No Rest For Bahrain's Duplicitous King

 Zainab Al-Khawaja being arrested at Salmaniya hospital on December 9th

Celebrating Bahrain's National Day on Sunday with the usual festivities, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa delivered another of his patented rhetorical offensives to a divided nation. Hamad had arrived at the University of Bahrain in order to mask his intentions, employing his father's name to establish the Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa Fund to "serve all citizens without distinguishing between religions, sects or cultures." A noble concept in theory, but those Shia facing government discrimination (largely carried out by Sunni police and mercenaries) don't have time to wait for future promises. Nor do they have time for the denial that has gripped Bahrain's tottering monarchy.

Hamad's circle has refuted any connection to the Arab revolutions throughout the island's 22-month uprising, and employs his speeches to ignore a fundamental political crisis rather than address it.

"In conclusion and on the great occasion of the National Day, we call on everyone to move forward, to be diligent for the sake of further accomplishments and to continue the nation-building process in various fields in order to achieve the well-being of our citizens... We commend our armed forces and the security and the National Guard forces who are always ready to provide the appropriate climate for development and progress through achieving security and stability and meeting all challenges for the sake of all people’s welfare and benefit.”

Protests naturally ensued before and after Hamad's speech. Disenchanted by anything their king in name only had to say - and he waisted no time vindicating their reaction - the youth-led February 14 coalition organized roadblocks and protests around Manama's surrounding villages. They were promptly met with the ubiquitous tear gas and rubber bullets that characterizes Bahrain's unique low-intensity situation. On Monday protesters attempted to march on the capital, now a strict no-go zone under de facto emergency law, resulting in a number of arrests. Among them, the acting head of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) and his wife, Yousef al-Muhafedha and Zainab al-Sairafi.

Al-Muhafedha currently oversees the BCHR's activities because its founders, Nabeel Rajab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, already occupy jail cells for "instigating unrest." Rajab's three-year sentence was reduced to two last week and legitimized in the process, a cheap scam to keep him unjustly imprisoned. Al-Khawaja's daughter Maryam has also been forced into exiled to avoid the fate of her sister Zainab, who was recently handed another month-long sentence for one of more than a dozen pending charges. Zainab has been verbally and physically on multiple occasions for staging one-woman protests and chanting for the King's resignation, treatment shared by her BCHR comrades and other political prisoners.

The systematic assault on Bahrain's leading human rights organization, by itself, demonstrates that the monarchy is far less concerned with substantive reform and more committed to terror tactics than the opposition. Concealing the truth and covering up Bahrain's political fissures is priority one. Dispatched by the monarchy as the fist inside Hamad's velvet glove, the King's official spokeswomen laid all responsibilities of violence on Bahrain's oppositional network as she established favorable terms for negotiations.

"Any national dialogue to overcome the crisis will not ignore any component of the Bahraini society and will not be with one side at the expense of the other," State Minister for Information Affairs Samira Ibrahim bin Rajab told al-Sharq al-Awsat. "It will, however, be complementary to the national consensus dialogue that took place in July 2011 and will commence as soon as the opposition stops violence and relinquishes conditions and restraints put to engage in that dialogue."

The egotistical notion of Bahrain's monarchy refusing to hold a second "National Dialogue," after the first failed so miserably, is no less absurd than staging one immediately. Government security forces and allied mercenaries from friendly governments (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE, Pakistan) bear the majority of responsibility for applying disproportionate force, however non-lethal. Complaints of Molotovs lose legitimacy when the monarchy blows hard on the streets' flames; Shia communities are raided at night, gassed, beaten and tortured for the past and future actions, while no political measures have been arranged to mitigate the fallout. 

Rifts between loyalist and oppositional forces - and between their own ranks - continue to widen at a treacherous pace. This accumulation of events has pushed Bahrain's environment beyond the trust necessary to open a dialogue in the first place. An expanding section of Bahrain's opposition has lost all faith in the monarchy, and cannot be expected to participate until substantial goodwill offerings are secured: ending military raids and releasing political prisoners. And even these moves may fail to end one overriding demand.

