Gaddafi and Saleh: opposite ends of America's "friendly dictator" spectrum
The international farce that is United Nations resolution 2014 warrants attention beyond Yemen’s individual sphere. By passing its motion, the UN Security Council’s veto-wielding members reaffirmed a long-standing tradition of the strong preying upon the weak. Unified in protecting Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime from the secrets his collapse would expose, superpowers are attempting to force their own “transition” on Yemen’s people, quarantining them while simultaneously claiming to represent them.
This breach in the ideals of international law will be examined within the wider context of 21st century multilateralism. For now the ongoing evidence of this international crime must collected and preserved.
Obama stays off Yemen’s radar
Stacked on the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) unpopular initiative, fresh U.S. statements indicate that the Obama administration will ride Saleh’s regime to its inglorious end, attempt to hijack the transition afterward and falsely support Yemen’s revolutionaries. “The United States stands with the Yemeni people,” the White House declared, aware of but refusing to acknowledge Tawakel Karman’s doubts. U.S. statements are largely copied and pasted from previously shallow statements, demonstrating how little the administration has responded to Yemen’s vast changes, including the mounting dead and wounded.
Both U.S. strategy and rhetoric is perceived as ignorant by the majority of Yemen’s revolutionaries - or worse, outright hostile.
Even more transparent, though, is President Barack Obama’s refusal to take ownership of UN resolution 2014 and the GCC’s initiative. While U.S. officials brokered the initiative, maintained its life-support as Saleh and Yemen’s protesters resisted, and finally organized the UN’s resolution behind EU cover, Obama himself has remained absent throughout the revolution. His personal involvement is minimal, geared towards green-lighting drone strikes and staying out of Yemen’s political sphere. A lack of personal diplomacy has wrecked havoc on the direction of U.S. policy, which remains in strict possession of the Pentagon and CIA.
Obama is so confident of the GCC’s initiative that he hasn’t gone anywhere near it, whether in May or on Friday. Instead the White House released a statement from press secretary Jay Carney; the State Department’s Mark Toner released a near identical statement with Secretary Hillary Clinton inactive on Yemen’s front. Yet Toner adds a ridiculous demand that “the Government of Yemen” investigate its own crimes and hold itself accountable - because Saleh is a rigorous self-policeman.
Neither spokesman attempted to clarify the status of the GCC’s immunity clause.
The only clarity within U.S. policy is a willingness to manipulate Yemen’s revolution, and black it out whenever possible. That UN resolution 2014 was passed on Friday afternoon is no coincidence, but the latest attempt to suppress Yemen’s revolution. Meanwhile the White House shoved the resolution aside by announcing the formal withdrawal from Iraq, capitalizing on Muammar Gaddafi’s death. Yemen, as usual, fell to the last priority. During an extensive briefing on Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and other foreign policy areas, several national security officials were asked directly about the hypocrisy between Libya and Yemen - to “knit this together on the Obama doctrine.”
Denis McDonough, Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor, never addresses Yemen’s revolution: “I think as you’ve watched over the last couple years, he’s not been bound up by a particular ideology, but rather bound up specifically by his interest in making sure that we neutralize the threats.”
Saleh feeds on U.S. strength, weakness
The international community's weak response, from the Obama administration's duplicity to Russian interference to the UNSC’s corrupt resolution, forms part of Saleh’s green light to continue his crackdown. Encouraged that he can retaliate without consequence, the strongman naturally agreed to the UN’s resolution after previously denouncing it. One government source told Saba state media, "The resolution conforms with the government's efforts to end the political crisis according to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative.”
What’s good for a government under threat of revolution is generally unfavorable to the revolutionaries.
This official added that Saleh’s General People Congress (GPC), which stands to participate in a UN-approved “transitional council,” is ready to “carry on dialogue immediately with the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) to put an end to the crisis in a way that maintains Yemen's unity and stability and achieve a peaceful, democratic and constitutional transfer of power.” The phrase “constitutional transfer of power,” however, is used by Saleh to stall until an election is held; he demands more time than the GCC’s 30-day grace period.
Today, unlike most other days, the JMP’s officials aren’t al-Qaeda-affiliated “bandits” looking to seize power through a coup. Saleh must be too busy attacking the homes of Hashid tribal leader Sadiq al-Ahmar, the second assault this week. Explosions and gunfire were reported in al-Ahmar’s Hassaba district soon after the UNSC’s vote and continued throughout the night. A military base belonging to defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar also came under attack by Saleh’s security forces and loyalists. These forces similarly clashed with protesters and oppositional forces in Ta'izz, the secondary epicenter of Yemen’s revolution.
Assaulting the al-Ahmars and Ali Mohsen is a transparent attempt to provoke an urban battle, which Saleh plans to exploit by pinning the GCC’s collapse on the JMP. This outcome was predicted on Wednesday and, true to form, Saleh’s presidential office just denied responsibility for Saturday’s attacks.
"Such baseless remarks by defected general Ali Mohsen and his outlawed allies of the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) aimed to cover up their pathetic intentions to escalate the situation and push the country into a comprehensive civil war... The ongoing pathetic attempts by those outlaws through shelling the residential neighborhoods in Sanaa and other cities as well as the indiscriminately murdering of citizens confirm their evil intentions.”
Positioning Saleh as Yemen’s responsible actor towards the GCC’s initiative, the statement boasted that his regime “will not be dragged into such attempts and will not give up the options of peace and dialogue.” In stamping the GCC’s initiative with UN approval, the Obama administration returned Yemen’s ball not into the GCC’s court, but into the realm of a delusional tyrant.
Over the last two weeks, as the world’s most powerful diplomats debated Yemen’s future, several constants began to surface above a haze of UN meetings.
First, the UN Security Council’s resolution was lifted from the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative, ensuring a central role regardless of additional amendments. Permanent members of the UNSC also muted their public criticism of Ali Abdullah Saleh as they weighed Yemen’s situation, a “precaution” that encouraged the strongman to continue assaulting pro-democracy protesters. What started as a U.S. soundbite has now been internationally legitimized. According to UNSC resolution 2014, the GCC’s initiative is “an inclusive and Yemeni-led political process, which responds effectively to the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people for change.”
This claim is blatantly false; Nobel laureate Tawakel Karman, whose initial protests and arrest sparked Yemen’s uprising in January, recently met Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to warn him against corrupting Yemen’s revolution. Asked by Inner City Press (the UN gadfly) whether she had seen the council's updated version, Karman responded, "Yes, I've seen it and it's bad. It's worse that the first."
While Ki-moon promised a “clear stance against impunity for gross human rights violations,” the issue remains shrouded in ambiguity. Constructed on a flimsy platform, the UNSC’s resolution welcomes “the engagement of the Gulf Cooperation Council, reaffirming the support of the Security Council for the GCC's efforts to resolve the political crisis in Yemen.” However the GCC's Saudi-bankrolled diplomacy is unwelcome amongst Yemen’s youth and civil movement. Brokered in April between Saleh’s officials and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the GCC's initiative functions as a stalling mechanism before morphing into an instrument of control.
The unpopular initiative stems from a compromise between Saleh’s regime, an unrepresentative political opposition and a selection of foreign actors. Built on Washington’s initial Egyptian contingency, executive power would transfer to Saleh’s vice president, Abd al-Rahman Mansur al-Hadi, rather than a revolutionary council. Beyond giving Saleh additional time to resign - contradicting the meaning of “immediate” - and scheduling an election before the popular opposition can organize, external powers wielded unilateral authority to excuse his regime from punishment. During a speech outside UN headquarters, Karman announced that Yemen’s revolutionaries, “reject and refuse any immunity for the criminals. Immunity is against what the UN was founded upon."
