Hillary Clinton Does (Psyops) Work

Different time, different place, same propaganda.

Holding Washington’s elite network of universities and think tanks in her palm, America’s Secretary of State enjoys a wide selection of platforms to issue international declarations, propaganda and warnings. In late 2009 Hillary Clinton used the U.S. Institute of Peace to launch a propaganda campaign in Pakistan, with predictably dreary results. Months ago, at the National Defense University, she tag-teamed the Arab Spring with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

On Monday Clinton unveiled her usual rhetoric at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 “Democracy Awards.” NDI’s global activities have acquired an external reputation for funding movements favorable to U.S. interests, and the Secretary seemed content with reinforcing this perception. Clinton had one objective on her list: confront the mounting doubts over America’s response to the Arab revolutions.

“I’ve heard skepticism about American motives and commitments, people wondering if, after decades of working with the governments of the region, America doesn’t—in our heart of hearts—actually long for the old days. I’ve heard from activists who think we aren’t pushing hard enough for democratic change, and I’ve heard from government officials who think we’re pushing too hard. I’ve heard from people asking why our policies vary from country to country...”

“I want to ask and answer a few of these tough questions.”

Unfortunately Clinton came to NDI to defend, not correct, the flaws in U.S. policy. Although she insists that the Obama administration “begins by rejecting the false choice between progress and stability,” this “false choice” is brutally real in Yemen and Bahrain, where entire populations have been sacrificed to preserve U.S. military interests. In Yemen’s case, Washington measures “progress” not by sustainable governance but “success” against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); non-military areas are given lip-service to offset military predominance. A vain attempt to mitigate regime change through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has exasperated Yemen’s conflict.

“The truth is that the greatest single source of instability in today’s Middle East is not the demand for change; it is the refusal to change," Clinton confidently argues. "That is certainly true in Syria, where a crackdown on small, peaceful protests drove thousands into the streets and thousands more over the borders. It is true in Yemen, where President [Ali Abdullah] Saleh has reneged repeatedly on his promises to transition to democracy and suppressed his people’s rights and freedoms. And it is true in Egypt.”

U.S. officials continue to disseminate the false notion that Saleh has “reneged repeatedly on his promises to transition to democracy,” when he never sincerely agreed to sign the GCC’s favorable initiative. This lie is exploited to lay all of the blame on Saleh as the administration quietly pushes for regime alteration. Already rejected by Yemen’s revolutionaries, the GCC’s initiative remains a stalling mechanism for Saleh and foreign powers. Clinton never mentions the proposal despite firmly backing its implementation, a tacit sign of the GCC’s illegitimacy, and the White House hasn’t clarified the proposals immunity clause with UN resolution 2014.

With rumors of an asset freeze floating out of Europe, Saleh is now looking for even more favorable terms under the GCC’s initiative. According to Sultan Barakani, the Secretary General of his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), Saleh “wishes to remain president of Yemen until the next presidential elections.” GPC spokesman Tareq al-Shami later clarified that the party is waiting on UN envoy Jamal Benomar to initiate a new round of dialogue “on details of the Gulf initiative so it can be signed.”

Western and Gulf powers had envisioned a ceremony in Riyadh on Thursday, a flagrant violation of Yemen’s revolution, and still plan to hold an out-of-country signing.

U.S. bias pervades military support for Saleh’s regime and political support for the GCC’s initiative. Clinton has actively participated in Yemen’s cover-up, avoiding its revolution whenever possible and backing the GCC when cornered. Her department assists in the task, addressing Syria 13 separate times since Yemen’s UN resolution 2014 was unanimously passed on October 21st. Not only are Yemen’s six statements briefer, all politely request Saleh’s signature on the GCC’s illegitimate initiative, offering no other context or explanation on Yemen’s revolution.

In contrast to Yemen’s singular mention and token reference to Saleh - and his immunity offer - Clinton slammed Bashar al-Assad before NDI’s adoring crowd.

