Islamists Mobilizing Behind Mali's Fog of War

As representatives from the United Nations, NATO, European Union, African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continue their pursuit of a multilateral response to northern Mali, the Islamist militants in control this territory are busy fashioning their own international coalition.

Reports of their latest troop movements surfaced over the weekend after multiple news sources inquired into their whereabouts and origins. In Timbuktu, the insurgent group Ansar Dine allegedly received and armed an estimated 200 recruits over the last five days. Local witnesses estimate that some fighters traveled from the nearby Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose Polisario Front has experienced trouble fending off al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) infiltration of refugee camps. The majority, however, are identified as Sudanese by locals and government officials alike.

"In the Timbuktu region and around Gao, hundreds of jihadists, mostly Sudanese and Sahrawis, have arrived as reinforcements to face an offensive by Malian forces and their allies," a Malian security official said.

A source from a local aid group added that they were accompanied by fighters from several other countries.

The same pattern was reported eastward in Gao, where Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have established a de facto capital for their autonomous zone. Residents claim that reinforcements arrived from Friday through the weekend, counting dozens of armed trucks as they checked into MUJAO's main office. Local journalist Oumarou Moumouni told the German news agency DPA that he saw over 120 trucks full of militants. Another witness, religious leader Bilal Toure, claims that "more than 90 pickups full of fighters" had arrived to secure the area around Gao. Whether all of these forces are one and the same is difficult to conclude, but MUJAO announced that it had welcomed "more than 355 new fighters... all from Sudan."

"They want war, we'll give them war," Habib Ould Issouf, a MUJAO official in Gao, told AFP. "This is why our brothers are joining us from all over. They are coming from the camps of Tindouf in Algeria, from Senegal, from Ivory Coast, from everywhere."

MUJAO's operations add a complex dimension to northern Mali's situation. Whereas Ansar Dine's Iyad Ag Ghaly pairs local Tuareg sources with AQIM's connection to the international jihadist scene - bringing Arab and South Asian Muslims into Mali - MUJAO has styled itself as an African coalition. If its background story is to be believed, MUJAO broke away from AQIM's focus on the Sahel (and the Algerian government's influence) in the process of opening a wider African movement. Equally likely is the possibility that cooperative elements within AQIM and MUJAO put their heads together to expand out of the Sahel. Thus many of its recruits allegedly travel from regional African sources. A MUJAO spokesperson told DPA earlier this month that the Nigerian Islamist sect Boko Haram maintains a presence in Gao.

Yet MUJAO seems no less willing to accept members of any Muslim nationality, including the lucrative quartet of Algeria, Egypt, Yemen and Pakistan. All four countries remain entangled in unpopular connections with the U.S., making them ideal recruitment centers for al-Qaeda's latest enterprises. Ansar Dine and MUJAO may share control of these particular forces by employing them in various locations, or MUJAO could now be operating as the dominate faction within Mali. Either way, the combination of local, regional and international forces adds to the balance and capabilities of the Islamic front awaiting African and Western capitals in Gao, so long as they retain a unified agenda for northern Mali.

Reports of Islamist recruitment efforts are inevitably obscured by their propaganda value; discerning accurate numbers, nationalities and the level of their training from outside Mali is impossible. Those inside are experiencing enough trouble of their own. This weekend's information was accompanied by two denials, one each from the Malian government and Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). On Monday a Malian security source confirmed to AFP, "the arrival of new terrorists in the north of Mali," but rejected the estimation of "several hundred" fighters.

"The arrival of convoys of jihadists from Sudan and the Western Sahara are totally false," said Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, an MNLA spokesman currently living in Burkina Faso's capital Ouagadougou. "We categorically deny it. We recognize that for a long time there have been a few Sudanese in the forces of MUJAO, of whom one is at the police post in Gao to oversee the application of shar'iah.'"

All three factions, including the Islamists, are motivated to exaggerate or downplay various narratives in northern Mali, but the government and MNLA appear most guilty in this case. Too many witnesses have reported sizable troop movements and Sudanese cadres to doubt their presence. Asseleh claims that the Islamists' "propaganda" is designed to "intimidate the international armies who want to intervene in northern Mali," a true statement in itself. Ansar Dine and MUJAO are committed to trading politico-military blows with African and Western forces as they race to establish their respective fronts. The MNLA naturally wants to blunt the public momentum of its Islamic competitors, and the Malian government similarly hopes to minimize the arrival of international fighters.

Problematically, several thousand entrenched militants may await a proposed ECOWAS-Malian coalition of 6,000. This ratio is less than favorable for retaking Mali's vast northern expanse, and only made manageable by Western air support.

Mainstream Media Hypes Foreign Policy Circus

A rudimentary display of U.S. foreign policy will take place tonight in Boca Raton, Florida between President Barack Obama and challenger Mitt Romney.

Interestingly, America's mainstream media has taken to hyping Monday's presidential debate with a common narrative: "How the Obama-Romney foreign policy debate could determine the election. With turmoil increasing in world hot spots, foreign policy and national security have become major presidential campaign issues. From China to Israel, Iran to Syria, stateless terrorists to struggling alliances, Mitt Romney and Barack Obama will have plenty to debate Monday night."

"If, at the start of the general election campaign, you told a seasoned political strategist in either party that the fate of the presidential race could well hinge on the foreign-policy-focused third debate, the reaction would have ranged from an eye roll to laughter," writes The Washington Post. "And yet, here we are. President Obama and former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney head to Boca Raton, Fla., for their final debate Monday night with national polls suggesting that the race is tied and with the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, dominating the headlines."

Where to start with this manufactured slant? Does one dead ambassador equal the difference between relevant and unimportant foreign policy in America?

There's no denying factual sections of the media's deceptive hyperbole. In terms of foreign policy, American voters are looking for a "tough" but "responsible" president to confront terrorist threats and international powers. They want someone that won't start a reckless war with Iran but will respond to terrorist pinpricks and plots that never fully develop. Essentially, Americans want their country to maintain global supremacy at an efficient cost. Most now seek limited military engagement abroad on the road to fiscal responsibility at home, a perfect combination for the rise of drone warfare and unconventional Special operations. However these matters address America's national security before its raw foreign policy.

Obama himself told reporters over the weekend, "Spoiler alert: we got Bin Laden." This talking point will make for an extra long debate.

National security understandably becomes more relevant when some visceral incident has just occurred. However foreign policy remains a low set of priorities - the mainstream agenda clearly believes that it needs to exaggerate Monday night's significance. Foreign policy areas themselves will be debated at the shallowest levels. Not even Libya's revolution, from the beginning to NATO's invasion to the country's future, will receive a thorough examination. Neither will seriously engage U.S. policy in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain or other coverups that support U.S. interests over popular movements. Syria is more likely to descend into a brawl over semantics than hard policy.

Worst still, Romney has encouraged his base's anti-Americanism by blaming the Middle East's turmoil on Obama's "abdication of leadership." Obama has failed to uphold his own promise to engage the Arab world, instead consenting to a vast counterrevolution in the region, but Romney dangerously preaches the return to an "American Century."

Larger issues like China may not be movable by one or the other; Russia should cause equal trouble for both.

