Quote of the Day

“Muammar Qaddafi is history, resistance, liberty, glory, revolution."

- Libyan President Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, losing his grip on reality (if he hasn't already lost it)

Hostage Killings Ill Omen for Somalia

Amid the initial uncertainty surrounding a crew of Somali pirates and their four American hostages, we briefly detailed why President Barack Obama would green-light a raid before “The Quest” reached shore.

With al-Shabab patrolling the area of Haradheere and Hobyo, Somalia’s main pirate havens, as it attempted to tax local captains, a rescue operation on land dealt the additional risk of confronting well-armed militants. Obama did sign an executive order on Saturday, but U.S. forces were unable to prevent the deaths of Jean and Scott Adams, Phyllis Macay, and Bob Riggle. Obama received word early Tuesday that the pirates had both surrendered to the U.S. Navy and killed their hostages.

Unfortunately this turn of events doesn’t improve upon the worst-case scenario of a land raid.

Current focus is largely centered around two topics: the yacht’s final hours and how America will respond. However these questions are more connected on land than water. Emerging details posit a disagreement between pirate leaders after a channel had been opened with the USS Sterett. Two pirates boarded the guided-missile destroyer tailing the yacht and stayed overnight. But at 8 AM local time, pirates on The Quest fired an RPG on the Sterett and small arms fire erupted soon afterward. Several pirates then appeared on the yacht’s deck with their hands up, at which point U.S. Special Forces rushed aboard the vessel.

All four Americans had been shot, two fatally, while two pirates also lay dead. Graeme Gibbon-Brooks, head of Dryad Maritime Intelligence, remarked, "We have heard threats against the lives of Americans before but it strikes me as being very, very unusual why they would kill hostages outright.”

The probable scenario is a basic disagreement over their fate. With the Sterett closing fast and the pirates suspecting a raid before land, 19 pirates stood a good chance of disputing a single course of action. Some clearly wanted to give up and others obviously resisted. But this quarrel soon fades into a surprisingly unanimity from local observers. For all the talk of “changing the game” by abducting U.S. citizens, pirates are indeed undergoing a change in attitude.

Killing hostages "has now become part of our rules," said a pirate who identified himself as Muse Abdi, referring to recent imprisonment of captured pirates. "From now on, anyone who tries to rescue the hostages in our hands will only collect dead bodies. It will never, ever happen that hostages are rescued and we are hauled to prison."

"It's a black day for us and also the Americans, but they lost bigger than us," echoed Bile Hussein, another pirate. "If they still want a solution and safety for their citizens in the oceans, let them release our men they arrested."

The sum of today’s events point to a hardening in the pirates’ ideology; what started as pure profit is beginning to take on political overtones. Imagine, for a moment, life as a Somali pirate. Already resentful of overfishing and illegal dumping along their coast, the international community’s response has avoided their own concerns with direct imprisonment. No aid is offered to their plight, and no reason to cease piracy except fear. This policy bears little resemble to Western ideals of corrective punishment.

One doesn’t need to count the rise in hijackings despite increased naval activity to realize the counterproductive psychology at work. Pirates are naturally going to reject this perceived injustice, and respond more aggressively and personally to threats against them. A boy that survives Somalia’s chaos to reach 18, only to risk the next 30 years in a foreign jail, will at least consider alternatives to imprisonment, including suicide. That option may have struck a note of discord with the present crew.

Abdullahi Mohamed, one pirate who claimed to know The Quest’s assailants, told the AP minutes before news broke, "the hostages will be the first to go. Some pirates have even suggested rigging the yacht with land mines and explosives so as the whole yacht explodes with the first gunshot.”

This tactical and strategic evolution presents a similarly vicious cycle as a disastrous land raid. Were al-Shabab and U.S. Special Forces to confront each other directly, a battle possessed the energy to escalate operations on both sides. al-Shabab could feel inclined to target U.S. embassies in Africa or the Middle East, while Washington would have no choice but to forcefully respond. However any U.S. reaction would limit itself to tactical strikes, and thus fall woefully short of the comprehensive counterinsurgency that Somalia requires.

Naturally the chorus for more international cooperation and operations has reached a new limit. Joining Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in “deploring” the killings, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon remarked through his spokesman, “He reiterates that piracy off the coast of Somalia is unacceptable and welcomes the ongoing efforts of the international community to stamp it out and bring the perpetrators to justice.”

Though Ki-moon makes an effort to single out illegal fishing, this general focus continues to ignore the land roots of piracy. Havens like Haradheere and Hobyo reside in virtually lawless territory, administered only nominally by al-Shabab. Nor is the solution as simple as protecting Somalia’s coast: resolving piracy requires a full-spectrum counterinsurgency on land. Law enforcement achieves maximum results when capping political, economic, and social structures. Conversely, substituting these structures with intermittent law enforcement yields negative feedback.

"This incident is a clear message,” declared Gen. Yusuf Ahmed Khayr, Puntland’s security minister “that it's time the world community quickly steps up to stop these pirate criminal activities. They should be treated mercilessly.”

What Khayr doesn’t mention is how even Puntland and Somaliland, the “stable” parts of Somalia’s Horn, have locked themselves in bitter clan warfare along the SSC. The Somaliland government and army, dominated by Isaaq clan of Hargeisa area, has been fighting the Dhulbahante clan of Puntland for years. A handful of sizable clashes broke out over the past weeks, resulting in hundreds of dead and wounded, while political rhetoric between the two sides has similarly escalated. In addition to denouncing Somaliland’s military occupation of the disputed Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) regions, Puntland also accuses its neighbor of funding, arming and providing safe havens for al-Shabab-allied fighters.

Reports allege that Mohamed Said Atom, Puntland’s leading militant, has hide in Burao under Somaliland’s protection.

"We wish to live in this region peacefully," said Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamud Farole, himself a Dhulbahante. "We wish that the two stable states of Somalia [Puntland and Somaliland] co-exist in peace and we hoped that a new administration in Somaliland would withdraw its forces from Las Anod. But if the situation is now at a point where our citizens are being massacred and Somaliland wants to seize Buhodle, then Somaliland must take responsibility for initiating this war."

Somaliland equally accuses Puntland of funding al-Shabab cells in its territory, and backing clan encroachment of its territory. Neither territory recognizes Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), going so far as to bar its officials from their territory.

Thus, like Western officials, the two territories’ vows to rid piracy from their coast comes off as irrational without a corresponding strategy on land.

A final risk to be weighed is whether U.S. pressure alters the business relationship between pirates and al-Shabab. Though pirates have no problem acquiring arms, they’re going to need bigger guns and possibly more muscle just to raise their personal level. Matching the 10 of U.S. firepower and technology is impossible, but they can turn themselves up from a 2 to a 4. Maybe a 20% “tax” doesn’t sound so unreasonable now.

Of course al-Shabab could take and keep taking. Pirates should know better, and realize how little pay a private U.S. citizen offers. That leaves the international community to hope they practice better business skills, because America and its allies aren’t prepared for the worst in Somalia.

Disputed Afghan Casualties Expose Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Flaws

One might expect Washington’s counterinsurgency “master” to know better than to detonate an already combustible situation. Systematic mismanagement of Afghanistan’s latest civilian casualties suggests otherwise.

Four days ago, according to NATO and Afghan sources, U.S. assault helicopters launched a raid in Ghaziabad district of Konar province. Either 36 Taliban militants or 50 civilians were killed, according to the same sources. ISAF initially denied civilian casualties through a series of press releases. It was only after local Afghan officials roused the international media that, “American commanders went into crisis mode Sunday, launching an investigation into the incident to find out what happened and prevent the episode from damaging relations with the Afghan government.”

"We take all those allegations seriously, and we'll get to the bottom of them as best we possibly can," said a senior U.S. military official said on Sunday.

Not by the look of Sunday’s national security meeting between General David Petraeus and Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

According to multiple participants, Petraeus denied the allegations after hearing Karzai’s version and accused Afghans of orchestrating a nefarious plot. Despite assurances that NATO’s investigation is ongoing, U.S. Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith has categorically rejected NATO’s involvement in civilian deaths. Citing intercepted conversations, Smith said the Taliban discussed fabricating causalities to government officials in order to halt the swarm of Apaches helicopters. They also discussed their own casualties, "stating they lost 50 and needed help in getting out the wounded and quickly burying the dead."

"I have reviewed the footage and found no evidence women and children were among the fighters," said America’s chief military spokesman in Kabul. "Again, no civilian structures were anywhere near where these engagements took place. It was at night and in very rugged terrain."

Instead, Smith added, the U.S. military, "did have initial reports that the feet and hands of the children appeared to have been burned. We have observed increased reporting of children being disciplined by having their hands and feet dipped into boiling water. No one is claiming this is the case in this instance, but it may well be."

Nobody except for the U.S. military.

According to one Afghan official present at the meeting, Petraeus, “claimed that in the midst of the [operation] some pro-Taliban parents in contact with a government official decided to create a civilian casualty claim to pressure international forces to cease the [operation]. They burned hands and legs of some of their children and sent them to the hospital.”

"I was dizzy," said one participant about listening to Petraeus. "My head was spinning. This was shocking. Would any father do this to his children? This is really absurd."