As for Bahrain, the State Department went a month and a half between August and October without commenting on Bahrain’s uprising. Even conservative editorials from the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post concede Washington’s double standard in Bahrain, but Clinton rejected the very silence that the Obama administration actively maintains. Current statements praise Bahrain’s investigation into its own crimes, and the Secretary’s explanation of U.S. policy reads straight from the propaganda playbook.

“The government has recognized the need for dialogue, reconciliation, and concrete reforms. And they have committed to provide access to human rights groups, to allow peaceful protest, and to ensure that those who cross lines in responding to civil unrest are held accountable. King Hamad called for an independent commission of inquiry, which will issue its report soon. And we do intend to hold the Bahraini Government to these commitments and to encourage the opposition to respond constructively to secure lasting reform.”

Clinton argued, “President Obama and I have been frank, in public and in private, that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens,” but both have been noticeably quiet. U.S. leadership suffers from an extensive confidence crisis within Bahrain’s opposition, who feel abandoned by the international community and praise the silver lining of America’s controversial 5th Fleet. Bahrain’s “National Dialogue” was exposed as a foreign-backed political sham and its internal investigation now blocks criticism of ongoing abuses. Instead of condemning the suppression of Ali Hasan al-Dehi's funeral, Clinton casually praised King Hamad for his response.

Several Bahraini groups followed Clinton’s speech by demanding the world’s absent attention. After the Arab League’s activity in Syria heightened resentment over a double standard, oppositional officials requested an AL meeting and pressure on Bahrain’s monarchy. The February 14th movement independently rejected the government’s dialogue and Western pressure to “respond constructively.”

While Clinton declares that the Obama administration will support all peoples “because democracies make for stronger and stabler partners,” Egypt’s military council has been promoted for “stability’s” sake, Saleh’s regime is being shielded, and Bahrainis face an isolated climb to serious reform. Eventually dispensing with “universal rights,” Clinton backtracks by defending the “one-size-doesn’t-fit-all” policy adopted by the Obama administration. She claims that U.S. policy varies depending on the country, that “it would be foolish to take a one-size-fits-all approach” - except the administration has adopted a one-side-fits-all response. Washington’s response to the Arab revolutions is based on self-interest, not altruist narrative that Clinton attempts to weave.

“We are not simply acting in our self-interest. Americans believe that the desire for dignity and self-determination is universal - and we do try to act on that belief around the world. Americans have fought and died for these ideals. And when freedom gains ground anywhere, Americans are inspired.”

NDI served its purpose in the end: redouble America’s double standard in the Arab world.

Kenya’s Offensive Goes National

Since its opening salvo Operation Linda Nchi never had the look of a brief incursion. Although General Julius Karangi, Kenya’s Chief of the Defense Force, told reporters that “we acted as a country on the spur of the moment,” kidnapped aid workers and tourism provided expedient justification for a contingency assault.

Kenya’s security isn’t invalid, but it does depend on the mission Nairobi selected for southern Somalia.

Kenyan officials initially outlined their goal around clearing al-Shabaab out of Kismayo and southern Somalia. Where southern Somalia ends was left ambiguous to keep al-Shabaab on the defensive and create leeway in the mission. This process rattled President Sharif Ahmed’s suspicions of Kenya’s proxy, Mohamed Abdi “Gandhi” Mohamed, a former Somali defense minister and current “president” of Azania. The autonomous zone was rebranded from Jubbaland and announced in April at a ceremony in Nairobi.

For months Mohamed’s faction of the Ras Kamnoni Movement pleaded with Kenyan officials to hit al-Shabaab in Kismayo. al-Shabaab has already targeted the sensitive Azania in its propaganda campaign: "Let them not deceive you with Azania. It is a Christian state, take care.”

Operation Linda Nchi began clearer - and hazier - when spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir announced nine towns and cities under threat of Kenyan attack. Several are located along the Jubba River, over 100 miles from the Kenyan border, hinting at a sweep across Jubbaland rather than the contained Lower Juba. Three other towns - Baraawe, Baidoa and Afoogye - lie hundreds of miles over the river. Chirchir didn’t specify a ground or air assault in his warning, but these areas will require both.

