Real Problem in Afghan War - Pakistan, India, Kashmir

By Mohsin Hamid, from The Washington Post

LAHORE - The United States is struggling to implement a strategy for Afghanistan that will improve the lives of the Afghan people and allow U.S. troops to go home. Part of what makes it so difficult is the way Washington views the conflict: through the lens of what officials have dubbed "AfPak," a war in the southern part of Afghanistan and the adjoining border areas of Pakistan. Though the acronym is falling out of official favor, the AfPak mind-set remains.

A different shorthand for the war might help. "AfPInd" may be less catchy, but it is far more useful. Peace in AfPInd requires not U.S. troops on the ground, but a concerted effort to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table, where under the watchful eyes of the international community they can end their hydra-headed confrontation over Kashmir.

But that's not how the United States sees this conflict. Mutual mistrust has bedeviled the U.S.-Pakistani alliance since the Afghan war began in 2001. Certain suspicions surfaced again recently in military documents revealed by WikiLeaks alleging that members of the Pakistani intelligence agency collaborated with militant groups fighting the United States in Afghanistan. Both Pakistani and U.S. officials have said that the information is old, unreliable and not true to the situation on the ground. Yet the recriminations and controversy have a "here we go again" feel. After all, we've seen this pattern before.

In 1947, when Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan were partitioned into two countries, the status of the region of Kashmir, with a Muslim-majority population and a Hindu prince, was unresolved. The United Nations said Kashmiris should hold a referendum, but both India and Pakistan seized parts of the territory, and since then the two countries have been at each other's throats.

Enter the United States -- not once, but three times.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan and the United States were allies. The United States gave Pakistan weapons and $2 billion in economic aid; it thought that the Pakistani military would be a bulwark against communism. The Pakistani military thought the United States would help it against a much larger and hostile India.

Then India and Pakistan went to war in 1965. American leaders castigated Pakistan for using U.S.-supplied weapons and terminated the alliance.

Fast forward to the 1980s, and Pakistan and the United States once again were allies. The United States gave Pakistan weapons and $3 billion in economic aid; it thought that the Pakistani military would be a bulwark against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military thought the United States would help it against a much larger and hostile India.

Then the Soviets were defeated. The United States castigated Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons (to counter India) and terminated the alliance.

Today, Pakistan and the United States are allies for a third time. Over the past decade, the United States has given Pakistan weapons and $4 billion (and counting) in economic aid; it hopes that the Pakistani military will be a bulwark against terrorist groups in the region. The Pakistani military hopes the United States will help it against a much larger and hostile India. Then . . .

By now, the recurring failure in the Pakistan-U.S. alliance should be obvious: The Pakistani military views it primarily as a means of reducing the threat from India, and the United States does not.

But perhaps the United States should.

The reason the Pakistani military continued to back jihadist groups, jointly set up with the CIA in the 1980s, after the Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan was that it believed the same tactics could be used in Kashmir against India. And the reason the Pakistani military remains obsessed with shaping events in Afghanistan is because that country is the site of a power struggle between Pakistan and India -- what commentators in Pakistan go so far as to call a "proxy war." It is what Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistan army chief, means when he speaks of Pakistan's desire for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan.

Fighting terrorists or fighting the Taliban -- or indeed, fighting in Afghanistan at all -- addresses symptoms rather than the disease in South Asia: the horrific, wasteful, tragic and dangerous six-decade confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

This confrontation ravages Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance, which was organized to fight the Taliban, is backed by money and weapons from India, and militant groups among the southern Pashtuns are backed by Pakistan. It is a big part of why peace eludes the country, even though the Soviets left a generation ago.

Ignore Kashmir, as the United States does, and the conflict seems incomprehensible. Include Kashmir in the picture, and it all makes sense.

At the moment, the Pakistani military uses militant groups to put pressure on India to negotiate, and India uses terrorism as an excuse not to negotiate. By so doing, both sides harm themselves greatly. The vast majority of people in South Asia, who like myself desire peace built on compromise, find our hopes held hostage by security hawks.

The situation is not improving. India's stance toward Pakistan has hardened since attacks by Pakistan-based militants on Mumbai killed 173 people in 2008. And here in Pakistan, militants are killing even more civilians, police officers and soldiers every month -- more than 3,000 Pakistanis in 2009. Some of the preschools I'm considering for my daughter now have snipers on their roofs and steel barricades at their gates.

Meanwhile, the United States has placed 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, where they can do little to eliminate the single biggest problem that nation faces: being made into a battleground by its neighbors.

The United States still sets much of the global agenda. If it hopes to salvage any remotely positive outcome from its massive, nine-year-old war in Afghanistan, then it should move a resolution over Kashmir up on its list of priorities.

Peace in AfPak is failing because the term itself is a willful illusion. Peace in AfPInd will not be easy, but the term rings true, and that at least offers a start.

Mohsin Hamid is a writer based in Pakistan. His most recent novel is "The Reluctant Fundamentalist."

Immortal Guerrilla Technique: The TTP's Devolution

Reaching a maximum diameter of four millimeters, Turritopsis nutricula has earned itself one of nature’s mightiest nicknames - the immortal jellyfish. Turritopsis nutricula possesses a unique ability to infinitely transform old cells into new ones and revert from medusa to polyp, the beginning stage of hydrozoan jellyfish. No surprise, then, that an organism this unconventional shares its trait with unconventional human affairs.

Guerrilla warfare similarly moves forward and backward through evolutionary stages, keeping guerrilla movements alive for what seems like an eternity.

Sifwat Ghayur is dead, the chief of Pakistan’s Frontier Constabulary assassinated in Peshawar by a teenage suicide bomber of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With 25,000 men in its ranks, the Frontier Constabulary serves as Islamabad’s paramilitary police force in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province) and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). And since its local knowledge and skill is accentuated by training from US Special Forces, Pakistan and America’s condemnation was entirely predictable.

"We have lost a very brave and able official in this cowardly attack," said Mian Iftikhar Hussain, the information minister for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. "It doesn't mean the terrorists are gaining strength, but they have been beaten and are targeting those who are active in the war against terrorism."

Though Hussain is a brave man - the TTP murdered his son a week before Ghayur - his words aren’t entirely true.

A more accurate reading of the TTP’s health resembles the life-cycle of Turritopsis nutricula. The TTP isn’t gaining in strength but it hasn’t been beaten, instead devolving from insurgency to a heightened form of terrorism in response to intense Pakistani military operations. The TTP’s stubborn potency is visible without examining the stages of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Described as “widely respected and a “bold police officer... credited with many of the successes in the war against Pakistani militants,” Ghayur’s death culminates several weeks of political assassination in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The TTP has vowed more attacks and there’s no reason to doubt its ability. Senior Provincial Minister Bashir Bilour claimed the TTP is going “berserk” after failing to achieve its goal, but killing a key member of Pakistan’s (and America’s) relatively successful military campaign in the FATA is perfectly rational. That the TTP suffered a military and popularity setback is undeniable; no longer does it reign freely in South Waziristan, Bajaur, or Swat.

But guerrilla warfare both evolves and dies in stages.

Dissenters of any government first combine and extend their political, economic, and social contacts to build a platform to fight on. If local support and resources permit they skip directly to insurgency and multiply in the open, conducting guerrilla attacks on government and military personnel while offering services to their own populace. Otherwise clandestine cells target government, economic, and media installations, along with those civilians who collaborate with these entities, using semi-discriminate terror attacks. In this way militants hope to capture enough popular appeal to evolve into a widespread insurgency.

These two methods outline rural and urban (or foco) insurgency, and history demonstrates the former is far more successful than the latter. RAND recently concluded from a study on how insurgencies end that the government’s odds of victory improve from 25% in a rural state to 75% in an urban state, and the TTP, despite its urban tendencies, remains rural based. The final phase of an insurgency then crystallizes in pure guerrilla warfare, which the TTP shows no potential of.

Here guerrillas enjoy so much support that they became legitimate political actors in a state, Hezbollah and the Sandinista National Liberation Front being two examples.

Militants generally evolve and devolve between phases of guerrilla war in accordance to their environment. Some insurgencies survive for a decade or more in terrorist form, like the FARC or ETA. The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, disadvantaged on an island from the beginning, regressed more than 15 years before collapsing. And guerrilla movements sometimes survive because they devolve, like the Taliban after 2001, making the ability to transform a necessary component of guerrilla warfare. The TTP had to devolve or be crushed by Pakistan’s frontal assault and will regroup over time.