“In trying to assess the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative,” warns Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), “which is supposedly intended to solve the political upheaval existing in Yemen, it seems quite clear by now that neither the authors of the GCC Initiative, nor the parties that are signatories to this farce of regional diplomacy with international blessings fully comprehend what the so called political crisis in Yemen is really all about.”
The UNSC's resolution stands divided on the fate of Saleh’s immunity. Point two “stresses that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable,” while point four reaffirms the GCC’s initiative without striking its immunity clause. Even more disturbingly, resolution 2014 “notes the commitment by the President of Yemen to immediately sign the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative,” when his consistent refusal necessitated a push from the UNSC. Contrary to the theory that foreign powers are luring Saleh with immunity, Washington and Moscow aligned in order to cover up military support for his regime, including the deployment of U.S.-trained security units against Yemen's protesters.
“Today the international community sent a united and unambiguous signal to President Saleh that he must respond to the aspirations of the Yemeni people by transferring power immediately,” the White House replied soon afterward, ignoring the international community's distorted signal.
The UNSC’s resolution would have breezed through a vote and forced an unpopular deal on Yemenis if not for their collective response. Although the immunity clause remains unsettled, the council did attempt to tighten its language without removing the GCC. Yemenis cannot be expected to face down the UNSC’s veto-wielding members, but they did squeeze a now-ubiquitous reaction out of Rupert Colville, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. While Colville refused to comment on the resolution’s specifics, he cautioned that, “international law prohibits the use of amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights.”
Unfortunately this legal council failed to impact the UNSC’s final resolution. “The GCC deal's the only game in town,” one Western diplomat told Reuters, a blunt assessment of abysmal diplomacy. The GCC's initiative is the only existing proposal because Washington and Riyadh monopolized the market; the UNSC’s rubber stamp was needed because Yemen isn’t an official member of the GCC. Ironically, removing the GCC's initiative from the UNSC’s resolution would provide a starting point for genuine regime change.
The problem is that foreign powers seek regime alteration instead.
Unrealistic as emergency amendments appear, the UNSC’s obscured resolution will only antagonize Yemen’s environment. A proposal that sincerely responds to the aspirations of Yemen’s people would be cleared of the GCC’s name. Under direction from Western capitals, GCC involvement has stunted the civil movement’s growth by refusing to negotiate with them, along with enabling Saleh’s violent streak. An immediate transition starts with his immediate resignation, not after 30 days, and an ICC referral should follow. An election schedule must favor Yemen’s civil movement, not Saleh’s regime and the JMP, as the current arrangement could retrench old political lines. Instead of calling on Yemen's opposition to obey the GCC's initiative, which it already signed, the revolutionaries should be encouraged to form an official transitional council.
Furthermore, the regional components of Yemen’s traditional opposition, the northern Houthi sect and Southern Movement, must be brought into a comprehensive solution.
In general, world powers must sever their support for Saleh’s regime, end their frequent meetings with his officials, break their media silence and apply the sanctions left out of resolution 2014. The Obama administration in particular must halt military cooperation - including drone strikes - until government oversight can be established. Their use, when combined with the GCC’s political obstruction, has minimized the White House’s urgency to act in Yemen. Both the GCC initiative and drones serve as a crutch, just as Washington is to Saleh, and must be removed in order to cure a stagnant U.S. policy. al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) cannot be subdued with the Pentagon and CIA's current strategy.
Ahmad Soufi, one of Saleh’s close advisers, automatically responded that he won’t resign before elections are held. Since the international community only listens to Yemen’s regime and traditional opposition, they shouldn’t ignore spokesman Mohamed Qahtan’s prediction that, "Saleh will not give up power voluntarily, not today, not tomorrow, not 2013 or even 2020.”
Muammar Gaddafi is dead, and that seems to be the limit of what everyone agrees on. How “The Colonel” expired remains anyone’s best guess, even to most of those who crowded around his lifeless body. The time-line of his event degenerates from a precise moment (French aircraft struck an 80-vehicle convoy at 8:30 a.m. local time) into a bloody mess. Gaddafi’s convoy was forced to stop outside of Sirte, where he had camped against conventional logic, and Libyan revolutionaries eventually pulled him from a drainage pipe.
At this point chaos ensued. Whether Gaddafi was injured during the air-strike remains unknown. Salem Bakeer, one of the first NTC fighters to corner his guards and hear his last words, said that he was wounded by gunshots to the leg and back. Several other fighters confirmed the story while being interviewed by NTC officials and foreign journalists. Another fighter, Omran Jouma Shawan, claimed that one of Gaddafi’s guards shot him in the chest. Other accounts have him wounded in the stomach, heart and head before being taken into custody. NTC spokesman Fathi Bashaga said that Gadhafi was found wounded in the neck, and that he bled to death 30 minutes later.
NTC sources first claimed that he was killed during a gunfight after his capture. Yet another account claims that an 18-year old revolutionary shot him moments after his capture - or that Gaddafi was killed by crossfire during his transport back to Sirte’s hospital. However video shows him being pulled from a truck and physically struck before falling the ground. Gunshots are heard and Gaddafi is shown bleeding from what appears to be his head.
One senior NTC official told Reuters, "They captured him alive and while he was being taken away, they beat him and then they killed him. He might have been resisting."
Gaddafi’s end provides a gruesome finish to his 42-year reign. The event certainly leaves much to be desired, but revolutionary war (and war in general) isn’t known to conclude under everyone’s ideal vision. Those who oppose all capital punishment will naturally disagree of his execution, and a captured Gaddafi is preferable to an expediently executed Gaddafi. His justice would offer a beacon to the new Libya, a shining contrast to his bloody corpse. NATO involvement also dampened the NTC’s moment; Paris claims to have been unaware of its target, but the convoy’s size clearly marked a Gaddafi.
Inside was a grisly mess of, “charred skeletal remains of drivers and passengers killed instantly by the strike. Other bodies lay mutilated and contorted strewn across the grass. Some 50 bodies in all.”
The event is over though, and jubilant NTC fighters see no difference between who killed Gaddafi. Finding him in the sewers, like “a rat,” served to counterbalance NATO’s influence and uplift national morale. That the youth captured him is equally symbolic. This end was the next best option to a formal trial, and both the NTC and NATO had low expectations of capturing Gaddafi alive. It may be tempting to extrapolate the chaos of his death to Libya’s political environment, and the NTC has enough investigating to keep people busy for years. However the situation must be flipped as well: Libya’s uprising and NATO’s intervention could have sunk into the desert sand.
The NTC, for all of its regional divisions and localized cells, remains a viable transitional channel into representative government. The NTC and Libya’s new leaders will experience growing pains as they repair a war-torn country, but how else can democracy come into existence? While organizing the aftermath of a revolution or other political upheaval is naturally challenging, “too hard” is no excuse not to try. Libya’s revolutionaries are hungry for a civil government and invigorated by their liberation. They have been doubted throughout their campaign because of NATO’s assistance, when NATO’s mission would have failed without an organized revolution.
Of course NATO states used the NTC for their own purposes, but the reverse also holds true: the NTC successfully leveraged NATO’s military power without ceding too much control in a post-Gaddafi world. Oil will flow to America, Europe, China or whoever else bids highest. NTC will enjoy friendly relations with Western states and international organizations, but a free election will determine Libya’s political orientation. The international community’s expectations will also serve as an external check on the NTC’s transitional process.
“This is only the end of the beginning of the road ahead for Libya and its people,” said U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
International leaders are correct in their observation. Fortunately the beginning of Libya’s end appears to be instilling good governance, not combating the insurgency that Gaddafi threatened and many observers anticipated. The odds of sustained guerrilla warfare were initially low in our estimation, given Gaddafi’s rapid fall from Tripoli, near-total destruction of his conventional forces and waning popular appeal. Libya’s revolutionaries had unified beyond any level that Gaddafi expected, while his own mercenaries lost the invincible feeling that they previously operated under.
