Yemenis Await Saleh’s Next Scheme

Whatever course Ali Abdullah Saleh decides to take today, Yemen’s revolutionaries plan to intensify their movement against his regime and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s biased proposal. The oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) may become an official target of protest too.

"Saleh could sign the deal within the next hours or tomorrow. But we cannot say for sure that we would sign because he has changed his mind many times in the minutes," an oppositional source told Gulf News on Tuesday morning. "The opposition was reluctant to accept him to stay in power even without power, because it was against the wishes of the camping protesters.”

Saleh also spent Saturday delegitimizing the JMP with his Republican Guard.

“You have foiled the plots of the revolution's enemies, deserters, mercenaries, and defeated elements. You have beaten the arms dealers with your bravery and persistence even if they turned into elements of sabotage. All their plots and propaganda were crushed. They had nothing left but explosive devices that they sneak inside camps and bases through some agents and hireling individuals so as to strike our valiant officers and soldiers. They deceived you by pretending to be your comrades, but they are not your comrades anymore, for they have breached the law and regime. They have become militias in military uniform; they shave their beards and adorn themselves with the armed forces uniform. They are blocking the roads and assassinate citizens; they are also preventing students from attending their schools or universities.”

Sounds like a man who shouldn’t be allowed to remain “honorary president,” keep his military leadership in power, oversee a snap election and receive immunity for thousands of murders. Expecting to manipulate a power transfer is one thing, but foreign diplomats are harboring illusions if they expect Yemenis to stop demonstrating against Saleh’s regime and the GCC initiative.

#No2GCCdeal

Egypt’s Revolution Grinds Forward

A great volume of debate has filled the Internet, public streets and policy circles around the world. Some people question whether Egypt’s revolution lost its way or failed to complete its objectives, while others doubt that Egypt is experiencing a revolution. Each time a large-scale protest breaks out in Tahrir and triggers the familiar violence of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, the debate reverses direction as it attempts to “take the revolution back.” These mood swings are understandable as an outlet to express frustration and re-empower the revolution’s narrative, but they are less accurate from a historical perspective.

“Egyptians Clash, Marking Quick Turn Against Military,” declares a headline from the Wall Street Journal, describing a “turn” that was months in the making.

Despite its ability to maintain a rapid pace, revolution is a long-term process by nature and cycles through a series of phases. Removing Hosni Mubarak and his son Gamal fulfilled the revolution’s first objective, to be followed by resistance against Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi and his Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). These are two phases in the same revolution. Understanding the ups and downs of revolution is central to outlasting a regime, loyalists and self-interested oppositional forces, and current events should be viewed as part of a single organic process.

The main takeaway for those believing Egypt’s revolution was “lost” and may be “won” again is the importance of action. Constant organization and initiative is necessary to drive the cycle of revolution towards completion, and radical action propels the movement between phases.

“This is the breaking point we were all waiting for,” Tarek Salama, a surgeon, predicted from Cairo’s field hospital. “Getting rid of Mubarak was just the warm-up. This is the real showdown.”

The tragic price of protracted struggle is the blood of new martyrs. Monday unfolded as Tahrir Square’s most heavy-handed crackdown in weeks; black-clad and bulky green forces from the Interior Ministry sprayed crowds with a variety of ammunition as they torched protesters’ tents. Tear gas and rubber bullets - deadly in their own right - gave way to live ammunition when organized Egyptians refused to back down. Multiple sources on the ground allege that security forces were ordered to aim for the head, and assaults against seemingly unconscious protesters quickly surfaced on YouTube.

Casualty estimates (over three days) from Egypt’s Health Ministry and independent sources range between 23 and 30, with at least 1,800 injured. Doctors at Tahrir’s field clinic reported at least ten patients killed by live ammunition, with a high of 20.

“It’s like someone who is drowning and flailing their arms to stay above water,” said Hazem Sadek, 21, from Tahrir. “That’s what SCAF are doing. They are panicking.”

The SCAF naturally denied responsibility for Monday’s bloodshed. General Saeed Abbas, assistant chief of the Central Military Region, told a press conference at Tahrir that, "the military council did not come to the square on Sunday to disperse protestors, but it came at a request of the Interior Minister Mansour el-Essawy.” Telling reporters that security forces hadn’t entered the square, Abbas claimed that “thugs” had been killed instead of peaceful demonstrators - before introducing a mysterious actor as the culprit.

“There is an invisible hand in the square causing a rift between the army and the people.”

The SCAF will hold an emergency meeting in the near future and, “invited all the political and national forces for an emergency dialogue to look into the reasons behind the aggravation of the current crisis and ways to resolve it as quickly as possible.” However no protester sees a political role for the SCAF, which has rejected the cabinet’s resignation until Prime Minister Essam Sharaf can be replaced. Egypt’s established political powers wouldn’t have flinched to the people’s demands without the provocation of mass action. The cabinet wouldn’t have submitted its resignation, adding another sources of pressure to the SCAF’s isolation, and some Egyptians now chanting "The people want the downfall of the field marshal" would be sitting in their homes.

Tahrir’s overnight count was estimated above 10,000 and, according to social media sources, remained packed as of 2 AM. The cabinet’s potential resignation merely catalyzed the revolutionaries’ demand for the immediate transition to civilian authorities, and a “million man march” is scheduled for Tuesday.

A final benefit of Tahrir’s new upheaval is the potential to delay next Monday’s scheduled parliamentary election, and the Obama administration's response to this weekend’s violence illustrates the merits of such a move. Instead of denouncing the SCAF’s overall misrule and the Interior Ministry’s brutality, U.S. officials attempted to ignore Monday’s violence as they maintain tunnel vision towards Monday’s election. White House spokesman Jay Carney and State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland both spent the majority of Egypt's allocated time on “a free, fair and transparent election.” Only when pressed on Tahrir’s violence did they respond, "We're deeply concerned about the violence. We call on restraint of all sides."

Not only do these statements reveal the U.S. bias in favor of Egypt’s SCAF - as if protesters were shooting live rounds and beating people unconscious - they set the tone to Washington's general policy. By “calling on all sides to urge restraint,” U.S. officials are announcing that they don’t want protesters to test heavy-handed security forces. They don’t want protesters to provoke a government crackdown and threaten Egypt’s military rule - they want Egyptians to patiently await an election under the SCAF’s terms. Although the council has yet to formalize a proposal that seized parliament’s power to rewrite Egypt’s constitution, Monday’s election holds the potential to create additional roadblocks for the revolutionaries.

Many Egyptians already doubted the SCAF’s ability to hold a fair election, and this pivotal event should ideally unfold without Tawani’s input.

The completion of Egypt’s revolution, from the first free election to the formal end of a transitional period, could take five years, a decade or longer. History has watched many revolutions and uprisings persist for decades or even hundreds of years. What’s important is to never stop moving forward and, when forward progress does stop, to regain focus and push onward. Revolution isn’t over until the revolutionaries give up.

Yemenis Persevere Under International Siege

Mimicking the troops they’ve trained and equipped, foreign powers are leading an unflinching assault against Yemen’s 11-month revolution. Silence is their first line of defense. When Ali Abdullah Saleh’s brutality triggered a wave of defections and forced his international allies to devise an exit strategy, the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) introduced a biased proposal at the direction of Washington. The GCC’s initiative is constructed to keep Saleh personally in power, or else salvage his regime by creating a “unity” government led by his vice president, Abd al-Rahman Mansur al-Hadi.

Veto-wielding members then summoned the UN Security Council to unanimously stamp the GCC’s initiative in October - nearly eight months after the proposal was introduced.

The month since resolution 2014 was forced onto Yemen’s revolutionaries unfolded no differently than the previous 10. Saleh sporadically vows to sign the GCC’s initiative while his security forces relentlessly attack peaceful protesters. Armed oppositional elements are quickly blamed for Yemen’s unrest and delaying the GCC’s implementation. Western officials ignore rising casualties and warnings by Yemen’s pro-democracy movement. Now, after several days of rumors, special UN envoy Jamal Benomar confirmed that Monday’s UNSC meeting has been postponed at Saleh’s request.

"We have met with representatives of Saleh's ruling party, including Hadi upon the request of visiting UN envoy who is running the talks,” oppositional spokesman Mohamed Qahtan told reporters, “but no progress or no compromise was achieved as Saleh still sticks to his conditions and refuses to transfer power peacefully.”