America is in trouble if this is the best Petraeus can do.

How Washington’s account squares with over 50 deaths remains unsettled, but let’s assume for argumentative purposes that the U.S. version contains a higher degree of truth. An inherent problem in counterinsurgency is how easily “the truth” can be manipulated, distorted, and disbelieved depending on the source. Information often travels by mouth and the majority of Afghans are unlikely to view NATO’s surveillance videos. Especially in the remote mountains, where most villagers only see and hear about U.S.-induced death.

So to build a U.S.-styled legal case in Afghanistan disregards counterinsurgency's premium on communications.

That Afghans generally split the blame between Taliban and foreign forces punches additional holes into the U.S. script. Fazlullah Wahidi, the governor of Konar, said that NATO forces have pounded the area for months, a fact that NATO agrees with. Maj. Gen. John Campbell, the top commander in eastern Afghanistan, told the Washington Post earlier this month, "That's been our most kinetic area. We've dropped over 900 bombs since we've been here, and probably greater than 50 percent has been up there. We've fired over 30,000 artillery rounds, mortar rounds, and much of it has been up there."

In Ghaziabad’s particular case, "It's just the challenging situation that goes on with these type of incidents: an isolated area, a tough area, tough terrain." One U.S. official argued that casualties were unlikely because, "It's up in the mountains and it's not around villages."

This remoteness automatically disqualifies Afghan accounts in favor of the U.S. version.

However, to locals on the ground, the impression they receive overwhelmingly supports the Taliban version. Coupled with the intense air operations, Konar's historic position on the border has yielded no sympathy for outsiders. Brig. Gen. Stephen Townsend, a senior Army official in eastern Afghanistan, explained of residents, "They're in extreme isolation. They just don't want us there." Another senior U.S. military official in Konar added, "we haven't seen much evidence of many civilian casualties."

Words such as “much” and “many” suggest an unidentified number of casualties. Yet were Wahidi lying, Konar's COIN is still unrecognizable to Marjah’s “proof” that the U.S. mission is now succeeding.

Petraeus’s second major problem is a strained relationship with Karzai, who presumably chafes at Petraeus’s “bottom up” strategy to locally circumvent the national government. Reportedly displeased with Petraeus's promotion after building a relationship with Stanley McChrystal, Karzai has butted heads with Petraeus on private contractors, corruption probes, local militias, and Taliban negotiations. Thus it was only a matter of time before Karzai’s officials spun the meeting in their favor. This opportunity also provided Karzai with a stage to play his favorite tune, declaring that his government "will take any steps necessary to prevent and stop civilian casualties in his country."

"Killing 60 people, and then blaming the killing on those same people, rather than apologizing for any deaths? This is inhuman," one Afghan official said. "This is a really terrible situation."

The counterproductive results of Petraeus’s decision manifest themselves through this division. Why he pushed back so hard - with the truth or not - can be plausibly explained by setting a precedent. More importantly than exposing the Taliban’s long-used tactics, America can’t have every Afghan thinking they can manufacture a casualty claim after NATO sweeps through their area. Let one lie slip and spawn a hundred more.

Sensible as this logic is, Afghans already manufacture and exaggerate casualty claims. This means of sustenance doesn’t invalidate all casualty claims, but the practice wouldn’t suddenly appear if Petraeus took false ownership of Ghaziabad. A strong argument, then, can be made in favor of accepting the casualties, paying out trifling $2,000 sums, and getting the story out of the headlines.

Instead Petraeus has amplified and extended the story, trading 36 militants for his credibility in Afghanistan and relationship with Karzai. This cost is too high.

Making such a claim may sound foolish to some, but without fully invalidating Petraeus's understanding of COIN, he doesn't live up to Washington's hype. The conditions between Iraq and Afghanistan match at a superficial level, and his media savvy, while useful for extending the war on Capital Hill, has proven less charming in Kabul. Though Petraeus helped compose the U.S. Army’s COIN manual, this book offers little innovative thinking on asymmetric warfare. Those Marines now “winning” Helmand pore over a more illuminating tomb: the 80-year old Small Wars Manual.

But most striking of Petraeus’s strategy is how quickly and silently he’s narrowed his definition of counterinsurgency. Afghanistan used to be a political problem - now it’s dominated by military achievements. Political solutions have given way to political expediency. Death tolls once more reign as the supreme metric, necessary for separating Afghans from the Taliban. Despite continual conflicts of interests with Karzai - for instance the government’s deep involvement in the heroin trade - and Pakistan (North Waziristan went from critical to irrelevant), America’s war is suddenly looking bright.

It’s true that U.S. Marines have won some “hearts and minds” in Marjah and Sangin. Petraeus’s response to Ghaziabad demonstrates how rapidly he can lose them.

U.S. Media Knew Raymond Davis is CIA, ex-Blackwater

Now we know that Washington is more concerned with Blackwater than international law and Pakistanis. At the request of U.S. officials - safety measure or cover-up? We're betting on the latter:

US officials have provided fresh details about Raymond Davis, the CIA agent at the center of a diplomatic stand-off in Pakistan, including confirmation that he had worked for the private security contractor Xe, formerly known as Blackwater. They also disclosed for the first time that he had been providing security for a CIA team tracking militants.

Davis was attached to the CIA's Global Response Staff, whose duties include protecting case officers when they meet with sources. He was familiarizing himself with a sensitive area of Lahore on the day he shot dead two Pakistanis.

The New York Times, Washington Post, Associated Press and other media outlets reported for the first time that Davis is a CIA employee. They said they had been aware of his status but kept it under wraps at the request of US officials who said they feared for his safety if involvement with the spy agency was to come out. The officials claimed that he is at risk in the prison in Lahore. The officials released them from their obligation after the Guardian on Sunday reported that Davis was a CIA agent.

Davis shot dead two Pakistanis in Lahore last month who he says had been trying to rob him. A third Pakistani man was killed by a car driven by Americans apparently on their way to rescue Davis.

Confirmation that he worked for Xe could prove even more problematic than working for the CIA, given the extent of hatred towards Blackwater, whose staff have gained a reputation in Pakistan as trigger-happy. For Pakistanis the word "Blackwater" has become a byword for covert American operations targeting the country's nuclear capability. Newspaper reports have been filled with lurid reports of lawless operatives roaming the country.

US officials have reiterated their concern about Lahore's Kot Lakhpat jail where Davis is being held, saying he had been moved to a separate section of the prison, that the guards' guns had been taken away from for fear they might kill him, and that detainees had been previously killed by guards. They are also concerned about protesters storming the prison or that he might be poisoned, and that dogs were being used to taste or smell the food for poison...

Other U.S. officials continue to deny Davis’s role in the CIA: "Davis is a protective officer, someone who provides security to U.S. officials in Pakistan. Rumors to the contrary are simply wrong."

US, Pakistan Tug of War over Raymond Davis

The main theory explaining a lull in U.S. drone strikes has Washington pouring water on its fiery relationship with Islamabad. Hellfire missiles haven't fallen on Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since January 27th, the night Raymond Davis killed two Pakistanis under murky circumstances. But if the Obama administration actually intended to mend America’s broken ties with Pakistan, why approve a strike now?

Perhaps a big fish will turn up fried, except the odds favor a handful of low level militants. As Davis’s case escalates in all directions, why would drones buck that trend? Retaliation makes no sense and perfect sense within America’s conflicted Pakistani policy.

Senator John Kerry recently traveled to Islamabad in hopes of negotiating an arrangement between the government and the victims’ families. Offering an investigation in America and payment to the aggrieved parties, Kerry must have thought he could smuggle Davis away like the other U.S. “diplomats” that already “flew the coup,” according to one Pakistani officer.

Yet the situation only intensified since his departure. Davis had summoned a Toyota Land Cruiser after shooting two Pakistani men, but the driver struck another Pakistani and fled. The car was later deposited within the U.S. consulate. With Pakistan’s media and populace digging in against what they consider a pliable PPP government, the Lahore High Court ruled on Friday to impound and search the car that ran over a third victim.

With neither Washington nor Islamabad willing to back down, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) then appeared to put its stamp on Davis’s diplomatic status. Already accused of designating drone targets for the CIA, multiple sources confirmed to The Guardian that the former Special Forces operative enjoys employment from the agency: “It’s beyond a shadow of a doubt.” This designation, if true, would squash the legal battle over his immunity.

Davis’s rescuers are also believed to populate the CIA's ranks, having left from his house.

Another Pakistani official denied reports that Davis killed two ISI agents, a theory started by none other than ISI sources. But the anonymous official did add: “We are a sovereign country and if they want to work with us, they need to develop a trusting relationship on the basis of equality. Being arrogant and demanding is not the way to do it.”

It’s not surprising, then, for a few missiles to make their own point in Waziristan.

Not that this strategy makes much sense, but a halt in drone strikes can be explained in other ways. The Obama administration isn’t making an additional effort to bridge the ever-widening trust deficit with Pakistan. On top of a bullying attitude that has infuriated public opinion, Davis is no more likely to receive a fair trial in America than in Pakistan. Or he may not see a trial, like the Toyota’s occupants.

Despite an eventual softening, Washington's reaction to Davis has consistently demonstrated insensitivity to Pakistan's situation.

