Two fundamental questions being debated in the White House and Pentagon are the similarities and differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. Differences appear to outweigh similarities, but one divergence is especially striking. The Iraq insurgency, while organized to a degree, was more of an ad hoc movement that often competed with itself.
The Taliban, despite its variances, is cohesive, regulated, and draws on a continuous past. It is a mature insurgency and bringing it down won’t compare to Iraq.
A flurry of admissions by US officials that Taliban participation in Afghanistan is unpreventable, coupled with General McChrystal's warning that the Taliban can’t be destroyed, prompted immediate speculation over the White House’s internal debate. Those advocating a limited strategy, either a middle way or counter-terrorism, yield to Taliban influence.
But believing the fire can be contained without being extinguished could be a catastrophic mistake. Ceding ground grows the Taliban corporation.
The NYT was only the latest to highlight a disturbing discovery - the Taliban’s war chest is full of more than opium cash. During an overhaul of their counter-narcotics strategy, including the deployment of DEA officers, Special envoy Richard Holbrooke admitted, “In the past there was a kind of a feeling that the money all came from drugs in Afghanistan, That is simply not true.”
Instead the Taliban has, according to the Washington Post, “embraced a strategy favored by multinational corporations: diversification. With money pouring in from so many sources, the Taliban has been able to expand the insurgency across the country with relative ease, U.S. and Afghan officials said.”
And good corporations plan for the future.
Celebration initially greeted a UN report documenting a 22% drop in opium cultivation, but high-yield crops and better irrigation reduced total opium production only 10%. A drop in opium price resulted not from counter-narcotics, but an abundance of opium almost double the world demand. An even more distressing problem - opium stores have steadily vanished since 2006.
UN, US, and Afghan officials agree that the Taliban has stockpiled opium to a tune of 10,000 tons, up from 8,000 in 2008. UN officials estimate the total value at export price at around 3.2$ billion. This reservoir is meant to insulate the Taliban from drops in supply, but also acts as a nest-egg for the future. The Taliban is preparing for the long-term.
And as the White House found out, drugs are only part of the equation, not the largest chunk. If President Obama were to freeze troop levels or deploy a limited number of troops (under 10,000), the Taliban will gradually expand and establish momentum as it grows its economy. A security vacuum exposes a favorite target - foreign contractors. Bribes to protect development projects are unsustainable, allowing the Taliban to make money off America’s troop shortage.
This counterinsurgency strategy isn’t viable. Convert Afghans to alternative crops and the Taliban will tax those too. Extortion has expanded beyond opium into legitimate businesses, farmers, timber and gemstone markets, and antiquity smugglers. The Taliban is the mob, imposing taxes on territory and pinching Afghan and Western subcontractors for protection money to safeguard development projects.
“The international community and the Americans have been deceiving themselves for the past seven years, saying the Taliban has been getting all of their money from drugs," said Waheed Mojda, a former Foreign Ministry official for the Taliban.
Such analysis, if true, poses a deadly risk to any strategy allowing the Taliban to regain territory. The more it spreads the more money it will make, not from increased opium expansion but by taking over the entire local economy. Allowing the Taliban to seize territory makes choking its funding impossible. America is already having trouble denting the flow.
In another indication that nation-building is necessary for American success, Afghanistan lacks a modern financial system. No paper trails means US officials can’t document monetary transitions to prevent money laundering from drugs and foreign donations, the largest portion of Taliban funding. Laws are being written as fast as possible.
"We're going after this with a great deal of urgency and a huge amount of effort to even more effectively disrupt the networks that fund the Taliban," said David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department's assistant secretary for terrorist financing.
But this problem cannot be solved through laws and regulations alone. Foreign donations, the primary source of funds, will increase with the Taliban’s ground success. Moreover, Afghanistan clearly doesn’t have the tools Western officials are used to, a quintessential sign that it needs nation-building - not counter-terrorism.
"They want Afghanistan back," Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen said over the summer. ‘We can’t let them or their Al Qaeda cohorts have it. It’s not just about instilling fear or spreading violence. They want Afghanistan back...That means not giving the Taliban the freedom of movement they've had for the last three years."
Unless President Obama increases the competition and find a new business strategy, the Taliban corporation will threaten to put America out of business.
October 21, 2009
October 20, 2009
Quotes of the Day
"We believe that this decision of the IEC is legitimate, legal and constitutional and that it strengthens the path towards democracy."
- Afghan President Hamid Karzai, on accepting a runoff
"President Karzai and the other candidates have shown that they have the interests of the Afghan people at heart. This is a reflection of a commitment to the rule of law and the insistence that the Afghan people's will should be done."
- President Obama, on Karzai's announcement after speaking with him by phone
"President Karzai really deeply believes he had won the election and that the international community was kind of conspiring to push for a different outcome. He had people within his government, people within the election commission who felt they were being insulted about putting together a faulty election process... There were a lot of very deep feelings about Afghanistan's right to run its election, its competency in running it and so forth."
- Senator John Kerry, on his meeting with Karzai
"There is every indication that the Obama administration favors a unity government rather than another vote. I think the most likely outcome is a unity government, but a government that will take a long time to put together, may not be very strong and will not be necessarily a very effective partner given the internal disagreements within that government."
- Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan and power player, on the future from Kabul
“It is not going to be complicated one day and simple the next. I believe the president will have to make his decisions in the context of that evolutionary process.”
- Defense Secretary Robert Gates, ticking the clock on President Obama's troop verdict
"I am relieved that this short-lived attempt to control the media and the public's right to know has come to an end. It's always been my belief that the American people should see the hard reality of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."
- Louise M. Slaughter, D-N.Y., chairwoman of the House Rules Committee, on the Pentagon's reversal to allow public photos of US soldiers killed in action
“The Government is dealing with the refugees like the Israelis’ attitude to the Palestinians."
- Saleh Shah, senator from South Waziristan, on the current operation
October 19, 2009
Explaining the Unexplainable
Certain phenomena throughout human history have defied description and explanation: love, religion, black holes, reality TV. Afghanistan ranks among the most complex pieces of land on earth, so one must wonder as White House and Pentagon officials review Afghanistan to death if explaining the war is actually possible in any amount of time.
Innocent as the demand is for information on Afghanistan, US officials are in no mood to illuminate the pitch black, forcing us once again to make our own light. Contradictory as this exercise may seem, we will attempt to explain the unexplainable positions being fed to us.
Deployed to buy more time for President Obama, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told CNN on Sunday, “I think it would be irresponsible and it would be reckless to make a decision on US troop level if, in fact, you haven't done a thorough analysis of whether in fact there's an Afghan partner ready to fill that space.”
Passing the talking-points memo to John Kerry, the Senator repeated, “It would be entirely irresponsible for the president of the United States to commit more troops to this country, when we don't even have an election finished and know who the president is and what kind of government we're working with.”
Yes, it would be entirely irresponsible - and it already happened. Emanuel, Kerry, and company must have short memories or else they want Americans to quickly forget the past.
Obama’s “Afpak” White Paper went up on his “progress” list of his foreign policy section as it was announced. He proclaimed, “I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months.” In addition to “taking the fight to the Taliban,” an objective the White House is now trying to walk away from, “this push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential elections in Afghanistan in August.”
That objective also failed and now the White Paper is being reworked. The 17,000 troops Obama deployed along with their comrades are stuck in limbo, unsure of reinforcements, their mission, or what the White House is thinking.
“Before you commit troops,” Emanuel argued, “which is not irreversible, but puts you down a certain path, before you make that decision, there's a set of questions that have to have answers that have never been asked.”
Obama didn’t, “know who the president is and what kind of government we're working with," or if the election could be secured and held fairly, or who the enemy is, yet he still put America down a certain path. "A thorough analysis" in the White House didn't occur. Obama is obviously frustrated at the election - is he mad at himself? Maybe this lapse is why Emanuel now believes analysis is so vital.
“Typically, you defer to the field for the resource needs,” said one senior official involved in the review. “In March we thought we had a handle on what McKiernan thought he needed.”
But they didn’t. Says Bruce Riedel, architect of the White Paper, “The military was not ready at that point to come to the president and say, 'Here's the number we think it's going to take.’ They were satisfied that what they had put on the table at the beginning of the administration met their requirement for the moment.”
President Obama is entangled partly because he chose to snap deploy the “requirement for the moment,” and not take the same time to review as they are now. General McChrystal has presented another momentary requirement - 40,000 troops - which he called the minimum requirement. Obama said during his “Afpak” roll out in March, “We will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable.”
Perhaps he's holding himself accountable, questioning his own decision to deploy troops without a government to work with or clear metrics for success. For example, the White House assumed that most of the Taliban's funding came from opium; this was later proven untrue. But Obama has made no admission of error and is growing defensive towards an increasingly irritated Pentagon and a curious American people.
We’re told the Afghan government is at fault, not him, even though his vision wasn't ready.
Yet in regards to the next government, evidence exists that America knows exactly who it will work with. Said Kerry, “I think this is a moment for President Karzai to frankly step up and help to share with the world a better vision for how the government here is going to deliver and be a full partner.” He doesn’t sound like he’s talking about a runoff, but like he expects Karzai to win or share power with Dr. Abdullah.
More blatantly, State Secretary Hillary Clinton told CNN, “It is likely that they will find that President Karzai got very close to the 50+1 per cent. I think one can conclude that the likelihood of him winning a second round is probably pretty high.”
They know, or think they know, who they’re going to work with - Karzai and his corrupt power circle power. The question is whether the White House wants this or not. Is the White House finished with Karzai and delaying troops in case he returns to power, or does it lack trust in and control of Dr. Abdullah and is waiting for Karzai to assume power?
Hard to tell what is true, but another unexplainable phenomena - why would anyone expect Karzai to change now? His circle just tried to steal the very election Obama was hoping would go well and is resisting a runoff at this moment.
