Saleh and Obama: Partners in Defiance

Voice of America needs to find some people with a better understanding of propaganda. Credible disinformation must be believable in developed societies and difficult to check in undeveloped societies, and VOA’s description of President Ali Abdullah Saleh qualifies as neither. With pro-democracy protesters swelling their numbers down Sitteen Street to counter Saleh’s own demonstrators, they don’t need T.V. or the Internet to know that Saleh refuses to step down after 32 years of ruling Yemen.

Nor was there anything “vague” about his response to the latest proposal from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as dictated by Washington and Riyadh. Dodging a direct offer by welcoming the GCC’s involvement, Saleh then told his remaining supporters in Sana’a, "We stress that we will hold on to the constitutional legitimacy, in loyalty to our people, as we categorically reject the attempted coups on freedom, democracy, and political pluralism.”

Saleh is crystal clear in his intent to remain in power until 2013 - at the least. His ruling General People's Congress (GPC) privately claimed that Saleh did accept the GCC's proposal, but that the party wants him to stay on for another five months as the "honorary" president. Both will take and take without giving. Thus offering Saleh an "initiative" merely serves to prolong his rule, which in the end furthers Washington and GCC’s objective.

In a jarring but predictable defense, Saleh continued to build on his rediscovered justification of constitutional legitimacy, a term used to implicitly reject the GCC’s initiative. Saleh undoubtedly possesses considerable survival skills, but his rhetoric relies on brute force in the same way that he over-extends his personal forces, the Republican Guard and Central Security. There’s nothing special about his black-and-white doublespeak: "We reject toppling democracy and legitimacy, but we welcome the Gulf initiative and we will deal with it positively according to the constitution.”

Saleh also mixed in the usual anti-oppositional slander when condemning the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Yemen’s main political opposition and his negotiating partner in Riyadh. Describing his opponents as "dilapidated and corroded," Saleh warned, "We strongly reject all plots against freedom, democracy and political pluralism. They (the opposition) want to grab power via coups. You have to remain firm before the renegade and cowardly elements. We will confront (their) challenge with challenge."

In his surface world the JMP’s negotiated position with the GCC amounts to a coup. Denial pervades Saleh’s words, whether blaming the JMP for ongoing violence, claiming the opposition’s support is “decreasing day after day in front of the Yemeni people and their strong will,” or denying violence outright. “We will not cause bloodshed,” he promised as Yemeni security forces continue to beat and fire upon pro-democracy protesters.

Saleh is fully aware of his own plot, however, and is simply playing the JMP for as long as possible. Knowing that Yemen’s political opposition lacks popular legitimacy, Saleh refuses to negotiate with any party except the JMP and its offshoots. He then proceeds to scapegoat them whenever the GCC makes a new offer, a pattern that ultimately refuses to negotiate with the entire opposition.

"The Opposition wants to take power using illegal means,” Saleh declared. “You cannot compare Yemen to Egypt. Yemen had fair presidential elections and the people voted for person most fit to rule. I am Yemen's legal president.”

This is the man that the Obama administration has repeatedly urged Yemen’s opposition to engage.

Failing to address Yemen all week, the White House and State Department ended Friday as defiant as Saleh, the silent yin to his clamorous yang. Refusing to offer a single detail on the GCC’s ongoing negotiations, only the occasional encouragement, the Obama administration has managed to duck a lax U.S. media and stay out of Yemen’s public sphere. The feat is remarkable given the dire threats from U.S. counter-terrorism officials, the depth Washington's involvement in GCC negotiations and Saleh’s steadfast insolence.

Except this course of inaction damages both Yemen’s political environment and U.S. interests in the country. Yemeni protesters have already incorporated anti-GCC slogans into their message - the result of Washington’s primitive understanding of fourth-generation warfare.

The White House predictably raced out in front of Syria’s violence today, standard procedures for mass casualties. To be fair Syria’s bloodshed exceeded Yemen’s, but President Barack Obama contradicts his own rhetoric in stating, “The United States will continue to stand up for democracy and the universal rights that all human beings deserve, in Syria and around the world.” Obama hasn't mentioned Yemen in over a month, when he was forced to condemn the brutal March 18th shooting in Sana'a. The White House remains unable to reconcile “universal rights” with its ongoing argument against a ‘one-size-fits-all” approach, and Syria and Yemen highlight this unbridgeable division.

One day after releasing an "offer" that called for an end to the protests - a demand that naturally infuriated protesters - additional information continues to reveal Washington’s true intentions. An unearthed WikiLeaks document from 2005 mentions defected General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as one of the U.S. government’s greatest fears, a concern that has plugged up efforts to joint-exile Saleh and al-Ahmar. Though this fear is no surprise, Saleh continues to demand al-Ahmar’s ouster even after refusing to resign, hardening al-Ahmar’s own position to remain in the country.

Security forces have arrested dozens of defected soldiers in the last 24 hours.

Meanwhile Muhammad Qahtan, the JMP’s spokesman, has maintained his support for the GCC’s initiative despite its unpopularity in the streets. Yemen’s youth coalition and wider opposition regularly denounce the JMP for negotiating an illegitimate agreement with Saleh, and, distrusting both, refuse to leave their urban camps. Acutely aware that Saleh is exploiting the JMP, the group has come under suspicion of fragmenting. JMP chief Yaseen Sa’eed No’man is already rumored to oppose an agreement with the GCC, and now Qahtan appears to be gravitating back to the protesters’ side: “The reason for the delay of Saleh's fall was the ambassadors of the US and UK. They bought him negotiating time and this is hurting the revolution."

Like Saleh, the Obama administration has escaped the glare of such a bright revolution by manipulating fear, both at home and in Yemen. But neither is likely to escape from Yemen itself. Although Saleh appears to believe he’s weathered the storm, U.S. support failed to stave off the revolution and will fail to keep him alive indefinitely. Yemen’s opposition knows what it wants and won’t stop until it sees the country cleansed of Saleh’s entire regime.

“The opposition talks as if they own the street, but we might have to overthrow them too,” warned youth activist Farea al-Muslimi. “If they accept any plan that involves stopping protests before president steps down, they will be betraying our society, and people will lose trust in them.”

White House’s Message to Yemeni Protesters: Go Home

Yesterday Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s embattled president, went beyond the country’s stalemate by smacking a political resolution backwards. As the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) shuttled diplomatic plans from U.S. officials amid rumors of a “new” initiative, Saleh reasserted his “legitimate” rule while rejecting a negotiated solution, arguing that power can only be transferred through “the ballot box.” His rhetoric belied reports of an impending agreement with the opposition.

Now it’s the White House turn to directly regress Yemen’s revolution. According to Mohammed Qahtan, a spokesman for the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), U.S. and European officials submitted their “30-60” plan on Thursday to Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP. The arrangement calls for Saleh to transfer power immediately and resign in 30 days, and dictates a presidential election 60 days later.

It also calls for an immediate end to protests.

Such a demand spawns an all-consuming red flag over the “30-60” plan, even before this initiative is broken down as the scam that it is. Assigned the typical catchiness that governments love, Washington and Riyadh’s “30-60” plan represents spilled blood on the opposition’s side. This agreement, which sounds like a sports club in New York, carries over a plan drafted on Tuesday while adding the critical clause of ending the protests. Sensible from a military and economic standpoint - for Saleh - the demand offers the latest evidence that he will renege on the proposal at a later date.

“The first thing is that no one trusts him at all,” responded Mohammed Abdulmali al-Mutawakil, an opposition leader in Sana’a. “Who can guarantee that everything will be carried out?”

Fully aware of Saleh's trust deficit, Washington continues to dilute the opposition's terms under the plausible belief that the JMP's position is weakening. Its “30-60” plan no longer calls for Saleh to specifically transfer power to Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansoo Hadi, a move already opposed by Yemen’s popular opposition. Now the agreement stipulates that Saleh can pick his successor, while suggesting that he appoint an opposition leader to run an interim cabinet to prepare for elections. A “unity” government would be composed of 50% GPC, while 40% would go to the opposition groups and 10% to other minor factions.

“I believe the 30-60 plan is the practical way to transfer power,” says Qahtan. “We have accepted giving immunity, and we have made a significant sacrifice by accepting that the president will transfer power to a deputy of his choice. The only condition that we have made is that this deputy is not a member of his family.”

The defection of “military leaders and solders” would also end, as if the opposition has any control over their personal decisions. More troubling, al-Mutawakil voiced concern that the new proposal failed to clarify the fate of those units trained by U.S. Special Forces and controlled by Saleh’s son and nephews. Although Western and Gulf media have labeled the “30-60” plan as a compromise between Saleh and the opposition, Yemen’s revolution will be compromised by compromising with Saleh, surely part of Washington and Riyadh’s real intentions. This “compromise” is also growing more lopsided in the government’s favor over time, and appears designed to fracture the opposition rather than negotiate with Yemen’s protesters.