Instead, grounding the Reapers may represent America’s shallow attempt to “play it cool.” With drones stuck in their own legal ambiguity, the White House likely felt (and rightly so) that continual strikes juxtapose with the “international law” argument. Never-mind that one month won’t erase any memories, a instantaneous crises demanded a quick policy fix.

But since Washington isn’t getting its way, the CIA might have decided to protect its own and fire a warning shot.

Although this endless cycle of escalation is nothing new in Pakistan, it’s still amazing how one man now threatens U.S.-Pakistani relations as a whole. Even if the two governments reach an agreement over Davis, a good possibility, anti-American sentiment in Pakistan runs the risk of entering single digits. The basic killing of three Pakistanis, mixed with Davis’s military background, the realistic chance of him being a spy, and America’s wider “War on Terror,” has reinforced Pakistanis’ toxic impression that Washington rules Islamabad. And unleashed a revolutionary anger at being valued less than Americans.

Revolutions often spark from the unexpected and catalyze around an individual - friend or foe.

Equally amazing is Washington’s willingness to jeopardize Afghanistan by trying to protect that very war. In attempting to shield intelligence assets under diplomatic immunity, likely a long-standing practice that's now being exposed, America has forgotten Pakistan as it views U.S. interests at the global level. Of course the Obama administration must see the forest through the trees, but its hard-headed pursuit of Davis is singlehandedly wrecking havoc on Pakistan’s politics and public sphere.

Apparently the Pentagon has written off an operation into North Waziristan, and expects little assistance in Taliban negotiations.

It’s easy to say that U.S. opinion can’t go any lower in Pakistan, or that the trust deficit has never been wider. These statements may be true. However Raymond Davis’s case is raising the temperature to untold levels, and trust, the lifeblood of military cooperation, is nowhere to be found in either capital. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton can drone on about “valuing” Islamabad’s strategic relationship - her smile campaign has crashed and burned.

While President Barack Obama and his cabinet repeatedly emphasize Pakistan’s necessity in the war in Afghanistan, their actions are speaking in the opposite direction. Real respect is earned, not enforced.

The ‘Long War’ "May" Be Getting Shorter

Op-ed published in The New York Times:

It is hard to tell when momentum shifts in a counterinsurgency campaign, but there is increasing evidence that Afghanistan is moving in a more positive direction than many analysts think. It now seems more likely than not that the country can achieve the modest level of stability and self-reliance necessary to allow the United States to responsibly draw down its forces from 100,000 to 25,000 troops over the next four years.

The shift is most obvious on the ground. The additional 30,000 troops promised by President Obama in his speech at West Point 14 months ago are finally in place and changing the trajectory of the fight.

One of us, Nathaniel, recently flew into Camp Leatherneck in a C-130 transport plane, which had to steer clear of fighter bombers stacked for tens of thousands of feet above the Sangin District of Helmand Province, in southwestern Afghanistan. Singly and in pairs, the jets swooped low to drop their bombs in support of Marine units advancing north through the Helmand River Valley.

Half of the violence in Afghanistan takes place in only 9 of its nearly 400 districts, with Sangin ranking among the very worst. Slowly but surely, even in Sangin, the Taliban are being driven from their sanctuaries as the coalition focuses on protecting the Afghan people in key population centers and hubs of economic activity, and along the roads that connect them. Once these areas are cleared, it will be possible to hold them with Afghan troops and a few American advisers — allowing the United States to thin its deployments over time.

A significant shift of high-tech intelligence resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, initiated by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former top commander, is also having benefits. The coalition led by the United States and NATO has been able to capture or kill far more Taliban leaders in nighttime raids than was possible in the past.

The United States certainly can’t kill its way to victory, as it learned in Vietnam and Iraq, but it can put enough pressure on many Taliban fighters to encourage them to switch their allegiance, depriving the enemy of support and giving the coalition more sources of useful intelligence.

Afghan Army troop strength has increased remarkably. The sheer scale of the effort at the Kabul Military Training Center has to be seen to be appreciated. Rows of new barracks surround a blue-domed mosque, and live-fire training ranges stretched to the mountains on the horizon.
It was a revelation to watch an Afghan squad, only days from deployment to Paktika Province on the Pakistani border, demonstrate a fire-and-maneuver exercise before jogging over to chat with American visitors. When asked, each soldier said that he had joined the Army to serve Afghanistan. Most encouraging of all was the response to a question that resonates with 18- and 19-year-old soldiers everywhere: how does your mother feel? “Proud.”

These changes on the ground have been reinforced by progress on three strategic and political problems that have long stymied our plans.

The first is uncertainty about how long America and its allies will remain committed to the fight. The question is still open, but President Obama and the NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, have effectively moved the planned troop withdrawal date from July 2011 to at least 2014, with surprisingly little objection. Congress and the American public seem to have digested without a murmur the news that far fewer troops will be withdrawn in 2011 than will remain. NATO is not collapsing because of Afghanistan. In fact, the International Security Assistance Force continues to grow, with one-quarter of the world’s countries on the ground in Afghanistan with the United States.

Two more vexing problems are the corruption of the Afghan government and the complicity of some Pakistanis with the insurgency. While it is safe to assume that neither the Afghan nor Pakistani leaders will fundamentally alter their policies any time soon, we are changing ours. Previously, our policy options with Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and Asif Ali Zardari were limited to public hectoring and private pleading, usually to little effect.

Now, however, the coalition’s military and civilian leaders are taking a new approach to the Afghan and Pakistani governments. We are establishing a task force to investigate and expose corruption in the Afghan government, under the leadership of Brig. Gen. H. R. McMaster. We are also shoring up the parts of the border that the Taliban uses by thickening the line with Afghan forces, putting up more drones and coordinating more closely with Pakistani border guards.

Not since the deterioration in conditions in Iraq that drew our attention away from Afghanistan have coalition forces been in such a strong position to force the enemy to the negotiating table. We should hold fast and work for the day when Afghanistan, and our vital interests there, can be safeguarded primarily by Afghans.

That day is coming, faster than many Americans think.

Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine captain, is the chief executive of the Center for a New American Security. John Nagl, a former Army lieutenant colonel, is the president of the center.
____________________________________________________

The usual propaganda from The New York Times, but a remarkably simplistic assessment of Afghanistan from one of America’s leading counterinsurgency analysts. Then again, what else can be expected from General David's Petraeus's preferred think-tank?

Counter-assessment is on the way.

Quote of the Day

"We didn't and will not accept blackmail and neither will our people. We are not interested in aid from any party that threatens to cut it for political reasons. The US approach must change because these double standards cannot continue and this situation is unacceptable."

- Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, amid allegations that Washington threatened to halt or limit aid if the Palestinians’ UN settlements resolution wasn’t withdrawn

NATO "Unaware" of Afghan Civilian Casualties

From Reuters:

Joint operations by Afghan forces and NATO-led foreign troops have killed 64 civilians in eastern Kunar province, including many women and children, over the past four days, the provincial governor said.

"They were killed by ground and air strikes in Ghazi Abad district," Fazlullah Wahidi, governor of Kunar province, told Reuters on Sunday.

Wahidi said 20 of the dead were women, 29 were children or young adults aged 7 to 20, and the remaining 15 were adult men.

Civilian casualties in NATO-led military operations, often caused by air strikes and night raids, have long been a source of friction between the Afghan government and its Western partners.

Rules governing air strikes and night raids have been tightened significantly by NATO-led forces in the past two years, leading to a sharp drop in civilian casualties caused by such incidents.

A spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said they were investigating media reports 7 civilians may have been wounded in operations in Kunar but were not aware of any reports of civilian deaths.

ISAF said on Friday that more than 30 insurgents had been killed in an overnight mission in Kunar, and on Saturday that operations had been going on in Ghazi Abad since February 16.

Another ISAF statement on Sunday said ISAF had engaged an "unknown number of insurgents" in two separate operations and attacked with small-arms fire and air strikes. Both statements said initial reports indicated no civilian casualties.

While we don't outright reject a decrease in NATO-caused civilian casualties, WikiLeaks exposed how routine cover-ups are in Afghanistan. Washington claims to have put an end to this practice...

Pirate Hostage Rescue Raises Somalia's Stakes

Someone call Ridley Scott and jet him to Mogadishu, he may have a Crash-like sequel to Blackhawk Down on his hands.

Scott and Jean Adam, an American couple that sailed their “Quest” around the world with an alleged cache of Bibles, are the latest pirate news out of Somalia. Their brazen hijacking, along with two unidentified Americans, has U.S. officials on Naval warships and in the White House considering “all possible options” to rescue them. Except the Adams merely serve to further the development of a grander plot.

Roughly four miles off the Somali coast, 80 miles north of Mogadishu, lies the pirate haven of Haradheere. Half-lawless territory, Hizbul Islam raided the town in May 2010 in an attempt to tax the willing and eliminate the resistant. Its merger with al-Shabab allowed Somalia’s main insurgent group to extend control past Mogadishu, yet governing Haradheere comes with a high price. In order to make the town worth the hassle, al-Shabab recently demanded a 20% tax on hostage ransoms.

