two revolutionary councils, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense held court with Major General Ahmed Ali al-Ashwal, Yemen’s Chief of General Staff. Limited information is available because Vicker’s trip, like Feierstein’s meetings, are rarely covered by the U.S. media; instead U.S. meetings are spun on Saba state media, adding to the revolutionaries’ distrust. Much can be inferred from the Pentagon’s apathy though.

Given the Obama administration’s utter disregard for Yemen’s people and their struggle for self-determination, al-Ashwal and Vickers’s meeting was likely as cordial as Saba described: “During the meeting, al-Ashwal and Vickers discussed aspects of mutual relations and military cooperation between the two friendly countries’ armies and ways of boosting them, particularly their cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the areas of training and rehabilitation.”

The U.S. Embassy in Sana’a added, “The United States and Yemen have a strong, mutual interest in countering this threat, and expect to continue our close cooperation.”

In reality Feierstein and Vickers’s positions mesh when considering the superficial nature of the ambassador’s remarks. The GCC initiative is designed to keep Saleh’s regime in power and his family of commanders safe from prosecution, where U.S. support would be highlighted. Once Saleh signs the agreement and “transfers” power to Hadi, Washington will further increase its counter-terrorism support - as if this support had suddenly halted. No such policy exists, as U.S. operations escalated since May regardless of Saleh’s intent to sign the GCC.

At one point U.S. officials claimed that this support had halted, but this was nothing more than propaganda to cover ongoing military operations. The same can be said of the GCC’s initiative.

All of these disturbances come as local reports indicate a horrific act of cannibalism in the Arhab district. Amid an ongoing battle between the U.S.-trained Republican Guard and anti-government fighters, local witnesses claim that Yemeni war planes bombed the Guard’s own position, killing “more than 200 Republican guards and at least three dozen-fighters.” A security official in Arhab said these troops refused to attack the tribesmen and were negotiating a ceasefire at the Sama’e military base, roughly 25 miles northeast of Sana’a.

This information is subject to change, but it fits the brutality that U.S. troops and equipment have sponsored in Yemen. The real face of U.S. policy is the face of Saleh’s regime.

Tracing al-Shabaab's Arms to Yemen's Saleh

The following appendix to Mogadishu’s Ramadan showdown warranted its own account.

Last week African Union officials preempted al-Shabaab’s looming offensive in the field and in the media, surrounding the notorious Bakaara market in Hawl Wadag district. As AMISOM forces pushed northeast towards Mogadiscio Stadium, in Wardhigley, their commanders informed reporters that al-Shabaab had sent 300 reinforcements to hold their remaining districts. According to CNN, “Sources say Al-Shabaab is massing hundreds of troops in the parts of Mogadishu it controls for a show of force during Ramadan.”

Clearly the insurgency is puffing itself up to appear stronger than its current position, which has eroded from losing the population’s support and now its refuge. al-Shabaab’s water is drying up from the migration to Mogadishu or Somalia’s borders, leaving its fish exposed to future military operations. Some Somalis claim that al-Shabaab’s fighters prefer to die in battle during Ramadan, however these fighters may fight with undying tenacity. If al-Shabaab doesn’t issue another promise of toppling the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the insurgency will maintain an active presence in Mogadishu after Ramadan ends.

Once these reinforcements have been established - local accounts and international media both report an escalation in fighting - the next question turns to their weapons. First, with Somalia flooded with arms to the point that some militia deserters can’t even pawn their guns, does al-Shabaab need an external source? Various reports attribute a pipeline to Eritrea or Saudi Arabia, denied by both governments but a plausible scenario nonetheless. Considering that al-Shabaab has a greater need for heavy weapons and explosives than light-arms, these types of packages often ship from rogue governments.

A shadowy underworld partially explains why AU commanders claim the weapons drifted in from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Over the weekend Fredrick Mugisha, AMISOM’s ranking general, spoke of this transaction in depth, relatively speaking. Telling reporters that he was alerted to two small boats sailing from Yemen’s direction, Mugisha complained that his force lacked the ability to intercept the vessels. Voice of America has since extrapolated this story through Hussein Haji Ahmed, an official inside Somalia’s consul in Yemen. Ahmed spiked the number of arms boats to 10, claiming that two had been intercepted by Yemen’s government. He believed the other eight reached Somalia’s coast.

