After Mali Comes Niger

This report on Niger makes no mention of a potential U.S. drone base in Niger, except in a negative context at the end, but also favors increased support to an admittedly corrupt government:

Last month, the French army's rapid advance into northern Mali and the timely deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seemed to result in a swift victory over Islamist and Tuareg militants there. Equally important, however, was the Islamist and Tuareg militants' hasty withdrawal into northeastern Mali. With France planning to pull its troops out of the country as soon as March, Mali will almost certainly be turned into an ECOWAS trusteeship. The most likely upshot is not a neat end to the conflict but, rather, a migration of the problem into neighboring Niger.

Parts of the Tuareg leadership, which signed a power-sharing agreement in March 2012 with three jihadist militias -- al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa -- have already fled across the unguarded Nigerien border, where they will try to regroup. Given Niger's weak government structures, they also pose a serious security threat to the country as a whole.

Niger presents an appealingly easy target. For one, despite several attempts at reform by President Mahamadou Issoufou, who was elected in April 2011, Niger's secular political elite lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its largely illiterate, rural, and deeply religious population. Numerous failed attempts at democratization and rampant corruption by previous governments have plagued the country for over two decades. Among the population, this troubled legacy has fostered a general sense of alienation from the capital.

Large parts of the Nigerien army, meanwhile, are opposed to the notion of civilian rule. Ever since it was pushed out of power in 1991, the army leadership has cultivated a deep mistrust of the civilian elite among all military ranks. Consumed with hatred for the Tuareg following two major military campaigns against them (1990-1995 and 2007-2009, respectively), the Nigerien army has overthrown three civilian governments since 1993. Although recent coup attempts in 2011 and 2012 proved amateurish and lacked sufficient support among both the armed forces and the population, they indicate long-standing tensions between parts of the military and the civilian elites.

Continue Reading

U.S. Drone Base Headed For North Africa

After months of speculation that concrete plans would begin to take shape, the theoretical is finally nearing reality in an undecided North African location.

For more than a decade U.S. military and intelligence officials have laid the groundwork of a "light" but vast network across the Sahel region, chasing al-Qaeda affiliates that have spun off their own franchises. In order to counter impressions of colonialism, utilize local forces and intelligence, and keep large numbers of U.S. troops off the continent, this process hinges on bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with cooperative African states. Included are a series of joint forward operating bases constructed through the Sahel, and training programs between national and U.S. forces.

The same program that failed amid Mali's coup and left Washington to patch together a emergency response, as reported by The New York Times earlier this month: "American spy planes and surveillance drones have tried to make sense of the mess, but American officials and their allies are still scrambling even to get a detailed picture of who they are up against."

The next logical step of a bigger presence in North Africa is drone bases in friendly (and needy) countries, and that is where the Obama administration and its partners are headed. Neighboring Niger has been designated as the leading candidate - few African leaders have urged a quicker NATO intervention than President Mahamadou Issoufou - followed by Burkina Faso. The latter currently serves as the base for clandestine PC-12 surveillance aircraft.

The military necessities of a drone base or, more likely, a series of bases around Mali is clear enough. American military commanders and intelligence analysts have good reason to complain about “sorely lacking" information in northern Mali, a territory roughly the size of France and many times more extreme. This environment has already created hurdles for logistics and overflights, and plays into the hands of militants in control of mountainous desert until international air-power scales up (at which point guerrillas lose their advantage).

The task will increase in difficulty when Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in North Africa (MUJAO) fall back to their mountain bases along the Algerian border.

America is the only state capable of delivering the level of surveillance required to effectively coordinate African ground forces with Western air power; eliminate U.S. support and NATO's mission in Mali will collapse. However U.S. officials won't be as candid about the litany of questions and concerns that drones entail. Suffice to say, drone bases function as instruments of control and are never built without strings attached. This manipulation goes both ways too, especially when an unpopular government makes use of U.S. support to buttress its international standing (Yemen and Ethiopia being primary examples). Some observers suspect that Issoufou is operating along these lines.

Mali's conflict has now afforded the perfect opportunity to begin building the first of several "lily pads" in the desert, a plan that is designed to synchronize with greater numbers of U.S. Special Forces and intelligence operatives. U.S. officials say that the drones will fly unarmed over Mali, but Mali is bigger than Mali to both the international community and al-Qaeda's ideology. Each side is thinking in decades, not months or years, and U.S. drones will eventually be armed. Consider the force brought to bear in Yemen, a smaller and more accessible country that houses a similar number of al-Qaeda militants.

Everything is a matter of time in North Africa. A NATO intervention in Libya that, according to the opinion of U.S. intelligence, overwhelmed U.S. military planners in Mali is now being trailed by a spine of bases into the Sahara. Within the alleged chaos lies a chain reaction so precise and efficient that it belies the region's unpredictability.

Ansar Dine Split Clouds Mali's Netwar

In their quest to create larger and more organized structures than their individual parts, non-state actors (both military and civilian) are driven by necessity to connect with like-minded groups and their own hierarchies. Unless commanded by strong central leadership at the network's hub, they generally assume flatter shapes that make them harder to kill but easier to divide - especially in insurgency environments where everyone has interests to pursue. The benefits of netwar can evaporate as quickly as one network breaks away from another, and time will soon tell how much Mali's Islamist alliance suffers from division.

Speaking to the Associated Press on Thursday, former Ansar Dine official Alghabass Ag Intalla has announced the creation of a new all-Malian Tuareg front: the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). Ag Intalla had initially chosen Iyad Ag Ghaly's newly-established Ansar Dine over the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) during their joint takeover of the north, locking down the Kidal region that both call home. The urgent question is whether Ag Intalla's intentions are sincere. Chafing under Ag Ghaly's authority would be natural for multiple reasons; Ag Intalla is considered a moderate Muslim and the heir to Kidal's tribal leadership. Just as the ambitious Ag Ghaly has involved himself in the Tuareg movement to the point of several failed takeovers, Ag Intalla doesn't want to take orders from someone else.

“We are neither AQIM or MUJAO,” he said, referring to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa. “We are a group of people from the north of Mali who have a set of grievances that date back at least 50 years.”

Ag Intalla's actions are believed to be driven by French air-strikes in the Kidal region, the first phase of bombardment on AQIM's catacomb bases located along the Mali-Algerian border. This must be partially true if his loyalist forces reject fighting and dying for "al-Qaeda's war," but Ag Intalla is also working a deal with international mediators and seems to expect his terms to be considered. For months African and European diplomats had used him in their attempts to pry Ansar Dine away from AQIM and MUJAO, with the intention of jelling it back together with the MNLA. Except Ag Ghaly was never serious about negotiating - later deemed a "miscalculation" by foreign sources - and instead offered MNLA fighters an ultimatum to join or die before storming their last towns with AQIM and MUJAO's assistance.