The two-day negotiations turned sour after pirate commanders balked. And a pirate who identified himself as Ali told Reuters, "al-Shabaab arrested four of our ringleaders today after we rejected their demands for 20 percent of the ransom payment.” Local reporters describe a tense scene between militants and pirates.

Imagine if U.S. Special Forces show up.

The chance of these particular pirates meeting their end is high, and there’s a degree of truth in thinking they looted more than they can carry. While propelling a large segment of international naval activity in the Gulf of Aden, U.S. forces have reserved lethal intervention for direct threats to U.S. citizens. So it’s probable that the pirates in question crossed the red-line. Graeme Gibbon-Brooks, head of Dryad Maritime Intelligence, said the four Americans offer no profit compared to the usual commercial vessels.

"They risk the collapse of their business model if they change their status quo and the American government deems that they pose an immediate threat to the safety of American citizens,” he predicts. “They've made a mistake and it's in the Somalis' business interest to get off the yacht as soon as possible."

But the question concerning President Barack Obama, who now faces another split second decision, is whether a rescue operation also proves harmful to U.S. strategic interests. Abdi Yare, a top pirate commander in Hobyo, said the squad had left Haradheere a week earlier, explaining, "The pirate team that hijacked the yacht is led by a senior commander from the Harardhere area.” Yare believes the pirates will return to Hobyo to negotiate.

And although he claims their ship is still “far out at sea,” U.S. officials expect the crew to make landfall on Sunday. That leaves a day or two to stop them from reaching shore. Otherwise Obama faces a daunting risk of escalating Somalia beyond Washington’s means.

The finale of this story depends on where the pirates take their hostages, and Hobyo reduces those risks involved. Its two positives are coastal proximity and a lesser degree of influence from al-Shabab. Yet the pirate haven remains close to Haradheere, roughly 60 miles north, where al-Shabab has gathered its strength to assert control. Were al-Shabab to make the short trip north, if its numbers afford it, Hobyo could offer similar battle conditions and strategic implications.

One must expect a speedy rescue to prevent the Adams from going ashore, because a land operation in either town exceeds the difficulty of past missions. Under the Bush and Obama administrations, direct U.S. action takes the shape of a U.S. missile or helicopter attack. Bush preferred to target al-Shabab and al-Qaeda commanders from afar, while Obama has opted for helicopter raids, one Seal incursion to eliminate Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and an “anonymous” attack on Marka. Only in Nabhan’s case did U.S. troops land on Somali ground.

An assault on Hobyo or Haradheere, particularly the latter, won’t enjoy the advantage of surprise. The helicopter assault on Marka, which targeted a mediation between al-Shabab commanders, has given the group advanced notice of future attacks. And its possession of truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns renders the possibility of surface-to-air missiles partially irrelevant. Haradheere sits 10 miles back from the coast, adding to the degree of difficulty.

Predicting al-Shabab’s potential response isn’t easy given past U.S. attacks; threats follow each attack, except none have materialized on U.S. soil. al-Shabab also recently jettisoned its former chief, the transnationalistic Moktar Ali Zubeyr, in favor of its nationalistic deputy Muktar Robow, and has consistently adopted local objectives over international terror. Its majority actually forced al-Qaeda into removing Zubeyr, who had pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. For now al-Shabab’s command shows little interest in becoming the next Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) actively threatens and plots against the U.S. homeland and Europe.

al-Shabab has a good thing going in Somalia and doesn’t want to invite another Afghan-like invasion. al-Qaeda seems to feel the same.

Yet the primary dilemma of a land assault, whether in Hobyo or Haradheere, remains strategic rather than tactical. Unlike prior U.S. operations, hostages pose a rescue mission rather than simple assassination. These maze-like towns recreate Mogadishu's environment, minus a million Somalis. Were a ground battle to erupt between al-Shabab and U.S. Special Forces and result in significant loss of life, al-Shabab could order its local al-Qaeda branch to prepare attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa or the U.S. homeland.

U.S. officials are fond of playing up al-Shabab’s threat despite its nationalist ideology, a scare tactic partially attributed to the numerous U.S. citizens serving in its ranks. But a messy attack in Hobyo or Haradheere, successful or not, could actually bring that threat to life.

At this point al-Shabab would be daring America to directly intervene, something the West as a whole isn’t prepared to do. Failing to act could embolden al-Shabab, further its foreign recruitment, and bait more African Union (AU) troops into a military stalemate. But counterattacking could spawn a vicious negative cycle to top the crises piling up on Obama's desk. While militarization of the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb straight is considered key to U.S. strategic interests, America lacks the means and focus to successfully implement counterinsurgency in Somalia. Especially in a snap decision, Obama’s worst enemy.

A battle is about to take place regardless of the site. The White House and Pentagon have all this and more to think about in the next 24 to 48 hours.

[Update: U.S. warship shadowing hijacked yacht]

U.S. Foreign Policy Running in Circles

A consensus among Arab scholars and regional observers is gaining ground in Africa and the Middle East: the Muslim world has irreversibly changed even if no more dominoes fall after the Hosni Mubarak regime. No longer can unresponsive governments rule without accountability. Globalization is erasing the bonds of fear, ignorance, and subservience that held their peoples in check, and the Muslim world will move forward regardless of what happens next.

Sadly this optimistic feeling goes hungry in America, where a democratic up-welling is being treated as a strategic liability.

President Barack Obama’s response to the Muslim world’s awakening may go down as one of history’s greatest ironies. Choking fits the description as well; few U.S. presidents swept to office with such high expectations for restoring American ideals of democracy and human rights. Although George Bush left the country’s global image in the gutter, Obama easily persuade the Muslim world to give him a chance.

Now is that chance.

“I am deeply concerned by reports of violence in Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen,” he said in a prepared statement today. “The United States condemns the use of violence by governments against peaceful protesters in those countries and wherever else it may occur. We express our condolences to the families and friends of those who have been killed during the demonstrations. Wherever they are, people have certain universal rights, including the right to peaceful assembly. The United States urges the governments of Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen to show restraint in responding to peaceful protests and to respect the rights of their people.”

Since he considers himself a sports aficionado, the revolutionary wave thundering across the Muslim world affords a heroic World Series, bottom-of-the-ninth situation. Except he’s striking out with the bases loaded - and going on strike seven.

It’s interesting to watch the U.S. media belatedly credit Obama for “demanding” regime change in Egypt - more interesting to read the many editorials and op-eds advising caution against pulling “another Mubarak.” In many quarters Obama didn’t do enough to prop up a dying dictator, leading to fears that he set a poor example for other U.S. allies. These thoughts and their offspring fall off the historical cliff, and continuing to suppress the revolutionary spirit will yield negative results for both the region and U.S. policy.

Such is the case in Egypt, where Obama patted himself on the back for installing an increasingly unpopular military council as a last resort. The Pentagon’s pet still stands a good chance of being overthrown by a pure civilian authority. But the fear of pulling “another Mubarak” takes on new life in states like Bahrain and Yemen, where the U.S. opposes any further regime change. Here we find similar walkbacks from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who’s eating her earlier praise of Bahrain's government. After the King opened live fire on peaceful protesters, Obama released his all-too-familiar statement of concern for loss of life. Always after, never before.

"This is a war," said Dr. Bassem Deif, an orthopedic surgeon examining dozens of bullet wounds.

In Yemen protesters enter their 9th straight day of marches despite violent government suppression. Saleh has unleashed his own loyalists, stealing a play from Mubarak, yet he continues to pull in U.S. military aid. Weeks ago many U.S. pundits and analysts were downplaying the opposition’s mobilization and praising President Ali Abdullah Saleh, arguing that he doesn’t use force on his people - that few Yemenis want regime change. But many did want Saleh gone, and more are changing their minds with each oppressive day.

The Saleh government denies involvement in the attacks even though officials from the U.S. embassy admitted to spotting government coordinators. And the White House continues to act as though it has the right policy in place.

“We have a counter-terrorism strategy with Yemen,” said spokesman Philip Crowley, “but part of that is, in fact, the kind of economic and political assistance that can help strengthen Yemeni institutions, strengthen the bond between Yemen and its citizens. Yemen’s got a number of challenges. They’ve got multiple conflicts, and that’s why we have a robust and expanding civilian program in Yemen that complements what we’re doing on the terrorism front.”

Not only has the trust deficit expanded between Saleh and Yemenis under U.S. policy, Washington knows that Saleh misappropriates U.S. training and equipment against the Houthis and Southern Movement. Only now has civilian aid caught up to military aid after widespread criticism of a counterproductive policy. And while anti-American sentiment remains high, Washington stubbornly shields Saleh from regime change because of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But Saleh's problems aren't going anywhere, and sacrificing popular opinion to keep up the fight contradicts the nature of counterinsurgency.

“Counter-terrorism” is a cheap knockoff that assigns a lower value to “hearts and minds,” which are now being chucked to the floor at an alarming rate.

The repetitive nature of the Obama administration's response vividly demonstrates how little has been learned from Egypt. Facing down 14-1 odds on Israel’s settlements is especially indicative of a broken foreign policy. Although Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the UN, argued that the Palestinian resolution would harden each position, the resolution also possesses a chance to break the current deadlock in negotiations. Clearly 14 other nations disagreed with the U.S. position. Most of the international community does.

