Syrian Opposition Leaks Six-Point Initiative

Kofi Annan meets with Burhan Ghalioun, chairman of the Syrian National Council

Western and Gulf powers share at least one mindset with their foe, Bashar al-Assad, as the minutes tick down to 6 A.M. Thursday. Trapped in a situation with few alternatives, each side of the power equation is fighting to keep Kofi Annan's ceasefire initiative alive after the plan died a brutal death. Hoping to conceal the remaining cards in Washington's hand despite a new spike in casualties, the Obama administration refuses to address the prospect of failed diplomacy until Thursday's "official" deadline passes.

That vacuum has forced Syria's opposition to fill it immediately.

Ascertaining the political position of Syria's National Council (SNC) is generally obstructed by two factors: internal divides over the level of foreign intervention and the protocol of international blocs. On top of a schism with the National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCC), which has coordinate with Moscow to oppose foreign intervention, the internationalized SNC has also battled local perceptions of lagging behind al-Assad's assaults. The SNC is thus trapped between fears of foreign occupation and civil war - or, most likely, a combination of the two - and forced to navigate between potential extremes. This diplomatic obligation is multiplied by the need to cooperate with the United Nations and Arab League as they attempt to negotiate a ceasefire with al-Assad's regime.

"We continue to consult with the Annan mission and seek some form, any form of compliance, or any means to get the regime to comply with the ceasefire," SNC spokeswoman Basma Kodmani said on Tuesday. “In spite of the difficulties that we are facing... we think that the Annan mission can continue to work with the regime and with international powers to get a U.N. mission, a monitoring mission of observers, on the ground."

Yet the resulting flow of hedged rhetoric isn't overly difficult to interpret. While Burhan Ghalioun keeps his hand outstretched just in case al-Assad defies his recent history and ceases fire, the SNC chairman has criticized Annan's plan and demands that the international community stop "flirting with the regime." Ghalioun used Istanbul's "Friends of Syria" conference to advocate the arming of Syria's opposition, and Kodmani acknowledged that al-Assad has no visible plans to halt his crackdown. Another member, Obeida Nahas, struck down the possibility of a "national dialogue" with the regime, as stipulated by Annan's plan. The SNC will participate in a dialogue with all of Syria's ethnicities and religions, "but the leaders of this regime have to go."

Just as the SNC is obligated to suspend its doubts and cooperate with Annan's plan, the group must employ a similar policy towards Moscow and Beijing. The foreign pillars of al-Assad's regime wouldn't even endorse Annan's defanged plan without a congenial opposition, since both powers still expect to maintain influence in the event of a new government. Kodmani held out the faintest hope that Moscow and China would modify their position ahead of the UNSC's next resolution, "because every attempt at a solution that requires the cooperation of the regime is leading to hundreds and thousands more deaths." However Moscow in particular has employed deceptive rhetoric to keep Western powers guessing on Russia's end game - a pro-regime strategy.

After lamenting that al-Assad "could have done more," Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said "The United States and other countries that have stable contacts with various Syrian opposition groups should not blame everything on Russia and China, but use their own influence to force everyone to stop firing in each other."

Kodmani says that if and when Annan's mission does fails, the SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA) expect the UNSC to approve military action by invoking Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Today Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian human rights activist with connections in Washington, offered an blueprint of this plan to Fox News. Supposedly authorized to speak on behalf of multiple opposition groups, Abdulhamid released their own six-point plan that begins with a call to arm Syrian insurgents. The opposition essentially argues that diplomacy cannot succeed without the application of force; in conjunction with foreign arms, air support is envisioned as the tool to open a safe haven into Turkey. Finally, the opposition requests an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in "liberated territories."

When applied collectively and in unison with diplomatic pressure, the SNC believes that their plan can eventually topple al-Assad's regime. These terms may sound unrealistic at the moment or even in the long-term (especially inserting UN peacekeepers into Homs or Damascus), but no less realistic than futile negotiations with a bloodthirsty dictatorship.

Bahrain's F-1 Race: Centerpiece of "Normality"

Manama is scheduled to hold two races on April 22nd. On the under card, Formula 1 teams will compete for the title of Bahrain's Grand Prix after skipping the island in 2011. Holding a race without resolving the political issues that canceled the last one may seem counterintuitive, but King Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa knows exactly what he's doing.

F-1 drivers are mere spectators to his main event: a game of chicken with Bahrain's opposition movement.

On Tuesday Zayed al-Zayani, the chairman of Bahrain's International Circuit, released a vicious info-assault on Bahranis and foreigners alike. Telling CNN that "armchair observers" have driven up a false debate over Bahrain's security, al-Zayani also blamed "huge misconceptions about the current situation" on the "scaremongering tactics of certain small extremist groups on social networking sites." Tasked with coordinating the government's narrative, the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) similarly "directs attention to comments made yesterday by John Yates, former assistant commissioner in the London Metropolitan Police Service, and current adviser to Bahrain's police." Yates said that "pockets of violence" wouldn't stop the race when the island is "95%" safe.

"It's a really important event for this country," he said. "It's hugely important for the economy. There is nothing that in any way warrants for the race to be postponed."

al-Zayani and Yates's comments demonstrate how the monarchy views its F-1 race as a win-win opportunity to defeat Bahrain's protesters. If all goes as planned, the February 14th Youth Coalition and anyone that joins their attempt to obstruct the race will meet the same resistance that guards Manama's Pearl Square. They won't even get near Sahkri, located roughly 20 miles southwest of the capital, and a thick security blanket should catch most of the protesters that slip in closer. Bahrain's government is already packaging the race as evidence of the country's political resolution, and a peaceful event would serve as the latest centerpiece to King Hamad's "reforms."

The monarchy is obsessed with returning Bahrain to normality and F-1 chairman Bernie Ecclestone is eager to assist. On the eve of February 14th demonstrations, Ecclestone dismissed Bahrain's protesters as "a lot of kids having a go at the police. I don't think it's anything serious at all." The F-1 boss has since improved his assessment of the situation in the months-long process of defending Bahrain's Grand Prix, and recently claimed that none of the racing teams have expressed political or security concerns. “Quite the opposite,” he says. “One of the teams sent a person over there recently – and I’ve spoken to them today actually – and they said everything’s perfect, there’s no problem.”

Well-versed in the King's talking points, Ecclestone announced, "It’s up to the people in Bahrain to decide. At this time, they are not canceling the event, so presumably they are happy.”

That's exactly what the monarchy wants the world to believe, but at least one unnamed team principal broke ranks on Monday: “If I’m brutally frank, the only way they can pull this race off without incident is to have a complete military lock-down there. And I think that would be unacceptable, both for Formula One and force Bahrain.”

Conversely, any attempt to disrupt the race will be dropped squarely on Bahrain's opposition. The monarchy had already prepared to steamroll the streets when the February 14th Coalition distributed an explanation of their future actions to Ecclestone, and the group's challenge is being met head-on. Readily dismissed by government officials as Molotov-wielding thugs, the Coalition's injection of energy comes with the price of an easy scapegoat. The leading political group, Al Wefaq, will also be blamed for failing to control the youth and refusing to engage in a dialogue with the government. Other than that, though, life on the island remains "normal."