Denying the conditions for its evolution becomes more important than killing foot soldiers and commanders.

Turritopsis nutricula is only theoretically immortal as it makes for easy prey. The way to kill it is to swallow it whole, illustrating why guerrillas are so hard to destroy - modern armies lack the capability to destroy a guerrilla organization in one moment. Always a piecemeal endeavor, the guerrilla body as a whole regenerates individual cells to keep itself alive.

The inability to destroy a guerrilla force all at once ultimately gave rise to the central pillar of counterinsurgency: protect the population. Instead of simply eliminating militants like a virus, all measures - limited force, responsive government, economic opportunity, social development - are directed towards preventing the making of new ones. So as guerrilla war evolves in states, so to does counterinsurgency.

Though it may not function as the ideal initial phase, a military sweep is often the first practical measure taken. The second phase of non-military development launches as the area is cleared and dovetails into holding operations. While counter-terrorism operations run in the background, political and economic reforms take precedent and assume the counterinsurgency's public face. That which is destroyed is rebuilt to secure local support. Thus the guerrilla steadily loses political, economic, and social power after his military power, impeding his ability to regenerate.

He degenerates into an insurgent, possessing less political and military power, and finally into a terrorist, which are most easily isolated in the final stage of a successful counterinsurgency. At least that’s the theory.

Unfortunately Pakistan may be stuck in the second phase of counterinsurgency for the indefinite future. While the FATA’s conditions have improved since Pakistan’s military campaign began in 2009, the non-military side hasn’t achieved the same progress. The TTP began re-infiltrating a war-scarred Swat before Maulana Fazlullah, the local commander, surfaced after being presumed dead, even before floods engulfed its residents. Now the TTP is capitalizing on the military’s distractions with floods and urban riots in Karachi by re-infiltrating dormant agencies.

Though thousands of TTP fighters have been killed, a similar amount is believed to have weathered the storm in Pakistani safe havens like North Waziristan and in Afghanistan, biding their time for the opportunity to reemerge.

Swat’s urgency is readily apparent in America’s latest humanitarian effort. While one target is Pakistani “hearts and minds,” reports of an increasingly active Taliban also drive Washington’s promises. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has taken the lead in Pakistani assistance, but she’s well aware of regenerating TTP cells too. At this point the focus is on currying local support to ward off the TTP’s specter.

That isn’t to say national Pakistani opinion is irrelevant; anti-US sentiment may be the single greatest factor in keeping US actions in check and Taliban approval above water. US popularity has undergone a minute improvement, if that, once more calling the TTP’s “defeat” into question. The TTP’s self-stated goal is an Islamic emirate in South Waziristan, followed by the FATA, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. A primary condition for this objective is the removal of US forces, which necessitates anti-US sentiment.

To this extent the TTP hasn’t failed, although through limited doing of its own. America has completed the task by itself, decreasing the efficiency of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency by sowing suspicions between Pakistanis and the government.

Observe the latest controversy surrounding US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who in a recent interview with ABC was questioned on North Waziristan’s status and its relation to President Barack Obama’s July 2011 deadline. Though Gates makes clear that Washington wants to see more action from Pakistan, he never actually says what the Pakistani press runs with: a veiled threat of operations “on both sides of the border.”

This phrase never appears in Gates’ transcript, highlighting the durability of Pakistani suspicions. After Clinton’s humanitarian mission in July, where she called for Pakistani action against al-Qaeda, Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen landed in Islamabad demanding action against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Haqqani Network. UK Prime Minister David Cameron would then allude to Pakistan’s support of the Haqqanis after Wikileaks, in India no less.

The message resonated loud and clear: do more.

But while Pakistanis generally express anxiety towards the ISI’s dual strategy, another feeling is all too common. With Clinton unable to wash away the impression she had come for North Waziristan and Mullen reinforcing it, the West then used Pakistan as a scapegoat for Wikileaks rather than address its own shortcomings in Afghanistan. This is the perception America competes against as it airlifts supplies into Swat.

Offering significant humanitarian assistance is the right thing to do, politically and morally, but America has aided in disaster relief before (the 2005 earthquake) and failed to overcome the systemic failures of US foreign policy towards Pakistan. And it’s not like TTP elements and cousins like LeT-affiliated Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) aren’t helping either flood victims either.

Meanwhile the weak point in Pakistani hearts stays untouched. Though eager to condemn LeT as a global threat, much to India’s delight, Kashmir’s unrest has unfolded in the silent shadow of the US State Department. Day after day passes with no mention of Kashmir’s battle for self-determination, nor the many youths caught in the crossfire of Indian security forces. It’s obvious to many that the region belongs to India in America’s eyes, and that Pakistan is a pawn in their geopolitical games.

UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon went to so far as to retract comments his office made on Kashmir, which, given the level of suspicion, was once again viewed as US interference.

By avoiding those issues Pakistan wants addressed and pressuring it where it’s most sensitive, America is solidifying the impression of a fair-weather friend and undermining Islamabad’s counterinsurgency. The “do more” mantra erodes the potential of US aid. Accumulating anti-US sentiment obstructs Pakistani officials from acting as Washington demands, ultimately keeping alive TTP sympathy and further obstructing development. Terrorists can flourish endlessly in such an environment, and possibly evolve back into insurgents if the government doesn’t meet expectations in the FATA.

While the TTP is unlikely to ever win its war, it will exist so long as US hegemony dictates the region, leaving the final stage of killing terrorists and eliminating their growth unachievable. Pakistan must improve relations with its people in all areas of society while also limiting US influence in policy, which would boost America’s image. And the TTP’s political agenda would shrink, leaving it open to permanent defeat.

The Taliban isn’t immortal, but it could seem that way by the time Pakistan's counterinsurgency finally ends.

Portrait of Afghanistan

A compatible family has a hard enough time synchronizing at one given moment. Those families that see less than eye to eye face all the more difficulty when staring at the camera in unison. Commotion followed by a quick freeze, then renewed wrestling, a flash of tranquility in a turbulent sky.

And for a brief moment in July, US officials got everyone to look in the same direction during Kabul’s international conference.

A masterpiece of choreography, Western governments and media packaged the conference as a turning point in Afghanistan. Karzai’s fraudulent election long forgotten, US President Barack Obama declared from Washington, “The Kabul Conference shows that... Afghanistan has the support of the international community, including the United States, which will remain a long-term partner for the security and progress of the Afghan people.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, just in from a diplomatic tour in Pakistan, hailed President Hamid Karzai’s efforts: “The Afghan government is stepping forward to deal with a multitude of difficult challenges. We are encouraged by much of what we see, particularly their work to improve governance. These steps are important. But much more work remains."

US officials paid special attention to scrubbing away the stain of corruption. Special envoy Richard C. Holbrooke returned to tell Congress that US-funded task force operations successfully targeted corrupt individuals inside Afghanistan's government, declaring it proof that Karzai “is serious about fighting corruption.”

Until he ordered probes into those anti-corruption units, citing breaches in the constitution and human rights abuses. Some analysts claim Karzai is being squeezed by those fragments in his power base coming under threat.

Now The Washington Post reports, “Obama administration officials fear that a move by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to assert control over U.S.-backed corruption investigations might provoke the biggest crisis in U.S.-Afghan relations since last year's fraud-riddled election and could further threaten congressional approval of billions of dollars in pending aid.”

Rep. Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.), a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee, has already threatened to withhold approval of $4 billion in non-military aid to Afghanistan for fiscal 2011. She responded in an interview for the story that Karzai's actions are "extremely troubling” and “put at jeopardy our mission."

"That money will not go forward until I get clearance that the promises and commitments that have been made by the Afghan government to work in good faith to stop corruption have taken place.”

The White House and Pentagon have shown less concern, desperate for funds and standing on their last leg in Karzai. US Secretary Robert Gates warns that delaying support for US soldiers puts them at risk, true to a point, but the influence is negligible compared to the erratic Karzai, a potential black-hole within US strategy. Holbrooke admitted to Lowey's subcommittee last week, “if corruption isn't dealt with, other things won't succeed. We had stated that it was a malignancy that could destroy everything else we were doing."

Said one NATO official involved in anti-corruption, "It has progressively gotten worse. It's at all levels.” And another Western official, "There is no political will on the government side to do anything that is meaningful, although everybody knows they have to say the word 'corruption' every time they talk about Afghanistan.”

"The U.S. had made strengthening the Afghan government's capability to combat corruption a priority," retired Marine Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields, special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, said in a report released Thursday. "However, the majority of U.S. reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan has been provided without the benefit of an approved comprehensive U.S. anti-corruption strategy."