This stat sums up U.S. foreign policy, an isolation that has become dangerously repetitious.

Without Egypt’s gravity to hold him accountable, Obama has reverted to silence as he passes the dirty work to officials and spokespeople. Only when situations escalate dramatically does he feel the need to make an appearance. However his silence speaks volume and costs lives, fomenting the impression that he sides with oppressive regimes. Conservatives pundits accuse Obama of becoming too friendly with Muslims and toppling U.S. allies, yet his main fault is the very absence of a connection to Muslims.

Crowley insisted to skeptical reporters, “The principles that we’ve laid out throughout the last few weeks, one of them has been the absolute requirement for political, economic, and social reform. As the President said last week, there is change coming to the region, and governments will be well served to anticipate and stay ahead of that change.”

Reform, reform, reform - but who trusts these governments to deliver? They’ve already chosen wrongly in violent suppression, and after receiving U.S. praise. Maybe the two share a correlation: the perceived safety in getting away with their actions. U.S. policy is going backwards, threatening the last of Obama’s credibility in the Muslim world. He wanted change and got regime change - and now he’s trying to stop it or slow it down. For all the talk of being on the right side of history, Obama must be asking himself how he ever found himself on the wrong side.

It’s not too late to change though. Revolution isn’t going away any time soon. But Obama needs to demonstrate, not just articulate, his clear support for Muslim democracy before trapping America on the wrong side for good.

Raymond Davis: A Violation of Counterinsurgency Law

So now America cares about international law.

As Senator John Kerry returned from his one day jaunt to Pakistan, Congress’s self-appointed Pakistan “fixer” expressed confidence that Raymond Davis’s fate would be decided under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Although a Pakistani court has adjourned its ruling on whether Davis holds diplomatic immunity until March 14, the window offers time to negotiate a settlement in exchange for Davis’s extradition. Kerry assured Pakistani officials that a full criminal investigation would be opened on U.S. soil.

Naturally Washington isn’t concerned with international law so much as its own interests. On top of legally protecting U.S. diplomats across the world and attempting to redefine the status of contracted personnel, U.S. lawmakers are worried of the message sent to “agents” in Afghanistan.

“This is a friction point,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, “this is a troubling matter, it doesn’t play well in Afghanistan. We can’t throw this agent over, I don’t know all the details, but we cannot define the relationship based on one incident because it is too important at a time when we’re making progress in Afghanistan.”

Graham was referring to the debate over whether to suspend Pakistani aid until Davis is returned home. But if Washington does manage to free Davis from Pakistan’s authority, the resulting damage will similarly threaten this fragile “progress” that Graham speaks of. “I worry a lot about Pakistan,” U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.

Poor public relations contribute to his anxiety as much as al-Qaeda.

The case of Raymond Davis remains anyone’s guess. Conspiracies flourish in Pakistan and Davis, a former Special Forces agent, allegedly traveled to Waziristan without informing Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). One version of the story has him killing two ISI agents sent to tail and possibly intimidate him. In any event, even those Pakistanis taking the contrarian view on Davis concede the shady circumstances surrounding his case.

Nor is there a legitimate explanation for a third civilian killed by the speeding embassy Land Cruiser summoned to retrieve him.

A legal battle quickly devolved into diplomatic conflict, with Washington and Islamabad disagreeing over the status of Davis’s visa (and whether he staffed the U.S. consulate or embassy). From there he morphed into a popular battle, as Pakistani public opinion turned decisively against Davis’s release. U.S. officials allege that while Islamabad accepts the legitimacy of Davis’s immunity, it fears that public outrage would spill over if America “got its way” again.

As emotions reach a boiling point, the liberal side of Pakistan’s media has attempted to nullify the wider opinion that Islamabad should hold firm. Some Pakistanis believe their country must adhere to international law rather than serve its own interests, and get rid of Davis before he undermines U.S. relations any further. Unfortunately this thinking, while technically correct, breaks down completely when applied in the real world instead of a vacuum.

“With respect to Davis,” President Barack Obama said Wednesday, his first comments since January 27th, “our diplomat in Pakistan, we’ve got a very simple principle here that every country in the world that is party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations has upheld in the past and should uphold in the future. If our diplomats are in another country, then they are not subject to that country’s local prosecution. We respect it with respect to diplomats who are here. We expect Pakistan, that’s a signatory should recognize Davis as a diplomat, to abide by the same convention.”

A gutsy card to play as he pioneers drone technology over Pakistani soil.

The contrasting nature of international law and drones symbolizes the dilemma currently facing America: an overpowering hypocrisy. Obama has, in fact, limited drone activity over the past three weeks, speculated as damage control with Islamabad. Yet a ceasefire simply admits to the ambiguous legality of drones, particularly civilian collateral. Clearly the White House and CIA are now trying to pull the rug over drone strikes, as if they could actually fool Pakistanis in this way.

The chatter of blood money also fails to correct negative perceptions. Perhaps the victims will agree to a deal and consider their grievances settled, but not every Pakistani can receive a settlement. The reasons they vent their anger will remain: poverty, government corruption and unaccountability, and foreign interference.

To many, blood money reinforces the reality that politicians can bought and persuaded against the will of the Pakistani people.

Obama’s “principle” amounts to protecting U.S. operatives in foreign countries. The real principle at stake is the perceived inequality of life between Pakistanis and Americans. The White House’s heavy-handed response and repeated denials disregard the Pakistani view of being second-class citizens in their own country. This violation fuels their anger on top of the usual politico-economic symptoms known to cause revolution.

“On the political side, the economic side, at least from my perspective, it looks worse than it has in a long time," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen added to Gates’s testimony. "The vector is going in the wrong direction overall for the country. We are very unpopular there. You have seen that. It gets highlighted in each crisis.”

Even those advocating a settlement, such as the progressive Daily Times, concede Islamabad’s no-win situation: “Its awkward position is such that if Davis is not released, vital assistance and ‘friendship’ with the sole superpower will be put at stake and if he is released, the public backlash in Pakistan could shoot through the roof.”

Many judges have predicted upheaval akin to Mubarak’s final days were Davis pardoned. It’s almost as if Washington views Davis as a means for regime change, although this doesn’t seem possible given the Zardari government’s compliance. A military “transition” is another story, but Egypt's empowerment demonstrates that America once again finds itself behind the revolutionary curve.

Like Tunisia’s Mohamed Bouazizi, one man’s actions have catalyzed the Pakistani public beyond their normal grievances with the state. Davis offers a concrete target to denounce a subservient government, a political lightning rod for people to latch onto. America’s hard-line response further contributed to the feeling that it acts with impunity in Pakistan, rendering the concept of diplomatic immunity obsolete. Egyptians rejected Mubarak’s parliamentary and constitutional arguments because they wanted both dissolved in the first place.

So too are Pakistanis questioning the legitimacy of immunity after America corrupted the principle.

Washington has reason to fear the message of losing an agent to Pakistan’s legal system. Yet there’s no corresponding concern for the message it sends to Pakistanis, which also damages the war effort in Afghanistan. Suddenly Pakistani “hearts and minds" don't carry much weight. And now that Pakistan is absorbing Egypt’s flavor, remaining so obstinate illustrates how little the White House has learned from Cairo.

Securing Davis’s release may uphold international law, but he's systematically violating General David Petraeus’s entire COIN manual.

Egypt: Change or Status Quo?

Palestine After Mubarak

Published in Foreign Policy:

Within days of the overthrow of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority announced plans for municipal, legislative, and presidential elections, as well as a cabinet reshuffle. Although these appear on the surface to be democratic measures in the new spirit of the times, they sidestep -- so far -- the serious challenges Palestinians face, including: the Fatah-Hamas split, the exclusion of refugees and exiles from Palestinian governance, and continued Israeli colonization and control over Palestinian land and lives.

The PA does not seem ready to address the Hamas-Fatah split, otherwise it would have sought reconciliation before the announcement of elections -- the latter of which Hamas rejected. Perhaps the PA still fears an American veto of unity efforts until Hamas meets the Quartet's three conditions. Yet elections in the absence of reconciliation would reinforce the West Bank's separation from Gaza. Even assuming a best-case scenario in which all parties are allowed to contest elections freely and fairly and the results are respected, it is not clear how elections will help bring an end to Israel's occupation.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, far from upholding "the will of the people," the PA is hiding from the post-Tunisia/Egypt reality. Arabs are demanding wholesale regime change, home-grown not foreign-driven. In the Palestinian case, that would mean going beyond a reshuffling of cabinet portfolios or another election under the yoke of Israel's occupation to tackle core issues of governance and new strategies for liberation.

The PA's disconnect from the people was underscored by chief negotiator Saeb Erakat's resignation when the leak of the Palestine Papers was traced back to his office. In a normal country setting, this would be a welcome show of accountability. But for most Palestinians it was the leaked papers' content that mattered, not their source--particularly revelations that the PA was willing to make major concessions about Palestinian refugee rights and Jerusalem.

