U.S. Propaganda Flooding Yemen’s Revolution

Typical surface-level propaganda

Anyone paying serious attention to Yemen’s revolution is aware of the double-standard in place. Many observers who glance over on their way to another uprising also realize the depth of Western hypocrisy. Even U.S. officials tacitly admit to their “selective democracy” between Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, evidenced by their scripted defense to counter these impressions. Yet this double-standard continues unaltered.

Propaganda can transform into an unstoppable force of nature.

Yemen’s current situation in the U.S. media, though tragic, is relatively easy to explain. A biased policy guilty of supporting Ali Abdullah Saleh and his murderous security forces needed to be hidden. A silent White House quieted an already subservient and unaware Western media (U.S. and European alike) during the revolution’s formation. The media then shifted into exaggerating Yemen’s “tribal civil war” and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) once this silence shattered.

Nevertheless, widespread apathy within the U.S. public continues to allow the Obama administration to freely subvert Yemen’s pro-democracy movement. A small cadre of Western “experts” willing to echo the U.S. script has monopolized the media, further eroding public awareness. Combined with Saudi misinformation, these conditions have generated a perfect storm of propaganda over Yemen’s revolution.

“I want to note one example, from today, that vividly illustrates many of the themes I discussed in that speech,” Salon’s Glenn Greenwald wrote on Thursday, referring to a May speech at FAIR's 25th anniversary. “It is found in the following passage from this Reuters article on Obama's escalation of the covert war in Yemen and his targeting of U.S. citizen Anwar Awlaki for assassination:

A U.S. official confirmed to Reuters that a U.S. strike last Friday killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, a midlevel al Qaeda operative, which followed last month's attempted strike against Anwar al-Awlaki, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”

As Greenwald points out, al-Awlaki is indisputably not the leader of AQAP. Whether Reuters innocently spaced or intentionally lied to justify U.S. militarism in Yemen isn’t verifiable, but Greenwald doesn’t harbor any doubt. Rather than “covering the weighty issued raised by this assassination program,” he denounces Reuters for explicitly, “doing exactly the opposite: they're ending the debate before it even begins by ‘reporting’ - falsely - that Awlaki "is the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula."

“So instead of raising vital questions about Obama's extraordinary conduct, Reuters suffocates those questions by disseminating false fear-mongering propaganda on behalf of the U.S. Government (he's the leader of Al Qaeda!!) to justify what the administration is going. Overwhelmingly, that's what the role and function of the establishment media is. This isn't the most significant or notable example ever: to the contrary, it's depressingly common, and I note it only because it happened to occur on the very day that I was preparing to post this speech about how the U.S. media subserviently disseminates and amplifies government propaganda, the very antithesis of what they claim to do and were intended to do.”

Greenwald’s conclusion can be extrapolated to all areas of U.S. policy in Yemen: the Obama administration has backed away from Saleh’s regime, U.S. policy supports the pro-democracy movement, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power transfer is the “only way forward.” None of these policies are seriously questioned, instead taken at face value since no established Western officials or analysts are willing to challenge them.

More than the U.S. media is guilty of drowning out Yemen’s revolution. Obviously Reuters is a British outfit, and The Telegraph and Independent have produced similarly careless headlines and reports. The EU and NATO follow U.S. policy blindly rather than realize the numerous strategic errors being committed, taking their medias down with them. Even Al Jazeera repeatedly labeled Saleh’s artificial conflict as “civil war.” Somehow the U.S. media, long a target of the international media, has set an unquestioned tone.

Instead of covering Yemen’s unique pro-democracy movement, the majority of attention is driven towards manufactured violence and exaggerated threats of AQAP.

Now Western propaganda is flowing into the idea that the Obama administration is “exploiting Yemen’s power vacuum.” This statement can be found throughout the U.S. media, mainstream and alternative. The Long War Journal erroneously remarked, “The US is said to be taking advantage of the security vacuum in Yemen to step up attacks against AQAP's top leaders and its network.”

Far from this optimistic spin, the Obama administration enabled Yemen’s power vacuum through political inaction and is now manipulating drones to appear active. First supporting Saleh unconditionally, then backing the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) over the popular opposition, ensured a protracted stalemate. Facing reports that Saleh’s son Ahmad has taken over his palace, relegating al-Hadi to the pawn that he is, U.S. officials continue to withhold any information on Yemen’s situation. This vain effort to maintain influence in Saleh’s regime is holding the vacuum open for his return.

With the White House ignoring Yemen entirely on Friday - but still releasing a separate statement on Syria’s violence - State spokesman Mark Toner allocated a single paragraph: “The government in Yemen needs to – in Sana’a needs to move forward with – along the lines of the GCC agreement and start this reconciliation process.”

Although the Obama administration continues to force the GCC proposal on all of Yemen’s actors, as of this moment Vice President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi insists that Saleh will return. Contrary to the U.S. version that he is “acting” president, Hadi possesses no power relative to Ahmad and high-ranking officials still loyal to Saleh. Deputy information minister Abdo Al Janadi repeated on Thursday, "It is impossible to talk about a transition of power before the return of the president.”

Fundamentally, the youth revolution opposes the GCC’s initiative in full, instead demanding a transitional council to supplant the entire regime. On Friday hundreds of thousands chanted for Saleh's trial, rejecting the GCC's family immunity package. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (among other officials) has falsely declared their support for what is widely considered a U.S.-Saudi plot.

Several street coalitions, including the Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), tell us they have no contact with U.S. diplomats.

Even The New York Times, a key media player in suppressing Yemen's revolution, is now forced to admit, "They deeply oppose the political solution advocated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, which grants Mr. Saleh and his family immunity from prosecution and is likely to preserve more of the status quo. They say the proposal — which Mr. Saleh repeatedly refused to sign before he was wounded last week — misses a golden opportunity for meaningful change and leaves Yemen’s direst problems unaddressed."

Few Yemenis actually believe Saleh is stable enough to return. Some believe they can stop him if he tries. However they fear his regime is now consolidating power and will refuse any political overtures, either from the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) or the streets. The mystery surrounding Saleh’s health - and the fact that U.S. and Saudi officials won’t provide details - has increased the distrust surrounding the GCC’s proposal. With the power vacuum widening under U.S. policy, the Pentagon is being forced to strike almost solely for appearances.

Thus “active” engagement in Yemen first targets the American public as propaganda, then AQAP physically.

No real advantage is being gained on the ground through U.S. air-strikes; progress can only be secured through political engagement with the youth and civil opposition. Yet aside from their legality, the effects of unilateral military operations remain unchallenged in the U.S. media - just like the rest of Washington's narrative. Yemen’s revolutionaries could build their country into a paradise if they received a dollar for every piece of propaganda spit out by the West.

Saleh’s Son, Nephews Reign in Yemen

This Washington Post report confirms our documentation of the futility afflicting U.S. policy in Yemen. The Obama administration is dreaming if it believes Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi can wrest power from President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and is more likely scheming to preserve influence with the ruling party.

Now, will a news organization listen to its own reporting after repeatedly backing the GCC proposal?

When embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh abruptly left over the weekend for Saudi Arabia, he handed the reins of government to his vice president. But the real power remains in the hands of those Saleh trusted most to protect his 33-year rule: his eldest son and nephews.

The son, Ahmed Ali, has moved into the presidential palace, while Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the acting head of state, remains in his office and rarely visits the palace, U.S. and Yemeni officials said. Neither Ahmed nor his three cousins, who together control much of Yemen’s military and security forces, have left their positions to visit Saleh in Saudi Arabia, where he is being treated for severe burn and shrapnel wounds sustained from an attack on the palace Friday.

For many Yemenis, that has sent a clear signal that Saleh and his relatives are intent on preserving his rule in his absence, even as calls mount from opposition groups and the international community for a swift transition of power.

“Power, wealth and intelligence are all in the hands of the president’s son and nephews,” said Muhammed Qahtan, a senior opposition leader. “They are the reasons that are preventing the vice president and the government from firing the president.”

The rising profile of Ahmed and his cousins has handcuffed Hadi’s ability to run Yemen at a critical and volatile time, forcing the vice president into a delicate balancing act to avoid overstepping boundaries set by Saleh’s family.

“The president’s son’s move into the office sends a signal to both the opposition and loyalists that Saleh’s regime will not cede power,” said Katherine Zimmerman, an analyst with the American Enterprise Institute’s critical threats project in Washington. “Any attempt to challenge the regime will likely provoke a military response.”

Ruling party officials said that before he left for Saudi Arabia, Saleh instructed his son and nephews to follow Hadi’s orders, adding that they were complying with those directions. “The state follows the orders of the vice president,” said Ahmed al-Sufi, a spokesman for Saleh. “And that includes the son and nephews of the president.”

But Yahya al-Arasi, a media adviser for Hadi, said the vice president had a good relationship with the president’s son and nephews and that they listened to him. But Arasi also conceded that there would be real limits to the vice president’s power if he wanted to accede to growing calls by opposition leaders to move Saleh aside by creating a transitional presidential council.