Gaddafi’s remnants could organize a small-scale insurgency, finding value in his “martyrdom,” but the entire country is plugged into the NTC’s network. Libya is not Iraq’s fragmented socio-political battleground. As for fears of mass Islamist extremism, one of the fighters crowded into the impromptu briefing of Gaddafi's death was wearing a Yankees hat. The jubilant masses of men, women and children leave no room for al-Qaeda's influence.
The best counterinsurgency is good governance and Libya’s leaders must shift immediately into the “building” stage. With Sirte and Bani Walid taken, the NTC’s political transition has no excuses for delay. Council leaders must fulfill their promises to fix an election schedule and resign after Libya’s sovereignty is secured. All political and military prisoners must be treated with due process. Services must be reconstructed and Libya’s revolutionaries must be disarmed.
Complex as these problems are, Gaddafi’s death opens space for a concentrated push towards Libya’s future.
Who is Ali Abdullah Saleh? U.S. ally? Sworn enemy of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? Defender of universal rights and free expression? Helpless victim?
Yemen’s strongman claims that he’s all of the above. A fork-tongued rhetorician who revels in duplicity, Saleh is sweating from a 10-month revolution against his 33-year misrule. After ordering his officials to court UN envoy Jamal Benomar and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, Saleh is currently resisting a resolution that he intermittently embraces. Now he accuses protesters of influencing the UNSC’s looming decision - the hunter accusing his prey of setting a trap.
Saleh would naturally denounce Yemen’s civil protesters and political opposition for swaying the UN ahead of its vote. Not only does he divert attention from his own actions, he may not believe that a revolution is occurring in Yemen. Saleh has attempted to contain urban demonstrations with snipers and plainclothes units, blaming them for crossing lines guarded by security forces. Meanwhile his U.S.-trained Republican Guard and Central Security Organization, two “counterterrorism” units led by his son (Ahmed) and nephew (Yahya), provide the muscle and air support against anti-government tribesmen. To all of these men, Yemen’s revolution is nothing more than a coup against a legitimate, democratic government.
Because democratic heads of state appoint their family to oversee the military, pilfer the state’s treasury and kill its people with impunity.
“The outside world treats this as if it is a peaceful revolution against a political regime and does not see the government’s supporters,” Saleh declared at a recent meeting between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. His supporters are seen though - as the minority caught in a revolution. Some (not all) are paid to attend Saleh's rallies, whereas oppositional protesters receive no compensation for their struggles beyond a meal. Over 1,000 people have been killed, with many thousands injured, during nine months of sustained demonstrations; casualties figures are clouded by political detentions and the hiding of bodies.
AQAP has influenced Yemen’s revolution over this time, but not in the manner expected in the West. Several hundreds fighters and their commanders have assumed priority over millions of Yemenis, obstructing a genuine resolution to their uprising.
Adhering to a historic pattern of disengagement, Saleh facilitated a May takeover of Yemen’s Abyan governorate by withdrawing personnel and ceding weapons caches. The 25th Mechanized Brigade was stranded as Saleh’s personnel units concentrated their firepower on protesters, and external fears of an AQAP haven spread as planned. Yemeni ground forces eventually reengaged Abyan's local capital of Zinjibar and U.S. air-strikes maintain a steady pace, scoring hits on Anwar al-Awlaki and several other propagandists. If Saleh wasn’t “needed” to curb AQAP’s spread and maintain political hegemony, the U.S. and European Union would have condemned his crackdown with the same vigor reserved for Gaddafi and al-Assad. Instead Saleh is ignored, excused or slapped on the wrist and allowed to continue killing.
Constantly laying mines for the international community through AQAP, and against the civil movement and JMP by assaulting both, each party (the U.S. included) has been blamed for starting Yemen’s revolution. Saleh acts as though he isn’t responsible for a single death. Thus his agreement with the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), an initiative organized by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the behest of Washington and Riyadh, is rendered void through no fault of his own. Two-faced as always, Saleh told his security council over the weekend, "Today, they stage demonstrations, which are welcomed. We are with freedom of expression but peacefully. We do not accept heavily armed marches.”
“We have strong proofs of the cooperation between Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda,” he added.
So what is Saleh’s next trap to scuttle the UNSC’s resolution? Only one course of action furthers his objectives: combining rhetoric and force to bait the JMP into over-committing militarily. One moment he claims to have signed the GCC’s proposal, the next he's describing the JMP as "insane people who can't sleep and only want to take power,” or promising that he will step down through “the ballot box.” Information Minister Hasan al-Lawzi similarly accused defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar’s “insurgents,” the JMP’s Islah Party and the al-Ahmer brothers (Sadiq and Hamad, two JMP players) of holding “unauthorized and heavily armed marches.”
While Ali Mohsen’s First Armored Division and the al-Ahmar’s tribal militia are partly responsible for antagonizing the situation, Saleh’s forces have committed systematic abuses against peaceful protesters and inflamed a preexisting humanitarian crisis. Many Yemenis believe that this violence is designed to provoke a large-scale confrontation with the armed opposition.
Unfortunately Saleh is too hardheaded to accept the UNSC’s generous offer. Although stipulating the prosecution of those involved in human rights abuses, Yemen’s resolution hinges on a GCC initiative that grants his regime immunity from its crimes. The proposal also schedules an election within an unreasonable two-month deadline, a tight window that favors Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP, and offers him 30 days before officially resigning. Confronted about his notorious duplicity, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could only respond, “President Saleh should take immediately decisive political reforms so that people can live in a better world without fear of oppression...”
The UN Human rights office ultimately needed to warn the UNSC against violating itself: “international law is pretty clear on this issue. It prohibits the use of amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals for war crimes.”
Given that Saleh “accepts” the GCC initiative while simultaneously condemning the UNSC’s legitimization, the strongman has no sincere intentions of cooperating with either party. Flipping back to courtship by lauding “any UN resolution on Yemen,” Saleh told a GPC meeting that he “would sign,” but not before receving “guarantees” from the GCC, EU and the Obama administration. This demand appears irrational because each party already guaranteed his immunity, but Saleh is rightfully worried about the clause being overturned. He doesn’t intend to formally resign, only stall the international community until he runs out of time.
“We don’t believe any further guarantees are necessary,” the State Department’s Mark Toner explained on Wednesday, before urging Saleh to sign the GCC initiative and “move forward.”
Unsatisfied with safe exile, transferring executive power to his vice president and giving his party a chance to steal a future election, Saleh’s destructive behavior has been enabled by external forces. On one level his resistance is a positive development - if the international community finally abandons his regime - since the GCC initiative is muddled beyond repair. Billed as the “only” exit out of Yemen's "political crisis," the document is merely the first and only attempt made by Saleh's allies. The Saudi-bankrolled GCC lacks confidence and legitimacy amongst Yemen's revolutionaries, and the UNSC cannot stop their pursuit of the regime or a transition on their terms.
Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) recently warned,“The GCC Initiative totally ignores the unequivocal fact that there is a large massive revolt by the people of Yemen, led by peaceful youth protesters, who have been calling for an immediate and unconditional removal of the long time reigning dictatorship of Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family mob, who are in control of almost every meaningful functioning organs of Government in Yemen (military, civilian and economic). This most important demand of the Yemeni people should be granted similar status and acknowledgement as granted to the similar demands of other popular revolts in the region, in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.”