Ag Intalla and his foreign handlers presumably reached out to each other when the French landed last week in Sevare, and the first details are now going public.

Accordingly, French officials say they are taking Ag Intalla at his word until his actions prove otherwise. They likely trust his immediate motivation to distance himself from al-Qaeda's flag, but they expect the type of rapid assistance that could shorten Mali's operation and win praise at home. Demanding that they "prove it on the ground," one anonymous diplomat said that Paris is looking for the IMA to "free up territory" and work with the Malian army in Kidal. Plugging into Ag Intalla's local network should ease the burden of fighting the Islamists' embedded positions in Mali's rugged north, so one can understand how eager the international community is to flip him.

For his part Ag Intalla claims his men are prepared to fight Ansar Dine and its allies. Less clear is his willingness to cooperate with the MNLA; forming a new group suggests a loose relationship, but they may be forced together by the circumstances. Also uncertain is the long-term effects on the Islamist alliance. Can Ag Ghaly afford to target Ag Intalla and risk provoking his own Tuareg base? Does Ag Intalla possess enough strength to confront Ag Ghaly and his allies head on? Will other groups splinter off and create a web of networks operating on competing agendas, and will this patchwork facilitate or obstruct a political resolution to the north's conflict?

And what if Ag Intalla wants what the international community isn't prepared to give any Tuareg: autonomy or independence? This current situation, like everything else in Mali, is shrouded in a fog of asymmetric warfare.

Slow Treading In Mali's Asymmetric Fog

The gears of humanitarian intervention are rolling along smoothly if one takes the words of government and military officials at face value. Backed by over 2,000 French soldiers, their Malian counterparts have managed to establish the beginning of a defensive barrier and halt the Islamist coalition's movements in the country's inner delta. For several months Ansar Dine, the north's Tuareg-Islamist outfit, had leveraged its al-Qaeda contacts to encroach upon the country's mid-section, seizing positions on both sides of the Niger River before advancing on Konna. This move proved one step too close to Sevare's airport, the Islamists' likely target, and the town has now been fortified by French troops in less than a week.

VOA French to Africa correspondent Idrissa Fall described Sevare as being in a "state of war," overrun by French and Malian military forces, and empty of civilians. Its airbase will serve as a main international jump-point into the north.

The influx of French troops has allowed for the creation of a defensive line between Sevare and Diablay, a modest town that was overrun by militants shortly after France's initial air-strikes in Konna. Several hundred miles to the southwest and 50 miles below Diablay lies the town of Niono. Here French forces have entrenched themselves with Malian soldiers as they construct a forward operating base on the conflict's northwestern flank. French commanders are currently awaiting reinforcements and scouting reports from the north, and plan to take control of Diablay after the town is checked for disguised militants (who reportedly vacated on Saturday).

“The deployment towards the north... which began 24 hours ago, is on course with troops inside the towns of Niono and Sevare,” Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Dosseur told reporters on Sunday.

Accordingly, defensive lines should be stretched in the opposite direction of Sevare as more French troops and the first African contingents arrive. 50 Senegalese troops landed in the capital on Sunday and 200 have been cleared to deploy from Niger. National media is interpreting their activation as a possible second front on Mali's eastern border, where Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Oneness in West Africa (MUJAO) are particularly entrenched. Neighboring Burkina Faso has also pledged to contribute a force inside Mali and to deploy a separate force along its border, theoretically connecting French and African troops along Mali's north-south divide.

In a potential boost, Chad recently offered to raise the total African force from 3,800 to 5,800.

So how long will the international community's wheels keep rolling in what they view as an uninterrupted state? Questioning over the conflict's anticipated schedule has yet to disperse, instead becoming less clear by the day. Every action and decision tends to run longer than expected in guerrilla warfare, as the style of warfare is designed to slow a larger army, and Mali's conflict is already headed in this direction. Less than 150 African soldiers have landed in Mali since French officials announced the beginning if their ground intervention; deploying the entire force will take weeks at best, months at worst.

“Step by step, I think it’s a question from what I heard this morning of some days, some weeks,” France's Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, said during a press conference in the Ivory Coast.

These troops are then scheduled to receive further combat training from NATO advisers, giving the Islamists more time to prepare and sliding the immediate brunt of combat onto Western forces.

To compensate for delays and soften northern Mali's ground targets, the French have begun bombing the Kidal region to the far north of Konna and Diablay. The ongoing assault is presumably intended to weaken the Islamists' material resources, not destroy their capabilities entirely, but "shock and awe" applies equally for the Western public. Such measures cannot be understand at the surface level. An extensive aerial campaign is insufficient by itself and requires a hard ground campaign against militants that have prepared underground since Mali's crisis began in early 2012. France's Defense Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, explains NATO's urgent dilemma: "The goal is to ensure that AFISMA, the African force, can take the baton from our own intervention."

Paris has continually measured its mission in weeks but, given the nature of asymmetric warfare and relative isolation of Mali, this number will hit double digits before the last African troops deploy and continue long afterward. For his part French President François Hollande has announced that France's mission will "last as long as necessary to win over terrorism in this part of Africa"; other officials, such as Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and Le Drian have issued more optimistic assessments. However Le Drian's latest statements, whether true or false, help understand Mali's vast proportions. Telling France 5, "The goal is the total reconquest of Mali. We will not leave any pockets of resistance," he was subsequently asked how far north Paris is willing to go.

"If necessary, the African forces can appeal for support from French forces when they arrive in Timbuktu," Le Drian answered.

Timbuktu rests at the edge of the war though. How long will African troops need to cross 500 miles of desert and recapture Kidal - six months to year? Holding the area until Mali's government can reassert authority could take even longer (elections are tentatively planned for April), and the Islamists are embedded in the city's mountainous surroundings. As with most of their urban holdings, the Islamists can afford to withdraw from Kidal and continue their guerrilla war along society's margins. French and possibly other Western forces thus stand a good chance of accompanying African troops throughout the initial phase of their campaign.

Timbuktu would just be the starting point.

With these issues come a variety of related problems that must be addressed in the near-term and long-term: the unstable status of Diablay and Konna, French calls for greater U.S. support, the uncertain depth of Washington's military commitment, African expectations of Western financial support. Descriptions of the Islamists in Diablay pile complications onto seizing any town, big or small; locals recount that they "generally kept their promise" to leave the people be, although their presence forced the town to shut down. Eyewitnesses said that every fighter masked his face, but they also reported a significant number of Algerians and Libyans in Ansar Dine's ranks, which are mostly composed of Tuaregs. Separating their legitimate grievances from the Islamist alliance's wider agenda presents a chronic challenge for the international community.