The president’s many backers would make any such transition very difficult, Arasi said. “If we go in this direction, his supporters will burn everything.”

Before the political upheaval that broke out in Yemen this year, Saleh had been positioning Ahmed to take over as his successor, a plan that the Yemeni leader has since renounced.

But Ahmed remains head of the country’s Republican Guard and special forces. Amar, Saleh’s nephew, is deputy director for national security, while Yahye, another nephew, is head of the central security forces and the counterterrorism unit. Yet another nephew, Tarik, leads the Presidential Guard. Other relatives are in charge of the air force and in key political and diplomatic posts.

The influence of Saleh’s son and nephews can be seen all around this sprawling capital, where Republican Guards and other security units stand watch at checkpoints and patrol neighborhoods. On Wednesday night, a barrage of fireworks and gunfire, including heavy weaponry typically used by soldiers, pounded the sky for two hours celebrating a report that Saleh’s health was improving. The falling bullets injured scores of people.

The celebration was widely seen by Western diplomats and analysts as ordered by Ahmed Ali as a show of strength. But Arasi called it a “spontaneous expression of support for the president.”

One Yemeni security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said all military and security affairs were now being run by Ahmed and his cousins as well as Ali al-Anisi, the chief of national security. Hadi was handling the administrative issues of the government, the official added.

Ahmed Ali Saleh is widely seen as having a good relationship with senior ruling party leaders; Tarik is also seen as very influential and is considered a hard-liner. They have urged ruling party leaders not to discuss a transfer-of-power proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of Yemen’s neighbors led by Saudi Arabia, until Saleh returns to Yemen, according to Yemeni officials.

The GCC proposal, which calls for Saleh to officially hand over power to the vice president who then will create a transitional unity government until elections can be held, is widely seen by the United States and its allies as the best option for a peaceful transfer of power. Saleh has thrice agreed to sign the proposal but has reneged every time.

Some opposition leaders say that have yet to receive any response from Hadi regarding the GCC proposal, suggesting that leaders of the ruling party will not take such a step without the approval of Saleh’s sons and nephews, who in turn await instructions from him, said opposition leaders and diplomats.

“The president’s son and nephews want the situation to remain unchanged until the president comes back,” said Abdulqawe al-Qaisi, a spokesman for the Ahmar family, who lead Yemen’s largest tribal confederation and are Saleh’s main opponents.

Qahtan, the senior opposition leader, said drastic measures are needed to press forward. “The international community should tell the sons and nephews that the vice president is now the legitimate authority and that if he asks for international support, it will come, even military support,” he said. “And so they will be targeted.”

U.S. Military Strikes Target Yemen’s Revolution

The latest exposure of U.S. military operations in Yemen has generally been interpreted through one of two lenses: the Obama administration’s “active” response or a debate around the legality of drones. Both perspectives obscure the reality of unilateral military operations inside Yemen, as is often the case in the Western media.

These strikes demonstrate the weaknesses in U.S. policy, not the strength of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The idea that air-strikes represent engagement on the White House’s part qualifies as dark humor. Initial silence and ongoing bias towards Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime stemmed from prior military escalation, which increased the trust gap between Saleh, Yemenis and Washington. An imbalanced strategy allowed AQAP to expand since 2009, when U.S. military operations kicked into high gear, and throughout Yemen’s revolution after Saleh enabled a takeover of the south. The lack of alternatives to Saleh, conceded by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, jammed a unilateral political response and UN sanctions, as U.S. Special Forces had trained the murderous Republican Guard now unleashed on Yemeni protesters.

Far from an active response, U.S. military escalation results from political inaction before and during Yemen’s five-month revolution.

Legality, on the other hand, is tossed around to avoid the real debate: results on the ground. The reason for this diversion is simple: targeted strikes won’t degrade AQAP. Abu Ali al-Arithi, the mid-level AQAP commander terminated by drone last Friday, will surely be replaced. Meanwhile the laws of counterinsurgency are flagrantly violated in Yemen’s political, information and social spheres. With governance subverted beneath counter-terrorism, millions of Yemenis have been spooked to kill one replaceable commander, which also cost at least four civilian lives. Although U.S. officials limited their response to The New York Times’ report, they remain eager to boast of military success when no such progress exists.

The damage wouldn’t be so severe if these strikes were conducted within a wider political and economic strategy that supported Yemen’s revolution. Both the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and youth coalitions have pledged to combat AQAP once Saleh and his regime are washed away. Yet an opaque process has eliminated any possibility of transparency. While U.S. officials refuse to speculate on Saleh’s health, his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) continues to promise a return. New rallies planned in Sana’a appear designed to provoke fresh conflict with the pro-democracy movement.

U.S. obstruction on the political front, combined with unilateral military operations to “exploit” Yemen’s power vacuum, have produced a wholly unworkable strategy to promote democracy, stabilize the country and ultimately eliminate AQAP.

As of this moment Obama administration officials remain tuned out off Yemen’s political front, reinforcing how little Washington understands of full-spectrum fourth-generation warfare (4GW). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton only briefly waded into the conflict during a press conference in Abu Dhabi, dropping the standard U.S. line on Yemen amid a detailed conversation on Libya and Syria. Squeezing in one paragraph between the other two revolutions, Clinton remarked, “We continue to urge all sides to honor the ceasefire, and we support an immediate, orderly, and peaceful transition consistent with Yemen’s constitution.”

“I think it’s clear that we have worked very closely with our partners in the Gulf and others to try to bring about a peaceful transition.”

Such a statement routinely deflects legitimate criticism of U.S. policy in Yemen; State spokesman issued a verbatim copy on Wednesday. With Clinton detailed to Yemen on Thursday, the State Department skipped its revolution entirely. White House spokesman Jay Carney similarly responded with a brief reaction to U.S. military operations.

“It’s a very important part of our counterterrorism effort,” he explained. “We’ve made clear -- we have not in any way been secretive about it, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is an important threat to the United States and to our interests around the world. And we have worked very closely with the Yemeni government to go after al Qaeda, because of the threat that it represents. It’s a very -- it’s a serious issue.”

This loaded statement is difficult to break down, as rhetorically intended. Although U.S. officials express a constant fear of AQAP, U.S. policy has been notoriously secretive in Yemen, making under-the-table deals with Saleh that eventually flipped back on Washington. Startling is the fact that Carney would even mention Yemen’s collapsing president, given that he is widely accused of manipulating AQAP to coerce military aid and political protection from Washington. In the end drones will only create new problems in the absence of political direction, which Washington continues to lack.

Carney makes no mention of the political situation in Yemen, containing its revolution within a military context. Neither does CIA Director Leon Panetta, who testified on Thursday that AQAP represents an "immediate threat" to the U.S. homeland. He also admitted on Thursday, “We are continuing to work with those individuals in their government to try to go after AQAP. And we are continuing to receive cooperation from them.”

So much for the temporary halt to U.S. counter-terrorism support, which was no more than futile propaganda to whitewash America’s bias towards Saleh. Praising his regime won’t help either.

The U.S. narrative, far from political, remains overtly militaristic, fueling Yemenis’ rampant distrust of Washington. U.S. policy already stands neck deep in the mud after supporting Saleh and now a power transfer negotiated through the Gulf Cooperation Council, moves that bled the last of America’s credibility. While Clinton and other U.S. officials busy themselves speaking in the name of Yemen’s revolutionaries, the streets have largely rejected the GCC’s proposal as a foreign tool. Washington sees this initiative a “clear way forward” to circumvent the streets and ramp up counter-terrorism operations.

In supporting the GCC’s proxy proposal, largely authored by U.S. and Saudi diplomats, the Obama administration is obstructing a transition by clinging to an agreement no side accepts in full. The White House and Pentagon have “clearly worked very closely with our partners in the Gulf" - to suppress Yemen’s revolution.

Many Yemenis see the GCC as nothing more than a foreign plot, and possess little understanding of what it entails after repeated rewrites. Rather than illuminate these details, the White House is pressing forward in a vain effort to ignore them. Except it cannot run from the countless negative perceptions that have consumed the GCC’s proposal. Often considered the “U.S.-Saudi initiative” in Yemen’s streets, many revolutionaries view Saleh’s absence as political vagary at best, a foreign conspiracy at worst.

As for constitutional legitimacy, Clinton raises the argument in favor of Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Yemenis speak of constitutionalism as well, only out of fear that the GPC will usurp power, possibly through a military coup led by Saleh's son. U.S. diplomacy is speaking an alien language to Yemenis.

Despite assurances of an “immediate transition” through al-Hadi, day six of the “post-Saleh” regime is already passing through a foreign-induced power vacuum. Washington is lucky that Mohammad al-Mutawakkil, a leading JMP official, kept the GCC transfer open for an unspecified date. The JMP is keen to secure power through its own mechanism rather than risk losing influence in a popular transition council. However al-Mutawakkil warned that the JMP is out of time and credibility, and will back the revolutionaries’ transition's council if isolated from the streets.