Saleh, the schemer that he is, could still twist his plots and trip over his usual traps; he’s sinking because his web of strategies finally entangled. Bloodshed brings his regime closer to collapse and his party would be overwhelmed in a fair election. However the international community, in coordination with Yemen’s youth and civil coalitions, must act immediately to devise an alternative to the GCC initiative. Having rejected the proposal at UN headquarters, Nobel Laureate Tawakel Karman submitted a letter to Ki-moon requesting sanctions and an ICC trial for Saleh's regime. Only Karman has bigger plans in mind.
“I want to talk to the Obama administration," she later revealed, "to get support for the Yemeni Revolution."
Nobel Laureate Tawakol Karman will soon land in New York City to oversee the UN Security Council’s debate over her country. Influence would be a more accurate term, but one that depends on whether the UN responds to her demands. In a letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Karman pleaded for the international community to support her Yemeni brothers and sisters on their quest for democracy and universal rights. She also demanded an ICC warrant for Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s entrenched strongman of 33 years.
Contrary to the ideals of international law, the UNSC’s proposed resolution would offer Saleh’s regime a pass for mass human rights abuses. The document is intentionally contradictory, stressing in point four “that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.” The next point calls for Saleh to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative, which contains an immunity clause. No one is sure whether UN law will supersede GCC law or if the GCC is using the UN to legalize immunity, since Yemen isn’t a member of the bloc.
The UN’s human rights office has warned the UNSC against violating its own law.
Less confusing is the international community’s position towards Yemen - the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia and China all favor the GCC proposal. Yemen’s popular revolutionaries reject the initiative and a bias UNSC resolution as a flagrant violation of national and international law. The international community, for a variety of reasons, has engaged all the wrong points of Yemen’s uprising. As the dominant powers, Washington and Riyadh remain directly connected with Saleh’s network and have aided in his survival in order to maintain their own influence, either by denying a revolution outright or managing a “transition.” This strategy has necessitated working with Yemen’s political opposition, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), to co-opt the spontaneous popular uprising.
The basic reality is that Washington and Riyadh would have lost too much control in the event of Saleh’s immediate collapse. Needing an exit strategy to Yemen’s revolution, Saleh’s party and the JMP were offered a “unity” council to preserve influence.
Yemen’s revolutionaries harbor few illusions of their big brother to the north. Some expected worse - a Bahrain-style invasion. America's light, on the other hand, miraculously peered through Yemen’s darkness during the revolution’s early stage. Yemenis hosts one of the world’s most open Muslim societies and, despite their suspicions of the West, expected America to play a positive influence. Unfortunately their doubts proved too true, as U.S. and Saudi policy inseparably entangled to the point of revulsion, and both parties now stand accuse of encouraging Saleh’s bloody crackdown. While President Barack Obama hailed Karman as an “extraordinary woman,” he hasn’t commented on her revolution in a month.
Instead U.S. officials feverishly meet with Yemeni officials behind their curtains, reinforcing America’s imperialism and support for Saleh. The White House has issued no reaction to weeks of ongoing violence, and only today did the State Department briefly address the UNSC’s activity (over a week into the debate). Spokesman Mark Toner had no update on the UNSC, except to urge Saleh to sign the GCC initiative and “move forward on a track towards a democratic transition.” Because both parties are attempting to devolve Yemen’s revolution into a political crisis, months of failure haven’t stopped the international community from favoring the JMP over the civil movement.
This arrangement offers a primary reason to distrust any resolution that marginalizes Yemen’s popular protesters.
Many U.S. analysts continue to support the GCC initiative as the "only" exit to civil war. Jeb Boone, editor of the Yemeni Times, generally has a grip on the situation, but his latest report to the Christian Science Monitor, squarely backed the flawed negotiations between Saleh’s regime and the JMP. Most of Boone’s tactical suggests are sound: U.S. diplomacy requires a dramatic overhaul in rural Yemen. Officials must learn the local nuances, speak the local language and know the local networks to supplement Washington’s aerial view with ground vision.
“Yemen’s tribes will play a pivotal role in the future of the country,” Boone concludes. “It is in America’s best interest to develop relationships with the tribes and encourage them to negotiate over the country’s future. Diplomats are going to have to literally get dirty to make inroads in Yemen, whether in resolving the government crisis, or countering AQAP.”
However engaging Yemen’s tribal network is only one piece of a larger solution. The revolution’s overall network is composed of four blocs: the JMP, youth/civil movement, northern Houthis and secessionist-minded Southern Movement. Regardless of their objectives, both Yemen’s internal networks and the international community must engage every bloc in order to stabilize the country. The youth movement has admittedly failed to coordinate Yemen’s grand network, but so has every other bloc.
Each of Yemen’s individual networks is similar in strength, possessing abilities and resources that the others lack. Thus unilateral engagement of the JMP is a primary error within U.S. policy. Yemen’s political opposition cannot be engaged without participation from the Houthis and SM, which is problematic given the mutual distrust between parties. One major example, defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, now sits in the JMP’s camp after leading Saleh’s offensive against the Houthis. Washington and Riyadh also isolated the JMP due to Saleh’s heightened antagonism against the Houthis and SM; U.S.-trained Yemeni forces were deployed in support of his campaigns.
Similarly, Yemen’s national network cannot be successfully engaged without connecting to the youth movement and wider civil uprising. Activists and youth leaders claim to have limited input at best; several leading coalitions have no contact with U.S. officials. These groups are led by capable individuals with a deep passion for civil rights. Boone writes, “It may be tempting to believe that the future of Yemen lies not with the tribes, but with the youthful protesters in Sanaa who are in their ninth month of an inconclusive revolution.”
His conclusion, though, is that, “Yemen’s independent youth have yet to demonstrate that they are capable of leading the country into a post-Saleh era of democracy. Lacking a specific plan for government or transition, the independent youth often release series of demands that are platitudinal and idealistic, proving themselves, thus far, to be ill-equipped to handle a transition of power, let alone a new Yemen.”
The popular coalitions have released several transitional plans that copy the GCC and UNSC’s numerical outline. They just happen to contain different points, such as Saleh’s immediate resignation and trial, a popularly-approved transitional council inclusive of all political networks, and a more realistic election schedule. Protesters do not spurn the support of Yemen’s tribes, but they do demand an equal partnership with the political opposition. Their organization would also improve if Saleh’s regime, the JMP and international community weren’t coordinating to undermine their influence.
Former U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine has supported the GCC initiative throughout Yemen’s revolution, citing the standard argument of working with the opposition. She also inadvertently explained why the youth movement should be engaged as a counterweight to the JMP. Speaking at Robertson Hall at Woodrow Wilson School, Bodine (and Washington) hoped that the JMP “would lead to a coherent opposition to drive reforms,” but the opposition’s leaders have “cancelled each other out.” Yemen’s tribes hold undeniable power and must be engaged, but the JMP’s fractured head doesn’t represent the most rational actor to negotiate with.
“It’s not a lack of leaders, but too many,” Bodine accurately observed. “Besides overthrowing Saleh, they have no common agendas.”
Conversely, Bodine noted that Yemen’s revolution is “especially youthful,” with 50% under the age of 15. This iceberg has been avoided at all costs by Saleh’s regime, the JMP and the international community, a strategy with overt intentions to manipulate Yemen’s revolution. If the international community - America in particular - does seek a stable, democratic Yemen, its popular movement must be brought into the political framework. Empowering the youth opens a door to balancing Yemen’s opposition, and would ultimately increase its leverage to remove Saleh’s regime.
“I want to talk to the Obama administration," Karman revealed, "to get support for the Yemeni revolution."
Barring a large-scale military feint, Kenya’s “Operation Linda Nchi” (Defend Our Country) appears headed for an extended grind in southern Somalia. Upwards of 800 troops are taking part in the operation, according to Kenyan sources, and Defense Minister Yusuf Haji told a Parliamentary Committee that the country was “in for the long haul.” With the border town of Dhobley now under TFG control thanks to Kenya’s air force and armor, the bulk of Nairobi’s force has moved 50 miles into Qoqani, the next major town inside Somalia.