"This offer awaits the president's approval," said Hassan Zayd, secretary general of the Shiite Islamist Haq party and a member of an opposition delegation.

Rather than sincerely negotiate with the opposition, which holds no legitimacy to speak for the popular movement, Washington and the GCC have used Saleh’s stall tactics to gradually inch an initiative in his favor. Real conflict resolution doesn't work this way. With the streets unwilling to bend to stricter terms on Saleh, let alone a sweeter deal, parts of the JMP also might be losing faith in the GCC’s cover. While unconfirmed, the government-friendly Yemeni Observer reports that Yaseen Sa’eed No’man, chairman of the JMP, announced his resignation because of “dissatisfaction” over the GCC’s proposal.

Several JMP leaders have denied these claims. However opposition figures in Sana'a allege that No’man phoned in his resignation to the information office at “Change Square." Yemeni journalist Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani reported that No’man is, at the least, protesting the GCC’s dialogue and calling for negotiations to be held directly with the popular movement. Zaid played down the reports but did admit that No’Man’s phone has been turned off for three days. Zaid didn’t think No’man has resigned, “he just expressed his anger about the Gulf initiative.”

“I don’t know if the opposition will accept the Gulf initiative after the carnage of last Saturday and the past few days,” the optimistic Zaid continued. “I do not know whether the parties would accept it under pressure because of fears that the situation between the army, the Republican Guards and the Central Security would explode.”

As a final caution both the northern Houthis and Southern Movement claim to be unrepresented in the GCC dialogue. Saleh has treated each movement as a greater threat than al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and leaving a huge part of Yemen’s society out of negotiations was no accident.

Contrary to Western observers who believe Washington and Riyadh are slowly forcing Saleh out, Yemeni protesters don’t trust these two governments to fulfill their “guarantees.” Saleh continues to slander the JMP while negotiating with its delegation, a pattern he has adhered to since the revolution’s beginning. He knows the JMP lacks the authority to speak for the streets and has employed the political opposition as a stall tactic. Meanwhile GPC officials claim the situation in Taiz is normal, in contrast to widespread reports of violence. The GCC’s actions, as decided by Washington and the Saudis, supports the protesters’ intuition.

“They are part of this regime,” Salah Sharafi, a youth leader in Sana’a, said of the JMP. “If they are with the revolution, they won’t accept any initiative from G.C.C. or from the United States, unless it’s conditional with his stepping down firstly.”

“We see this as direct foreign intervention into Yemeni affairs,” added Adel al-Surabi, a leader of the student coalition credited with initiating the protest movement. “We’re not interested in exchanging one ruler for the next, keeping a system where all power stays in the hands of one man. We want a parliamentary system, and we will continue until we achieve it.”

Only if they can break through the combined muscle of Saleh, Washington and Riyadh, all of which would rather leave Yemen’s unpopular president in power and see protesters return home.

Netanyahu, Obama Face Dueling Peace Plans

From The New York Times:

WASHINGTON — A Republican invitation for Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to address Congress next month is highlighting the tensions between President Obama and Mr. Netanyahu and has kicked off a bizarre diplomatic race over who will be the first to lay out a new proposal to reopen the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

For three months, White House officials have been debating whether the time has come for Mr. Obama to make a major address on the region’s turmoil, including the upheaval in the Arab world, and whether he should use the occasion to propose a new plan for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

One administration official said that course was backed by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the president himself, but opposed by Dennis B. Ross, the president’s senior adviser on the Middle East.

As the administration has been pondering, Mr. Netanyahu, fearful that his country would lose ground with any Obama administration plan, has been considering whether to pre-empt the White House with a proposal of his own, before a friendly United States Congress, according to American officials and diplomats from the region.

“People seem to think that whoever goes first gets the upper hand,” said Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator and a director at the New America Foundation. Using Mr. Netanyahu’s nickname, he said: “If Bibi went first and didn’t lay out a bold peace plan, it would be harder for Obama to say, actually, despite what you said to Congress and their applause, this is what I think you should do.”

The political gamesmanship between the two men illustrates how the calculation in the Middle East has changed for a variety of reasons, including the political upheaval in the Arab world. But it also shows the lack of trust and what some officials say is personal animosity between Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu.

White House officials are working on drafts of a possible proposal, but they have not decided how detailed it will be, or even whether the president will deliver it in a planned speech. If Mr. Obama does put forward an American plan, officials say it could include four principles, or terms of reference, built around the final status issues that have bedeviled peace negotiators since 1979.

The terms of reference could call for Israel to accept a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. For their part, Palestinians would have to accept that they would not get the right of return to land in Israel from which they fled or were forced to flee. Jerusalem would be the capital of both states, and Israeli security would have to be protected.

Mr. Netanyahu has made it clear that he wants Israel’s security needs addressed before any peace deal with the Palestinians. He has become even more concerned about security because shifts in power among Arab states in recent months have weakened Israel’s already fragile relations with its neighbors, particularly Egypt.

The tussling between the Obama administration and the Israeli government reached a peak last week when Mrs. Clinton, in Qatar for a meeting of the U.S.-Islamic World Forum, announced that Mr. Obama would be “speaking in greater detail about America’s policy in the Middle East and North Africa in the coming weeks.”

Her announcement electrified Israeli officials, who quickly got on the phone with American officials and journalists to determine whether Mr. Obama had decided to put an American plan on the table. He had not made such a decision, and White House officials cautioned that the internal debate was still going on.

But two days later, the House speaker, John A. Boehner of Ohio, announced his intention to invite Mr. Netanyahu to address a joint meeting of Congress. “America and Israel are the closest of friends and allies, and we look forward to hearing the prime minister’s views on how we can continue working together for peace, freedom and stability,” Mr. Boehner said in a news release.

Like many other foreign leaders, Mr. Netanyahu has addressed Congress before. He did so in 1996, and four other Israeli prime ministers have over the past 35 years. The platform gives American elected leaders the opportunity to publicly demonstrate their support for Israel before the politically crucial Israel lobby.

Mr. Netanyahu’s address will coincide with the planned meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, arguably the most powerful of the American groups that advocate for Israel.
Brendan Buck, Mr. Boehner’s press secretary, said that staff members had received no pushback from the White House about the invitation to Mr. Netanyahu. “Obviously, it’s a troubled time for the region,” he said. “Our members have been very interested in demonstrating that we stand with Israel.”

Last November, Representative Eric Cantor, Republican of Virginia, told Mr. Netanyahu that the new G.O.P. majority in the House would “serve as a check on the administration,” in a statement that was rare for its blunt disagreement on American foreign policy as conveyed to a foreign leader.

Mr. Cantor put out a statement after a meeting with Mr. Netanyahu saying that he “made clear that the Republican majority understands the special relationship between Israel and the United States, and that the security of each nation is reliant upon the other.”

Brian Katulis, a national security expert with the Center for American Progress, a liberal research organization, said that Republicans were trying to “make Israel a partisan wedge issue.”

“And that’s bad for Israel, and that’s bad for the United States,” Mr. Katulis said. But he added that the administration would never publicly, or even privately, oppose the notion of an Israeli leader addressing Congress.

Two American officials, speaking on condition of anonymity out of diplomatic caution, said they thought that if Mr. Netanyahu intended to make a bold proposal for a peace deal with the Palestinians, he would do so before his own people in the Knesset.

“Instead of focusing on peace-making, everybody seems to be focused on speech-making,” said Martin S. Indyk, vice president for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a former United States ambassador to Israel. “And unless the speeches generate peace negotiations, making speeches will not generate peace.”

Much of the debate is taking place under a pending deadline of the United Nations General Assembly meeting scheduled in September, when the Assembly is expected to broadly endorse Palestinian statehood in a vote that could prove deeply embarrassing to Israel and the United States, which are both expected to vote against it.

Obama's short-term history and Netanyahu's long-term history suggest that neither will release an innovative peace plan in the coming weeks. But we’ll still preempt them in confronting a way past the current stalemate.

Massive Information Gap in Yemen

Believing the latest reports out of Yemen is difficult to begin with. Based on limited information, U.S. and U.K. officials have resubmitted their initiative under the guise of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which calls for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to transfer power to Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansoo Hadi. Yemen’s oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) has objected to the 30 day time-line - something the streets cannot be convinced of - and the document’s wording, as if their negotiators wouldn’t catch the difference between “transfer” and “resign.”

Without any further details, U.S. diplomats are supposedly confident of an agreement being reached.

But by refusing to give up any details, the White House and State Department have once more abandoned their initiative in the public sphere, twisting it into an even uglier form than its present state. Such a feeble ploy displays how unwilling Washington remains in letting go of Saleh. As he continues to violently suppress pro-democracy demonstrations and blame the JMP for instigating riots, GCC Foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement with the JMP on Tuesday or Wednesday. The state of negotiations between Saleh, the opposition, GCC and America are nowhere near a resolution.