The monarchy's handling of Bahrain's Grand Prix is laced with irony. In choosing to hold the race without any resolution to the uprising - instead blocking it out entirely - King Hamad is extending the life-span of Bahrain's conflict. His refusal to overhaul the country's parliamentary and judiciary system has generated an unbridgeable trust-gap with the opposition, while unequal negotiating conditions are blocking serious efforts to cross. This process, combined with frequent beatings and gassings, has increased the friction between Bahrain's political and popular opposition, driving up the demand for regime change and further polarizing the country.

April 22nd falls straight in line with this trend, indicating that the monarchy has no plans to alter its current policy. King Hamad still believes that he can beat the opposition in a long-term race, but this type of conflict happens to be the only kind that offers Bahrain's opposition any chance of victory.

Forecasting After Annan's Syrian Plan Implodes

The inevitable diplomatic breakdown between Bashar al-Assad's regime and international powers was already tumbling down a confrontational path when Monday morning dawned. Now al-Assad's foreign opponents have been struck with a new bolt of urgency after two murky clashes along the Syrian border.

According to one version of events, revolutionary insurgents ambushed Syrian forces near Salama village before fleeing across the Turkish border. Syrian troops returned fire as the surviving insurgents dashed towards the Oncupinar refugee camp, taking the lives of several rebels and refugees in the process. Another version contends that Syrian insurgents were attempting to open a humanitarian corridor when they were ambushed; one anonymous official from Turkey's Foreign Ministry said a group of refugees came under attack after linking up with Turkish personnel.

Separately, plain-clothed gunmen launched an hours-long assault on a Lebanese media team in Wadi Khaled. Ali Shaaban, a cameraman for al-Jadeed TV, was killed in a hail of gunfire that Syrian state media attributed to repeated "terrorist" infiltrations. The government claims that a border post came under just as the journalists were moving through the area.

The parallel between Oncupinar and Wadi Khaled tragically illustrates Syria's situation in blood. With both sides unable to entangle themselves from the country's numerous front lines, al-Assad's regime and the many parts that form Syria's armed opposition continue to hold each other responsible for escalating the conflict. Street militias and the nominal commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Raid al Assad, say they are willing to ceasefire but refuse to lay down their arms as the regime demands. al-Assad has manipulated this power equation throughout his negotiations with the Arab League and United Nations, trapping and baiting the opposition with brutal assault waves. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported at least 84 deaths on Monday alone, while al Assad counted over 1,000 casualties in the last two weeks.

The areas around Homs, Hama and Idlib remain open war zones.

"I am shocked by reports of a surge of violence and atrocities in several towns and villages in Syria, resulting in alarming levels of casualties, refugees and displaced persons, in violation of assurances given to me," Kofi Annan, the UN's newly-installed point man, said on Sunday. "As we get closer to the Tuesday 10 April deadline, I remind the Syrian government of the need for full implementation of its commitments and stress that the present escalation of violence is unacceptable."

Many Syrians and observers are not shocked by al-Assad's actions, only tormented by the vast damage and loss of life inflicted on Syrians of all ethnicities. Few actors within Syria's National Council (SNC) expected Annan's six-point initiative to end differently than the Arab League's monitoring mission, which collapsed under its own weight in January. They anticipated the ferocity that accompanies al-Assad's "compliance" with international demands. The SNC has kept a political branch extended to the international community in order to maintain Syria's moral high ground, but the more vocal FSA is known to speak its collective mind.

"When the regime asks Kofi Annan for written guarantees that we will drop our weapons it is actually mocking the United Nations," remarked Colonel Qassem Saad al-Deen, spokesman for the FSA's joint-command. "This is a joke."

Despite a low probability of success, Western and Gulf capitals continue to pursue a negotiated settlement to an intense asymmetric conflict. This strategy has been adopted due to the absence of a "Plan B," and no one is sure how long al-Assad's opponents are willing to haggle with his allies. Washington, European states, Ankara and Riyadh have yet to concede the impossibility of a compromise with Moscow and Beijing. Perhaps al-Assad's own "friends" will eventually switch sides to preserve their influence in the country, but this theory has only escalated Syria's conflict to the present day. Moscow and Beijing still refuse to budge from their "solution": "a political settlement process."

"Attempts to force a solution on Syria from outside will lead only to an escalation of tension," Gennady Gatilov, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, warned foreign powers. "Everything must follow from respect for Syria's sovereignty, and violence must be stopped."

Up until now Moscow's calculated warnings to al-Assad, along with the potential scale of military intervention, has contained U.S. policy to the diplomatic level. Calls to fully arm the FSA have only translated into logistics equipment. The Obama administration also refuses to confront the reality of al-Assad's defiance until Tuesday's deadline passes, suggesting that another round of political warfare will preempt an organized military campaign. Repeatedly pressed on Washington's future course of action, the State Department's Victoria Nuland told a skeptical press corps that Annan would propose his next steps on Tuesday "and take it from there." The White House's Jay Carney didn't "want to get ahead of that deadline or Mr. Annan’s assessment" either, saying "there will be discussions to decide what should happen next." Nuland was specifically asked whether the administration takes "any kind of responsibility for your choice of policy on the Annan plan?"

"The fact that it hasn’t worked yet," she responded, "doesn’t change the fact that having the international community increasingly united and increasingly willing to pressure Assad will not eventually bring him down. He will go down."

Nuland has made similar comments before, except al-Assad won't be going down any time soon without delivering material support to the opposition. Even a well-trained and equipped insurgency could need years to destroy his regime's structure. Whether the Obama administration wants to hide behind Annan's neutrality or refuses to militarily intervene in Syri (both factors are active), UN ambassador Susan Rice told reporters that she still hopes a diplomatic approach is "possible." Yet she also claimed that Annan's proposal is the last of its kind. This scenario is impossible to verify, but the Turkish and Lebanese attacks have injected additional urgency behind the push for humanitarian corridors.

Such a move would be perceived as a direct act of war and end the initial debate over military intervention in Syria. The international community should prepare for this outcome regardless of the coming days, because any fresh debate around a political solution will trend towards the same outcome: protracted insurgency.

Obama Turns Super-Hawk

By Danny Schechter, published in Al Jazeera:

New York, NY - Back in the last Century, when Bill Clinton was running for re-election in the "permanent campaign" he, with the advice of the smarmy Dick Morris chose to co-opt Republican positions to pre-empt their using them against him. It was called "triangulation" but also disguised a clear strategic shift to the right that has now surfaced in the Obama campaign. It appears that Team Obama does not take the concerns or values of its liberal support base seriously. They think they can be mesmerized by selective symbolic stands and they have nowhere else to go.

The Black Community has pledged itself to his re-election despite criticisms by black leaders who privately feel abandoned by him.

Robert Scheer, who edits Truthdig, says liberals will have to embrace Obama by "default". "The Republicans are a sick joke and their narrow ideological stupidity has left rational voters no choice in the coming presidential election but Barack Obama," he writes.