One resident, Saleban Mohamed, said that he “saw around 32 trucks and tanks, with hundreds of troops.” Another witness, Abdulahi Sayid Adam, added that these soldiers “are heavily armed and they have started digging trenches near Qoqani.”
Despite Nairobi’s public emphasis on a protracted campaign - managing expectations is critical to the offensive - its mission in southern Somalia remains unclear. How long does Nairobi plan to deploy, for weeks or months? Is Kenya’s air force clearing a path for TFG troops and their proxy militias, the Raskamboni movement and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, backed by Kenyan armor? Or will Kenyan soldiers take the lead in offensive and defensive operations? Understandably unconcerned with military analysts, Nairobi has intentionally obscured its intentions to keep al-Shabaab off guard.
Waiting is the only option for non-participants.
However Kenya’s troop movements suggest that they will assume combat significance. Currently drawing their front at Qoqani, Kenyan and Raskamboni forces are already moving towards Afmadow, another 15 miles to the east. Abdinasir Serar, a senior commander in the militia, told Reuters (over 12 hours ago) that his forces were seven miles Afmadow, “which we are waiting to capture in the coming hours.” From here the combined force plans to launch an offensive into Kismayo, Somalia’s second-largest port and one of al-Shabaab’s windows to the outside world.
While al-Shabaab is helpless to stop a mechanized offensive, the group appears to have drawn its own battle-line above Kismayo. According to local residents al-Shabaab seized dozens of trucks in the central Afgoye district, roughly 15 miles outside of Mogadishu and over 200 miles north of Kismayo. The column was seen heading south. Meanwhile Kismayo residents claim that the city is relatively empty after most of al-Shabaab’s garrison was spotted on the road to Afmadow. Although the group abandoned its local base under Kenyan air-strikes and the Raskamboni soon claimed control, Afmadow town elder Abdi Gaboobe said militants were entrenching themselves around the town.
Dozens to “hundreds” of fighters were seen hiding in brush surrounding the town.
The massing of resources by both sides is generating fears of a large-scale battle. al-Shabaab would be foolish to fight conventionally after ceding territory in Mogadishu, and allocating its southern resources to a single point will leave Kismayo vulnerable to attack. Afmadow serves as al-Shabaab’s regional command but Kenyan forces and their proxies could move into Kismayo first, then attack Afmadow from the west and south. The force could also divide and simultaneously attack Kismayo and Afmadow; although a concentrated assault may fail against an asymmetric opponent, al-Shabaab may be overloaded by a pincer maneuver.
al-Shabaab’s one advantage is that Kenyan and TFG forces must hold the cities its occupies, which could require more resources than presently available. Its job, then, is to make Kenya’s stay in Somalia as unpleasant as possible. Fade away and Kenyan troops might be encouraged to extend its mission. al-Shabaab shifted its forces from Mogadishu to prevent a southern offensive, placing a higher value on its current territory. The group must increase Kenya’s time-line without resorting to passive resistance - it must inflict as many casualties as possible and hold its defenses for as long as possible.
“We say to Kenya: Did you consider the consequences of the invasion?” asked Ali Mohamud Rage, a Shabab spokesman, at a Monday news conference in Mogadishu. Nairobi gave deep consideration to these consequences and made the decision anyway, most under the assumption that al-Shabaab is bleeding. The group’s only strategic hope of repelling Kenya’s assault is to raise the risks. One possible outcome is a strategic defense of initial resistance, followed by waves ambushes, and extensive use of IEDs on the roads connecting the three southern towns.
A stubborn defensive inside Somalia will function as a greater deterrent than attacks on Nairobi’s “skyscrapers.” Internal attacks usually trigger the patriotism necessary to sustain a foreign intervention, whereas external costs often weigh down political approval. Kenyans don’t seem to be under the impression of a quick or easy mission, but their primary fear is getting stuck in southern Somalia. al-Shabaab also denied involved in the kidnapping of aid workers inside Kenya, not the most believable claim but a seed of doubt nonetheless.
As an overall observation, Kenya’s local offensive is less likely to succeed in the absence of a regional campaign. al-Shabaab must be pressured in other areas to keep its reinforcements away from the southern front (and Mogadishu must be thoroughly swept). Otherwise rumors of Nairobi’s “short stay” in Somalia - some observers expect nothing more than a show of force - might eventually come true.
On Saturday night a team “comprising Kenya Army and Rapid Deployment Unit officers” left Kenya’s border in the direction of Dhobley, Somalia. Located a mile across the border, Dhobley has experienced intermittent fighting under the control of the Raskamboni movement, a Kenyan-backed militia combating al-Shabaab’s territorial influence. Two weeks ago al-Shabaab attacked from three sides, sparking a battle outside the town and sending residents fleeing. Dhobley’s melee degenerated to hand-to-hand fighting before al-Shabaab was repulsed by government and Raskamboni forces.
The group’s leader, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, has been itching to launch a counter-attack to Kismayo, and now his request appears to have been granted. After discussing a joint-military operation with officials from Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Kenyan team returned to their side of the border several hours later. Wasting no time, warplanes began bombing al-Shabaab positions late Saturday night. Several hundred soldiers in armored trucks and tanks crossed into Somalia on Sunday, along with assault helicopters, and reinforcements are gathering at the border.
"We have crossed into Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabab, which is responsible for the kidnappings and attacks on our country," Kenyan spokesman Alfred Matua said.
Although the recent kidnappings of aid workers is justifying the current operation - Minister of Internal Security George Saitoti argued, "For the first time our country is threatened with the most serious level of terrorism” - Nairobi has been inching towards an assault for months. Having accepted a high number of refugees fleeing Somalia’s famine and al-Shabaab’s rule, Kenya’s only path to long-term stability is reversing the border’s unsustainable environment. The immediate question is how much weight Kenyan soldiers can lift.
“They’re going all the way to Kismayo,” according to one Kenyan security official, referring to al-Shabaab’s port roughly 100 miles inland. “We’re going to clear the Shabab out.”
Another official added, "They [the army] have been instructed to get ready for the assignment, which will mainly include pushing the Shabab rebels far inside Somalia, away from the common border.”
Over the last year Kenyan forces have actively coordinated with the TFG to undermine al-Shabaab’s hold on the south. Back in early April, former Somali officials gathered in Nairobi to declare the creation of a new autonomous region in southern Somalia. The formation of Azania, a piece of the wider Jubaland, was loosely coordinated with the TFG in order to provide a buffer zone along the Somali-Kenyan border. However the arrangement also served to encroach upon al-Shabaab territory, not simply contain the group, and Madobe’s militia gathered his strength under this umbrella.
"They (Kenya) help with many things including guns and bullets,” said Major Abdikadir Bashir, a Raskamboni intelligence officer. “Without that support, how could we have beaten them?”
Now Madobe’s militia and TFG soldiers are advancing under Kenyan air-strikes. al-Shabaab positions in Qoqani and Afmadow, two towns roughly 50 and 70 miles into Somalia, were bombarded and occupied by TFG and Raskamboni forces, providing a staging ground into Kismayo, 60 miles to the south. Madobe’s faction of the Raskamboni Bridage was evicted from the port in 2009 by al-Shabaab, with the help of the Brigade’s other half. Abdinasir Sayrar, a spokesperson for Madobe’s faction, told Shabelle Radio that their forces in Qoqani were headed “directly for Kismayo.”
Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, the opposing Raskamboni commander, has already welcomed Kenyan troops by vowing to inflict pain.