Palestinian communities in exile were more vocal in their outrage. Voices now openly challenge the Ramallah-based leadership's claim to representation, as in the recent petitions organized by Palestinian American and Canadian groups. While these statements may be longer on rhetoric than actual ability to change the situation on the ground, they do erode a self-imposed Palestinian barrier to public criticism that has been in place, with few exceptions, since the first Oslo Accord in 1993. Even more significant is the simple, powerful statement by the General Union of Palestinian Students launching a campaign for direct elections to the Palestinian National Council in order to restore the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people, wherever they may be.

The Union's statement goes to the heart of the way Palestinian governance has been skewed towards statehood, almost at any price, and away from the quest for freedom. Since the first Oslo Agreement in 1993, the PLO has been allowed to shrivel while the PA has been beefed up. Even though the PLO is formally responsible for negotiations and agreements, the real power is with the PA insofar as there is freedom of action under occupation. The move to reclaim the PLO is significant because the Union is an integral part of the PLO's political structure and has long nurtured Palestinian, particularly Fatah, leaders. It thus has the capacity to impact the situation on the ground.

Yet the PA still seems to be on auto-pilot, believing it can really swing a Palestinian state by September on its own accord, even though United Nations recognition would not stop Israeli colonization or loosen its controls.

Meanwhile, Hamas is calling on Egypt to end its support for Israel's siege and open the Rafah border. However, Egypt's military rulers are likely to be as wary of inheriting Gaza as they were under Mubarak, given Israel's goal of shedding its responsibility as the Strip's occupier. If the PA is happy to leave Gaza to its fate, and Hamas is happy to have Gaza for its own, then both would be effectively playing into Israel's hands.

Will the inspiring Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions derail Israel's expansionist dreams and the PA's illusions of statehood? Despite the Palestinian people's political and geographic fragmentation, several trends are moving in that direction.

The most important, as described above, is the challenge to the PA's claim to representation and the attempt to revive the PLO. Another trend is the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions' affirmation of the sense of a common Arab destiny that was dormant since the 1973 October War. Arab youths' current use of social networking tools to connect and share experience is likely to grow, sustaining the cross-border movement for participation in the political and socio-economic decisions that affect their lives.

This may also inspire more Arab support for Palestinian civil society's struggle for freedom. For the past six years these have included the demonstrations against the encroachment of Israel's separation wall on Palestinian land, which have drawn international and Jewish solidarity, and the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement that has scored considerable success -- so much so that the Israeli Knesset just passed the first reading of a bill to make it illegal for Israelis to support boycotts.

The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions have also pushed the discourse about Arab and Palestinian causes more firmly into the realm of universal human rights. They will reinforce a shift that had already been taking place with greater numbers now willing to apply the term apartheid to describe Israel's actions in the occupied Palestinian territories and towards its own citizens. Efforts by Israeli officials and institutions to whitewash military occupation and inequality and to de-legitimise the "de-legitimisers" simply reinforce the parallels to South Africa.

Finally, America's grip on the region is weakening, despite the fact that close ties with the Egyptian military will give the US more of a say in Egypt's transformation than the people want. The US continues to undermine its capacity to influence events through its unwavering support of Israel's occupation, including its apparent intention to veto a United Nations resolution affirming the illegality of the settlements, even though this has been the formal US position since a 1978 State Department legal memo that was never superseded.

September is just seven months away. It is not yet clear that these trends will develop fast enough to forestall moves towards a settlement of the conflict that would abrogate Palestinian rights. But at the very least, the notion that a US-funded security state -- whether in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, or Palestine -- can buy stability forever has been dealt a body blow, and as peoples take action to determine their own futures, expect Palestinians to do the same.

Nadia Hijab is co-director of Al-Shabaka, The Palestinian Policy Network.

Ugandan Opposition Speaks Out Before Friday's Election

The revolutionary spirit continues to spread in Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni has ruled for 25 years and is intent on adding to the total. Museveni exploits al-Qaeda and al-Shabab's threat to internally and externally buffer criticism of his consolidation of power, and he's denying any comparison to Egypt.

"We would just lock them up," he said of future protesters. "In the most humane manner possible, bang them into jails and that would be the end of the story."

Museveni's troops and personal drive form the backbone of the African Union's mission in Somalia. Just one more ruler that America cannot afford to lose.

Obama Passes the Revolutionary Buck

Today was a day for answers. Hearing enough of himself and his policies tossed around in the media, a smiling, loose President Barack Obama descended upon the South Court Auditorium to brief the press. Effortlessly moving between fiscal responsibility and health-care, Obama portrayed the confidence of someone who would bet his life on his policy.

He even insisted that the White House was “on the right side of history” in Egypt “at every juncture.” Unfortunately no reporter asked the crucial follow-up: “Do you possess an aversion to blame, or are you simply delusional?”

One needn’t look far to find an Egyptian dismayed by Obama’s handling of their revolution. Popping up on every media channel and social site, Egyptians saved their anger for the Mubarak regime as they adopted a parental disappointment in Obama. Jaded by false promises of Cairo, Egyptians held out hope that Obama would ultimately choose their freedom over Mubarak’s totalitarian machine. They knew that Egypt still needed America’s support.

Thus came the final expression that they hoped Obama “learned his lesson.”

This impression, however, is hard to find in his latest remarks. Unsatisfied with a basic defense of his crisis management during the 18-day standoff, Obama offered no indication of regret for a policy that he clearly sees a need to defend (along with Clinton). On the contrary, Obama argued to reporters who asked just the question, his "3AM" response was as good as it gets.

“What we didn't do was pretend that we could dictate the outcome in Egypt, because we can’t,” Obama told reporters... “So we were very mindful that it was important for this to remain an Egyptian event; that the United States did not become the issue, but that we sent out a very clear message that we believed in an orderly transition, a meaningful transition, and a transition that needed to happen not later, but sooner. And we were consistent on that message throughout.”

Obviously Obama offers two different sets of conditions, as an “orderly” transition under former Vice President Omar Suleiman had little in common with a “meaningful” one. His administration's (and Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf states) free-fall from protecting Mubarak - the infamous “not a dictator” - to supporting Suleiman to accepting a military council is well documented. Now Obama praises the purer expression of Egypt’s democracy as “messy” - what happened to order? His definition of consistency is confusing at best, contradictory at worst.

So how does Obama explain himself?

“Well, first of all, without revisiting all the events over the last three weeks, I think history will end up recording that at every juncture in the situation in Egypt that we were on the right side of history.”

How convenient and historically accurate to ignore Egypt’s time-line. He might have to write those books himself though. Maybe George Bush can help.

Listening to Obama and one starts to wonder what revolution he was watching. During questions about Iran’s enthusiasm for Egyptian protesters, Obama at one point responds: “on Iran, we were clear then and we are clear now that what has been true in Egypt should be true in Iran, which is that people should be able to express their opinions and their grievances and seek a more responsive government. What's been different is the Iranian government’s response, which is to shoot people and beat people and arrest people.”

Apparently Mubarak loyalists - mostly policemen and party members - didn’t do that in Egypt. Did Obama forget that Egyptians were protesting police brutality and state torture?

Continuing to draw attention towards his personal comments and away from his cabinet, Obama argues, “Particularly if you look at my statements, I started talking about reform two weeks or two-and-a-half weeks before Mr. Mubarak ultimately stepped down. And at each juncture I think we calibrated it just about right. And I would suggest that part of the test is that what we ended up seeing was a peaceful transition, relatively little violence, and relatively little, if any, anti-American sentiment, or anti-Israel sentiment, or anti-Western sentiment. And I think that testifies the fact that in a complicated situation, we got it about right.”

First, while Egyptian security forces violently suppressed the opposition during November’s fraudulent parliamentary election, Obama was busying issuing "no comment." Egyptians have since overthrown the results themselves after the military dissolved parliament. The “reform” that Obama speaks of, starting on January 25th, also admits to the fact that he originally supported Mubarak, who no protester was prepared to accept. When revolution subsumed reform, Washington initially hoped to prevent the former by supporting the latter.

The one benefit of waiting 18 days rather than two is the resignation list of Mubarak's allies, although not all have left power.

Furthermore, anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans were eliminated in order to keep Egypt’s message on Egypt. The revolution raided the fuel depot of Zionism and Americanism imperialism, then stuck a smiling Egyptian mask on the front. Conversely, the revolution’s overwhelming expression of non-violent disobedience had nothing to do with Obama’s “calibration.”

Egyptians peacefully united in their intent to eject Mubarak and disprove Western stereotypes.

Obama still places a priority on Israel too. “What we’ve seen so far is positive,” he says, only to begin with the Egyptian military’s ratification of its treaty with Israel. Next come negotiations with the opposition, free elections, building democratic institutions, and finally strengthening the economy. Perhaps this order is coincidental, or he was saving the most important for last, but the power of words spring alive by starting with Israel.

No comment, however, displays the perplexing state of Obama’s reasoning more than “the media card.” As analyzed several days ago, The New York Times provides a number of accounts in which Obama blames the media for casting him on Mubarak’s side. If Obama was so pleased with his response “at every juncture,” why did he constantly complain of the White House being "misrepresented? Why did his younger staffers lament the old-guard’s stonewalling that embarrassed Obama in Tahrir? And why did he agree?

Clearly he was dissatisfied with the policy and message coming out of his own office, and vexed by his inability to correct either.