"Down, Down Hamad."

Senate Committee Drops Turbo Propaganda On Middle East

Days or even weeks are necessary to break down a massive propaganda assault released by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While the renewed emphasis on Kuwait's U.S. base has stolen the current headlines, a full reading of the document is certain to jolt anyone concerned with America's ongoing military complex in the Middle East. On a fundamental level, the report offers the latest evidence that U.S. policy in the region is irreversibly counterrevolutionary. 

A few points of observation on the Senate's Gulf Security Architecture with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 

• The Senate's report is openly framed as pro-GCC, anti-Iranian. This priority automatically skews U.S. policy along Sunni-Shia divisions and flips the recommendation to leverage America's "strategic position to be a steady force for moderation, stability, and nonsectarianism" on its head. 

• Numerous highlights of Israel's qualitative edge contrast sharply with the total absence of the Palestinian cause.

• Washington's unconditional support for Nouri al-Maliki (paralleled by Tehran) and the subsequent collapse of U.S. diplomacy in Iraq is masked by a "recommendation" to bring the country "into the Arab fold."

• Several of the identified "challenges" have already manifested in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, starting with Challenge 1: "While the United States has significant economic and security interests in the Gulf, it should not be seen as opposed to popular reform efforts." 

• Challenge 3 belatedly warns, "The United States must carefully shape its military presence so as not to create a popular backlash, while retaining the capability to protect the free flow of critical natural resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran."

• One recommendation: instead of limiting or suspending military aid in response to human rights abuses, use these incentives to reduce abuses. The Senate also "recommends" that U.S. equipment not be deployed against peaceful protesters, when this violation persists in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain (tear gas in particular).

• Conversely, the Senate heaps praise on the Obama administration and GCC's response to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Although the GCC provides Washington with an expanding outlet to address the Arab revolutions, Saudi Arabia's all-encompassing influence has played a key counterrevolutionary role in Egypt and Yemen. Both Washington and GCC's advances against Bashar al-Assad and his Shia regime have been stained by this double-standard. After being caught off guard by the first revolutionary fires, Washington and Riyadh have rallied to exploit the revolutions and pursue their own interests above democratic movements.

• The Senate's light warning on Bahrain is drowned out by Manama's 5th Fleet and its centerpiece relation to Washington's "lily-pad” deployments. Recommending a "dialogue" between "moderates" punts the issue down field, to be covered up again at a later date. 

Despite its redundant nature and plentiful disinformation, the Senate's report deserves an attentive read and a comprehensive search. Inside lies the blueprint of U.S. talking points that the Obama administration is using to veil a systematic counterrevolutionary offensive. The GCC has been labeled as the Gulf Counterrevolutionary Club for good reason, and Washington is proudly financing its investment into the future.

Quarantining U.S. Propaganda Overflow In Yemen

A large amount of information and disinformation has been released from two events in Yemen. Following the death-by-drone of Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, a midlevel player in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Obama administration approved the public release of a foiled bomb-making plot involving a double agent. The resulting mass of intel must be broken down and sorted in accordance with Yemen's environment. 

Another AQAP "Leader" Dead 

The current wave of U.S. propaganda wasted no time gathering momentum from the death of al-Quso, who was targeted on May 6th in Shabwah governorate (in al-Awlaki territory). Immediately billed as AQAP's "chief" or a "senior leader" by the U.S. media, al-Quso's killing trickled across cable news because of his minor role in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. What the Obama administration and U.S. media won't tell Americans is that al-Quso is no chief, leader or "senior" commander; he acted as one of several local organizers during the Cole's plotting, and the U.S. media openly reports that al-Quso overslept his assignment to tape the attack. He's one of many figures involved in AQAP's origins and current operations, rendering his death meaningless beyond American and Saudi justice. Just as AQAP has seized more territory and killed hundreds of Yemeni troops since Anwar al-Alwaki's death in September 2011, al-Quso's absence will go unnoticed on Yemen's battlefield and within AQAP's external operations. 