No blaming Wikileaks now. With the lights dimmed US and Afghan officials are back to political feuds, Washington’s perfect picture in Kabul spoiled by behind-the-scenes footage.

Politicians Make Poor Counterinsurgents

Is it more than coincidence that on the same day the US State Department released its annual country reports on terrorism, 14 US citizens were arrested for providing financial support to al-Shabab? Proves the threat is real and that law enforcement is on top of it. Counter-terrorism officials had already dispersed into the media, providing them rapid access to spinning the story. Intentional or not the two events played well for Washington, as their timing led to the same outcome.

Like the latest bombings in Kampala, Uganda, any terror-related news involving Somalia only invokes reactionary fear in America, not rationality. Wars are driven, not resolved, by this thinking.

"This is a very disturbing trend that we have been intensely investigating in recent years,” said US attorney general Eric Holder, “and will continue to investigate and will root out. But we must also work to prevent this type of radicalization from ever taking hold.”

Now Holder may be a fine lawyer, except he's no counterinsurgent and that is the skill in question. Somalia isn’t “a terrorism” but an insurgency, which few US official are willing to differentiate. al-Shabab cannot simply be killed off or arrested, the conditions that enable it to thrive must be neutralized. Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty offered a short statement: “This is a stark reminder that the threat of terrorism is not limited to faraway places. We must remain aggressive and vigilant in combating terrorism both at home and abroad.”

And Rep. Tim Walz, who represents the Rochester district where several suspects were arrested, vowed, “Terrorists around the world need to clearly understand that this country will never rest until their extremist ideology is eliminated whether it be in Somalia, Afghanistan or on the streets of Rochester. From my experience meeting with our special forces in the Horn of Africa and in meetings with the FBI held in my Rochester office, it is clear we need to remain vigilant and focused on defeating terrorism here and around the world.”

These men may or may not be capable in their positions, but they demonstrate limited familiarity with counterinsurgency. None offer any motive why these 20 suspects from Minnesota were driven to “radicalization” and “terror,” only that their kind must be defeated “around the world.” Were America to do as they say and increase military activity in Somalia, through drone strikes or overt Special Forces for example, radicalization within the Western Somali diaspora would increase.

“As demonstrated by the charges unsealed today,” Holder said, “we are seeing an increasing number of individuals, including U.S. citizens, who have become captivated by extremist ideology and have taken steps to carry out terrorist objectives, either at home or abroad. It’s a disturbing trend that we have been intensely investigating.”

But given Washington’s push for extra African Union (AU) troops in Somalia, the war itself appears immune from investigation. Daniel Benjamin, State Department coordinator for counter-terrorism, toed the same initial line that home-grown Islamist radicalization is a “disturbing trend,” only he added “it is also a trend that was to be expected.” Unwilling as he too appears to question Somalia’s root conflict, he cited Ethiopia’s invasion in 2006 as a source of “a great deal of anger.”

Rarely stated in the media is that Minnesota houses around 30,000 Somali immigrants, the most in America, and many are refugees. The AP reports, “20 men from the U.S. — all but one of Somali descent — left Minnesota from December 2007 through October 2009 to join al-Shabab.” The include 33-year-old Amina Farah Ali and 63-year-old Hawa Mohamed Hassan, Abdikadir Ali Abdi, 19; Abdisalan Hussein Ali, 21; and Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, 33) and two others (Farah Mohamed Beledi, 26; and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, 26).

While US officials hype a “direct terror pipeline,” most avoid the direct pipeline between Ethiopia’s US-sponsored invasion and today’s events.

Holder labels the suspect list as evidence that, “we are seeing an increasing number of individuals, including U.S. citizens, who have become captivated by extremist ideology,” but only one isn’t of Somali descent. Nor have they merely been “captivated,” witnessing Somalia’s suffering and foreign meddling first hand. Benjamin also warned that another Ethiopian-style event “could foment radical support.”

And here goes a new Ugandan-led, AU backed, US funded intervention into Somalia, against the advice of many regional and international analysts and officials.

America would reconsider US foreign policy - seemingly endless wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, or Israeli unilateralism - were it serious about correcting the upswing in “homegrown” radicalization. Thursday's arrests as President Barack Obama’s non-military focus, but this is erroneous. America has long driven AU and foreign intervention, whether Bush or Obama, leading to a massive Somali diaspora vulnerable to al-Shabab’s influence. With the AU’s latest mission likely to prove indecisive and further destabilize the conflict, Somalis will continue seeking refuge in the West and some will inevitably come to disdain the West.

Listening to politicians who cannot separate counter-terrorism from counterinsurgency offers a fast track to escalation and radicalization.

Calderon Puts Drug Debate in Obama’s Hands.

The toll of Mexico’s drug war weighs heavily around President Felipe Calderon’s neck. Leaking political fuel from a fatal milestone - 28,000 dead since 2006 - Calderon ended a three day conference on national security with what The Los Angeles Times described as “unscripted remarks.”

"This has become an activity that defies the government,” he warned, “and even seeks to replace the state. They are trying to impose a monopoly by force of arms, and are even trying to impose their own laws... Their business is no longer just the traffic of drugs. Their business is to dominate everyone else.”

Calderon’s evaluation of the cartels’ threat may be overblown. With the cartels showing no tangible indications of weakness, even after suffering key casualties, multiplying skeptics have left Calderon few choices other than to hype the threat. The fault isn’t his alone, as his task would overwhelm most anyone, but leading with the military in a counterinsurgency decreases stability over the long-term.

Though we’re less than certain, the cartels give off an impression of commercialist and preservationist insurgents - preserving the status quo for monetary gain. Before 2006 they enjoyed relative autonomy. Now, constantly under attack, the cartels’ seek to break the state’s will to fight in order to resume business. We interpret this as different from replacing the state outright or secessionism. The cartels desire quasi-statehood inside Mexico to prevent unrestricted foreign military aggression, basically any kind of regional autonomy to continue their drug operations.

It’s hard enough to believe the cartels would be able to supplant the Mexican government and conventionally defeat the military. The cartels have amassed a frighteningly high-tech arsenal, travel in state vehicles, and Kevlar is standard attire, but they would need to unite to have any real chance, an unrealistic possibility. Replacing the state is too much additional work. Hamas knows a thing or two about getting too deep in administration.

Of course Mexico’s cartels could seek the state’s destruction too. One cannot risk assumptions, they could dream of seizing military hardware and manipulating economic laws. But total domination doesn’t appear to enjoy high odds.

Nevertheless Calderon’s remarks included significant progress. The Los Angeles Times reports, “He acknowledged the need to significantly alter the drug war strategy to include education as well as addiction and jobs programs and to involve greater segments of society, including religious groups.”

This would be the start of real counterinsurgency, a welcome admission at a time when Calderon’s strategy (and America’s) is being accused of military centricity. Calderon lashed out at critics by claiming they want to give into the cartels, but what they really want is a holistic strategy that targets all aspects of society. Calderon has made similar statements before, but he grows more obliged to deliver a change in strategy as the bodies mount. And he must convince President Barack Obama to do the same.

Most positive is Calderon’s concession that the debate on legalization be thrown open. While Calderon insists he remains opposed to legalization, Mexico already decriminalized small amounts of drugs and mulled legalization. Several officials at the national security conference had raised the issue, citing California’s decriminalization bill among other evidence, prompting Calderon to warn that Mexico’s youth could be endangered.

But Calderon's office issued a statement late Tuesday saying that he no longer opposed a debate - a debate that terrifies most US officials.

“Belying his traditional reluctance to accept any questioning of the military-focused offensive,” in The Guardian’s words, Calderon admitted, "It is a fundamental debate. You have to analyze carefully the pros and cons and key arguments on both sides."

Calderon qualified the economic impact of legalization with valid points: potential decreased prices and exporting to the international market. Price fluctuation was recently addressed in a RAND analysis that predicted up to an 80% drop in marijuana prices and a 50-100% increase in consumption. Economic impact would be minimal under these conditions, an estimated $300 million in revenue. RAND notes at the end that its analysis is inherently unpredictable, and there are reasons to doubt such a minimal impact.

A price drop doesn’t favor the cartels either.

Realistically legalization is not the answer to the American drug war, which is a more proper name for a theater that stretches from Peru to Canada. But decriminalization of marijuana in America, the major consumer, and Mexico, accompanied by social health programs, is one aspect of full-spectrum counterinsurgency. As the insurgent attempts to induce death by a thousand cuts, so too must the counterinsurgent bleed the insurgent dry prick after prick.