Only one factor appears concrete in Mali: the conflict will always move slower than described by government officials. Asked at Niomo whether a "long war" had finally begun, the commanding officer Colonel Frederic replied, "Maybe, yes."

Hostages Become Easy Prey In Mali's Intervention

Tuesday's raid on an Algerian oil facility highlights the simplistic chaos of unconventional warfare. Known by many names - terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, rebellion, revolution - unconventional warfare encompasses all terms on the asymmetric side of warcraft, and has bedeviled countless sources of authority throughout human civilization. Even the predictable cannot be fully predicted and the unexpected happens enough to become expected.

Beyond the numerous strategic implications of the attack on Tigantourine, the raid is remarkable for two factors: the straightforward nature of the attack and its location. Despite the high alert of those European and African capitals contributing to Mali's intervention, none could anticipate where the Islamists eventually struck or how quickly they reacted to France's overflights through Algeria. Their "surprise" attack was also delivered exactly as promised. In early December Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former commander of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), announced the creation of his El Moulethemine katibat ("Brigade of the Veiled Ones"), a unit dedicated to kidnapping foreigners in the Sahel region. Afterward followed an introductory video for the "Signers in Blood," a purported suicide squad.

The Algerian government, international media, and Belmokhtar's own men have attributed the attack to his second creation rather than the first, but both are loosely aligned with AQIM's strategic view. While Belmokhtar has splintered away from the core to be his own boss, he is particularly eager to assist his former deputy in Mali and has been regularly spotted in Gao since the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) encamped in July 2012. Oumar Hamaha, a local Tuareg, doubles as a spokesman for Ansar Dine and a senior military official in MUJAO, and he would confirm Belmokhtar's cooperation with the two groups.

Accordingly, Hamaha was selected to inform The Associated Press of Belmokhtar's actions and the motivation behind them, namely Algeria's overflights and France's killing of Muslims. 

"We have a struck a blow to the heart (of the international community),"he declared ominously. "It's the United Nations that gave the green light to this intervention and all Western countries are now going to pay a price. We are now globalizing our conflict."

What is startling is the depth of Belmokhtar's raid, allegedly conducted by 20 men in three "heavily-armed" vehicles deep inside Algerian territory - a distance that exceeds the space between Mali's capital and the Islamists' northern bases. One immediately wonders how they traveled so far in open terrain, over multiple days, without being discovered by any government. It's certainly possible that the attackers traveled discreetly and acquired their vehicles near the strike point, or entered directly from Libya, but their range is equally impressive.

Hundreds of Algerians were initially taken hostage before being released or escaping. At least 41 people (including Americans, French, British, Irish, Norwegian and Japanese) are believed to have been captured, several more killed, and recent accounts of AQIM's kidnappers have described how quickly and quietly the Islamists move their bargaining chips. They will likely be taken into the cave network constructed along the southeast end of the Algerian-Malian border, where underground bases have been built dozens of miles apart. If the attackers can escape into Libyan territory, that is. 

Algerian forces have approached the complex where the hostages are being held (Westerns are reportedly being held in a separate wing) and reportedly fired shots in the area. Reached by telephone, one of the assailants was quoted as saying, "We will kill all the hostages if the Algerian army try to storm the area."

Even if the Algerian military cuts off their exits, NATO as a whole must factor the risk-reward of a major hostage situation into its plans as French troops mobilize for battle in Diablay, taken by the Islamists shortly after the French began landing en masse. They may need a week or two just to carefully dislodge the Islamists occupying the town - which, contrary to French claims of an offensive on the capital, appears to represent no more than a diversion tactic. Paris has repeatedly measured its ground campaign in weeks rather than months, but unless Special Forces and intelligence agencies can recover the new hostages, they will apply an immediate source of friction against NATO's campaign and further extend Mali's long war.

Another raid in Somalia recently failed to go as planned.

As for strategic planning in the international front, the pressing question is whether Algeria responds militarily on Mali's northern border or continues to take a passive-aggressive role in the conflict. Interior Minister Daho Ould Kabila told the official news agency APS, "The Algerian authorities will not respond to the demands of the terrorists and will not negotiate," suggesting that Belmokhtar has crossed a line that cannot be forgiven. The need for Algerian forces appeared inevitable from the start of Mali's insurgency, given that a hardened force must smash into the Islamists' mountain fortress and from multiple directions. Except Algeria's intelligence is also suspected of collaborating with elements of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in order to enhance the government's regional influence, whether that means interfering with Tuareg separatists or securing Western favors without strings.

A vocal Algiers backed Ansar Dine's superficial dialogue with international mediators over the last five months, now termed a "miscalculation" but a suspicious one at that.

For its part the Algerian government hasn't looked forward to any uncontrollable disturbance, either from France and NATO or the Islamists and Tuaregs. Algiers prefers manageable instability and seeks to avoid entanglement on Mali's ground. Abdallah Baali, the country's ambassador to Washington, warned NATO less than two months ago, "You cannot really fight a conventional war there. Your enemy will vanish in the desert before your eyes."

Obviously Algeria would not fight conventionally inside or outside its territory; assault helicopters and Special Forces would coordinate with local intelligence to beat the Islamists at their own games - mobility and disguise. However the 1,000 mile Algerian-Malian border gives perspective to the enormity of the task at hand inside Mali, and the introduction of Algeria's hegemonic agenda creates yet another dimension to a rapidly evolving conflict.

Estimating Force Levels In Mali's Asymmetric War

The Trench has called attention to the reality that French officials have dramatically oversold the threat in Mali by claiming that its capital, Bamako, would have fallen by now without Paris's direct intervention. This observation isn't made in resistance to a well-planned and executed counterinsurgency, but to the raise awareness of a potential destabilizing factor in a mission with little margin for error.

As reported on Monday, the notion of an Islamist tsunami sweeping through the south and into the capital is militarily infeasible. Even gung-ho jihadists with minimal strategic skills would recognize the impossibility of Paris's narrative. Thousands of guerrillas would be needed to secure population centers on the way to the capital, located some 450 miles from their northern bases, and still possess enough forces to assert their authority in Bamako. A defensive force must also guard their northern and rear fronts, along with the cities under their control, further depleting the manpower available in the south. The best-case scenario of a fully-resource offensive would leave the Islamists with sporadic control inside and outside of the capital, and maintaining this authority on a permanent basis would require substantial reinforcements and supply lines.

The Islamists would be idiotic to believe they could take Bamako as easily as Paris predicted, and the French would be equally foolish to believe so. More likely, Paris has exaggerated the threat in order to justify a larger ground operation than any NATO member publicly announced in the run-up to Mali's intervention.