Kenyan officials are generally saying all the right things in Jubbaland after Ahmed rocked the political boat. Kenyan forces came to assist in Somalia’s liberation, and territorial authority would be handed over to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Tensions reportedly eased since Somali premier Abdiweli Mohamed Ali returned from Nairobi, where he held meetings with Kenyan leadership and foreign representatives. The Azania option has reportedly taken a back seat due to existing concerns, but doubts in the TFG’s governing capabilities and Azania’s equally questionable council remain unresolved.

The scale of Operation Linda Nchi is growing by the day, generating what could be the best or worst case scenarios in Somalia.

Operation Linda Nchi’s size caused widespread concern before its front advanced beyond the Jubba River. Some of these fears may be exaggerated if Kenya’s operation fits within a long-term, regional campaign. Somalia's TFG, its neighbors and regional blocs (African Union and IGAD) envision a year-long operation running through August 2012, when elections are scheduled under the TFG’s expiring mandate. AU reinforcements will land in Mogadishu and, if all goes according to plan, Kismayo. From here each force would attempt to inflate the security bubble around their respective population centers. Opponents of asymmetric actors cannot run from COIN laws, and Kenya shouldn’t try to fit a protracted mission into a smaller window.

An extended stay is necessary to control the environment rather than the enemy, and premature withdrawal will yield instability. Too short often becomes too long in COIN, one of its many dangers.

Kenya’s looming problem is mission drift. A year-long campaign made sense in Lower Juba (and the Jubba River offers a natural front), but Jubbaland more than doubles the contested territory and takes Kenya deep into al-Shabaab territory. This strategy risks the failure of Ethiopia’s national offensive. Despite these conditions Kenya is preparing for a large operation, judging by its troop movements. The original battalions of 1,600 men are now estimated between 2,500 and 3,000, with a ceiling as high as 6,000. Two more convoys recently left Garissa, one headed north towards Dhoobley’s crossing and the second towards Hulugho, near the Kilbio crossing.

"We are set for the mother of all the battles,” said the Kenyan source. “It's no longer jet fighters alone that will fight them, we are all moving to hit al Shabaab.”

Such statements hint at a ground offensive up to the towns Chirchir designated for attack. Instead of the northern flank converging on Kismayo after assaulting Afmadow, a reinforced column will likely move towards the Jubba River as the southern flank targets Kismayo. More troops would follow these units to secure the inner territory and push the front northward.

In al-Shabaab’s words, it is "apparent that the operation is not simply an attempt to defend Kenya's territorial boundary as they claimed but rather a clever camouflage for the full-scale invasion of Somalia.”

The group’s fighting tactics will slow Kenya’s advance not by fighting, but by not fighting. Keeping in mind the vagaries of Somalia’s reporting environment, al-Shabaab appears to have undergone a phased response to Kenya’s invasion. The first movements away from camps resulted in a scramble to check their territory. Kismayo residents reported an empty town after al-Shabaab ferried part of its garrison to Afmadow, where Kenyan officials were already hyping a big battle. Located along the Lagh Dera, Afmadow functions as a choke-point to Kismayo and is equally valuable to both sides. al-Shabaab fighters began entrenching themselves as if prepared to do battle, while locals reported fighters in the area’s thick brush, but a fight didn’t immediately develop.

al-Shabaab then began to shift its forces to the border and around Kenya’s columns, employing a harassing campaign instead of serious resistance. This strategy makes sense despite its low frills. Fighting a conventional enemy head on violates the laws of guerrilla warfare, and al-Shabaab is staging pin-prick assaults along Kenya’s border and inside its territory. While conventional forces would attempt to repulse a conventional force at the border, unconventional forces draw their opponent inside their territory seeking a war of attrition. Avoiding Kenyan forces head on is al-Shabaab’s best chance of survival.