The international community has devoted its energy towards isolating Yemen’s revolutionaries, not Saleh’s regime, throughout 11 months of protests. Falling deep into Saleh’s plot, Benomar has little choice except to pursue the orders of major powers such as the US, UK, China and Russia. However the envoy still deserves personal responsibility for defending the UN’s actions and engaging in disinformation with Yemen’s protesters. Benomar told several youth groups that no immunity would be given to Saleh’s regime, but no attempts have been made to clarify the GCC intiative’s status within UN resolution 2014.

Western and Gulf officials simply insist that he agree to both documents.

Delaying resolution 2014’s mandated 30-day review demonstrates how much power Saleh retains with his international allies. Contrary to applying pressure, foreign powers have built a political shield around his regime and continue to follow his meandering lead. The European Union similarly postponed its “discussion” over Saleh’s assets until December at the earliest, fully exposing this maneuver as a scam to approve the GCC’s initiative. Attempting to preempt these artificial deadlines and skip the threat of punishment entirely, Western and Gulf diplomats are sprinting to orchestrate a favorable power transfer - again hinting at a signing by next week.

One Western diplomat in Sana’a told the AFP that U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein “presented a new proposal to move forward with the implementation mechanism.” Feierstein has cooperated with Saleh’s regime throughout the revolution, earning widespread distrust, and whatever his “new proposal” entails won’t benefit Yemen’s revolutionaries. The Western-Gulf vision in Yemen sees no room for revolutionaries: “Western mediators want to clinch a deal between Yemen's key players - Saleh and his son Ahmed, who commands the elite Republican Guard, and General Ahmar and Hamid al-Ahmar.”

Although Saleh’s regime and the opposition must be removed from the revolutionary equation, foreign powers are primarily interested in working with these forces to manipulate Yemen’s transition.

It bears constant repeating that Yemen isn’t an official member of the GCC, a formality that necessitates the UN’s approval. As foreign governments and media obsess over the GCC’s illegitimate proposal, revolutionaries have initiated a new Twitter campaign called #No2GCCdeal with the hope of building on #ShameonRueters. Meanwhile Western and Gulf powers intend to sign the GCC’s unpopular deal in Riyadh to avoid domestic disruptions, a precaution that targets Yemen’s protesters rather than the duplicitous Saleh.

Various dignitaries can keep their suits and robes clean in an air-conditioned skyscraper, and plug their ears to millions of Yemenis in the process.

Nairobi Losing Its Grip on Somalia’s 4GW

Despite a raucous chorus of international skepticism, Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for “Protect the Nation”) maintains the potential to reach a degree of mission success - if guided by achievable strategic objectives. In its most practical state, Kenya’s mission would define Lower Juba as its area of operations and single out the control of Kismayo as the final territorial objective. Current reinforcements from the African Union (AU) would land in Mogadishu, while a future deployment teams with Kenyan forces to restore order in Kismayo and Lower Juba.

This contained mission would form only a piece of the long-term strategy for uprooting al-Shabaab; Lower Juba represents roughly 1/5th of the group’s territory. However an insurgency cannot be removed in haste, and eliminating al-Shabaab’s presence and ideology remains a multi-year challenge. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its neighbors would be wise to conduct their counterinsurgency with patience. Securing Lower Juba by August 2012, when the TFG’s mandate is set to expire amid elections, evolves within a national strategy and deprives al-Shabaab of a revenue/military source.

By achieving reasonable goals, the TFG and AU can impress the international community and secure new funds to pursue their campaign.

Unfortunately Kenya’s mission is heading further off road as its mission expands beyond Lower Juba. The initial concept of replacing al-Shabaab’s authority in Kismayo with a Kenyan proxy, the Azania council (and its Ras Kamboni and youth militias), unnerved Somali President Sharif Ahmed and triggered public divisions with Nairobi. This plan has been scrapped until further notice, adding to the unease over Kenya’s exit strategy.

After an air-strike sparked civilian collateral in Jilib (located some 50 miles north of Kismayo), military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir issued an air-raid warning to the residents of seven other towns. His Twitter alert expanded Kenya’s area of operations across Jubbaland, which is slightly larger than Belgium, and into Somalia’s midsection.

Now Operation Linda Nchi is starting to drag beyond the normal friction of war, mud and al-Shabaab’s asymmetric defense. Kenyan troops continue their month-long preparation for a large-scale battle at Afmadow, a strategic town situated near the Lagh Dera river, but have yet to move in force. The port city of Kismayo remains a distant objective. More Kenyans are reinforcing their brothers in the field - another 400 soldiers (plus helicopters) recently passed through the Kenyan bordertown of Liboi - to push their numbers well above the commonly reported 2,000. Relying on air power to clear the way ahead of ground troops is textbook military science, but the persistent threat of bombardment is unnerving Somalis hundreds of miles from Lower Juba.

At Kenya’s political level, parliamentarians and activists accuse the government of violating the constitution by bypassing approval of the operation. Although Operation Linda Nchi enjoys widespread support amongst Kenyans, many doubts exist over their government’s ability to finance it.

Worse still, the AU is experiencing a shortage of funds and won’t be able to deploy fresh troops until the beginning of 2012, at the earliest. While rushing a counterinsurgency should be discouraged, speed and mobility are vital to success on the battlefield and in political meeting rooms. Mogadishu residents and Kenyan troops are in equal need of AU reinforcements - they don’t have months to wait - and Nairobi’s urgency is visibly evident in its international appeals. The bleed-over between AQAP and al-Shabaab appears credible (if unverified), but Kenya is using Yemen to scare up Western assistance in Somalia.

The Los Angeles Times reports, “Despite the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. drones and other surveillance aircraft are in short supply. Moreover, the officials cautioned, the intelligence reports alone may not enable Kenya's military to achieve even its limited objectives.”

Given the ongoing confusion between Nairobi and Western donors, the international community appears leery of funding a national offensive and corresponding naval blockade from Kismayo to Mogadishu. They sense Operation Linda Nchi’s ballooning objectives and presumably flashback to Operation Gothic Serpent, a “three-week” mission that ended six weeks later with two downed Blackhawks. Although Western states, particularly the U.S. and France, appear to be playing a greater military role than acknowledged, extensive divisions exist within a potential multi-lateral force. A newly released WikiLeaks cable casts additional uncertainty over U.S.-Kenyan cooperation.

“According to a cable dated Feb. 2, 2010, Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, provided Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula with a variety of reasons that the U.S. believed a proposed Kenyan incursion could backfire during a Jan. 30, 2010, meeting in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.”

One U.S. official claimed, “We have not declared war on Al Shabaab.”

The combination of expanding mission objectives and a delay in international support has driven Kenyan officials to potentially counterproductive allies. On Monday Prime Minister Raila Oginda erroneously publicized military relations with Israel, along with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision of a “Christian-Jewish” coalition. al-Shabaab responded with an immediate call for global jihadists, only for another of the coalition’s pillars to enter Somalia’s rumor cycle. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one TFG official said that Ethiopian troops have already begun to move into Somalia.

While these forces protect and breach the border on a regular basis, a whole new front involving “thousands of troops” is now being proposed. President Ahmed reportedly opposes the idea in principle, but believes “he has no choice” with the rest of his modest forces committed to Mogadishu and the south.

“The idea is to relieve pressure on Amisom,” the official said of the AU’s mission. “We’re looking at how neighboring countries can assist, and we are quite aware of the sensitive aspects.”

The mere rumor of another Ethiopian intervention - stacked onto Israel’s red flag - suggests the opposite. While the AU requires more troops to increase Mogadishu’s stability, a perquisite to organizing a national offensive, sending Ethiopians is only practical if their government is willing to spend its own money. No shortage of AU reinforcements exists - the pressing dilemma is a shortage of Western funds. However Ethiopia doesn’t intend to send its troops to Mogadishu, but into al-Shabaab’s Bay stronghold of Baidoa (over 100 miles from the Ethiopian border).

“Ethiopia is supposed to build (military) capacity in Somalia,” says Chirchir. “That could apply to cross-border operations.”

This arrangement has the potential to add a stabilizing effect to Somalia - or go horribly wrong. An Ethiopian flank was posited in our initial reaction to Operation Linda Nchi, but as a blocking maneuver more than full-blow offensive. Beginning without the stigma of past aggressors, Kenya is now openly aligned with the unpopular trifecta of America, Israel and Ethiopia. The political and psychological drawbacks of this alliance could negate and possibly outweigh its military advantages, replaying Ethiopia’s failed invasion from 2006-2009.

Nairobi must learn from America and Ethiopia’s past errors - not duplicate them - in order to withdraw with its forces and credibility intact.