Based on Western estimates, the reported flow of jihadist recruits, the ability to conduct multiple operations in separate areas and the reserved tasked to defensive works, the Islamists' ranks appear to possess between 1,500 and 2,000 trained guerrillas. Washington, for its part, estimates a force of 800-1,200. Some African capitals have posited higher figures, but these are likely attributed to the hyperbole of their own frantic (albeit legitimate) calls for Western assistance. Reuters notes that independent estimates "on their numbers and their origin vary wildly."

"The numbers I have heard range from 100s to 1,000s, so it is clear that no one has much of a clue," a senior Western security official told Reuters.

A disturbing statement in itself, extreme estimates of 4,000-5,000 would still push the Islamists to their breaking point in the event that they storm Bamako. While measuring insurgent forces is never simple or completely accurate, one must obtain a reasonable estimate to predict their objectives. Interestingly, France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius believes that "the presence of French troops on the ground in Mali, an Islamic country, would not galvanize Al Qaeda recruitment in the region."

The latest reports have France pouring in 2,500 troops to secure the border until an equivalent number of forces arrive from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nearly 800 French troops have already landed in Mali to repel the militants' immediate counterattack and prep the ground for ECOWAS's campaign in the north. They expect to greet their African comrades in the next two weeks, the current breakdown being as follows: 144 troops from Guinea, 300 from Benin, 500 from Burkina Faso, 500 each from Niger, Senegal and Togo, 900 from mission leader Nigeria, and an unspecified number from Chad.

Supporting these forces is a robust logistics and intelligence network of American, British, French, German and Canadian personnel. Paris has also inquired into the availability of the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose reach in the Eastern Hemisphere continues to grow with every Western initiative (Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Egypt).

This joint force, if left intact, is capable of retaking northern Mali's population belt and inflicting heavy losses on the Islamists. The overriding question, from a strategic and tactical level, is what ECOWAS can do after the Islamists go underground to emerge at a later time - or when they resist beyond foreign expectations. Clearing is always easier than holding and building, and uncertainty will immediately set in if NATO pulls back early into ECOWAS's campaign. As Al Jazeera notes, the incoming African task-force will undergo further combat training with French and other NATO personnel before launching a sustained offensive. The result: a holding pattern between the north-south divide near Konna until ECOWAS can head north. This period will be dominated by NATO air strikes and ground raids on the Islamists leadership.

What French forces plan to do after ECOWAS crosses north remains unstated, but they will likely participate in both offensive and defensive operations with African units. On Tuesday U.S. General Carter Ham, the head of AMISOM, told The Wall Street Journal that the French campaign "may prove to be decisive," but added that aerial operations will be necessary until then. His "sense" tells him that "the French are committed and understand this will not be a short-term campaign." On the other hand, Paris has committed a large measure of force with the apparent hope that it can quickly smash the Islamists and leave ECOWAS to mop up.

"France is today in the vanguard, but within a week African forces will start to deploy on the ground," Prime Ministr Jean-Marc Ayrault said on Tuesday, telling reporters that "French forces won't have to bear the. Burden of fighting in Mali for very long."

No, just part of the burden for an undetermined length of time.

French, NATO Oscillations Intensyfing In Mali

Tough talking and bombing aside, Paris's response in central and northern Mali has assumed a dangerously comical quality.

Over the weekend French officials repeatedly boasted that they had stopped the Islamists' advance southward at Konna and inflicted heavy casualties, along with substantial material losses, at their northern bases near Gao. Not long afterward, they also admitted that the militants' antiaircraft capabilities had "surprised" the war cabinet of President François Hollande, and the town of Diablay has now been seized after a "surprise" raid on its Malian garrison. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian admitted (with obligatory embellishment) that the well-armed militants, "took Diabaly after fierce fighting and resistance from the Malian army, that couldn't hold them back."

The Associated Press was able to reach a local commander at nearby Niono before Diabaly fell. Once contacted after the battle, the AP reported that he sounded "almost desperate" in comparison to his previous confidence: "We feel truly threatened."

War is inherently complex, unpredictable and rapid; capabilities and intentions are often misestimated due to the fact that every side is trying to mask them. However French officials are publicly expressing the swings of a disturbing pattern. The beginning of NATO's long intervention in Mali has already launched as an emergency deployment rather than a coordinated assault with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and an elected Malian government, which remains stricken by the effects of March 2012's coup. Two wide-ranging objectives - defense of the south and intervention in the north - have been floated by Paris, a divergence noted by many regional observers.

Marina Ottaway, of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, warns, "The shortcoming of the French approach is that it's not clear what the next step is. They're just going in and stopping the advance of the rebel groups."

This assessment isn't entirely accurate since the bulk of French ground forces only need to remain operational until ECOWAS's task-force arrives (between 1-2 months) to secure Mali's middle region and push northward. The root problem is the insufficient size of ECOWAS's planned force, as 3,200 ground troops will need continual U.S. and French air support to cover Mali's northern territory - roughly the size of France. NATO's special forces will be needed to enable offensive and defensive operations, and are likely to increase their numbers unless other African states phase in reinforcements after the initial waves.

The fight will eventually be taken north by ECOWAS ground forces, and outside forces Mauritania and Algeria may decide to act from the west and north. NATO and the EU may be left off the official record as the U.S., U.K. France, Canada and other states respond with bilateral action. What remains unclear are NATO's force ratio and how long its contributors believe they have to stay in Mali, especially when they don't plan on informing the public for the time being.

“There has been no request, no discussion (within NATO) on the situation in Mali, the alliance as such is not involved in this crisis,” spokeswoman Oana Lungescu told reporters.

All available information suggests that NATO's muscle and expertise will be needed in greater quantities, and for a longer period of time, than its members are willing to publicly concede. The Islamist umbrella of Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) suffers from military and non-military weaknesses that can be exploited, but the groups are also well-funded by drug and kidnapping profits. On Saturday the Prime Ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia pledged to begin sharing intelligence and jointly patrolling their borders in response to the networks being established by al-Qaeda's loose fronts; Tunisia’s President Moncef Marzouki described his country as "a corridor for Libyan weapons."

Trained with dependable arms by veteran jihadists looking for the next Afghanistan, these forces cannot be caught totally off guard because they expected a NATO invasion since taking control of northern Mali. Their response is likely to be twofold. On one hand, hard fighting will be delivered in the form of mountain warfare along the Algerian border. Here AQIM has recreated a Tora Tora scenario around Kidal, in the Adrar des Ifoghas, by drilling into the rocky desert and constructing bases inside. Whether saved for first or last, this mission alone requires extensive aerial bombardment and ground combat.