The same phenomenon has elevated AQAP's senior bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, whom the Obama administration has turned into an irreplaceable mastermind. al-Awlaki, al-Quso and al-Asiri have all been described as AQAP's chief of external operations in the U.S. media. 

Building on al-Quso's death, the White House has now released information on a foiled bomb plot involving a Saudi double agent (citing his safety as the reason for delay). The informant managed to infiltrate AQAP's ranks and volunteer for the job of detonating a U.S.-bound airplane with military-grade explosives, then turned the device over to Saudi and American officials in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This development quickly exceeded the scale of al-Quso's death and is being hailed as a major security achievement for the Obama administration. According to The New York Times, the Saudi agent also "provided critical information that permitted the C.I.A. to direct the drone strike on Sunday that killed Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso." 

al-Quso's death and the foiled bombing illustrate how successful counterintelligence can fit within an unsuccessful counterinsurgency. 

The Obama Administration Drones On 

The strategic takeaway from the last 72 hours is only indirectly related to the widening scope of U.S. counterterrorism on the Arabian Peninsula. Expansion is a known fact; the Obama administration has spent its entire term increasing the number of military assets inside and around Yemen. Applying the systematic formula developed in Pakistan, personnel from Afghanistan (along with other parts of the region) are being shifted into the conflict to develop more actionable intelligence on ranking AQAP members. Yemen's semi-new government then concentrates on defending its bases from AQAP and reclaiming lost territory. 

The real upshot of two high-profile, low-context events is equally known but significant at the fourth-generation level. Armed with these "successes," the Obama administration is emboldened to intensify its policy and believes that it cannot be caught. Obama himself doesn't need to go near Yemen or explain U.S. policy to the American people. Shallow U.S. media coverage and a limited number of Yemeni observers provide another smokescreen for drone strikes and covert operations. By eliminating high-profile AQAP figures and thwarting a small number of external plots, the administration can sell its policy in Yemen (and the overall war against al-Qaeda) as an undeniable success - even though AQAP has grown its footprint throughout this time. 

On Tuesday Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said that Washington has "begun to reintroduce small numbers of trainers into Yemen," a claim he made numerous times during the revolution. U.S. officials would employ a similar line when confronted on the level of training to Saleh's personal guards, which had turned on protests instead of AQAP, but Washington's collective press corp rarely initiated this discussion. Yemeni officials also admit that U.S. personnel never left and that they traveled with government troops to Rada'a after AQAP militants briefly seized the city in January. 

"I mean, our counterterrorism cooperation, even through Yemen’s darkest days, frankly, continued, has continued," the State Department's Mark Toner told reporters while highlighting this cooperation.

This pseudo-development is being spun as a response to recent attacks on the Yemeni military - attacks that AQAP attributes to U.S. drone strikes. A vicious cycle of drone strikes creates new militants, sparking new clashes that demand more U.S. forces, which in turn create new militants. The presence of U.S. Special Forces has been and will remain integral to AQAP's own propaganda, yet the administration continues to feature its achievements as U.S. policy tumbles down an unstable path. White House spokesman Jay Carney assured inquiring reporters, "It is indicative of the kind of work that our intelligence and counterterrorism services are performing regularly to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda in general, and AQAP in particular." 

Battle of Two Cancers 

If paired with a full-spectrum strategy that respects Yemen's sovereignty and history, U.S. counterterrorism operations could deal a potentially irreparable amount of damage to AQAP. 

Unfortunately this strategy remains a theoretical prospect that is unlikely to see daylight under the Obama administration or a GOP president. Yemen's political, economic and social needs have yet to near or surpass Washington's military priorities; the presidential promotion of Saleh's former vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, is meant to ensure the flow of U.S. counterterrorism. Political and economic reforms will eventually follow but they could also falter, and wise counterinsurgency would already be leading with these platforms. Even Yemenis that support Hadi and oppose AQAP fear an expansion of U.S. military operations, and expect American influence to bleed into Yemen's political affairs. The Obama administration funded Saleh's corrupt regime, trained his violent family members, sped up the construction of an internal drone base, held the GCC's signing ceremony in Saudi Arabia, organized a UN-sponsored referendum for Hadi and approved Saleh's immunity. 