The White House has lauded its “new” civilian approach to Mexico when military still outpaces non-military spending. America isn’t ready for decriminalization, but it must at least prepare for the debate.

Obama Defends His 'Good War'

By Robert Grenier, from Al Jazera:

It is the nature of politicians to take credit for whatever they can when things go well, and to avoid blame as much as possible when things do not. This week the administration of Barack Obama, the US president, has worked hard to do both in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, but in so doing, it may be further entangling itself in a trap of its own making.

In Atlanta on Monday, Obama was not shy in taking credit for claimed successes in Iraq. The successes he chose to stress, however, were telling. They in fact had little to do with Iraq itself, but rather more with the fidelity his administration has shown in meeting its timetable for the withdrawal of US forces, and for bringing the US military engagement there to a "responsible end".

There is more than a little irony in the sight of Obama taking credit for the results of a redoubled US effort in Iraq which he actively opposed as a senator and as a presidential candidate.

That irony is compounded by the president's current stress on the US' ongoing transition from a military-led effort in Iraq to a civilian effort dominated by diplomats, when the pervasive complaint heard from many key figures across the political spectrum in Iraq has to do precisely with a lack of diplomatic engagement from the US.

Iraq has been in post-election political gridlock for four months now, unable to form a government or even to convene its parliament, while looking in vain for some sign of political energy or imagination from its US partner to help break the impasse.

Similarly, the current US administration has shown little attention to the need to negotiate the details of a Strategic Framework Agreement called for between Iraq and the US, despite the importance of such an agreement in setting the tone and expectations for the US' future engagement with Iraq - and despite the recent US investment in Iraq of over 4,400 troops killed, over 31,500 wounded, and nearly $1 trillion spent.

'War of choice'

Instead, the success in Iraq touted by the US president now is the withdrawal of 90,000 troops, with the promise of more to come by the end of 2011. "The message is that when the president makes a commitment, he keeps it," as the White House deputy press secretary proclaimed.

Obama should be wary of a focus on commitments, however, as this could ultimately prove unhelpful where Afghanistan is concerned. For as much as the Iraq war was, in candidate Obama's telling, George Bush's ill-considered and costly "war of choice," the war in Afghanistan, in sharp contrast, was a comparatively under-resourced "war of necessity".

Once president, Obama wasted no time in making this "good war" his own, launching a full policy review and then announcing a new and highly ambitious Afghan nation-building strategy with appropriate fanfare in March, 2009.

At that time, President Obama differentiated himself from his predecessor not by the greater modesty of his aims - he adopted all of the ambitious goals tacitly set by the Bush White House in Afghanistan - but by his commitment to resource the effort adequately for success.

That "commitment," however, was dealt a severe blow when the extent of the resources required to fulfill it began to come into clearer focus. Informed by his then-newly-arrived commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, that some 40,000 additional troops, over-and-above the 21,000 Obama had already added to the Bush administration's total, would be required just for a chance of success, the president demanded yet another policy review.

He emerged several months later with distinctly less ardor for an open-ended exercise in Afghan nation-building and a timetable for the start, at least, of a US withdrawal.

The al-Qaeda link

Obama has always been careful to tie the US effort in Afghanistan to the over-arching imperative to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat" al-Qaeda, the organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks and still clearly committed to a campaign against the US and the West.

That tie-in was again very much on display in Atlanta this week, as the president spoke before a war veterans group. The effort against the Taliban, he indicated, was fully justified, for "if Afghanistan were to be engulfed by an even wider insurgency, al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates would have even more space to plan their next attacks. As president of the United States, I refuse to let that happen".

He went on: "In this region and beyond, we will tolerate no safe haven for al-Qaeda and their extremist allies."

For the time being, the president is clinging on principle to the need to confront al-Qaeda, and justifying the sacrifices associated with a problematic - some would say failing - counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan on that basis.

However, having rejected in his last policy review a less far-reaching approach in Afghanistan, one focused much more precisely on counter-terrorism aims, and advocated by his own vice-president, no less, Obama is going to have difficulty justifying the broad counter-insurgency effort currently underway unless his new commander, General David Petraeus, is able to produce a clear turn-around, and quickly.

For all that Obama continues to assert that his campaign in Afghanistan is "focused on goals that are clear and achievable," it seems that a rapidly-developing majority in his own party is becoming convinced that his goals there are neither.

It is hard to see how the president is going to avoid an abrupt change in policy between now and his self-imposed deadline of next summer, no matter how vigorously he pursues his current PR campaign in defence of the current one.

Robert Grenier was the CIA's chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1999 to 2002. He was also the director of the CIA's counter-terrorism centre

Drizzle in Lebanon, or Calm Before Storm?

Now a little theory on Lebanon. Today’s events could be a volcano letting off steam, but there’s no ruling out an eruption either. We’re waiting for new clashes to break out and a trend to develop before predicting a full-blown war. It does seem that Israel’s day in the sun won’t be followed by an encore though.

One day it yields to the UN, the next it attacks. One step forward, two steps back. Business as usual.

Israel and Lebanon exist in a state of 4th generation warfare, where the media may be more a decisive arena than the military. Both sides blame each other absolutely and contradictory, sparking a ferocious propaganda battle. Each supplied rapid information to favorable media sources as the incident unfolded in order to distort the actual events.

Israel says its forces approached “The Tree,” which both sides claim, in coordination with UNIFIL officials. Lebanese forces had mustered on their side of the border. An Associated Press photo showed an Israeli standing on a crane reaching over the fence that Israel erected to separate the two countries. The IDF argues, "It was over the fence but still within Israeli territory.”

At that point a verbal battle occurred, followed by one of two events. Either Lebanese snipers, acting under independent command of a higher officer, opened fire on an Israeli outpost, killing Lt. Col. Dov Harari and seriously wounding Captain Ezra Lakia. The IDF now claims the entire situation was an ambush planned by that same officer.

Or, as Lebanon claims, “Israelis crossed onto Lebanese soil despite calls from the U.N. and Lebanon to stop. When the Israelis persisted, Lebanese troops opened fire with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.” Israel responded with tank and helicopter fire, killing two Lebanese soldiers and a journalist. How Harari and Lakia were hit wasn’t explained.

Israel would be suicidal to start a new war with Lebanon. It will gain no diversion from Palestine and Iran, only scorn. But Israel's objective doesn't appear to be a diversion; its propaganda barrage indicates an attempt to regain US and European sympathy and channel it those spheres. Pressuring UNIFIL to clamp down on Hezbollah is likely a secondary goal. Said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, "I hold the Lebanese government directly responsible for this provocation.”

But he’s been saying the same of Palestinians for the last month. Netanyahu has no benefit of the doubt - he’s cried wolf too many times. And even if Lebanon opened fire first, now was a provocative time to cut down a controversial tree. MSNBC's picture isn't flattering.

Conversely, foreign factors seeking a diversion cannot be ruled out on the Lebanese side. Iran, Syria, and Egypt, all of them constantly probing for Israel’s weak-points, offered immediate military support. Or a Lebanese officer simply hated Israel enough to risk a regional war. In any case the most responsible actor appears to be Hezbollah. By offering assistance while also refraining from entering the fray, Nasrallah attached himself to Lebanon’s defense while highlighting his force’s discipline.

He is the winner in today’s clash, a Sun Tzu-like victory without fighting.

This is especially why any Israeli aggression inside Lebanon would be self-defeating. Israel was able to lean on IDF casualties and hostages to justify the July war in 2006. An exploitable George Bush was also necessary. Hezbollah clearly wants to make sure Israel starts the next conflict so that it can fight a total war with the Lebanese army. Nasrallah believes, were Israel to instigate the war, that he would win on the ground, in the international community, and in the media.

As the Freedom flotilla comes under UN investigation and America echoes Israel's call for direct talks with the Palestinians, Netanyahu would not enjoy the one month Washington approved in during 2006. World support wouldn’t last a week, maybe not even a day.

[Update: A UNIFIL official has, “confirmed that we received notification from the IDF about the work and we passed the information on to the Lebanese Army.” However Lebanon doesn’t dispute UNIFIL’s awareness, as its soldiers deployed after UNIFIL communication. More importantly, the official believed the tree in question resided in Israeli territory. A technical team dispatched to analyze the scene found that the tree was indeed on Israel’s side of the blue line, but the area is still under inspection.