Conversely, these bases have likely been built in order to be abandoned in time. While Ansar Dine's spokesman, Oumar Ould Hamaha, has taunted the French by egging them to "attack on the ground if they are men," the Islamists would be foolish to "welcome them with open arms." Such a plan is presumably intended for jihadist consumption, as it goes against the grain of unconventional warfare. They have already begun to disperse, vacating MUJAO's base in Douentza before French planes struck and moving west on Diablay to draw attention away from Mopti's central position. Frontal maneuvers on French troops should be an infrequent development. Although the Islamists are eager to fight undisciplined Malian troops and can score quick propaganda victories with French casualties, they will likely drag the fight on as long as possible to disrupt NATO's operation schedule and raise the cost of intervention.

And as J. Peter Pham notes, "by planting their flag there, it's now become the latest place to go if you want to fight a Western army."

All of these factors add up to a longer and more intense intervention than France is currently telling its public, yet Paris is equally guilty of exaggerating the Islamists' advance. Following the events in Diablay, Le Drian speculated that if Paris hadn't intervened five days ago to stop the Islamists at Konna, "Bamako would be today in the hands of the terrorists." Unless the Islamists' ranks have been vastly underestimated by the thousands, the situation described by French defense officials isn't militarily feasible or strategically probable. Diabaly is a modest town of 36,000, and assaulting the city makes sense from a guerrilla's standpoint - they will attack wherever NATO isn't, then move to where NATO moves from. This pattern necessitates the force saturation that NATO is wary of committing.

Diabaly is located on the road to Bamako, as French officials remind us, and all possibilities must be considered in war. However several major cities stand in the way of the capital, some 300 miles south, and the Islamists need to garrison each population center in order for their offensive to be more than an exercise. That leaves few guerrillas - troops that usually wage urban warfare on the defensive - to storm a capital of 1.5 million. They could hold no territory along the way and still lack the necessary forces to assert control in Bamako, as the demand for weapons will be exceeded and supply lines will be severed deeper inside the south. Either option also reduces the men assigned to defend the north, which remains their prize due to the territory's inaccessibility.

Nothing adds up on this side of Mali's equation except for France and NATO's desire to justify all of their decisions and actions, whether sound or not.

"Our assessment was that they (the rebels) were actually able to take Bamako," Gerard Araud, French ambassador to the United Nations, said on Monday. "So we decided that what was at stake was the existence of the state of Mali, and beyond Mali was the stability of all west Africa.nWe had no other choice to launch this military intervention."

The main dilemma in Mali was never if, but how.

Information Vortex Trailing French Actions In Mali

The acceleration of NATO intervention in Mali has left observers in a thick mass of war fog. Much like the water or air column that follows a body in motion, a wave of information has formed behind NATO's military activities as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) readies an emergency task-force. This wave is crushing everything outside its direct path, as is typical in warfare, and obscuring the ground situation in north-central Mali.

Further analysis will be posted as the information cycle allows.

For now a basic sketch of NATO's unfolding offensive must suffice, beginning in central Mali and expanding outward. At least 550 French air and ground troops have reportedly deployed inside the country as air strikes continue for the third day. A significant portion of these troops landed at the airport in Sevare, the predicted target of Islamist militants that had recently staged attacks on the nearby towns of Konna and Mopti. Malian forces regained Konna with the help of French Mirage and Rafale jets, working in conjunction with assault helicopters, but they would have needed French air-combat controllers in the ground. The war-zone around Sevare was quickly ringed by checkpoints and French ground forces have been deployed from Sevare's airport to Konna and Mopti.

Western sources are already "reporting" the unconfirmed death of Ansar Dine commander Iyad Ag Ghaly, a veteran Tuareg jihadist, but his loss is unlikely to imperil the group.

Using the Inner Niger as NATO and ECOWAS's forward operating position into northern Mali, French warplanes and helicopters have launched an air campaign to shock the Islamists across their territory. Mirages reportedly destroyed a government base that had been taken over in Lere, located on the delta's west side, while a series of strikes targeted bases in Timbuktu and Gao. The latter now serves as the headquarters of the Movement For Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Air strikes are set to increase in the immediate future before tapering down in reaction to the Islamists' movements.

"Hundreds" of French troops have also been deployed to Bamako to "assess the capital," secure diplomatic personnel and aide French nationals.

Given the fast-moving uncertainty, these factors are worth monitoring in the run-up to Africa's next asymmetric land war. 

Shifting Objectives

One set of determining factors is the multiple objectives offered by French officials as they attempt to convince their own voters of Mali's just cause. On Saturday President François Hollande announced that current operations in Mali are "limited to preparing for the deployment of an African intervention force." The Defense Ministry subsequently declared that Paris's goal "is to lead a relentless struggle against terrorist groups," including the prevention of "any new offensive of these groups to the south of Mali." These objectives ultimately intercept: France must provide the force to block the militants' offensive actions and defend the border between north and south until African reinforcements arrive. 2,000 of the planned 3,200 ECOWAS troops are expected to land by Monday - 500 each from Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal - and NATO air operations will continue throughout their deployment.

How these strikes are interpreted by the local population - as the Islamists full responsibility or hostility towards the south and international community - has been decided for the immediate future. Residents have reportedly welcomed French flags in the sky and expect African ground forces to follow, sentiments that must be nurtured in order for NATO and ECOWAS's mission to succeed. NATO is currently operating without the support of a legitimate government or military.

A U.S. official also confirmed that Washington will deploy drones for surveillance purposes (easily armed at a moment's notice), and Britain has dispatched two C17 aircrafts to transport allied troops. Both powers prefer that France "take the lead" in what could be a long, messy war in Mali.

Underestimating Guerrillas' Capabilities

The joint NATO-ECOWAS force is rightfully viewed as vastly superior to the Islamist umbrella currently entrenching itself in northern Mali. However Western and African capitals should be wary of falling into a quintessential guerrilla trap: underestimating the opponent. Many negative things have been said of the Islamists' relative strength, how they only defeated a rag-tag Malian army, and how professionally trained armies will overpower them. This pattern represents the nature of insurgency; asymmetric forces are inherently weaker than conventional forces, and usually stronger in comparison to weak governments. Some insurgencies, such as Hezbollah and the Taliban, are more disciplined than others, which must evolve their capabilities or risk elimination from the actions of stronger governments.

A weaker insurgency is known to become stronger through the only school of war that is often available: direct combat. This phenomena was noted in U.S. observations of Iraq's insurgency and appears to be occurring in Mali.

After a great deal of talk concerning their weakness, French officials are either flattering Mali's militants or genuinely surprised by their abilities - which would be an inexcusable error and ominous sign of future events. How the Islamists fight NATO and ECOWAS soldiers on land remains to be seen, but the militants are putting their air defense weapons to immediate use. Western intelligence suspects that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) smuggled out a cache of Libya's surface-to-air missiles, potential fear-mongering that doubles as a real possibility. Heavy machine guns have also been mounted onto the Islamists' pickups.

"What has struck us markedly is how modern their equipment is and their ability to use it," said one of Hollande's aide, but another French official said that Paris expects a short campaign before ECOWAS takes over.