Naturally that includes ground and air operations, and Somalia’s airspace is rearranging the battlefield on multiple levels. Those Somalis who initially considered themselves beyond Kenya’s area of operations - residents in Baardheere, Baidoa and Afgoye - now fear an air-strike at any time. These cities were fairly stable despite al-Shabaab’s misrule, and must now decide whether to flee or remain in danger. Kenya will feel the ramifications in the process. Regardless of the final outcome to Kenya’s airstrike in Jilib, its civilian casualties are now rolling around in the minds of Somalis.

Nairobi’s preemptive warning also split al-Shabaab’s forces in towns beyond the Jubba River. Ahmed Nour, a resident of al-Shabaab’s Baidoa stronghold, told Reuters, "I am sure Kenyan jets will fail to know who to bomb or not - the fighters have scattered.”

However al-Shabaab must eventually mount a resistance around the towns under immanent threat: Afmadow and Kismayo. These cities represent al-Shabaab’s real front line, rather than Kenya’s border, and they won’t be abandoned without inflicting a cost on Kenya’s forces. Kismayo residents speak of al-Shabaab arming locals, digging trenches inside the city, and positioning heavy and anti-aircraft guns on the roofs. These measures will decrease the size of al-Shabaab’s targets as its fighters intertwine themselves with civilians. Eritrea’s suspected package of small arms and explosives has also extended Nairobi’s mission time-line, according to local reports.

The group may not put a great effort into holding territory if Kenya is allowed deeper into Somalia, but each battle could take weeks or even months. Clearing operations, Kenya’s stated goal, will demand additional time.

Operation Linda Nchi is beginning to drift and must be regularly corrected to achieve its strategic objectives. While an isolated operation in Lower Juba would leave al-Shabaab free to operate inside the rest of Jubbaland and southern Somalia, such a mission also held the highest probability of success. The 10 months between now and August may be necessary to clear and hold the tip of southern Somalia, let alone the six administrative regions under al-Shabaab control (Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabele).

Unsure of its capabilities to prosecute a regional offensive, Nairobi finds itself in caught in a typical COIN dilemma. Kenyan officials face the awkward decision of going too big or too small.

Around the Revolutionary World

The counter-revolution draws its energy from many fears, primarily the loss of Western/Gulf interests and the rise of Islamic radicalism in government. The first problem cannot be removed from the Arab world’s equation; the second, however, can be reduced in the near-term future. The face of “Islamic democracy” recently underwent a facelift in Tunisia, where the 70-year Rachid Ghannouchi has moved to the forefront of the country’s transition.

"There is some confusion in the West about Islamism," Ennahda's (Renaissance) leader told Reuters after his party’s results were finally tallied. "Some confuse it with fundamentalism and link it to violence, extremism and takfir... We are against trying to impose a particular way of life.”

Tunisia Builds a Lighthouse

Question marks still linger over Ghannouchi’s head. His Nahda party formed in the crucible of Iran’s revolution, resulting in an initial fascination with Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (whose writings inspired Osama bin Laden). Ghannouchi would amend his views around the synchronization of Islam and democracy while exiled under Ben Ali’s government, and returned by voicing full support for Tunisia’s revolutionaries. Ghannouchi and his officials are so concerned with Western opinion that his greater problem could be shifting too far away from Islamic conservatives.

Local suspicions aside, Nahda was rewarded with 41.7% of Tunisia’s assembly vote - 91 out of 217 - giving the party preeminent status within a coalition government. Rather than dramatically alter Tunisia’s political and social environment, Nahda is giving its people what they voted for: universal rights and normality. Unemployment and investigations into the revolution’s human rights abuses sit atop Nahda’s agenda. Paired with the oppositional CPR and Ettakatol, the three groups offer a broad platform of Islamic-infused democracy and secular guarantees. Coalition officials speak in relative unison and have agreed to keep the first article of Tunisia’s current constitution: the country’s language is Arabic and its religion is Islam.

"This is just a description of reality," Ghannouchi said. "It doesn't have any legal implications. There will be no other references to religion in the constitution. We want to provide freedom for the whole country.”

The new constitution is expected to take a year to ratify.