Even more telling, Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) flipped its criticism into optimism after meeting with GCC ministers; the GPC has blasted the GCC’s initiative as unconstitutional and targeted the JMP in the crossfire. According to GPC Assistant Secretary-General Ahmed Bin Dhagar, who led a delegation in the UAE, dialogue between the two parties was deemed “successful.”

Now add in Saleh’s latest defiance and watch the information vacuum tear apart.

It’s not completely accurate to say that Saleh has given up all pretense of leaving. An April 8th speech made clear that he wasn’t leaving any time soon, but Wednesday’s address appears to have anchored Saleh in a do-or-die mentality. Fearing the fate of Hosni Mubarak long before Egypt’s former president found himself under house arrest, Saleh told his supporters today, "We will continue to resist... undaunted and committed to constitutional legitimacy, while rejecting the plots and coups.”

“We will remain steadfast like the mountains of Eidan, Nuqum and Zafar,” he declared "during his meeting with tens of thousands of women." “We will not be shaken by the wind.”

Yemeni observers are well aware of Saleh’s political and military double-speak, which in itself makes a mockery of the Obama administrations “shift” in policy. The White House then fails to correct his conflicting rhetoric. For Saleh to speak as he has and steadfastly resort to violence in Washington’s silence - and still receive a favorable agreement through the GCC - offers flagrant support for Yemen’s embattled president.

“It’s deplorable that the UN’s press statement won’t reflect the gravity of the situation on the ground,” lamented a Sana’a-based diplomat briefed on the conduct of recent UN meetings. “Especially since the language of United States, the European Union, and the Gulf Co-operation Council is almost identical at this point on the need for an immediate democratic transition.”

The real tragedy is how hard the U.S., E.U. and GCC are pushing a flawed transfer on Yemen’s political opposition, which doesn’t fully represent the youth coalition or general opposition. Meanwhile The Washington Post ran a story on Saleh’s use of the Republican Guard and Special Forces, led by his son Ahmed and trained by U.S. Special Forces. Elsewhere the Yemen Post cites almasdaronline.com in reporting “Saleh and his relatives... have chaos and criminal plans” to target defected General Ali-Mohsen al-Ahmar’s First Armored Division, and clear out protesters from Sana’a during the mayhem.

True or not, these allegations are based in Yemen’s current ground conditions and proliferate amid complete silence from the Obama administration. For comparison, the State Department has addressed Syria’s uprising 17 days since the pivotal outbreak on March 15th, while Yemen has been addressed 18 times since February 2nd. Syria’s output doubles Yemen’s since mid-March.

Saleh’s finale, however, goes beyond even these grievances. Flush with confidence from Washington and the GCC’s de-facto support, and still able to summon counter-demonstrators, Yemen’s president of 32 years has perceived the momentum as tipping back in his favor. Not only does the situation remain stalemated, he’s trying to regress into deeper conflict. Quoted by Saba state media, Saleh resisted all thoughts of resignation with his most disturbing remarks yet: "Those who want power or to gain the seat of power should do it by heading to the ballot box. Change and departure will be through voting under the legal framework of the constitution.”

Such a statement goes beyond a declaration to remain in power until his term expires, in 2013, by implying that Saleh will seek re-election. Yemeni protesters refused to believe his pledge not to run for good reason. U.S. diplomats might hold an ace up their sleeve, but the more likely scenario is that they’re cheating for Yemen’s president.

He does seem to believe he’s winning despite the massive revolution outside his door.

Uganda’s Quiet Riots Scream Double-Standard

The double-standard haunting NATO’s intervention into Libya had already floated down to Côte d'Ivoire by the time Alassane Ouattara launched his military campaign towards Abidjan. Speaking for many skeptical observers weeks before the advance, Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia criticized the international community for imposing a no-fly zone over Libya on March 19th. With Nigeria chairing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it became Lagos’s duty to lobby for an immediate resolution to hostilities, which left over 1,000 people dead, wounded additional thousands and displaced over a million people.

Disputed president Laurent Gbagbo ultimately set a much-feared tone by refusing to step down after electoral defeat in November 2010. Thus people naturally began to wonder why Gbagbo was left to his own devices while Muammar Gaddafi faced NATO’s wrath.

Although understandable from a moral position, criticism of the international community suffers from a number of unfavorable comparisons with Libya. A no-fly zone was inapplicable to Gbagbo’s military, which did utilize artillery and tanks but not nearly to the degree that Gaddafi has. Lacking a workable air force of his own, Gbagbo’s deployment of small units within urbanized environments would have posed even smaller targets for streaking fighter jets, with the risk of civilian casualties running high in the non-designated zone of Abidjan. While not entirely forested, Côte d'Ivoire’s urbanized southern coast is also covered in jungle and waterways, whereas Libya’s desert offers the most favorable terrain for air-power.

A greater degree of truth exists in the opinion that Côte d'Ivoire was left for dead, however this trend only took off after Egypt’s revolution. Up until that point Côte d'Ivoire’s crisis had mobilized and unified Western and African states, capturing international and U.S. media attention in the process. Economic sanctions and diplomatic assistance aided in isolating Gbagbo’s regime, while UN peacekeepers protected Ouattara in the Gulf Hotel from Gbagbo’s fervent militias. UN forces eventually stepped directly into battle on April 4th by launching a helicopter raid on Gbabgo’s remaining military base, presumably to counter the impression of a double-standard.

The international community intervened with nearly every non-military option available in Côte d'Ivoire. Without appealing to NATO for a no-fly zone or resorting to ECOWAS’s military contingency, a second civil war was allowed to burn out on its own terms, keeping foreign forces out of the messy aftermath.

While the West applied different strategies to Gbagbo and Gaddafi, the two dictators shared in the designation of regime change. A double-standard was never theoretically applied. Although Uganda doesn’t qualify for Libya or Côte d'Ivoire’s level of violence, a real double-standard has pervaded the Western response to this much-needed ally. President Barack Obama never shied away from Côte d'Ivoire and he’s unlikely to go near Uganda, a key backer of Somalia’s war against al-Shabab.

Here’s a state where the opposition leader can be arrested without a word from Washington. Where America and Europe must remain silent due to Uganda’s heavy lifting in Mogadishu - and subvert human rights through another quid pro quo.

A long-time acquaintance of Gaddafi, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently secured his fourth election victory over frequent challenger and former ally Kizza Besigye. Though marred by the usual accusation of fraud, the February 19th election landed Museveni with 68% of the vote amid scant attention from the international community. He’ll have overseen Uganda for 30 years if he can last to his next “victory” in 2016, and all evidence suggests that he will.

Although Besigye started talking revolution before the results were released, the country hadn’t reached the ripe state of more mobilized societies such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Museveni’s 26 years fall in line with Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s 24, yet the 30's and above obviously provide more time to spawn a true tipping point. These repressive regimes often followed a period of greater political and economic instability, allowing them to accelerate their economies to placate dissent and create a relativistic shield to hide their abuses behind.

As economic progress fades the masses lose their reason to sit quietly in the corners of society, and begin to risk their lives for a better future.

Museveni is following but hasn’t necessarily completed a similar trajectory. After coming to power on the back of a victorious resistance, Ugandans were glad to finally rid their nation of colonialism and inter-African conflict. Museveni exploited the image of an “independent” man and national hero to counter Africa's foreign “puppets,” while simultaneously becoming an IMF darling during the 1990’s. More recently he’s taken on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an unpopular insurgency in the country’s north. Positioned by the West as part of Africa’s “new generation,” Uganda could have done worse during a fragile period of nation-building.

Relativity, however, loses its meaning to those suffering on the ground, and the West was eventually forced to back off Museveni like the rest of the fallen “generation.” Even with 6-8% growth over the last five years, upwards of 30% of Ugandans remain impoverished and unemployed. Human rights abuses have piled up over the last two decades, while Museveni has secured each election victory under a cloud of fraud allegations. Besigye took his previous outcomes into the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor but against overturning the results.

Kampala resumed its daily activity after his latest defeat in February and Uganda’s revolution never got off the ground. Defeated a third time without much of a plan, some predict that Besigye has lost his spirit. But protests and riots have steadily increased since then, with Besigye walking to work to protest rising fuel prices. Uganda’s exchange rate has risen by 15% since the beginning of year, followed by a 20% spike in fuel and broad increase in all commodities prices. Inflation in general rose from 6.4% in February to 11.1% in March.

Besigye, who Museveni has previously targeted through state security and lawsuits, found himself arrested twice in the last week. Although the government accuses him of disturbing the peace, the more likely motive is suppressing all attempts to protest, which often foments new dissent.

Museveni himself outlines his views in a CNN op-ed, saying, “we must distinguish between demonstrations and insurrections. Peaceful demonstrations should not be fired upon with live bullets. Of course, even peaceful demonstrations should coordinate with the police to ensure that they do not interfere with the rights of other citizens. However, when rioters are attacking police stations and army barracks with the aim of taking power, then they are no longer demonstrators; they are insurrectionists. They will have to be treated as such. A responsible government would have to use reasonable force to neutralize them.”