Without accompanying political support for Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, U.S. missiles are interpreted not as an attack on AQAP but the revolution itself.

Somalia's Prime Minister Becomes Political Casualty

In an unsurprising development, the BBC is reporting that Somalia’s President and Parliamentary Speaker agreed to postpone a national election after months of political deadlock. Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden had denied his ally-turned-rival Sheikh Sharif Ahmed an extension to his presidential term, only to extend parliament’s own term by three years. Sharif responded by demanding an extension of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), mandated by the UN to expire on August 20th.

UN officials have spent the preceding weeks condemning most of the TFG’s behavior. Infighting became so severe that Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni threatened to pull his 5,000 troops out of Mogadishu if the UN didn’t grant Sharif’s request. The move backed Somalia’s president to the point that we speculated an early exit for Aden.


Not exactly. In a more surprising turn of events, Sharif and Aden reportedly reached an agreement only after dumping Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed.

On the job for a little over eight months, Mohamed managed to inject much-needed vitality in the TFG through a slimmer cabinet and savvy public relations. Always out in front of the African Union’s ongoing counteroffensive against al-Shabab, the U.S.-educated prime minister organized an extensive campaign in the U.S. media on his way to Somalia’s most successful period in years (relatively speaking). Troop salaries were delivered for the first time in months.

An unabashed critic of his own government, Mohamed has recently expressed legitimate fear that the TFG’s political crisis could jeopardize AU military gains. His efforts earned him a high reputation in comparison to Aden and his parliament, widely viewed as the TFG’s least productive and most corrupt component.

“He (the speaker) is not sincere on the general interest of the country because he running after his personal ends,” Mohamed warned two days ago. “We are at state of war against naughty militants, who are committed destroying our beloved nation, and that made impossible elections to be hold at this time. My government has several occasions attempted to have direct discussions with the speaker to end the internal rift, but all ended in vain.”

Now he finds himself out of power, to the displeasure of what could be a substantial number of protesters. And the question immediately shifts to whether Sharif and Amed’s agreement, assumed to be forced by Ugandan's hand, just threw new fuel on Somalia’s political crisis.

The New York Times has updated, "According to United Nations officials who work on Somalia, the speaker of Parliament wanted to install his own supporters in the upper reaches of the government and insisted that if the president was going to stay for another year, the prime minister had to go. According to the agreement, the prime minister will resign in 30 days. The president essentially sacrificed the prime minister to keep his own job."

White House Treating Yemen’s Revolutionaries as Afterthoughts

U.S. officials claim to have their “best interests” at heart, that “a peaceful and orderly transition... respects the aspirations of the Yemeni people.” From an air-conditioned bubble 7,000 miles from the broiling streets, they go so far as to insist Yemen’s revolutionaries want this themselves.

Then act like they barely exist.

“It’s important to keep the focus on where it should be,” State spokesman Mark Toner argued on Tuesday, “which is on the Yemeni people and this is really – these are decisions that they need to make. What we’re calling for is that the transition should begin for an orderly political process, and ultimately one that addresses the concerns that we’ve seen raised by the many protestors and demonstrators over these past weeks. But it’s really up to the government and the oppositions to -- the opposition members to get together and begin that process.”

The masses that Washington claims to speak for refuse to budge from their sit-ins around the country. With Vice President al-Hadi refusing power, Saleh’s son Ahmad retaining authority of Yemen's security forces, and a U.S.-Saudi “transition” encircling the streets, they realize the need to eliminate the vacuum that external forces are working independently to fill. Rather than cede their revolution to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) proposal, which would grant Saleh immunity and muck up the transition through his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), they demand an immediate a transitional coalition composed of publicly-approved figures.

Whether the GCC schedules an election in 90 days or two weeks, as an updated version suggests, protesters wish to construct a political framework for 6-12 months before holding an election.

Contrary to infrequent public announcements from the Obama administration, Yemen’s revolutionaries have been cut out of the political loop throughout their own uprising. The U.S. position stands solidly behind a proxy GCC proposal, a “power transfer” negotiated between Ali Abdullah Saleh, the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Washington and Riyadh. Although the popular opposition largely rejects the GCC’s interference as bias towards Saleh’s regime, U.S. officials falsely and shamelessly declare that Yemen’s pro-democracy movement backs the corrupted proposal.

U.S. policy in Yemen bears a resemblance to Saleh’s condition: half charred, full of shrapnel and bleeding internally.

While U.S. officials continue pressuring “acting” President al-Hadi and the JMP to work together, the JMP has threatened to join the popular coalition so long as the GPC insists on Saleh’s return. Ultimately America is trying to cobble together a new government out of two parties that don’t want to work together - or adequately represent the streets. “A peaceful and orderly transition... consistent with Yemen’s own constitution,” is but a leftover, stale argument from Egypt’s revolution. Such a “logical” argument flies in the face of popular demands for a new constitution.

No White House statement or high-level U.S. officials greeted Yemen’s revolution on Wednesday, leaving Toner to remark, “I think we’ve had a consistent message both publicly and privately with regard to Yemen, which is that they need to – and now with Saleh’s departure for Saudi Arabia where he continues to receive medical treatment, there’s – this isn’t a time for inaction. There is a government that remains in place there, and they need to seize the moment and move forward.”

So “consistent” is U.S. policy that it reached the pinnacle of inaction in Yemen. Paralyzed by a consistently counterproductive strategy, the Obama administration kept consistently silent as the revolution began to boil. Once this silence was broken by Saleh’s continual stalling and human rights abuses, the administration graduated to slow, repetitive and out-of-touch statements. In regards to al-Hadi, Yemen's acting president in name only, Saleh’s cabinet is heavily divided on how to move forward. His son and nephews remain in charge of his security forces, which at this moment continue to attack peaceful protesters.

Much to the Obama administration’s private displeasure, al-Hadi is simply not in a position to lead Yemen’s transition or make any decisions in the youth’s name. Yet U.S. officials continue to hype the GCC's proposal as a "clear path forward."

At least some parts of the U.S. media are willing to expose this dilemma: “As for Saleh's deputy, Abd Rabo Mansur Hadi is a characteristically weak figure, with no units of the military loyal to him personally. In a statement he provided to the ruling party committee, the vice president, in a shaky voice, simply said that Saleh's return was imminent, refusing to accept the responsibilities of acting president. Hadi's obvious ambivalence to assume power was something glaringly obvious to Yemen's pro-democracy protesters.”

Few U.S. outlets follow Time’s lead though. Rather than provide oversight, a disconnected media has further enabled Washington’s muddled policy to hit rock bottom. News corporations are consumed by AQAP and Yemen’s tribal fault-lines, or else continue to back the White House’s strategy in relation to Saudi Arabia, now considered the “smart play.” Few Yemenis want anything to do with the GCC or Saudi hegemony, yet the U.S. media has foregone independent reporting by copying Washington’s script.

“The best available policy nevertheless appears to be that being pursued by the Obama administration, which is pressing for acceptance of the deal brokered earlier this spring by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council,” writes The Washington Post after discounting the youth as “attractive” but disorganized.”

So too does Charles Schmitz put down Yemeni protesters as “disorganized,” a fashionable way to marginalize them in Washington. Almost universally, the mass driver behind Yemen’s revolution receives no more than a few paragraphs in any Western report. Schmitz argues in Foreign Policy, “The street demonstrators who have rocked Yemeni politics since February should not be confused with the formal opposition. They are not well organized, and their demands are vague calls for equality, ridding the country of corruption, and bringing economic growth.”

Yemen’s pre-revolutionary power axis does warrant consideration of all political actors. However the protesters themselves should not be drowned out so carelessly.

The Post stated its conclusion directly after admitting, “U.S. and Saudi interests in the Middle East are diverging as the kingdom seeks to prevent the spread of Arab democracy.” In supporting the GCC’s proposal, the Obama administration has similarly prevented Yemen’s democracy from growing. The West pushes the GCC because it overly simplifies an extremely complex process. Its terms will create new disorder by first stalling the revolution, then installing a shadow GPC government. Instead of moving to a transition council, weeks could pass in a power vacuum if Washington and Riyadh refuse to back down.

Like most major U.S. news sites, The Washington Post supported the GCC two weeks ago after Ambassador Gerald Feierstein was trapped in the UAE Embassy. Saleh then detonated Yemen’s crisis by manufacturing civil war against this own tribe. Schmitz and most Yemeni analysts toe the Washington line as U.S. policy remains in free-fall, ignoring the widespread disorganization on the GPC, Saudi and Western front.

Thus the U.S. government and media continue to work in tandem in suppressing Yemen’s revolution.