He also recognizes that Obama has now "backed Republican initiatives", calling the president the "moderate" choice in the coming election, "defending centrist programs that Republicans in the past helped originate".

'Hopey to mopey'

Van Jones, who Obama appointed to a job advocating green energy solutions until attacks by the right led to his dumping him, calls his former boss a "post-hope" candidate. He said in an interview on MSNBC:

We went from 'hopey' to mopey… I saw the misfires: how the White House didn't really understand the grassroots movement; the grassroots movement certainly didn't understand the grassroots movement…and there was this 'hope' bubble that collapsed (with) both sides not understanding each other.

For years now, the president, in what some analysts say is a deeply engrained fear/reaction to a total assault by Fox News, has sought to keep the messengers of patriotically correct banalities off guard with a slew of hawkish/hardline foreign policy initiatives.

He escalated the two big wars he inherited with "surges" in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as drone offensive associated with continuing collateral damage, i.e, civilian deaths. He turned General Petraus from his counter-insurgency specialist into a hero spymaster and gave him more and more power, perhaps to prevent his running against him. He turned the covert-action Seals units into a Presidential-sanctioned assassination squad and, then, practically went steady with the Pentagon. The flag pin he avoided as a candidate is now a staple of his "uniform".

You can understand why: he can't really run on domestic issues.His economic policies have failed to create jobs or a recovery because he banked on the banks. Despite all the Republican banter about his alleged socialism, he's given the capitalists just about everything they want, including the new JOBS bill that will erode financial reform rules and open the door to more fraud. His Justice Department has not waged a jihad to put financial criminals in jail. They've settled complaints with major mortgage fraudsters paying fines instead being locked up...

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News Dissector Danny Schechter blogs at NewsDissector.net. His new book is Occupy: Dissecting Occupy Wall Street (Cosimo Books) and his latest film Plunder about financial crime (PlundertheCrimeof Our Time.com). He hosts a radio show on Progressive Radio Network. (PRN.fm.) Comments to dissector@mediachannel.org

Saleh, UNSC Stage New Counterrevolutionary Show In Yemen

On Friday Yemen's new president, Abd Mansour Hadi, issued what some government officials and political analysts described as a sweeping military restructure. Among the casualties of his firing range: Mohammed al-Ahmar, Ali Abdullah Saleh's half-brother and commander of the Air Force, his nephew Tariq and the governor of Abyan governorate. The foreign powers behind Hadi's takeover hailed his moves as integral to restoring confidence in an opaque transition.

"The Group of Ten Ambassadors considers that the Presidential decrees are fully consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the GCC Initiative and with the responsibilities entrusted to President Hadi by the Yemeni people in the election of February 21, 2012. The changes will serve to eliminate points of friction and reduce tensions as envisioned in the GCC Initiative and Implementing Mechanism. The Group of Ten Ambassadors calls on all Yemenis to cooperate fully with the decrees and will view with utmost concern any steps to resist their implementation or impede the operation of the airport or other state institutions, facilities, or infrastructure."

At face value, removing several of Saleh's relatives from Yemen's chain of command advances the prospects of a complete overhaul. Hadi also stands to improve his popularity by challenging Saleh's authority, theoretically reducing the number of obstacles in Yemen's two-year transitional phase. However these benefits, like Yemen's electricity, are far from certain. Given the standing mutiny against Mohammed, Saleh is motivated to cut his dead weight and salvage the positions of his son and nephew, who still command his personal military units. The Republican Guard and Central Security Organization led Saleh's crackdown throughout the last year, taking hundreds of protesters' lives in the process, and the strongman maintains significant power through these U.S.-trained units. Defense Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed recently told Yemen's parliament that Saleh is using his son's headquarters as his war-room.

Having battled Ahmed throughout last summer after Saleh evacuated for medical treatment in Riyadh, Hadi is viscerally aware of their potential for collateral damage. A phased firing, then, is meant to limit the spillover - he cannot contain the damage if Saleh's relatives are dismissed at once. The possibility remained that Saleh would accept his losses as a compromise to keeping Ahmed and Yahya in power, but Hadi's modest actions immediately triggered an excessive response from the old regime's loyalists. Mohammed ordered his remaining forces to seize control of Sana'a International Airport and threatened to target incoming planes. In a calculated defense, his aids said the de facto chief will only resign after Hadi fires more oppositional figures, starting with rogue general Ali Mohsen. Mohsen flipped sides early in the revolution to avoid becoming a primary target and cannot be ordered to stand down now.

Saleh has similarly refused to leave the country until Mohsen exits, a condition designed to entrench himself in Sana'a.

Elsewhere in the capital, a barrage of shells fell on the neighborhood of opposition figure Hameed al-Ahmar. Leading members of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) are frequently targeted after political breakdowns. Tribesmen were also ordered to attack oil pipelines in Marib governorate, another tactic that is normally blamed on anti-government tribesmen or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but sometimes attributed to Saleh. This reaction offers a brief preview to the carnage that Ahmed's firing will bring,

Another international response may be forthcoming after the "Ten Ambassadors" tripped between Friday and Saturday's events, but any statement will sound as hollow as the last. Just as the White House's previous warning to Saleh refrained from addressing him directly, today's statement called on "all Yemenis to cooperate fully with the decrees" - as if anyone besides Saleh bears responsibility. These are the same powers that granted immunity to Saleh's family, currently allow them to maintain power, then act surprised when he disobeys. For instance, Abyan governor Saleh Al-Zawari recently accused the regime of surrendering territory and weapons to AQAP, so his removal will have a limited impact on the situation. Saleh's rebellious half-brother was also reassigned as an assistant to the Defense Minister. Left alone, Hadi's movements will only add to Yemen's instability. He's caught in a strategic dilemma: he cannot dismiss Saleh's closest relatives without building his own power base first, but he doesn't have months or years to wait either.

As for Saleh, he's still playing the international community because they're all actors in the play. Repeating the status quo will once again demonstrate that foreign powers are uncommitted to dismantling his regime, and more interested in controlling Yemen's future government.

UN, Arab League Encouraging al-Assad To Kill

No side of Syria's revolution has stopped shooting at each other in the six days since the "Friends of Syria" met in Istanbul. Here, more than two weeks after Bashar al-Assad conditionally "agreed" to ceasefire, Kofi Annan would formally accept his "compliance" to a UN-sponsored initiative that aims to establish a political dialogue and humanitarian mission. Ground conditions remained static throughout Annan's negotiations with al-Assad and his foreign allies, and Syria's information sphere continues to overflow with the effects.

On Thursday Annan was forced to concede the impending failure of an initiative based on Yemen's flawed "model."

"All points of the plan are crucial, but one is most urgent: the need for cessation of violence," he told the UN General Council. "Clearly, the violence is still continuing. Alarming levels of casualties and other abuses continue to be reported daily. Military operations in civilian populations have not stopped."