Saleh Safeguards Power Through Military Council

Ali Abdullah Saleh picked the wrong day to announce a military transfer, if any day can be worse than another. Saturdays in Yemen usually bring a propaganda run to counter the weekend’s revolutionary demonstrations, and today is no exception. Speaking during an inspection of his Republican Guards, a private security outfit trained by U.S. Special Forces and commanded by his son Ahmed, Saleh alluded to a military handover in the event of his resignation.

"Yes, we support change against all corrupted political forces and we at the presidential office are ready to make sacrifices for the country,” he declared, “but you (Republican Guards) will stay on even if we step down, because your are the power, you are the safety valve of the homeland.”

Hours earlier Egyptian police poured into Tahrir Square to evict protesters from their camps, killing a 23-year old and wounding at least 676 people. The clashes culminated Friday’s protest against Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), an elitist group of men primarily concerned with their own interests. Despised Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi reigns as Egypt’s de facto pharaoh, and the council is busy expanding ties with Washington and the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Abusing the remnants of Hosni Mubarak’s tyrannical power, the SCAF has perpetuated the country’s emergency law and recently grabbed at the power to rewrite Egypt's constitution. Human rights groups estimate that the SCAF has detained over 12,000 individuals since Mubarak's fall.

Most are subjected to military tribunals despite committing no crime.

Alaa Abdel-Fattah is one of the suffering. Arrested on October 30th for “inciting” violence against Christians, Abdel-Fattah’s 15-day detention was recently renewed for another 15 days, an indefinite process organized by the SCAF. Awareness campaigns have failed to secure his release and few Western capitals have joined his cause. Although President Barack Obama urged the SCAF to end Egypt’s emergency law and military trials for civilians, his administration continues to defend the SCAF’s “good intentions” and has kept quiet on Abdel-Fattah’s imprisonment.

In a recent letter smuggled to the outside world, the well-known blogger grieved for missing the birth of his son and described Egypt’s horrid prison conditions.


“I am writing this note with a deep sense of shame,” reads a blog entry dated November 5th. “I have just been moved from Ist’naf (appeal) prison, at my request and insistence, because I simply couldn’t withstand the difficult conditions there: because of the darkness, the filth , the roaming cockroaches, crawling over my body night and day; because there was no courtyard, no sunshine and, again, the darkness.”



Abdel-Fattah accuses the SCAF of selecting Egypt’s best and brightest as punitive examples, the opposite vision of the revolutionary movement. Back in Tahrir, prominent activist Malek Mostafa lost his right eye from a torrent of rubber bullets fired by riot police. According to Ghada Shahbender, a member of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "They were shooting rubber bullets directly at the heads… I heard an officer ordering his soldiers to aim for the head."

Above the din of battle, protesters could be heard chanting "The people want to topple the regime” and “Down with the Marshal.”

Needless to say, few revolutionaries across the region would put any faith in a military council. Such a maneuver is overtly hostile to pro-democracy movements seeking total regime change, and Egyptians’ ongoing struggle serves as a precautionary tale. Unfortunately Saleh’s propaganda is deathly real - he always planned to cede power to his son, just like Mubarak and Gaddafi’s schemes. As the head of Saleh’s crackdown against peaceful protesters, Ahmed is also extremely dangerous and possibly more stubborn than his father. Leaving him in power would sink Yemen deeper into the abyss.

Saleh added a warning to oppositional forces: "We tell them that's enough ... Our response will be harsh and decisive.”

These statements are generally attributed as threats of civil war. While armed oppositional elements have aggravated Yemen’s revolution, Saleh’s forces regularly attempt to provoke them in order to scapegoat the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

The secondary concern over a military council is just as lethal. Rather than condemn this destructive maneuver, the international community has sanctioned Egypt’s aborted contingency in Yemen by passing power to Saleh’s vice president, Abd al-Rahman Mansur al-Hadi. According to the GCC’s initiative, a false power transfer orchestrated by Washington and Riyadh, Saleh’s family would receive immunity for their crimes and remain in charge of the military (with the pliable Hadi serving as a figurehead). The entire setup was then legalized by the UN Security Council’s unanimously passing of resolution 2014.

If Western or Gulf officials refute Saleh’s language, they do so disingenuously.

U.S.-Saudi policy has unified in Egypt and Yemen, two central targets of the counter-revolutionary network, by approving regime alteration through military “councils.” Neither capital is willing to allow local populations to decide their own future, and dictators such as Saleh and Tantawi will continue abusing the West’s double-standard until it collapses.

Re-Orienting America - CFR Style

The Pacific is self-evidently consequential to U.S. foreign policy and international relations as a whole, but CFR President Richard Haass just dropped some heavy propaganda on the Middle East:



This is not to argue that the Middle East is irrelevant or that the US should ignore it. On the contrary, it is still home to massive oil and gas reserves. It is a part of the world where terrorists are active and conflicts have been common. Iran is moving ever closer to developing nuclear weapons; if it does, others may well follow suit. And it is a region now experiencing what could prove to be historic domestic political upheavals. There is also the unique American tie to Israel.

Nevertheless, there are grounds for the US doing less in the greater Middle East than it has in recent years: The weakening of al-Qaeda; the poor prospects for peacemaking efforts; and, above all, the mounting evidence that, by any measure, massive nation-building initiatives are not yielding returns commensurate with the investments.



At the same time, there are strong arguments for greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. With its large populations and fast-growing economies, it is difficult to exaggerate the region's economic importance. The US companies export more than $300bn in goods and services to countries in the region each year. Meanwhile, Asian countries are a critical source of investment for the US economy...

Complete article in Al Jazeera

U.S. Lulled Into Arab League’s Syrian Plot

Last Saturday the Arab League finally appeared to respond to Syria’s pro-democracy movement, which had just concluded its “Friday of Freezing Syria's Arab League Membership.” An “ultimatum” was delivered to Bashar al-Assad: withdraw your security forces from Syria’s cities within three days or face suspension. His proxies and loyalists responded with immediate violence, attacking embassies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, France) and denouncing the League’s decision as a Western plot.

Except for the mounting casualties, Syria’s drama feels like a night of professional wrestling.

More paper tiger than African lion, the Arab League’s whimper is living up to its meek reputation in Syria. Strip away a “tough” decision to quarantine al-Assad’s government and his retaliation, and the League remains complicit with Syria’s strongman. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim al-Thani tacitly exposed their relationship through his personal statements over the past five days. Qatar’s Foreign Minister emerged after the League’s emergency session in Morocco to tell reporters, "We do not want to talk about a last-ditch attempt because I do not want this to sound like a warning. What I can say is that we are close to the end of the road as far as the (League's) efforts on this front are concerned."

"Economic sanctions are certainly possible if the Syrian government does not respond.”

Bin Jassim can sleep soundly knowing that his words fall drastically short of a warning. How, exactly, must al-Assad respond in order to save his seat in the Arab League? In the foreign minister’s own words, the Syrian government has another three days "to sign the protocol that was sent by the Arab League.” This step would permit a mission of international observers to oversee Syrian’s human rights environment and any electoral processes. In other words, the League is still scamming for a counterproductive initiative that favors al-Assad’s regime.

Negotiated over the last month and “agreed upon” at the beginning of November, the Arab League’s plan calls for Syrian forces to withdraw from restive cities and cease their fire against protesters. al-Assad must release political prisoners, allow international journalists and monitors into the country and open a dialogue with the opposition within two weeks. The deal sounds favorable to Syria’s protesters until the last point, which rules out regime change and effectively negates the entire proposal.

"We are happy to have reached the agreement and we'll be happier if it is carried out," Bin Jassim said. "Now it is important for the Syrian side to carry out this agreement because it is what will allow the situation to quiet down and the crisis to be resolved."

A diverging outcome is more likely. Syria’s largest opposition network, the Syrian National Council (SNC), and many pro-democracy protesters reject the regime’s “dialogue” as a stalling tactic. Their situation parallels Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain’s external manipulation, and is openly associated with these uprisings. Speaking to reporters after the first strategic dialogue between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threw both powers firmly behind the Arab League’s proposal.

"The Russian position has been embodied in the Security Council resolution on Yemen adopted a few days ago unanimously. This resolution was based on the GCC initiative which provides for the need of the government and the opposition to sit down and agree upon a deal which would resolve the current crisis. It's a fair deal, it's a fair initiative, an initiative which is being implemented these days.”

Lavrov explained that Moscow and GCC states agreed that, "[the Syrian situation] requires the same approach [as Yemen], an approach that provides for the need of the government and the opposition to deal with each other, the same approach must apply to the situation in Syria.”

On Tuesday GCC Secretary-General Abdul Latif Al Zayani rejected an emergency meeting on Syria, instead voicing support for “League efforts to end the bloodshed.” Two days later Lavrov blamed oppositional defectors for Syria's violence. The interaction between these foreign powers highlights the trap proposal set by the League.