Inexplicable too is the Afghan people, who are dangerously close to being abandoned yet again. Octopus Mountain is growing deeply disturbed by Obama’s fixation on al-Qaeda at the expense of the Afghan state. We're aware of how improbable and costly nation-building is in Afghanistan; we also remember how the Soviet war ended.
A strategy that limits itself to al-Qaeda risks an America vacuum to be filled with civil war at the maximum, chronic instability at the minimum. Leaving the Afghan people isn’t only morally objectionable, but strategically futile.
America has witnessed what happens when Afghanistan is left to pick up its own pieces. The Taliban and al-Qaeda don’t just come to power, war lords and bandits also descend on the country and spiral it into total lawlessness. Foreign powers continue to play their games from outside. To hesitate on troop levels and back away from counterinsurgency, from nation-building, is 1988 redux.
President Obama’s assertion that he must take his time now so as to make the correct long-term decision is sound and we back his logic. Unfortunately we believe he ignored his own advice and trapped himself in a final paradox highlighted by General McChrystal: delay too long and the war may become irreversible. Waiting until after a runoff just to decide, let alone deploy, additional troops could mean December - 5 months after his request. Will that be too late?
It’s hard explaining the unexplainable. Point out any confusion and we’ll correct or reexamine our analysis.
Innocent as the demand is for information on Afghanistan, US officials are in no mood to illuminate the pitch black, forcing us once again to make our own light. Contradictory as this exercise may seem, we will attempt to explain the unexplainable positions being fed to us.
Deployed to buy more time for President Obama, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told CNN on Sunday, “I think it would be irresponsible and it would be reckless to make a decision on US troop level if, in fact, you haven't done a thorough analysis of whether in fact there's an Afghan partner ready to fill that space.”
Passing the talking-points memo to John Kerry, the Senator repeated, “It would be entirely irresponsible for the president of the United States to commit more troops to this country, when we don't even have an election finished and know who the president is and what kind of government we're working with.”
Yes, it would be entirely irresponsible - and it already happened. Emanuel, Kerry, and company must have short memories or else they want Americans to quickly forget the past.
Obama’s “Afpak” White Paper went up on his “progress” list of his foreign policy section as it was announced. He proclaimed, “I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months.” In addition to “taking the fight to the Taliban,” an objective the White House is now trying to walk away from, “this push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential elections in Afghanistan in August.”
That objective also failed and now the White Paper is being reworked. The 17,000 troops Obama deployed along with their comrades are stuck in limbo, unsure of reinforcements, their mission, or what the White House is thinking.
“Before you commit troops,” Emanuel argued, “which is not irreversible, but puts you down a certain path, before you make that decision, there's a set of questions that have to have answers that have never been asked.”
Obama didn’t, “know who the president is and what kind of government we're working with," or if the election could be secured and held fairly, or who the enemy is, yet he still put America down a certain path. "A thorough analysis" in the White House didn't occur. Obama is obviously frustrated at the election - is he mad at himself? Maybe this lapse is why Emanuel now believes analysis is so vital.
“Typically, you defer to the field for the resource needs,” said one senior official involved in the review. “In March we thought we had a handle on what McKiernan thought he needed.”
But they didn’t. Says Bruce Riedel, architect of the White Paper, “The military was not ready at that point to come to the president and say, 'Here's the number we think it's going to take.’ They were satisfied that what they had put on the table at the beginning of the administration met their requirement for the moment.”
President Obama is entangled partly because he chose to snap deploy the “requirement for the moment,” and not take the same time to review as they are now. General McChrystal has presented another momentary requirement - 40,000 troops - which he called the minimum requirement. Obama said during his “Afpak” roll out in March, “We will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable.”
Perhaps he's holding himself accountable, questioning his own decision to deploy troops without a government to work with or clear metrics for success. For example, the White House assumed that most of the Taliban's funding came from opium; this was later proven untrue. But Obama has made no admission of error and is growing defensive towards an increasingly irritated Pentagon and a curious American people.
We’re told the Afghan government is at fault, not him, even though his vision wasn't ready.
Yet in regards to the next government, evidence exists that America knows exactly who it will work with. Said Kerry, “I think this is a moment for President Karzai to frankly step up and help to share with the world a better vision for how the government here is going to deliver and be a full partner.” He doesn’t sound like he’s talking about a runoff, but like he expects Karzai to win or share power with Dr. Abdullah.
More blatantly, State Secretary Hillary Clinton told CNN, “It is likely that they will find that President Karzai got very close to the 50+1 per cent. I think one can conclude that the likelihood of him winning a second round is probably pretty high.”
They know, or think they know, who they’re going to work with - Karzai and his corrupt power circle power. The question is whether the White House wants this or not. Is the White House finished with Karzai and delaying troops in case he returns to power, or does it lack trust in and control of Dr. Abdullah and is waiting for Karzai to assume power?
Hard to tell what is true, but another unexplainable phenomena - why would anyone expect Karzai to change now? His circle just tried to steal the very election Obama was hoping would go well and is resisting a runoff at this moment.
Inexplicable too is the Afghan people, who are dangerously close to being abandoned yet again. Octopus Mountain is growing deeply disturbed by Obama’s fixation on al-Qaeda at the expense of the Afghan state. We're aware of how improbable and costly nation-building is in Afghanistan; we also remember how the Soviet war ended.
A strategy that limits itself to al-Qaeda risks an America vacuum to be filled with civil war at the maximum, chronic instability at the minimum. Leaving the Afghan people isn’t only morally objectionable, but strategically futile.
America has witnessed what happens when Afghanistan is left to pick up its own pieces. The Taliban and al-Qaeda don’t just come to power, war lords and bandits also descend on the country and spiral it into total lawlessness. Foreign powers continue to play their games from outside. To hesitate on troop levels and back away from counterinsurgency, from nation-building, is 1988 redux.
President Obama’s assertion that he must take his time now so as to make the correct long-term decision is sound and we back his logic. Unfortunately we believe he ignored his own advice and trapped himself in a final paradox highlighted by General McChrystal: delay too long and the war may become irreversible. Waiting until after a runoff just to decide, let alone deploy, additional troops could mean December - 5 months after his request. Will that be too late?
It’s hard explaining the unexplainable. Point out any confusion and we’ll correct or reexamine our analysis.
COIN 101
Pakistani intelligence officials claim the army reached verbal agreements with two militant commanders, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, three weeks before the Waziristan operation began. In exchange for neutrality and allowing Pakistani soldiers to pass through their territory, the army will not attack the men and their fighters.
Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas told the AP that no formal agreements have been signed, but that, "there was an understanding with them that they will not interfere in this war. There is always a strategy to isolate your main target... Obviously, they are not coming to rescue or to help."
The American response can't be positive. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly is doing his job when he says, "We have a shared goal here, and the shared goal is fighting violent extremism," but his job isn't to tell the truth. Maybe Pakistan is truly isolating the core TTP first, then will turn on its offshoots in the event of its defeat. America is pressing Pakistan to turn into North Waziristan once its finished in South Waziristan.
Except these deals can't be an encouraging sign for America. Pakistan doesn't have the ability to combat every group at once, vast as they are in number, a bad sign in itself. Though a smart move by Pakistan, negotiating with militants hostile only to America sends an explicit message.
Pakistan seems unlikely to take on TTP branches as long as they stay neutral and focused on Afghanistan. Bahadur is second in command after Hakimullah and commander of North Waziristan, while Nazir is actually a commander in South Waziristan. Pakistan knows that it'll spark a larger fire than it can contain by breaking agreements with Bahadur and Nazir, yet this ensures the whole system will survive if Hakimullah resists the onslaught.
Sec. 203, paragraph C(A), of the Kerry-Lugar bill calls for, "ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries."
If the Pakistani army is truly upset by the bill, negotiations with militants could be push back in addition to military pragmatism, a message that it won't be ordered around by America. It won't support them, but it won't attack them either. Then again, negotiations themselves qualify as support if Bahadur and Navir benefit from them.
Seeds of Jihad
Earlier this month the third rail that is Tibet shocked President Obama after he scrapped a meeting with the Dalai Lama, who had visited Washington to accept an award. Damage ranged from minor burns to loss of the senses. Some Democrats and Republics, and especially India, accused him of “kissing up to the Chinese.”However, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters after the announcement, “The president has decided that he will meet with the Dalai Lama at a mutually agreeable time.” The Dalai Lama himself confirmed this statement, having been briefed beforehand by Valarie Jarrett on Obama’s visit to China.
“His holiness is looking forward to meeting President Obama after his visit to China,” read a press release from his office in September.
But though the uproar’s magnitude was unwarranted, Obama did raise real questions. Is he courting China at India’s expense? Is he afraid to move against China given current trade relations? Is he afraid to go near Tibet? These questions have been on the table for months.
“We firmly oppose any foreign forces interfering in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues,” China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told reporters on September 15th. “The U.S. side is well aware of our position on this issue.”
Surely Xinjiang is no different, yet here Obama may find even deeper troubles.
Tibet, righteous as the cause may be, falls under championing democracy and freedom, a charge Obama’s critics are levying in connection to his apologies for past American mistakes, such as Iraq. No one is complaining that Tibet is instrumental to America’s safety, but Xinjiang falls strictly under national security.
When Pentagon officials speak about predicting jihadist threats rather than reacting to them, they’re subconsciously warning about Xinjiang. Tibet will likely be on the agenda, if not his mind, when Obama travels to China. Silence could hurt his credibility, but silence on Xinjiang could eventually hurt America and the rest of the world.
Last week Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader and potential heir apparent, called for jihad against China.
“This massacre is not being carried out by criminal Crusaders or evil Jews who have committed crimes against our nation," al-Libi stated. “Today, a new massacre is being carried out by Buddhist nationalists and communists against the Muslim population in eastern Turkestan.”
Though al-Libi wasn’t the first to call for jihad in Xinjiang, he is one of the highest ranking members to do so, evidence that al-Qaeda is serious about expanding into China. Inroads will be hard to come by, but al-Qaeda is nothing if not persistent. Octopus Mountain has sounded the alarm before - al-Qaeda is looking ahead 5-10 years for new bases.