Everyone involved seemed to anticipate this scenario. After telegraphing his moves with the deception of previous "agreements" with the Arab League, Syria's activists and insurgents expected al-Assad's forces to maintain their assault. Some witnesses claim the attacks are becoming more ferocious, with houses being put to the torch and civilians being execute instead of taken prisoner. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon counts himself among those who believe the situation deteriorated from last weekend. Western powers have also voiced their skepticism that al-Assad will comply with Annan's six-point plan, despite the fact that they've encouraged him to sign for months.

"Can we be optimistic?" French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe asked reporters in Paris. "I am not. Because I think Bashar Assad is deceiving us."

This flood of negativity became the center of Syria's attention during Thursday's briefing at the State Department. Possibly the most independent-minded journalist operating in the press corp, the AP's Matthew Lee observed that, "in listening to the speeches at the UN, it seems like everyone’s as pessimistic as ever." Lee asked spokesman Mark Toner, "realistically, what hope does the U.S. have that Assad is going to abide by this deadline?" leading Toner to reply, "it’s not surprising; certainly discouraging."

"It is clear that the Assad regime appears to be using this window to continue to carry out its horrible assault on the Syrian people."

The overriding question, if Western and Gulf powers aren't surprised by al-Assad's response, is why the UNSC attempted another futile diplomatic mission. Part of this strategy intends to establish the conditions of just war theory, specifically the use of force as the last resort. International powers still hope to avert a large-scale civil war in the region, but offering a proposal that is doomed to fail advances the legitimacy of intervention. Militarily, foreign powers need to buy time as they study a varied opposition and plan contingencies for a war that is expected to dwarf Libya's intervention. Yet the lack of punitive actions is encouraging al-Assad to accelerate his crackdown, in turn enlarging the war and its potential spillover.

A skeptical Lee presses Toner to expand on his statement that, if al-Assad doesn't comply by April 10th, "then we’re going to be consulting with the Security Council on next steps." Unsatisfied with this initial response, Lee double-checks his questions and triggers a debate that exposes the weaknesses behind the international community's semi-united front.

QUESTION: Was the U.S. satisfied with the strength of the presidential statement coming out of the Security Council? I mean, it’s urging them; it’s not – it didn’t have any demands in it.

MR. TONER: Well, look, it’s very clear what Assad needs to do. So it was a strong message of unity on this issue. And I don’t think it’s a message that we can convey enough to Assad and his regime that time is running out. They need to comply with the April 10th deadline.

QUESTION: Mark, I just want to make sure I got this right. You said that if Assad doesn’t comply by the April 10th deadline, the U.S. – you guys and your allies are going to consult –

MR. TONER: We’re going to consult on next steps, yeah.

QUESTION: I’m sure he’s shaking in his boots. That’s really what the “or else” is? You do this or else we’re going to consult?

MR. TONER: Matt, our approach to Syria is on several fronts. We have the Friends of Syria group that, as you saw over the weekend, took additional steps to provide support to the opposition, as well as increase humanitarian assistance to people in need in Syria. We’ve got this sanctions group that’s look at how to more effectively implement sanctions against Assad. We’re – this is something we’re working on multiple fronts. We’re going to continue to use the UN where we believe it’s going to be effective. We’re going to go back and consult on next steps.

QUESTION: Why is not an accurate assessment – because I’m sure you’ll say it’s not an accurate assessment – that there is no reward for compliance and there’s no punishment for non-compliance? How does that work?

MR. TONER: Punishment for noncompliance – the punishment for non-compliance --

QUESTION: Yes. The punishment is that you’re going to consult.

MR. TONER: The punishment for noncompliance is going to be increased pressure on Assad, on his regime, and a clear message to those around him that they’re on the wrong side of history.

QUESTION: So what kind of strong consequences Secretary Clinton talk about if he doesn’t --

MR. TONER: I think I just talked about that. We’ve – this is not just about the Security Council, just about the UN. We’ve said before that we’re going to consult with the Security Council on next steps when appropriate. But we’re also applying pressure through sanctions, political pressure through the Friends of Syria group.

The State Department's response swims in two areas: the need to maintain a political high ground and the element of military surprise. However the threat of force must be publicized if the international community intends to back al-Assad into submission through credible deterrence. Syria's strongman has thrived on the present unwillingness to engage militarily, and bet his regime on the ability to crush the opposition before sanctions take a fatal toll. He presumably believes that Syria can survive in relative isolation, just like Iran, so long as he sufficiently divides the country.

Over the weekend, the Trench observed that the pressure to act had fallen squarely on Western and Gulf powers. All available evidence suggests that April 10th will unfold the same as the day before and day after. Solutions to a multifaceted conflict remain obscured by its many demands, but the international community's current strategy is throwing gas on Syria's fire.

U.S. Policy in Iraq Suffering From Political Drift

Despite a high level of support to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq, the country's ongoing destabilization has guided some American lawmakers to a simplistic military conclusion: President Barack Obama should have left behind a residual force. Other pundits and analysts praise Obama's "decision" to remove U.S. troops on schedule, but the weakness of U.S. policy has always been political on nature. Politics obstructed a renewed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and politics are responsible for the current stalemate in Baghdad.

The administration hasn't adapted between now and last December, when Obama welcomed Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to the White House and showered him with praise. Obama has so far escaped responsibility for contributing to Baghdad's crisis; Deputy Vice President Saleh al-Mutlaq responded by branding al-Maliki as a dictator, and the latter followed with threats to hold a no-confidence vote. By this time al-Maliki had already locked horns with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, another official working under Iraqiya's umbrella, over allegations that al-Hashimi funded a Sunni death squad. While the charges may be true, al-Maliki's refusal to implement a power-sharing agreement with Iraqiya's Ayad Allawi pushed the bloc into a fundamental standoff with the Premier.

Allawi, who never received a promised national security post, directly refuted Obama's statements in January and recently told The Washington Times, "The policymakers [in Washington] promised to support this, but ultimately and unfortunately, none of this has happened, and the United States forgot about this power-sharing completely."

These factors had no impact on the White House's latest readout with al-Maliki.

President Obama called Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki today to congratulate the Iraqi people on the success of the Arab Summit hosted in Baghdad last week, and on Iraq’s continued reintegration into the region as a sovereign, independent state. The two leaders discussed the United States and Iraq’s joint efforts to advance peace and security in the region as strategic partners. The discussion also covered the political situation in Iraq, and a range of other shared interests. President Obama expressed the United States’ firm commitment to a unified, democratic Iraq as defined by Iraq’s constitution, as well as his support for Prime Minister Maliki’s participation in the ongoing dialogue convened by President Talabani tasked to reconcile Iraqi political blocs in a flexible and open manner.

Obama can afford to glance over Iraq because the cumulative effects of George Bush's surge averted a civil meltdown. The conflict remains at a "manageable" intensity and "only" 112 Iraqis - 78 civilians, 22 policemen and 12 soldiers - became the casualties of insurgent attacks in March. The lowest figure since U.S. and international forces entered the country in 2003 also reduced last March's total by half, with Baghdad's AL conference functioning as an end-of-the-month bonus. Less encouraging is the persistent nature of Iraq's militancy and the diversion of violence into Baghdad's political sphere.