The Obama administration now finds itself deep in a counter-revolutionary plot. While cautiously supportive of the Arab League’s efforts, U.S. officials have preached mutual interests with the GCC as the bloc employs identical strategies in Syria and Yemen. Because the White House is open to regime change in Syria but not in Yemen, copy-and-paste diplomacy has sunk the White House into an awkward position. Coordinating with the Arab League possesses its advantages - “Arabizing” Syria’s international isolation - if the AL and GCC can be trusted. However this “isolation” currently doubles as protection, and some U.S. officials have inadvertently confronted the possibility.

Victoria Nuland, a State Department spokeswoman, told reporters after al-Assad initially “agreed” to the Arab League’s proposal, "There is a risk here that they are trying to string out diplomacy, that they are trying to offer their own people half steps, or quarter measures, rather than taking the real steps." Such a policy is actively pursued in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, forcing the Obama administration to flow with the Arab current in Syria.

Fresh U.S. rhetoric upholds this trend; public support for the League increased after issuing its suspension notice to al-Assad. President Barack Obama lauded the Arab League’s “leadership in its effort to end the crisis and hold the Syrian government accountable,” even though the League’s proposal is counterproductive to these ends. He insisted that “the United States joins with the Arab League in its support for the Syrian people.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton similarly declared, “Today the Arab League took a strong and historic stance aimed at stopping the violence in Syria and protecting Syrian civilians. The United States commends the principled stand taken by the Arab League and supports full implementation of its efforts to bring a peaceful end to the crisis.”

The Arab League’s “strong and historic stance” is designed to alleviate pressure on itself and al-Assad; “full implementation” of its proposal would place a new mountain in front of Syria’s revolutionaries. These types of statements illustrate how the U.S. is cooperating with the AL and GCC, and thus Moscow and Beijing, to suppress revolutionary change in Syria. Although the Obama administration and European powers view the Arab League as an internal tool to pressure al-Assad, the body’s allegiance remains overt. Traveling with the Arab herd will push U.S. policy towards regime management and away from Syria’s pro-democracy movement.

The entire setup sheds light on the recent spate of attacks organized by the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

"At the moment no country in the world has helped," Colonel Riad al-Asaad, the FSA’s commander, told BBC over the weekend. "All of them, every country has refused. Even Turkey has never offered us even one bullet and has even completely banned operations on the border, or on the road to the border. On the other hand, we are from inside Syria, we work inside Syria and the weapons are from Syria."

The Arab League will eventually knock itself out of Syria’s revolution, and U.S. would be wise to unhitch itself before that point. The fear of being perceived as Western interventionists is currently outweighing the urgency to support Syrians in their hour of need.

Tracking al-Shabaab’s Counteroffensive

Nearly one month has elapsed since Nairobi launched Operation Linda Nchi, and Kenyan troops haven’t drastically improved their positions from two weeks ago. What began as a rapid advance stalled under heavy rains and beneath the logistical demands of a large-scale operation, but Nairobi’s course has its merits. Imaana Laibuta, a former major in the Kenyan Army, outlined the basic COIN theory of clear and hold in The Daily Nation.

“The military’s continued and seemingly slow siege on Afmadow and Kismayu is a pre-operation anesthetic stage,” Laibuta writes. “It is meant to give the residents of the two towns time to leave likely military targets. It is meant to give civilians time to vacate the towns and abandon the militia.”

From a counterinsurgency vantage, Kenyan forces would err in sweeping through southern Somalia on search and destroy missions. Controlling the airspace and eliminating al-Shabaab cadres is insufficient to restoring national authority in the Lower Juba administration or Jubbaland as a whole. Since Kenya’s military lacks the rapid deployment capabilities of a major power, a steady advance is the best alternative for clearing and holding ground. Kenyan forces are currently policing the area between their border and front line, which runs from outside Afmadow to the Somali coast (around the Buur Gaavo area).

The flow of refugees headed to the Kenyan border has also tailed off due to Kenya’s advance, al-Shabaab’s threats and flooding. Opening humanitarian corridors is paramount to Operation Linda Nchi - permanently disrupting aid organizations will reduce Nairobi’s political capital in southern Somalia.

Laibuta rightfully points out that waiting too long is no less risky. Successful COIN combines mobility with patience; one must design a long-term strategy while moving faster than the insurgent. Kenyan troops are now running behind Nairobi’s ideal schedule and require an undetermined period of months to seize their near-term prize of Kismayo, al-Shabaab’s coastal hub. A longer wait theoretically implies a stiffer resistance.

“If it drags on for too long, it might give the militia enough time to reorganize its defenses,” says Laibuta. “It might also give them time to tactically retreat and move their fighters, weapons, command structures, finances and other assets to safe havens elsewhere from where they can continue their terror.”

Since all of these risks have already surfaced, where and how will al-Shabaab launch its counter-offensive? How will it defend those cities under its control? The group’s overall strategy is unlikely to fundamentally change throughout Kenya’s intervention, instead phasing through an asymmetric defense of towns and topographical points such as river crossings. Strictly defensive cells will hold their positions for as long as possible in order to stretch Kenya’s time-line; time favors the insurgent unless the counterinsurgent possesses a clear advantage. al-Shabaab will employ a combination of ambushes, entrenched resistance and civilian shields to guard against preemptive air-strikes.

“In Kismayo, it was one of the jetty's that's close to the port," Kenyan military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir explained of a militant base. "There used to be a palatial home and they believe this was the nerve center where they used to plan their battles. But now, after the first incursion and the second incursion we've had - they have resorted to moving back to the city to mix with the local population.”

Residents reported a similar pattern in Baardheere and Baidoa, two al-Shabaab strongholds located deep inside southern Somalia, after Chirchir issued an imminent warning to nine towns.

While some al-Shabaab cells defend the towns, others will be tasked to conduct mobile warfare against Kenyan forces. Police spokesman Eric Kiraithe told reporters at Nairobi’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Al-Shabaab is losing its foothold in Kenya very fast,” but border raids and internal attacks within Kenya will continue for as long as Kenyan forces remain in southern Somalia. Crude grenade attacks that yield few casualties are also difficult to stop and agitating over time. Inside Somalia, al-Shabaab won’t engage in a large-scale battle unless surrounded, or if they somehow get the best of Kenyan troops in a conventional fight (a possibility that is unlikely to repeat). Mobile warfare offers the highest odds of surviving ground confrontations and ariel bombardment.

According to Somalimemo, a website used by al-Shabaab, the group recently obtained radar equipment “to detect enemy aircraft breaching Somalia's airspace.” This unsubstantiated claim must be taken seriously, as it would affect Operation Linda Nchi’s entire outcome. al-Shabaab obviously becomes more dangerous if it can actively avoid Kenya’s air power.

The difference between conventional assault and unconventional ambush also requires clarification. al-Shabaab would be reckless to challenge Kenyan troops and tanks in open combat, and conventional defenses around urban environments won’t hold for long. Large-scale ambushes pose a separate threat. On rare occasions the Taliban deploys hundreds of fighters to assault a military outpost or village, mostly as shock and awe. Large-scale raids are counterweighted by the risk of high casualties, but al-Shabaab may find a tactical use in ambushing Kenyan forces with 100+ fighters.

This conclusion is partially drawn from al-Shabaab’s military parade in Marka, where Somali and Kenyan media reported “nearly 1,000” fighters brandishing their weapons and artillery (and a few armed speedboats). Although presumably overestimated, this figure might not be off by more than a few hundred; al-Shabaab’s strength in souther Somalia is estimated around 2,000 fighters. After adding Kenya’s force, also estimated over 2,000, to hundreds of TFG and proxy fighters, a 2-1 or 3-1 ratio against al-Shabaab still favors the insurgent.

Since al-Shabaab’s strategy of mobile warfare and dispersion applies to Kenya’s air and ground operations, the primary influence over its strategy hinges on the scope of Operation Linda Nchi. al-Shabaab claims to be operating under the impression that Kenya is invading all of Jubbaland, not just Lower Juba, and appears to be distributing its forces accordingly. The group could expend less resources on Kismayo and Afmadow if anticipating an assault from the north, deploying a national counter-offensive if necessary. With Ethiopian troops lurking along the western border, anonymous Somali officials recently tagged Baardheere for an eventual TFG operation.

Government units lack the capabilities to deploy independently, so the threat is either a bluff or supported by external forces. Baardheere is located 150 miles north of Afmadow and Kismayo, 100 miles south of the Ethiopian border, and over 200 miles west of Mogadishu.