Xinjiang, the size of Iran and home to 8 million Sunni Muslims, would make an ideal haven despite China’s authoritarian tendencies. Few Uyghurs will be swayed by al-Qaeda’s transnational jihad, but more than a few could relate to Chinese repression, sufficient to get splinter cells up and operational. al-Qaeda could then begin to gradually funnel outside cadres over a period of years.
The situation could already be ripe. An influx of Han, from 500,000 in 1950 to over 7 million presently, has marginalized Uyghurs from society and power. Further government pressure poses a huge risk.
Listen to Rebiya Kadeer if not al-Qaeda. Days after a Chinese court convicted six Uyghurs to death for their actions in the July riots, the exiled president of the World Uyghur Congress warned, “This is not going to create peace and stability in the region, this will further enrage the Uyghur people.”
She pointed out that China’s only response to Uyghur complaints has been law enforcement; the underlying issue of the riots, a murky rape/beating/snitching, was ignored. Instead Urumqi, the capital, remains under heavy guard with roadblocks and Chinese police patrolling the streets. Security without a sincere redressal of historic grievances prepares fertile ground for al-Qaeda.
“There is no way to remove injustice and oppression without a true return to their religion and serious preparation for Jihad in the path of God the Almighty and to carry weapons in the face of those (Chinese) invaders," al-Libi said. “It is a duty for Muslims today to stand by their wounded and oppressed brothers in East Turkestan and support them with all they can.”
Weakened as al-Qaeda may be in the short-term, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s message cannot be underestimated in the long-term. Dell L. Dailey, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief, told the NYT, “Abu Yahya is a senior Al Qaeda member, a top strategist for the group, and trusted and presented as one of the group’s most effective promoters of jihad.”
al-Qaeda is far from putting down roots in Xinjiang. The group’s operational existence is constantly questioned; some intelligence officials believe China specifically exploits the group to retain a free hand in Xinjiang. Few American officials, if any, would step between China and al-Qaeda, but this ambiguous approach could perpetuate the conflict.
China’s public actions indicate it’s only concerned with security, not political and cultural liberties - the exact mindset that spreads extremism. al-Qaeda nourishes its movement with oppression.
Whether it would use a potential base to launch attacks on China or America too is difficult to discern, but one suspects al-Qaeda would use Xinjiang for all their activities. Penetrating China won’t be easy, but al-Qaeda seems determined to do so. President Obama is unlikely to issue a public statement on Xinjiang when he visits China in November, but silence would fail to address world security, not just America’s. Obama must do as his military leaders advise and see three, four steps ahead.
Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Nigeria - China is the fifth and beyond.
October 18, 2009
Quote of the Day
"This is a war bound to end in the defeat of the Pakistan army... The government has put the country's sovereignty at stake to please Obama, we'll attack his well-wishers everywhere."
- Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq on the TTP's resistance in Waziristan
- Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq on the TTP's resistance in Waziristan
Assassination in Iran
Typical of the Middle East to interrupt a chaotic but predictable routine that was beginning to set in. General Nourali Shoushtari, head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards' ground forces, and General Mohammadzadeh, the Guard's commander in Sistan-Baluchestan, were assassinated along with four other senior Guard commanders and dozens of civilians in twin suicide blasts.
Though Israel wasn't cited as a suspect in the attack, the alternative could be worse. Jundallah - Soldiers of God - has fought an insurgency with Iran since at least 2003, when the organization was believed to have formed in Balochistan.
Though Israel wasn't cited as a suspect in the attack, the alternative could be worse. Jundallah - Soldiers of God - has fought an insurgency with Iran since at least 2003, when the organization was believed to have formed in Balochistan.
Al Jazeera's Nazinene Moshiri reported from Tehran, "Just three weeks before presidential elections there was a big explosion in that area, where 25 people were killed and more than 100 injured. The head of Jundullah said that his group carried out the attack. The Iranian's say that they are carrying out a duel war against drug traffickers and Jundullah, which they claim is linked to al-Qaeda."
Not to mention, allegedly, the US government.
Ali Larijani, Iran's parliamentary speaker, reportedly said, "We consider the recent terrorist attack to be the result of US action. This is the sign of America's animosity against our country." However, President Ahmadinejad claimed, "We were informed that some security agents in Pakistan are cooperating with the main elements of this terrorist incident... We regard it as our right to demand these criminals from them."
The trail from an Iranian general is perilous regardless of where it leads. Will negotiations with Iran's nuclear weapons be effected?
October 17, 2009
Paper Unity
Reality is on a roll. A day after Afghanistan nudged one step closer to runoff abyss, Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai “disengaged” himself from President Robert Mugabe over “toxic issues.” Only last week Tsvangirai hailed “substantial progress” in Zimbabwe."If you were to have come to Zimbabwe last year between March and June, the level of human rights abuses was far higher and now people can live in peace," Tsvangirai told Reuters while in Valladolid, Spain to accept a lifetime achievement award. “There has been substantive progress, it's just that you have got one or two incidents and then it spoils the thing.”
Not only that, the MDC started a poll on September 24 asking its supporters to vote, “Should The MDC pull out of the inclusive government?” Tsvangirai announced last week, “I want to tell you the evaluation is overwhelmingly that we should stay in government and make this the direction the country needs to take.”
It turns out Tsvangirai wasn't being real.
“The detention of our party treasurer Roy Bennett has brought home the fiction of the credibility and integrity of the transitional government,” Tsvangirai told a press conference days after his return. “It has brought home the self-evident fact that ZANU-PF see us as a junior, fickle and unserious movement.”
Tsvangirai admitted he “papered over the cracks” in order to persuade the world that the unity government was progressing. But now, “Until confidence has been restored, we can't continue to pretend that everything is well.”
And if Tsvangirai had been fudging the truth, that means the West has too. America still maintains sanctions on Mugabe, but publicly acts without urgency along with Europe. Ian Kelly, a State Department spokesman, illustrated the point during his press briefing.
“Our position hasn’t changed,” he said, “it is that we are looking to Mr. Mugabe to implement the Global Political Agreement and foster democracy and respect for human rights. We do understand that the MDC has indicated that it will disengage from the government. But our position remains the same, that there is a way forward in place through this Global Political Agreement, and we would urge President Mugabe to implement his part of it.”
This simply isn't reality.
Tsvangirai decried, “We have seen total abuse and disrespect of the GPA and in particular of the MDC. Ministerial mandates have been changed unilaterally, government internal rules have not been changed to recognize the new reality. Over and above this, some government agencies, in particular few components in the National Security forces, still behave as if the old order exists. The National Security Council itself has met only once in nine months.”
In a letter dated October 7th, Tsvangirai requested from Mugabe, “that your office institutes appropriate action against Brigadier (Justin) Mujaji to ensure his immediate cessation of illegal activities, in particular, the use of the Zimbabwe National Army to perpetrate unlawful acts.”
Tsvangirai accused Mujaji of evicting white settlers from their farms. Expanding on the trend, “We are also aware of the extensive militarization of the countryside through massive deployment of the military and the setting up of bases of violence that we saw after the 29th March 2008. Over and above this, we are aware of over 16 000 of Zanu PF youth functionaries who have been imposed on the government payroll.”
It’s safe to say Mugabe won’t be changing his ways, certainly the power cabal behind him isn’t. After stealing two elections and procrastinating for months just to sign a power-sharing agreement, eight months have brought a semblance of normality that runs paper deep.
“If you have been married for seven months and you find that the marriage has no chemistry, something is wrong,” said Tendai Biti, the MDC Finance Minister who opposed joining the unity pact.
ZANU couldn’t agree more. Spokesman Ephraim Masawi reacted, “If MDC wants to disengage... we don't have a problem with that. We were having problems with MDC, working together. We have been trying but it was not easy."
New battle, same war
Tsvangirai has boxed himself in now and he must be careful. With the truth exposed and battle lines starting to reform, he can only return to the government if, as he put it, “all outstanding issues are fulfilled, " or ZANU will eat him up. The chances of Mugabe conceding power are low based on his history, so where does that leave Tsvangirai?
“It is a constitutional crisis which should be resolved if Zanu-PF and its leadership know that there is a price to pay for procrastination,” he said.
That price is a call for emergency UN-sponsored elections. If he can't muster support for such desperate measure, Tsvangirai is pushing for elections in 18 months. In the meantime, “We have to manage our transition until such time as the MDC can be elected in its own right.” Except Mugabe stands a large chance of compromising any election.
Ultimately Tsvangirai needs outside help to uproot Mugabe's apparatus. The AU and SADC aren’t applying the necessary pressure and the West helplessly watches from beyond. Sanctions bounce off Mugabe and a UN-sponsored election is equally improbable to damage him unless America oversees it.
Realistically Tsvangirai stands alone, now and possibly in the future, but at least reality is finally shining through. A few morsels of food drift down into the deep.
October 16, 2009
The Monkey's Sledgehammer
Perceptions are slowly merging with reality. What the world has known since August 20th, but vehemently downplayed by many US officials, is about to come true - Afghanistan’s election needs a runoff. After the first round threw a wrench in President Obama’s strategy, the monkey will be swinging a sledgehammer in the second roundBegin with an undeniable truth: Afghanistan needs a runoff. The country as a whole won’t accept Hamid Karzai without one, America will look even more foolish for propping him up, and the Taliban are sure to capitalize. Nor can Afghanistan afford to look like Iran and project a double standard. Regardless of what any particular party wants, the constitution demands a runoff if no candidate receives over 50% of the vote.
Final results of the recount are expected Saturday, but word leaked that Karzai has fallen below 47%. “Chances are there will be a second round,” Said Tayeb Jawad, ambassador to America, told reporters, “although it was not so sure up to a couple of days ago, but now it looks like there will be a second round.”
Vindication is near for Peter W. Galbraith. The former deputy of the UN’s Afghan mission similarly told reporters, "I think everybody has figured out what's going to happen. My guess is that from everything that has happened, it's probably a sign that there is going to be a runoff."