This reaction may come true - or suggests that NATO still has much to learn about the Islamists' overall forces and the non-military environment in Mali. Three different networks, operating with semi-independent agendas, have spent the last six months recruiting across Africa, the Middle East and South Asia in preparation for NATO's intervention.

Overselling Guerrillas' Capabilities

Taken together with this potential underestimate, politically overestimating the situation in Mali could generate more unexpected consequences in a country divided by its own government. French officials speak as though the capital was facing imminent danger, an assessment that The Trench disagrees with considering that thousands of well-trained militants would be needed to effectively sweep across the south. Building on Hollande's mixture of humanitarian and nationalist rhetoric, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius boasted that, "The Islamist offensive has been stopped. Blocking the terrorists... we've done it." 

The Islamists had launched an offensive into the central delta but no one knows how far - they could stopped at Mopti. Yet French intelligence services claim they "detected preparations for what they described as a 'major offensive' organized and coordinated by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb."

Jean-Yves Le Drian, France's Defense Minister, unequivocally announced on Sunday, “There was a spectacular acceleration of these [jihadi] groups since Thursday. If no one intervened, Bamako would have fallen two or three days later. France is at war against terrorism.”

Instability and other uncertainties normally accompany the hype of war against terrorism.

Political Resolution Is Mali's Only Exit

Lastly, the concrete deployment of NATO forces will push a negotiated settlement even further away from reality. African capitals have invested months into pulling Ansar Dine away from AQIM and MUJAO, hoping at the least to sow division between networks. Now this possibility goes from implausible to impossible. Accordingly, NATO and ECOWAS must commit an even greater amount of time and energy to organizing a political-economic resolution with the north's diverse ethnic groups.

None of these challenges begin to address the present lack of government in Bamako.

France's Rapid Burst Jumpstarts Mali's Long War

[Note: The current situation in Mali continues to accelerate within the fog of war:  "Hundreds of French troops drive back Mali rebels."]

Clearly deeming the situation as immanently unacceptable, the start of what should be a long foreign intervention has finally commenced in Mali's central river delta. Responding to estimates of 500-900 Islamic gunmen and their convoys, French military assistance has reportedly driven Ansar Dine and its allied muscle out of Konna for the time being. The bones of this information were jointly confirmed by Malian officials and French President Francois Hollande, who issued a national address on Friday to announce that France's operations will "last as long as necessary."

"French armed forces supported Malian units this afternoon to fight against terrorist elements," Hollande said from Paris.

The muscles and flesh of this information, though, remain obscured by the fog of war and must be pieced together as best as possible. Accepted as true is the presence of French military forces on Malian soil; Col. Abdrahmane Baby, an operations adviser for the foreign affairs ministry, confirmed that French forces had arrived in the country. Who landed, where they arrived, how long they plan to stay and what they specifically intend to do is left unanswered. It's possible that French forces had already arrived in the country on standby, and one must assume that standard soldiers were not called upon for the task at hand. France's Army Special Forces Brigade (known by the French acronym BFST), which experienced combat in Afghanistan, is the most likely unit to land first.

Beyond providing air combat controllers to multiply Mali's existing forces, the BFST would fulfill the initial training and scouting duties until NATO's first official batch of trainers arrives.

Also obscured is the status of Konna and how Malian forces dislodged the Islamist umbrella that moved on the city days earlier. French air-strikes were reportedly used to roll back militants and establish momentum for Malian forces, but no further information was provided to explain the actions of French soldiers. Paraphrasing the other officials willing to go on record, Lieutenant Colonel Diaran Kone simply told Reuters, "The Malian army has retaken Konna with the help of our military partners. We are there now."

For his part, Ansar Dine spokesman Sanda Ould Boumana denied that the group vacated Konna and its surrounding area. He claimed that “some planes came and bombed some civilians,” along with a mosque - overt propaganda to discredit the French. He would state matter-of-factly, "That’s France, and that’s the West. We are not surprised.”

The developing counteroffensive to Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) activities in central Mali holds the potential to accelerate a foreign intervention, or else spin it out of control at its launch. Delayed by all sorts of obstacles - U.S. laws barring direct support to Mali's coup-stricken government, the vast terrain of northern Mali and expected forecasts of its rainy seasons - the international blocs planned to unroll an intervention over the next eight months. Now the first NATO member is sliding down Mali's slope and threatening to pull other members in, even though Mali's government and military remains inoperable at the national level.

Washington and France had previously demanded that Mali hold elections, scheduled for April, before an intervention could begin.

Hollande also seems to be overselling the urgent threat of Mali's Islamists in order to justify a preemptive strike. Arguing that the "very existence of the Malian state" is at stake, France's president repeats his emphasis by adding the Islamists "are seeking to deal a fatal blow to the very existence of Mali." In reality the Islamist alliance has already dealt a fatal blow to Mali's sovereignty by sheering off half of the state, and the cost of re-securing the north outweighs the ease that it will lost. However The Trench believes that the Islamists are unlikely to pursue a genuine offensive into the south, so the threat of losing Konna and nearby Mopti is defensive-oriented. Capturing these areas and the air-base at Sevare would hinder an intervention into the north, and thus hinder its reunification with the south.

A full-blown march on the capital, Bamako, has no basis in reality.

Problematically in the near-term, the Islamists don't need to hold Konna at the moment and can leave the town alone while they target other areas in the Inner Niger. Once they withstand the initial air-strikes, they will likely take greater pains to disperse their forces in civilian areas. France will then be forced to add more troops, or else receive assistance from other NATO or AU forces (presumably the U.S. and U.K.), in order to provide defensive support and pursue several networks of militants; over-relying on air support is liable to backfire. Meanwhile Catherine Ashton, the European Union's (EU) foreign policy chief, has called for "accelerated international engagement" and said the bloc would speed up the deployment of 200 trainers, but organizing this process requires more time than coordinating offensive actions.

Furthermore, the Islamist coalition is likely to enjoy its own boost from France's involvement, and should receive an influx of recruits in the coming weeks. That pressure would add to the lobbying for more troops, but risks their deployment without a  defined time limit or the resources necessary to compete their mission. The air-strikes that will be used to supplement an initial force carry the potential of civilian casualties, and U.S. drones are likely to make an eventual switch from surveillance to targeted strikes. Mali's war will subsequently expand into a front along the boundary between north and south, and then degenerate into a multi-year conflict inside the north.

Ultimately, more rush will add to the international community's friction and could work in the Islamists' favor. Counterbalancing this force is vital to their success in central and northern Mali.

Mali's Islamists Toying With International Negotiators

A rapid turnaround in northern Mali has fully illuminated the multidimensional nature of netwar.