Each candidate brings a different set of problems to the same table, potentially resulting in similar outcomes. While Obama and Romney diverge widest on the possibility of war against Tehran, both of their regional agendas operate on a steep Iranian tilt. Both will try their hardest to convince the audience that they support Israel more than the other, and ultimately leave the Palestinians in the dust on their way to promising a hollow two-state solution. Their policies are nearly identical in Afghanistan - both want the majority of U.S. troops out by 2014 so long as they can deploy a residual force afterward. Obama publicly claims that Afghanistan's war will end in 2014, and he may prepare a surprise for Monday night, but Iraq's ending says otherwise.

The moderator is unlikely to fact check Obama's wayward policy in Iraq, which the President says he's looking forward to debating. Dozens of bombings and shootings continue to plague the country each month, often as Obama declares the war over from 9,000 miles away. Many large-scale attacks have been claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group that didn't exist before U.S. troops arrived in 2003 and could have 5-10 years of life in it. The response to these security incidents and Iraq's general reconstruction has also been obstructed by the poor leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Obama administration's passivity towards Baghdad's political crisis has resulted in a gradual loss of influence with the divisive al-Maliki, who retained his position in 2010 with U.S. assistance. Obama's policy in Iraq qualifies as one of his worst, but he will spin it into one of his highlights.

The brightest light, of course, will shine upon Osama bin Laden's dead body. Here Obama will hit Romney hardest to score as many points as possible, bludgeoning him on a topic that Romney has no real control over. He will mention his drone achievements and few to none of his failures. Obama could speak of his kills in Yemen but will certainly not mention how unpopular he has become in Yemen. He will rout al-Qaeda on more than one occasion, "from Pakistan to Somalia" before "staying alert" in new hotspots. He may go near Mali if he's feeling bold, to highlight the international coalition being put together by U.S. allies, but avoiding al-Qaeda's other hideouts makes for smarter politics. Obama won't mention that al-Qaeda cells in Iraq crossed into Syria.

Romney will take these punches and throw back as many as he can design. Both will do whatever they can to distract voters from actual issues, instead emphasizing terrorism and the type of American "leadership" that translates into hegemony. U.S. media has already responded in a similar fashion by placing terrorism at the top of their scorecard. "Voters finally get to know Obama and Romney's foreign policies" - when Monday is far too late to make informed decisions. Unfortunately those seeking a deeper conversation on foreign policy will leave empty handed, and those comforted by the shallows will move onto the next channel when the debate is over.

Only a major screw up, not any real wisdom, moves the political needle on election day.

Pin The CIA Base On the Map

Yesterday The Washington Post excited or disturbed a wide population of various individuals by announcing the CIA's request for additional unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

Pentagon-approved plans are in the final stages of being submitted to the White House, where the proposal will be evaluated by counterterrorism chief John Brennan and a group of national security officials. If approved by President Barack Obama, the CIA's drone fleet is expected to rise from 35 to 45 and increase the range of its entire assassination/surveillance operations. The CIA currently supplements its forces by employing weapons systems from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). A boost in its capabilities is aimed at retaining the CIA's autonomy; the CIA relies on military pilots to operate from the U.S. and reportedly chafes at using JSOC airstrips.

This latest move that has unnerved some Pentagon departments, if their own staff is to be believed, except none of them could be as stressed as those inhabiting a drone's flight path.

The Washington Post only breaks small pieces of "new" information, and even then no aspect is surprising. Drones are scheduled to increase the ranks of all branches that fly them, especially covert divisions, and CIA officials speak as though their shipment is late. The Department of Defense naturally wants to clarify their terms, but has no overriding reason to stop a process that cannot be stopped. Brennan then acts a buffer for all parties in the White House. Most surprising would be a veto from the drone-slinging President.

What's unnerving to foreign populations are the requirements of UASs and their collateral damage. A drone's range is grimly impressive for its machinery - up go 1,000 miles - but it needs a network to support its operations. Drones fly out of multiple points in Afghanistan, having been evicted from Pakistan, while a grid of drone bases has been constructed over the Horn of Africa to target al-Qaeda and its affiliated militants. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and the Seychelles all host their own bases, controlled by either the CIA or JSOC, and Yemen just received its own during a popular revolution. Many of these cases illustrate the hegemonic threat that drones bring to their area of operations. In Yemen, the CIA had already began construction under Ali Abdullah Saleh's secret approval when the revolution struck, and the White House accelerated its building schedule from two years to eight months in response.

This decision was attributed to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) growth in southern and eastern Yemen, a predictable that did come true. However the corrupt Saleh himself was largely responsible for watering AQAP and his duplicitous approval of U.S. air strikes fertilized the soil. More virus than cure, U.S. policy would have gone in a vicious circle with Yemen's tribes had Saleh survived the revolution's first phase. Washington happily accepted his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and turned over the base's secrecy to him - one of many reasons why Washington and Riyadh orchestrated Hadi's ascendency.

Yemenis themselves were never told anything or allowed any input, despite the fact that they suffer most when a drone misses. Even then civilian casualties are denied - forget compensation - and the mere presence unnerves adults and children alike. The entire project is thoroughly totalitarian.

As The Washington Post reports, "Any move to expand the reach of the CIA’s fleet of armed drones probably would require the agency to establish additional secret bases." This "need" entails more secret handshakes with autocratic, unrepresentative and unreliable governments. The new wave of bases will hit northern Africa hardest, possibly starting with Algeria as a launch point into Libya and Mali. Algiers runs a notoriously anti-interference policy to tamp down its cooperation with foreign powers (Washington), and may eventually consent in a similar fashion as Ethiopia's government. The two governments have already assembled a chain of bases in the Sahel and a new agreement would ensure no problems in the event that pro-democracy demonstrations flair up, as they periodically do.

Friendlier lands could be found in Nigeria, one of world's the most pro-American states, and neighboring Niger. Mauritania or even Mali itself could play host to a base as part of NATO and ECOWAS's intervention, which includes a robust training mission and the need for Western support bases.

The populations of these nations will be lucky to receive an advanced warning of their new guests.

Pakistan Quarrels Over North Waziristan Operation

The near-fatal shooting that galvanized Pakistan's public into cooperative action against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also rekindled the explosive debate over a military intervention in North Waziristan. Following the assault on 14-year old Malala Yousafzai, a youth activist of women's rights and literacy, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani reportedly informed President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf of an emergency meeting between the chiefs of Pakistan's three branches at Joint staff headquarters.

At this point Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, announced to reporters, "The government and military leadership will decide if there is a need for an operation in North Waziristan."

Fast forward a week. Instead of capitalizing on popular sentiment to finally enter North Waziristan, the possibility of a large-scale military operation continues to spin its tracks in the mud. Various sources of information (and common sense) speculate that the decision hinges on the unanimous agreement of Pakistan's cabinet defense committee and its military, which controls the final green light. Thus Islamabad's civilian and military components seek to exercise as much authority as possible while also splitting the responsibility of failure. To this end a resolution has been crafted for Parliament's approval as a means of unifying the government's decision, for better or worse.

Except the motion has now run into resistance with the oppositional Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), effectively sending the decision back into Islamabad's civilian-military showdown. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) currently has no plan to submit the resolution even though the group holds the necessary votes. If the PPP does proceed, it will do so after receiving the go-ahead from above.

“We wanted to have consensus over the issue, but we will not press you (the opposition)… however, it will not disseminate a positive message,” said PPP leader Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah explained, adding that the resolution contained no mention of North Waziristan. “We do not want to divide the nation, therefore, will not table the resolution."

“For the time being there is no plan for military operation in North Waziristan," Rehman said on Wednesday. "But if needed, the decision would be taken by political and military leadership of the country in harmony."