Manipulated in its present form, the Obama administration's support for the GCC’s proposal appears more concerned with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) than Yemen’s democracy. Beyond obstructing a transitional council currently under development in the streets, the GCC is designed to restart counter-terrorism support to the Yemeni government - specifically Ahmad's Republican Guard - which the Pentagon claims to have held in “abeyance” several days ago. Toner said the White House is “encouraged” by al-Hadi even though he refuses to accept power or negotiate with the JMP.

Asked, “So the cooperation could be extended to dealing with the acting president,” he explicitly replies, “Yes.”

Clearly al-Hadi serves the dual purpose of figure-heading a “unity” government and reconnecting Washington's counter-terrorism pipeline, if it ever went offline to begin with. The New York Times just reported that, in absence of political progress, the Pentagon decided to move ahead with unilateral strikes: “On Friday, American jets killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, a midlevel Qaeda operative, and several other militant suspects in a strike in southern Yemen. According to witnesses, four civilians were also killed in the airstrike.”

Because Washington remains confounded by Yemen’s revolution, it instinctively supports al-Hadi and the JMP as an alternative to the streets. As these short-sighted designs failed to produce results, the Obama administration decided to magnify its nearsightedness with unilateral military operations. A disastrous headline in itself, Yemenis have no doubt that Americas puts its own interests ahead of them.

U.S. policy is misreading Yemen’s revolution completely backwards: stall a political transition then overcompensate militarily. Theoretically the higher standard, governments remain in disorder while “disorderly” protesters organize themselves at a faster pace. The GPC, U.S., and Saudi positions writhe in disarray but nevertheless oppose Yemen’s revolution, yet are branded as the “order” Yemen needs. Meanwhile the streets, having mobilized millions of non-violent protesters and formulated as coherent a plan as the GCC, are discredited as “vague.”

U.S. policy is standing still as Yemenis march forward. So stands America in Yemen - upside-down, with its head in the sand.

A Real Democratic Transition In Yemen

Saudi Arabia finally bailed the White House out of Yemen’s political morass by extracting its wounded president over the weekend, ending months of waffling silence and repetition. Still, government sources claim that Ali Abdullah Saleh only agreed to board the King’s jet after his condition deteriorated, necessitating a secure location to recuperate. What are now reported as “serious second-degree burns,” shrapnel wounds in his chest, a collapsed lung and ruptured skull could take months to heal.

Western and Gulf actors assume that Saleh’s evacuation opened a gap to unlock Yemen’s political crisis. While this theory is partially true, external forces are already charting a reckless collision with Yemen’s pro-democracy movement.

Many Yemenis and observers believe that Saleh couldn’t return to Sana’a if he wanted to; either Riyadh and Washington will lock him down or the youth will seize him at the airport. He’s also considered to be politically decapitated at this point. Conversely, Saleh’s ruling General People’s Party (GPC) maintains his authority and promises a return. His son, Ahmad, and nephews still command his remaining security forces in major cities, threats that must be taken seriously despite mounting pressure on the Kingdom. Saleh’s government remains semi-hostile to Washington, normal behavior during their rocky relationship.

“The American government is mainly interested in a transfer of power from whomever to whomever,” said Ahmed al-Sufi, one of several presidential spokesman. “This is why they make up these stories. Definitely within a week, he will come back.”

Problematically, Saleh’s sudden exit runs a high risk of stunting Yemen’s growth under foreign interference. With the embattled president temporary removed from the equation, the Obama administration is lobbying Riyadh to squeeze his signature onto the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power transfer. U.S. and Saudi officials circumvented the street movement for two months by negotiating between the GPC and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), designing a favorable extraction to preserve their interests. The resulting “30-60” plan demanded Saleh's resignation in 30 days, followed by a two-month transition into a presidential election.

As Saleh and his family were granted immunity from widespread human rights abuses, along with 50% of a transitional council through the GPC, popular coalitions denounced the GCC’s initiative for usurping the revolution. Few trusted Saleh, a notorious two-face, to sign anyway.

That didn’t stop the Obama administration from clinging to the proposal even after Saleh besieged the UAE Embassy, trapping U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein in the melee. U.S. officials continued to advocate the GCC’s proposal - and Saleh’s “commitment to transfer power” - after he attacked the head of his own Hashid tribe. And after Saleh’s security forces rigged water cannons with gasoline to burn down Taiz’s “Freedom Square,” torching protesters alive. And during the ensuing weeks of “civil war” manufactured by a desperate Saleh. The JMP had labeled the GCC’s proposal as a “death sentence” by the time White House counter-terror chief John Brennan landed in Saudi Arabia.

Now the GCC is back to haunt Yemen’s democratic spirit.

The days surrounding Saleh’s assassination attempt moved the Obama administration as much as five months of revolution. Although issuing no reaction until Sunday night, two days after an explosion tore apart Saleh’s personal mosque, U.S. officials such as Vice President Joe Biden contacted his counterpart throughout Saturday. Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi suddenly found himself in charge just as Yemen’s constitution and the GCC stipulated, and Ambassador Feienstein met him on Sunday to promote continuity. Lingering troubles aside, Washington relished how the last 72 hours unfolded. The EU and even NATO jumped behind the GCC’s initiative as the only path to a “peaceful transition to democracy.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton inadvertently revealed the fatal flaw in U.S. policy on Monday: “The civilian government remains in power in Yemen. The vice president is currently serving as the acting president. And our position has not changed. It continues to remain the same.”

As Biden, Clinton, Feierstein and Brennan all frantically pressured “acting” al-Hadi to accept power, tens of thousands of protesters marched on his residence to issue their demands. Contrary to handing their transition over to the GPC (as the JMP already agreed to), Yemen’s popular opposition demands a transitional council be formed immediately to govern for 6-12 months. The JMP calls this the “alternative option" when it should be the first; so far al-Hadi and the GPC have rejected protesters and the JMP's overtures.

The Media Council of the Youth Revolution announced on Tuesday, “The youth are still protesting in front of the acting President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi's house... They demanded to start forming a Transitional Council that consists of national figures, urging Hadi to meet all the youths' demands.”

U.S. policy in Yemen requires a total strategic realignment. Nevertheless, parts of this situation could have run a different course through a transparent response. Factoring in the sensitivity around Saleh and contradictory statements from GPC and Saudi officials, the Obama administration still failed to deliver a clear message during the chaos. U.S. officials silently and immediately moved onto al-Hadi as if personally legitimizing his rule. Only late Sunday did the State Department first clarify, "Our position is still that we would call on Saleh to immediately begin a transition of power.” After multiple rewrites, many of them opposed by the JMP, the GCC’s terms are more ambiguous than ever.

“Immediate” remains undefined.

Considering that U.S. officials push this deal without offering details, not even the White House seems to understand how the GCC’s proposal would operate on the ground. So officials are resorting to blatant falsities in order to control Yemen’s transition. While Clinton claimed that a civilian government “remains in power,” al-Hadi is widely assumed to be acting as Ahmad’s mask until his father decides his future. Ambassador Feierstein met with the JMP on Monday to deliver another disturbing message: “cooperate with the vice president and the ruling party.” The State Department further urged the opposition to work with the GPC to form a “unity” government.

Not only is Ahmad running the show in his father’s absence, the White House is fuming that al-Hadi himself refused to accept the presidency. Rather than legitimatize Yemen’s revolutionary transition council, the Obama administration is again side-stepping the street coalitions by pressuring the JMP to negotiate with a resistant GPC - a policy both impractical and illogical.

Lobbying Riyadh to hold onto Saleh has become a red herring, as his exit forms part of a foreign scheme to retain influence in Yemen. While the Obama administration urged the Saudis to take “ownership” over the past months, Yemen’s pro-democracy movement unconditionally opposes a Saudi-led transition. Fears of a Saudi takeover are eclipsing the U.S.-backed GCC proposal; Riyadh will not foster political or economic reform, only seek to maintain a favorable status quo. The White House must fold on al-Hadi and the GCC’s rapid-fire election while opening direct communications with the popular revolution. Instead of colluding with the Kingdom (Bahrain) to install another weak regime, Western and Gulf states must recognize Yemen's transitional council as the legitimate government.

As Yemenis celebrate the lifting of a 33-year dark cloud, they also realize the next storm drifting over their new horizon. Saleh has been sacrificed to preserve his regime and keep him from snitching on the misuse of U.S. military aid. Threats of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continue to skyrocket, part of a campaign to seal the GCC’s proposal. Saleh was allowed to continue killing with impunity, yet the protesters are suddenly untrustworthy. They’ll fight over the transition process and ultimately succumb to tribal factions, or worse - extremists. AQAP will flourish. Thus Western and Gulf states must push for an immediate transition to cover up the last five months, recommitting the same mistakes rather than invest in Yemen’s transition.

For too long U.S. policy in Yemen emphasized security without democracy, unsurprisingly producing neither. Now the opposite strategy must be applied: give Yemen’s revolution the time and space it needs to grow independent.