The time-frame and scope of Nairobi’s mission currently remains unclear, but the operation is the result of a coordinated buildup, not a spontaneous decision to defend Kenya’s border and its citizens. This level of planning suggests an extended operation rather than a blitzkrieg; while foreign incursions into Somalia are known to spin out of control, Nairobi had time to weigh the risks and rewards of such an operation. Both governments believe that al-Shabaab is vulnerable in the south, and that now is the moment to strike. A movement south could be a precursor for separate assaults to the west and north.
Government spokesman Abdirahman Omar Osman told reporters, "The enemy is lost and we will continue pursuing them.”
Fears of an imperialist narrative are also evident; Francis Kimemia, permanent secretary at Kenya’s Ministry of Internal Security, told the private-owned Citizen Television that, “it's important to indicate we are not at war with the government of Somalia, or with the people of Somalia.” The TFG is masking Kenya’s level of involvement for varying reasons, either to absorb most of the credit or to minimize local fears of an occupation (or both). Several officials denied that Kenyan troops entered the country, contrary to Kenyan statements and local eye witnesses, but lauded assistance to TFG units. One commander claimed that reports of Kenyan activity are designed to confuse al-Shabaab.
“Kenya can never invade Somalia,” Osman said, “but we are working together for security issues and to defeat the extremists. It’s our troops who are in our territory, it’s our troops doing the legwork; Kenya troops are at the border. Our neighbor Kenya is fully supporting us militarily and our mission is to drive al-Shabaab out of the region.”
Much of Nairobi’s risk will be determined by the choice of its reward, and thus the length of its mission. al-Shabaab stands no chance of repulsing a coordinated air-and-ground assault, so the smart move is to melt away and dodge Kenya’s assault (the group vacated Qoqani and Afmadow). Besieged areas would be re-infiltrated at a later date, jeopardizing a reentry but keeping the group’s units alive. Kenya would presumably like to clear a path into Kismayo and allow the TFG to take over, but the possibility of guerrilla warfare may demand that Kenya maintain a presence inside the country, whether on the ground or in the air.
One reason al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu was to reinforce its southern territory, suggesting that it anticipated an eventual attack. A desperate fight awaits its enemies.
As dangerous as intervention is, Kenya’s strategy could flip either way depending on its actions. al-Shabaab has already raised the anti-Christian, anti-imperialist battle-cry, except Kenya isn’t despised like arch-enemy Ethiopia. Nairobi has also assisted countless Somali refugees, providing a base of goodwill to stand on, and seizing territory will open humanitarian corridors into the south. So long as Kenya avoids flagrant civilian casualties, al-Shabaab may be lucky to see a small boost in recruits. The situation is a marked improvement from Ethiopia’s last campaign, when a mass of armor launched a doomed occupation across the country. While TFG and Kenyan forces will need time to clear Somalia’s south, Nairobi has no reason to get involved in Mogadishu.
This isn’t to say that Kenya’s mission can’t go wrong - and external attack poses its own threat - but enough “laws” of war are being followed to provide a semblance of optimism in Somalia.
Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is a struggle of ideas. Those actors who most clearly organize and disseminate their ideas possess a qualitative advantage over their opponents, allowing weaker opponents to fight on equal terms. Superior militaries have been defeated because they weren’t able to control their message; an asymmetric force’s message of resistance often feeds on the unshakable label of imperialism.
Richard Nixon withdrew in embarrassment from Vietnam because Washington failed to dominate the war’s narrative. George H. W. Bush experienced success in Iraq due to a unified international voice and, to his credit, attempted to speak to Somalis during Operation Restore Hope. His successor then crossed America’s message in the months prior to the Battle of Mogadishu. Both battles were highly publicized on CNN, with opposing results. Iraq’s second invasion narrowly avoided rock bottom only when the Pentagon started to communicate with Iraq’s many audiences, and mixed signals to Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis contribute to mission drift in Afghanistan.
The Obama administration's reaction to the Arab revolutions depends on the effectiveness of its communications. While NATO’s handling of Libya’s revolution drew sharp criticism from their own governments and peoples, and justifiably so, a relatively unified voice towards the revolutionaries (both military and non-military support) and Muammar Gaddafi assisted in maintaining a cohesive opposition after The Colonel’s flight. Conversely, U.S. policy in Yemen is spiraling downward because the administration lost control of America’s message.
No amount of rhetorical support for Yemen’s revolutionaries can change their impression that President Barack Obama’s administration is protecting Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime.
The latest shooting in Sana’a served as the U.S. media’s under-card to the death of Anwar al-Awlaki’s son, Abderrahman. Observing thousands of protesters gear up with gasmasks and no oppositional protection, dozens of media personnel followed their march into the city center only to be drowned out by “bigger” news: several “top” leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had been eliminated in a series of drone strikes. Ibrahim Mohammad Al Banna, “media chief” of AQAP, and Sarhan al-Qussa'a, cousin of AQAP military chief Fahd al-Qussa'a, were among the dead.
Another “media chief” of AQAP, gone; Al-Awlaki was only a contributor to Inspire magazine. A Yemeni official similarly labeled al Banna as one of AQAP’s “most dangerous operatives.” He will be replaced.
Saturday’s coincidental events weren’t coordinated in a vacuum, but U.S. strikes seem to happen around the weekend, when protesters and Saleh’s activities often peak. Indirectly, the West is accused of sanctioning Saleh’s violence through the GCC initiative and the UNSC's looming resolution, both of which grant Saleh’s family immunity for their human rights abuses. One might think that the UN’s potential amnesty of murder warrants more coverage than the death of a propagandist - especially since protesters accuse the international community of encouraging violence - but Western governments and media have other priorities.
Saturday’s result is 9-24 dead militants and over a dozen dead protesters, with 300 wounded, according to Mohammed al-Qubati, director of the field hospital at Change Square.
Washington is speaking to five distinct audiences in Yemen: Saleh’s regime, the political opposition, Yemen's civil movement, Riyadh and the American people. Of these five channels only two are open, to the Saudis and Americans. Despite non-stop negotiations and meetings with Saleh’s officials, the besieged strongman is largely deaf to the Obama administration. He listens only on occasion - sharing the language of AQAP - and responds by alternating threats and false promises. Saleh directly accused Obama of plotting Yemen’s revolution in March, before the GCC initiative was introduced, and now condemns the proposal as a foreign coup. Yemen’s political opposition was easily led on by Saleh and Washington, leaving the popular revolutionaries to fend for themselves in darkness.
The overwhelming belief amongst Yemen’s revolutionaries is that Washington places al-Qaeda above human rights - that Washington is so bent on counterterrorism (CT) that it's causing terror. Meanwhile relations with Riyadh are running smoothly, corrupting Yemen’s political transition through the GCC and maneuvering around Saleh’s regime. The CIA’s new drone base reportedly lies somewhere along the Yemeni-Saudi border, a “gift” from the King. One defense official told the Associated Press, "The Saudis are making their information available to the Americans. Both them and the Americans are broadening their cooperation without direct Yemeni involvement."
Generally satisfied that AQAP is “on the run” from the Predators, Americans as a whole remain indifferent to alienating Yemen’s people. Destroying AQAP could take years of up-tempo operations, far too long to let Saleh remain in power, but this is little concern to a country suffering its own crisis. Drones are preferred over ground armies, even if “on shore” and “off shore” operations provoke in relatively equal measure. U.S. media is quick to remind Americans that AQAP has, “taken over several cities in the south, raising fears that they could establish a permanent stronghold,” without mentioning that Saleh encouraged Abyan’s takeover.
The narrative has morphed into “yielding results,” as “human assets on the ground directly provide actionable intelligence to U.S. commanders rather than relying entirely on Yemen's security agencies...”