The Haaretz also reports, “Israel will launch a diplomatic campaign calling on the United States and France to stop their military assistance to Lebanon following Tuesday's exchange of fire on the northern border.”]

Minutes of Israeli-Lebanese Clash

Not much to add to Gregg Carlstrom’s round by round update on the skirmish between Israeli and Lebanese soldiers. From Al Jazeera:

12:45pm: There are many conflicting reports from southern Lebanon, but the latest confirmed details right now (from the Lebanese defense ministry) are that three Lebanese soldiers were killed, and four others wounded. There are also reports of an Israeli soldier killed in the fighting - the Al-Manar television station, which is run by Hezbollah, has carried that story for an hour or so - but no confirmation from the Israeli military.

A journalist was also killed in the fighting; Lebanese media are identifying him as Assaf Abou Rahhal, from the Al-Akhbar newspaper.

12:51pm: Saad Hariri, the Lebanese prime minister, and Michel Sleiman, the Lebanese president, were the first two senior Lebanese politicians to comment on the clash. Hariri's statement was predictable: It condemned Israel's "violation of Lebanese sovereignty" and demanded that the UN stop the fighting.

Sleiman said much the same thing, but he also included a message for the Lebanese army, asking it to "confront any Israeli aggression, whatever the sacrifices."

12:56pm: Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, meanwhile, said Israel "holds the Lebanese government responsible" for the incident. This recent violation is one of many violations of Resolution 1701, the most severe of which is the massive rearmament of Hizbullah, including the rearmament of Hizbullah units in southern Lebanon.

He also directed the Israeli representative at the United Nations to file a formal complaint about Lebanon.

1:08pm: The Israeli military, which issued only a brief statement this morning on the clashes, just e-mailed a longer statement to reporters.

It claims an Israeli army unit was carrying out "routine maintenance" along the border, and that the work was "pre-coordinated" with UNIFIL, the United Nations peacekeeping force in the region. The IDF force immediately returned fire with light arms at a force of the LAF, and the IDF also made use of artillery fire.

[...] The IDF holds the LAF responsible for the incident that disrupted the calm in the region, and its consequences.

1:14pm: Many reports say this whole incident started because Israeli troops were trying to cut down a tree on the Lebanese side of the border. The US television network MSNBC has posted a photograph that appears to show an Israeli soldier, in a crane, cutting down a tree on the Lebanese side of the border fence.

1:24pm: A few regional reactions. Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, phoned Sleiman and told him Syria "stands with Lebanon." And Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Egyptian foreign minister, spoke with Hariri and promised Egyptian support. He also called for "self-restraint," and asked the UN to intervene to "de-escalate" the situation.

1:33pm: Al Jazeera just spoke with Neeraj Singh, a spokesman for UNIFIL, who said that peacekeepers are being deployed in the area. We are focused on restoring calm in the area... UNIFIL peacekeepers are deployed in the area, and our immediate priority right now is to restore calm.

1:43pm: Syria's state-run SANA news agency released a summary (in Arabic) of Bashar al-Assad's phone call with Sleiman. President Bashar al-Assad telephoned Lebanese president Michel Sleiman on Tuesday and expressed Syria's support for Lebanon against the brazen aggression launched by Israel.

Assad believes that this aggression proves once more that Israel has always sought to destabilize security and stability in Lebanon and the region.

1:54pm: NOW Lebanon is reporting that Sleiman has called for an emergency session of Lebanon's higher defence council.

2:24pm: As we mentioned in a story yesterday: The International Crisis Group has a timely new report out called Drums of War, assessing the possibility of another conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Their summary of the situation:

Four years after the last war, the situation in the Levant is paradoxical. It is exceptionally quiet and uniquely dangerous, both for the same reason. The build-up in military forces and threats of an all-out war that would spare neither civilians nor civilian infrastructure, together with the worrisome prospect of its regionalisation, are effectively deterring all sides. Today, none of the parties can soberly contemplate the prospect of a conflict that would be uncontrolled, unprecedented and unscripted.

2:43pm: General Gadi Eisenkot, the head of Israel's northern command, just called the clashes a "one-time event," and said he didn't expect the violence to escalate. He also said two Israeli officers were wounded in the fighting.

3:08pm: The Israeli army has confirmed that a lieutenant colonel was killed during the skirmish today.

3:20pm: Selim el-Sayegh, Lebanon's minister of social affairs (and a member of the Phalange party), told Al Jazeera that he didn't believe the Lebanese army instigated the fighting (as the Israeli government has alleged). The history of the Lebanese army's actions have been defensive... it is in no position whatsoever to conduct any attack against Israel. It wants only to defend Lebanese territory... Israel has been doing these activities as a matter of provocation.

3:45pm: The Israeli army just confirmed that another officer - a captain - was wounded in the fighting today. To recap the casualty figures, then: Three Lebanese soldiers were killed, and four wounded; one Israeli soldier was killed, and one wounded; and a Lebanese journalist was killed.

4:44pm: The United Nations Security Council just wrapped up a brief closed-door meeting on Israel and Lebanon. Alain Le Roy, the head of UN peacekeeping operations, said the UN is still investigating the incident, and that he'll have more details tomorrow. The Security Council didn't issue any formal statement on today's skirmish.

4:51pm: Lebanon's higher defense council just wrapped up the emergency meeting called by president Michel Sleiman.

“After consultations, the council has ... given instructions to face all aggressions on our territory, army and people by all available means, no matter the sacrifices,” said General Said Eid, the head of the council.

5:45pm: PJ Crowley, the US state department spokesman, urged "maximum restraint" from both sides, and said the US was in touch with both the Israeli and Lebanese governments. We are trying to understand what happened... our greatest concern is that whatever did happen not be repeated. The region has enough tension as it is. The last thing that we want to see is that this incident expand into something more significant.

6:18pm: Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah is speaking right now in front of a large crowd in Beirut (Nasrallah, as usual, is not actually at the rally; he's delivering his speech via video). Hezbollah was not involved in the skirmish today. They also haven't said anything about the incident until now - presumably because the group didn't want to preempt Nasrallah's speech, which was already scheduled for this evening.

Nasrallah said that Hezbollah would put itself "at the disposal" of the Lebanese army, which he praised for its bravery.

“We were immediately at a high state of alert... but the national interest demanded that the Lebanese resistance put itself at the disposal of the army. We called the president, the parliament speaker and the prime minister, and we said, we will not take any action [unilaterally], despite the great pain we felt.”

6:46pm: Two other items from Nasrallah's (still-ongoing) speech. First, he threatened to retaliate against Israel for any "future aggression."

“The Israeli hand that targets the Lebanese army will be cut off.”

He also attacked Israel on several other issues: He accused it once again of running a large spy ring in Lebanon, and said more than 100 spies have been arrested in the last two years; and he accused it of trying to use the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is investigating the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, to create divisions in Lebanon.

7:03pm: Avital Liebovich, a spokeswoman for the Israeli military, was on Al Jazeera a little while ago talking about the attack. She called it a "pre-planned" attack and accused the Lebanese army of positioning snipers in the area. We coordinated this operation with Unifil. It was not done in a secret manner. We have reason to believe this attack was pre-planned by the Lebanese army.
Liebovich did not provide any evidence to back up that claim, though, nor has the Israeli military.

8:15pm: A few other odds and ends we missed earlier today.

First, Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, echoed what we've heard from other Israeli officials (including foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman). He called the skirmish a violation of UN resolution 1701, and said the Lebanese government was "directly responsible." Several other countries, including Iran and Jordan, offered their reactions throughout the day.

We've rounded them up here.

And the United Nations promised to announce the results of its investigation into the skirmish at a press conference on Wednesday. Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas, the head of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, has been in New York for the last few days meeting with senior UN officials; he is now on his way back to Lebanon.

9:00pm: That's all for the live-blogging this evening! But we'll obviously continue to follow this story on the main Al Jazeera Web site in the hours and days to come.

Afghanistan Still Off the Radar

Anyone who happened to stumble upon CNN on Sunday night was treated to a convoy of Afghan pitches, notably from Senators Carl Levin and Lindsey Graham. As they blasted Wikileaks and voiced optimism for the war, one might be absolved for believing Afghanistan has finally become a relevant topic in America. This doesn’t seem to be the case though.

These were one-sided commercials selling Afghanistan. CNN ran a story the same day claiming Midterms put focus on Afghanistan, but it should know better that Afghanistan remains a distant 5th on the minds of US voters. CNN's coverage of its own headlined with the economy and immigration, with Afghanistan down at the bottom as usual.