The questions are: has Obama figured out what’s going to happen, and what’s he planning to do?
Opposing a runoff would be suicidal, so cross out that option. Reconciliation is also unlikely. Jawad said of the possibility, “That’s peaceable, that’s doable, that’s probably a good way to go politically, but whether it would make a huge difference as far as the reality on the ground, and as far as bringing more capable, skillful Afghans to the government, I doubt it.”
Dr. Abdullah, Karzai’s challenger, isn’t optimistic either. Though he recently admitted, “It will be a different environment, no doubt, once the announcement is made,” he’s also rejected a power-sharing deal on numerous occasions. He’s waiting to see just how much Karzai’s lead gets cut down. If it comes near his own level then he’s going full bore on a runoff.
Abdullah isn’t stupid though, he could join Karzai if his lead is insurmountable. But Karzai isn't stupid either. He already thinks he won and knows he has the majority to win a runoff. If by chance he did give Dr. Abdullah a position of power, will he be an equal partner and can they get along for five years? How will Afghanistan’s ethnic fault lines react? Will the same divides split the government itself?
Octopus Mountain isn’t optimistic of power-sharing.
Yet a runoff could smash what’s left of Obama's original “Afpak” strategy. Afghan officials are pointing to an early November date, otherwise the runoff will be delayed until spring. Obama simply cannot wait that long to deploy more troops. Three weeks isn’t close to enough time either, but Obama needs to figure it out. By any means.
"How can the second round be desirable for Afghanistan?” Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta reacted to runoff speculation. “The international community loses security forces, we lose our security forces, we have to spend a significant volume of money. The security situation will be worse, and this is not desirable."
Yesterday General Jonathan Vance, chief Canadian commander in Afghanistan, called the military situation “serious, “desperate,” and “a major emergency.” Then today, Major General Mart de Kruif, NATO’s commander in southern Afghanistan, warned, “we absolutely need additional forces.”
“In RC (regional command) south, to really complete the 'shape, clear, hold, build,' we need at least two additional brigades of coalition forces, somewhere between 10,000 or 15,000 troops,” he said.
Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission will announce a runoff on Saturday, barring a miracle or foul play that declares Karzai the winner. Obama should use the opportunity and justification to go public on a troop deployment. The reasons are twofold.
First, purely from a perception standpoint, holding a runoff without additional US forces screams, “We’re not going to support you.” US officials preach a long-term commitment, but delaying troops until after a runoff is about American interests, not Afghanistan’s. While stumping for Karzai yet again, State Secretary Hillary Clinton claimed that Obama will only make a decision when he's, "absolutely comfortable with what he believes is in the best interest of the United States."
Conversely, nothing would prove America stands by Afghans more than troops to guard the runoff. This option isn’t practical though; Obama could announce them tomorrow and they still won't reach Afghanistan in three weeks. He needs to find a way though because he’s locked in a catch 22. An unprotected runoff will unleash more havoc, while deploying troops without a stable government is tactically and strategically dangerous.
War is chaos incarnate and cannot be expected to follow logic. Paradoxes are inevitable. The White House doesn't want to admit that Afghanistan needs more troops regardless of who’s in power.
Arguing that President Obama should wait until after the runoff before making a decision doesn't work when he's already rejected withdrawal. Freezing troop levels, especially with a runoff looming, is absurd. Thus his only debate is over numbers, whether 10,000, 20,000, or 45,000. Assuming he’s already committed more troops on paper, he should launch an emergency deployment of those decided.
Send 10,000 or 20,000 immediately and mull the rest during the runoff and winter. America maintains Rapid Deployment Forces for military contingencies. Launch them. A contingency is defined as, "a future event that is possible but cannot be predicted with certainty," and a fraudulent election fits the requirement. Also hold an emergency meeting with NATO and try to cull another 5,000 to be deployed immediately. This is war, not academics. Make it work.
Jawad said of a runoff, "Four weeks will push it into early November and that's the latest that it will happen because after that it will be extremely cold, especially in northern Afghanistan. But if it's delayed to spring, this is clearly a recipe for disaster - this creates a lot of confusion, a lot of indecisiveness and also further complicated relations."
Five or sixth months is too long for Obama to make a decision. He doesn’t like his options, but no words will change reality. He was unprepared for a runoff, America was to be fair. If Obama isn't ready to commit now then he’s not ready for Afghanistan.
October 15, 2009
COIN 101
Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik has made a very honest, very dangerous admission. Having assumed a public role now that his jurisdiction is the main target, Malik told reporters in Lahore, "The kind of terrorism we are facing; our forces neither had capacity nor training to counter this."
Pakistan "is not prepared for these kinds of attacks," Malik said.
Though he promised the government was improving the country's security forces, such as importing Chinese-made scanners and bullet-proof jackets, he admitted the new security system will take another 6 months to a year to develop. Pakistan doesn't have the kind of time - the Taliban are just getting started.
Remember the words of TTP spokesman Azam Tariq: "This was our first small effort and a present to the Pakistani and American governments."
2010 could be brutal. Unless the TTP is puffing itself up expect attacks every week for months. After all, it's fulfilled its threats so far and Malik will only encourage them. He's in a tough position between the Pakistani people and the militants. The truth was the better choice, if only because the TTP already knows it can't be stopped.
But it gets worse. Malik also told journalists, "The banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are operating jointly in Pakistan," calling them a "syndicate."
The TTP's viral spread is the new "it" topic, as if it wasn't already happening. This plan has long been in motion. Indeed, Amjad Farooqi, spokesman for the Punjabi Taliban, reportedly claimed responsibility for the Lahore attacks. The Taliban umbrella is expanding.
Now that Pakistan has confessed its inability, will America use the opportunity to send more trainers, armaments, and weapons?
Ameen Jan, an analyst on Pakistan, perfectly explained to Al Jazeera, "The Taliban and insurgents are trying to send a very clear message: 'we're still here, we're still going to create hell for you and we are not going away anywhere soon.' This is an insurgency that is here to stay for some time and it will take all of the effort of the Pakistan military and the rest of the state apparatus, and will require the support of the Pakistani people to battle it for the months and years to come."
Pakistan "is not prepared for these kinds of attacks," Malik said.
Though he promised the government was improving the country's security forces, such as importing Chinese-made scanners and bullet-proof jackets, he admitted the new security system will take another 6 months to a year to develop. Pakistan doesn't have the kind of time - the Taliban are just getting started.
Remember the words of TTP spokesman Azam Tariq: "This was our first small effort and a present to the Pakistani and American governments."
2010 could be brutal. Unless the TTP is puffing itself up expect attacks every week for months. After all, it's fulfilled its threats so far and Malik will only encourage them. He's in a tough position between the Pakistani people and the militants. The truth was the better choice, if only because the TTP already knows it can't be stopped.
But it gets worse. Malik also told journalists, "The banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are operating jointly in Pakistan," calling them a "syndicate."
The TTP's viral spread is the new "it" topic, as if it wasn't already happening. This plan has long been in motion. Indeed, Amjad Farooqi, spokesman for the Punjabi Taliban, reportedly claimed responsibility for the Lahore attacks. The Taliban umbrella is expanding.
Now that Pakistan has confessed its inability, will America use the opportunity to send more trainers, armaments, and weapons?
Ameen Jan, an analyst on Pakistan, perfectly explained to Al Jazeera, "The Taliban and insurgents are trying to send a very clear message: 'we're still here, we're still going to create hell for you and we are not going away anywhere soon.' This is an insurgency that is here to stay for some time and it will take all of the effort of the Pakistan military and the rest of the state apparatus, and will require the support of the Pakistani people to battle it for the months and years to come."
Quotes of the Day
"There was some oversimplification of the issues... and even there was this lack of knowledge. But after awhile this has changed and everybody realized it's not really as simple as that, just getting rid of a leader of a country you don't like."
- Said Tayeb Jawad, Afghanistan's ambassador to America, speaking of the early Obama administration
"This is a ferociously difficult issue, and it bears a lot of thought and reflection and review."
- David Axelrod, senior Obama adviser, after today's "situation room" meeting on Afghanistan
"It's punishment for war photographers. They're saying if you want access, you have to play by our rules. And our rules are this — the public will NOT see dead U.S. soldiers."
- Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on the Pentagon's new press rules in Afghanistan.
- Said Tayeb Jawad, Afghanistan's ambassador to America, speaking of the early Obama administration
"This is a ferociously difficult issue, and it bears a lot of thought and reflection and review."
- David Axelrod, senior Obama adviser, after today's "situation room" meeting on Afghanistan
"It's punishment for war photographers. They're saying if you want access, you have to play by our rules. And our rules are this — the public will NOT see dead U.S. soldiers."
- Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on the Pentagon's new press rules in Afghanistan.
Guerrilla Warfare
For all the opposition to escalating Afghanistan, relatively little notice is given to the current temperature in Pakistan. For instance, when Senator John McCain criticizes President Obama for stalling and endangering US troops, he usually forgets to mention Pakistanis are falling in greater numbers.Taliban fighters staged their fifth attack in ten days on government targets: the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) building, Manawa Police Training Centre and Eliot Force Training Centre. The death-toll started at 5, stands at 24, and will probably rise. The attack itself is packed with significance; the surface is stained with blood but underneath lies a near complete picture of guerrilla warfare.
Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik told a local television station, “The enemy has started a guerrilla war.”
Either Malik is a fool or he's playing one because he's staring at an advanced stage of guerrilla war, one that started decades ago, perhaps centuries. The real question is whether the insurgency has become too advanced.
Every report today will speak of how these attacks are connected; obviously they’re connected. These attacks don’t happen randomly, they could have been planned months ago in Waziristan. Each attack is one move out of hundreds on the chess board, neither the first nor last.