This alleged weapons shipment falls into harmony with America’s ongoing narrative to fuse Somalia and Yemen into one theater, similar to the now defunct “AfPak.” It’s no secret that al-Shabaab is connected to the al-Qaeda’s hub or that it maintains contact with AQAP; both groups have alluded to a idealistic partnership, and al-Shabaab vowed to ship reinforcements to Yemen in 2010. The depth of their partnership remains unclear, but this news is being repackaged as new after Osama bin Laden’s hard-drives and the April interrogation of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. The formal al-Shabaab official was indicted on terrorism charges after being captured in the Gulf of Aden, where he supposedly admitted to being a "key interlocutor" between al-Shabaab and AQAP.

All of this information has been systematically released anonymous U.S. officials, who add of Warsame, "of course had ties and a relationship" with AQAP cleric Anwar Awlaki.

The main problem with understanding al-Shabaab and AQAP’s relationship stems from U.S. efforts to combine them. Although these groups maintain contacts, lumping the groups together simplifies Special Forces and CIA command while rationalizing both fronts to Americans. That al-Shabaab and AQAP could merge also overlooks the fact that al-Qaeda’s networks intentionally diversify to avoid this scenario. Mutual assistance is natural but all of these groups value their independence.

Combining the two groups also legitimizes the response to both, even though U.S. policy is more responsible for Yemen’s situation than Somalia’s. To respond the same - through Special Forces and drones - errors towards a disastrous policy in Yemen, where Washington supplied Ali Abdullah’s regime for far too long.

On a deeper level, Jeremy Scahill’s latest report emphasizes the willingness of Somali military and intelligence agents to do anything for regular U.S. payments. Rhetoric is child’s play compared to leading the CIA’s Mogadishu interrogation unit. The AU has a similar motive to link Yemen and Somalia, believing that a connection will increase the West’s urgency and funding. Both Mugisha and AMISOM spokesman Paddy Akunda criticized the international community for not doing enough on land, in the sea or over Somalia’s airspace. Yemen’s specter is presumably expected to accelerate a Western response.

TFG and AU officials wouldn’t mind another U.S. drone base in Somalia’s southern region.

How eight ships slipped through the international armada parked in the Gulf of Aden is an unbelievable logistical feat. Assume, though, that this half of the story is entirely true, because the other side is even more questionable. AQAP has amassed a heavy arsenal through tribal connections and looting government facilities, but the ongoing battles in Aden and Zinjibar supposedly left AQAP with a stockpile of weapons. In a recent interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Brigadier General Mohammed al-Sawmali openly admitted from Zinjibar, “The security services pulled out of Abyan leaving their weapons behind, and Al Qaeda seized these weapons, and is now using them against us. This is something that no one can deny.”

The commander of Yemen’s 25th Mechanized Brigade, which found itself besieged after other army units withdrew, accused the U.S.-trained Central Security of leaving his unit to fend for itself. These forces, along with the U.S.-trained Republican Guard, has busied itself attacking protesters and tribal fighters instead of AQAP.

Thus if Saleh orchestrated the takeovers in Aden and Zinjibar, he could be directly responsible for the weapons now landing in Somalia. This excuse is then used to justify escalating activity in both Yemen and Somalia, even though Saleh’s source drips with the blood of Yemen’s people. Whether Washington and its allies are lying or telling the truth, their dirty pipeline will fuel America’s war machine until the connection is permanently severed by mainstream media.

Meaning war is due to escalate in both countries.

No Democracy in Yemen

By Gulf Times staff writer Khaled Al Ziadi:

The advent of Ramadan seems to have only made the Yemeni youth more confident. They are demanding their right to determine their destiny and bring about democracy in Yemen. Tribal leaders have been proactive in declaring their support for the alliance of pro-revolution tribes on July 30.

This alliance is led by Shaikh Sadeq Al Ahmar, head of Yemen's largest tribe, the Hashid, which extended critical support to the formation of the Transitional Council last week.

This move negated the futile process of discussing the power transfer between the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). It is obvious that Saleh and the ruling party are more interested in political theatrics than implementing the GCC initiative, which had the backing of the international community.