The White House's cookie-cutter rhetoric - "reconcile Iraqi political blocs in a flexible and open manner" - stands as its own evidence of mismanagement. Obama is praising al-Maliki for attempting to resolve problems that he started and for holding a conference that non-Shia officials claim he reluctantly submitted to. “All matters will be resolved according to the constitution,” al-Maliki told reporters over the weekend, but few steps have been taken to build confidence ahead of the meetings. Iraqiya unsuccessfully warned the Obama administration of this non-transparent atmosphere after the summit's preliminary phase collapsed: "There is no need for the preparatory meetings, particularly they were unable to name the conference, date and agenda."

Viewing Hashimi and al-Mutlaq's cases as politically exaggerated, Iraqiya demands that both issues be resolved before the National Conference in order to keep the summit on track: implementation of a standing power-sharing agreement. However al-Maliki wasn't willing to discuss al-Hashimi's case anyway, instead considering him to be an independent judiciary issue. Allawi told reporters last week, "Three months have now passed, and nothing has been done on these points." Today the conference was delayed "indefinitely" due to "mounting difference" with al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, with holds 89 parliamentary seats to Iraqiya's 91.

“It is better to postpone the conference until we reach a way out of the standoff,” said Parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi.

Meanwhile a secure hosting of the Arab League is juxtaposed by the reality that al-Maliki remains a supporter of Bashar al-Assad. Iraq is one of several Arab nations that adheres to a strict non-interventionist policy in Syria, and among the most vocal proponents of negotiating with the regime. al-Maliki has recently worked to appease Riyadh by signing a prisoner exchange, but the two powers remain uneasy neighbors as the region splits down Sunni and Shia lines. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar received al-Hashimi over the weekend, infuriating al-Maliki to the point that he threatened to call Interpol.

Most importantly, Iraqis don't believe that their country is near a sovereign state yet - the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are all accused of meddling in the country's affairs. America and Iran (in that order) recently topped the list of perceived threats during a poll conducted by Doha's Arab Center For Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). With most Americans either happy to be gone from Iraq or angry that U.S. troops left too soon, Obama and his National Security Council are clearly skilled at shoveling Iraq into a dark corner (like Afghanistan) and papering over the deficiencies in Washington's response. Allawi explicitly told The Washington Times, “I think the United States deliberately is taking Iraq out of the screen because there is a gross failure in Iraq.”

Demonstrating how overwhelmed the Obama administration is, the State Department's Victoria Nuland responded, “We strongly disagree with [Mr. Allawi‘s] characterization of our relationship with the government of Iraq and the role we have played to keep the Iraqi political process on track.”

Allawi is hardly the only politician to view Baghdad's situation this way; Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, will deliver a similar message to Obama when they meet in the coming days. Barzani says he's pleased with the improvement in the Kurds' political clout, but sees a letdown in U.S. diplomatic activity following the withdrawal of military forces. “That question is still on the table," he said of America's commitment to a free and sovereign Iraq. Barzani counts himself among those who fears that al-Maliki's rule verges on a dictatorship.

“There may be some people who do not want to call it a crisis, but it is a crisis," he said. "This is not the Iraq we struggled for: We are seeing the consolidation of power under one party and one ruler.”

Under the present conditions, U.S. policy will continue to bleed influence so long as Washington accepts al-Maliki's status quo. At worst, the refusal to challenge al-Maliki could open the door to another potential cycle of instability. Allawi remains open to three alternatives: a "true partnership," appointing a new Premier from al-Maliki's party, or new elections. If none of these scenarios play out, Allawi has threatened to launch "peaceful demonstrations" against the government - and Iraqis have already tasted al-Maliki's response to the Arab revolutions.

Countdown To Syria's Artificial Deadline

On Monday the "Friends of Syria" - more specifically, at this point, the friends of Syria's anti-government movement - tried to play hardball with a man that has slaughtered thousands of people over the 12 months. Foreign powers spent over half of those months calling for an immediate ceasefire of Bashar al-Assad's crackdown, and more than 150 days have been consumed by negotiations with his regime. Now, after repeatedly watching their diplomatic missions fail and undermine their credibility, Western and Gulf powers have given al-Assad 10 days to comply with an initiative first put forth in November.

"Kofi Annan has given us a plan to begin resolving this crisis," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told her audience in Istanbul. "Bashar al-Assad has, so far, refused to honor his pledge. There is no more time for excuses or delays. This is a moment of truth. And the United States is committed to this effort. We think the communique coming out of the meeting today is a very important document, and we commend it to all of you. It represents a considerable advance forward by the international community as represented by the more than 80 nations that attended here today."

Because of the overall situation and this very pledge, the pressure to deliver rests on these 83 actors when al-Assad's forces ignore their deadline to withdraw. Syrian activist groups have reported a "normal" volume of military incidents in separate parts of the country, with the UK-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights recording 34 casualties (including 16 unarmed civilians) on Monday. One activist who goes by the name of Fadi al-Yassin also reported an ominous trend: "The regime forces have pretty much stopped arresting people. They either kill them right away or keep them for one day to get information and then kill them."

Amid the disintegration of the Arab League's monitoring mission, a similar wave of death crashed into Syria's revolutionaries when Moscow and Beijing vetoed a UNSC proposal on February 3rd. They have watched in terror as the regime's forces island-hop through oppositional territory, unable stop the reality that al-Assad is racing against the UNSC's next moves. The death toll in Homs alone is estimated above 700. Syrians have good reason to suspect that the same process is underway again - the next nine days could bring all-out war - and Western officials are already confronting this reality as they try to salvage Annan's proposal.

"Let me say that from the US point of view," said Susan Rice, Washington's ambassador to the UN, "and I think the point of view of many member states, what we have seen since April 1 is not encouraging. Should the government of Syria use this window, rather than to de-escalate, to intensify the violence, it will be most unfortunate and it will be certainly our view that the Security Council will need to respond to that failure in a very urgent and serious way."

Moscow and Beijing are hoping to fit al-Assad with a silencer before another "response" from the UNSC, leading Russia's Foreign Minister to pressure al-Assad into complying with Annan's ceasefire. Sergey Lavrov's public insistence that "the Syrian government must take the first step" has been attributed to Moscow's increasing frustration with al-Assad, but Moscow remains a staunch ally. The Russians and Chinese are only irritated by his refusal to accept Annan's generous terms, which could savage the regime and allow the two capitals to manipulate a transitional period. This potential to avoid total war and expand influence also entices Western and Gulf powers into compromising with their Eastern counterparts. Although Clinton reiterated the Obama administration's claim that al-Assad has lost legitimacy - that he "must go" - the Arab League's proposal was weakened by the latest round of dialogue with Annan. The international community still prefers that Syria's revolutionaries negotiate al-Assad out of power after he has killed so many of them.

"No-one should allow this regime to feel at ease or to feel stronger by giving them a longer maneuvering area," SNC leader Burhan Ghalioun said during his Monday address. "It's enough that the international community has flirted with the regime in Syria. Something has to change."