Unfortunately many violent means exist beyond live bullets to counter protesters, and protesters were arrested during peaceful demonstrations. Leaving economic riots to the side, many of Besigye’s political protesters have been arrested for civil-disobedience rather than “insurrection.” Even so, Museveni attempts to outmaneuver them by forbidding all civil-disobedience, even non-violent tactics that form the core of fourth-generation resistance. “Reasonable” force becomes disproportionate.

Elsewhere Norbert Mao, president-general of the Democratic Party, also finds himself jailed with six supporters for protesting, and accepts the charges willingly. Although he rejects the two counts of assault and incitement to violence, Mao recently declared during his court hearing, “Once again, Your Lordship, if it's an offense to protest against the high commodity prices in the country, then I am guilty. If it's an offense to speak on behalf of other Ugandans, then I am guilty.”

“Once again... they have brought the wrong people to court.”

The overriding point of Uganda’s unrest isn’t to expect a full-blown revolution. Conversely, expecting the latest wave of discontent to pass like the rest has doomed many experienced dictators. Accumulation is the key to a revolution and Uganda has plenty of stored energy. But the most glaring anomaly from outside the country is how little attention it receives from an international community lost in North Africa and the Middle East. Museveni’s level of oppression is staggering in comparison to the perceived threat. At least four protesters have been shot and killed in the last four days, while the government moved to cut off Facebook and Twitter. And the top two oppositional candidates remain jailed.

Internal Affairs Minister Kirunda Kivejinja went so far as to warn that protesters will be detained because they're acting, “outside the law and accepted norms of society. We shall not be ashamed in the execution of our duties.” Either Museveni believes the opposition is more potent than he lets on, or he’s committed to stamping out every last trace of dissent. Neither option is acceptable by international standards.

Though far less dire than those countries deep in revolution, Uganda’s internal situation clearly warrants attention from the international community. In its latest human rights report, the State Department concluded that, “Serious human rights problems in the country include arbitrary killings; vigilante killings; mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects and detainees; harsh prison conditions; official impunity; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention; incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention; restrictions on the right to a fair trial and on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on opposition parties; electoral irregularities; official corruption...”

But this is as far as Washington has been willing to go.

It would be too simplistic to lay the entire cause on Somalia’s ongoing war. Beyond economic opportunities for foreign investment, Museveni forms a stable U.S. alliance with Ethiopia and Kenya in a region rimmed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan and Somalia. Thus he’s useful for more than his 8,000 troops stationed in Mogadishu, most of which were deployed before Kampala was struck by a dual-suicide bombing in July 2010.

However Uganda’s leading role in Somalia leaves no doubt as to why America and Europe want nothing to do with another uprising. Kampala’s attack allowed Museveni to remove the UN-mandated ceiling of 8,000 and push it over 12,000, in accordance with Western governments. Oddly, while Museveni has criticized Libya’s rebels for accepting foreign support, the president has shown no such embarrassment in fighting Somalia’s counterinsurgency for the Somali people.

He’s also unwilling to fund it, instead relying on Western funds and often complaining of late payments. And he wants to deploy more troops.

While it’s understandable that Museveni won’t fight America’s war for free - and rationally believes in keeping Western forces out of Africa - he certainly wishes to keep his arrangement as is. His dependence in Somalia is explicitly designed to keep the international community off of his back, and he's succeeding. Consider al-Qaeda’s three main theaters: Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. With two dictators guarding Washington’s vulnerable back-doors, who can blame Museveni and Ali Abdullah Saleh for leveraging U.S. aid and continuing to rule with impunity?

No Eyes On Yemen

Updating the Obama administration’s daily response to Yemen’s revolution can grow admittedly repetitive. Each day the country passes unsaid through the White House's roll-call and U.S. media, belying dire threats and its assigned importance from counter-terrorism officials. Although silence offers a variety of plot-lines, it can also go dead as a topic at any given moment.

But truth often exists within this silence and today was no different. With President Ali Abdullah Saleh stalling on the political front, provoking women and firing on protesters with tear gas, water cannons, and live bullets, the White House and State Department closed their eyes to another volatile weekend. State spokesman Mark Toner hasn’t spoken on Yemen since April 8th, when he voiced support for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative to end the stalemate. He has proceeded to use this time to address Libya and Syria on a daily basis.

Meanwhile Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (briefly) filled Toner's vacuum by pushing a conclusion through the GCC, even as Saleh refuses to bow and maintains his violent crackdown.

Unfortunately for Washington and Riyadh, Yemen’s political opposition doesn’t appear to have bitten on their 30-day deadline to transfer power. Mohammed Kahtan, spokesman for the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), did tell reporters, "We are happy that our brothers in the GCC listened to our point of view. The GCC leaders were happy to hear from the JMP delegation about the guarantees that would be given to the president if he decides to step down.”

However the status of Saleh’s immunity remains unsettled in the streets, and the issue also remains secondary to his immediate fate. After sending their latest delegation to Riyadh, the JMP reiterated their call for the GCC’s April 3rd plan, which explicitly called for Saleh’s immediate resignation after transferring power to Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansoo Hadi. According to the JMP, the latest U.S. “offer” failed to clarify Saleh’s resignation - only his transfer of power - on top of delaying their own time-line by two weeks.

Sultan al Atwani, an opposition leader, told reporters after the meeting that the JMP supports the GCC initiative, "but we reject the paragraph that was issued in the final statement … which refers to the transfer of powers of the president. We demand the resignation of the president."

In line with Saleh’s usual doublespeak, the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) described the meeting between GCC ministers and the JMP as a "failure due to the obstinate position of the JMP.”

Perpetual silence from the White House may suggest that it doesn’t wish to enter such fluid negotiations, except this perception is false. The White House and State Department have backed the GCC’s plan against the will of Yemen’s popular opposition, triggering an immediate bias in Saleh’s favor. U.S. diplomats have personally submitted Washington’s plan to government officials in Sana’a and Riyadh, in addition to persuading the JMP to accept. The White House is already in too deep to feign ignorance - nor is the State Department shy about addressing the “positive” results of Bahrain’s ongoing negotiations.

As has been the case before, Toner’s remarks are easily transposed onto Yemen:

QUESTION: Can I start with Bahrain? So this time, Mr. Feltman [Jeffrey Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs] was able to meet with leaders. How high were his meetings and how – I’m quite surprised by the tone of your statement because it seems like the push for demand for the respect of the rights of Bahrainis has been toned down quite a lot. You highlighted the concerns about Iran and your longstanding commitment to the people and the government who have been at loggerheads in recent weeks. Has this tone softened?

MR. TONER: Well, again, you’ve summarized some of what I said. But he also underscored the United States’ belief in universal values and conveyed that belief to the Bahraini authorities. And he also emphasized the fundamental need for respect for human rights. So I wouldn’t say there’s been any softening, but these talks took place in a very constructive atmosphere.

And we believe that this was done in a constructive manner and progress was made, and that going forward, we urge both that ongoing respect for human rights, but as well as the opposition and the Bahraini Government to engage in a political dialogue that leads to resolution.

QUESTION: Can you tell us some of the things that you expressed concerns about – the deaths in prisons, maybe?

MR. TONER: I think I – I mean, I think I’ve spoken to all of the incidents about which we have concern over the past week, including, as you noted, the death of a prominent human rights activist last week.

QUESTION: There are continued, I mean, deaths and human rights abuses taking place in Bahrain that have been documented by human rights groups over the last week and – I mean, the situation in Bahrain has been getting really bad. Last week, there were numerous criticisms of the United States and its approach to Bahrain, and, I mean, even if you’re couching your language at this podium, I hope that we can expect that – I mean, that Secretary Feltman took – can you say that he raised some of these serious issues?

And it sounds as if you’re talking about two different Bahrains because we’ve been talking at the podium about how horrible the situation is in Bahrain right now and U.S. concerns, whereas none of what you just said really reflected the seriousness of the situation there.

MR. TONER: Well, Elise, again, I disagree. Secretary Feltman went to Bahrain. He went there both to speak to the government as well as to the opposition, met with a wide range of actors, and did so in a constructive spirit. But we’ve been very, very clear about where we stand on this, that the Bahraini Government needs to respect human rights and needs to address the legitimate aspirations of its own people, and that was conveyed.

Toner then blanked on Yemen to prove how clear the White House is on universal human rights and democratic aspirations.

Yet the administration's ongoing silence cannot be blamed solely on U.S. officials. Difficult as it is to report on the non-existent, journalists seem to have forgotten the art of following up. When White House press secretary Jay Carney stops by Iraq to laud America’s progress - and “a full transition to the Iraqis” - no reporter inquires about Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s recent offer to extend the mission. No one questions Iraq's stability.