There are no changes in the government position towards the GCC initiative. The regime insists on imposing fake democracy on the people, and worsening the political turmoil in Yemen.

I strongly agree with Abdul Al Janadi, the Yemeni deputy minister of information, who in a letter to the editor, published in the July 31 edition of Gulf News in response to my previous article, asked a simple question: ‘Why does a democracy need a revolution?' But I would simply ask him: ‘Does democracy exist in Yemen?' It is well known that it is a dictatorship, and that is the reason the youth, and not extremists, have been protesting peacefully on the streets for more than five months.

They are on the streets — day and night — to achieve the most prominent democratic values: justice, equality and freedom from the dictatorship of the ruling family in Yemen.

If the notion of democracy had existed in Yemen, Saleh would have stepped down long ago. He would not have ruled the country for 33 years, and would not have tried to pave the way for his son to take over. Also, Saleh must be subjected to criminal prosecution for many massacres.

Let me remind the Yemeni official bragging about democracy in Yemen that in March this year more than 52 peaceful protesters were massacred in Sana'a.

In May, at least 50 peaceful demonstrators were murdered in Taiz, including physically challenged people who were burnt to death in their tents. More than 100,000 Yemeni families fled Sana'a, Taiz, Abyan and Arhab seeking help and shelter from the United Nations agency working in Yemen. They have become refugees in their own country.

Yemen is in chaos and there is no evidence of democracy in the country. Human rights violations are rife. No country in which the regime shuts down newspapers, arrests writers, assassinates opposition figures, and fires rockets at the homes of its political opponents can claim to be a democracy.

Only a fake democracy exists in Yemen, where one family controls the army, the air force, the Presidential Guard, the Central Security Forces, the counterterrorism unit, and the National Security Bureau. In democratic countries, state resources cannot be monopolised by the president's family. It is well known that Yemen's oil resources are controlled by Saleh's regime and his family.

Unfortunately, the Yemeni government is also taking advantage of Saudi and UAE oil aid; Saudi Arabia has donated three million barrels of crude oil while the UAE also donated three million barrels of oil and 40,000 tonnes of diesel to help people in Yemen. But, unfortunately, the black market in oil is booming in Sana'a.

The government is continuing its policy of punishing its people for protesting by creating an economic crisis that worsens their living conditions. It's difficult to describe how most Yemenis live in poverty. They do not even have access to basic necessities, while the government spends millions of dollars on PR agencies in the UK and US to polish the image of its "democracy."

The international community should not give direct support to the Saleh regime, which is unwilling to change its confrontational approach. It is particularly important to support the revolutionaries who want to make Yemen stable and ensure a prosperous future for all peoples of the region.

Saga of Somali Aid Continues

Today the White House took the controversial step of granting immunity to aid agencies operating in Somalia. Numerous political and security concerns have limited the response’s scale and time-frame, and a growing consensus is realizing that waiting for al-Shabaab’s approval is no longer feasible. The insurgents are certainly liable to siphon international aid, tax the agencies or kill their workers, all problems that could end up back on President Barack Obama’s desk. But considering the extreme risks, opening the aid gates to maximum capacity will likely cause less suffering and regret.

One U.S. official admitted that the administration has no illusions of a “grand bargain” with the group, and succinctly explained, "Our number one goal is to save lives.” Aid groups were directed to proceed into areas “where the level of security and acquiescence of local authorities is deemed acceptable.” From there a national system may be constructed if conditions permit.

To this end the White House assured aid groups that they can deliver supplies without fear of prosecution from the U.S. Treasury, a cited fear of humanitarian officials. Charities “must only pledge their best efforts to combat attempts by al-Shabab to hoard aid or collect taxes on supplies,” now deemed a low security threat compared to the alternative. Multiple news sources clarified that no specific law forbids distribution in Somalia, but when the State Department designated al-Shabaab a terrorist organization in 2008, aid officials feared that bribes, tolls and other “costs of doing business” could draw punishment.

A purely humane sentiment is unlikely to be circulating through the administration; U.S. officials cite Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s privately debated link between food and security. The Pentagon believes that al-Shabab could became an even greater threat if Somalia further destabilizes, while loose guns pose a greater threat than loose aid. Regardless, CBS News reported no “major disagreement” within the administration and the operation is moving forward once donations are secured.