Tunisia’s model is unlikely to work for every active revolution, but it does provide evidence that each country can adapt its local features to a democratic structure. Tunisians believe that Islam and democracy can co-exist just as Western democracies founded themselves on Christianity. CPR and Ettakatol’s officials have both clarified their position to the international community (and Tunisians), explaining that their parties aren’t the “secular” opposite of Nahda’s “conservatism.” CPR leader Moncef Marzouki says he favors an Islamic national identity combined with universal (read:women’s) human rights.

"We can promote these rights without being in an ideological civil war with the conservative part of society."

Abdellatif Abid, an Ettakatol co-founder, added, "We're not secularists as the west conceives of it. We're for the separation of religion and politics, but not of religion and the state."

This relationship appears less likely to manifest in Egypt’s political system, where the Muslim Brotherhood won’t modernize to Nahda’s level. A snap election in Yemen could also allow its Islah party to out-organize the civil protesters. Yet the ongoing synthesis between Islam and democracy - essentially the mass realization that they can co-exist - should limit the influence of “Islamist” factors. New parties offer the ideal vehicle to rearrange a country’s political system without compromising national or religious identities.

"When we establish democracy, we see that it achieves many of these aims," Ghannouchi said of justice and compassion. "Anything that promotes these aims is Islamic, even if it is not called Islamic. That's why we say that Islam and democracy are compatible."

Egyptians Experiencing Déjà vu

Given the long-term trajectory of revolution, Egypt’s current situation doesn’t appear as dire as commonly assessed. Talk of a second revolution against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is certainly overblown: all of these events comprise a singular revolution against Hosni Mubarak’s regime. The SCAF “promised” to hand over power to a civilian government in six months, only to entrench itself for the possibility of two-year transitional period, and Egypt’s Emergency Law remains active. Resistance against these developments is a unified force.

The parliamentary battle to displace the SCAF will be fierce, but Egyptians stand a good chance of following Tunisia’s lead in the long-term. Its popular movement cannot be totally suppressed by brute force or political maneuvering, and the SCAF’s interference will endure sustained resistance so long as the council remains in power. Over 12,000 Egyptians have been arrested and tried before military tribulans since Mubarak’s fall, according to No Military Trials of Civilians.

“All the lawyers we’ve spoken to have said it’s a sham,” said Shahira Abouellail, an activist with in the campaign. “It’s not really a trial. You’re tried by the military. Most of the time you’re tried collectively so there’s like 30 people there and they all get prosecuted together and they all get the same sentence within like five minutes to half an hour.”

Try as it will, the SCAF cannot imprison every Egyptian who refuses to back down. Mubarak’s legacy may continue on the ground, but a new Egypt is rising up through the earth. When Alaa Abd El Fattah was arrested on October 30th, Egyptians rallied international attention to his cause and smuggled his letter to the outside world. His mother, Cairo University professor Laila Soueif, just informed Egypt's prosecutor-general that she is going on a hunger strike until her son is released "from his unjust imprisonment."

The SCAF’s ability to weather Alaa Abd El Fattah’s storm remains doubtful. After Sunday prayers in Tahrir Square, Syrian protesters joined with Egyptians are they chanted “down with Bashar Al-Assad’s rule” and “down with Ali Saleh’s rule.” Needless to say, Egyptians won’t give up on the future of their own country.

Syria’s Rising Tide of War

Unfortunately for those Syrians protesting al-Assad’s brutal regime, eight months of determined resistance have failed to produce Mubarak’s immediate fall or Gaddafi’s eventual demise. With the relatively young al-Assad overseeing a vast security apparatus, Syrians face an improbable uphill climb towards regime change and universal rights. Many remain upbeat despite the high loss of life; the turbulent city of Homs recorded 111 deaths in the last five days of fighting. Oppositional groups speak of food and energy shortages, paramilitaries and their refusal to surrender.

“It’s going to take unbelievable political and social efforts to restore normalcy again to the city after what it’s gone through,” said Fayez Sara, an opposition figure in Damascus. “It’s going to be very hard for us to reach a political solution after this.”