Expecting Washington not to interfere with Yemen's future has no basis in reality. 

The fundamental problem of U.S. counterterrorism remains the overall effect of U.S. counterterrorism: both Washington and AQAP's leadership view Yemen as another Pakistan to manipulate. Both need instability to pursue their ends, which intersect due to mutual goals. For this reason John Brennan's latest defense of U.S. counterterrorism - "We're going to work with them to remove this cancer from Yemen" - is reflected back on America. Sana'a, Washington and Riyadh will be working for a long time with their current strategy.

Bahrain’s Crackdown: Where U.S. and Pakistani Interests Unite

The roots of discord plaguing U.S.-Pakistani relations can be traced to a simple source: diverging interests. Genuine alignment is unlikely, if not impossible, because both governments are pursuing regional influence over peace. But change the sphere of influence and interests begin to shift with the geopolitics.

Far from Afghanistan’s chaotic border, Washington and Islamabad have found unity in Saudi Arabia’s counter-revolution.

Last month Al Jazeera’s Mujib Mashal documented an alarming contractor ring orchestrated by the Pakistani and Bahraini militaries. Recruited after Saudi and Bahraini officials visited Islamabad for security talks, an estimated 2,000+ former servicemen have bolstered the island’s forces by 20%. Roughly 9,000-12,000 soldiers make up Bahrain’s active Defense Force, leaving the government undermanned in its crackdown against the Shia-majority opposition. Saudi troops stamped with the Gulf Cooperation Council’s logo (Peninsula Shield Force) had already entered the country in March, along with UAE police and a Jordanian unit operating under a Saudi false-flag. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently met with Bahrain’s King Hamad Ben Isa Al Khalifa, who offered his “full support” for Jordan’s GCC bid.

Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, cannot believe that “our own Shia cannot join the security forces, but the government recruits from abroad.”

Islamabad’s close relationship with Riyadh, coupled with a robust military apparatus, has paid large dividends to Manama and opened the door to further security cooperation. This week a smiling King Hamad held court with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to promote, “the existing Pakistan-Bahrain bilateral ties through enhanced economic interactions, promotion and facilitation of business community.” Although Pakistan’s weak economy naturally steered the conversation in this direction, “stability” underlined their meetings without ever mentioning Islamabad’s direct involvement in Bahrain’s crackdown.

According to Al Jazeera’s July report, a Pakistani conglomerate called the Fauji Foundation has handled most of the recruiting. The company - billed as a charitable trust - maintains a variety of legitimate business interests, but also outsources ex-military personnel through its Overseas Employment Services, including Special Forces, the national guard and riot police. Rajab and other protesters identified the majority of recruits as Pakistani after they understood Urdu instead of Arabic; Balochs supposedly make up a sizable portion of the recruits.

Now a second, odder source is vouching for what is still considered a suspect report in Pakistan. Former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, author President Barack Obama’s initial “White Paper” on Afghanistan and propagator of “AfPak,” recently told Voice of America that Bahrain has recruited Pakistani veterans for decades. 2011’s uprising “sparked a sharp increase,” says Riedel, who may be exaggerating for effect but doesn’t appear to be completely lying.

"This winter, when the very serious demonstrations began and it looked like the regime might even be toppled at a certain point, their hiring of mercenaries went up substantially," he said. "And they began sending out basically want ads in major Pakistani newspapers advertising well-paying jobs in the Bahraini police and the Bahraini National Guard for any experienced soldier or policeman in Pakistan."

Worse still, Rajab warns that Pakistani troops often possess the heaviest hands and may be involved in torture cases. With the risk of defection running high, the King has followed past generals by deploying his mercenaries to the front. But the use of Sunni troops also appears to be a calculated political offense to the Shia opposition, an open attempt to inflame social tensions and justify suppression of the uprising. The use of foreign soldiers and police has become a main grievance on top of political and judicial reform; Bahraini Shia view the pattern - Sunni bonding, Saudi loyalty, high pay and miseducation - as a systematic attack.