However much the majority of Americans disagree - and possibly Pakistanis as well - Islamabad's decision-making process isn't wholly irrational. For starters, the TTP's origins lie in Afghanistan's invasion just as the Taliban emerged from Washington and Moscow's power games; the lack of contingencies in regards to Pakistani militants mushroomed the problem throughout Iraq's war. Deep resentment towards the lack of U.S. responsibility still hasn't been addressed to this day, and perceptions take on real politico-military significance. The Obama administration has made little personal effort to reverse this situation and the past four years speak for themselves. Operation Tight Screw, the latest joint-proposal for North Waziristan, is no less applicable to Pakistan's government.

Washington and Islamabad share the exact toxic feelings about each other: "do more."

This relationship is only capable of producing intermittent achievements. To achieve lasting results in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan must employ a combination of political and economic resources with public approval (both locally and nationally) and foreign support. Missing ingredients will generate new instability in the tribal provinces and potentially reignite the TTP's urban campaign inside Pakistan. Unfortunately Islamabad doesn't possess all of the factors necessary to launch an operation on North Waziristan's scale. Hardest of all is the socio-economic fight after the military battle; Pakistan has never been able to clear, hold and build on a consistent basis. An asymmetric military operation can only buy time and space for non-military action, and starts to become a liability when it can't afford anything else.

Equally problematic for Islamabad is distinguishing true allies from foes. The Pakistani military does seem to recognize the need to uproot al-Qaeda's influence, the extremist Punjabi Taliban and other groups with regional agendas. Hakilmullah Mehsud, the TTP's de facto chieftain, has allied himself with these unpredictable elements. Yet the TTP's other commanders, several of which have challenged for the TTP's scepter, do not pose the same type of threat to the Pakistani state. In particular, North Waziristan's own Hafiz Gul Bahadur has upheld his end of a truce with Islamabad and concentrates on Afghanistan's front. The Haqqanis have instigated a large number of problems for local Pakistanis as they solidify their presence in the FATA, but they too are militarily concerned with Afghanistan's war.

For this reason Washington wants them disposed of, and naturally Islamabad has balked at enthusiastically throwing itself against them. It would prefer to bring these figures into a regional agreement with the Afghan Taliban and foreign capitals. Their forces represent the least threat to Pakistan and still fulfill their proxy uses, generating the accurate impression that Washington wants Pakistan to do its dirty work for cheap. Counterarguing that Islamabad should fix its own state will make no difference on the ground. The real cost of an operation into North Waziristan exceeds the billions in U.S. aid, and Washington lacks the forces to synchronize a long-term border campaign. The Trench has also reported on the Haqqanis' diversification beyond North Waziristan, expanding the battlefield accordingly.

With the bulk of NATO forces scheduled to withdraw by 2014, Islamabad isn't going to destabilize its Western flank any more than it already is. Not without delivered incentives, at least.

Al Jazeera Speaks With PKK Rebel Leader

Interesting interview with Murat Karayilan, acting chief of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The asymmetric conflict between Turkey and the PKK bears no evidence of a resolution in the foreseeable future.

Nabeel Rajab's Appeal Hearing Delayed, West Shuts Eyes

A Bahraini appeals court postponed Nabeel Rajab's hearing on Tuesday, perpetuating the criminalization of a leading human rights defender in the Middle East.

The ruling is hardly surprising in light of recent events. During his last appeal hearing on September 27th, the government's prosecution team introduced doctored video "evidence" of Rajab "instigating violent protests" that hadn't been shown at the trial. His inhumane treatment leading up to his trial was similarly unjust and the sham trial itself was clearly the product of a government takedown. Bahrain's appeals process then functions as a black hole for prisoners of conscience. One of Bahrain's foremost "public enemies," the monarchy is treating Rajab as such in the vain hope that he will eventually crack and stand down. King Hamad and royal circle are mistaken in this strategy though. The most they can do is keep him off the streets for as long as possible - three years at the moment. They can't even stop his Twitter feed.

Rajab’s next hearing is scheduled for November 8th.

While Bahrain's appeals process experiences natural delays like any other country, Tuesday's decision is typical of the monarchy's systematic campaign against Bahrain's human rights activists and revolutionary personalities. The appeals circuit has already struck down a high-profile group of political prisoners, including Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, and is bound to do the same to Rajab. Al-Khawaja's daughter, Zainab, is also imprisoned on 13 different charges; most deride King Hamad but all messages were sent through non-violent protests. All of these individuals have endured the monarchy's physical and mental abuse, so each new injustice cannot be separated from the whole.

Mohammed Al-Maskati, President of Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR), was also arrested on Tuesday after being ordered to report "on the charges of rioting and participating in an illegal gathering." He will be taken to the Public Prosecution Office tomorrow and accused of the same charges as Rajab. This is how the monarchy's scheme works: detain the opposition's leaders on the grounds that they are instigating Bahrain's violence. However their voices express the island's non-violent movement more clearly than any others. Those protesters who have chosen violence did so out of personal resolve, or else in reaction to the hostile and unjust treatment of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement. They have nowhere else to turn when the monarchy assaults them, refuses an honest dialogue with the opposition, then holds the latter responsible for not participating (all designed to stall for as long as possible).

No protester has been explicitly or implicitly ordered to commit, in the monarchy's words, "sabotage" and "terrorism." The most Rajab and the Khawajas have admitted to is a sympathetic understanding of Bahrain's pent-up anger. Al-Maskati's case is almost certainly tied to his presence at the UNHRC's 21st session, which Bahrain's monarchy dominated through sheer numbers and power. So complete is King Hamad's repression.

These developments follow another of his delusional speeches. Too obsessed with Iranian missile strikes and coups to concern himself, the King goes about his monarchial business as though Bahrain's 20-month uprising doesn't exist. Meanwhile government officials continue to "improve relations" with their U.S. counterparts. As Rajab was being taken back to his cell, Field Marshal Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa met with Lt-General Robert B. Nelle, CENTCOM's senior Marine commander, at the BDF Headquarters in Manama. This high-level meeting of delegations was attended by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Krajeski, who also met with Minister of Human Rights Affairs Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdulrahman on Tuesday.

Bahrain's Minister would "unveil a prospective visit to the USA where he will hold meetings with US officials, congressmen, human rights organizations and Media centers in order to give them an update on the latest developments in Bahrain, inform them about the kingdom's human rights achievements and discuss with them exchange of expertise and experiences."

The U.S. government issued no response to Rajab's latest judicial harassment and has remained publicly silent since his July 12th arrest.

Truthful Elements Behind Rumors of Saleh's U.S. Trip

On Sunday the Yemen Post reported that former president Ali Abdullah Saleh is scheduled for new medical procedures in the United States.

Rumors of medical leave and exile crop up from various sources on a regular basis in Yemen, often to placate Western and Arab governments who demand that he stop "meddling" in Yemen's political transition. This one is no different, coming straight from Saleh's camp weeks before President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi opens his internationally-sponsored "National Dialogue" in early November. Sultan al-Barakani, the Secretary-General of Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC), claims that the displaced tyrant will undergo two surgeries in the unspecified future. His absence would clear a path for Hadi, Saleh's former vice president of 19 years, to assert his independence amid the political battles that are due to be fought by Yemen's numerous parties and revolutionary groups.