A lack of international (particularly U.S.) communication inside Yemen has served Saleh’s purposes throughout a 10-month revolution. With the Obama administration making no sincere effort to contact Yemen’s civil movement, the U.S. narrative has remained centered around AQAP rather than military support for Saleh’s regime. This storyline is now bypassed through claims of unilateralism, but the reality is that any U.S. involvement in the country keeps Saleh alive. Washington’s need for a puppet against AQAP, whether Saleh or his vice president, outweighs Yemen’s democratic uprising.
Regime officials, as they usually do, also took credit for the strikes, then blamed the JMP for collaborating with al-Qaeda’s bombing of an oil pipeline. The perpetrators were reported as al-Awlaki’s tribesmen or AQAP, depending on the source, but Saleh welcomes either option as an excuse to slander the JMP. The only time he isn’t accusing Yemen’s opposition of “sabotage” is when he promises to sign the GCC initiative. The JMP, not Saleh, is delaying its implementation in his oddly-colored world.
Killing Abderrahman could work in Saleh’s favor like every other aspect of U.S. policy; he’ll take any excuse for retaliation. Anonymous tribal elders are responsible for much of the info coming out of Shabwa, and local accounts describe an angry scene after four other member were caught in the strikes. Several papers surfaced in the aftermath of al-Awlaki’s death, arguing that AQAP is barely plugged into Yemen’s tribes, but that is no excuse to agitate them.
U.S. policy is running on the fumes of technological superiority. Although killing AQAP’s leadership and rows of fighters is an achievable goal in the long-term, relations with Yemen's people are being sacrificed in the process. The Obama administration's strategy takes Saleh’s existence for granted; the Pentagon and CIA have a vested interest in keeping his regime alive for as long as possible. U.S. officials such as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta insist that any future government will also cooperate against AQAP, a statement that rubs off as American imperialism.
Maybe Washington only seeks to win battles, because Yemen’s political and diplomatic war is being lost with each blood-stained day.
Whoever contracted Mansour Arbabsiar to carry out an assassination plot against Adel Al-Jubeir must be shaking their heads. If high-level officials within Iran’s leadership or a rogue cell actually intended to assassinate the Saudi ambassador - and a vocal Iranian critic - they selected one of the more pathetic “agents” in the history of espionage. Those who knew the “disoriented” Arbabsiar mocked his ability to “mastermind” a plot, citing his outgoing nature and memory lapses.
So is Arbabsiar a 30-year sleeper cell? Or was he simply chasing money, contrary to several of his friends’ testimony, only to find himself ensnared in a web at JFK? Another “old friend” in Corpus Christi, Tom Hosseini, told The Washington Post that Arbabsiar bragged about incoming wealth over the summer. What Hosseini couldn’t understand is why “anyone” would use Arbabsiar to communicate with Los Zetas. While U.S. officials compare the plot to a movie because of its “Hollywood threat,” the movie element is an unwitting protagonist stumbling into a plot above his head.
Even if the Quds were looking for an ignorant fall-guy, the haphazard communication into Iran still doesn’t make sense.
Definite proof of a double-plot may never surface, but at least one angle of a U.S.-Saudi conspiracy has been removed, if only temporarily. The Associated Press reports that the Obama administration has decided to pull nearly all 41,000 troops out of Iraq by December 31st. An unspecified number of Marines and 157 other military personnel will guard the massive U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and handle weapons transactions, while another 5,000 private security contractors will provide national security for the State Department. However these figures are lower than the 10,000-15,000 trainers and combat personnel requested by the Pentagon.
The decision was made after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ruled out immunity for a residual force. The administration's pressure indicated that combat missions were indeed part of its equation, and the White House only recently forfeited to inability to maintain a training and combat force. Numerous parties in Washington hoped to see a 5-10 year buffer against Iran, but they must wait until Iraq’s parliament reconvenes on November 20th to have any last chance. An emergency agreement to allow limited training missions will offer a meager conciliation prize after so much heavy lifting, and al-Maliki seems to have ruled out the possibility entirely.
Believing that an immunity clause won’t pass, neither he nor Washington are willing to embarrass themselves and further jeopardize their influence. Presuming that al-Maliki supports a residual force and has no reason to lie, more actors than Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc must oppose the decision. One of al-Maliki’s advisors did leave the door open to U.S. forces basing themselves across the border in Kuwait, but the issue of immunity would be left unresolved.
After months of political haggling and external pressure, the Obama administration apparently will not get its way in Iraq, an anti-climactic end for Americans. Few will complain after eight misguided years, and Obama will hold to his promise after all. Unfortunately Iraqis are left to clean up a region’s mistakes; while the absence of a U.S. force should temper some sources of violence, a steady killing of hundreds of civilians and dozens of security personnel will persist for an unpredictable number of years. Every insurgent group is sure to take credit, then begin to fight with each other over territory and influence. Government security forces remains partial, as evidenced by non-responses to bombings in Sadr City.
For better or worse, U.S. officials and troops have no place in Iraq’s politics and cities. Factor in a stalled weapons packaged to Bahrain - also for “external threats” - and Arbabsiar’s value in the U.S. is plummeting. Maybe Tehran did send him after all.
In the immediate aftermath of Anwar al-Awlaki’s death, President Barack Obama issued a contradictory statement regarding al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) former cleric, propagandist and foreign plotter. Understandably resistant to discussing operational details, Obama assured the American people that al-Awlaki, “met his demise because the government and the people of Yemen have joined the international community in a common effort against Al Qaeda.” The sad reality is that the White House has no working relationship with the Yemeni people.
Tracking al-Awlaki was “something that we have been working with the Yemeni government for quite some time,” Obama added, seemingly unaware that cooperation with Ali Abdullah Saleh is the root problem of U.S. policy.
Last Friday Tawakel Karman’s Nobel Prize brought a peaceful radiance to Yemen, cutting through the darkness that Saleh and AQAP have thrived on. Her recognition, hard-earned after years of advocating female equality and civil rights in general, also highlighted the incongruity between Yemen’s revolutionaries and the international community’s response. While some conservative elements in the U.S. media questioned Karman’s “Islamic” association with Yemen’s Islah party, the Obama administration isn’t open to negotiating with her populist faction. Instead the Joint Meeting Parties’ (JMP) established core, which includes Islah’s main branch, has been engaged over Yemen’s popular protesters, obstructing national unity by pitting the traditional opposition against Yemen’s democratic uprising.
Far from working with the people to combat AQAP’s dispersion, a trend facilitated by Saleh’s regime, the Obama administration has coordinated with Yemen’s eroding government to undermine their revolution. The vast majority of Yemenis want nothing to do with AQAP; anti-government protesters have rallied against AQAP and vow to give no sanctuary to the group. Many believe that Saleh’s misrule provides the fertilizer for AQAP’s growth, funneling proxy "jihadists" into the contested southern governorates and avoiding engagement until it serves his purpose - milking the Western cash cow for political immunity and military assistance.
Karman’s initial protests in January accelerated a "secret" CIA base somewhere on the Arabian Peninsula, and only in April did the Obama administration publicly backtrack from Saleh by introducing an unpopular power-sharing initiative.
Despite international calls to resign, Saleh remains buffered by the administration and House of Saud’s proxy, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although his resignation is now being interpreted as immediate, the GCC initiative grants him 30 days to resign after formally agreeing. Executive power would then transfer to his vice president Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who would oversee a transitional process until a presidential election can be held in two months; during this time a “national unity government” would act as Yemen’s central authority. Washington and Riyadh threw in an immunity clause when Saleh’s family of security commanders initially balked.
The GCC initiative also stipulates an end to protests, contrary to U.S. assurances that "peaceful protesters have the right to demonstrate."