"Many of these Sunni Pakistani troops, if they’ve served well and served long enough, will also be offered Bahraini citizenship at the end of their career - an offer that is intended to try to increase the demographic size of the Sunni minority on the island,” Riedel explains. “And that only intensifies Shia frustration with the way things are governed in Bahrain.”

"They’re uneducated," adds Rajab. "They’re told they are going to go to a holy war in Bahrain to kill some non-Muslims or kafir [infidel] or Shias. They are paid well, maybe. They are staying in isolation in Bahrain.”

The widespread use of this strategy leaves little doubt of a connection between Riyadh and Islamabad, and thus Washington by extension. While quick to voice caution, U.S. officials have justified Saudi Arabia’s deployment (and Jordan and UAE) as an internal matter. No one is stopping Pakistan’s flow of ex-military or even reacting to the story. Amid these developments, the Obama administration has failed to respond to Bahrain’s collapsed dialogue after hailing its pompous opening in June. Al Wefaq, the main opposition group, left the dialogue in silence, while Wa'ad stayed to the end to prove its worthlessness.

Three weeks ago Human Rights First unsuccessfully called out the Obama administration, bluntly stating, “The U.S. government should clarify its position on the discredited Bahraini National Dialogue that failed to address fundamental issues of reform or human rights. Its recommendations have been met with widespread disappointment from human rights activists within the country.”

“At the start of the dialogue President Obama described it as ‘an important moment of promise for the people of Bahrain,’ and he commended the Bahraini King for his leadership in initiating the process. This praise baffled many Bahrainis because six weeks earlier President Obama had told the Bahraini government, ‘You can’t have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail.’ Bahraini pro-democracy protestors wonder where the U.S. stands now, and it’s time it made its position clear.”

Unfortunately Bahraini protesters know where Washington stands in their country - in the Naval Support Activity Bahrain, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and in Riyadh. One of the administration's mentions came from Hillary Clinton in July, when the Secretary of State optimistically asserted “we’re trying to encourage dialogue in Bahrain.” After the dialogue crumbled into illegitimacy, the administration reportedly re-upped Bahrain’s defense pact through 2016. Weeks of counter-demonstrations ensued, including a “No Retreat Festival,” and Wefaq leader Sayed al-Mousawi told his audience during a protest against the National Dialogue, "The government thought the results were great. We thought they were nothing. There's no fully elected government, no reforms to the voting system. It's a one-sided deal."

Although Obama officials vigorously defend U.S. policy as upholding the universal right to protest, Bahrainis attempted to stage protests outside the U.S. Embassy in Manana only to face a security cordon and riot police.

Washington is unquestionably aware of Bahrain’s present environment. Riedel’s testimony, though unusual, is sufficient proof given the multiplicity of reports. A lie of this caliber is too grand even for him or VOA, whose editorials often defend the government's efforts to reform. While the ex-CIA analyst has participated in the U.S. media campaign against Pakistan, notably its “loose” nuclear weapons, Riedel toes the Saudi line too closely to falsify what verges on condemnation: "The fact that the [ruling] Khalifa family is importing Sunni Pakistani mercenaries to repress the Shia majority only underscores the perception of the Shia majority that the regime is not interested in genuine reforms, not interested in building a constitutional monarchy, but interested in repressing the majority simply because they are Shias.”

Riedel isn’t inactive in the White House - if he knows the truth so does the Obama administration. Finally, a cover up that Washington and Islamabad can agree on.

Winds of Change Rocking Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet

Press TV broke some “interesting news” on Thursday, as anchor Saeed Pourreza remarked when he appeared to receive an on-air update.

Whether he proceeded to break The Times’s story or vice versa, Pourreza announced that the Obama administration is scouting a new home for America’s Fifth Fleet, currently stranded in Bahrain. The Australian would pick the story up and run, giving “Capital Hill” too much credit for debating the issue “within days of the protests breaking out.” No part of the U.S. government has demonstrated foresight in the Arab Spring.