This "trip" may be nothing more than disinformation against Saleh's internal opponents and Hadi's foreign guarantors, Washington and Riyadh. The loyal and deceptive al-Barakani is willing to say anything for his boss - as a result, disinformation is also falsely attributed to him. Following the death-by-drone of Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, a bit player in the USS Cole bombing, al-Barakani told The Washington Post, "The drone strikes have not helped either the United States or Yemen. Yemen is paying a heavy price, losing its sons. But the Americans are not paying the same price." This argument simply mimics the grievances of Saleh's countless enemies in a futile attempt to blend in with them.

“There is more hostility against America because the attacks have not stopped al-Qaeda, but rather they have expanded, and the tribes feel this is a violation of the country’s sovereignty,” said Anssaf Ali Mayo, who heads the oppositional al-Islah party in Aden. “There is a psychological acceptance of al-Qaeda because of the U.S. strikes.”

Saleh is largely responsible for enabling al-Qaeda in the Peninsula's (AQAP) growth in order to salvage his own corrupt regime. Less than maximum effort was directed towards the influx of "rehabilitated" Saudi and Yemeni militants, a development that many Yemenis link to Saudi hegemony, and he would later approve of U.S. air strikes (selectively) in exchange for political and military support. This aid was then redirected against the north's Houthi sect and secessionist Southern Movement, with U.S. knowledge. Saleh's plan to maintain power would have succeeded if not for Yemen's revolution. However Western, Arab and Eastern powers conspired to replace him with his malleable lieutenant, and Washington continues to expand its military-intelligence network behind Hadi. 

Anything that al-Barakani says about Saleh and AQAP is susceptible to the autocrat's designs, but Washington is motivated to get him out the country before November. The diplomatically-immune Saleh has persistently undermined the same agreement that grants him immunity, and some observers suspect that he's awaiting 2014's presidential election to move through his son, General Ahmed (presently in charge of his Republican Guard units). No foreign supporter of the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement wants him to star as the National Dialogue's focus or interrupt their pro-democracy narrative. If no one else takes him - Germany, the UAE or Ethiopia, three U.S. allies, for instance - the Obama administration may assume the negligible domestic risk and bring him in. This situation would replay his February visit to New York City, which coincided with Yemen's UN-sponsored referendum of Hadi and ended with a triumphant return to Sana'a. His GPC also "confirmed" and "denied" this information before he finally landed in New York.

Whether the newest rumor is true or false, its odds remain higher than Saleh's national or international prosecution.

ECOWAS, NATO Inching Closer To Northern Mali

After months of navigating the world's international blocs, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently approved the submission of a politco-military proposal for northern Mali within 45 days. Whether NATO, the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can launch their intervention before April 2013's election remains uncertain; multiple delays have obstructed an effective response to Mali's coup and burgeoning asymmetric war. Both Western and African powers talk tougher than they seem prepared to act - not that caution or multilateralism is unwise - and initial estimates of 3,000 troops underestimate the task at hand. Mali's interim government has even sent mixed signals about the presence of any foreign troops.

Five days from now, representatives from the UN, ECOWAS, AU, EU and other "neighboring countries" (presumably Algeria and Mauritania) are scheduled to debate a hard mission plan in Mali's capital.

The Islamic network that swept over northern Mali earlier this year takes these threats completely seriously, for an intervention is certain to arrive at some point in the future. Having pledged to defeat any intruder and entrenched themselves within the population, militant spokesmen also promise to send their forces into Mali's south. Nor did they waste any time responding to Friday's at the UNSC and French President Francois Hollande in particular.

"If he continues to throw oil on the fire, we will send him the pictures of dead French hostages in the coming days," Oumar Ould Hamaha, a spokesman for MUJAO, told Reuters on Saturday. "He will not be able to count the bodies of French expatriates across West Africa and elsewhere."

However observers and locals alike have trouble determining who exactly is controlling northern Mali. Two theories may help explain the general situation between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a hydra-like network of African, Arab and Asian militants. Each supposedly has their own agenda. Ansar Dine is commanded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg who fought in earlier rebellions but has broken off under the banner of strict Sharia law. His forces, along with MUJAO, would expel the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) from northern Mali's urban areas after the Tuaregs' own campaign. Ag Ghaly now allies himself with AQIM, whose Arab fighters are periodically reported by locals in northern Mali's towns.

MUJAO, on the other hand, is suspected of growing out of AQIM. Looking to expand beyond the Maghreb and into lucrative West Africa, the group touts itself as pan-African and allegedly recruits from local sources. Northern Mali's vast deserts and mountain ranges provide an ideal base to increase the size and training of a guerrilla force.

A second theory places AQIM as the head of these two other groups, rather than as a partner. By absorbing Mali into their area of operations, the group could now control an enormous amount of territory to train in and plot from. What difference this makes on the ground is unclear though; they could experience a leadership dispute similar to al-Shabaab nationalists and al-Qaeda's branch in Somalia. Or they could fight more effectively as a diversified network. With AQIM's random bankroll, MUJAO's regional following and Ansar Dine's local intelligence, the three groups make for a deadly combination on paper. Defeating them on the battlefield won't dismantle all three groups or stop their activities. Thus local resistance, cooperation with the MNLA, political sensitivity and organization within Mali's government form the keys of victory. Resolution 2012 conditions a military response on progress in these areas, but they are no more stable than northern Mali.

Detailed analysis of NATO and ECOWAS's plans will be posted shortly.

London's Political Battleground: Maryam al-Khawaja VS. Bahrain's Prince

She could never stop the onslaught, but Maryam al-Khawaja fired off as many shots as she could before yielding the spotlight. al-Khawaja recently met with William Hague, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to impress upon him the stagnation of Bahrain's political reforms and a theoretical dialogue with the island's opposition network. One of Bahrain's leading activists couldn't have minced words with the Secretary.

While no transcript is available, "diplomatic protocol" may have sounded something like this: "People today are saying the United States and the UK are to Bahrain what Russia is to Syria. They are countries willing to aid repression, people who are willing to overlook human rights violations because it's in their own interests. The only difference is that Russia doesn't try to present itself as a beacon of human rights and democracy."

Al-Khawaja's accusation carries a risk at the government level; Bahrain's monarchy is hypersensitive to being compared with Syria and the Arab revolutions in general. The U.S. and U.K. governments also reject comparisons between the two countries's situations, which have demarcated the ends of the region's violence spectrum. Yet the exiled Al-Khawaja cannot withhold the truth either and she's unpopular enough in Western capitals. Her jailed father and sister can't afford to wait, nor can Bahrain's democratic opposition, and reality must be expressed in order for her to retain credibility with them. Someone has to stand up when Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, pays a visit to London.

Acting as though he hadn't paid attention during Al-Khawaja's meeting, Hague welcomed Al-Khalifa with open arms on Thursday and proceeded to soften Bahrain's hardline environment. The young prince serves as his father's international face as well as the West's "moderate" savior in Bahrain, and Washington and London's doors always remain open as a result. Employing a script that has become set in concrete, Al-Khalifa would "affirm the unprecedented steps taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain had reflected His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's commitment towards the comprehensive reform process that His Majesty had launched." He also claimed that the monarchy realizes "the need to push forward in facing challenges in the path of reform," and "within a pure Bahraini framework implemented in through a unified Bahraini spirit."