The possibility of an armed revolt is rising in proportion to these decreasing odds. The Arab League’s latest failure to broker a ceasefire surprised few protesters, seeing that the political bloc has applied its breaks to Syria’s revolution. Dialogue between the regime remains out of the question, says Syrian National Council chairman Burhan Ghalioun. With the international community unable to unify around al-Assad - Western capitals have erroneously latched onto the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to “Arabize” their response - the Free Syrian Army is positioning itself for an inevitable revolt.

"We are the future army of the new Syria,” Colonel Riad al-Assad, the SFA’s leading commander, declared from a secure base in Turkey. “We are not in league with any particular sect, religion or political party. We believe in protecting all elements of Syrian society.”

While the risks of armed insurrection pile up quickly, militarized rebellion will counter the risks of non-violent resistance or surrender. al-Assad will only capitulate when a mass of Syrians force him to. The SFA will attract al-Assad’s full wrath in the near-term as he attempts to demonize the opposition, a process similar to Gaddafi and Saleh’s schemes. After protesters are pounded by security forces, reactive oppositional elements are branded as “terrorists” and exploited to pollute the revolution. Fortunately Syrians appear to be traveling Libya’s route instead of Yemen’s; Riad al-Assad hopes to cooperate with the SNC rather than compete with it.

One SNC confirmed “off the table” discussions with the SFA, saying, "Our commitment is, and has always been, peaceful resolution, but our patience has a limit. It depends on the political developments among the Arab League, the Middle East and the International Community... In 10 days we will present a new plan that is to include a military and political strategy. Here the issue of the SFA may well be put on the table."

Foreign Powers Still Rowing Saleh’s Boat

Syrians are clearly aware that their struggle must advance to the next level, and soon. International pressure can only compliment internal pressure, not bring down a regime by itself, and protesters suffer no illusions otherwise. Daniel Glaser, the U.S. Treasury Department's assistant secretary, recently briefed officials in Beirut and Amman on al-Assad’s possible attempts to circumvent Western sanctions.

Western sanctions against Ali Abdullah Saleh are even less promising.

Much like her meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the immediate takeaway from Tawakel Karman’s meeting with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe left much to be desired. Paris’s position is considered more sympathetic than Washington and London’s, and Juppe did tell reporters, “I think asset freezes will be discussed as soon as possible.” However the operative word of “discuss” triggers immediate doubts in the West’s flimsy resolve. Financial and military sanctions against Saleh’s regime should have been implemented months ago, but were obstructed by foreign powers (U.S., Russia) aligned with Saleh’s regime.

Waiting until next week’s EU meeting may be practical, except the delay also highlights the West’s chronic lack of urgency in Yemen. Worse still, Juppe hoped that UN resolution 2014 would open an inquiry “to see if there were any crimes committed that could be taken to an international court.” He still believes the path towards stability starts with the GCC’s unpopular initiative - which grants Saleh’s family immunity from past crimes - and blamed the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) for not uniting properly.

“I am ready to discuss with my European colleagues how to ensure the resolution is implemented, but our action would be more efficient if the (Yemen) opposition was more united.”

In reality Western and Gulf states have abused the JMP as a proxy in their political designs, forcing the group to negotiate with Saleh’s regime and cutting out Yemen’s revolutionaries in the process. Foreign powers have also ignored the autonomous causes of the northern Houthis and Southern Movement, contributing to their alienation from the JMP and its dominate arm, the Islah party. This disunity has aided foreign manipulation of Yemen’s revolution. Protesters wish to remain peaceful despite a saturation of violence, but the international community’s total failure to act in Yemen will partially explain a transition to armed resistance.

Global protesters are monitoring each other’s historical progress, and everyone is determined not to be left behind.

Ali Saleh Will Never Change

On Saturday Ali Abdullah Saleh issued his usual pledge to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative: "We look at the Gulf initiative as an indivisible integrated system.” Yemen’s embattled strongman has good reason to fulfill his promise, as the initiative would keep his party and security commanders in power through a UN-mandated transitional period. Washington and Riyadh also offered him immunity from 33 years of misrule and 10 months of sustained aggression against Yemeni protesters.