Yet Obama states early in his briefing, “Part of the challenge here is that this town - let’s face it, you guys are pretty impatient. If something doesn’t happen today, then the assumption is it’s just not going to happen. Right? I’ve had this conversation for that last two years about every single issue that we worked on, whether it was health care or "don't ask, don't tell," on Egypt, right? We’ve had this monumental change over the last three weeks -- well, why did it take three weeks? (Laughter.) So I think that there’s a tendency for us to assume that if it didn’t happen today it’s not going to happen.”

Such a statement reveals a desperation belying Obama's confident projection. “Impatience” in the U.S. media is unrelated to his personal handling of Egypt, or his runaway National Security circle. It just so happened that Egyptians grew irritated and angry with Obama’s lack of support, leaving reporters no choice except to describe the popular sentiment in Tahrir Square. Beltway culture was irrelevant to his response.

Egyptians rejected his “orderly transition," not journalists.

Speaking of impatience, Obama demanded health-care overhaul and Guantánamo's closure within a year, a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in two. U.S. generals believed that he sped up Iraq's withdrawal too fast. Why is impatience suddenly a sin? Yes, Egyptians demanded immediate results. They wanted Mubarak gone before January 25th.

Upheaval is the nature of revolution.

Obama will likely have one leg to stand on when Egypt's current history begins to emerge. All he can claim is that he didn’t prop up Mubarak beyond his demise, however this policy is so suicidal that it barely warrants consideration. Obama inevitably had to jump Mubarak’s ship, yet he missed the chance to tap the revolution’s deepest potential by jumping after Mubarak sank.

Obama has proven during his short tenure that he despises blame and admitting when he’s wrong. Not many people do, of course, but life is different in the Oval Office. First Obama passed Egypt’s buck to his officials, international news organizations, and political critics, and now to a generally protective U.S. media blanket. Worst of all, he’s complaining that Egypt’s events happened too fast, even though millions of protesters and many outside observers preemptively recognized the end of Mubarak’s reign.

Revolutions are supposed to be fast. They can happen in an instant. What about a life-or-death emergency on U.S. soil - who will he blame then?

Quote of the Day

"This is really the heart of the insurgency. I believe they have been beaten."

- Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, force commander of Helmand province, offering his opinion of the Taliban's health. He made a similar claim last year.

"They've taken on the Taliban, the insurgency, right in the heartland and they've defeated them," Mills told USA Today on January 12th, 2010.

Petraeus Shaving Taliban Estimates

by Gareth Porter, published in IPS:

WASHINGTON, Feb 14, 2011 (IPS) - Despite evidence that the Taliban insurgency had grown significantly in 2010, the U.S. intelligence community failed to revise its estimate for Taliban forces as part of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan in December.

That unusual decision was in deference to Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S.-NATO forces in Afghanistan, who did not want any official estimate of the insurgency's strength that would contradict his claims of success by Special Operations Forces in reducing the capabilities of the Taliban in 2010.

In late 2009, the intelligence community adopted an estimate of 20,000 to 30,000 full-time insurgents, as reported by McClatchy newspapers in November and confirmed in a press briefing by Brig. Gen. Eric Tremblay, a spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), on Dec. 3, 2009.

But in 2010, the Taliban and their allies increased the total number of attacks to 34,000, compared with 22,000 in 2009, according to official ISAF data – a whopping 54 percent rise.

That major step-up in operations suggested that the Taliban had grown substantially between 2009 and 2010. Yet no revised intelligence estimate of Taliban strength appeared in late 2010, even though the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan in December. Such an NIE would normally be expected to include an updated estimate of insurgent strength.

Last month, officials of NATO and Petraeus's command managed to suggest that the number of insurgents had not grown in 2010 and then dismissed the very idea of an intelligence estimate of the size of the forces fighting against ISAF.

On Jan 3, 2011, an unnamed NATO official in Brussels said there were "up to 25,000" Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan, according to a Jan. 6 story by Associated Press reporter Slobodan Lekic. The same 25,000 figure - the mid-point in the 2009 estimate - had been provided earlier by "several military officers and diplomats", according to the Lekic story.

That figure would imply that the number of full-time Taliban had not grown since 2009, and might even have shrunk - thus supporting Petraeus's claims of success.

But in a Jan. 9 response to a query from Associated Press, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu clearly disparaged the idea that there could be an official estimate of the Taliban strength.

"There has never been a single reliable source for the size of the insurgency," said Lungescu, adding that all estimates of the insurgents are "highly unreliable".

Lungescu sought to divert attention away from a focus on the numerical strength of the Taliban, suggesting that it "misrepresents gains made by alliance forces in the past year". But it is logically impossible for a numerical estimate of insurgent strength to "misrepresent" the results of military operations.

Lungescu was implying that an estimate of Taliban numerical strength would interfere with ISAF's claims of having weakened the Taliban.

In an obvious effort to suggest that the insurgency had been reduced in size, Lungescu said, "Thousands of insurgent leaders have been killed or captured and several thousand fighters have been taken off the battlefield."

In response to an IPS query to ISAF about the estimated strength of the Afghan armed insurgency, an ISAF spokesman, U.S. Navy Lt. Fernando Rivero, did not respond except to refer to the Jan. 9 statement by Lungescu.

An Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman said Feb. 9 that the ministry estimates the number of Taliban insurgents at between 25,000 and 35,000, although he said it was "just a guess".

The failure of the intelligence community to adopt a revised estimate in the NIE last year was shaped by a highly politicized relationship between the intelligence community and the most powerful field commander in modern U.S. warfare.

The NIE reflected an agreement on what one intelligence source called a "division of labour" between the NIE and the military under which the NIE would not deal with issues bearing on the success of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. Intelligence officials understood that such issues were "outside our lane", the source said.

An estimate of Taliban strength in the NIE would have obvious bearing on the success of U.S. military operations, since it would show whether the Taliban had been able to continue to grow despite losses inflicted by Special Operations Forces raids.

The decision to forgo a formal estimate of insurgent forces may have been authorized by the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, who has oversight of any national intelligence product, and adjudicates any major differences of view that can't be negotiated. Clapper, who took over as DNI last August, has a reputation for sacrificing truth to support existing war policies.

He is best known for having claimed in October 2003, when he was director of the Defense Department's National Imagery and Mapping Agency, that the missing WMD in Iraq "unquestionably" had been transferred to Syria and other countries before the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Dr. Antonio Giustozzi of the London School of Economics, a widely-published specialist on the conflict in Afghanistan, told IPS the Afghan National Army had provided him with an estimate in April 2010 of 36,000 full-time insurgents – roughly a 50 percent increase over the 2009 estimate.

Giustozzi provided IPS with his detailed estimate of insurgent forces as of January 2011. The estimate includes 36,000 full-time fighters and nearly 50,000 part-time local fighters. The Taliban only mobilize that much larger local pool of manpower occasionally, according to Giustozzi.

That a revised estimate of the insurgency's strength is missing from the latest NIE recalls the political struggle between the CIA and the U.S. military command over the estimate of Vietnamese Communist-led military forces.

In late 1966, a CIA analyst, Sam Adams, found that the military's estimate of less than 300,000 Communist-led forces in Vietnam did not reflect the evidence of continued growth in those forces – and particularly of "irregular" local paramilitary forces.

The CIA came up with a new estimate of Communist-led forces to 431,000 to 491,000, which was presented in a draft national intelligence estimate in spring 1967. But the military command continued to stonewall, flatly refusing to accept any increase in the overall Viet Cong "order of battle" above 300,000.

Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote to Gen. William Westmoreland, the top U.S. commander in Vietnam, on Mar. 9, 1967, "If these figures should reach the public domain they would literally blow the lid off Washington."

Wheeler urged Westmoreland to "do whatever is necessary to insure [sic] that these figures are not repeat not released to news media or otherwise exposed to the public."

Westmoreland agreed. According to his intelligence chief, Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, Westmoreland said such an estimate would be a "political bombshell" if it got out to the public.

CIA Director Richard Helms finally caved in to military pressure in September 1967 and ordered the CIA to agree to an estimate of exactly 299,000.

Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern told IPS he recalls Sam Adams quoting in a conversation with him the explanation Helms had given to Adams: "My job is to protect the Agency, and there is no way I can do that if I get into a pissing match with the Army when it's at war."

Like Westmoreland, Petraeus appears to have invoked the privilege of the military commander to avert the potential "political bombshell" of an estimate that would almost certainly have shown a large increase in the number of armed insurgents in Afghanistan.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.

Drone attacks aside, the Obama administration appears preoccupied with al-Qaeda’s “allies,” as the Taliban is known in White House speak. This ambiguous attempt to “clarify” the U.S. mission naturally generates more confusion. Perhaps al-Qaeda would regain a presence in Afghanistan were U.S. and NATO forces to withdraw in the relatively near future. But America’s only enemy in Afghanistan is the Taliban.

Whatever its numerical strength, Petraeus’s high estimate of 25,000 should cause similar concern as a low estimate.

Obama Misses Chance to Change Middle East

This should have been his defining moment. The world’s stage, in fact, couldn’t have been scripted better. While Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advised U.S.-supported dictators of a perfect storm, President Barack Obama was sailing straight into one of his own. The Middle East's clouds had naturally parted for the transformative democracy that George Bush attempted to impose by force.