Al Jazeera: Inside Yemen’s Power Vacuum

Al Jazeera Inside Story, featuring Hassan al-Haifi. Visit his newly-established blog, Yemen Common Sense, for updates from the ground.

Improving U.S.-Muslim Relations: My Fellow American

This video was sent to us by My Fellow American, an online film and social media project that calls upon concerned Americans to pledge and spread a message that Muslims are our fellow Americans.

Unfortunately the Arab Spring seems to be driving Americans and Muslims further apart in terms of perceptions and fears. Much blame is laid on the Islamic world inside and outside of America, either for not condemning extremism or participating in it. Some criticism is justified, but much of it ignores the disastrous state of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Barring a complete transformation from its present form, both sides may continue drifting further apart.

Pew Research reported in May, “With the exception of Indonesia, Obama remains unpopular in the Muslim nations polled, and most disapprove of the way he has handled calls for political change roiling the Middle East. Moreover, many of the concerns that have driven animosity toward the U.S. in recent years are still present -- a perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally, opposition to the war on terror, and fears of America as a military threat.”

Heated Afghan Summer: The Battle for July Withdrawals

Both sides are marshaling their forces, plotting their logistics and sizing up the opposition. Battle has already been joined, each side skirmishing with the other to improve their field position. Far from Afghanistan’s lush valleys, jagged peaks and a prickly Taliban insurgency, the White House and Pentagon are about to enter a test of strength over who truly runs America’s “civilian” military.

On Monday President Barack Obama convenes what may be his final national security meeting before deciding on July’s troop withdrawals. His Defense Secretary couldn’t wait.

The normally coy Robert Gates launched a preemptive blow on Sunday when he briefed the “Raider” Brigade in Kandahar. Billed as his farewell tour, Gates announced a bullish update on the war’s progress and staked out his position around the hotly-contested July withdrawal. After gratuitous warnings of “fragile gains," the Secretary hailed NATO advances in Kandahar province as “absolutely amazing. You have ejected the Taliban from their home territory.”

The most “hesitant” supporter of Obama’s surge, according to the U.S. media, now finds himself leading the assault against his boss. Gates’s remarks were soon countered by a New York Times report of a “steeper pullout,” which drew a clear battle line between the White House and Pentagon. With Osama bin Laden dead, Afghan President Hamid Karzai at odds with Washington and America’s economy refusing to heal properly, supporters of a “limited” war in Afghanistan are now trying to open a political exit for 2012.

Although they call these factors “new strategic considerations,” they also want to begin the draw-down before campaign season ends.

“These new considerations... are combining to create a counterweight to an approach favored by the departing secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, and top military commanders in the field,” says The Times. “They want gradual cuts that would keep American forces at a much higher combat strength well into next year, senior administration officials said.”

"I'd try to maximize my combat capability as long as this process goes on, Gates added. "That's a no-brainer."

The matter is set to be “debated intensely over the next two weeks,” capped by a national address from Obama later this month. However not much will change on Afghanistan’s ground during this time; the Taliban can still field between 15,000-20,000 fighters and local governance won't spring from the ground. More than 5,000 troops is militarily unrealistic, and removing a third of Obama's surge will facilitate the Taliban’s immediate expansion. Military gains will erode whatever negotiating leverage has been built up, creating the impression of defeat.

A decision is already locked in - the outcome depends on who outwits and out-muscles the other.

Back in Afghanistan Gates called for “support troops” to withdraw first, leaving “the shooters” for last. This plan accords with previous reports, and would see 1,000-3,000 troops exit along with a 1,500-member MEU that Gates deployed in 2010. No figures are given on the White House’s side, but 5,000 marks a plausible ceiling while also providing a juicy number for headlines. This force would also be broken down between combat and support troops.

Only so many non-combat troops can be withdrawn without negatively affecting those in the field.

Gates and General Davis Petraeus are supposedly facing down a clique headed by Vice President Joe Biden. Rather than a leader, Biden appears to be a pawn of those Democrats who want out of Afghanistan. He’s also likely speaking for Obama himself in an attempt to conceal his position, so Biden doesn't represent Gates’s real target. Nevertheless, as Obama's face, he appears to stand little chance of overcoming the Pentagon. Conversely, Gates is unlikely to isolate himself and will attempt to find a favorable “middle ground” that can save Obama’s credibility.

“No one wants to give up the gains that have been won at such a hard cost, and nobody wants to give our allies the excuse to run for the exits,” Gates told the Army’s 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Forward Operating Base Walton. “I have confidence that we’ll strike the right balance.”

In reality the Secretary is playing the “safety of the troops” card. Valid as this concern is, Gates has laid the responsibility on Obama’s desk and dared him to blink. Gates supported a beef-up surge from the beginning, contrary to media speculation, but didn’t want to challenge Obama’s authority. He even promised to stick to the 18-month time-line in a final Oval Office briefing, knowing full well that Petraeus was aiming for December 2011 rather than July.

One major dilemma of a military-centric strategy is undermining the very attempt to hold Taliban territory. “Shooters” aren't the ideal people to work with locals in developing governance, yet Gates appears ready to further concentrate on body counts. Unfortunately “Biden’s way” presents an equally disturbing outcome. Rather than deescalate the war as part of the withdrawal, Democrats also favor an increase in drone operations in Afghanistan. Current CIA head Leon Panetta, Obama’s future Defense Secretary, is another proponent of drone-centric warfare, contrary to counterinsurgency.

To many bin Laden's death vindicated quick counter-terrorism over prolonged COIN.

However those believing an “off-shore” strategy will accomplish anything more than killing Taliban and alienating Afghans could be gravely mistaken. Coupled with reduced forces in the field, Karzai’s resistance to night-raids and air-strikes, pervasive corruption and economic blight, and the “offshore theory” becomes a recipe for COIN disaster. U.S. Marine Corps Major General John Toolan warned, “The biggest fear for the Afghans is that we’ll leave and leave them cold without development projects.”

Gates and Biden’s strategies appear to be headed in a similar direction. Said Gates, "First of all it has to be acknowledged that these drones have a significant role in taking a lot of Taliban leaders, trainers off the table. The question really then becomes the role of the drones, our relationship with Pakistan and how this all fits together."

Both the Secretary and NYT also claim that the latest strategy review “is about far more than how many troops to take out in July.” A separate timetable will reportedly announce the departure of all foreign troops by 2014, now standing at about 130,000. Although politically appealing, such a time-line doesn’t appear to be any more realistic than a “steep” July withdrawal. “Looking past” this summer also sounds eerily similar to previous chatter in 2010, when Pentagon officials thought they succeeded in pushing Americans “past 2011.”

“It’s really not so much about where you start, but what the next year and a half to two years looks like,” Gates said. “We have to look at it strategically like that and not just focus on the front end of this and whatever number gets announced in July.”

Gates is the leading U.S. advocate of a residual force after 2014. While Karzai and many Afghans want foreign troops gone by then, the Secretary told U.S. troops in March, "Obviously it would be a small fraction of the presence that we have today, but I think we're willing to do that... My sense is, they (Afghan officials) are interested in having us do that."

U.S. officials love to hype the Taliban’s military setbacks and the political divisions triggered within its ranks. Less mentioned is the fact that these same divisions exist within the White House and Pentagon. Gates’s confidence belies the tension building between these forces. Soon he will receive a final chance to prove who’s stronger.

Saudi TV: Saleh To Return To Yemen

"Saleh will come back. Saleh is in good health, and he may give up the authority one day but it has to be in a constitutional way. Calm has returned. Coups have failed. ... We are not in Libya, and Saleh is not calling for civil war."

- Abdul Al Janadi, Yemen's deputy information minister

"The Yemeni people will do all in their power to not allow Saleh to re-enter the country. We will work with all our strength to prevent his return. We see this as the beginning of the end of this tyrannical and corrupt regime."

- Mohammed Qahtan, spokesman for the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)

Although Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's health is reportedly worse than expected, his aides haven't given up on a return to Sana'a. Tareq Shami, spokesman for the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) insisted, "He will continue leading the country as he has been with no changes." And while Washington continues to urge him to take a favorable immunity offer through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), his son and nephews continue to operate in the capital.

On Monday government snipers opened fire on Sadiq al-Ahmar’s militia despite a Saudi-brokered ceasefire.

Disinformation still reigns for now. U.S., European, and Gulf media alike have interpreted Saudi Arabia as the lead story in Yemen’s revolution. Minimized in their reporting despite being the revolution’s driver, Yemen’s pro-democracy movement is already working to preempt U.S.-Saudi interference with a transitional council.

Updated analysis coming soon.

Yemen's Assassination Aftermath: U.S. Recognizes VP Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi

After feasting on fear and blood for decades, the wind is finally reversing towards Ali Abdullah Saleh. At midnight Saturday, Yemen’s president of 33 years reportedly stepped off a Saudi jet at King Khalid Air Base in Riyadh, where he transferred to a military hospital for treatment on his assassination wounds. Rumors swirl around Friday’s encounter with death, and an instantly-infamous evac is already being celebrated as the beginning of the revolution’s end.