U.S.-Russian "cooperation" enjoys low odds of paying off with al-Assad's compliance. He openly refuses to resign as of this moment, doesn't believe that he's lost legitimacy and is preparing to declare an end to Syria's rebellion. In conjunction with his ongoing military offensive, the regime also launched a new propaganda offensive to justify the looming collapse of Annan's six-point initiative. Speaking to reporters outside the Security Council on Monday, Syrian ambassador Bashar Jaafari said, "The Syrian government is committed but we are expecting Mr. Kofi Annan and some parties in the Security Council also to get the same kind of commitments from the (opposition). A plan wouldn't be successful unless everybody is committed."

On top of blaming the opposition for continuing their resistance in the face of government assaults, the "Friends of Syria" will function as al-Assad's second excuse to keep firing. Dubbing Istanbul's conference as a "violation and contradiction of Kofi Annan's mission," Jaafari turned the diplomat against his handlers by expecting the international community to "undermine his mission." He also singled out Saudi Arabia and Turkey for openly expressing the "duty" to arm Syria's revolutionaries, creating another excuse to void Annan's proposal. Lavrov would later joined Jaafari when he rejected a 10-day deadline to ceasefire, believing that "such an approach is dangerous and contradicts Kofi Annan's efforts." Russia's Foreign Minister claims to defend Syrians of all ethnicities and religious affiliation, but its blatant counterrevolution exposes the desire to protect a ruling minority.

Accordingly, Moscow and Beijing will continue to squeeze al-Assad in the likely event that his forces remain in the field, whether disguised or in the open. The real pressure, though, will fall on Western and Gulf powers to deliver on their ultimatum. al-Assad has leveraged a stated intent to avoid military intervention and feeds off any new diplomatic initiative to survive; an indecisive response to his obstructionism will further embolden his crackdown. For now some countries (U.S., EU states) will provide non-lethal equipment for the insurgents, while others (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) will bankroll the Free Syrian Army's (FSA) salaries and weaponized imports. However the international community has yet to unify around a course of action and Clinton punted the decision-making process to each capital.

"We are going to be supporting the SNC with direct assistance in areas such as communications, others are going to be supporting fighters associated with the SNC,” she said. “So countries are making their own decisions.”

While this ad hoc strategy is coordinated behind closed doors, the idea that each country should "make their own decisions" could add to Syria's friction. Leading powers will be soon be pressed for more of everything and a collective response outweighs the actions of isolated blocs. Ghalioun and Syria's revolutionaries are already preparing for a bigger, longer war, viewing conflict as the only possible means to trigger al-Assad downfall.

He's counting on the international community's hesitation to keep his escape hatch open.

U.S. Blurs Fact With Fiction In Yemen

Instead of holding Ali Abdullah Saleh internationally accountable as the strongman openly defies the UN/GCC-led "transition" process, the Obama administration has organized another information campaign to muffle Saleh's commotion and defend U.S. policy in Yemen. The latest strike was just transmitted through The Los Angeles Times, but it seems to have missed its mark again. The report's misleading main body ends with a refutation of U.S. counterterrorism and illustrates how far the administration is willing to exaggerate in order to conceal a foreign policy meltdown.

Washington's Definition of "Lull"

General James Mattis isn't the first individual to make such a claim, but he may be the most powerful. CENTCOM's new chief inherited David Petraeus's transactional relationship with Saleh when he took command in August 2010, and he now oversees Special Forces and CIA coordination on the Arabian Peninsula. The Times' journalists fall into the administration's trap when they write, "The U.S. effort in Yemen was brought to a virtual standstill — a 'lull,' Gen. James N. Mattis told Congress — by Saleh's yearlong effort to cling to power." The Wall Street Journal provided an accurate assessment when reporting on Mattis's early-March testimony, clarifying that "he said there had been a 'lull' in some U.S. programs, but they hadn't stopped all U.S. operations."

"The U.S. military suspended training activities in Yemen last year due to political instability," said Army Lt. Col. Jim Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman. "However, given Yemen's critical needs, we are exploring the possibility of resuming our suspended military assistance to help Yemen confront the common threat of al Qaeda."

As the WSJ points out, the CIA has expanded its operations since Yemen's revolution caught fire in January 2011. The number of drone strikes spiked in May and June, when Saleh first left the country for medical aid, and have continued throughout the "transitional" process that began in November. This strategy is designed to wow American voters, who generally demand a cheap, far-off war against al-Qaeda, and create distance between Saleh's corrupt and murderous regime.

Whether U.S. training operations were truly suspended at any point is difficult to conclude; State and Pentagon officials have given contradictory statements on the issue. However the manufactured divide between programs is superficial. Saleh's U.S.-trained Republican Guard and Central Security Organization spearheaded his assaults against Yemen's revolutionaries, at times using U.S. weapons to kill protesters. Pentagon officials insist that no equipment bled over into the streets, but WikiLeaks revealed Saleh's misappropriations against the north Houthis and Southern Movement before the revolution.

Training and arming his personal guard, then suspending operations during a year of carnage, is an absurd alibi.

Despite a bloody crackdown that killed hundreds of peaceful protesters, Saleh has kept himself useful by intermittently cooperating on the intelligence front, in turn producing the death of public enemy Anwar al-Awlaki. As a direct consequence of Saleh's notoriously duplicitous behavior (exposed by WikiLeaks, among other sources), Washington also assists with the logistics and supplying of Yemen's army as it battles al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the south. Residents of Abyan governorate and one of Saleh's own generals accused his counterterrorism units of withdrawing for months, a reality later confirmed by John Brennan himself. The White House's counterterrorism chief has assumed diplomatic duties in a politically volatile environment, to many Yemenis' displeasure, and Brennan subsequently claimed that Saleh's cooperation had since improved by the time of al-Alwaki's death. After AQAP overran Rada'a, located southeast of Sana'a, with suspicious ease in January 2012, Yemeni officials reported that U.S. Special Forces were participating in the recovery operation.

These developments have created a vicious cycle of instability that is currently drowning out Yemen's revolutionaries. Disturbingly, the Obama administration wants to get every program back online and, more importantly, boosted to higher levels before the revolution achieves its objectives. Washington continues to entertain the payoff of a smaller war, but Yemen's battleground will only expand under the current U.S. policy.

"Not supporting Saleh"

According to named and unnamed officials, training operations with Saleh's regime were suspended once the administration became fearful of the safety of U.S. personnel. This notion jars with Washington's eagerness to "restart" counterterrorism training by deploying personnel already sleeping inside the country. More flagrantly false, though, is the White House's claim that America "isn't backing a repressive ruler." The administration had grown unsustainably close to Saleh's personal "counterterrorism" units, more often deployed against the Houthis and Southern Movement than AQAP. The administration did support the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) prior to the revolution, when Saleh attempted to stretch his five-year term to seven, but Washington simply hoped to run a counterterrorism campaign under Saleh through 2014.

A billion dollar aid package was earmarked to sustain him until then. From here his son, Ahmed, or another pro-American official (possibly Hadi) would assume nominal control of the presidency as Saleh worked from the background.