For months anti-government protesters, activists and international supporters have warned against negotiating with a murderous tyrant, to no avail. The Obama administration falsely claims that the GCC initiative complies with the aspirations of Yemen’s people, when the international community’s idea of regime continuation is incompatible with the revolutionaries’ civil demands. President Obama and Secretary Clinton praised Karman as an inspirational leader only to ignore her own platform. One of the first to welcome Saleh's return as an opportunity to try him, Karman rejected the GCC initiative during interviews for her Nobel.
“We are disappointed in Obama,” The New Yorker's Dexter Filkins quoted her as saying in March, a feeling that hasn’t changed judging by her fresher rhetoric.
Yemen’s revolutionaries have a different transition in mind, starting with Saleh’s immediate and unconditional resignation. They realize that he intends to hold out until a snap election can be manipulated. They also seek a trial for his extended family, not a rescue mission, and have requested sanctions as a temporary fix, along with the freezing of U.S. military assistance. The release of political prisoners remains an unfulfilled demand. How a popular transitional council will be chosen has yet to be decided, but most protesters have limited faith in the impotent Hadi (already perceived as a U.S. puppet) to break away from the old regime and oppositional elite.
And they aren’t going home until their demands are met.
Saleh doesn’t believe a revolution is happening inside Yemen - only a conspiracy - and he doesn’t merely renege on signing the GCC initiative. He often responds violently while offering a poisonous olive branch, besieging the UAE Embassy through his loyalists and following with an assault on the neighborhood of Hashid tribal chief Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar. Saleh’s son, Ahmed, and nephew Yahya turned their U.S.-trained units loose on protesters after “authorizing” Hadi to negotiate the GCC’s "mechanism," provoking urban warfare with armed oppositional elements. They were then accused of a coup.
After his latest false promise to resign, regime loyalists attacked a group of women marching in Karman’s honor, an incident that drew no rebuke from the Obama administration.
The Executive Board of Yemen’s National Revolution Council, “would like to clarify their stance after Saleh's recent statement, as it deems repetitive and of no new substance from what he stated in the previous months. He continues to cling on to power, and desperately deceives the public opinion in Yemen and abroad prior to the UN Security Council meeting on Yemen and discussing the report prepared by the UN Envoy to Yemen Mr. Jamal Benomar, which highlights clearly the responsible party for blocking of the GCC initiative.”
The GCC initiative doesn’t encourage Saleh and his family to leave Yemen - it makes them believe they can manipulate Western and Gulf states with impunity. The GCC would usher in a corrupted transition that allows the remnants of Saleh’s regime to oversee the next election, while his immediate scheme is to attack unarmed protesters and force defected General Ali Mohsen or the al-Ahmar brothers (Sadiq and the politically ambitious Hamid) into retaliating. Government-initiated violence grinds on peaceful protesters - the main party opposed to conditional negotiations - and scares the international community into chasing a “political solution.”
The UN Security Council is currently in the process of legitimizing the GCC initiative rather than listening to Yemen’s civil movement; AQAP’s influence cannot be nullified so long as Saleh's regime survives. The Obama administration, European Union and UN must jumpstart a process of empowerment with Yemen’s revolutionaries, engaging them instead of scheming (and flying) above their heads. A lack of political will, not the lack of viable options, is sinking international policy in Yemen. The belief that Washington’s options are limited rests on a flawed assumption that political and military support must continue in the absence of an alternative solution.
Cutting Saleh’s life-line is the beginning of that alternative.
Spearheading the newest phase of President Barack Obama’s progressive response against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an “initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda” on October 12th. A second “combat-equipped team” will deploy next month, bringing to total force (presumably a mixture of “white” and “black” operatives) to 100 personnel. The announcement builds on several years of legislation and inter-agency cooperation, which the administration is visibly proud of.
“The United States’ comprehensive, multi-year strategy seeks to help mitigate and end the threat posed to civilians and regional stability by the LRA,” reads the State Department’s “fact sheet.”
While Africa is full of friction and mission creep (with traces of “invasion”) has already setting into the U.S. media, parts of the administration's strategy rest on solid grounds. A brutal “Christian” extremist group despised by the majority of Ugandans, the LRA qualifies as an apocalyptic-utopian insurgency seeking little more than individual power. Thousands have lost their lives across a regional scale; the State Department counts an excess of 2,400 people killed and 3,400 abducted since 2008. World police may not serve America’s overall interests, but assisting in the LRA’s elimination is legally and morally justifiable.
The centrality of LRA leader Joseph Kony also makes the group vulnerable to an immediate takedown, a mission that the Obama administration is obviously fond of. Although flanked by a small circle of violent lieutenants - Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ogwen and Okot Odek - Kony’s charisma and religious visions turn the LRA’s wheels, unlike more developed militant networks. Remove the hub and the spokes could be permanently neutralized.
Col. Felix Kulayigye, Uganda's military spokesman, explained of the deployment, "We are aware that they are coming. We are happy about it. We look forward to working with them and eliminating Kony and his fighters."
Counterinsurgency is rarely simple though, and the Obama administration must guard against a number of contingencies. The same survivalist mentality that weakens the group (“no agenda and no purpose other than its own survival,” in Obama’s words) increases the danger it poses. Ugandan forces have unsuccessfully hunted Kony for over a decade, and one must assume that he will seize on U.S. “intervention” to bolster his cause. LRA commanders are also believed to be operating in the semi-lawless regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and south Sudan, roughly 300,000 square miles of rough terrain. The modest group is estimated at 300-400 fighters, one reason why U.S. personnel were summoned to assist Ugandan forces in a vast field.
However this strategy depends largely on counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, to eliminate the LRA’s threat to civilians. Killing or capturing Kony and his lieutenants is the objective, not restoring order in the lawless enclaves that they survive in, or repairing central Africa’s non-military spheres. A program is being developed to disarm LRA fighters, but they will only consider disarming after the loss of their leaders. Kony’s religious element also opens the possibility that a follower will attempt to claim his throne.
Obama’s rules of engagement are leading some U.S. politicians and observers to question how effective this deployment can be. Conceived as an intelligence unit, U.S. forces have been ordered “not to fire unless fired upon.” Their mission as force-multipliers fits Uganda’s situation; Ugandan forces can carry out the mission’s tactical components under the guidance of U.S. operators. The more U.S. personnel become directly involved in the region’s battlefield, the less effective they may be in reducing the LRA’s appeal.
The administration’s decision to limit their actions is sound on a tactical and information level. In addition to keeping U.S. personnel out of unnecessary firefights, the White House is determined to manage expectations that Uganda’s mission won’t creep out of range. Even a few U.S. casualties could spoil domestic support. A small force also facilitates a rapid exit, leaving a minimal to non-existent footprint. Not every American will approve of Uganda’s deployment and war is known to wreck schedules, but Obama has involved himself (in part) because Uganda is a relatively easy mission compared to the other battlefields that America’s military is engaging.
The largest area for concern is mission creep outside of Uganda’s parameters. By definition, U.S. troops could roam between four central African states in search of LRA leadership, and they will take up position within Washington’s growing African network. The CIA has already established bases in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, and assisting Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni functions as a downpayment for another AU deployment into Mogadishu (ignoring his crackdown on a recent opposition movement). Washington is coordinating with Sahel states to construct desert bases, and plunking new personnel into central Africa adds more muscle to Washington’s offensive against al-Qaeda’s offshoots, with Nigeria next in line. Although Libya’s mission could leave Western states with less influence than they expect, this key space on Africa’s chessboard has also attracted considerable suspicion.
The Obama administration, of course, sees nothing wrong with its arching African strategy, and neither do many Americans, whether they’re oriented around national security or the economic crisis. Developing a regional framework is vital to inhibiting insurgencies and other militants groups. Predicting the unintended consequences of this militarization will be the long-term challenge.
Gaddafi and Saleh: opposite ends of America's "friendly dictator" spectrum