Likewise, Toner doesn’t go so far as to support regime change outright in Syria, believing he would risk a double-standard in Bahrain and Yemen. Except the reporter continues, “Look, it’s not for us to say when a transition should take place. Really? I mean, you did say so in Egypt and you did so say in Yemen and you have said so in Libya...”

Beyond a sluggish response to Egypt’s revolution, the Obama administration hasn’t definitively moved against Saleh. Nearly two weeks have passed since the GCC intervened, days after The New York Times' alleged “shift” occurred, and the U.S. plan attempted to delay his resignation by another month. While a weakening in position did occur, Washington is still mounting a resistance to soften Saleh’s landing. Bluntly speaking, he hasn’t been so militarily useful as to deserve this royal treatment.

Some reporters give Toner a hard time after raising America’s clandestine support for Syria’s opposition, wondering why the administration hasn’t done more to undermine Bashar al-Assad's regime. Responding to the same question, Carney replies, “As you know also, the U.S. government provides support to civil society, democracy and human rights activists around the world in line with our values, among them respecting the fundamental human rights of free speech, peaceful assembly and human dignity. U.S. outreach to Syrian civilian society is entirely consistent with those principles.”

No one asks why the opposite strategy was pursued in Yemen - why U.S. efforts were directed into propping up Saleh.

Maybe reporters believe the obvious answer is al-Qaeda, maybe they’ve fallen into the White House’s spell, or maybe they’ve been ordered to keep quiet. But the pattern of evasion is crystal clear and time-stamped. We await the day when the U.S. media flips its lights on - after Saleh's fall.

Until then a deep shadow lurks below Yemen’s surface.

Greg Mortenson Prepares Counter-Offensive

From The Los Angeles Times:

Bestselling author Greg Mortenson has issued a written response to a "60 Minutes" report calling into question his philanthropic practices and his experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mortenson chronicled those experiences in the books "Three Cups of Tea" and "Stones Into Schools" and leads the Central Asia Institute, an international charity that supports schools in remote regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Steve Kroft's "60 Minutes" report cited accounts that contradicted essential parts of Mortenson's story, and calls into question the way funds are allocated by the charity. The report, which aired Sunday night, is embedded above; "60 Minutes" posted Mortenson's response on its website. The following is from that statement.

60 Minutes' question: Did you really stumble into Korphe after failing to summit K2? The two porters who accompanied you on your journey down from K2 have told us you did not. We have three other sources that support the porters' accounts. The evidence suggests that you did not step foot in Korphe until a year later.

Greg Mortenson: Yes, I first visited Korphe village, Braldu valley, Baltistan, Pakistan, after failing to summit K2 in 1993, and met Haji Ali, a long time dear mentor and friend. My second visit to Korphe was in 1994. I made two visits to Korphe in 1995, the year we built the bridge over the Braldu River. And I again made two visits to Korphe in 1996, the year we built the Korphe School.

Mortenson further told the Bozeman Daily Chronicle, "The time about our final days on K2 and ongoing journey to Korphe village and Skardu is a compressed version of events that took place in the fall of 1993." He also told the paper, "As the co-author of the book, along with David Oliver Relin, I am responsible for the content in the book. There were many people involved in the story and also those who produced the manuscript. What was done was to simplify the sequence of events for the purposes of telling what was, at times, a complicated story."

Mortenson's written response continued:

It is important to know that Balti people have a completely different notion about time. Even the Balti language -- an archaic dialect of Tibetan -- has only a vague concept of tenses and time. For example, "now" can mean immediately or sometime over the course of a whole long season. The concept of past and future is rarely of concern. Often tenses are left out of discussion, although everyone knows what is implied. And if a person is a day or a week late or early it doesn't matter. The Balti consider the western notion of time quite amusing.

Language and perceptions of time seem to be coming into some kind of conflict. In his written statement, Mortenson looks to language, and an underlying difference in worldview, to blame for accounts that contradict his own. That's the same position he takes when responding to the television show's next question.

Question: Were you kidnapped for eight days by the Taliban in Waziristan in 1996? Three of the men in the photo you published in "Stones Into Schools" deny that they kidnapped you and say they are not Taliban. We have two other sources of information that support their account.

Mortenson: Yes, I was detained for eight days in Waziristan in 1996. It was against my will, and my passport and money were taken from me. I was not mistreated or harmed, but I was also not allowed to leave. A blanket was put over my head any time I was moved by vehicle. A "Talib" means student in Arabic, and, yes, there were Taliban in the region. Waziristan is an area where tribal factions and clan ties run deep. Some people are Taliban, some are not, and affiliations change overnight often on a whim. The Pathan people of Waziristan are proud people who I greatly admire. In speaking to American audiences, I often talk about my admiration for their concepts of Pashtunwali, their unwritten code of honor and conduct, and Nenawastay, hospitality.

The answer doesn't exactly address the question. Read the responses from the Central Asia Institute's (at www.ikat.org) board of directors and Mortenson's responses to the television show's other questions here.

Perhaps Mortenson will speak up further about these issues and others raised by the "60 Minutes" report.

We will refrain from commenting until more information (and disinformation) is released by both sides - and leave Mortenson’s passionate defense to others. However, this new controversy doesn’t change our opinion that Pentagon officials manipulated Mortenson to sell a softer side in Afghanistan, and thus extend what remains a predominately militarized counterinsurgency under the banner of educating Afghans.

Whether he was corrupted or became “corrupt,” in the sense of using the Pentagon for his own purposes, is still debatable. But the number of schools built, Mortenson’s management style and royalties are only indirectly connected to his disturbing link with the Pentagon. We're concerned with Washington's exaggeration, not his own.

Conversely, during a July 2010 interview with Charlie Rose now cited as evidence of fraud, Mortenson was critical of the Obama administration’s ongoing strategy. Maybe he changed his mind too deep into the game. With Viking Press reviewing his best-selling Three Cups of Tea, Mortenson has finally entered Afghanistan’s political and media battlefield, and must battle his way out against unseen forces.

[Update: See Mortenson's exclusive interview with Outsideonline.com]

Saleh Opens Usual Bag of Tricks

After enraging women protesters across Yemen for ordering them not to mix with men - essentially ordering them out of the revolution - President Ali Abdullah Saleh has lost himself in some deep backtracking. Tawakkol Karman, Yemen’s leading female activist, pounced on Saleh for showing “his real face and his hatred against women.” With women spearheading rallies in Sana'a, Taiz and Aden, opposition figure Ali Obaid added, "Yemeni women lead the Yemeni revolution and men follow."

Manifesting Saleh’s counter-productivity in the streets, protester Raiofa Nasser explained, "Many women were avoiding the protests, but since Saleh's verbal attack on women, we will not go home.”

Amid reports that security forces fired point-blank on protesters, government officials have blamed protesters for illegally marching and for injuring policemen with stones. The reality is that provoking disproportionate force through low-intensity violence serves as a pillar of fourth-generation warfare, and Saleh fell right into the trap. Now his officials are spinning his latest address as “advice” to protect women from harm, while ironically accusing the opposition of twisting his words. Although Saleh was foolish enough to trigger Yemen’s estrogen, he’s not so stupid as to realize the consequences for shooting women, especially from his American benefactor.

"Saleh is the first to support women's rights and has always shown interest in involving women in Yemeni politics," said Zaid Thari, a senior member of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC). "Saleh was advising protesters and not acting against women in specific."

A typical example of the duplicity Yemenis have become habituated to after 32 years, and an explanation for why the streets don’t trust the political opposition to negotiate on their behalf:

SANA'A, April 17 (Saba)- President Ali Abdullah Saleh has affirmed his keenness to strengthen women's participation in political action and in all institutions of the State.

This came during his meeting on Sunday with a number of women's leaderships, who expressed their appreciation for encouragement, care and support provided by the president to women in the country.

President Saleh said that Yemeni women have proven that they have sufficient awareness and care about the national issues more than some people.

"We do not suspect our mothers, daughters or sisters. Women are the best and more honorable than to say anything about," he said.

He wondered how those, who sit-in in front of Sana'a University, permitted to themselves to leave women in the streets, while they claim to not mix.

"When we talked and said why mixing, that is because of our worry about our daughters, sisters and mothers from mob and anarchists," the president explained.

President Saleh noted that women have demonstrated a rare courage in this crisis in all parts of the country, highly valuing their role in the current crisis.

He renewed emphasis to women's leaderships, saying, "We will not let you down whatever the circumstances.”

Spoken like the calculating but disconnected dictator that U.S. cables knew him to be.

Saleh Goes From Hunter To Hunted

He wasn’t joking.

Like other foreign journalists streaming into Yemen, Haley Edwards didn’t receive a friendly welcome from the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh. “Are you going to write nice stories?” asked the customs agent before finally approving her entry. Edwards, a freelance contributor to The Los Angeles Times and traveler of the enigmatic nation, answered in the negative by broadcasting Saleh’s orchestrated violence and intimidation to the world.