As disinformation and scheming form the nucleus of Saleh’s governing style, information around the last 48 hours must be subjected to intense scrutiny. Vigilance is all the more necessary during this critical phase in the revolution.

The entirety of Saleh’s assassination attempt remains shrouded in darkness; chaos naturally flows from his being. Although attention immediately turned to Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, attacked by Saleh nearly two weeks ago in an attempt to provoke Yemen’s tribal lines, the Hashid chieftain has denied responsibility. Many still suspect that the al-Ahmars, Yemen’s most powerful family, wanted to show Saleh who’s the real “Boss” in Yemen. Security forces also shelled three of Sadiq’s brothers (Hamid, Hemyar and Mizhij) directly after the palace breach.

However others doubt that Hashid fighters possess the means to target Saleh so precisely inside his compound. Some news outlets are reporting an “advanced” rocket unused by Sadiq's militia. An accurate mortar strike cannot be ruled out, either by skill or luck, but splitting the pulpit amid Saleh’s ranking staff has generated a sizable number of skeptics. According to government sources Saleh's “inner circle” is beginning to suspect rogue General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, whose house was also shelled after the attack. Saleh will justify killing his rivals by any means, accounting for retaliatory attacks on the al-Ahmars and his former right-hand man.

A U.S. drone hovers over the mystery after Yemeni officials cryptically condemned the White House for “inciting assassination.” The State Department brushed off the accusation as “absurd,” but the Pentagon knows how much Saleh knows about U.S. military aid - and that he’ll snitch.

Regardless of who pulled the trigger, the extent of Saleh’s wounds has assumed priority for the moment. A high number of casualties within his bodyguards fueled rumors that he suffered more damage than officially acknowledged. A raspy tape released after the attempt multiplied speculation that Saleh was either seriously injured or dead. These rumors appeared to be disqualified after the BBC and Reuters reported him walking off of the plane.

Being self-conscious of his appearance also accords with Saleh’s narcissistic character. Rather than appear weak, playing to his strengths - deceit and chaos - is likely to hold greater appeal.

The overriding dilemma is that Saleh never operates in a straightforward fashion, and isn’t likely to start now. Some Yemeni officials still put Saleh in Sana’a, others concede his trip to Riyadh; his injuries range from second-degree burns on his head and hands to a 7.6 cm piece of shrapnel embedded below his heart. Such an injury would prove more laborious than minor burns, leading to the question of when Saleh plans to return.

This variable marks the event horizon currently breaking down most predictions.

While the hesitant euphoria of Yemen’s revolutionaries is certainly justified, Saleh’s temporary exit has thrown their cause into new disarray. The risk of misreporting, already running high, now increases with everyone guessing of his return. The U.S. media hasn’t paid attention to Yemen’s revolution and is in no position to make an accurate call now. Yet the information vacuum surrounding Saleh’s retreat is conducive to wild media speculation.

The AP reported, “Saleh might never return, given the opposition by large segments of the population and a powerful tribal alliance that took up arms after peaceful protests failed to persuade him to step down.”

"He is unlikely ever to return to Yemen as president," The Guardian similarly predicted.

That Saleh won’t return must be considered as a possible scenario. Battered and nearly bankrupt, Saleh might have finally realized his end and fled. A significant portion of his U.S.-trained Republican Guard has defected and he certainly wishes to avoid the punishment of their actions. As a long-time friend, King Abdullah would provide a comfy refuge where Saleh could live out the rest of his days in peace, oblivious to the outside world and his legacy as a brutal dictator.

This possibility has encouraged the belief that Saleh passively accepted the U.S-Saudi proposal sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or else was coerced by Washington and Riyadh to safeguard their interests. Reports now have Vice President Abd al-Rabi Mansur al-Hadi as acting president, the second step to transferring power “constitutionally” after Saleh’s resignation. Perhaps the GCC’s deal kicked into immediate effect rather than wait the allocated 30 days.

Saleh’s son and nephews, who remain in control of his personal security forces, would presumably be rescued from Sana'a.

Except if Saleh truly accepted the GCC’s terms, such a plan remains a highly controversial way of “moving Yemen forward." The streets oppose Saleh escaping on his terms and leaving his ruling General People’s Party (GPC) to reassert control through the next election. Saleh himself has threatened to stage his own uprising inside or outside of the country. Left at large and his shadow will loom over Yemen’s future, undermining a total regime change.

Only international powers would welcome this outcome as it could preserve counter-terrorism operations against AQAP, counterproductive as this arrangement is during counterinsurgency.

Coupled with a call from White House CT adviser John Brennan, Yemeni journalist Munir Al Mawri told Al Jazeera from Washington, "US Vice-President Joe Biden has already phoned the Yemeni Vice-President [Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi], indicating that the US accepts him as the one to take over power in Yemen... I think the Saudis will never allow Saleh to go back to Yemen because they care about their interests inside Yemen."

In fact U.S. ambassador Gerald Feierstein, who has no contact with the youth coalitions, just met with al-Hadi. Feierstein reportedly hoped for "the quick recovery of President Ali Abdullah Saleh," and "affirmed" America's "full cooperation in all that concerns peace, stability and unity in Yemen."

This overt takeover is an affront to the revolution. Yemen needs legitimate closure to Saleh's regime, not more artificial chaos and foreign manipulation.

An “orderly transition” is unlikely to follow an abrupt exit, which in turn appears to enjoy low odds. Staying out of Yemen and thanking Washington for extracting him is a smart play, but Saleh was never keen on rationality. Sometimes the will to survive overtakes logic. One Yemeni government official said that al-Hadi would take over, "should the president be incapacitated,” not that Saleh had temporarily transferred power. By leaving his son, Ahmad, and nephews to hold down the capital (they just met al-Hadi), Saleh appears prepared to return on a script of coups, chaos and civil war.

One Saudi official told the AFP early Sunday morning, "President Saleh has arrived in Riyadh for treatment, but he will return to Yemen.”

Transformative history is unfolding in Yemen and Saleh may be on his last leg, but the streets’ building sense of optimism must be directed into the death blow. Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) and other popular coalitions are advising caution, and now offers a breather to reinforce defenses in preparation of a final showdown. An information offensive must target Western governments and media to block their manipulation of Saleh’s temporary absence.

If he decides to spare his life (which is all he cares about) or is blocked by Riyadh and Washington, the pro-democracy movement can expand on the ground and proceed against Saleh’s remnants until a free Yemen is truly born. Several coalitions have demanded that he actually appear within 24 hours or else they will declare an official government. One cannot sleep on a madman or Washington, and the next 24 to 72 hours present both opportunities and dangers to prepare for.

"This is absolutely despicable," CCYRC spokesman Jamal Nasser warned of Saleh's mysterious departure. "After all we have sacrificed, after all the lives that were lost, Saudi and Saleh are trying to dupe us again. This isn't the end. There will be more violence. Saleh isn't done yet."

U.S. Policy Jammed On Yemen's Revolution

Nearly two weeks have elapsed since Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s teetering dictator of 33 years, picked a fight with his own Hashid tribe. 24 hours hadn’t passed since his “besieged embassy” act, which Saleh used to scuttle the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) final attempt to transfer power. Since then multiple massacres and war crimes have occurred under the umbrella of manufactured civil war and al-Qaeda’s expansion.

Clever as he may be, Saleh is widely believed to have lost his grip on reality. The Obama administration isn’t far behind.

On Friday, in complete defiance of Saleh’s brutality and the demands of Yemen’s revolutionaries, the White House repeated its standard call to accept a dead GCC proposal. While the U.S. and many parts of the international media continue to report “pressure” from the Obama administration, this pressure is nearly as artificial as Saleh’s self-induced “civil war.” The GCC deal is a rotting corpse - the streets buried it alive before Saleh defiled it - and Yemen’s tribal network has closed ranks around the youth's revolution. Rather than divide the country, the political situation stands as one clique versus the masses. This equilibrium could shatter after Saleh’s fall, but the U.S. media has grossly misreported Yemen’s revolution.

After Friday's mass funeral procession, Imam Taha al-Mutawakil told his audience that Saleh, "wants to overturn this revolution and show the world that it is a conflict between (Hashid chieftain Sheikh Sadiq) al-Ahmar."

The chasm between perception and reality in Yemen stems in part from the Obama administration’s silence over the last five months. Cover-up, to be specific. Under the Pentagon’s watchful eye, the White House has scrambled to hide U.S. support for Saleh and potential complicity in his Republican Guard, now attacking tribal fighters and peaceful protesters. Despite Washington’s blaring terror alarms and Yemen’s position atop The Economist’s “Shoethrower Index,” the country fell below Egypt, Libya and Syria in priority, neutralizing extensive media coverage.