New U.S. aid may be headed for the UN’s World Food Program, the largest of the organizations operating in Somalia. The White House and UN should also consider diverting as much aid as possible through currently recognized groups, such as the International Red Cross. Although an emergency response must criss-cross Somalia’s central and southern territory, accelerating tolerated organizations first may deliver aid quicker than forcing it through the UN.
One possible system would keep UN programs in Mogadishu and leave the south to apolitical groups.

The key to a functional emergency response is to reduce friction within Somalia’s ad hoc system. Few countries, if any, are more scrambled and each strand of chaos must be targeted for potential elimination. al-Shabab’s source of friction isn’t going anywhere in the near-term, nor will a non-existent infrastructure and political authority suddenly materialize. This leaves the bureaucratic mass between Washington, the UN, African Union (AU) and Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a realistic challenge to overcome. Red tape has tied Somalis to their fate and must be cut wherever possible.

A lack of trust due to corruption and an undeveloped economy has kept Western capitals at a distance from the TFG, which is only now beginning to prove its worth. Risks remain high, but Somalia’s famine offers the opportunity to lower these barriers, as the international community and TFG must develop trust after the drought has passed.

The government also needs to deliver services as well, but most U.S. financial assistance currently flows to the AU’s military campaign. Viewed as the more reliable force, the AU has earned its new reputation by seizing whole districts in Somalia and engaging locals. Civilian casualties run higher than the AU will admit, but it is exploiting openings created by the drought. AMISOM is moving and adapting quicker than any other force inside Somalia, partly because its logistics is already established and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni demands monthly progress from his troops.

However the AU also learnt a few things from Somalia’s former prime minister, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who spearheaded an extensive Western media campaign to promote the AU’s gains. AMISOM is now leading the propaganda effort after suffering repeated body-blows through 2009 and 2010. Lt Col Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM Force spokesperson, condemned Tuesday’s attempted suicide bombing in Mogadishu by relating to the drought: “In the midst of a famine seizing Somalia the extremists are choosing to focus on killing, not saving life... AMISOM Forces are in the middle of conducting security operations in the capital to increase the areas of the capital under government control and safeguard Somalis.”

Ultimately, though, the Somalia’s national government will require its own emergency funds. If it fails the test then it fails. Somalis believe that the TFG can only win permanent support by defeating al-Shabaab and effectively governing. One without the other passes Somalia into the next stage of its vicious cycle.

Egyptian Military Gases the Revolutionary Fire

As Egyptian protesters take stock of the now-cleared Tahrir Square, their “loss” has been greeted by cheers from local residents and various foreign observers. Those Egyptians bearing the square’s economic costs possess legitimate gripes, even if they should be directed at the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Yet some U.S. analysts in the square itself consider July’s sit-in “a strategic blunder,” believing the protesters should have focused on political organization.

Now imagine the opposite scenario: an untrustworthy military council free of public pressure and left to its own devices. Everyone gets comfortable and returns to their daily routines as the system retrenches itself. This is exactly how the military, a segment of Egyptians and many U.S. elements envision a post-Mubarak Egypt. In a sign of tacit approval, the Obama administration avoided Monday’s melee in favor of Syria’s.

Capitalizing on local opposition to Tahrir sit-in, the SCAF’s Ramadan sweep fits into a larger plan to lockdown Cairo before Hosni Mubarak’s trial. While Egyptian security forces mopped up the hundreds of protesters refusing to leave Tahrir, Appeals Court President Abdel Aziz Omar informed the public that Mubarak’s trial venue would move from Cairo’s convention center to its policy academy. This decision relocates a flashpoint to the city’s outskirts, attempting to minimize security concerns by limiting demonstrations.

Many Egyptians are still skeptical that Mubarak and his sons, Gamal and Alaa, will enter a cage. If his health doesn’t free him from court, the SCAF will delay the trial or strike a lenient deal. Omar said the Police Academy was selected "because it is difficult to guarantee the protection of the other place," and the facility may offer greater accommodation, but moving the venue further from the city’s core adds to these suspicions. With the trial already scheduled for national television, the SCAF could quarantine the area from thousands of revolutionaries seeking a final resolution.