Finally deported on March 14th along with another journalist and two cameramen, the Yemeni government issued a standard denial before accusing the group of “illegal” visitation. Security forces had, of course, stalked them from the beginning.

In the fear-based reality of Saleh’s universe, “not being nice” to the government offers grounds for punishment, which many Yemenis have endured over 32 years of stable instability. Anyone opposing Saleh’s domination risked suppression under the threat of civil war or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen’s diverse opposition was fragmented with relative ease through a mixture of patronage, bribery, coercion, and brute force. A mutated roshambo where Saleh always held the upper fist, quarters of the country found themselves trapped under each resilient finger. No singular opponent could be allowed to divide Yemen again, lest everyone else follow their example.

Fear became the denominator of unity.

Yemen’s history (or any, for that matter) is too deep to examine in an contained analysis. Suffice to say, Yemen’s desperate parts had become unbearably agitated under Saleh’s rule by 2009. The northern-based Houthis, an insurgent group following the Zaydi school of Shi’a Islam, had suffered four cycles of conflict and were perched on a fifth with Saleh, himself a Zaydi Shia. To the south, the secessionist-minded Southern Movement (SM) faced continual suppression amid a semi-declared war-zone. Saleh’s unfulfilled promises had degenerated into a state of lawlessness in the southern governorates of Abyan (now partially under AQAP control) and Shebwah, where it’s dangerous to drive in a state vehicle.

Once U.S. Special Forces and CIA moved in to train Saleh’s counter-terrorism squads, they were abruptly deployed to these two theaters. According to recently released WikiLeaks from 2009, Saleh belatedly corrected his priorities during a meeting with Stephen R. Kappes, former deputy director of the CIA. When asked to rank the threats to Yemen’s security, Saleh initially assigned the Houthis, SM, and AQAP to “the same level,” then paused and placed AQAP atop his list. Ambassador Stephen A. Seche admits that Saleh’s decision “to reverse himself” was “almost certainly taken with his USG interlocutors in mind...”

“Nor was it coincidental,” Seche concluded, “that Saleh was quick to blame foreign powers for the nation's woes. From the U.K., Qatar and Libya aiding the southerners, to Iran and Hizballah engineering the Houthi rebellion in the north, to an international terrorist conspiracy fueling AQAP's growth, the implication is that Yemen is beset by forces that it will be hard-pressed to repel without substantial external support. This argument is, of course, also tailored to Saleh's USG audience, and meant to elicit the necessary level of political, economic and military assistance to forestall Yemen's collapse, and the negative effects it would have on regional stability and security.”

Saleh deftly exploited this argument locally and in foreign capitals to buttress his rule after Yemen’s last civil war, in 1994. When he wasn’t busy pitting tribes against each other and encouraging revenge killings, he was bribing them into temporarily obedience. To Yemen’s tribal and urban population, and later to the U.S. government, Saleh threatened a Somali-like meltdown in the event that the Houthis or SM attempted to secede. Never truly attempting to unify the country or develop its infrastructure, Saleh divided each of his opponents into their own manageable quarters and left them to stew.

Seeds of a revolution

Now the ground beneath Saleh is quaking, the sky is falling on his head and his world has flipped upside-down since January 17th, the first of activist Tawakkol Karman’s many protests. The primal fear of revolution offers a fitting conclusion to those rulers who survive through threats and abuse. Although dictators live in constant fear, regime change provides a final fright to balance the cosmic scales. Mubarak, Gaddafi, and Saleh are typical bullies found in Western cartoons. Having beaten up their peers one by one, the oppressed inevitably unite and overpower their neighborhood tyrant. Justice is ultimately delivered.

While Saleh may have been the only man capable of holding Yemen’s parts together, his temporary rule came with the price of inevitable collapse. Once Yemenis lost all fear and Saleh lost his primary weapon, the masses turned to prey on him.

Much as a volcano or fault-line stores energy unseen to the naked eye, Yemen’s stagnant opposition has revived itself with an influx of pent-up anger. This energy gradually increased between 2001, 2005 and 2009 before exploding in 2011, as Saleh’s grip on power tightened without relief. His money supply had begun to dry up along with Yemen’s water and oil reserves, turning an economic crisis into a catastrophe. Although he felt the rumblings, Saleh decided not to take them any more seriously than the previous 17 years of dissent. Nothing appeared out of the ordinary - except the pieces of his unsustainable equilibrium had finally begun to crumble.

A late 2009 cable summarized, “Like other Saleh watchers, 'xxxxx' characterizes the multitude of threats facing Saleh as qualitatively different and more threatening to the regime's stability than those during any other time in Yemen's history. Saleh is overwhelmed, exhausted by the war, and more and more intolerant of internal criticism...”

To the north, Saleh found himself unable to restore control to Houthi territory. Saudi Arabia reluctantly pitched in with warplanes and ground troops, disdainfully labeling Saleh as “the Devil we know,” while Washington passed along ammunition and trained counter-terrorism units that would deploy far from AQAP. Only part propaganda, Saleh’s appeal to Riyadh stemmed from the real belief that he couldn’t defeat the Houthis by himself; he was eventually forced into an uneasy truce that is currently void.

By this time he had already lost control of much of the south. The port city of Aden, now a hotbed of protests, has long been openly hostile to security forces.

Meanwhile Saleh’s oil resources had dwindled, forcing him to increasingly rely on siphoned foreign aid to bribe neutral and potentially hostile tribes. A new U.S. aid package was supposed to alleviate his personal deficit, but one elder in the Baqil tribe, one of Yemen’s two main tribes, succinctly explained, “Buying is forever, renting is just temporary.” Many tribal figures have since drawn attention to the timing of Saleh’s shortfall and his unveiling of AQAP, a feeling that carries over to the present.

“It’s obvious that Al-Qaeda appeared after the president said ‘Yemen is a time bomb,’” says Naji Al-Sumi, head of the political department of the Islah Party in Al-Jawf governorate. “Then the security withdrew in preparation for Al-Qaeda to appear.”

Obsessed with his main foes, Saleh committed the final mistake of ignoring Yemen’s unemployed, urban youth. As the cash ran out and no improvements were made to their communities, tribal leaders entered a perfect mindset to join the revolution’s energetic core in Sana’a. Tribal leaders now speak of how they cannot accept monetary offers to return home. Saleh has dishonored their name by killing the Yemeni people, thus they cannot accept his bribes without losing their own tribes’ legitimacy. At a practical level they know Saleh is tapped out and few payments will follow, just as the youth views Saleh’s belated economic incentives as fraudulent.

Long on enemies and short on allies, the scales finally tipped against Yemen's embattled president. A revolution becomes a dog pile as the opposition attempts to collectively outweigh the regime, and everyone saw an opportunity to jump on. Now Saleh is being conquered by those he tried to divide.

Beginning of the end

Mirroring the decades-long culmination of resentment and poverty, Yemen’s revolution has fueled itself on a series of tipping points, each one driving towards the point of no return. First came Karman’s January 16th protest to commemorate Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. Her arrest on the 23rd catapulted the early phase of protesters into the streets, who weathered a lull before Mubarak’s fall re-ignited them again. Yemenis began to truly believe they could replicate their Egyptian brothers and sisters.

Despite the popular rage, Yemen’s political opposition initially attempted to dictate their terms and control the demonstrations. Hamid al-Ahmar, a wealthy leader within Saleh’s Hashid tribe, immediately jumped into the driver's seat. As a political figure in both the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and Islah party, Hamid initially attempted to quell the revolution’s energy into a manageable force. The pace of Egypt’s revolution, which initially outstripped the political opposition’s capabilities, hadn’t been lost on him.

At first many figures within his tribe rejected his position, while outsiders labeled him as an opportunistic strongman of Saudi Arabia. But Hamid threatened to summon his militia, supposedly up to 10,000 men, after Saleh continued his crackdown on peaceful protesters. Other tribes began to flock to Sanaa. Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, head of the Council of Islamic Clerics and Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood, defected from Saleh’s side on March 1st (al-Zindani is allegedly connected to AQAP). Widespread political defections began on March 5th, while the March 8th gassing incident at Sanaa University triggered a new level of popular support.

Initially assumed to be tear gas, fears of nerve gas developed after lingering symptoms of convulsion and blindness. Although no definitive study has been conducted, the probable scenario is overexposure to a high concentration of CN gas, which Saleh's security forces continue to employ in closed spaces.

With support pouring in from all corners of Yemen’s society, Saleh vainly turned to his secondary tactic of foreign conspiracies. But instead of the usual Iranian-Houthi connection, Saleh privately shocked the White House by blaming his crumbling position on “control rooms” in Washington and Tel Aviv. Predictably recanting after hitting this dead-end, Saleh has since tried to pin his problems on foreign media, specifically Al Jazeera. The organization, which is forced to hide its reporters’ identities, has operated under a ban throughout the revolution and suffered attacks on its personnel and facilities.