Lahore itself was chosen specifically as a propaganda victory. Now the government is wondering just how deep the TTP has infiltrated Punjab province. Now nowhere is safe. Pakistan is said to primarily, if not exclusively, use military officials from Punjab to safeguard nuclear weapons keys, believing them to be disconnected from the insurgency.
The TTP is seeking to challenge this notion.
Though civilians died in the attacks, every target was a government buildings, three of them related to law enforcement. Malik is right, this is guerrilla warfare and the enemy is attacking political targets, creating an inverse scenario. Attacking government instead of civilian targets is the TTP’s way of hoping to stave off complete public abandonment.
It may or may not be working. What turned the Paksitani public was Swat, not everything before, even though the Taliban steadily declined in popularity as the war escalated. By attacking the police and army, the TTP is trying to attack legitimate targets of war.
Except it’s become too proficient. Bombings and attacks have lost their political impact and simply look like one act of war after another. Multiple sites are attacked in multiple cities, militants infiltrating the most secure army facilities, wave after wave. Sometimes the attack is purely civilian to instill control, which naturally backfires. The TTP would be better off with its populace in its territory, not evacuating.
The TTP is overwhelming the populace and ultimately imploding, winning battles but losing the war.
In another dimension of guerrilla war - foreign investment - Mohammed Sohail, chief executive at brokers Topline Securities said, “The market is sort of used to terror attacks. These high profile targets are a concern, but investors are optimistic that eventually the Waziristan operation will take place and the terrorists will be attacked."
Yes, Waziristan, the TTP’s only hope. Many reports are liable to claim the TTP is trying to prevent an operation. Imtiaz Gul, a political analyst in Islamabad, told Al Jazeera, “It seems that [opposition fighters] are taking advantage of the lack of leadership in Islamabad at the moment. Obviously these attacks are meant to prevent a ground offensive in South Waziristan."
Octopus Mountain offers a different theory: these attacks are meant to provoke a ground offensive in South Waziristan.
Beyond everything encapsulated in these attacks, sheer bravado is a driving force. Baitullah Mehsud wasn’t shy to wage war with the Pakistani government, but his successor Hakimullah is a loose cannon who vowed a bloodbath after Baitullah’s death. He's reportedly given Qari Hussain, commander of the suicide forces, a free hand to execute. Eager for war and believing his movement is still growing stronger, Hakimullah has the men and the means to launch almost any attack he wants.
He also seems arrogant and overconfident. How strong does he actually think he is? Strong enough to take on the Pakistan army? Waziristan has been invaded three times since 2005, all to no avail. The TTP has been constructing its defense network for years. They claim to have 20,000 soldiers, Pakistan estimates 10,000 along with 2,000 hardcore foreign fighters. Either is enough to challenge 40,000 Pakistani soldiers, but this depends on the type of war fought.
Does Hakimullah have the means to fight a war that will become less guerrilla, more conventional? More jets, tanks, and artillery. More drones. The TTP will suffer high casualties - is the it ready for such a transition? It could knock itself out if it tries to land a knockout punch.
Sohail perfectly stated, “investors (the Pakistani government and people) are optimistic that eventually the Waziristan operation will take place and the terrorists will be attacked.”
But if they withstand that attack? The TTP wants to fight the Pakistani army, wants to settle scores and test its strength. However, it will only outlast the army if it fights smart and to survive until winter. Such an outcome would deal a huge blow to the government if it survives and could be the TTP’s ultimate objective. Protraction is the correct move.
Pakistan must be on guard not to fall for the TTP's trap. We’ve said it once and we’ll say it again - be absolutely sure of victory before launching. Don't launch prematurely in reaction to the TTP's attacks, don’t fall into the Waziristan trap. But if the TTP is so bold to deploy conventional tactics - large formations, challenging tanks - don't miss the opportunity to smash it.
The TTP will be at its weakest point outside of guerrilla war, a fish out of water.
October 14, 2009
Mullen's Treadmill from Hell
Imagine a treadmill that never ended, an intentionally broken treadmill. The display reads 12-18 months and the two numbers never change. You never move anywhere, have no countdown, just 12-18 more months on the treadmill. Forever.
“I think with the troops that we put on the ground there, that over the next 12 to 18 months, we have to dramatically change the security situation and stem the tide,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen told reporters in May while rolling out President Obama’s new “Afpak” strategy.
Strange, because he repeated this assessment in June - “It's important to start to turn the tide in the next 12 to 18 months” - July, August, and September - “I do believe we have to start to turn this thing around from a security standpoint over the next 12 to 18 months.”
As if time doesn’t exist in Afghanistan.
Perhaps Mullen innocently forgot to turn off the treadmill, but repeating the same line to such a degree is comically obvious. He was fulfilling his part of the “Afpak” strategy by creating breathing room for President Obama. The problem with words, however, is that reality washes them away.
Mullen often accompanied this 12-18 month window with, “I would look to 2009 and 2010 to be incredibly important years in Afghanistan... the Taliban is much better organized than they were before.” 2009 is almost over though, leaving 2010 all alone.
“Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) - while Afghan security capacity matures - risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible," General McChrystal wrote in his review.
Except 12 months is more like 6-12 months, a critical difference.
Furthermore, troops aren’t launched all at once like a rocket. Obama’s newest troops took until fall to fully deploy and 20,000-40,000 troops will similarly take a year, to say nothing of actually improving security. Mullen hasn’t given his shtick in October, but he’s liable to announce a 12 month window when that window is nearly closed.
This treadmill doesn’t just ramble on endlessly, it halts too and you have to stand for a while. In June Mullen claimed he had enough forces and, “I think we have the right strategy,” while Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in early September that Obama, “has the right approach to begin making some headway.” He even countered that Afghanistan isn’t slipping despite the dire warnings from his counterpart.
Mullen had told CNN’s State of the Union in late August, “I think it is serious and it is deteriorating and I’ve said that over the past couple of years that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics.”
Why, if Obama has the right strategy, is the White House, Congress, and Pentagon frozen on Afghanistan? Where is the headway in Afghanistan? Is General McChrystal lying when orders more troops? Afghanistan is clearly slipping and the right strategy is just as slippery. Some people just don’t want us to think that way, don’t want us to move.
The treadmill does move though, sometimes when you least expect. President Obama squashed the notion of leaving Afghanistan, sputtering the treadmill to life again. 13,000 support soldiers are being deployed, another lurch. The belt picks up speed. Obama recently revealed he would make his decision in the coming weeks, but what doubt can there be?
A simple addition problem: those favoring escalation include General McChrystal, General Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Clinton. Obama, by staying in Afghanistan, adds himself to the equation. He’s going to deploy more troops, Karzai or not, whether 10,000 or 40,000. 10,000 is sure to keep the treadmill running strong, undermanned as America still is.
In the event that 40,000 additional troops are deployed (no sooner than 2010), Obama and the Pentagon are likely to utilize a similar formula to their first rollout in March. 18 months will be gone and 2010 will be the year, 12 months to go whether 10 or 3 months remain. Yet a turnaround in one year is so improbable that pushing 2011 could be the new slogan. Many people may not notice.
“It's important to start to turn the tide in 2010 and 2011,” rolls right off the tongue.
It should go without saying that Afghanistan is a treadmill, sometimes speeding up, sometimes coming to a crash, but always picking up again, never ending. How long will the American people, let alone Afghans and Pakistanis, have to keep running?
12-18 months.
“I think with the troops that we put on the ground there, that over the next 12 to 18 months, we have to dramatically change the security situation and stem the tide,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen told reporters in May while rolling out President Obama’s new “Afpak” strategy.
Strange, because he repeated this assessment in June - “It's important to start to turn the tide in the next 12 to 18 months” - July, August, and September - “I do believe we have to start to turn this thing around from a security standpoint over the next 12 to 18 months.”
As if time doesn’t exist in Afghanistan.
Perhaps Mullen innocently forgot to turn off the treadmill, but repeating the same line to such a degree is comically obvious. He was fulfilling his part of the “Afpak” strategy by creating breathing room for President Obama. The problem with words, however, is that reality washes them away.
Mullen often accompanied this 12-18 month window with, “I would look to 2009 and 2010 to be incredibly important years in Afghanistan... the Taliban is much better organized than they were before.” 2009 is almost over though, leaving 2010 all alone.
“Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) - while Afghan security capacity matures - risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible," General McChrystal wrote in his review.
Except 12 months is more like 6-12 months, a critical difference.
Furthermore, troops aren’t launched all at once like a rocket. Obama’s newest troops took until fall to fully deploy and 20,000-40,000 troops will similarly take a year, to say nothing of actually improving security. Mullen hasn’t given his shtick in October, but he’s liable to announce a 12 month window when that window is nearly closed.
This treadmill doesn’t just ramble on endlessly, it halts too and you have to stand for a while. In June Mullen claimed he had enough forces and, “I think we have the right strategy,” while Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in early September that Obama, “has the right approach to begin making some headway.” He even countered that Afghanistan isn’t slipping despite the dire warnings from his counterpart.
Mullen had told CNN’s State of the Union in late August, “I think it is serious and it is deteriorating and I’ve said that over the past couple of years that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics.”
Why, if Obama has the right strategy, is the White House, Congress, and Pentagon frozen on Afghanistan? Where is the headway in Afghanistan? Is General McChrystal lying when orders more troops? Afghanistan is clearly slipping and the right strategy is just as slippery. Some people just don’t want us to think that way, don’t want us to move.
The treadmill does move though, sometimes when you least expect. President Obama squashed the notion of leaving Afghanistan, sputtering the treadmill to life again. 13,000 support soldiers are being deployed, another lurch. The belt picks up speed. Obama recently revealed he would make his decision in the coming weeks, but what doubt can there be?
A simple addition problem: those favoring escalation include General McChrystal, General Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Clinton. Obama, by staying in Afghanistan, adds himself to the equation. He’s going to deploy more troops, Karzai or not, whether 10,000 or 40,000. 10,000 is sure to keep the treadmill running strong, undermanned as America still is.