Yemen's revolution essentially accelerated this plan; Western and Gulf powers still intend to guide Yemen down a controlled path of political, military and economic hegemony. Saleh himself received a medical vacation in New York City before returning to Sana'a, where he receives preferential treatment under the guise that he must be removed slowly. Hollow threats to freeze his assets or evoke his UN-approved immunity are nowhere close to materializing (because some of his assets and potential warcrimes trace back to Washington). Yet this narrative has been successfully built up stateside as the U.S. and GCC attempt to restructure Yemen's military, an urgent process that subverts a genuine political transition.

A majority of Yemenis already perceive the U.S. as of Saleh's only allies, and efforts to manipulate the revolution continue to expand the country's pre-existing antagonism towards America.

"Not interfering with internal conflicts"

The Obama administration would like Americans and Yemenis to be believe, in one official's words, "We don't want to become involved in the country's internal battles." Unfortunately the administration has accelerated far past this point of return. Turning "every antigovernment fighter against the United States" could be an exaggeration, but Washington has made enemies with every anti-regime bloc outside of the JMP. From the Houthis in the north to Yemen's urbanized revolution to the south's secessionist campaign, each area is negatively affected by U.S. and Saudi policy.

Pentagon officials counter these fatal flaws by raising the profile of Abd Mansur Hadi, Saleh's replacement and former vice president. The less egoistical Hadi represents an upgrade from Saleh's autocratic personality and, if left to his own decisions, could serve as a passable transitionary figure. A senior Defense official told the LA Times that Hadi "has shown the will and ability to make the changes... It's a matter of getting the right focus and the right plan and someone to lead it." However Washington and the GCC didn't author "the right plan" to resolve Yemen's multidimensional conflict - they wrote with their own interests in mind. Saleh kept Hadi around for a reason and the new president has found himself predictably obstructed by loyalists - all a byproduct of the GCC's terms.

Although cautiously accepted by the revolutionaries as the lesser of two evils, Hadi is viewed as a puppet by Saleh and Washington alike.

The country's geopolitical significance partially explains the relentless nature of counterrevolutionary forces. What accounts for the mystery is the fact that America's pre-revolutionary policy would create a more dangerous AQAP by 2014. The revolution should have triggered a strategic realignment that emphasizes relations with Yemenis, not sacrifices them to maintain counterterrorism operations with the remnants of Saleh's regime. Until the full spectrum of Yemen's popular grievances are addressed by an objective party, U.S. policy will remain a source of instability with limited sustainability in Yemen's future.

U.S. Says AQAP Threat Grows After al-Awlaki's Death

The Obama administration is so desperate to preserve its influence with Ali Abdullah Saleh and Yemen's transitional government that it will admit defeat in order to maintain the status quo. No alternative strategy to Washington's isolated counterterrorism is visibly manifesting on Yemen's political or military battlefield:

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is more of a threat today than it was six months ago despite the death of the American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, according to US officials familiar with the situation.

Asked if the Al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen was stronger and better positioned than it was at the time of Anwar al-Awlaki’s death Sept. 30 in a CIA drone strike, one official simply responded, “Yes.”

“AQAP has been on an upward trajectory,” Fox News was told. As the Al Qaeda affiliate has strengthened its base in southern Yemen, U.S. officials said the “expanded domestic footprint provides more room and more opportunity to invite operatives from abroad, more recruits to train and continue plotting external attacks.”

One U.S. official even characterized AQAP’s expansion since May of 2011 as “a bit of a land grab for them,” going as far as to describe how easy it had become for foreign jihadis to join Al Qaeda’s most active affiliate which has increasingly moved from a covert to an overt organization.

“I could take a flight to Aden and get in a taxi cab and tell them to take me to the AQAP check point and get out where (Al Qaeda’s) black flag is flying at the entrance to Zinjibar (another strategic port city in the south) and ask, 'how do I get in on the fun."

A New Doctrine Of Intervention?

Simple propaganda from heavyweight insider Henry Kissinger:

Not the least significant aspect of the Arab Spring is the redefinition of heretofore prevalent principles of foreign policy. As the United States is withdrawing from military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan undertaken on the basis (however disputed) of American national security, it is reengaging in several other states in the region (albeit uncertainly) in the name of humanitarian intervention. Will democratic reconstruction replace national interest as the lodestar of Middle East policy? Is democratic reconstruction what the Arab Spring in fact represents?

The evolving consensus is that the United States is morally obliged to align with revolutionary movements in the Middle East as a kind of compensation for Cold War policies — invariably described as “misguided” — in which it cooperated with non-democratic governments in the region for security objectives. Then, it is alleged, supporting fragile governments in the name of international stability generated long-term instability. Even granting that some of those policies were continued beyond their utility, the Cold War structure lasted 30 years and induced decisive strategic transformations, such as Egypt’s abandonment of its alliance with the Soviet Union and the signing of the Camp David accords. The pattern now emerging, if it fails to establish an appropriate relationship to its proclaimed goals, risks being inherently unstable from inception, which could submerge the values it proclaimed.

The Arab Spring is widely presented as a regional, youth-led revolution on behalf of liberal democratic principles. Yet Libya is not ruled by such forces; it hardly continues as a state. Neither is Egypt, whose electoral majority (possibly permanent) is overwhelmingly Islamist. Nor do democrats seem to predominate in the Syrian opposition. The Arab League consensus on Syria is not shaped by countries previously distinguished by the practice or advocacy of democracy. Rather, it largely reflects the millennium-old conflict between Shiite and Sunni and an attempt to reclaim Sunni dominance from a Shiite minority. It is also precisely why so many minority groups, such as Druzes, Kurds and Christians, are uneasy about regime change in Syria.

The confluence of many disparate grievances avowing general slogans is not yet a democratic outcome. With victory comes the need to distill a democratic evolution and establish a new locus of authority. The more sweeping the destruction of the existing order, the more difficult establishment of domestic authority is likely to prove and the more likely is the resort to force or the imposition of a universal ideology. The more fragmented a society grows, the greater the temptation to foster unity by appeals to a vision of a merged nationalism and Islamism targeting Western values.

We must take care lest, in an era of shortened attention spans, revolutions turn, for the outside world, into a transitory Internet experience — watched intently for a few key moments, then tuned out once the main event is deemed over. The revolution will have to be judged by its destination, not its origin; its outcome, not its proclamations...

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Annan's Syrian Plan Circles Drain

Kofi Annan is presumably acting with good intentions. When he flatters Bashar al-Assad with the slightest expectations, Annan is speaking from a lack of options to end Syria's bloodshed. He must stay neutral or al-Assad could run off like a frightened deer - except al-Assad is no deer and Syria isn't experiencing a crisis to be resolved ASAP. Annan's conflict resolution has little immediate place in a revolutionary conflict. While Syria's revolutionaries continue to fight for their lives and future, the United Nations and Arab League are fighting to sell their failed proposal.

"The government must stop first and then discuss a cessation of hostilities with the other side," Annan spokesman Ahmad Fawzi told reporters on Friday morning, three days after al-Assad ”accepted" the former secretary-general's six-point initiative. "We are appealing to the stronger party to make a gesture of good faith... The deadline is now."