Somalia’s war-torn capital won’t be left alone either; al-Shabaab must maintain diversionary pressure for its southern front. Valiant attempts to rebuild the city continue to be interrupted by sporadic al-Shabaab attacks and the group has yet to be fully cleared from every district. Keeping with its tactic inside Kenya, grenade attacks against government targets were reported throughout last week, including one attack near the Bakaara market. al-Shabaab withdrew the bulk of its troops from their entrenched positions in order to spare them and reinforce the south, but the terminated Fazul Abdullah Mohammed advised that a low-intensity presence in Mogadishu cannot be eliminated.

“We are the ones who are attacking now,” warned Ali Mohamud Rage, an al-Shabaab spokesman. “They will not attack us anymore.”

This lingering problem dovetails into Kenya’s available forces and territorial ambitions. Nairobi is counting on AU reinforcements to buttress Mogadishu and eventually land in Kismayo, otherwise Kenyan forces would potentially overstay their welcome. Yet according to AU spokesman Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, "Sometimes the coffers are dry and other times, bureaucracy delays the process. We've been having 2,000 Ugandan troops ready to deploy but there is no equipment for them. The result is, you have less forces on the ground to maintain operational momentum."

Any delay presents a grave threat to Operation Linda Nchi; the mission was predicated on immediate AU reinforcements. Burundi has prepared another 1,000 soldiers for the 9,500-man force, except they too will clog the pipeline until Western funds are released. Ankunda said that unstable funding also discouraged other members from contributing to the force. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni advocates a 20,000-man force for a national campaign.

"The helicopters are ready to go now," said Lt. Col. Felix Kulaigye, the Ugandan army spokesman. "It is very critical. You can do operations, you can do casualty evacuations, you can do quick resupplies. Given the state of roads in Somalia, they would be very handy ... We will send them when the U.N. has money to pay for them."

At roughly $10 million the UN’s deficit still makes for incredibly cheap COIN. Western funding has been a chronic source of friction due to the TFG’s corruption, but foreign powers have no alternative at the current juncture - Kenya’s operation requires coordination with a larger AU force. al-Shabaab will enjoy greater mobility to defend to its territory without an expanding presence in Mogadishu, along with the potential of a Kismayo detail. The group could also gamble on large-scale raids without the immediate threat of an AU/TFG raid into Baidoa or Baardheere.

AMISOM's situation is dire enough for Kenya to offer its own forces, even though the issue of funding would remain unresolved.

Policymakers and commanders must account for these factors and many more in predicting al-Shabaab’s defense. Conversely, they must never forget that Operation Linda Nchi is primarily political in nature. While Colonel Cyrus Oguna declared that his troops “have been able to register one victory after another,” victory in every battle may not yield stability in southern Somalia. Kenyan forces must constantly fight for Somali approval, and a proactive strategy allows Nairobi to jump on the grim inevitability of war. Getting Somali President Sharif Ahmed on the same page is vital to Operation Linda Nchi. Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) also recommends an international donor fund to compensate for civilian deaths and injuries caused AU and TFG forces, an idea that should be adopted for the benefit of Kenyan forces.

al-Shabaab’s counter-measures are most effectively neutralized at the political level, not on Somalia’s military battlefield.

VOA Bombs Yemen’s Revolutionaries

U.S. officials are skilled at softening their condemnation of ‘“friendly” regimes, and the Voice of America’s new editorial on Yemen provides a blueprint of the Obama administration's duplicity. All of the usual rhetorical tricks are on display, illustrating a line by line meltdown of U.S. foreign policy.

For the past ten months a popular uprising seeking to oust President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been underway in Yemen. Pro-Saleh forces regularly engage in deadly clashes with armed tribesmen and military defectors who support the protesters in Yemen's largest cities. In the south, al-Qaida-linked militants have occasionally taken control of entire towns. The many months of violence have forced more than 80,000 residents of Zinjibar to flee to neighboring provinces.

The VOA’s opening paragraph sets the tone for marginalizing Yemen’s revolutionaries. A peaceful uprising by youth and civil movements transitions immediately into clashes between Saleh’s security forces and armed elements affiliated with the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). While the ongoing conflict between these forces is a key battleground inside Yemen’s revolution, Saleh and the international community both seek to elevate the threat of “civil war” above Yemen’s revolution.

al-Qaeda is then thrown into the mix without framing Saleh’s plot in the southern governorates. The only reason AQAP managed to “occasionally taken control” of Zinjibar and Jaar is because Saleh’s security forces redeployed to crackdown on protesters. This threat was then successfully leveraged to maintain U.S. support.

According to the Yemen Observatory for Human Rights, about 400 people have been killed since the protests that began in February, although group spokesman al-Jalil Waddah said the numbers of those killed in the south and Arhab region could be much higher. He added that his organization has documented many cases of political prisoners alleging abuse at the hands of government security forces in Sana'a and the country's second largest city, Taiz.

The United States is deeply troubled by reports of attacks against civilians in Yemen. The U.S. condemns violence by all parties and calls for all sides to exercise maximum restraint.

With respect to the YOHR, Yemen’s casualty figures have been consistently reported above 1,000 by local groups and media counts. YOHR does mention that the true death-toll is obscured by the government’s practice of hiding the wounded and dead, but VOA picked some of the lower statistics that it could find. Most noticeably, VOA uses YOHR as a proxy to document government abuses and condemns violence by “all parties,” not Saleh’s regime specifically.

No watering down occurs in VOA’s editorials on Syria.

President Saleh's refusal to transfer power has further destabilized Yemen, denying the country the opportunity to restore peace and ultimately elect a new government. Economic conditions also continue to deteriorate under the pressure of growing protests and increasing division throughout Yemen. Widespread inflation, including rising commodity prices, affects every Yemeni. International and domestic investors are deterred from investing or expanding their operations in Yemen due to a deteriorating security situation. Ongoing political instability and uncertainty over the status of Yemen’s leadership have also undermined expected reforms related to responsible economic management, anticorruption efforts, taxation, and subsidy reduction.

If President Saleh cares about Yemen's future and the well-being of the Yemeni people, he must immediately initiate a full transfer of power that allows early presidential elections to be held within the framework of the Gulf cooperation Council transition initiative. The U.S. calls on him to fulfill his promises without delay. Only then can the Yemeni people come together to address the enormous challenges facing their country.

These paragraphs are particularly duplicitous. Although Saleh’s past and present actions are responsible for Yemen’s current destabilization, his “refusal to transfer power” functions as a crutch for preexisting and ongoing U.S. support. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is enabled by the international community’s unbroken favoritism towards Saleh’s regime; the strongman manipulates Yemen’s fuel and electricity supplies, turning them on and off depending on the arrival of foreign diplomats.

Closing with support for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative speaks for itself, and demonstrates the Obama administration’s level of insensitivity towards Yemen’s revolutionaries. VOA concluded its previous editorials on Yemen, spaced months apart, with the same propaganda: “The United States again urges President Saleh to initiate a full transfer of power without delay and arrange for presidential elections to be held before the end of the year within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative.”

The GCC’s initiative is condemned daily in Yemen’s streets and abroad, viewed as a monster spawned by imperialist powers. A “full transfer of power... within the framework of the Gulf cooperation Council transition initiative” will obstruct Yemen’s revolution, ultimately destabilizing its political and economic spheres. Saleh doesn’t care about the well-being of most Yemenis, only the few.

This redundancy captures the essence of America’s failed policy in Yemen.

Kenya Needs a Silent Partner in Israel

Is Nairobi merely desperate or eager to parade a powerful ally? After weeks of consultations with foreign officials and few immediate results, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga traveled to Jerusalem for a “surefire” boost of international support. Israel maintains an active military presence in Africa - think Hamas weapons, al-Qaeda camps and Somalis fighting with Hezbollah - and the two countries have steadily expanded their mutual security ties.

“Kenya's enemies are Israel's enemies,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Odinga, according to a statement from the latter’s office. “We have similar forces planning to bring us down. I see it as an opportunity to strengthen ties."

Although few details were released and the Israeli government hasn’t confirmed Odinga's statement, there’s no reason not to trust its validity. Netanyahu supposedly spoke of “a coalition against fundamentalism," which would include Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania (all Christian-majority countries), and accepted Odinga’s invitation to visit Kenya early next year. Israeli President Shimon Peres was also quoted as saying, “Kenya has stood on the side of Israel at its hour of need. Consistently, Kenya has shown a very positive attitude towards Israel and Israel is ready to help.”

Odinga’s office is unlikely to fabricate such remarks.