Assassination remains a possibility given that only one mind is necessary, but the bulk of Egyptians want to see Mubarak receive justice. “Tight security from the police and the army” kills two birds with one bullet.

That the SCAF seeks to calm Egypt’s environment before Mubarak’s trial isn’t completely irrational. Both sides of the former strongman may reaction violently, depending on his legal outcome. This sensibility, however, is checked by the SCAF’s desire to suppress street demonstrations at all costs, whether during Ramadan or November. The military wasted July by announcing superficial political reform and conducting a systematic propaganda assault on the youth, branded as “thugs” as if Mubarak had hired them.

Although some Egyptians are exhausted by the revolutionaries, the SCAF potentially committed its own strategic blunder. Over the weekend 26 political movements agreed to suspend the Tahrir Square sit-in during Ramadan, realizing the need to regroup and breathe. Essam Abdel-Aziz Sharaf, Egypt’s new Prime Minister and a former Tahrir protester, would be given “one last chance” to implement reforms over Ramadan. Labeling the sit-in a partial success for “pushing the Egyptian revolution a step forward,” the bloc clarified that, “based on our belief that sit-ins are a means, and not a goal, the political parties and youth movements have decided to temporarily suspend their sit-in during the holy month of Ramadan.”

After Eid, the revolutionaries “will return once again... to protest peacefully in Tahrir Square so that the rest of the demands are met.”

At this point Tahrir Square began to empty of all but the most hardened core, protesters vowing not to leave their camps since January. They too, however, issued a statement that their sit-in would end once Mubarak entered the courtroom. Seemingly responding to this demand with force, hundreds of Egyptian troops descended on Tahrir Square to eradicate the camps.

Accompanied tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and the Central Security Forces, the military “attacked Tahrir square from all directions without prior warning.” Every tent was smashed, every protester chased by electric baton-wielding security forces. Over a hundred (possibly 200) were detained and taken out of the square, their belongings dumped into garbage trucks.

Ramadan 2011 was supposed to mark a different era across the Middle East. Instead the SCAF responded as though Mubarak’s regime was still in charge, and some Egyptians believe it is. Given that the majority of protesters decided to exercise compassion and leave the square, a brutal crackdown against the few hold-outs qualifies as a disproportionate use of force. Clearing the square is initially sensible through the SCAF’s eyes - until the brutal sweep provokes even larger demonstration. The opposite effect may occur, but the SCAF appears to have ensured a Wednesday-Friday showdown in Cairo.

Until their full demands for justice and representative government are met, Tahrir Square can only be cleared physically, not mentally or spiritually.

Updates From Somalia’s Fronts

African Union Schedules Drought Conference
Organizing a global summit requires an unavoidable amount of time and effort. Already confronted with a regional drought stretching over an estimated 12 million people, the African Union has circled August 9th to address Somalia’s humanitarian crisis. The announcement was made after Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), visited Mogadishu to coordinate with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Unfortunately for starving and roofless (and now drenched) Somalis, the next nine days will feel like 90.

As the U.S., UN, TFG and al-Shabaab point fingers at each other, only a combination of factors can fully explain Somalia’s aid controversy. Remove al-Shabaab and the task of feeding over three million people would certainly accelerate. However it remains to be seen where al-Shabaab is responsible, and where a lack of infrastructure poses the real obstacle. The African Union wisely adopted the drought as a political shield, but danger lies in scapegoating al-Shabaab, potentially creating a backlash between Washington, UN and TFG.

The AU claims to have foreknowledge of al-Shabaab’s next Ramadan offensive, which will supposedly target internally displaced (IDP) camps and food distribution centers in Mogadishu. For this reason AU units launched their new offensive “to push the militants' front line farther back from the camps.” al-Shabaab is very capable of attacking IDP camps out of spite for leaving their territory - to send a warning - and highways through Mogadishu must be cleared to reach those still trapped in al-Shabaab territory.

At the same time, the TFG asserts control over 80% of Mogadishu’s population. Why must AU units secure the whole city to feed the majority of inhabitants, to utilize the capital’s port near the airport, or to begin moving supplies south? The AU can have good intentions and still excuse its looming invasion of the Bakaara market, al-Shabaab’s most lucrative stronghold, on “protecting aid agencies.”