Last Thursday the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution outlining a dual-track approach of political negotiations and military engagement against dissenting Islamic militants. As if coordinated before the UNSC's unanimous vote - itself the process of intense calculation between NATO, the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - Timbuktu's local Islamist outfit struck back immediately on Friday by announcing a pact with Mali's rival Tuareg movement. Under their public terms, Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) pledged to "coordinate their positions and actions in the context of seeking a peaceful and durable solution with the transitional authorities in Mali, with the guarantees of the relevant parties."

Their joint-statement claimed that mutual security would be established "through the deployment of security forces comprising members of both their groups."

These statements belie northern Mali's ground conditions, which indicate that no sustainable agreement can be forged between the two groups. They have already fallen out after leeching each other's abilities to rout Mali's army; once a days-long pact was broken in late May (or possibly never signed to begin with), Ansar Dine and its Islamist allies proceeded to kick the MNLA out of its Gao headquarters. The strategically-located city now hosts the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and is unlikely to be shared with the MNLA. The only tangible progress from months of negotiations between Ansar Dine and the MNLA, organized by neighboring Burkina Faso and Algeria, is the Islamists' military advance on MNLA positions.

Ansar Dine recently assisted in MUJAO's capture of westerly Léré after its leader delivered an ultimatum to the MNLA, essentially threatening to join or die. The MNLA rejected Iyad Ag Ghaly's message and "expressed their determination to fight against all terrorists."

Muddy as these negotiating waters are, Mali's fourth-generation reality emits a polarized clarity and reveals an ingenious plot at work. The possibility of Ansar Dine establishing sincere relations with the MNLA cannot be discarded entirely, on account of Ag Ghaly's history with Tuareg militias, but the odds hover near zero. In addition to a cutthroat ultimatum, Ansar Dine just spun off Mali's own version of Ansar al-Sharia with formal approval from the group's leadership. AQIM has supposedly tasked this new group to improve relations with its Libyan counterpart, a loose network of jihadist groups blamed for the assault on Benghazi's consulate, and potentially construct a training base in eastern Libya.

The group is reportedly overseen by Oumar Ould Hamaha, a senior military official connecting Ansar Dine and MUJAO. Hamaha, a local Tuareg from the Timbuktu area, also doubles as a confidante of AQIM personality Moktar Belmoktar, who announced the formation of his own El Moulethemine katibat ("Brigade of the Veiled Ones") in early December.

Ansar Dine and its allies' vision of peace is total control over northern Mali. Instead of negotiating an agreeable outcome with the international community or MNLA, the group is stalling to attract more human resources from West Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Now Ansar Dine is taking shelter beneath the MNLA, a group that the international community cannot avoid negotiating with, in an attempt to stave off a foreign intervention entirely. This wise maneuver is reminiscent of the guerrilla hiding within an urban population, hugging civilians in order to deter aerial bombardment.

Following the UNSC's vote, an adviser of Mali's interim president said that his government is ready to "wage war against the terrorists and continue to negotiate with our brothers who are ready for dialogue."

Problematically, Malians are expecting military action but lack faith in their government and military, directing a trickle-up effect towards the UNSC. Furthermore, non-state actors move with exceptional quickness in relation to cumbersome international blocs. As a result of Mali's internal crisis, which legally bars the U.S. from direct aid, and the international community's hesitant response to the situation as a whole, both sets of actors have given the distinct impression that they seek to avoid fighting under the present conditions. The UNSC has painted itself into a corner by emphasizing dialogue over military action, and the Islamists are "cooperating" by giving what is being requested. Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO all realize the advantage of this wariness to enter an uncertain terrain the size of Iraq, with less than ideal resources, for an unspecified length of time.

The end product: Ansar Dine is positioning itself as a necessary component of Mali's political solution and an outright international front of AQIM.

"We denounce this decision," Mohamed Ag Akharib, a representative of Ansar Dine, told reporters between meetings in Algiers. "We have always denounced the (planned) military intervention and we have said that it is not the solution. We are very optimistic and we ask Algeria and the international community to join us in searching for a peaceful solution to the Mali crisis."

Algiers' Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) is suspected of manipulating both sides of the Sahel - coordinating with AQIM and other non-state actors in opposition to the Tuaregs, and using AQIM to establish favorable military and intelligence relations with Western capitals. The government's massive influence in the region is unlikely to prove a source of lasting stability in northern Mali, although Islamists and the Obama administration are both looking its way for assistance. To its credit Algiers is legitimately cautious of spillover into its territory and understands the opponent better than most. Military and intelligence analysts have reached a consensus that the proposed force - 3,000 ECOWAS soldiers, an equal number of Malians and NATO trainers to guide them - falls disturbingly short of northern Mali's taxing demands.

"You cannot really fight a conventional war there," warns Abdallah Baali, Algeria's ambassador to Washington. "Your enemy will vanish in the desert before your eyes."

Of the other scenarios in play, Ansar Dine could be gunning for absolute control of Mali's Tuareg movement with the intention of evicting AQIM, MUJAO and the MNLA in turn. Thus of all the conceivable scenarios, workable peace between Ansar Dine and the MNLA appears furthest removed from reality.

Mali News Travels Slow To Western Media

Nearly six days ago The Trench recorded the formation of a new Islamic militant group that had branched out from Mali's local tree, Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith). Christening themselves as the fourth Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) in the MENA (after Yemen, Tunisia and Libya), this group has allegedly recruited Barabiche tribesmen from Timbuktu's surrounding area and placed them under the authority of several Ansar Dine officials: Omar Ould Hamaha and Sanad Ould Bouamama.

In every manifestation Ansar al-Sharia operates either as a loose front for al-Qaeda's general ideology or a masking agent for the group itself, as in Yemen's case. However Mali's new group has reportedly received specific directions from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On top of decentralizing the group's network and tapping into local human resources, Ansar al-Sharia has been tasked to build a logistics highway between eastern Libya and northern Mali - and, if AFRICOM is to be believed, establish a base in east Libya to strike the West.

"In return, AQIM is offering to provide Libyan Islamist groups with training and finance," The Telegraph reported earlier this month.

Somewhat oddly, this news created no initial splash in the U.S. media and is just now reaching American ears in the form of an ABC News report. New information is only presented in small portions, namely a welcoming statement from one of Ansar Dine's senior leaders. Although potential disinformation, no mention of the connection between Ansar al-Sharia and Libyan militants is made. Instead, speculation of the offshoot's cause revolves around Ansar Dine's leadership and the absorption of fighters from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

In the latter case, ABC News claims that MUJAO has been losing fighters to Ansar Dine and Ansar al-Sharia due to their local reputations, which carry more weight inside and outside Mali.