Hague, in turn, reciprocated a similar point of view through a combination of flattery and deception. Like his U.S. counterparts, the Secretary praised Bahrain's commitment to reforming its judiciary and police system. He welcomed "recent commitments made by Government of Bahrain last month at the Human Rights Council, in particular to consider ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture." Hague also supports a peaceful dialogue between the monarchy and democratic opposition, in line with U.S. policy. Most interestingly, his "open and honest exchange about political reform in Bahrain... confirmed to me the Crown Prince’s personal commitment to an inclusive political dialogue."

"His Royal Highness the Crown Prince expressed his satisfaction with the progress of ongoing cooperation and coordination between Bahrain and Britain and on working towards reinforcing stability in the region," Bahrain's state media reported of the meeting. "For his part Hague expressed his happiness for meeting His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, welcoming his visit and presented him with a letter from UK President David Cameron."

Of course they did.

Stronger in appearance than logic, the entirety of Hague and Al-Khalifa's meeting can be broken down to its rusted base. Hague's emphasis on the Prince's "personal commitment" is telling - does his father share the feeling? His hawkish great uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, surely doesn't. One of the opposition's fiercest enemies, the 41-year Prime Minister currently stands as the more influential voices in King Hamad's royal circle. Salman told Hague that "the insistence on practicing violence would lead to results harming all that in turn would cripple advancement," when his family is busy outlawing and gassing protests in Manama.

The idea of "considering" the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture is equally absurd. Many of Bahrain's leading activists have been physically assaulted over the past 19 months of demonstrations, including Maryam's sister Zainab. The latter resides in a cell for the seventh time in less than two years, awaiting 13 charges with their father Abdulhadi. King Hamad has made the Al-Khawaja's punishment a national priority, and Abdiulhadi sent her out of the country "to make sure people on the outside made sure what was happening on the inside." This harassment fits into a wider campaign to destroy Bahrain's activist network and the Bahrain's Center for Human Rights, which counts all three Al-Khawajas as senior members. Rajab Nabeel, the BCHR's director, also sits in jail after being given three years for instigating protests. He too reports cruel and unusual punishment of Bahrain's prisoners of conscience, including himself.

Accordingly, the Bahraini regime enjoys far greater access with the necessary Western governments. Al-Khalifa and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa attended other meetings in London, including an "honorary luncheon" with Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Alistair Burt.

Al-Khawaja argues that this double-standard has emboldened Bahrain's government to maintain its crackdown against the opposition. The West is too inclined to accept Manama's hollow promises and superficial attempts to reform, a process that comes nowhere near the opposition's demand for a parliamentary overhaul. Al-Khawaja told The Independent that statements from Washington and London "made a difference" last year, but, "Now they don't make any difference because the Bahraini government now knows that even if there are statements it won't result in any consequences." Western pressure has, from time to time, helped a Bahraini out of prison; Washington supposedly opposed Riyadh's March 2011 intervention, to no avail. Yet public and private comments achieved results only to the extent that Bahrain's monarchy initially believed them. With Rajab and the Al-Khawajas locked within cell walls and Western silence, Manama is visibly prepared to continue its repressive counterrevolution as opposed to a genuine dialogue with Bahrain's opposition.

"I had a meeting at the White House and I told them, 'Everything you fear and is making you not do the right thing because you fear it, you are actually making it a reality.' At the end of the day it only makes sense that when people feel polarized, cornered and ignored they're going to look for help from wherever they can get it. I'm actually really surprised that hasn't happened yet. I'm really surprised that we're still to a large extent peaceful. I'm surprised we're not as sectarian as I thought we would be and that we haven't yet reached a point where we say we'll find help from wherever it comes."

Either Washington and London don't realize this dilemma, or more likely, they believe that their position is as invincible as King Hamad's. Unfortunately Bahrain is traveling far off the path of democratic reform and Western powers comprise a big section of the roadblock.

Disinformation Fogs U.S.-Jordanian Troop Movements

On the sidelines of Wednesday's meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta generated minor headlines by publicizing the deployment of U.S. Special Forces to Jordan. Primarily tasked to assist in the response of any chemical emergency in Syria, Panetta told reporters that Washington and Amman are similarly coordinating a response to the area's humanitarian crisis. Special Forces have been moving across the border for months, or presumably longer, to gain situational intelligence.

“We’ve also been working with [Jordan] to try to develop their own military and operational capabilities in the event of any contingency there,” Panetta said.

His relative frankness can be appreciated for a brief moment. In response to NATO's events, the Jordanian government quickly issued a denial through Jordan News Agency (Petra) and claimed that the Jordanian Armed Forces "is capable of confronting any future threats that may arise without outside assistance." A separate statement from the JAF added that all international military personnel on Jordanian soil are participating in unrelated joint-training exercises. Why the Jordanian government decided on this course isn't fully explainable. The two governments have held joint exercises since May, nicknamed the "Eager Lion," to develop reactive strategies in the event of a chemical weapons attack inside or outside of Syria. 

Naturally the King and his forces are leery of appearing more pro-American than they are already perceived, and would like to keep their public space at a manageable level. Their current denial, though, is only reinforcing the negative image that they want to dispel. The JAF's statements are attributed to a New York Times report of Panetta's press conference, not the high-profile media session itself. There's nowhere to run except into shadow.

“We’ve also been working with [Jordan] to try to develop their own military and operational capabilities in the event of any contingency there,” Panetta explained. "We have a group of our forces there, working to help them build a headquarters and to ensure that we make the relationship between the United States and Jordan a strong one so we can deal with all of the possible consequences."

This headquarters goes by the name of King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, where roughly 150 U.S. Special Forces are working overtime to train Jordanian commandoes. The 16 square-mile bunker complex is hard to miss if you can get close enough - it also has its own website - and judging its activities isn't exceedingly difficult. The base functions as one of Jordan's largest Special Forces schools, making it an ideal launch pad for American and British Special Forces (and intelligence agents). Again, Jordanian officials concede that a variety of operations are being developed with Western "specialists," while denying the presence of US “boots on the ground." The latter information is simply false, as the majority of American personnel are reportedly drawn from the U.S. Army's network: Delta Force and Rangers.

Both of these forces wear boots when walking on the ground. They are equally proficient in combat and training, and are only limited by their controllers in Washington. Although currently providing "technical and logistical support” to secure the Jordanian-Syrian border, they can and will spearhead any military contingency that is being rehearsed with Jordanian forces. Amman and Washington are "currently exploring the possibility of establishing a 'buffer-zone' along the border region," a move that would require significant U.S. assistance.

Information Minister Sameeh Maaytah, the only official who spoke on the record, said the U.S. presence was part of "routine training exercises." He denied any involvement in Syria's planning; Panetta and other Jordanian officials say that blueprints are being developed at this moment.

As jarring as this disinformation may be, one can understand Amman's plight and the caution exercised over the presence of Western military advisers. Jordan remains involved in the diplomatic attempt to remove al-Assad from Syria's presidential office, and must attempt to remain in a defensive position for as long as possible. The Jordanian government also suspects al-Assad's regime of maintaining sleeper cells in the country and hopes to avoid the blowback of any Western-Gulf actions. Except al-Assad's regime isn't so incompetent that it will be deceived by U.S. cooperation, leaving the American and Jordanian publics as the main targets of disinformation. The fact that Jordan is experiencing its own unrest cannot be ignored either (not that the Kingdom's security forces need help crushing a revolution), and the state is integral to the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) expansion plans (whose strings are pulled by Riyadh).

These wider factors demonstrate that the true nature of U.S. policy in Jordan is hegemonic, not humanitarian.