Meanwhile Nairobi is searching for allies who will gear up now, not in the future; AU reinforcements to Mogadishu are idling due to lack of funds and Kenyan officials are beginning to publicly question U.S. policy. Today UN Ambassador Macharia Kamau told the Associated Press that he submitted a new appeal for a naval blockade around Kismayo: "Why this has not happened is actually a little bit beyond us because it does not require any troops on the ground, neither does it really put anyone at any risk.”

"We would like to see the US and the international community taking advantage of basically what Kenya is doing,” he added, “which is putting troops on the ground, taking risks that need to be taken to achieve the goals that we all say need to be achieved, which is to bring peace and security to Somalia.”

Nairobi is clearly desperate for international support and justified in its demand - enhanced regional cooperation is essential to counterinsurgency. Yet reluctance to pursue a naval blockade suggests that Western cooperation is, in fact, more tenuous than suspected. This hesitation has left Kenya to draw on all available support, including Israel’s. Beyond political support and possible financial aid, Netanyahu made "everything available” to safeguard Kenya’s internal security, suggesting that Israeli personnel will assist Kenyan police in tracking al-Shabaab cells and offshoots. It seems logical that the Mossad would carry their operations into Somalia if requested.

That Israel’s strategic disadvantage could outweigh its tactical advantages is another possibility.

al-Shabaab commanders, Somalis and the rest of the world saw Odinga’s statement come across BBC’s newswire at the same time. Outside analysts couldn’t believe that Israel would broadcast its intentions, even if Odinga’s office was used as a proxy (an outside possibility remains that Jerusalem didn’t sign off). al-Shabaab probably couldn’t believe its luck either, and the bare mention of Israel’s presence shot to the top of its propaganda.

"We want to tell the Muslim world that we have the same religion, the same faith and the same god," Mohammed Ali Rage, al-Shabaab's spokesman, said in a local radio broadcast. "It is their responsibility to support their Muslim brothers in Somalia because the Kenyan Christians are seeking support from the Jews in Israel."

While Israel can militarily enhance Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi, this support is weighed down by ideological blowback. As much as Nairobi needs international assistance, Somalia’s political and social spheres are the primary battlegrounds for reestablishing government authority. Progress on the security front cannot overrule political factors; Israel’s declared support will boost al-Shabaab’s ideology and alienate those Somalis opposed to any foreign intervention. These sources of friction add time to Kenya’s relatively small window in southern Somalia.

The idea of a “Christian coalition,” however, appears to be the deadliest of all psychological errors, and Netanyahu’s use of the word “fundamentalist” further increases the potential for chaotic outcomes. This isn’t to say that al-Shabaab isn’t ruthless and unIslamic in its behavior, but to observe how Western actors are also perceived as fundamentalists. This word inadequately defines Somalia’s environment to suit Christian-Jewish propaganda, and ups Somalia’s disorder by vividly branding Operation Linda Nchi as a “religious war.” Israeli officials might not even see al-Shabaab, only al-Qaeda.

Nairobi should realize that Israel’s high-profile presence is counterproductive to defeating both groups.

al-Shabaab Commanders Reported Dead in Afogye Missile Strike

Two weeks ago a large explosion rocked the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) humanitarian camp in Jilib, located in the watershed of Somalia’s southern Jubba River. In addition to at least 45 wounded, somewhere between five civilians and 10 al-Shabaab fighters were reportedly killed in the blast. Kenyan officials disputed local accounts of an errant air-strike, claiming that al-Shabaab drove an exploding technical into the MSF camp.

Although the aftermath remains hazy - Nairobi has yet to release an investigation - several facts emerged from the initial chaos. Military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir took immediate responsibly for the blast in order to contain its fallout, explaining that intelligence suspected an al-Shabaab meeting in the area. Jilib’s collateral damage also prompted Chirchir to alert locals and residents in eight other towns that they “will be under attack continuously.”

Regardless of al-Shabaab’s disapproval, Kenya cannot afford repeated civilian casualties in southern Somalia.

Chirchir’s warning reverberated throughout Somalia’s geopolitical sphere. Locals report a pervasive fear surrounding Kenya’s uncertain strikes and al-Shabaab’s defensive maneuvers; the group is arming locals and has split into smaller groups to avoid aerial bombardment. Regional observers similarly questioned whether Nairobi’s threat is real and, if so, how far it extends into Somalia. Attacks on Jilib, Baardheere, Baraawe, Baidoa and Afogye would take Kenyan warplanes hundreds of miles beyond the Lower Jubba administration, where ground forces are currently grinding towards Kismayo and Afmadow.

Sunday night’s strike on Afogye, located 20 miles northwest of Mogadishu, answered at least one question: every town on Chirchir’s list does live under the threat of air-strike.

The rest of Afogye’s details remain clouded by debris and Somalia’s natural hazards. Locals report an explosion at an al-Shabaab meeting near the Tadamun orphanage (upwards of four explosions were recorded in total), and described streaks of light before impact. Anonymous U.S. sources rejected involvement in the raid, while an al-Shabaab official described an off-shore missile attack and no casualties. Chirchir has already denied Kenyan responsibility while Lieutenant Colonel Paddy Ankunda, the AU’s spokesman in Somalia, informed reporters that “we are still trying to gather information."

Confirmed casualties have yet to be released, but local officials and media are reporting the deaths of several al-Shabaab commanders: Moktar Ali “Ahmed Godane” Zubeyr and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

As the situation stands, every available piece of information agrees on a missile strike originating from the Indian Ocean. Since Kenya would presumably take credit for the deaths of two high-ranking figures, that leaves an American or French warship as the missiles’ source. French activity has been reported in the Baraawe area, 100 miles south of Mogadishu, and all the way past Kismayo, so this option cannot be ruled out. Either possibility, though, leads to the same conclusion. If CIA and Special Forces agents operating in Mogadishu didn’t pass the intel onto the French, a U.S. missile strike appears to be the likeliest outcome in Afogye.

The strike itself may not yield an expected bounty either. Senior al-Shabaab leaders have been falsely reported dead in the past - most recently after Kenya’s air-strike on Jilib. Furthermore, the elimination of Zubeyr and Aweys could lead to unexpected results within al-Shabaab’s command. Zubeyr is no longer chief of al-Shabaab, a position he held from late 2008 to December 2010, after being removed by al-Qaeda’s own local leadership. A transnational jihadist born in Somaliland, Zubeyr picked several fights within the group’s national leadership, one with his deputy Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and another with Aweys.

The latter had made several unsuccessful attempts to merge his Hizbul Islam with al-Shabaab, and was finally accepted just as Zubeyr was replaced by Robow’s proxy, Ibrahim "al-Afghani.”

Preexisting animosity between Zubeyr and Aweys suggests multiple outcomes: their meeting could be fabricated, or the ICU veterans of Ethiopia’s invasion decided to cooperate against Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi. That the Zubeyr and Aweys would meet by themselves seems unlikely, so additional commanders could have been killed in the strike on Afogye. If, however, Zubeyr and Aweys were terminated in isolation, their absence shouldn’t noticeably impact al-Shabaab’s operations. Not only would Zubeyr’s removal boost the group’s nationalist leadership, al-Shabaab retains a bench of commanders to draw on.

If worst comes to worst (al-Qaeda generally saves its Americans), the U.S.-born Omar Shafik Hammami could take the group’s reigns to poke al-Shabaab’s finger in Washington’s eye.

A leadership change isn’t necessarily wanted during a foreign invasion, but Zubeyr replaced the Aweys-schooled Aden Hashi "Ayrow" Farah after he was killed in a U.S. air-strike. The same process will repeat in the event of another “decapitation” strike. While this outcome isn’t reason to avoid high-value raids, al-Shabaab’s ranks cannot be eliminated by air power alone. Nairobi, Mogadishu and Washington need ground troops to secure contested towns like Afogye, Baidoa and Baardheere, otherwise government authority will not be restored.

Changing Somalia’s environment remains the only sustainable policy for reducing and ultimately destroying al-Shabaab’s network.

[Full analysis published ASAP]

GOP, U.S. Media Propaganda In Overdrive

In the race to be viewed as America’s “toughest” defender of U.S. interests abroad, GOP candidates are tripping over their tongues for Republican votes.

The recent debate over foreign policy merely highlighted an ongoing trend of misinformed, potentially disastrous positions staked out by GOP contenders. President Barack Obama’s own positions towards Iran and China are frequent targets, leading to repeated missteps over Tehran’s nuclear program. Mitt Romney, for instance, believes that America’s Iranian policy is cut-and-dry: "If we re-elect Barack Obama, Iran will have a nuclear weapon. And if you elect Mitt Romney, Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.”