More than a few journalists were thrown out of Yemen during February and March, but the media too has enjoyed the last laugh. Not every Western reporter can be rounded up, and it seems Al Jazeera cannot be stopped. Singled out by Saleh as a “Zionist” tool long before the revolution started, Al Jazeera has broadcast daily footage of demonstrations and clashes with regime elements. No protester believes Saleh when he blames the country’s political and economic unrest on foreign media, or when he denied government defections as media fabrications.

Somehow Al Jazeera became the leading news site in Yemen.

A culmination of incidents set the stage for March 18th, widely assumed as the revolutions ’s climatic tipping point. After snipers fired upon a crowd as security forces looked on, an attack that left at least 45 people dead, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar finally stepped over to the protesters’ side. The leader of the Hashid tribe assured that Hamid was no longer off playing president in his own world. General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Saleh’s fist against the Houthis, joined the protesters a day later.

As more tribes flocked to the demonstrations, they came under social pressure to settle their differences. Bribes were refused while tribes pledged to guard oil pipelines and opposition-controlled government facilities. Proximity has breed familiarity, further reducing tribal barriers. The northern Al-Jawf and Al-Otmi tribes have supposedly ended their 30-year cycle of revenge killings. Although the Murad and Abeeda tribes from Marib share a similar history of revenge, they now share one tent at Al-Tagheer Square. All of them blame Saleh for “creating crises” between them.

“The amazing thing," says Al-Sumi, "is that it was the tribal position that brought balance to the political game."

Nearly surrounded on all sides, Saleh hasn’t been so obtuse as to ignore the revolution completely. Hoping to deplete its energy through concessions, Saleh chose Mubarak’s shadow tactics over Gaddafi’s open warfare in order to avoid surrender. Yemen’s defiant president maintains an open stance towards negotiations geared to his terms, mainly a time-table for resignation, to ward off his immediate departure. His concept of an “orderly, democratic” transition is the same advocated by Washington.

Yet Saleh’s repressive stall tactics are responsible for his own demise, making the justice so poetic.

White House scrambles emergency response

Given that Washington and Riyadh constituted his sole backstop, the final hammer came down after the March 18th sniper incident. The Obama administration could handle Saleh’s personal taunts, misappropriated arms, and social marginalization - public policy and the flow of WikiLeaks reveals the depth of Washington’s tolerance. But the loss of tribal support awoke the White House from its slumber. The realization set in that Saleh wouldn’t survive, and that his stalling allowed AQAP to seize enough territory in Abyan to declare an Islamic Emirate. The narrative that Saleh made America safer had burnt up.

Attempting to counter months of relative silence, U.S. officials continue to argue, “We do not build our policy in any country around a single person.” They aren’t fooling Yemenis at this point; even the U.S. media is having trouble ignoring the White House’s prolonged silence, though it is doing an impressive job. WikiLeaks show that Washington knew most, if not all, of Saleh’s offenses and chalked them up to the costs of doing business in the “War on Terror.”

This was never a stable arrangement, but an unnatural alliance doomed to collapse at a certain point. Believing that Saleh could withstand the opposition's energy indefinitely committed a colossal strategic error. As it turned out, he didn’t last two years under Washington’s beefed-up counter-terrorism.

WikiLeaks’ trail paints a horrendous picture of strategic blindness, and media reports indicate that the Obama administration only recently turned against Saleh after giving him countless chances. With America plummeting from the moral high-ground and AQAP seizing literal ground, the White House finally submitted and phoned Riyadh to plot another “orderly transition." Step one was pasting Egypt’s brief power transfer to Omar Suleiman onto Abd Rabbo Mansoo Hadi, Saleh’s vice president of 17 years, or another of Saleh's men. The plan has only worked for the moment and, in calling for a 30 day time-table, will set up a showdown inside the opposition. After Ali-Mohsen announced his approval along with al-Ahmar, the JMP tentatively accepted a plan they put forward weeks ago.

"We know that the protesters have objection to the plan as they want to prosecute President Saleh for the previous clashes that left dozens killed or injured," spokesman Mohamed Qahtan assured, "we in the JMP can guarantee that after Saleh steps aside, we will convince the protesters to accept the new situation and to show mercy on Saleh for the sake of a new Yemen."

Yemen’s popular opposition has steadfastly rejected the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) overtures until Saleh resigns. This was a man who, just before the revolution, eyed the removal of term limits, a move Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was forced to condemn during a rare visit to Sana'a. Saleh has already rewarded the JMP, the only opposition group he's willing to talk to, with the usual slander of "bandits" and criminals."

The JMP automatically responded by backing away from the GCC's plan - a pragmatic decision that inevitably plays into Saleh's stall tactics.

Beyond al-Qaeda's threat

Both in foresight and hindsight, Saleh’s collapse was distinctly visible to all save for himself and U.S. policy-makers in Washington. The Saudis and CIA handlers on the ground perceived the difference in energy. So did tribal leaders such as Hamid, who told U.S. embassy officials in 2009 that a revolution was coming in 2011. U.S. officials nevertheless continued to view Yemen as "stable enough," and shared in the local belief that Yemenis couldn’t unite the way they have.

The revolution’s swiftness proves how ripe the country truly was.

What comes next seems to concern people more than how Yemen reached its current point. Although a legitimate question, it tends to ignore the introspection needed to answer it. AQAP and Islamic extremism inevitably crop up first in U.S. circles, automatically limiting the debate. True, Yemen’s heightened unity has yet to express itself fully to the international world. Speaking for the Houthis, Southern Movement, various tribes, urban youth, and political opposition is predictably challenging. Nor can any possibility be ruled out during a revolution.

However, a growing body of evidence suggests that Yemen isn’t headed towards civil war or an Islamic caliphate under AQAP’s domination. While the opposition has yet to discover a leader capable of speaking for the whole, Ali-Mohsen (also linked to AQAP) and al-Zindani are viewed as pawns rather than kings. The opposition simply needed to borrow their weight; neither are considered serious candidates for the future presidency. Numerous oppositional figures have also pledged to continue the fight against AQAP, and the coalition adopted a demand that it withdraw from Abyan, to be enforced by the new political authority and local tribes.

In the streets march burqa-clad women chanting for democracy - chanting to men - something that Saleh himself labeled "unIslamic." At the revolution’s core sit optimistic, educated 20-somethings ready to build a real state.

Yemenis still want America’s help too. They know the U.S. government has its hands in the country’s problems, thus opening a spot in the revolution’s conclusion. Only after the March 8th crackdown did sentiment turn openly hostile towards Washington, pressure that had accumulated over the last month (and years). But beyond the occasional anti-American chant or sign, Yemenis remain open to U.S. support so long as it’s on their terms.

Like many inside and outside the country, Edwards guards the hopeful feeling that Yemenis can stay united after Saleh’s fall. Unresolved political and tribal divisions, the unholy alliance between the Hashid and Houthis, the wild-card SM, and local sympathy for AQAP could turn Yemenis on each other once Saleh is removed from the equation. They could also realize - as every faction claims - that Saleh was playing them off each other. A more permanent balance may be achieved without his regime.

These arrogant rulers falsely believe they can hold back the forces of nature, including the human spirit. To underestimate that spirit is to recommit Saleh’s fatal error.

Of course what comes next in Yemen will experience its chaotic moments. That’s how revolution works. But Saleh expects to know who he’s passing his power to before giving it up, a decision that isn’t his to make after 32 years. Nor is it Washington or the GCC’s. For better or worse Yemen’s future must be decided by its diverse people. Saleh’s legacy will set with one positive: triggering a revolution in the first place.

No one will forget the hunt for freedom.

U.S. Opens 30-Day Window For Saleh

The Yemen Post has finally dropped the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) pretense, hopefully the start of a trend. Citing “sources familiar with the matter,” the “U.S.-EU vision was submitted by U.S. and EU envoys to Sana’a,” calling for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to transfer power within 30 days. This demand breaks sharply from the popular opposition’s call for an immediate resignation.

Under Washington's plan Saleh has a week to “pick a new vice president,” either Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansoo Hadi, Prime Minister Ali Mujawar or deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimyat. He must then hand in his resignation within 30 days - 37 days at the minimum.

Replace the EU’s cover as the Saudi hand that it is, and one gets a clear sense of how the Obama administration plans to proceed in Yemen: slow and “orderly.” Welcoming the GCC’s mediation has exercised a display of self-congratulation, a predictable shadow game designed to postpone Saleh’s departure. Far from shifting completely against Saleh, this public posturing was a temporary diversion to create space and buy time for him to maneuver. Washington and Riyadh always planned to salvage Saleh as well, contrary to the wishes of many Yemeni protesters, and are instrumental in securing amnesty/exile for his family.