Mexico Pleads Ignorance After Lazcano Heist

The killing of Heriberto Lazcano must inevitably grow more bizarre before receding to some measure of normality. Los Zetas's deceased commander, as previously suspected, wasn't tracked down so much as bumped into by Mexican Marines last Sunday, according to multiple authorities. This information has become critical to the government's explanation of why Lazcano's body disappeared in the aftermath. In a series of Wednesday interviews, Rear Adm. Jose Luis Vergara said that Lazcano was left at a local funeral home in Progresso because the Marines believed him to be "just a common criminal."

“For us it was two more criminals, he told MVS Radio. "We had no indication that it was ‘Lazca."

The government would doublecheck its forensic tests after masked gunmen stole Lazcano's body and supposedly matched his fingerprints. However this process is hardly trustworthy. Why didn't a convoy of Marines recognize Lazcano's bodily appearance - one of the military's most analyzed targets? Police and government corruption runs so high that one cannot be sure of anything they say, or rule out any possibility. Suspecting corruption seems reasonable; depositing Lazcano at a local funeral home is akin to leaving Osama bin Laden's body in a Pakistani mosque. This scenario doesn't make sense with the current information. Furthermore, both the Navy and outgoing President Philipe Calderon have stopped short of unequivocally announcing Lazcano's death.

"Information was obtained after the first forensics tests were carried out that yielded indications that suggest that one of the bodies is Heriberto Lazcano," the navy's statement said.

Equally interesting is the Navy's confidence in Miguel Angel "Z-40" Trevino's ascension to Los Zetas's throne. Attempting to downplay fears of another violent turf battle, either inside or outside Los Zetas, Vergara told Reuters that the government is not expecting a dispute over the group's leadership. The hardened Trevino, he says, is a "natural" successor to Lazcano. Unfortunately a stable Los Zetas still means an unstable Mexico.

"We don't think that there will be violence due to a battle between them for power, since we think that Z-40 is definitely taking the lead," Vergara told Reuters. "From what we know, the most bloodthirsty of them was Heriberto Lazcano, there's no doubt about that. I think his downfall should help curb the violence in our country."

Mexico's Navy sits in an disadvantageous position after failing to immediately identify Lazcano and losing his body. These failures do not engender trust in the government's other analyses.

[Update: U.S. knew Zeta leader's identity before body stolen]

Massive Info-Battle Follows Lazcano's Execution

By now the world observer knows that Heriberto Lazcano, leader of Los Zetas crime syndicate, has been killed in a shoot out with the Mexican Navy. The observer also knows that his body was stolen overnight by unidentified gunmen, presumably Zetas, but the general oddities of Lazcano's death still warrant an organized account. 

Known as "El Verdugo," or the executioner, Lazcano was killed on Sunday after encountering a Marine patrol in the northern border state of Coahuila. The favorable advantage of saturation enabled the discovery of his location; an additional 1,500 navy, army and federal police were deployed to the area after the October 3rd killing of José Eduardo Moreira, son of the state's former Gov. Humberto Moreira. The Navy claims that a local tipoff identified a suspicious vehicle near Progreso, Coahuila, about 80 miles west of Laredo, Texas. After a brief exchange of gun and grenade fire, Lazcano's body was found lying in or near a baseball field.

This information, unconfirmed as it remains, appears more certain that the rest of Lazcano and Los Zetas's future. After all, Zetas have built their syndicate on disinformation and fabrication to counterattack the efforts of other drug cartels and government agencies (and recruit locally, nationally and internationally). Connected to Guatemalan commandos, El Salvadorian street gangs, the Italian mafia, FARC and, more dubiously, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, Los Zetas needs ambiguity to stay operational. Many members have been "killed" only to surface again, while Lazcano himself replaced Los Zetas's founder, Arturo Guzmán Decena, after the latter was killed in a 2002 shootout.

Now everyone in the underworld and law enforcement is speculating over Lazcano's fate. Will the loss of its entire original leadership lead to a formal schism in Los Zetas, which allegedly controls over 10,000 individuals from all sorts of political and military backgrounds? Los Zetas currently oversees criminal activities down Mexico's Gulf Coast and in the states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila and parts of Hidalgo, Puebla and Zacatecas. For the past two years, however, various media "rumors" have reported an internal competition for the group's leadership and over lucrative new territory, such as the Yucatan peninsula. This information falls in line with Los Zetas's increasing fragmentation, attributed to the systemic loss of its older leaders and the rise of their younger replacements.

Whether the new boss, former deputy Capo Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, can keep the organization in one piece will affect the entirety of Mexico's drug war. Morales is considered more rash and brutal than Lazcano and Decana, the most able of the three. If any of them is going to lose control, it's Z-40. Yet Morales should be estimated as no less militarily capable than his predecessors, and his independence was supposedly deep in progress by the time of Lazcano's death. Of the three options - unity, division and collapse - the organization is too big to fail even in a worse-case scenario. Nor has the criminal underworld been more entwined than now and many powers, national and international, need to keep Los Zetas alive. Lazcano's death could also force Morales to pursue deeper international relationships to maintain his authority.

Lastly, some Mexicans and observers still question the veracity of Lazcano's death and his body-snatching drove the speculation to new heights. The kill itself was an enormous development but the theft induces a surreal situation. New rumors of police corruption are fanning the theory that Lazcano somehow faked his death in order to undergo facial reconstruction surgery, as Amado Carrillo Fuentes infamously attempted and died from in 1997. The sequence of events resembles the overall status of Mexico's drug war: after a major takedown follows infiltration.

This war can only be managed, not ended, with a top-down approach that fails to sufficiently address government corruption and inefficiency.

Nabeel Rajab Starts Hunger Strike

The prison saga of Nabeel Rajab, one of Bahrain's leading human rights activists, has taken a new turn at an old tactic. Rajab was granted a temporary release on Thursday to attend the funeral of his mother, where he delivered a pro-democracy speech to his supporters and urged them to forsake surrender.

"I want and wish for all of you to go to the capital Manama, and everywhere else to fight for democracy, respect, and other rights. We will prove to them (the government) that even if they imprison us, kill us or our families, we will return and we will win this battle against their cruel policies, God willing."

This speech may or may not have cost Rajab's attendance at his mother's three-day condolence gathering. One could argue that monarchy wouldn't have freed him any longer than necessary, speech or no speech, and 24 hours is too long for King Hamad's watch. Regardless, the monarchy's public prosecution team claims that "convict Nabeel Rajab" violated the conditions of his release and won't be afforded future privileges. Such a ruling is understandable in a contextless vacuum. In reality, however, Rajab is being imprisoned and abused strictly for his political beliefs and the pro-democracy movement that he has organized over the years. He is a convict only to Bahrain's autocracy, a minority of Bahrainis, the Saudi Kingdom and, due to association and inaction, the U.S. government.

By "inciting mourners to stage illegal protests," chief prosecutor Wael Buallay means to say that any protest against the King is considered illegal. Opposition protests have already been banned in Manama, a feeble attempt to control the movements of Bahrain's uprising, and any protester (peaceful or not) runs into trouble with their anti-king sloganeering. Zainab Al-Khawaja has been repeatedly arrested and beaten by female police officers for staging her peaceful, one-woman protests against King Hamad. In sum, the monarchy continues to take the position that Bahrain isn't experiencing a pro-democracy uprising at all, but a foreign-directed campaign of terror.