As comprehensive sanctions and a regional military campaign don’t guarantee the destruction of Iran’s suspected nuclear program, Romney must consider himself to be Superman.

The Associated Press captured many errors after fact-checking last night’s GOP debate in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Candidates cannot legally criticize Obama’s level of covert activity in Iran (particularly Michele Bachmann, who serves on the House intelligence Committee), given the inherent level of secrecy involved. Military action also provides an incomplete safeguard against Iran’s nuclear weapons - and may yield a world war. Noticeably absent, however, are the fallacies lobbed at the Arab revolutions.

According to Herman Cain, “This president has been on the wrong side in nearly every situation in the Arab world, which has basically done nothing except to put that entire thing at risk.”

Although Cain’s assessment is correct for misguided reasons, he’s eager to explain how he would lead America on the wrong side of history. Worried that “our relationship with Egypt may not survive,” Cain bashes the Obama administration for backing an opposition that was “more of the Muslim Brotherhood,” when the administration initially resisted regime change with the MB in mind. He must be temporarily satisfied with Washington’s support for Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which stands accused of colluding with the MB against Egypt’s civil movement. Yet he still demands more - that White House actively suppress millions of Egyptians!

Clearly articulating himself as a man with negligible knowledge of foreign policy, Cain moved to Yemen’s revolution and proceeded to embarrass himself by supporting another dictatorship. Bashing the Obama administration’s response to the Arab Spring has become frequent sport for GOP officials and aspiring presidential candidates alike, but some criticism flies further off the cliff. Perhaps the moderator should have inquired into the exact number of dictators that Cain plans to support.

"This president has already said that the president of Yemen should go,” he told CBS’s Scott Pelley. “He is our friend. He has been helping us fight Al Qaeda.”

Western media has failed to objectively report on the Arab revolutions, so the GOP’s fear-mongering in Yemen is likely to go unchecked throughout the campaign. Every candidate would have eliminated Anwar al-Awlaki, a cleric and operative within al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and some exaggerated his status (only Glenn Greewald seemed to notice). Many downplayed the significance of extrajudicial killings, a valid debate that happens to block a debate on Yemen itself. When Bachman claimed that Yemeni refugees left a “state sponsor of terror,” media corrected her figures and reported that Yemen is not a state sponsor of terrorism, according to the U.S. State Department.

Of course not, Saleh is America’s “friend.”

Ask many Yemenis and they will tell you that Saleh’s regime has sponsored terror for years. If he isn’t arresting his political opponents without due process and beating them, he’s allowing AQAP to maintain a visible presence for terror’s sake. Some Yemenis believe that he funds his own “jihadists” as proxies in southern Yemen’s battleground. Saleh has leeched off of U.S. military aid (applied to his political opponents) and politically shields himself by stimulating new chaos. Western and Gulf states have cooperated with his regime throughout Yemen’s revolution, yet the GOP is obviously unsatisfied with the administration's current strategy.

"The standard [Obama] has fallen back to of humanitarian intervention could apply to Sudan, to North Korea, to Zimbabwe, to Syria this week, to Yemen, to Bahrain,” Newt Gingrich said in late March. “This isn't a serious standard... I would not have intervened.”

In reality the administration has tried everything short of direct military action to stop regime change in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. At the time Gingrich issued one of his few comments on Yemen, Obama oversaw a military imbalance within U.S. policy (complete with hidden drone base) and called for “reform” after the March 18th sniper massacre. No intervention has occurred in Yemen or Bahrain - the administration is attempting to rescue these regimes by manipulating the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A GOP president wouldn’t have changed their targets, only the level of force applied to suppress these uprisings.

Gingrich must be talking about America’s usual double-standard.

Such massive lies on Yemeni policy are gulped down by the AP and mainstream media in a binge of low awareness. One cannot politically blame the GOP for taking “the people’s side;” a recent CBS poll found that 65% of respondents support unilateral military action in Pakistan and Yemen. The majority of their memories of Yemen begin in December 2009, when a U.S. airstrike targeted al-Awlaki and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded a plane to Detroit days later. The American people have been led to believe that Saleh “is a friend,” or else “the only option” against AQAP, but his decrepit regime is neither.

Rather than construct a sustainable policy built on outreach with the Yemeni people, the Obama administration decided to support an opportunistic tyrant with a short lifespan. That Egyptians and Yemenis would make better partners than murderous tyrants remains a hard sell to Americans.

Administration officials would never admit that the White House reacts to GOP mudslinging. Given the outrageous charges and unwanted attention towards the Arab revolutions, Obama may try to soften his stance towards the protesters he’s alienated. More likely, the administration’s policy will remain unchanged in order to appear “firm” but practical. This stance conceals the White House and Pentagon’s existing manipulation while refusing to “bow” to the GOP.

Rick Perry claims "the Obama administration has appeased the Arab street at the expense of our national security,” but he means “the Obama administration has appeased Arab dictators at the expense of our national security.”

West/Gulf Powers Enabling Yemen’s Chaos

In what has become its own weekend tradition in Yemen, Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi issued his latest defense of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. Responding to faux Western pressure and ignoring Friday’s “No Immunity For Martyrs,” Yemen’s 17-year VP went about his usual business negotiating a “mechanism” for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative.

"We all have a task represented in translating U.N. Security Council resolution 2014 into action on the ground, and this is a task the ruling party and the opposition must shoulder together.”

Western diplomats lapped up Hadi’s pledges - some six months in the making - as he tried to match Saleh’s firebrand rhetoric against Yemen’s opposition. Widely viewed as a puppet of the regime and foreign powers, Hadi claims that the GCC’s initiative would have been signed by now if the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) “sincerely” cooperated. Saleh committed no destructive acts or massacres - he was simply protecting Yemen’s constitution and “unity.”

Over 75% of Yemenis “have no relationship to what is happening and are not affiliates to any political parties.”

Apparently the revolutionaries who swarm Yemen’s cities should thank the JMP for obstructing the GCC’s unpopular initiative. Not only is the proposal legally invalid - Yemen isn’t part of the GCC and UN immunity violates international law - the majority of Yemen’s pro-democracy protesters reject appeasement with Saleh’s regime. A “unity” government formed by the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and JMP would oversee an “early election," two codewords for corrupting the revolution.

He said that 85% of negotiations have been achieved, a statistic with no practical use other than to manipulate foreign impressions.

Even the JMP, which lacks credibility to speak on the GCC’s intiative, criticized Hadi’s statements in the middle of supporting the GCC’s efforts. Yasin Said Numan, head of Yemen’s Socialist Party, told Reuters from Dubai, "What does it mean to talk about a mechanism when the other side has not signed the initiative yet? They must sign it first and then we can talk about its implementation. I believe the whole world needs to put real pressure on the other party to sign the accord.”

Numan would hedge his stance by adding, "Diplomacy has only is encouraging the regime to commit massacres, like the ugly one that happened in Taiz yesterday.”

Following the worn trail of Yemen’s 33-year strongman, Hadi rejected accusations that government forces were responsible for ongoing assaults in Sana’a and Taiz. His statements followed a warning from the Defense Ministry, which promised to “defend” the country against “subversive armed elements” of the JMP. Although armed elements of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the JMP have impeded Yemen’s revolutionaries, they share no blame in Saleh’s ruthless tactics. In addition to nationwide attacks on Friday, the U.S.-trained Republican Guard opened fire on prayers in Taiz, killing women and children.

According to the Legal Committee and forum of Yemeni lawyers in Sana’a, “shelling residential areas, women, children, elderly men, freedom square, and everyplace in Taiz is a defiance to the UNSC’s resolution.”

Yemen’s National Revolutionary Council and many youth coalitions condemned the attacks before turning on the international community’s leniency.

“The silence of the international community, UN and human right organizations is only encouraging Saleh to continue his hysteric revenge against his own people,” Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) warned in an emergency press release. “This silence is increasingly being perceived by Yemeni people as being deliberate and that the international community is in fact backing the regime.”

CCYRC joined Yemen’s vast revolutionary network in calling on “the honest - only the honest - international community to take urgent and serious measures against Saleh’s regime.” Western and Gulf media continue to float rumors of an asset freeze to push Saleh’s signature onto the GCC’s initiative, and oppositional figure Mohammed Abulahoum returned from Washington with “good news” after consulting with U.S. officials. Unfortunately the majority of evidence reveals this maneuver to be a scam. Persistence avocation of the GCC’s initiative is a dead giveaway; foreign powers ideally seek to move Hadi into Saleh’s position, where he would maintain authority over Yemen’s security forces.