In the event that 40,000 additional troops are deployed (no sooner than 2010), Obama and the Pentagon are likely to utilize a similar formula to their first rollout in March. 18 months will be gone and 2010 will be the year, 12 months to go whether 10 or 3 months remain. Yet a turnaround in one year is so improbable that pushing 2011 could be the new slogan. Many people may not notice.
“It's important to start to turn the tide in 2010 and 2011,” rolls right off the tongue.
It should go without saying that Afghanistan is a treadmill, sometimes speeding up, sometimes coming to a crash, but always picking up again, never ending. How long will the American people, let alone Afghans and Pakistanis, have to keep running?
12-18 months.
October 13, 2009
A Casual 13,000 (80,000)
The Washington Post is reporting the public authorization of 13,000 troops, mainly support staff, to Afghanistan. Apparently they were part of the original package signed by President Obama in March, but were left out of the announcement. Will be interesting to hear him explain himself, if he actually does. Seen or unseen, spoken or silent - we'll feast one way or another.
Update: Obama only met briefly with reporters to say he would make a troop decision in the "coming weeks." He ignored the latest Washington Post report and left its explanation to spokesman Robert Gibbs, who subsequently claimed that George Bush authorized the deployment before leaving office.
New Update: The AP reports that General McChrystal is increasingly worried that Afghanistan's fraud-riddled election, coupled with existing corruption, could be enough to negate his highest troop estimate - 80,000 additional US troops. Apparently McChrystal settled compromised on 40,000 in relation to the 10,000-15,000 troops the White House supposedly wants. He also found another supporter in Hamid Karzai, to no surprise, who told ABC, "I'm fully behind him for what he is seeking in his report."
The Afghanistan debate is more a tapestry of propaganda, which is what the White House wants. Quoting Reuters, "A deliberative style is an Obama trademark on issues from national security to the economy, though the White House is frustrated by media leaks that have thrust internal debate on Afghanistan into public view."
Two options ultimately merge into one outcome: either Obama wants to save a national debate until after he's made his decision or he doesn't want a debate at all. Aside from a complete absence of dialogue, waiting until Obama decides would result in the same outcome. The whole point of debating now is to pressure him, whatever the side. There's no point in waiting until after he deploys more troops except for theoretical purposes. America is trying to speak when it matters - now.
President Obama wants indefinite time to delay and for no one to talk while he does. Audacious indeed.
Update: Obama only met briefly with reporters to say he would make a troop decision in the "coming weeks." He ignored the latest Washington Post report and left its explanation to spokesman Robert Gibbs, who subsequently claimed that George Bush authorized the deployment before leaving office.
New Update: The AP reports that General McChrystal is increasingly worried that Afghanistan's fraud-riddled election, coupled with existing corruption, could be enough to negate his highest troop estimate - 80,000 additional US troops. Apparently McChrystal settled compromised on 40,000 in relation to the 10,000-15,000 troops the White House supposedly wants. He also found another supporter in Hamid Karzai, to no surprise, who told ABC, "I'm fully behind him for what he is seeking in his report."
The Afghanistan debate is more a tapestry of propaganda, which is what the White House wants. Quoting Reuters, "A deliberative style is an Obama trademark on issues from national security to the economy, though the White House is frustrated by media leaks that have thrust internal debate on Afghanistan into public view."
Two options ultimately merge into one outcome: either Obama wants to save a national debate until after he's made his decision or he doesn't want a debate at all. Aside from a complete absence of dialogue, waiting until Obama decides would result in the same outcome. The whole point of debating now is to pressure him, whatever the side. There's no point in waiting until after he deploys more troops except for theoretical purposes. America is trying to speak when it matters - now.
President Obama wants indefinite time to delay and for no one to talk while he does. Audacious indeed.
October 12, 2009
Jeopardizing the Palestinian Cause
Several droplets had barely dripped down the sides of a frozen Israeli-Palestinian conflict when a new blizzard iced them up again. The Goldstone report, nearing infamy, has transformed into a political groundhog. Both Israelis and Palestinians saw their shadows and ran back inside, ensuring six more weeks of winter.
That could be six months, a year, or longer in Middle East time.
The Goldstone affair has played out in predictably ugly fashion. Palestinians were bound to exploit it and Israel certain to torpedo it, with America awaiting the coordinates. Forget the politics gyrating around Richard Goldstone’s report for a moment, if possible, and remember why the report exists in the first place - to bring justice, order, and restitution to Gaza.
Forget the politics because the leaders - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - cannot. Each undoubtedly believes they’re pursuing the best for their people, yet each is in a deeper hole than when the Goldstone report was first submitted to the UN Human Rights Council last week.
Why? They saw power in their shadows, not fear, and wanted more.
Abbas is looking less guilty each day compared to his counterparts, but he committed the original sin. Withdrawing the report wasn’t a problem if his plan was to gather more support or wait until reconciliation with Hamas, but bowing to American pressure, little choice did he have, after an equally embarrassing UN summit exposed too much weakness from Palestinian leadership. Shrouding the reasons for his actions compounded the damage.
Of the three leaders, Abbas is most difficult to explain. With nothing to gain by delaying or lying, he burnt his credibility and opened the door for challengers like Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouthi. He appears terrified to act against America’s wishes, but what good is American support if he’s losing Palestinians? Abbas may have been lured by the illusion of President Obama’s power.
The Goldstone report has become a weapon in the Palestinian’s negotiating arsenal (by any means necessary). If anything good can be said for Abbas it’s that he didn’t overplay a good hand, potentially saving deeper investigations for a more timely occasion. The same cannot be said of Khaled Meshaal.
Hamas easily stood to gain the most through the Goldstone report despite its own implication. Israel predictably overreacted to a counterinsurgency and induced a propaganda battle disguised as a legal battle, possibly Hamas’ plan all along. This strategy has more potential to damage the Israeli state than any rocket and it’s showing.
Why then was Hamas so unprepared to seize the advantage? Simple - greed.
Hamas would be in a greater position of power if not for itself. If Hamas had stayed cool and collected, reaffirmed the reconciliation process, added its weight to Fatah and Arab states to push the Goldstone report, and championed the voice of Palestinians, the party and its leaders would’ve spiked in popularity while simultaneously bringing down Abbas.
Instead Meshaal is playing his hand too quickly, telling seven Palestinian groups in Damascus, “A courageous leadership is a leadership that is frank with its people. Those who are accumulating political mistakes are today continuing their lies. This is not a leadership that deserves to be entrusted with the leadership of the Palestinians.”
Hamas failed to realize that letting Abbas fall by his own hand provides a higher chance of success in the coming election than bringing him down. It tastes power in Abbas’ weakness and desires more, but now Abbas is hitting back with the ammo Hamas is giving him.
"This campaign by Hamas is aimed at serving their interests, which is to postpone the signing of the reconciliation agreement," Abbas said in reaction to his criticism. “They want to concentrate their rule and their regime in Gaza. They want to ensure the continuity of division in Gaza, that aims at weakening the Palestinian Authority."
Naturally Meshaal insisted Hamas wasn't to blame for anything, telling Fatah, “We are angry because of what is happening to our people. Do not say we have embarrassed you.”
Fatah embarrassed itself, but now Hamas is too; missing an advantage is as bad as creating a disadvantage. Forging reconciliation with Fatah would yield a boost in popularity, increase the chances of advancing the Goldstone report, and solidify its hold on Gaza. Failing to do so would be a strategic error.
And by the sound of its internal debate, Israel is headed down the same road.
Few people had faith in Benjamin Netanyahu to pursue the Goldstone report or any serious investigation into the Gaza war, but just to be sure, he recently announced, “We will not allow Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak, who sent our sons to war, to arrive at the international court in the Hague... Israel will not allow its leaders to be prosecuted at The Hague. We reject this absurd state of affairs.”
Israel isn’t alone. Any state would reject an international attempt to try its present leaders, but once again Israel is missing the point. Its battle is primarily propaganda, not legal, and it’s sorely losing. The more Netanyahu stalls, objects, and defiantly attacks, the more Israel is damaged in public. The West is its only ally and some states are losing patience.
After denouncing Goldstone and reiterating his demands from Palestinians during a recent Knesset speech, Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni took to the floor and berated Netanyahu.
“The Americans exerted pressure and the Goldstone Report was taken off the table,” Livni said. “Wonderful. But then Israel, led by you, had to boast of its performance, humiliate the Palestinians. And what happened is that the report is now back on the table. If hurting the Palestinians and humiliating Abu Mazen gives you pleasure, this shows that you are still in the field of ‘there is no partner’ and have not moved to the real negotiations field.”
Knowing that America isn’t serious about pressuring Israel, Netanyahu has grown accustomed to getting his way and once again laid the blame on Palestinians for refusing to recognize the Jewish state of Israel. Growing more audacious, he manipulated the Goldstone report into an obstacle in the War on Terror to further exploit America. Instead of policing and protecting itself - and scoring a public victory in the process - he’s stonewalling the UN with absolute confidence.
Withdrawing the Goldstone report was victory to him, but at what cost?
“In short: We have beaten America, humiliated the Palestinians, isolated ourselves,” Livni said. “Raise your head from the small politics and see what has happened, see that Israel is excommunicated. Today Turkey, yesterday Britain, before that Europe. You have turned the state into a state that is losing its international support. When the prime minister thinks he wins, all of Israel loses.”
One tragedy follows another. The battle over the Gaza war has been just as fierce; sadly Palestinians are once again lost in the middle.
Israel is drunk with power, to the point where Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman can sweep aside a two-state solution with no American response. Livni warned Netanyahu that failing to advance the peace process will eventually unite the Palestinians and increase their demands. Meanwhile Palestinian factions, obsessed with advancing their individual interests in pursuit of power, are overlooking an even greater potential in unification.
These leaders aren’t just power tripping, they’ve actually tripped over their own power.
That could be six months, a year, or longer in Middle East time.