U.S. counter-terror operations currently run through Saleh’s son Ahmed, commander of the Republican Guard, and nephews Ammar and Yahya, chief of national security and commander of Central Security, respectively. All three units are guilty of crimes against the Yemeni people - and misappropriated U.S. aid with Washington’s tacit consent - partly explaining why the Pentagon wants to spare them from trial.

The White House still refuses to acknowledge that Yemenis possess an intense disdain for Saleh’s mind games. His well-chronicled duplicity drives their immediacy, and the lack of a time-table has hung up GCC negotiations since they began two weeks ago. Pro-government forces continue their assault against the pro-democracy movement with impunity. Protesters justifiably believe that Saleh will corrupt the transition, at the least, and ultimately cancel the transition at worse. Proving their fears as far as they’re concerned, Saleh reaffirmed his constitutional legitimacy on Friday by drawing support from the “silent millions.”

By accusing the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) of sabotaging both oil pipelines and the GCC’s dialogue, his every action paints the image of a man believing he’s weathered the storm.

Washington too realizes this possibility and has gone so far as to play into it; one secondary objective is identifying new officers to run counter-terror programs through. Were the Obama administration serious about removing Saleh and cleansing his regime, it would have sweetened the deal on the opposition side rather than double-down on a collapsing government. The White House cannot be trusted to guarantee Saleh’s resignation after past and current policy.

Understand that Saleh has listened to U.S. defense officials stubbornly support him over the opposition. When Gates warned of Yemen that it cannot fall into “Islamic extremists,” Saleh followed the next day by banning the gathering of men and women. He knows the Pentagon wants to keep him despite his shoddy track record against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - and that it can override the White House.

After taking Saleh’s speech in the chin and rejecting his propaganda, the JMP still plans to meet GCC officials on Sunday. But the delegation’s objective appears to have shifted from tweaking the proposal to "getting answers." Whatever the case, the delegation cannot return to the streets with a 30 day time-table.

Politically opportunistic as the JMP is, they must know this is exactly what Saleh wants.

Gates's Version of "Realism" in Middle East

Propaganda straight from the Voice (of America):

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has sounded a cautious tone on the United States’ ability to help democracy advocates in the Middle East. Gates used what was expected to be a routine speech at a library opening Thursday to send a message about the difference between moral support for the activists and what the United States can and should do based on its national security interests.

It is a thin line many U.S. officials have been trying to walk for months now, since people in several Middle Eastern countries began marching for freedom.

President Barack Obama has made clear the United States supports the spread of democracy, and has urged leaders in the region to accept reforms, with mixed results. Some analysts and members of congress have criticized him for not doing enough to help the demonstrators, while others have criticized him for putting U.S. interests at risk by encouraging the fall of allies in the war on terror, including Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak and Yemen’s leader Ali Abdullah Saleh.

On Thursday, speaking at the opening of a library at the home of the first U.S. president, George Washington, Secretary Gates tried to explain what he called the persistent "dilemma" U.S. leaders have faced for more than 200 years between the desire to promote America’s values and the need to protect its interests.

"It is vital that we speak out about what we believe and let the world know where we stand, even as we do what we must to protect our interests and our security," said Gates. "The most successful leaders, starting with Washington, have steadfastly encouraged the spread of liberty, democracy, and human rights. At the same time, however, they have fashioned policies blending different approaches with different emphases in different places at different times."

Gates acknowledged that doing "what we must" has sometimes meant working with what he called "some of the worst violators of human rights," even as American leaders made protection of human rights "the centerpiece" of their foreign policy. And regarding today’s democracy movements in the Middle East, he said, U.S. moral support for demonstrators who are risking their lives for freedom and democracy does not necessarily mean support for quick, destabilizing change throughout the region.

"When we discuss openly our desire for democratic values to take hold across the globe, we are describing a world that may be many years or decades off," he said.

Gates said while the United States would like to see "democratic values" take hold across the globe, achieving that ideal "may be limited by time, space, resources or human nature."

Secretary Gates - who is expected to retire in a few months - has been in government for 40 years and held numerous senior positions at the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency under eight presidents. He is known as a "realist" on U.S. foreign policy. That refers to someone who believes the United States must identify and defend its most important national interests, even if that sometimes involves dealing with dictators or not helping people in need. "Idealists," on the other hand, believe the active promotion of U.S. values is more important, and will serve the country’s security interests in the long term.

Typical doublespeak from Gates, but we do not disagree that realism acquired the "interest" definition - our exact intention is to counter this false realism plaguing Washington. Realism gauges the geopolitical landscape as is and acts accordingly, amplifying rather than limiting positive effects. Thus “realism” can be warped into idealism and idealism becomes realism. Realism isn’t “dealing with dictators or not helping people in need,” but a pragmatic idealism that cannot sustain itself. The VOA’s definition of realism is especially nonsensical considering that it’s aimed at foreign markets, and that its objective is to express a positive image of America.

True realism resolves the seeds of conflict instead of nurturing them. Gates’s “realism” has, in his own admission, made America less safe from Yemen’s threat. Nor is much realism found in an "orderly transition," which have already proven anything but.

Quote of the Day

“What can I say about a regime that spreads chaos and accuses others? These are nothing but lies."

- Dr. Mohammed al-Motwakil, professor of political science and member of Yemen's Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), pushing back against President Ali Abdullah Saleh's accusations

Saleh Shows No Sign of Quitting

The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Yemen’s main political opposition group, has assumed enormous risk by negotiating with President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Half of this risk stems from its divergence with the street demands for an immediate resignation. With much of Yemen’s opposition unwilling to trust Saleh after 32 years of mind-games, the revolution’s popular core operates under zero-tolerance for his (and the JMP’s) time-line and familial immunity.

The JMP’s personal risk is completed by the fact that Saleh, regularly alternating between demonization and encouragement, is liable to turn on the group at any moment for his own gain.

In his latest address to the nation, Yemen’s embattled president blamed JMP “bandits” for “sabotaging” oil-pipelines and other government facilities. Although oil infrastructure is increasingly targeted by oppositional and rogue elements, Saleh’s remarks attempt to dump Yemen’s economic crisis on the pro-democracy movement, as if it began after the revolution. Saleh also repeated his usual criticism of damaging Yemen’s unity.

Elsewhere, as pro-democracy rallies hit Yemen's cities, government officials accused defected General Ali-Mohsen al-Ahmar of orchestrating a conspiracy to destabilize the country. While his personal Armored unit has clashed with government forces as it defends protesters, the general left Saleh’s side fairly deep into the revolution.

Yemen's uprising is a pure expression of its people.

Guarding its claim that the Obama administration has decided to move on from Saleh, The New York Times noted that he “appeared less defiant” in focusing on the masses. Yemen has seen bloodier days, but Saleh’s speech bears no evidence of a man ready to transfer power peacefully. Denouncing his opponents as a minority while hailing his own supporters as the “silent majority,” Saleh declared that “masses come to these squares to say yes to the constitutional legitimacy, yes to freedom and democracy, yes to Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of this nation.”

"Millions of demonstrators came today to this square to say yes to the constitutional legitimacy and yes to Ali Abdullah Saleh as the president of this nation, which can be regarded as a public referendum and a clear message to the international community and local opposition.”

With that said, Saleh extended his usual hand to the JMP, the only part of the opposition he’s willing to negotiate with. Because the JMP is viewed as an illegitimate authority for the revolution as a whole, and because it’s willing to play his politics, Saleh has found the JMP useful in stalling for time and splintering the opposition. Labeling JMP leaders as “fibbers” and “owners of vulnerable souls,” Saleh declares, "Millions of Yemeni people say yes to freedom, security and stability... they say no to blocking roads, killing innocents and cutting the supplies of oil and gas, we hold the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) responsible. We ask the opposition to stop lying to the people.”

He then adds, “we renew our call for the opposition Joint Meeting Parties to engage in dialogue.”

The JMP has, until further notice, accepted the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative that would transfer power to Abduraboo Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s vice president of 17 years. The agreement also stipulates immunity for Saleh’s extensive family, and fails to provide a time-table for the transition. Yet the JMP went so far as to claim it will convince the streets of supporting this plan. Many popular opposition groups believe the GCC document opens a loophole for Saleh to remain in power through the transition, and have rejected the GCC’s overtures until a concrete ultimatum is in place.

With Saleh scapegoating the JMP again and reaffirming his constitutionally legitimacy, the JMP will be hard-pressed to keep its hand open. Saleh appears set for a true showdown with the popular opposition, which has announced a two-week deadline for him to resign.

As the GCC is increasingly perceived as the Saudi-American hand that it is, US-backing also increases in its fraudulence. These negotiations started under Washington and Riyadh’s rules, not the Yemeni opposition’s. Pervasive reports of them "finally" moving against Saleh run into a favorable deal for him and his own public defiance. Thus the White House is simply abetting his stall tactics. By continually refusing to comment - particularly during moments when Saleh reasserts his rule - the Obama administration remains positioned in his shadow.

As tall as Saleh tries to stand, his shadow will eventually fade.