Of course past polling has indicated enthusiasm levels near 5%, so maybe 8% does represent a permanent attention shift. But if the economy and unemployment don’t improve at the rate people expect, 47% could quickly breach 50% and continue upward. This may apply even more pressure to President Barack Obama’s July 2011 transfer deadline, or the US public may simply be overwhelmed and lose focus.

And while a lack of support kept Obama from going all in, he had plenty of capital to launch a mission that many doubt can be accomplished, his campaign promises of a wider war misinterpreted or ignored. US Congress passed its Afghan war bill soon after Wikileaks. Elsewhere Iraq has been forgotten as an issue except for the random bad news. Somalia hosts more al-Qaeda operatives than Afghanistan but remains completely off the radar. Perceptions can be extremely fickle.

CNN reports, “The Obama administration has made clear some troops - no one can say how many - will start withdrawing by next July from stable areas where Afghan forces can provide security.”

We predicted zero months ago, give or take a thousand. Maybe that’s the only way Afghanistan will receive the attention it deserves. Kandahar, Wikileaks, Pakistan, and an evaporating deadline don’t appear to be waking the masses. Yet.

Afghanistan won’t be a key issue in 2010, but 2012 is another story.

Israel’s First Smart Move in Months

That Israel agreed to a UN investigation into the Freedom flotilla incident is being viewed as a sudden 180, which is true in several ways. Not only does Israel openly disdain the UN, it’s also taking a leap of faith that no wrong doing will be found on its part.

"Israel has nothing to hide,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaimed in a statement. “The opposite is true. It is in Israel's national interest to ensure that the factual truth about the entire flotilla incident will be made public, and that is precisely the principle we are promoting."

"We are sure that any independent look at the facts will verify that Israel took appropriate steps enforcing the naval blockade," added government spokesman Mark Regev. "Ultimately we are sure that the facts are on our side. We have no problem whatsoever with a credible, objective panel."

This brimming confidence follows Israel’s own investigation that found multiple flaws in the intelligence, planning, and command aspects of the raid. Elements of Israel’s press called for a stricter probe as international pressure mounted and a UN panel is more evidence against Israel’s internal investigation. Israeli officials must be fronting given these holes in their testimony.

The UN could easily find Israel guilty of criminal acts in international waters.

But participation is Israel’s only real move, and in that sense it’s the right decision. Israel has been known to back itself into corners and stay there, so maybe the biggest surprise is Kadima’s counter-response. Opposition leader Tzipi Livni has repeated condemned Netanyahu for isolating Israel, but Kadima said after his cooperation with the UN, "Netanyahu's government has dragged Israel into one of the worst diplomatic situations in its history and continues to break negative records of pushing the country into a corner.”

Assuming Livni isn’t opposing the UN, Kadima’s statement suggests that it fears the UN probe will ultimately rule against Israel. The statement concluded, “Had the Netanyahu government listened to our call to establish a true committee of inquiry, it would not need to deal with foreign committees. And had Barak and Netanyahu worried less about themselves and more about the soldiers, the IDF would not now be investigated by the UN.”

This feeds back into aforementioned concerns.

Yet for all the potential to sink deeper into trouble, a UN investigation also offers the chance to avoid a settlement freeze and build confidence going into the UN Security Council meetings in September. Whether or not Palestinians demand statehood in the absence of progress with Israel is uncertain. Today Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad told The Media Line, “There is not going to be a unilateral declaration of statehood. What’s the point? We did that in 1988, and what did it get us?”

Either way Palestinians have exploited the threat, building pressure on themselves but also on Israel and America to demonstrate guarantees of a sovereign Palestinian state. Netanyahu must extract Israel from its corner or he may find himself out of power, and settling the Gaza raid could go a long way towards battling Israel's negative image. With a Turkish representative to make up one of the four investigators, Israel could also begin repairing ties with a critical ally in the Iranian endgame.

Their latest actions suggest that a UN probe is America’s plan to dodge Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Washington undoubtedly lies behind Israel’s decision, having likely vouched for its sovereignty in some fashion, and cooperating with the UN days after leaked reports of US threats against the Palestinians is no coincidence. Hanan Ashrawi, the member of the Palestinian Legislative Council that initially made the claim, later rejected these reports as Israeli propaganda.

But a reading of Monday’s State Department briefing suggests otherwise. Spokesman Philip Crowley ensnares himself in the question over threats but never actually denies the report, only attempting to re-frame the question and language. A classic non-denial denial. So low and behold, the next day Israel signs up for the UN raid, likely as a quid pro quo with Washington to cancel out each other’s heat.

"There was no choice but to agree to the international community's demands, first and foremost those of the US and the UN," said an anonymous Israeli official.

Just in time for next week’s trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and US President Barack Obama. And since the investigation is scheduled to conclude in mid-September - just in time for the UN assembly - Netanyahu and Obama’s sights are clearly set on escaping from Abbas and the Arab League’s requirement for direct talks: a settlement freeze.

Crowley correctly points out that Abbas has the Arab League’s approval, but forgets to mention that a settlement freeze hasn’t changed.

The level of synchronization within these events hold the potential to unlock Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. A positive experience with the UN, coupled with formal apologies to Turkey and additional good will measures towards Gazans, may be enough to provide Abbas with enough cover to enter direct talks before the UN Security Council meets in September. Avoiding one more clash with the White House won’t hurt either.

Unfortunately for Israel, UN cooperation may still fall short of the Palestinian’s demands after Netanyahu produced a new wave of skepticism. Cooperation also becomes null and void were Israel to obstruct the process. In response to Kadima, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement saying, “it was unfortunate that the opposition was issuing irresponsible statements to the media instead of checking simple facts.”

“If they had bothered to check,” the statement read, “they would have found that IDF soldiers and officers will not be investigated by the UN or any other body.”

Kadima responded that, “it was clear the UN body would not be investigating the decision-making of the septet, but rather the actions of the IDF.” That would put Netanyahu in the clear, a perception sure to arouse new doubts in Palestinians and Arabs. Israel’s decision comes with a severe qualifier. Though it has chosen correctly, it had only one choice to pick from - leaving it with no alternatives.

If the UN deems Israel’s cooperation and insufficient - or if Israel disobeys any ruling - Netanyahu will be left with absolutely nothing to stand on in September. Palestinians may not demand statehood, but the situation will fly into the turbulence of US Congressional elections and the expiration of Israel’s tenuous settlement freeze in the West Bank. Try as America will to shield Israel, these conditions favor the Palestinians’ ability to extract stipulations for direct talks.

Today marked Netanyahu’s first good move in months. It remains to be seen if his decision is a surface response, and whether Israel can string multiple moves together.

US’s Non-Denial Denial

From the State Department's Monday briefing:

QUESTION: Palestinian officials have said that the U.S. Administration has threatened the Palestinian Authority that the relations between the U.S. and the authority will be affected if they don’t start immediately the direct negotiations with Israel. Can you confirm that?

MR. CROWLEY: I don’t – I wouldn’t characterize it that way. We have had intensive conversations with the parties in recent weeks. We have – we strongly believe that this is the time where the parties need to move from proximity talks into direct negotiations. We think there are clear benefits to doing – taking that step at this time. We’re encouraged by the fact that neighboring countries have given a green light to proceed with direct negotiations. We’re trying to move the parties in that direction. George Mitchell will be traveling to the region soon. We’ll have more to say about that. His schedule’s not yet locked in.

But we think that at this particular time, the best way to address the core issues is to – by moving to direct negotiations. That’s not a threat. I think that it’s an opportunity here, that we think after weeks and months of working with the parties, gaining a better understanding of where they are and what they want to do, we think the time is right.

QUESTION: Can I follow-up?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: So there was – at no time or at no point was there any warning to the PA that if they refused and they continue to refuse to go to the direct negotiations, that U.S.-Palestinian relations will be adversely affected? Is that what you’re saying?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we --

QUESTION: Because that’s what they’re claiming.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I think we would characterize this as a significant opportunity for the Palestinians in terms of what they feel that they need to resolve the core issues. We have made a strong argument to them that you gain leverage inside a direct negotiation, not by setting – trying to set conditions prior to the start of that negotiation. But we think this is the right time to move in the step. We’re encouraged by the fact that leaders assembled in Cairo late last week agreed. We’re having follow-up conversations even today with U.S. officials and Palestinian officials. And our message is this is the right time and it’s an opportunity that both sides should not forsake.