Casualty figures are highly disputed, but the death toll is estimated well above 1,000, with countless thousands injured and displaced.

Saleh appears bent on going out in a glaze of “glory” - the stupidity of Mubarak and Gaddafi. Often embedding his promises within rows of accusations against the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Saleh has spared no effort in attempting to implode the GCC’s initiative. When he isn’t refusing to sign in the presence of foreign diplomats, Saleh’s security forces provoke armed JMP elements with the intention of nullifying the GCC’s initiative. His standard claim: the JMP collaborates with al-Qaeda.

“We welcomed the initiative and we appreciate the Gulf brothers for their positive dealing but we are sorry to say it did not fail but it was suspended because the JMP refusal to come to the Republican Palace to sign it.”

Saleh hasn't changed one line of rhetoric since May, when he “agreed” to the GCC’s proposal three times before aborting. In reality he never meant to sign, and the false notion that he “reneged three times” negatively affects Yemen’s revolution to this day. Saleh would “promise” again and again, an obvious stall tactic approved by concerned foreign powers. After designating his vice president to sign in his absence, another shady maneuver backed by Western and Gulf states, Saleh instead returned to Sana’a in September after a three month medical leave in Riyadh. His son, Ahmed, held the throne throughout a brutal summer, and the streets of Sana’a would flow with blood upon his return.

“We are ready and willing to sign at any time,” Saleh claimed as the dust temporarily settled. “But we need to sign the GCC initiative as a whole, and we need timelines for the mechanism of executing it. We are not holding onto power, we are willing to leave power as stated in the agreement, within the days and hours that will be agreed upon.”

That he’s still "supporting" the GCC initiative seven months after its introduction is part of Yemen’s problem, not its solution. Concocted by foreign powers seeking regime alteration, the initiative fails to resolve the situation’s fundamental issues. The GCC would simply leave Saleh’s regime in power to do political battle with the opposition, returning Yemen to its pre-revolutionary position. The mass of Yemen’s protesters seek a new political order devoid of the traditional political elite.

By controlling the GCC’s initiative, Western capitals have encouraged Saleh to hold out for as long as internally possible.

He “commemorated” Eid al-Adha with another scathing attack on Yemen’s opposition: “The current daily escalation and their failure to respond or meet the international community's call that stressed the importance of resolving the Yemeni crisis through a political settlement agreement based on the Gulf initiative are all evidence to their insistence to complicate the crisis and rejection of all initiatives suggested by the good forces in the world keen to preserve the unity, security, and stability of the homeland; namely, the GCC initiative which we have always supported.”

Saleh also claimed to support UN resolution 2014, one of many signs that it favors his regime.

The international reaction to Saleh’s latest actions couldn’t have been more pathetic. With al-Assad attracting criticism from foreign governments and media, Saleh continues to fly under international radar due to his uses. Growing tired of his crying wolf would be understandable if paired with targeted condemnation, but Western diplomats spent the week hyping an agreement by Eid al-Adha. Naturally this false alarm comes with no punishment - because the international community triggered it.

Media headlines are equally misleading. The few media outlets that did submit a basic report ran ridiculous headlines such as “Committed to Gulf transition plan or,” Yemen's Saleh makes Eid plea for peace.” This “plea for peace” was wedged between hostility towards the JMP; two paragraphs support the GCC’s initiative, compared to dozens criticizing the JMP and rejecting Yemen’s revolution. Oppositional warnings date as far back as Saleh’s rhetorical tricks.

"President Saleh has been seeking to drag the military and security forces into full-armed confrontation in a bid to abort the initiative brokered recently by the foreign ministers of the GCC," defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar predicted in April.

A disproportionate amount of attention has been given to Yemen’s tribal conflict with the regime. These factors unquestionable shape the present situation and Yemen’s long-term future, but they also minimize the revolutionary forces at work. Saleh wants the international spotlight - dim as it is - to stay on the opposition and international powers are happy to oblige. His end game remains absolute: drag Yemen’s tribes into manufactured civil war, or else manipulate a snap election.