The Goldstone affair has played out in predictably ugly fashion. Palestinians were bound to exploit it and Israel certain to torpedo it, with America awaiting the coordinates. Forget the politics gyrating around Richard Goldstone’s report for a moment, if possible, and remember why the report exists in the first place - to bring justice, order, and restitution to Gaza.
Forget the politics because the leaders - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - cannot. Each undoubtedly believes they’re pursuing the best for their people, yet each is in a deeper hole than when the Goldstone report was first submitted to the UN Human Rights Council last week.
Why? They saw power in their shadows, not fear, and wanted more.
Abbas is looking less guilty each day compared to his counterparts, but he committed the original sin. Withdrawing the report wasn’t a problem if his plan was to gather more support or wait until reconciliation with Hamas, but bowing to American pressure, little choice did he have, after an equally embarrassing UN summit exposed too much weakness from Palestinian leadership. Shrouding the reasons for his actions compounded the damage.
Of the three leaders, Abbas is most difficult to explain. With nothing to gain by delaying or lying, he burnt his credibility and opened the door for challengers like Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouthi. He appears terrified to act against America’s wishes, but what good is American support if he’s losing Palestinians? Abbas may have been lured by the illusion of President Obama’s power.
The Goldstone report has become a weapon in the Palestinian’s negotiating arsenal (by any means necessary). If anything good can be said for Abbas it’s that he didn’t overplay a good hand, potentially saving deeper investigations for a more timely occasion. The same cannot be said of Khaled Meshaal.
Hamas easily stood to gain the most through the Goldstone report despite its own implication. Israel predictably overreacted to a counterinsurgency and induced a propaganda battle disguised as a legal battle, possibly Hamas’ plan all along. This strategy has more potential to damage the Israeli state than any rocket and it’s showing.
Why then was Hamas so unprepared to seize the advantage? Simple - greed.
Hamas would be in a greater position of power if not for itself. If Hamas had stayed cool and collected, reaffirmed the reconciliation process, added its weight to Fatah and Arab states to push the Goldstone report, and championed the voice of Palestinians, the party and its leaders would’ve spiked in popularity while simultaneously bringing down Abbas.
Instead Meshaal is playing his hand too quickly, telling seven Palestinian groups in Damascus, “A courageous leadership is a leadership that is frank with its people. Those who are accumulating political mistakes are today continuing their lies. This is not a leadership that deserves to be entrusted with the leadership of the Palestinians.”
Hamas failed to realize that letting Abbas fall by his own hand provides a higher chance of success in the coming election than bringing him down. It tastes power in Abbas’ weakness and desires more, but now Abbas is hitting back with the ammo Hamas is giving him.
"This campaign by Hamas is aimed at serving their interests, which is to postpone the signing of the reconciliation agreement," Abbas said in reaction to his criticism. “They want to concentrate their rule and their regime in Gaza. They want to ensure the continuity of division in Gaza, that aims at weakening the Palestinian Authority."
Naturally Meshaal insisted Hamas wasn't to blame for anything, telling Fatah, “We are angry because of what is happening to our people. Do not say we have embarrassed you.”
Fatah embarrassed itself, but now Hamas is too; missing an advantage is as bad as creating a disadvantage. Forging reconciliation with Fatah would yield a boost in popularity, increase the chances of advancing the Goldstone report, and solidify its hold on Gaza. Failing to do so would be a strategic error.
And by the sound of its internal debate, Israel is headed down the same road.
Few people had faith in Benjamin Netanyahu to pursue the Goldstone report or any serious investigation into the Gaza war, but just to be sure, he recently announced, “We will not allow Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak, who sent our sons to war, to arrive at the international court in the Hague... Israel will not allow its leaders to be prosecuted at The Hague. We reject this absurd state of affairs.”
Israel isn’t alone. Any state would reject an international attempt to try its present leaders, but once again Israel is missing the point. Its battle is primarily propaganda, not legal, and it’s sorely losing. The more Netanyahu stalls, objects, and defiantly attacks, the more Israel is damaged in public. The West is its only ally and some states are losing patience.
After denouncing Goldstone and reiterating his demands from Palestinians during a recent Knesset speech, Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni took to the floor and berated Netanyahu.
“The Americans exerted pressure and the Goldstone Report was taken off the table,” Livni said. “Wonderful. But then Israel, led by you, had to boast of its performance, humiliate the Palestinians. And what happened is that the report is now back on the table. If hurting the Palestinians and humiliating Abu Mazen gives you pleasure, this shows that you are still in the field of ‘there is no partner’ and have not moved to the real negotiations field.”
Knowing that America isn’t serious about pressuring Israel, Netanyahu has grown accustomed to getting his way and once again laid the blame on Palestinians for refusing to recognize the Jewish state of Israel. Growing more audacious, he manipulated the Goldstone report into an obstacle in the War on Terror to further exploit America. Instead of policing and protecting itself - and scoring a public victory in the process - he’s stonewalling the UN with absolute confidence.
Withdrawing the Goldstone report was victory to him, but at what cost?
“In short: We have beaten America, humiliated the Palestinians, isolated ourselves,” Livni said. “Raise your head from the small politics and see what has happened, see that Israel is excommunicated. Today Turkey, yesterday Britain, before that Europe. You have turned the state into a state that is losing its international support. When the prime minister thinks he wins, all of Israel loses.”
One tragedy follows another. The battle over the Gaza war has been just as fierce; sadly Palestinians are once again lost in the middle.
Israel is drunk with power, to the point where Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman can sweep aside a two-state solution with no American response. Livni warned Netanyahu that failing to advance the peace process will eventually unite the Palestinians and increase their demands. Meanwhile Palestinian factions, obsessed with advancing their individual interests in pursuit of power, are overlooking an even greater potential in unification.
These leaders aren’t just power tripping, they’ve actually tripped over their own power.
Quote of the Day
"This was our first small effort and a present to the Pakistani and American governments."
- Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq after the TTP's raid on Pakistan's army HQ.
- Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq after the TTP's raid on Pakistan's army HQ.
COIN 101
One thing is clear in the cyclone of Afghanistan propaganda.
Though a vigorous debate may appear in session, the American people are witnessing a mirage. Confusion reigns supreme, more cacophony than dialectic, a mixture of Pentagon discontent, Congressional talking-point competitions, and an uninformed media pretending to understand counterinsurgency. The American people only matter in the form of polls. We are not part of the process.
President Obama has vanished since Afghanistan's election, but though his stalling is annoying and mostly self-inflicted, hesitation isn't necessarily the problem. Silence has followed his delays, leaving his own defense to officials and negating his most valuable commodity - himself. America is trying to debate Afghanistan without Obama. This makes no sense.
We're fed impression management instead of transparency, enlarging the information black hole. Misinformation instantly fills the void and creates friction between parties. Obama is paying a heavy price for his deliberation, which isn't synonymous with choosing the right strategy. In a further sign of the military's irritation with the White House, officials are warning that Obama is now downplaying Afghanistan.
We know for certain that Afghanistan's government hangs on life support while the Taliban rapidly expands, the countryside is so insecure that US civilians have stopped leaving Kabul, American support for the war is falling, and Obama is leaking credibility.
Yet his own officials claim he's frustrated that the debate is playing out in black and white, escalation or withdrawal. Obama is still searching for a middle path to the annoyance of both parties. Chafing under the pressure, the White House responded that both sides are creating strawmen and should lay off, an unconvincing argument.
Obama's choice is fundamentally in or out, black or white though, he can't change this with public relations. America needs more troops - lots of them - to do the job right, and staying without them is futile. Obama wants the debate framed his way without entering the debate, an equally futile endeavor.
But this last quote deeply disturbed us. The NYT documents a complete breakdown in civilian goals, which isn't a surprise, but one official described Obama as "impatient" with the war's progress. “The president is not satisfied on any of this," said the official.
For the second time Obama has been labeled impatient, the first being over Israel and Palestine. If President Obama is impatient after nine months with a protracted conflict spanning 200 years, Octopus Mountain wonders if he has the patience to entangle America in Afghanistan.
Though a vigorous debate may appear in session, the American people are witnessing a mirage. Confusion reigns supreme, more cacophony than dialectic, a mixture of Pentagon discontent, Congressional talking-point competitions, and an uninformed media pretending to understand counterinsurgency. The American people only matter in the form of polls. We are not part of the process.
President Obama has vanished since Afghanistan's election, but though his stalling is annoying and mostly self-inflicted, hesitation isn't necessarily the problem. Silence has followed his delays, leaving his own defense to officials and negating his most valuable commodity - himself. America is trying to debate Afghanistan without Obama. This makes no sense.
We're fed impression management instead of transparency, enlarging the information black hole. Misinformation instantly fills the void and creates friction between parties. Obama is paying a heavy price for his deliberation, which isn't synonymous with choosing the right strategy. In a further sign of the military's irritation with the White House, officials are warning that Obama is now downplaying Afghanistan.
We know for certain that Afghanistan's government hangs on life support while the Taliban rapidly expands, the countryside is so insecure that US civilians have stopped leaving Kabul, American support for the war is falling, and Obama is leaking credibility.
Yet his own officials claim he's frustrated that the debate is playing out in black and white, escalation or withdrawal. Obama is still searching for a middle path to the annoyance of both parties. Chafing under the pressure, the White House responded that both sides are creating strawmen and should lay off, an unconvincing argument.
Obama's choice is fundamentally in or out, black or white though, he can't change this with public relations. America needs more troops - lots of them - to do the job right, and staying without them is futile. Obama wants the debate framed his way without entering the debate, an equally futile endeavor.
But this last quote deeply disturbed us. The NYT documents a complete breakdown in civilian goals, which isn't a surprise, but one official described Obama as "impatient" with the war's progress. “The president is not satisfied on any of this," said the official.
For the second time Obama has been labeled impatient, the first being over Israel and Palestine. If President Obama is impatient after nine months with a protracted conflict spanning 200 years, Octopus Mountain wonders if he has the patience to entangle America in Afghanistan.