This reasoning is fatally distorted by the intense nature of Syria's burning revolution. Attempting to counter widespread doubts over the AL/UN proposal, Fawzi insists, "We expect him to implement this plan immediately." Where their expectation comes from (beyond propaganda and desperation) is a mystery. al-Assad's regime has intentionally scuttled the Arab League's diplomacy and "negotiations" with Annan were paired with assaults on oppositional territory. The Local Coordination Committees estimated that upwards of 50 people were killed on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. al-Assad is speaking through violence and has no intention of "making a gesture of good faith."

The Annan plan "specifically asks the government to withdraw its troops, to cease using heavy weapons in populated centers," Fawzi said. "The very clear implication here is that the government must stop first and then discuss a cessation of hostilities with the other side and with the mediator."

According to various media sources, al-Assad will deliver a speech next week that offers a ceasefire on the condition that Syria's rebels halt their operations first. He is almost certain to blame the opposition for all of the state's woes and vindicate the regime's "leadership." Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdessi gave a preview on Friday night, saying that military units won't withdraw from "any zone" until it "returns to normal life." Normal, to Makdessi, means the killing and taking of hostages by opposition forces, but his slander transcends the physical. Normal is simple code for prerevolutionary - the thought that Syria's revolution doesn't exist. In comments that are sure to be echoed by al-Assad, Makdessi declared on state TV, "The battle to bring down the state in Syria has already ended and the battle of reinforcing stability has started."

"The regime wants to send a message to the Friends of Syria that all is well and they have control of the situation, to break the morale of the revolution," said Wadi Jamal, a coordinator between the Syrian National Council (SNC) and Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Foreign powers are clearly stalling for time just as al-Assad is. Although many Western and Gulf officials doubted the sincerity of his latest response, the UN's rhetoric is gashed by a major disconnect with al-Assad's personality. The international community is currently adding to the opposition's division by pushing a divisive political initiative upon them, one that stipulates a dialogue with al-Assad despite his brutal insistence to remain in power. SNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun has yet to solidify his standing with local Syrians, but the exile may speak for many revolutionaries when he announced, "We have no illusions over the possibility of the mission's success because Bashar Assad and the Syrian regime have no credibility to engage in a political process. It will soon become obvious the regime won't even implement the first clause of the agreement."

The opposition's problems also distract from the reality that Western and Gulf states are divided on a course of action - they might not be able to decide on their scale of intervention even when given a transparent opposition. Meanwhile al-Assad remains flanked by a unified Moscow and Beijing, who supported Annan's shuttle diplomacy as a means of relieving pressure on al-Assad and themselves. They also expect to subvert Annan's proposal by shifting the burden of responsibility to Syria's opposition and involved foreign powers - a classic counterrevolutionary tactic. Before al-Assad had done anything at all, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov told reporters on Tuesday, "this is a step forward... Now it's the opposition's turn."

"We'd like to call on Syria's opposition to make responses as soon as possible to create conditions for opening dialogue and stopping violence," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei added on Friday.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is presently highlighting the divisions between Western and Gulf capitals as she attempts to close the gaps before Sunday's "Friends of Syria" conference. Stopping over in Riyadh en route to Istanbul, Clinton fulfilled one of al-Assad's stipulations by applying her brakes to King Abdullah's suspected arming of the opposition. Whether Washington genuinely or only publicly opposes a weaponization process remains unknown; a double game with Riyadh and its hegemonic arm, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is easily playable. According to media reports, Clinton responded "very well said" after Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal told her, "The arming of the opposition is a duty, I believe, because it cannot defend itself without weapons."

Washington and Riyadh have succeeded if their objective is to manufacture a legitimate cause to intervene. Otherwise a massive amount of pressure to arm Syria's revolutionaries is due to erupt on Sunday. Unimpressed with Annan's diplomacy and the international proposal that he represents, Ghalioun considers al-Assad's "acceptance" to be "another lie and a maneuver" to disguise his crackdown. Similarly, the Syrian Revolution's activists on Facebook reported to the Arab League's "national dialogue" by posting, "The Muslims and the Arabs have abandoned us ... but God is with us ... and our determination will carry us to victory."

Ghalioun says the council and its allies have "repeatedly called for the arming of the Free Syrian Army. We want the 'Friends of Syria' conference to live up to this demand."

Implementation of a "safe no-fly zone" into Turkey forms the other half of an asymmetric struggle to oust al-Assad's regime. His flirtation with Annan indicates an organized drive to pit his foes against each other, and the strongman will feed on discord if the SNC and its alleged friends cannot reach an agreement on Sunday. Syria's current narrative in the media is focusing on the lack of a "Plan B" and accompanying low expectations hovering over Istanbul, but the summit is packed with significance: the potential to force a strategic review in Washington.

Neoliberal Egypt: The Hijacked Revolution

By Dr Jason Hickel, published in Al Jazeera:

London, United Kingdom - The ouster of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 set off a spate of political reforms in Egypt culminating in the recent parliamentary elections and the ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. Yet the meaning of the 2011 "revolution" remains far from decided.

When Egyptians rose up last year, it was not only against tyranny and political repression, but also against the neoliberal economic order - designed by the United States - that has generated hunger, poverty and inequality in Egypt since the 1980s. For most people, these latter concerns were at least as pressing as the former, though they have been completely obscured in the prevailing media discourse. Now the tragedy is that, when it comes to economic policy, Egypt’s new rulers seem set to reproduce more of the same.

Khairat el-Shater - multimillionaire businessman, deputy chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, and likely candidate for prime minister of the coalition government - has been forthright about his economic ideology. He promotes a version of Islam that explicitly valourises free-market capitalism. He has clamped down on dissent among those within the Brotherhood who hold different ideas about how the economy should be run. El-Shater's partner, Hassan Malek, the Brotherhood's next most influential businessmen, has advocated for policies along similar lines.

While hoping to train a higher-skilled workforce and build the country's manufacturing base for import substitution (two concessions to the economic left within the Brotherhood), el-Shater has openly espoused free markets, deregulation and other policies geared toward attracting foreign direct investment - the pillars of neoliberal economics.

The Brotherhood's new position on economic policy has delighted the United States. US lawmakers have pushed hard since the beginning of the uprising to foster a form of political Islam compatible with US economic interests and the ideology of the Washington Consensus. When Senators John Kerry and John McCain opened the Egyptian Stock Exchange in a made-for-TV moment last June, it was clear to all that the US would seek - in a characteristically cynical move - to hijack the cries for freedom echoing from Tahrir Square in order to promote the "freedom" of deregulated market capitalism.

As far as the US is concerned, it doesn’t much matter if the people in power are tyrannical dictators or political Islamists, so long as they align with US economic policy. This was certainly true under Mubarak, who, with the help of the US, implemented a battery of macroeconomic reforms that shifted wealth and power to the upper socioeconomic strata of the population...

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Dr Jason Hickel teaches Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has contributed political critique and analysis to various magazines, including Foreign Policy in Focus, The Africa Report, Pambazuka, MR Zine and Thought Leader. Currently, he is co-editing an interdisciplinary volume titled Ekhaya: The Politics of Home in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.