One reason rises above a host of contenders to explain why Washington fears Yemen's revolution: AQAP is one of the weakest links in U.S. foreign policy. The revolution has been made to feel like an afterthought because of strategic deficiency on the administration's part, conceded by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in March. A five-week blackout in the White House and State Department’s briefings exists between April 18th and May 23rd, the Monday after U.S. ambassador Gerald Feierstein was trapped in the UAE Embassy in Sana'a. Since then the U.S. position hasn’t moved even though Yemen’s situation is rapidly escalating.

Relative to Saleh’s own maneuvers, U.S. policy isn’t treading water but drowning.

More than two months ago, President Barack Obama himself entered the fray after a horrific sniper attack on Change Square. He hasn’t returned since announcing, “It is more important than ever for all sides to participate in an open and transparent process that addresses the legitimate concerns of the Yemeni people, and provides a peaceful, orderly and democratic path to a stronger and more prosperous nation.”

The ensuing GCC’s “30-60” deal unfolded in shadows. Negotiated during the April/May black hole, U.S. and Saudi officials exploited the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Yemen’s political opposition, to freeze out the street movement. Few details were offered, even the JMP was misled at the cost of its remaining credibility, and Yemen sank into deeper conflict. Nevertheless, on May 18th, John Brennan phoned Saleh to inform him, “this transfer of power represents the best path forward for Yemen to become a more secure, unified, and prosperous nation and for the Yemeni people to realize their aspirations for peace and political reform.”

As of Friday the Obama administration (and European Union) refuses to open its eyes to rivers of blood flowing from peaceful sit-ins. Faced with a "civil war" and an assassination attempt on Saleh, the administration synchronized its response in a disturbing display of group-think. Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism, already tried to jumpstart the dead GCC proposal in Saudi Arabia and UAE, seemingly to no avail. Undeterred, U.S. spokesmen Jay Carney, Tommy Vietor and Mark Toner repeated a phrase they have likely memorized by now.

Using Saleh’s assassination attempt to rebuke the Hashid tribe, the White House issued a statement calling, “on all sides to cease hostilities immediately and to pursue an orderly and peaceful process of transferring political power as called for in the GCC-brokered agreement.”

Over a month ago the White House, “applauded the announcements by the Yemeni Government and the opposition that they have accepted the GCC-brokered agreement to resolve the political crisis in a peaceful and orderly manner.”

Meanwhile at the State Department, spokesman Mark Toner told reporters on May 23rd, “we believe that President Saleh still has the ability and the opportunity to sign this initiative and break this deadlock.” Thus the administration put the crisis “in Saleh’s hands.” On May 31st, after security forces bulldozed Taiz’s “Freedom Square,” Toner reiterated, “Again, this is a situation where there’s a path forward, and President Saleh just needs to live up to commitments he’s made to accept the GCC’s agreement and to move Yemen forward.”

Each time U.S. officials point out Saleh’s reneging, only to repeat his “commitment to transfer power.” Ignoring hundreds of casualties and Saleh’s violent struggle to survive, Toner said yesterday, “And again, our efforts are trying to convince President Saleh that this agreement is the best way forward, it’s the way – it puts – it charts a path, if you will, for Yemen to move out of this period of crisis and to move towards a democratic transition.”

“Clearly, the deteriorating situation in Yemen can only be addressed through a peaceful and orderly transfer of power,” he said today. “And so we, again, call on President Saleh to move immediately to heed the calls of the Yemeni people.”

Informed that a government spokesman just blamed Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for “inciting assassination,” Toner remarked “that’s absurd.”

He continued in equally absurd fashion, “Again, our focus has been in working with the government and with President Saleh in support of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s proposal. And again, that, we believe, charts the best way forward into something that President Saleh, as we’ve said repeatedly over the past week or so, should live up to his commitment and sign.”

The GCC is only serving as political cover to a clueless and helpless administration; neither Saleh, the JMP nor Yemen’s revolutionaries accept the proposal. Particularly disturbing is how the GCC’s proposal “heeds the calls of the Yemeni people,” contrary to the mood in Yemen's streets. Saleh himself likes to pander to the “youth revolution” while slandering the JMP - his own negotiating partner - and the White House has sadly adopted his tactic.

"I salute our armed forces and the security forces for standing up firmly to confront this challenge by an outlaw gang that has nothing to do with the so-called youth revolution," Saleh said in a recording released after the assassination attempt.

“We urge all sides to heed the wishes of the Yemeni people, whose aspirations include peace, reform, and prosperity,” Carney echoed from the same script.

Unbroken interplay between Saleh and White House demonstrates the residual connections that continue to gunk up Yemen’s revolution. Human rights abuses transpire in obscurity. The charred corpses in Taiz, products of water cannons converted into gasoline flamethrowers, would have provoked international condemnation in Libya or Syria. Instead the massacre was barely acknowledged relative to the scale of the crime, shocking Yemen’s pro-democracy movement.

At the political level, Saleh has never intended to sign the GCC’s proposal, instead manipulating it to stall for time. After manufacturing a civil war with his tribe and allowing AQAP to operate freely in the south, U.S. officials appeal to Saleh’s “commitment” and a “peaceful and orderly transition.” Washington has and continues to follow an irrational dictator rather than lead the free world.

“I don’t have anything beyond what we’ve said before,” Carney concluded on Friday, “which is that we obviously condemn the violence on both sides, that we hope that there will be and that there should be a negotiated settlement in Yemen, and that we believe that President Saleh should sign the agreement transferring power.”

Still confusing a revolution for a political crisis to be “negotiated” and “settled.” This statement alone indicates that Obama administration, after five months to prepare for a post-Saleh Yemen, remains lost in the waves of the Arab Spring.

Sobering Up From Ali Abdullah Saleh

The Obama administration suffers from an addiction problem: dependency, abuse, relapse. Being hooked on Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s embattled ruler of 33 years, detrimentally affects the lives of countless people. Some Yemenis have died, many more have bled and nearly all dream of a brighter future.

In ignoring these problems and fulfilling Saleh’s own dependency, U.S. foreign policy hit rock bottom. Now it's time to get clean and rebound.

U.S. officials insist that Yemen’s non-violent revolution is debunking al-Qaeda’s violent ideology. However the month since Obama’s bin Laden’s death has validated his underlying narrative of corrupt Western puppets, and President Barack Obama’s missed his “Moment of Opportunity” by reinforcing Yemen’s isolation. The “realism” of supporting Saleh evaporated after al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) capitalized on his weak and unpopular regime. Saleh is also suspected of enabling AQAP’s growth during Yemen’s revolution by withdrawing his U.S.-trained forces, creating artificial opportunities to strike back and “prove his worth.”

Pro-democracy protesters wanting nothing to do with al-Qaeda are increasingly outraged that their peaceful revolution is so casually ignored. They’re also demoralized over the U.S. media’s hyper-focus on al-Qaeda and civil war - two threats manufactured by a besieged Saleh. Yemen’s Coordinating Council for the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), a leading street coalition, shrewdly observed, “American foreign policy always seems to be short sited because it is based on what is believed rather than the facts on the ground.”

Contrary to the belief that the White House backed away from Saleh in early April, the ensuing U.S.-sponsored proposal with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has consistently favored Saleh and his regime. Before the GCC itself pronounced the proposal dead last week - after Saleh interrupted a signing ceremony at the UAE Embassy and attacked his own Hashid tribe - the strongmen was due to enjoy a 30-day reprieve until transferring power. The proposal also granted immunity for Saleh and his family members, several of which head his U.S.-funded security apparatus, and would allocate 50% of a transition council to his ruling General People’s Party (GPC).

By gradually reversing open support for Saleh - Defense Secretary Robert Gates praised his cooperation as late as March - the Obama administration created a shallow political illusion of joining Yemen's pro-democracy movement. U.S. policy coordinated with Saleh’s own stall tactics: pandering to the youth while politically isolating them. In vivid contrast to international efforts targeting Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, including UN sanctions and recommendation to the Human Rights Commission, the administration continues to avoid hard tactics to squeeze Saleh from power.

Deploying John Brennan to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is the latest attempt to unjustly extract him, rather than leave his fate in the Yemeni people’s hands. The White House’s counter-terror chief has pressured Saleh numerous times in vain, and sends the wrong message during what should be a diplomatic mission. After condemning the horrific crackdown on Taiz’s Freedom Square, the White House explained of Brennan’s trip, “These tragic events underscore the need for President Saleh to sign the GCC-brokered transition proposal and to begin the transfer of power immediately.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed this position offhand during remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota.

The Obama administration currently supports a dead and illegitimate proposal backed solely by itself and Riyadh, a position that is draining the last of America's credibility in Yemen. A “peaceful and orderly” transition, which Saleh never actually "committed" to, is a mythical beast under GCC terms. Negotiated over the heads of millions of protesters through the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the Western-backed proposal encountered immediate rejection from the leading popular coalitions. The reality is that Yemen’s revolutionaries were locked out of negotiations because they rejected the GCC’s intervention outright.