October 11, 2009
The Perfect Strategy
Hope and change had barely faded into the afterglow when President Obama deployed another slogan to bring down the very expectations he had just lifted. With no time to waste in fulfilling his promises, Obama set about warning against the perils of perfection.
“Let’s not let the perfect become the enemy of the good,” he preached, whether stumping for health care, the economy, or Palestine.
Now this motto is facing the ultimate test in Afghanistan, where Obama is trying to discern its many qualities independently and relative to Iraq. As the insurgency gathers by the day, he and his national security team have aborted the Taliban - “the perfect” - as a selling point. The narrow goal of defeating al-Qaeda - “the good” - the essential and necessary, remains the same as when Obama took office.
Except he is still on a quest for the perfect strategy, one that removes al-Qaeda without confronting the full might of the Taliban, glues together and shields a broken government, and doesn’t require building a whole nation. He must be on guard and prevent the perfect strategy from becoming the perfect storm.
Days after the Taliban downplayed a global agenda, the White House raised eyebrows by admitting it’s prepared to accept some Taliban involvement in Afghanistan's future. Ambiguity was quick to follow. Did Obama and his team agree that the Taliban doesn’t pose a direct threat to America, or did Pakistan's veto on drone strikes in Quetta force a change of position?
Luckily the confusion didn’t last long. Focus may have permanently shifted off the Taliban when the latest intelligence report estimated its full-time fighters has ballooned from 7,000 in 2006 to 25,000, about one insurgent for every four coalition troops. Despite an influx of foreign fighters, the report concluded “most insurgents are Afghans.” Coupled with General McChrystal’s dire review, Obama apparently realized the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily or politically.
"The Taliban is a deeply rooted political movement in Afghanistan,” a senior administration official said, “so that requires a different approach than al-Qaeda.”
Reality being what it is, Obama has wisely chosen to sidestep prolonged war with the Taliban and its political consequences. Complete annihilation of al-Qaeda may be impossible, but displaying its weakness is easier, at least until another major attack. Unfortunately Obama’s plan to maneuver around the Taliban could be even more dangerous than fighting it.
Pitfalls are already manifesting themselves.
Hoping to bring General McChrystal’s request under 40,000, White House and Pentagon officials are calculating the number of troops necessary to destroy al-Qaeda and keep its remnants from regrouping. The search is on for how many troops will keep the Taliban from overrunning the central government. “That's the question,” a senior administration official said. “That's the sweet spot we're looking for.”
Perfection is the sweet spot and such a mindset could short-arm the war effort, like aiming pitches instead of just throwing the ball.
Tuned to the chatter, one Pentagon official responded, “The real question is, do you want the Taliban to be in power in Afghanistan? If you don’t, then they have to be addressed through a counterinsurgency campaign."
No doubt should exist that the Taliban will aggressively capitalize on troop shortages. Keeping it at bay requires nation-building, the furthest extreme of counterinsurgency opposite of counter-terrorism. Under speculation that America withdrew from the outpost near Kamdesh, false according to the military, the Taliban raised its flag in what could become an infamous event. Sound bite extraordinaires, the Taliban instantly disseminated its message worldwide.
"This means they are not coming back," spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid declared. "This is another victory for Taliban. We have control of another district in eastern Afghanistan. Right now Kamdesh is under our control, and the white flag of the Taliban is raised above Kamdesh.”
The US military quickly countered that it's still operating in Nuristan province and an official involved in Obama's review told AP that he would “not tolerate their return to power,” but how will he guarantee that promise with limited troops? How can America nation-build or prevent the Taliban from doing anything if it retakes territory? Can the government be protected when it’s perceived as fraudulent and corrupt, or when a shadow government is ruling the south and east?
“If you accept as a premise that you will not eradicate every last element of the Taliban,” mused one official, “preventing it from providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda or threatening the government will still require resources.”
Yet a strategy that targets al-Qaeda and tolerates Taliban influence is similar to the strategy employed after the Soviet war: let the parties duke it out upon withdrawal. The Taliban swept into power after four years of warlordism. The next phase will see factional fighting between Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns, only this time the government controls the semblances of a real Afghan army. Besides a potential to tear the army along sectarian lines, the Taliban could sheer off some of the army for itself.
All the space America voids will be gobbled up by the Taliban. From there, who knows.
Avoiding the perfect sounds rational, but this advice is rendered useless when no good options exist. Stay in the country and the Taliban will rabidly attack; withdraw into urban environments to protect the populace and it will feed off conquest in the south like before. Hoping to thread the needle, to pinpoint the exact number of troops necessary to control but not destroy the Taliban, is both improbable and prone to protraction.
President Obama, were he to pursue this strategy, must taste the forbidden fruit. Ignoring the Taliban in cold silence is a recipe for disaster, dishonorable and cowardly. Examining its negotiating position is a prerequisite to tacit acceptance. A treaty or some kind of understanding must be pursued, possibly within a jirga system between all parties involved.
Forget al-Qaeda for a moment. The Taliban will want a seat at the table if the door is left open, otherwise it may blow the house down.
“Let’s not let the perfect become the enemy of the good,” he preached, whether stumping for health care, the economy, or Palestine.
Now this motto is facing the ultimate test in Afghanistan, where Obama is trying to discern its many qualities independently and relative to Iraq. As the insurgency gathers by the day, he and his national security team have aborted the Taliban - “the perfect” - as a selling point. The narrow goal of defeating al-Qaeda - “the good” - the essential and necessary, remains the same as when Obama took office.
Except he is still on a quest for the perfect strategy, one that removes al-Qaeda without confronting the full might of the Taliban, glues together and shields a broken government, and doesn’t require building a whole nation. He must be on guard and prevent the perfect strategy from becoming the perfect storm.
Days after the Taliban downplayed a global agenda, the White House raised eyebrows by admitting it’s prepared to accept some Taliban involvement in Afghanistan's future. Ambiguity was quick to follow. Did Obama and his team agree that the Taliban doesn’t pose a direct threat to America, or did Pakistan's veto on drone strikes in Quetta force a change of position?
Luckily the confusion didn’t last long. Focus may have permanently shifted off the Taliban when the latest intelligence report estimated its full-time fighters has ballooned from 7,000 in 2006 to 25,000, about one insurgent for every four coalition troops. Despite an influx of foreign fighters, the report concluded “most insurgents are Afghans.” Coupled with General McChrystal’s dire review, Obama apparently realized the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily or politically.
"The Taliban is a deeply rooted political movement in Afghanistan,” a senior administration official said, “so that requires a different approach than al-Qaeda.”
Reality being what it is, Obama has wisely chosen to sidestep prolonged war with the Taliban and its political consequences. Complete annihilation of al-Qaeda may be impossible, but displaying its weakness is easier, at least until another major attack. Unfortunately Obama’s plan to maneuver around the Taliban could be even more dangerous than fighting it.
Pitfalls are already manifesting themselves.
Hoping to bring General McChrystal’s request under 40,000, White House and Pentagon officials are calculating the number of troops necessary to destroy al-Qaeda and keep its remnants from regrouping. The search is on for how many troops will keep the Taliban from overrunning the central government. “That's the question,” a senior administration official said. “That's the sweet spot we're looking for.”
Perfection is the sweet spot and such a mindset could short-arm the war effort, like aiming pitches instead of just throwing the ball.
Tuned to the chatter, one Pentagon official responded, “The real question is, do you want the Taliban to be in power in Afghanistan? If you don’t, then they have to be addressed through a counterinsurgency campaign."
No doubt should exist that the Taliban will aggressively capitalize on troop shortages. Keeping it at bay requires nation-building, the furthest extreme of counterinsurgency opposite of counter-terrorism. Under speculation that America withdrew from the outpost near Kamdesh, false according to the military, the Taliban raised its flag in what could become an infamous event. Sound bite extraordinaires, the Taliban instantly disseminated its message worldwide.
"This means they are not coming back," spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid declared. "This is another victory for Taliban. We have control of another district in eastern Afghanistan. Right now Kamdesh is under our control, and the white flag of the Taliban is raised above Kamdesh.”
The US military quickly countered that it's still operating in Nuristan province and an official involved in Obama's review told AP that he would “not tolerate their return to power,” but how will he guarantee that promise with limited troops? How can America nation-build or prevent the Taliban from doing anything if it retakes territory? Can the government be protected when it’s perceived as fraudulent and corrupt, or when a shadow government is ruling the south and east?
“If you accept as a premise that you will not eradicate every last element of the Taliban,” mused one official, “preventing it from providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda or threatening the government will still require resources.”
Yet a strategy that targets al-Qaeda and tolerates Taliban influence is similar to the strategy employed after the Soviet war: let the parties duke it out upon withdrawal. The Taliban swept into power after four years of warlordism. The next phase will see factional fighting between Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns, only this time the government controls the semblances of a real Afghan army. Besides a potential to tear the army along sectarian lines, the Taliban could sheer off some of the army for itself.
All the space America voids will be gobbled up by the Taliban. From there, who knows.
Avoiding the perfect sounds rational, but this advice is rendered useless when no good options exist. Stay in the country and the Taliban will rabidly attack; withdraw into urban environments to protect the populace and it will feed off conquest in the south like before. Hoping to thread the needle, to pinpoint the exact number of troops necessary to control but not destroy the Taliban, is both improbable and prone to protraction.
President Obama, were he to pursue this strategy, must taste the forbidden fruit. Ignoring the Taliban in cold silence is a recipe for disaster, dishonorable and cowardly. Examining its negotiating position is a prerequisite to tacit acceptance. A treaty or some kind of understanding must be pursued, possibly within a jirga system between all parties involved.
Forget al-Qaeda for a moment. The Taliban will want a seat at the table if the door is left open, otherwise it may blow the house down.
October 10, 2009
Quote of the Day
"What happened in Peshawar, Islamabad and today, all roads lead to South Waziristan. Now the government has no other option but to launch an offensive."
- Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik after 41 people were left dead at Pakistan's army HQ.
- Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik after 41 people were left dead at Pakistan's army HQ.
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