Offensive and Counter-Offensive

The AU has eyed Bakaara since landing in Mogadishu and, with momentum finally at its back, is perched to crash upon the market from three sides. This pre-emptive strategy didn’t stop Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM’s spokesman, from releasing a statement explaining, "Our troops have dealt with specific security threats in a short tactical offensive operation.” The assault around Bakaara, he said, was to “ensure that aid agencies can continue to operate and get vital supplies to internally displaced persons.”

It’s true that Wadnaha Road, a key highway fronting the Bakaara market to the south, recently opened to civilians after being locked down by al-Shabaab. Problematically, moving through Bakaara and the rest of Wardhigley will create more IDPs. António Guterres, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, warned, "An offensive on Thursday by pro-government forces in and around the important Bakara and Balcad markets has increased the risk for Mogadishu's citizens as well as the estimated 100,000 internally displaced people (IDP) who have fled drought and famine in neighboring regions in recent months.”

AU troops moved all the way up to Ali-Kamin junction, a mile north near Mogadishu stadium, before retreating under heavy insurgent fire. Feeding the starving and protecting aid workers are surely priorities, but the AU appears most concerned with taking advantage of al-Shabaab’s vulnerability under the cover of moving aid. While time is running out for many Somalis, the AU’s offensive may be self-defeating if new casualties are created on the way to their rescue.

al-Shabaab Claims U.S. Kill

Somalia’s insurgency has fallen on hard times since last Ramadan. After failing to topple the government as promised, the AU counter-attacked in Mogadishu as TFG, Ethiopian and Ahlu Sunna forces assaulted al-Shabaab’s western and northern fronts. Coupled with a November-December leadership dispute and an epic drought, and al-Shabaab is now being written off by a number of analysts. Although the group may eventually die out, insurgencies are known to survive longer than anticipated despite a loss of popular support and financing.

The TFG and AU are now sharing the Afghan government’s pain of “controlling” territory, only for al-Shabaab to infiltrate and strike behind enemy lines. In Mogadishu, the insurgents hold actual districts rather than maintaining an active underground presence across the city. Once these maze-like districts are seized, they can still strike into government territory and destabilize security. On Sunday gunmen killed a TFG parliamentarian in Hamarweine, home to many government buildings and usually controlled by the AU.

If al-Shabaab learns from last Ramadan and adopts a more realistic goal of holding its districts, the odds of political assassination likely outweigh attacks on IDP camps or aid centers. The group has also allowed access to "non-political" groups such as the International Red Cross and Kuwaiti-based International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO).

In another piece of counter-propaganda, Sheikh Abi-aziz abu Mus’ab held a press conference in Mogadishu to declare that a senior U.S. official had been killed in Hodan district. “The man used to train AMISOM and he was also a senior advisor,” said Mus’ab, an al-Shabaab spokesman, adding, “We will soon display his identity and all other documents we have to make it proof.” Although the insurgency is liable to produce disinformation at any time, U.S. trainers likely have more duties than interrogation and maintaining drones.

Jeremy Scahill’s exclusive reporting to The Nation infers a deeper arrangement, one that routinely circumvents the TFG by paying its own agents or outfitting the AU. 30 CIA agents supposedly operate at Mogadishu’s detention center/drone base, and some presumably work in the field training Somali intelligence officials or AU personnel. The Pentagon already “approved plans to send $45 million worth of military equipment to Uganda and Burundi, the two major forces the AMISOM operation.”

Scahill also mentions a draft of a defense spending bill approved in late June by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Another $75 million in U.S. counterterrorism assistance would escalate AMISOM’s budget, specifically because the Somali military cannot “exercise control of its territory.”

Facing enemies on all sides, al-Shabaab hopes to raise the U.S. flag and provoke new local hostility. We believe that, barring civilian casualties, Somalis are too absorbed in their survival to hate the West. Regardless, a U.S. response often follows these types of casualties so the possibility warrants consideration. While some TFG officials have mused over international military action, Washington seems to have its hands full with green-lighting donations.

When, though, does the Pentagon and CIA waste an opportunity to strike?