QUESTION: So just --

QUESTION: But that doesn’t answer the question, though. I mean, have you – and this isn’t the first time that the Palestinians have claimed that you kind of said, well, if you don’t sit down for proximity talks or if you don’t sit down for direct talks, we’re going to pick a fight with you like we picked a fight with Benjamin Netanyahu, or this is going to negatively affect our relationship. I mean, these are the claims that the Palestinians are making.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we’re not picking a fight with anybody. We’re trying to reach an end to the conflict, which benefits everyone in the region.

QUESTION: But when you made your strong arguments to the Palestinians, was there any warning or advice attached about their relationship with the (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: We are always giving the parties our best view of what needs to be done now --

QUESTION: Right.

MR. CROWLEY: -- based on these conversations. We have given our best advice to President Abbas and his team. We have given our best advice to --

QUESTION: Did it come with a warning (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: -- Prime Minister Netanyahu --

QUESTION: Did you link their relationship --

MR. CROWLEY: -- and his team.

QUESTION: Did you link their relationship between the U.S. and the Palestinians to President Abbas’ willingness to sit down for talks?

MR. CROWLEY: If – let me rephrase the question. Have we strongly encouraged the Palestinians to move into direct negotiations? The answer is yes.

QUESTION: No, I don’t want to rephrase the question.

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: That isn’t the question.

MR. CROWLEY: And have we strongly encouraged the Israelis to move into direct negotiations? The answer is yes.

QUESTION: But that’s not the question. The question is: Have you linked --

MR. CROWLEY: Right.

QUESTION: -- your future relations with the Palestinians to whether he’s willing to sit down and talk? So it’s a yes-or-no answer.

QUESTION: Have you threatened them that the relations will be affected if they don’t start negotiations?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I don’t consider that statement to be a threat.

QUESTION: So in the President’s letter – P.J., just bear with me for a second.

QUESTION: So, you’re not saying no?

QUESTION: Bear with me for a minute. The quality of the relationship between the American Administration and the Palestinian Authority was not brought in any way in the letter that the President sent to Abbas in mid-July?

MR. CROWLEY: Look, I’m not going to answer that question. I’m simply going to say that we believe and are strongly encouraging the Palestinians and the Israelis to move into direct negotiations..."

Quote of the Day

"I do not sweet talk. They say they want a weak prime minister. The country is facing a lot of problems and if the prime minister is not strong, then the country will crumble, and sectarianism and warlords will return. I do not understand the theory of a weak prime minister who will be a prisoner in the hands of one group or another.”

- Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, speaking the same day that US President Barack Obama promised Iraq’s withdrawal will finish on time

US Disinformation Warping Iraq, Afghanistan

As if his message hadn’t gotten through, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates is back on the hunt for Wikileaks’ blood.

"My attitude on this is that there are two areas of culpability,” Gates told ABC’s “This Week. “One is legal culpability. And that's up to the Justice Department and others. That's not my arena. But there's also a moral culpability. And that's where I think the verdict is guilty on WikiLeaks. They have put this out without any regard whatsoever for the consequences."

Who exactly suffers most from Wikileaks and why could be argued ad nauseam. While the Pentagon has no choice except to defend US soldiers, the likelier targets for violence appear to be Afghans caught in a renewed tug of war for their support. It also seems, outside of the Pentagon and Afghanistan’s dwindling proponents, that the real danger to US troops comes from the strategic level, not tactical.

Wikileaks founder Julian Assange believes that keeping US and NATO troops in a war that most evidence indicates cannot be “won” is the graver threat. We agree.

But whatever the case, the “mortified” and “appalled” Gates isn’t speaking solely out of protection for US soldiers when chastising Assange for having “no sense of responsibility. Only weeks ago he ordered a crackdown on interaction with the media in the aftermath of Stanley McChrystal’s Rolling Stone report. Many viewed this as a wall between the Pentagon and press designed to countervail negative information coming in from Afghanistan, a charge the Pentagon naturally denied.

Gates isn’t just worried about US soldiers, his anger is personal and driven by embarrassment. He’s shocked that his own power continues to be circumvented, jading his view of the war. Whereas many see a foreboding doom in the Wikileaks time-lapse portrait, warping President Barack Obama’s July 2011 deadline, Gates sees a challenge to his own power and control on US war policy. He may even convince himself that, if not for Wikileaks, Afghanistan’s end was achievable and thus blame Wikileaks if the war becomes lost.

And yet the Pentagon has no trouble “leaking” information (or disinformation) when it favors the US military. This time the Iraqi government, a supposed US ally, has sounded a warning, but its credibility is treated no differently than Assange’s. The Pentagon is rejecting all dissent.

Baghdad recently claimed that 535 people - 396 civilians, 89 policemen and 50 soldiers - were killed in violent attacks during July, with an additional 1,043 people wounded. The AP notes, 
“overall casualty tolls are compiled by Iraq's ministries of health, interior and defence and released every month, [and] the US military usually does not publicly contest them.” But July’s total produced the explosive headline July deadliest month since March 2008, sending Pentagon officials into spin mode.

“USF-I (United States Forces-Iraq) refutes the reported figures of violence that claims that July 2010 is 'the deadliest month in Iraq since 2008'," the US military said in a counter statement. "The claim that July 2010 was the deadliest month in Iraq since May 2008 is incorrect.”

According to US data, 222 people were killed in Iraqi violence last month, less than half the Iraqi figure, and added that 782 people were wounded. Basically, the war is half as bad as being reported. Major General Stephen Lanza, spokesman for US forces in Iraq, did offer a plausible explanation: "While we have noted discrepancies in the past and have fully supported the GOI (government of Iraq) position to not release official casualty figures, we believe the figures provided to media by unofficial sources this month were grossly overstated.”

But his agenda becomes clearer the more he angles. Figures released by the Iraqi ministries “did not reflect the security situation this past month,” he argued, urging journalists to provide “context” to their reporting. "I believe it's important to take a holistic view of security in Iraq," Lanza said. “Overall, the security situation in Iraq is stable... yes, there are violent acts; but certainly, current trends cannot be accurately characterized as a rise or surge in violence."

While it cannot be argued that current violence levels have plummeted since 2006 and 2007, journalists did provide context by referencing March 2008 (if Iraq’s figures are more or less accurate). Moreover, comparing today’s violence level to near-civil war conditions isn’t exactly contextual. Some violence is better compared to a lot of violence, but doesn’t equate to stability either. 2006 and 2007 witnessed extraordinary levels of death and destruction, and anything close to that environment is distressing.

The US position in Iraq, like Afghanistan, is to convince observers that the war is progressing better than it appears. To negate the image of al-Qaeda planting its flag on Iraqi government property. But Iraqis are getting anxious and so are US officials.

The information switch has been thrown in both directions. While the Pentagon instantly provides its own casualties figures, it’s also keen to portray a united front in regards to withdrawing US troops. Roughly 65,000 are all that remain from a peak 140,000, with the final 15,000 combat troops due out by August’s end. US officials insist that the withdrawal will be completed on schedule, but Iraqi and even Pentagon officials worry that Afghanistan has distracted from Iraq’s chronic instability.

Rumors persist that Washington intends to extend the remaining 50,000 troops’ mandate beyond the December 2011 deadline. Pentagon opposition to President Barack Obama’s accelerated withdrawal took root during the 2008 campaign and never receded. General Ray Odierno, the top US military official in Iraq, is prepared to delay one combat brigade beyond September 1st if the situation demands. One can assume that the Pentagon’s opinion hardens as Iraq’s violence steadily rises and, more importantly, its political vacuum stays open.

Almost five months have passed since the March 7th national election.

And while cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, part of the Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, recently made overtures to Sunni leader Ayad Allawi and his inclusive al-Iraqiya List, progress with his fellow Shia has reportedly suffered a downturn. Late Sunday Iraq state television released excerpts of an interview with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in which he promised not to remain prime minister “so long as a partnership between his bloc and the Shiite coalition continues.”

The Iraqi National Alliance had just suspended contacts with al-Maliki's State of Law bloc until it put forward another candidate for the prime minister's job. It did, however, say a merger between the two parties is unaffected.

Problematically, a Shiite coalition will deny and likely agitate Allawi, whose party won the most parliamentary seats and whose constituency faces renewed violence. And a similar feud would develop were al-Sadr to join with Allawi. Perhaps they should all join together and seize the majority necessary to form a government, choose a prime minister, and divide power equally. But the last five months have confirmed a rigid political system stuck in gridlock.