Now Rajab has decided to undertake his own hunger strike, following the path of his fellow inmate Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, in protest of his own conditions and Bahrain's repressive environment. He will be lucky to receive any tangible help from Washington, which has refused to or is unable to secure his release nearly 100 days after his July 12th arrest. Public statements remain scarce and expressing "private concern" is more akin to a coverup. Expecting assistance from the U.S. is an exercise in futility; writing to one of the few Congressional representatives willing to defend Rajab is pointless. The only option for an American and non-Bahrainis is continual awareness and mobilization in support of pro-democracy movements such as Bahrain's.

As for the monarchy itself, a long-term threat to public security stems from Rajab's unjust imprisonment - not his freedom.

U.S. State Department: Taliban Has The Ball

The New York Times recently reported that the Obama administration has lost faith in a direct political resolution between the U.S. government and Mullah Omar's Taliban. The first official response to this information (or possibly disinformation) is no less encouraging than the administration's current plan to hammer out a sustainable agreement. Forced to address the topic of "reconciliation" on Wednesday, the State Department's Victoria Nuland demonstrated why Afghanistan's war is more likely to rush past 2014 than end "on time," a ridiculous notion in asymmetric warfare.

”On the reconciliation side, as we’ve said for a long time now, we support an Afghan-led process, and there has been a lot of work done to prepare the ground for that. It’s really – the ball is in the Taliban court, whether they want to play or not.”

Putting aside the fact that Washington is exploring diplomatic channels behind Hamid Karzai's back, Nuland's analogy leads to the following questions: is the Taliban holding the ball in Washington's court, or is Washington still playing in the Taliban's court? And what is more valuable, the ball or the court? What happens when Kabul takes control of the court? The Trench understands the need to negotiate directly between Afghanistan's government and Taliban, but giving them "the ball" seems dangerously passive. Washington argues the opposite - an enormous quantity of kinetic action has forced the Taliban onto the defensive - except this theory is incomplete. The Taliban cannot be killed into submission, and such thinking relies on Western minds to interpret an insurgency's thought process. Far from engaging Kabul on Washington's terms, the insurgency is likely to keep fighting and stalling until they receive a favorable offer.

In the event that no reconciliation agreement is reached before 2015, a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Kabul and Washington could legitimize the Taliban's ongoing fight against occupation.

Not everyone was convinced by Nuland's attempt. Asked, "as far as reconciliation is concerned, do you think it’s working now?" the spokeswoman refuses to budge from her predetermined answer: "They’ve got an open door to it. It’s now for the Taliban to decide if they want to take advantage of it." This passivity is again concealed by military action, which has supposedly forced the Taliban to the negotiating table, and shifts blame away from the failures of U.S. strategy. By arguing that Mullah Omar refuses to walk through this door, the administration can claim that it did everything possible to end Afghanistan's war "responsibly." The only culprit is the Taliban, for rejecting peace, and not the unrealistic "red lines" drawn by Washington: renounce al-Qaeda, accept Afghanistan's constitution and lay down arms. That and accept a U.S. military presence after 2014.

If the Taliban do reconcile with the Afghan government on the condition that no U.S. military forces remain inside the county, these terms may cause significant annoyance in the U.S. government.

Demanding surrender over resolution ultimately puts Afghanistan's war on a longer track; in general, whoever possesses "the ball" in any sport occupies an advantageous position. While the NYT report claims that the Obama administration has accepted the fact that the Taliban will keep fighting, the State Department continues to advocate the established policy of "negotiation by destruction." The inability to capitulate the Taliban has been conceded by Pentagon officials, however these admissions don't match the Pentagon's impulse to continue killing or its public bravado. Interestingly, the Department of Defense trotted out two non-Americans to deliver this message to Americans.

"They are, we think, at the point of realizing that they simply cannot achieve their political aims by military means alone," Lieutenant General Adrian Bradshaw of the British army told reporters on Tuesday. "In fact, we see some real signs of that in our intelligence reporting. This is a very important point in any insurgency, because this is the signal to the insurgents that they must join the political process. When they do that, of course, the reintegration program provides their fighters a mechanism by which to reintegrate into society. So in that respect it could become a game-changer."

Only a foolish insurgency would believe that "military means alone" are response for political victory. The Taliban has never believed in this simplistic equation and always fought on non-military fronts to compensate for its inferior strength. "Blue on Green" is politically oriented. Nor is the Taliban searching for a military conquest of Kabul and the rest of the country at this point; various reports indicate that the insurgency will content itself with governing its historic territory and maintaining political representation in the national government (similar to Hezbollah, Hamas or Muqtada al-Sadr's strategy). Of the two forces, America is more likely to chase military results than the Taliban. The U.S. cannot achieve their political aims by military means alone either, so these statements are mostly composed of air.

"The likelihood of a Taliban military victory is less likely than ever before, and they understand that,” said Brigadier Roger Noble of the Australian army, deputy deputy chief of staff for NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Does the Pentagon and NATO understand that similar odds apply to them?

Bahraini Activists' Prison Built By Power Politics

Last week, as expected, a Bahraini appeals court refused to release imprisoned activists Nabeel Rajab and Zainab Al-Khawaja. This decision mocks the monarchy's own defense of a trial that is widely perceived as politically motivated - namely the defendant's right to an appeal process. In reality Bahrain's appeals courts function as a vortex to another dimension. Activists like Zainab's father, Abdullahi, have already fallen down this seemingly endless pit only to receive harsh prison terms at the end. Now Nabeel and Rajab are tumbling down their own wormhole of disinformation and injustice.

The second session of Rajab's appeal trial offers a typical example of the modern advances in autocracy, and also displays the obvious collusion between Bahrain's royal family and their judiciary system. In video "evidence" present by the public prosecution, Rajab is shown attending several different protests and failing to call for peaceful demonstrations as "youthful" protesters threw their Molotovs. The defense, however, argues that the videos were edited to remove Rajab's peaceful message and spliced with another protest to discredit him. These videos weren't presented at his trial either, demonstrating the orchestrated nature of Rajab's persecution and how far King Hamad's circle will go to keep him off Manama's streets. The defense also submitted a complaint that no one has been held accountable for his January 6th encounter with Bahraini security forces.

If his government is left to its own devices, one cannot anticipate a favorable hearing on October 16th or the conclusion of Rajab's appeals process. He has been jailed for a total of 126 days and faces a three-year prison sentence for "instigating protests."

The treatment of Zainab is no less horrific. Recently sentenced to two months in prison for “ripping the photo of the king" - after being jailed since August 2nd - she faces at least eight lawsuits and another five pending cases that are designed to exhaust her. And since her spirit cannot be broken, the monarchy has decided to break her down physically in the jetwash of police custody. Having already been assaulted during August's arrest, which left her with a leg injury that has yet to heal, Zainab came under renewed attack at the Isa Town police station. She was later able to inform her mother of the incident:

"Despite being on a fast, she was forced to sit at the police station without food or water from 1 pm to 7pm (fasting break at around 5:40pm). When she started walking around because she got tired of sitting, a female officer told her to sit down. When Alkhawaja sat next to a domestic worker who had a young child who appeared to be Alkhawaja’s daughter’s age, and spoke to the woman, policewoman Basma Alhajeri attacked Alkhawaja verbally. She told her to stop speaking to the other woman, that the other woman is more honourable than her, and continued to verbally assault Alkhawaja in reference to her honour. She then told Alkhawaja to go into the room next door.