Unnamed "analysts" attribute this trend to Ansar Dine's legitimacy at the negotiating table, but local credibility and momentum is the likeliest culprit of any established pattern. The network of AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine acts as a jihadist funneling system, drawing fighters from across the MENA and shaking them down into appropriate roles. Both Ansar Dine and MUJAO fighters have joined Ansar al-Sharia because the group is allegedly involved in expanding eastward, where MUJAO hopes to go. MUJAO's military planner, Omar Hamaha, also doubles as an Ansar Dine official, reinforcing the connection between all three groups.

While decentralization can instigate personal feuds within a network of militant groups, Mali is big enough to necessitate a portfolio of groups tasked with specialized agendas. The inflation of open territory and density of local actors are determining factors in slicing up northern Mali's pie.

Coincidently, ABC News's reporting is equally sluggish as the international community's response to northern Mali's conflict. Today, almost a year after the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine began to overrun Mali's military, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution authorizing a two-track intervention in Mali. Except negotiations with Ansar Dine amount to a stalling tactic for AQIM and MUJAO, meaning that an ECOWAS force of 3,300 won't land in Mali until the second half of next year at the earliest. The Trench has frequently reported on the obstacles facing an international coalition, starting with Mali's fractured government and ending with the virtual certainty of guerrilla warfare.

"It is likely that [the MNLA and MUJWA] will avoid direct confrontation, in which case [the intervention force] would have no chance," a senior French officer told the AFP after the UNSC's vote. "If the force sent to deal with them is credible, [the MNLA and MUJWA] will certainly leave the towns and head for their sanctuaries in the mountain ranges close to the Algerian border... and that will become a different ball game to dislodge them."

One "former intelligence chief" states the problem in even blunter terms: "It's not 3,000 men that are needed, it's 100 times as many, and for a long time. We are far from what's required. Take Afghanistan as a reference and you'll understand."

This estimate, while excessively high, still offers a more realistic assessment than the international community (UN, NATO, AU, ECOWAS) has tabled. Roughly speaking, a minimum of 30,000 troops and 3-5 years (plus Western logistics) appear to be needed to control northern Mali's population belt and wage asymmetric warfare against the Islamists. Give Ansar Dine and its allies another 10 months and they will embed themselves that much deeper in northern Mali's terrain.

The international community is trapped between the dilemma of an immediate but reckless campaign, and waiting for Mali's government to put itself back together first.

AFRICOM's Coverage of AQIM Mixes Fact, Fiction

Last week The Trench reported on the political and military movements of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and present commander of El Moulethemine katibat ("Brigade of the Veiled Ones"). A significant portion of this information was retrieved from Magharebia, a Pentagon-run site dedicated to covering events in North Africa, and independent information confirms the overall agenda of Belmokhtar. Now Magharebia has reported on a video statement from Belmokhtar announcing the "Signers in Blood," a suicide squad presumably designed to greet an international military coalition in northern Mali.

However the headlines of "breaking away from AQIM" appear to deliberately mislead an overview of the situation.

That Belmokhar has experienced a heavy share of confrontation with AQIM chief Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (Abdelmalek Droukdel) is well-documented. Various explanations of AQIM's internal strife have been advanced over recent years: divisions between Algerian and Mauritanian leadership, personal rivalries, and the distribution of Western ransoms and drug profits. Leadership schisms are a natural product of regionally-networked militant groups, as the need to decentralize across borders and cultures often erodes a firm hierarchy. Those groups that enjoy permanence at the top usually function as symbols of national power: the Taliban's Mullah Omar or Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah.

At the same time, a foreign intervention of northern Mali stands a good chance of closing the Islamists' ranks, at least until the momentum swings against them and the alliance is forced to scatter across northern Mali.

Belmokhtar's recent announcements illustrate the dilemma facing Western and African capitals. While "One Eye" cannot be expected to obey every command of AQIM, he has pledged to abide by the decisions made collectively by AQIM, the local Ansar Dine outfit and the regionally-minded Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). His group will allegedly specialize in kidnapping Westerns and extorting ransoms to fund the Islamic alliance, thereby dividing their labors. Belmokhtar has relocated his base to Gao, where MUJAO has established its headquarters and oversees the Islamists' campaign in northern Mali.

Reinforcing the line of communication between groups is MUJAO's military planner and Bekmokhtar's deputy, local Tuareg Omar Ould Hamaha.

Abdalahi Ould Ahmed, editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Chouhoud, gives a more comprehensive explanation for AQIM's proliferating offshoots: "As the organization has grown and incorporated fighters of different origins, conflicts of interests have become increasingly frequent.” This process carries its advantages and disadvantages. Given an increase in funds and territory, turf battles become inevitable in the war for jihadist hearts and minds. Purely commercial elements flock to West Africa's flow of cash and cocaine, undermining the Islamists' overall message and corrupting personalities from the lowest to highest ranks.

Militant groups must also network and decentralize to some degree in order to survive the short-term precision and long-term pressure of joint-government operations. In AQIM's particular case, the group is undergoing rapid expansion after northern Mali opened a huge amount of territory and influence to its sub-commanders. This fragmentation allowed AQIM personalities to establish their own local units under the mothership's flag, pursue their own interests and quickly seize all available power in the region. Accordingly, a group of Barabiche tribesmen from Timbuktu have formed a "new"  faction at the urging of AQIM's leadership, with the intention of developing relations with Libya's self-styled Ansar al-Sharia. 

The fourth manifestation flying the "Partisans of Islamic Law" banner (after Tunisia, Libya and Yemen), Ansar al-Sharia will now operate out of Gao as they attempt to build a logistics network through neighboring Niger. Their alleged objective: establish a base in eastern Libya to facilitate attacks on Western and African targets in response to Mali's planned intervention.

"Their aim is to establish a foothold in Libya from which to launch attacks against Western targets, as well as gaining access to the large stockpiles of weapons – including Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles – that were looted by Libyan rebels during the fall of Colonel Moamer Kadhafi's regime at the end of last year," The Telegraph reported on December 4th. "In return, AQIM is offering to provide Libyan Islamist groups with training and finance."

As Mauritania's al-Akhbar notes, Gao's branch of Ansar al-Sharia raises the number of Islamic militant groups in Mali to five: AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine, Belmokhtar's "Masked Brigade" and Ansar al-Sharia. Pentagon intelligence and independent reporting has also collaborated the presence of Nigeria's Boko Harem in Gao. All of these groups operate as loose fronts for "the Base", waving the flag to attract recruits and acting semi or totally independent. The efficiency and inefficiency of this cooperation generates the double-edged sword of netwar.

So long as AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO collectively wield influence in northern Mali, its splinter factions shouldn't cause an excessive amount of friction between the alliance. Scattering will become its own strategy if they are initially overrun, and division won't pose a fatal problem if Mali's internal woes and regional deficiencies in governance are left unresolved.