US officials, justifiably fearful of meddling in Iraqi politics, benefit from the more nefarious act of limiting attention to this dilemma. Iraqi parties may be able to strike a deal in the final hour, allowing US officials a slight reprieve, but that outcome doesn’t bode well for future challenges over oil and Iran. And the heat would really turn up if US combat troops were to withdraw without a government in place. Not the image of stability Washington was looking for.

The fate of 50,000 US troops remains unknown - will they end up like their brethren in Afghanistan?

Gates vowed after denouncing Assange, “We are not leaving Afghanistan in July of 2011. We are beginning a transition process and a thinning of our ranks. And the pace will depend on the conditions on the ground. The president has been very clear about that. And if the Taliban are waiting for the 19th month [the end of the surge in U.S. forces], I welcome that. Because we will be there in the 19th month, and we will be there with a lot of troops."

India Knows Kashmir Is "Very Big Problem"

The reason for our intensive focus on Kashmir is twofold. By no means will resolving Kashmir’s dispute magically cure the region, but there’s no evidence that Kashmir has a limited influence either. Kashmir is a major clog in South Asia and extremely divisive, and Pakistanis aren’t alone in this belief. India’s actions suggest that it too considers Kashmir a very big problem.

Coupled with the mainstream US media, even the counter media and international media, having little appetite for Kashmir and we’re left without options. The few must keep attention on the conflict, lest there be none. Last week, when the Kashmiri American Council and Kashmir Centre and Association of Humanitarian Lawyers recently hosted an international conference in Washington, Indian media reported that organizers miraculously “roped in a few US Congressmen to plug the Pakistani line.”

The US Congressional/lobby/media relationship with India and Kashmir mirrors Israeli-Palestinian policy. It’s a dark world.

Whether in speeches from Pakistani officials or media editorials, average Pakistani opinion or militant groups, evidence of Pakistani spite in Kashmir is abundant. A recent Pew Research poll manifested these feelings when two Pakistanis listed India as the greatest national threat for every one who picked the Taliban. 70% considered Kashmir a “very big problem,” a landslide too clear-cut to discount.

These feelings have affected Pakistani officials as much as direct relations with India and America, whose officials and supporters accuse Islamabad of hiding its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) behind Kashmir. But Mumbai trials and Wikileaks don’t negate Kashmir’s legitimacy, and Pakistanis demand that their leaders to stand up for Kashmir’s determination. How else will they gain the support to follow America in Afghanistan or compromise with India?

“For us the most important thing is the rights of the Kashmiri people - we are committed to finding a resolution to the Kashmir dispute,” US-Pakistani ambassador Hussain Haqqani told the conference in Washington. “We look forward to a meaningful and result-oriented dialogue with India on Kashmir.”

He added that Kashmir is not a territorial dispute between two nations, but an international conflict: “It is about 12 to 14 million people of Kashmir, it is about Kashmiris’ right to self-determination, about killings, rapes, torture and mass graves.”

A deep-rooted paradox, India needs assurances from Pakistan that it will cease funding separatists groups, while Pakistan has no reason to believe India will negotiate Kashmir’s status. Kashmiris generally seek independence, which Pakistan likely hopes to exploit as a proxy state. India, fearful of that outcome, absolutely rejects parting with the contested Jammu and Kashmir. The two poles came to a head when the latest Pakistan-Indian dialogue shut down after one wanted to talk Kashmir and the other Mumbai.

Most Indian and US commentators criticized Pakistan for taking the easy way out, but India is doing the same by accusing Pakistan of duplicity with LeT rather than addressing Kashmir’s untenable status. Many assume that Pakistan’s double games sit on the wrong side of history, which may be true, but so does any modern occupation. India’s grip on Kashmir loosens the harder it squeezes. Defiance to addressing the issue confirms that India does believe Kashmir is a major obstacle to regional peace, that New Delhi knows it’s losing control and expects to lose control were it ever to negotiate Kashmir’s status with Pakistan or the UN.

And so it keeps silent, pushing its geopolitical weight on Washington to do the same while also containing Pakistan’s activities in Kashmir.

But within India’s government rages a contentious debate on Kashmir’s response and outlook. Back-channels between New Delhi and separatist political parties, already active before Kashmir’s latest violence, have tried inching the parties closer together. These talks were pursued as the temperature rose in Srinagar, the region's capital. Unfortunately, as the situation spiraled further out of control amid the breakdown between Pakistan and India, these channels held faint hope of producing a cease-fire.

Going on two months of spirited protests, strikes, and riots, India recently declared Srinagar calm after a momentary lull. But yesterday four civilians including a teenager were killed in various clashes with Indian security forces. India justified firing live rounds into thousands of people by accusing protesters of throwing rocks. Having seemingly learned nothing, the next day security forces killed two more protesters including another teenager.

Mohammad Dilawar Mir, general secretary of the People’s Democratic Party, remarked after the latest incidents, “This government seems to have become a man eater.”

And because India refuses to translate its private reservations into public action, Kashmir has come under increasing control of separatist authorities. The arrangement is conducive to new fits of political strife and violence which, in the absence of progress between parties, necessitates further security crackdowns, which in turn spawn new protests and violence. Clearly an unsustainable environment.

Now the hot topic in India is whether Kashmir remains under state control, a sign that Kashmir has already seized partial sovereignty. The last two months ran on the Hurriyat (Geelani) calendar, a line-up of shutdowns and protests created by Kashmir’s political umbrella. State offices and schools opened an estimated five days in July. The Hurriyat has explicitly advertised its calendar with the message that India’s government “does not run in the Valley.”

“The Omar Abdullah government seems to have been reduced to a mute spectator,” The Economic Times wrote of Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah.

Several days ago Home Minister P. Chidambaram rejected the notion that India has lost control of Kashmir, as the regional government had reaffirmed control of the territory. "May be in Srinagar or some other parts, they may be able to mobilize support and call bandhs,” Chidambaram said before qualifying, “according to the Jammu and Kashmir government, the situation is near normal.”

For starters the Jammu and Kashmir government doesn’t have its fingers on Kashmir’s pulse, and near normal makes for overt political speak. India’s Congress is also reportedly upset over the state's "handling of the situation,” which has "failed to break the cycle of violence.” A senior Congress functionary said the Jammu and Kashmir administration, "failed in containing the influence of separatists whose writ runs large. The separatists are calling the shots. They are virtually running a parallel administration. It's a matter of serious concern."

As of this moment Kashmiris’ own actions represent the best chance of altering the status quo, however high the price in blood. Washington will presumably stay out of the conflict unless it gets particularly nasty; silence greeted the latest killings. And while elements within India demand negotiations with Kashmir’s political parties, the only actions taken continue to be security-related. After appealing for calm Abdullah hinted at continual security measures to break up protests.

Meanwhile security forces are hunting Masrat Alam, the hard line Hurriyat leader who designs the calendar, as if catching him will resolve the factors of Kashmir’s instability.

India’s singular problem is a lack of credibility; few Kashmiris give it the benefit of the doubt. Any crackdown will be perceived as oppression, any political feelers treated as disingenuous. India’s actions have eliminated popular support for a dialogue with New Delhi, making negotiating that much harder.

And Kashmiris surely laugh at Abdullah’s suggestion that, “Lock-outs and strikes only lead to public discomfort and badly tell upon the education of our children. These tactics are in no way in anybody’s interest. These only mar the livelihood opportunities of the poor and hamper the process of economic growth.”

To Kashmiris only India does these things. Their tactics favor their interests plenty, boiling the issue and creating division within New Delhi and with Kashmir’s regional government. Though their short-term interests may be inhibited, shutting down the territory could be Kashmiris’ only means of achieving freedom in the long-term.

India can keep cracking down - at its own peril. But with the Naxalite rebellion killing increasing numbers of Indian security forces, the moment has finally come to address and resolve Kashmir’s status. Such a long process needs to start sooner than later. Preliminary measures should focus on restoring confidence, including a freeze on oxymoronic security crackdowns, and build into negotiations between Kashmiris, New Delhi, and Islamabad.

India knows Kashmir is a “very big problem” just like Pakistanis do. Time to treat it like one.

Quote of the Day

"Nobody thinks that Afghanistan is going to be a model Jeffersonian democracy. What we're looking to do is difficult — very difficult — but it's a fairly modest goal, which is: Don't allow terrorists to operate from this region. Don't allow them to create big training camps and to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland with impunity."

- President Barack Obama, lowering his bar in Afghanistan during an interview with CBS' "Sunday Morning."