Tahrir Square offered the chance to empower global change from the bottom up - and reconnect the West to the Muslim world in the process.

“There are very few moments in our lives where we have the privilege to witness history taking place,” Obama began his address shortly after Hosni Mubarak’s resignation. “This is one of those moments. This is one of those times. The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same.”

Good thing they didn’t listen to him, or else Egypt stood a good chance of staying the same.

How time flies during a revolution. Not about to be conned by anyone after 30 years of propaganda, Egyptian protesters barely paused when reports first surfaced of the White House’s conception of democracy: “order” and “stability.” To think, after watching Friday’s mass euphoria, that only days ago the White House threw these words behind former Vice President Omar Suleiman. While conservative quarters in America attack Obama for “supporting the Muslim Brotherhood,” the truth is that his administration backed their enemy.

A plot revealed weeks ago, first in the international media and later through a series of WikiLeaks, U.S. and Israeli contingencies called for a Suleiman transition in the event of Mubarak's sudden departure.

If the protesters had ever listened to the White House during 18 days of struggle, they would have been stuck with the Israeli hot-lined, CIA torture chief who advocated "hungry" Gazans. Through Friday morning the White House still seemed O.K. with Suleiman’s transition, as it worked the phones to clarify just how much power Mubarak had transferred to him. Vice President Joe Biden released updates from his discussions with Suleiman, attempting to project an air of confidence and control. Suleiman also enjoyed support from Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

But Egyptians held their ground and refused any powers conferred upon Mubarak II. Under popular pressure and anxious of its own survival, the military’s “communique number 1" interrupted Mubarak’s finals hours and the U.S.-Israeli plot to replace him with a drone. Suleiman appeared grim as he finished Mubarak’s dirty work, his own power evaporating into the jubilant Egyptian night.

Both were cast out, a unilateral rejection of U.S. policy in Egypt.

In the end Obama still couldn’t bring himself to say the magic word: "leave, leave, leave." As former president Hosni Mubarak couldn’t bear to resign of his own accord, instead delegating the announcement to a sulking Suleiman, so too could Obama never take the final step. Failing to explicitly declare himself on the side of Egyptian protesters, Obama released his “strongest response yet” after Mubarak failed to resign on Thursday. True only because his prior statements were so weak, Obama must have cursed himself for prematurely jumping on the right side of history - once more landing him on the wrong side.

The conspicuous absence of Obama’s cabinet after Mubarak’s fall spoke volumes of his self-reflection. This wasn’t just a presidential moment unfit for Secretaries, but a deliberate attempt to make up for 18 days of ambiguity. An overt admission that he hadn’t supported the protesters enough. Egyptians ultimately freed themselves from the Hosni Mubarak regime and changed their destinies despite Obama.

Not because of him.

Although he may have escaped being run over by a popular uprising, Obama came dangerously close for someone of his professed ideals. One could easily forget that he owns a Nobel Prize after his administration initially sided with Mubarak ("not a dictator"), only for its message to crumble along with him. Consulting Israeli officials every step of the way, Obama processed America's response through an Israeli lens until Mubarak resigned. His manipulable policy and typical, middle-of-the-road strategy almost derailed Egypt's revolution, if such a thing were possible.

No force, neither Saudi oil, U.S.-Israeli defense pacts or a brutal police force could stop millions of Egyptian protesters. Thus Obama's response cost him everything and bought him nothing.

While Israel faced the same strategic dilemma on February 11th as on January 25th, Obama risked what was left of his credibility and left himself exhausted more than exuberant. Far from appearing celebratory as he sent Mubarak off into “history,” his stern tone drew from anger more than solemnness. At one meeting Obama was, “seething about coverage that made it look as if the administration were protecting a dictator and ignoring the pleas of the youths of Cairo.” He then, “made it clear that this was not the message we should be delivering.”

So why did he?

The official line, one parroted by the U.S. and international media, is that Obama had no choice in backing Mubarak and Suleiman. According to David Sanger, The New York Times’ Washington corespondent, Obama found himself, “often torn between idealism and pragmatism... navigating the counsel of a traditional foreign policy establishment led by Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Biden and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, against that of a next-generation White House staff who worried that the American preoccupation with stability could put a historic president on the wrong side of history.”

This false choice led to a dead-end policy. Lost in their own world, Obama’s cabinet and stable of personal advisers held nothing more than an idealistic notion of U.S. empire - the arrogance and folly of believing they could channel Egypt's revolution into a personal candidate. And the U.S. media, pro-Israeli on the whole, attempted to clean their tracks.

“Pragmatist” became a codeword for Israeli, Saudi and Gulf interests.

Pragmatism, in fact, would have ridden the revolution and come out on top, repositioning America ahead of the curve. Realism cannot be defined as suppressing a popular revolution and installing Suleiman to protect political, military, and economic interests. Biden, Clinton, and Gates’s "traditional foreign policy" must be defined as something other than realism, given that Egyptians overthrew it. Vainly attempting to control or stop a revolution qualifies as an idealistic pipe dream.

Realism would have allowed the revolution to unfold naturally, confident that a functioning democracy will produce more stability than Mubarak’s autocratic regime. Obama has since latched onto the theory that a democratic transition would produce regional stability, not instability. If only he had done so on January 25th, before Egyptians grew furious with Washington’s mixed messages and fence-straddling. Many protesters expressed frustration at Obama and “hoped” that he learned his lesson.

“The White House shared those concerns,” Sanger and Helene Cooper write of Israeli interests, “but workers in the West Wing also worried that if Mr. Obama did not encourage the young people in the streets with forceful, even inspiring language, he would be accused of abandoning the ideals he expressed in his 2009 speech in Cairo.”

Aside from the fact that these accusations surfaced last year, why did Obama fly so close to the Sun? He's played the "policy rift" card before in Afghanistan and Israel, but “bad coverage” can’t excuse poor policy and indecision. He should have taken action if he disagreed with the White House's reaction. An inability to control his own office gives the distinct impression that Obama isn’t in control of the White House, ruled instead by the old guard.

Those wondering why Obama didn't connect with protesters should start here.

Fortunately for him all isn’t lost in Egypt, not yet anyway. America will remain an ally of the Egyptian people, but the latest loss of credibility requires a clear and expressed policy of supporting Egyptians. The opposition still desires U.S. support, only on their terms. The decades of suppressing Egyptians and Palestinians to favor the Israeli people must come to an end. No longer can such an heinous policy continue.

Obama will forever relive his handling of Egypt, but he must focus on seizing the next chance for regional empowerment. If he truly learned anything from Egypt’s revolution, Obama will apply this knowledge to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by negotiating a fair deal for the Palestinians. Standing silent during the Gaza war but vowing to push his peace process from “day one,” a reference to George Bush’s last minute Annapolis summit, Obama immediately staked out an unrealistic two-year deadline for a resolution.

Two years later with nothing to show, Obama’s policy has all too often shadowed Bush’s: limited talk and no action. Both of their “achievements” - declaring a Palestinian state and the illegality of Israeli settlements within Palestinian territory - are self evident. As direct talks once again stalled in September 2010, U.S. officials including Clinton held out hope for an agreement within one year. So did former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2007.

The present atmosphere between the Palestinians, Israelis, and White House isn’t poisonous so much as non-existent. Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, recently resigned to widespread jokes that he doesn’t need a replacement before scheduled September elections. “What negotiations?” goes the thinking.

While the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians played a negligible role in Egypt’s revolution, it also served to amplify U.S. and Israeli fears of Mubarak’s resignation, further impairing their out-of-touch response. More importantly for Obama, his inaction on the Palestinian front disappointed the Muslim world and placed him at a disadvantage for Egypt’s revolution. Cairo was perfect for recapturing Cairo, but instead Egypt's revolution engulfed any attempt to revive negotiations.

Now Obama must flip his miss into a second-chance opportunity.

Legitimate reasons exist to doubt Obama’s credibility amid Egypt’s aftermath, and he’ll prove his sincerity through a series of tests. Supporting or suppressing wider regime change in key states such as Algeria and Yemen, two corrupt states infected by al-Qaeda, is one. Shoveling copy-cat uprisings underground until they blow at a later date will recommit Egypt’s mistakes; continuing to manipulate the revolutionary spirit awakened in the Middle East will generate similar results.

Obama must also assume personal control in balancing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which includes substituting some Israeli boosters in the White House with Muslim intellectuals. He must stand up to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As conservative fire rains upon him, he must personally convince Israelis that a fair two-state solution best serves the interests of all parties. Lopsided Israeli influence damages U.S. interests and obstructs regional peace.

The time demands impartial negotiations.

President Obama assumed office with the highest expectations on record: a two-state solution within two years and dreams of a new Middle East. Instead his pro-Israeli bias flushed two years down the drain, jeopardizing his regional vision. Luck wouldn’t begin to describe an agreement within the next two years, yet Obama shouldn’t presume a second term either. The conflict dominates millions of lives, leaving no time to waste - especially when he knocked Bush for waiting.

Though he blinked and missed a revolution in Egypt, Obama still retains the power to change the region in an instant. If the president controls his own office.