Alkhawaja refused saying she should be moved when she will be taken to the police station. The male officer at the station then ordered that she be taken prison, and as soon as Zainab started to walk she noticed the male officer signalling to officer Basma Alhajeri, who proceeded to physically attack Alkhawaja, with no regard to Zainabs injured leg. She knocked Alkhawaja to the ground and continuously kicked and punched her, while verbally assaulting her as well. She then dragged her to the police jeep, and continued to verbally assault her during the drive to the police station where Zainab will be held overnight."

It should be noted that Zainab and Rajab are two of the most peaceful advocates that Bahrain's opposition has to offer, and latter has also endured physical abuse during his time at Jaww Prison.

Due to the monarchy's intractable position, the Bahraini Center for Human Rights (BCHR) has urged the US administration, "as well as other governments that have influence in Bahrain including the UK government and the EU," to call for the immediate release of human rights activists. Unfortunately Bahrain's opposition floats in the outer regions of Western policy; the mobilization needed to overcome U.S.-Saudi dominance is truly astronomical. The island was ignored completely during President Barack Obama's latest address to the UN General Assembly, a speech that is currently plastered on the frontpage of the U.S. Embassy's website, and the White House is too busy campaigning to notice. The State Department has yet to comment on Rajab and Zainab's continual imprisonment. No Facebook post has been issued from the U.S. Embassy and no Tweet by UN Ambassador Susan Rice.

Nothing remains except a black hole of injustice and propaganda.

Meanwhile King Hamad's men blended into the surrounding environment and mingled freely the UNGA's 67th session. High-level consultations with Western or Gulf states often follow prison sentences and security crackdowns, and the days following Rajab's appeal hearing repeated this choreographed process. On the sidelines of Geneva's 21st UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) session, Human Rights Affairs Minister Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdurrahman met to discuss bilateral cooperation with Scott Busby, a senior advisor for the U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (headed by the pro-Bahraini Michael Posner). While Busby did raise "several "issues, including "the prosecution of doctors and the court verdicts against activists," these obligatory concerns are ultimately designed to marginalize Bahrain's political prisoners.

Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa was particularly laden with a "luncheon" hosted by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, a sideline session with US Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Elizabeth Jones, a GCC–EU "troika meeting" and another GCC-U.S. sideline session. All parties would unanimously reaffirm their support for the other and opposition towards the Iranian-Syrian alliance, offering perfect cover for Al-Khalifa and highlighting the unrivaled access that Bahrain's monarchy enjoys. Most interestingly, he and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were "updated on progress of work on a naval operation centre in the Kingdom of Bahrain."

Today Information Affairs Authority (IAA) President Shaikh Fawaz bin Mohammed Al Khalifa met with U.S. Admiral John Miller and Rear Admiral Kevin Scott at the US Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain US Naval Forces Central Command: "They reviewed bilateral friendly relations and both countries' keenness to boost them."

Rajab and Zainab presumably weren't on the agenda.

U.S.-Taliban Negotiations Need A Reality Check

Due to each side's posturing and their interrelations with external forces, gauging the real status of negotiations between the U.S. government and the Taliban's leadership is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, this New York Times report appears to be truer than false. Its contents conform to the present reality surrounding Afghanistan, and thus match The Trench's continual observation of one of the weakest links in U.S. policy.

According to several anonymous officials, the Obama administration has decided to "scale back plans" for a U.S.-negotiated political settlement with Mullah Omar's inner shura (along with other Taliban factions such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin). Washington intends to distance itself through the proxy of a joint-committee with Pakistan, in order to vet potential new Taliban interlocutors, and pair this move with other incentives to "break the ice" with Kabul. This formula makes a degree of sense on one level. For years the Taliban has refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, encouraging Washington to cut out Hamid Karzai and generating a new source of friction in the process. With the U.S. backed away from the table, Afghanistan's power centers may be able to reach a more permanent agreement on national terms.

"Now American officials say they have reduced their goals further — to patiently laying the groundwork for eventual peace talks after they leave. American officials say they hope that the Taliban will find the Afghan Army a more formidable adversary than they expect and be compelled, in the years after NATO withdraws, to come to terms with what they now dismiss as a “puppet” government."

Mualavi Qalanmudin, a former Taliban minister who now sits on the High Peace Council, expects the Taliban to maintain its opposition against the Karzai administration until the bulk of U.S. troops have exited. This time would open an ideal window for cutting an agreement that yields territory and preserves their network. However the Taliban must be feeling more confident as the U.S. surge exits and NATO's alliance continues to shake, and the Obama administration's plan begins to roll downhill from here. Rather than a savvy political move, the administration is trying to salvage its strategy after the Taliban dodged the knockout blow of Obama and Petraeus's surge. Fresh Pentagon estimates still hover around 20,000 full and part-time fighters, while independent estimates push the number higher. The Taliban also find Afghanistan's security forces to be more penetrable and malleable than NATO soldiers.

Consider the damage that al-Qaeda's cells still inflict on Iraq's army and police, as well as the Taliban's superior strength and how far Iraq's security forces are ahead of Afghanistan's. Or consider how the Haqqanis view themselves as Afghan Taliban and how Washington just branded the group as a terrorist organization.

“I don’t see it happening in the next couple years,” said a senior coalition officer says of a peace settlement. “It’s a very resilient enemy, and I’m not going to tell you it’s not. It will be a constant battle, and it will be for years.”

This source utilizes the same propaganda that most Pentagon officials have memorized: the Taliban's momentum has been "blunted," "halted" or even "reversed," but the insurgency remains a "formidable" enemy. Translation: we're winning but we need to keep fighting. Obama similarly highlights the Taliban's losses and downplays its survival, however the insurgency's overall structure has been left intact. Why, then, would the Taliban unconditionally agree to Washington's terms when it still occupies a relative position of strength? In light of these factors, military insiders could be pushing back against Obama's new promise that "our war will be over in 2014.” The Pentagon surely hopes to keep a residual presence in Afghanistan after losing Iraq, and Obama's campaigning stands directly in the way.

This layer of friction between the White House and Pentagon, as well as GOP and mainstream opposition to "negotiating with extremists," stacks on top of Afghanistan's internal dilemmas.

Equally worrisome is the unrealistic settlement between Washington, Kabul and Afghanistan's neighbors: Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India. Opposing power politics often reach agreements over proxy territory, except this specific web continues to thicken instead of unravel. Bluntly speaking, Syria is now absorbing a higher percentage of the diplomatic energy released by Washington, Tehran, Moscow and Beijing. Pakistan and India are nowhere close to resolving their territorial disputes or ceasing their race for self-interests in Afghanistan. The odds of reaching a negotiated settlement cannot be raised much higher than 0% when division exists at the local, national, regional and international levels of Afghanistan's conflict. More than one factor needs to change significantly.

The Trench shares its observations with many others when suspecting that U.S. "negotiations" created a front for ongoing military operations. The Obama administration has yet to pursue a resolution on sincere terms, instead demanding unconditional surrender from the Taliban: renounce al-Qaeda, accept the Afghan constitution and lay down arms. Since the agreement of all three terms was unrealistic from the beginning, the negotiating process itself has shared in this futility. Washington needs to set a concrete agenda on realistic conditions, otherwise the messy end of Vietnam is not an unrealistic possibility; while the military aspect is unlikely to be as severe as Saigon's fall, the political side of a diplomatic failure will reverberate across the region.

Failure to produce an agreement equals a long-term, low-intensity conflict with no end in sight.