The GPC has also attempted to amend the proposal to more favorable terms, such as allowing Saleh to remain as “honorary president” until a “snap election.” The odds of manipulation increase in proportion to how soon a presidential vote is held.

Abulahoum claimed that “the US administration has been very understanding,” when nothing is further from the truth. “Financial sanctions” appear to be a pure setup, and the U.S. State Department reinforced its disconnect in Yemen by issuing another hollow statement. Condemning the violence “by all parties” - a statement out of Saleh’s playbook - spokeswoman Victoria Nuland called for a “prompt investigation into the circumstances of these attacks and for those responsible to be brought to justice.” Because self-policing is so popular in Yemen and Bahrain.

“If President Saleh cares about Yemen's future and the well-being of the Yemeni people, he must immediately initiate a full transfer of power that allows early presidential elections to be held within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition initiative. We call on him to fulfill his promises without delay. Only then can the Yemeni people come together to address the enormous challenges facing their country.”

Yemen’s revolutionaries are already preparing for the next phase in their struggle - the GCC’s signing. They view their situation as parallel to Egypt’s: cutting off Saleh’s head may leave his military intact within Hadi’s body. Foreign powers have falsely positioned themselves on the side of Yemen’s revolutionaries, and the UN itself is in danger of committing irreparable damage.

Few Yemenis expect Riyadh and its Gulf satellites to promote their cause. Until Western powers, specifically Washington, drop their support for Saleh’s regime and the GCC’s futile initiative, they will only fuel Yemen’s instability.

Quote of the Day

"The Republican Guard forces are in a state of high readiness and vigilance to defend the country against subversive armed elements of the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and the defected First Armored Division."

- Yemeni Defense Ministry, explaining the activities of Ali Abdullah Saleh's U.S.-trained "counter-terrorism" unit. Saleh's regime frequently accuses the JMP of a "coup" - and attacks its armed elements - in order to invalidate the GCC's initiative and obstruct Yemen's revolutionaries.

Obama's "Arab Problem"

By Abdullah Al-Arian, published by Al Jazeera:

Obama's "During the past few months, Barack Obama has come under increasing pressure from his would-be Republican opponents, not for secretly subscribing to the faith of the enemy (Obama Muslim-baiting is so 2010), but for his supposed culpability in the events engulfing the Arab world during the past year.

On September 29, presidential hopeful Michele Bachmann told supporters, "You want to know why we have Arab Spring? Barack Obama has laid the table for the Arab Spring by demonstrating weakness from the United States of America."

Just last week, another Republican presidential candidate, Newt Gingrich, pronounced the Arab Spring to be the result of the Obama foreign policy's "grotesque failure". Gingrich went so far as to call it an "anti-Christian spring", apparently believing that longstanding authoritarian rule was the only thing protecting religious minorities in the Arab world from unbridled persecution.

But before the narrative of Obama's "Arab Problem" conveniently replaces his "Muslim Problem" in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, it is instructive to examine the actual posture of this administration toward Arab revolutions from Tunisia to Yemen...

Yemen’s “No Immunity For Murderers”

Faced with the reality that Ali Abdullah Saleh and Yemen’s revolutionaries are equally unwilling to stand down, Western officials turned to a new tactic earlier this week. Due to Saleh’s “usefulness” against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Yemen’s geostrategic location, international powers have avoided the financial sanctions levied against Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.

Now, after meeting with Nobel laurete Tawakel Karman, European officials are set to “discuss” the issue at next week’s meeting in Brussels.

This development, as positive as it appears, feels like another of the many traps set by Western and Gulf capitals. For starters, financial sanctions are likely to prove ineffective against Saleh’s accounts, which are already protected in Gulf banks. The notion of “financial” sanctions also diverts attention from the more pressing need: a freeze on U.S. military support. Neither response would halt Saleh’s ferocious crackdown against Yemen’s revolutionaries, but a unified political position would assist them in the long-term.

Instead foreign powers have unified against Yemenis through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The threat of financial sanctions functions as pressure to sign the GCC’s unpopular initiative, not genuine punishment as Saleh's forces tirelessly assault Sana’a and Taiz. Washington has tasked an ICC warrant to European powers (as the U.S. isn’t a full member), but leaving the EU in charge of financial sanctions reeks of a setup. The GCC’s initiative also contains an immunity clause for Saleh and his inner circle of security commanders, including many relatives, and the international community continues to ignore widespread opposition to the proposal.

Western officials on recent record maintain support for the GCC’s initiative, and their true intentions will be confirmed if and when its officials step out to advocate again. Many protesters inside and outside of Yemen are at a loss to deter foreign powers from regime manipulation, but they stand ready to confront the outside world.

With these factors in mind, Yemen’s revolutionaries wanted to remind the international community of a primary demand on their 40th Friday of demonstrations: “No Immunity For Murders.”

Libya’s SIMs Redirect Sahel’s Instability

A small collection of fears dominated the policy discussion inside and outside of Libya when the Obama administration green-lit NATO’s “Operation Odyssey Dawn.” Among them: what if Gaddafi stages another Iraq? What if he retaliates against Western targets? What about his arms depots and chemical weapons? Although valid questions, Iraq’s comparison was never accurate and Western military supremacy would deter most conventional attacks.

The outflow of his weapons, on the other hand, is a hardened source of concern. Anyone from the highest government authorities to Western citizens to local populaces in north Africa received a jolt when up to 20,000 surface-to-air missiles were reported missing.

"I myself could have removed several hundred [missiles] if I wanted to, and people can literally drive up with pickup trucks or even 18 wheelers and take away whatever they want," warns Peter Bouckaert, emergency director for Human Rights Watch. "Every time I arrive at one of these weapons facilities, the first thing we notice going missing is the surface-to-air missiles."

Below this headline, small arms trafficking has been consistently reported by Algerian, Nigerien and Egyptian authorities. Concrete estimates of Gaddafi’s remaining stockpile are unavailable after NATO destroyed part of his network, but a comical military buildup suggests that northern Africa is more awash with weapons than usual. The unease of regional governments is two-fold. Enjoying tenuous relations with the sprawling Tuareg people, Mali and Niger have already received warnings from newly constituted groups who fought under Gaddafi. Above this national threat, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) expanding transnational operations are feeding into the Sahel’s instability.

Western powers, specifically Washington and Paris, generally concern themselves with the Tuaregs only as much as they interact with AQIM. The nomadic people have minimal contact with AQIM - nothing on a systematic level - and many Tuareg leaders condemn the group. However neighboring governments claim that Libyan nationals and Tuareg smugglers are moving weapons to AQIM. That leaves al-Qaeda’s African consolidator, not Libya’s Libyan Islamic Movement (formally LIFG), as the West’s primary obstacle out of Libya.

And its one-eyed commander just attempted to leverage this fear.

Speaking to the Mauritanian news agency ANI, Mokhtar Belmokhtar boasts that AQIM has been “one of the main beneficiaries of the revolutions in the Arab world.” Also known by the alias of Khaled Abou al-Abbas, the Algerian national didn’t explain how AQIM got its hands on Gaddafi’s arms caches, saying only that “our acquisition of Libyan armament... is an absolutely natural thing.” Belmokhtar has chafed with AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel at times, but dismissed reports of widespread internal divisions.

His warning is presumably based in reality, not propaganda.

Behind the preexisting fears of Libya’s missing weapons, Belmokhtar’s interview pushed AQIM into mainstream headlines and stirred up a new panic cycle. This reaction isn’t completely unfounded, but skepticism is necessary to trace AQIM’s trails in the Sahel. As al-Qaeda’s least understood branch - slightly below Yemen’s al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - the danger of Western overreaction poses a chronic threat to the region. For years U.S. and European powers organized counter-terrorism training with local governments years, and involved forces have embarked on a base network throughout the Sahel.

Many analysts and interested observers doubt AQIM’s jihadist reach, arguing that the group uses al-Qaeda’s brand to recruit individuals into a criminal network. Belmokhtar denies these accusations as fabrications, but that doesn’t change the fact that Western capitals are lavishing attention on AQIM.

Although the uncontained flow of SIMs appears to raise a red flag in Washington, this news isn’t exactly unwelcome. These weapons, contrary to U.S. public statements, will justify expanding operations in the Sahel. U.S. military officials have already connected AQIM to Nigeria’s Boko Haram, which in turn is “loosely” connected to al-Shabaab, a claim made without any proof. Libya’s weapons are feared to have shipped throughout Africa already, and the Pentagon is eager to hunt them down wherever they land. How the U.S. responds to AQIM is just as consequential to the Sahel’s security as AQIM’s own operations.

With the wrong strategy, Washington will simply add to the region’s destabilization.