Yemen's popular position runs counter to the GCC-U.S. proposal: Saleh’s immediate resignation, prosecution of all those involved in human rights abuses and neutralization of the GPC. Protesters want Western governments to seize any of Saleh’s international funds, then politically suffocate him through the UN Security Council and International Criminal Court. They also request emergency humanitarian aid. These measures are considered practical in comparison to the West’s own “pragmatic” steps. With former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak scheduled for an August trial, Yemen’s revolutionaries will accept nothing less than total and unconditional regime change.

Never a true friend of America, Saleh is now exposing his lunacy to the world at large. Yemen’s strongman functioned as steroids for U.S. policy - a quick fix with deadly long-term consequences. Granting the revolution’s demands for a free and equal Yemen is the best option to neutralize AQAP, though it will force Washington to confront its skeletons. The U.S. position, as a base platform, must abandon the GCC’s hollow proposal and sever military ties with Saleh. Having finally bowed to street pressure, the JMP’s Mohamed Salem Basandwa forwarded a letter to the international community through the UAE Embassy - just in time for Brennan’s visit. This letter labeled the GCC's initiative as a “death sentence” for Yemen’s revolution.

“The Saleh regime should be held responsible for killing the GCC plan and its attempts to drive the country to violence and state terrorism as an alternative to the efforts by Yemen's neighbors and friends to contain the situation.”

To truly move Yemen forward, U.S. and GCC diplomats must correct their fatal error of freezing the youth out of the negotiating process. Sending a senior counter-terrorism official to Saudi Arabia is wholly counterproductive. U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein has also spent more time with Saleh than the protesters, a bias that hasn't gone unnoticed. The CCYRC and other coalitions endured minimal contact with U.S. diplomats over the last two months, and the CCYRC succinctly clarified, “The US embassy does not dialogue with us.”

Yemen’s revolutionaries will ultimately achieve their goals with or without international support. The Obama administration would be wise to believe in them over Saleh - and no leap of faith is required.

Museveni Threatens Withdrawal From Somalia

In the last six months the African Union (AU) has steadily advanced across Mogadishu, cleaning out pockets of al-Shabab in a systematic sweep of the capital. The Bakaara market, long held by al-Shahab, is close to falling into government hands. Meanwhile troops from Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a and their Ethiopian armor have tied the insurgency down behind its front line.

Although many AU soldiers have been lost and a sizable portion of Mogadishu remains under al-Shabab’s control, the group hasn’t suffered this much pressure during its five-year history. AU commanders also speak COIN (even if they don’t exactly match it with action), promising not to harm civilians and keeping a hand open to militants willing to cross over. The possibility of the AU suddenly evaporating should be enough to scare Western capitals.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni warned the international community on Friday, "If the current system collapses, or if it is seriously undermined, we can have no justification to stay in that situation - we will leave Somalia."

Given Uganda’s proximity to the fragile nation, Museveni’s latest statements may be nothing more than a political tactic. Leaving isn’t an option; Uganda could face al-Shabab’s retribution for the past years whether the group regains ground or not. However Museveni does want everyone to know where he stands in public. Augustine Mahiga, the UN’s special envoy to Somalia, recently proposed a power-sharing agreement to loosen the TFG’s gridlock, a vague and controversial arrangement to another controversial arrangement.

With the TFG’s mandate due to expire on August 20th, a great volume of debate has gone into the possibility of a 12-month extension.

The strategic dilemma also rests on a personal feud between President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. Among the many grievances surrounding the battle over a new constitution, Aden has blocked Sharif from a term extension while approving his own in parliament. This issue alone has jammed the TFG and attracted scathing rebukes from the UN and Washington. Conflict over a national election, urged by the UN but considered unrealistic by many political actors, adds to the present tension. As a result the Western money flow to the TFG and AU, already seeping out of corrupt politicians’ briefcases, has dried to a trickle.

Political progress in Somalia is running inversely proportional to military gains, an unstable trend in counterinsurgency. Museveni is threatening to pull his 5,000 troops out of Somalia unless an extension is granted to the TFG. He explains in reference to Mahiga’s “win-win” theory, "We believe that to have a win-win situation, we should allow the TFG complete their tasks, after all Somalia has been unstable for the last two decades.”

“Why should one year be a big issue?”

While we consider Museveni himself to be a liability in the TFG’s grand strategy, he’s correct in assuming that Somalia cannot hold elections by August. He’s also adhering to COIN by linking political progress to military commitments, although Museveni may simply care about securing Western-held funds. The major risk comes in extending the TFG’s mandate without resolving the current crisis. Both Sharif and Aden are unlikely to share power judging by their personal history and the magnitude of their divisions.

In backing Sharif’s solution over Aden - the TFG president supported Museveni's "wise and logical" decision "100 per cent" - Uganda's president may be setting up a move against Somalia's Speaker. After Mahiga criticized the TFG for being a “waste,” Sharif responded that he hadn’t met the UN envoy “in a long time,” and jibbed, "it seems he is not aware of what has been going on. May be he needs more details."

The UN is unlikely to muster the political weight necessary to break this deadlock. Conversely, Museveni appears to be backing Sharif and might have the muscle to force Aden out. The president received a hero’s welcome during his last visit to Mogadishu and possesses the unilateral power to make TFG officials move. Or his emergence could further inflame Somalia’s crisis.

Either way Museveni’s position - not to mention his domestic situation - will be factored into the TFG’s end game. Today marks the first of many volleys to come.

Joint U.S.-Pakistani Team Feeds Shehzad Conspiracy

Another day, another conspiracy in Pakistan. In the latest unusual coincidence, news of Washington and Islamabad’s joint-intelligence team to hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders has leaked amid a frenzy of U.S. military visitors. Though meant to assassinate high-ranking militant leadership, the team is also being assembled to demonstrate the renewed strength of U.S.-Pakistani ties.

For their next meeting, maybe U.S. officials can get to the bottom of Syed Saleem Shehzad’s assassination.

Shehzad’s torturous death has shaken Pakistan’s civil society to the core - shocked truth-seekers around the world - and the effects are eerily similar to Osama bin Laden’s killing. Shehzad further proves that no one is safe in Pakistan, except this time the culprits appear to be of Pakistani origin. While the Afghan Taliban had no reason to kill the Asia Times Online’s Pakistan Bureau Chief, who served as one of their mouthpieces, al-Qaeda and TTP leadership may have diverged in ideology.

However the real killers are widely assumed to work for Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which has supported a variety of militant groups over the last three decades.

Shehzad uncovered these shadows for the majority of this time, and numerous theories attempt to explain why the Pakistani military would suddenly terminate him now. Blackmailed last October, he was finally found dead days after reporting on the attack inside PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi. al-Qaeda had infiltrated a number of cells into the Pakistani navy, forcing Islamabad to eventually arrest more than a dozen suspects. al-Qaeda proceeded to issue threats against naval targets and one cell decided to take action after bin Laden’s death at the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs in Abbottabad. The ISI recently demanded that Saleem reveal his sources, who in turn refused and provoked Rear Admiral Adnan Nawaz and Commodore Khalid Pervaiz.

"This killing bears all the hallmarks of previous killings perpetrated by Pakistani intelligence agencies," said Ali Dayan Hasan, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch in South Asia.

While we fundamentally sympathize with America’s historically destabilizing influence in Pakistan, we aren’t oblivious to its self-induced erosion either. The public has lost trust in nearly every part of the government, the economy lies in ruins, and the ISI remains divided over the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s presence in the region. Yet if true, the Pakistani navy’s involvement in Shezhad’s death reveals much more than an ISI assassination; the order and coverup would stretch all the way to the top.

Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, “The United States strongly condemns the abduction and killing of reporter Syed Saleem Shehzad,” few Pakistanis expect the transparent investigation that she called for. Washington’s support doesn’t inspire confidence. An odd exchange between State spokesman Mark Toner and journalists only added to the confusion surrounding Shehzad’s death.

So because these governments “trust” each other so much, they’re now taking the extraordinary step of forming a joint team tasked strictly to al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. The top five targets include al Qaeda’s new head, Ayman al-Zawahri, and operations chief Atiya Abdel Rahman, and Taliban leaders Mullah Omar and Siraj Haqqani, thought to be untouchable in Pakistan. Clearly the U.S. hopes to silence all doubt by cutting off every remaining head of the "terror" hydra.

Such a strategy may work in the context of a larger political and economic scheme. Or it might further alienate the militant’s rank and file rather than force their surrender, in addition to covering up Afghanistan’s lack of non-military progress. The overriding question is whether Islamabad will actually move on those assets that still respect its command, and the answer depends on its trust gap with Washington.

With Shezhad’s death hanging directly over these high-level meetings, both events appear to be products of the same smoke and mirrors.