A story like the Fifth Fleet, though, was too big not to automatically trigger Washington’s denial mechanism. Late night an anonymous State Department official told The Huffington Post, “We are aware of these reports, which do not reflect the views of either the departments of State or Defense.” Just so that everyone was clear, Fifth Fleet public affairs officer Commander Amy Derrick-Frost told Gulf News, “The speculation in the London Times article about Fifth Fleet leaving Bahrain is false.”

The two officials then voiced identical support for King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa: “Diplomatically, we regard Bahrain as an important partner, while the U.S. Navy has a long-standing relationship of more than 60 years with Bahrain.”

No one can deny this fact. Many Bahrainis happen to view their government’s close relationship with Washington as part of their problem. But with the State Department official stepping too far out on a limb - “the United States continues to support all of the ongoing efforts that are necessary to promote reconciliation among Bahrainis and to advance necessary reforms” - the U.S. Navy’s bluster quickly dissipates. No plans exist to move the Fifth Fleet for the moment, only because no feasible options lie on the Persian Gulf’s horizon.

One thing is certain: the Naval Support Activity Bahrain affords the most advantageous placement of the U.S. Navy’s forward presence, specifically against Iran. The Navy also maintains full control over NSA Bahrain, a Guantánamo Bay that Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s governments actually welcome. No alternative of its kind exists; moving is a political and logistics nightmare because NSA Bahrain is the Fifth Fleet’s ideal base. Yet King Hamad’s regime has grown too shaky for the Pentagon to ignore entirely, reverberating a forceful denial in the opposite direction.

Two sites under consideration in the media - Qatar and the UAE - share pros and cons. Both states have experienced negligible unrest during the Arab Spring due to a combination of factors, including lower unemployment and poverty, and maintain extensive trade relations with America (a point of leverage for both sides). Each state also hosts U.S. personnel and logistics that could link up to their ports. Situated west of Doha, Al Udeid Air Base quarters the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (ACC) and several strike groups. Jebel Ali, the Middle East’s largest port, already refuels numerous U.S. Naval craft and has erected facilities to accommodate a supercarrier.

Neither port, however, is equipped for the Fifth Fleet’s total capacity, estimated between 30-40 ships and 16,000-30,000 personnel. Naval Forces Central Command lists its staff at 28,000.

Barring a complete meltdown in Bahrain and a reactive eviction, the Fifth Fleet won’t be moving until a personalized base can be established in the next 2-4 years. The practical considerations of relocating outweigh the existential threat that Bahrain’s monarchy finds itself under, bottlenecking a rapid solution. In case of emergency a patch-work strategy may split the Fleet between Doha and Dubai, while the U.S. Air Force would theoretically function as a stop-gap.

If worst comes to worst though, King Abdul Aziz Sea Port appears to be the most attractive alternative. Located right across the King Fahd Causeway, roughly 30 miles away in Ad Dammām, the Saudi port would make a natural home for the Fifth Fleet. Although the port may be insufficient to house the entire array of vessels, no state would be more accommodating that King Abdullah. His port could renew domestic unease in America and come with a hefty price, however the move makes sense logistically and geopolitically.

Once the dust cleared from Hosni Mubarak’s fall, Obama administration has eagerly adhered to Riyadh’s counter-revolution. As National Security Adviser Tom Donilon would tell you, America and Saudi Arabia share “fundamental, fundamental” interests.

For this reason discounting a move entirely is impossible. One of these shared interests happens to be Bahrain’s faltering “National Dialogue,” which both governments support in order to avert regime change. The move predictably backfired as King Hamad treated the dialogue as the political tool that it is. Unless he and his foreign strong-arms decide to hold a serious dialogue over Bahrain’s inequalities, his government will find itself confronted with a rising swell of opposition against the Sunni monarchy.

Trapped on the same island by the same problems, Washington and Riyadh don’t have many allies to turn to except each other.