"We will face the challenge with challenge.. And who wants power, he should turn to the ballot boxes.”

The GCC’s initiative offers a false exit to Yemen’s revolution. A sustainable solution must be internally developed by the youth/civil movement, tribes and regional parties in the north and south (Houthis and Southern Movement). A sustainable solution doesn’t include Saleh’s vice president of 19 years or a “unity” coalition with his ruling party. Unfortunately the Obama administration has hooked onto a calculating madman in Yemen - a man who will never change.

Counter-revolutionary Engine: America’s Double Standard

True to campaign form, the Obama administration has relied upon a rhetorical arsenal to contain the Arab revolutions.

U.S. officials are willing to do and say nearly anything to deflect criticism away from the administration’s response. Under the cover of “universal rights” and “supporting the people,” military councils are propped up, transitional councils are corrupted, and a toxic “dialogue” with murderous regime is peddled in areas of heightened interests. A rolling “concern” is also deployed over friendly regimes, sparing them from harsher condemnation.

Yesterday several journalists decided to call the State Department out.

Hours earlier Bahraini police had opened fire upon the funeral of Ali Hasan al-Dehi, father of Al Wefaq’s deputy-general (Hussein al-Dehi). Nabeel Rajab, head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, reported that Bahraini police blocked roads leading to the Shi'ite district of al-Daih “so people do not take part in the funeral.” When the existing protesters began moving towards Pearl Square, Bahrain’s most coveted battlefield, “security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets, and used police cars to try to run over protesters.”

Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland would “call on everybody to exercise restraint,” as if Bahrain’s peaceful protesters were shooting at their own funeral. Unable to digest this response, one reporter counters, “they’re [the Bahraini government] not exactly heeding your call for restraint,” to which Nuland replies, “We are urging restraint privately. I am urging restraint publicly here today.”

Unfortunately U.S. officials have “urged restraint” in Bahrain for months, without any consequence to King Hamad’s regime. A weapons packaged from the Pentagon would have sailed through the administration if concerned members of Congress didn’t raise an outcry, and no immediate plans exist to move the 5th Fleet’s base in Manama. Not that Bahrain’s opposition wants Washington to relocate Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NSA Bahrain). Its leadership believes that their uprising would receive even less attention without a U.S. military presence.

Another journalist at the State Department agrees: “The feeling in the region is that when it comes to Bahrain, or even to a lesser degree Yemen, there seems to be not as much enthusiasm from the podium of the State Department to really call for an urgent end to this or an urgent change for that and so on. Do you agree with that?”

Nuland naturally disagreed, and “vehemently disagreed” to the assertion that Bahrain “gets a free pass.” She proceeded to argue the usual U.S. line: “we are in support of reform, openness, meeting the needs of the people, and particularly support for the universal human rights of individual citizens.” Nuland then transitioned to Bahrain’s “Independent Commission of Inquiry,” where the administration has kept its focus for the last month. Whenever new abuses are committed, U.S. officials simply respond (if they do respond) that they want to see a transparent investigation of these abuses. However the Ministry of Health already denied allegations that al-Dehi was beaten to death, saying he cut his face after feinting from a heart attack.

"Such actions by Bahraini authorities take place on and on again despite the presence of an inquiry commission in Bahrain," one opposition figure, Matar Matar, told the AFP. "The Bahraini government feels that it has been given international immunity. This is why it continues in this direction."

Demands for political reform (and “Down with Hamad”) are muted in the process.

Denying that a double-standard exist in U.S. foreign policy will only fool so many people, and very few in the hypocritical epicenters of Bahrain and Yemen. Nuland never responds to Yemen’s inclusion, where the Obama administration has systematically ignored a revolution since January; most action occurs behind closed doors. When U.S. officials do confront Ali Abdullah Saleh, they usually put on kid gloves instead of an iron fist. On September 15th Nuland expressed “encouragement” that Ali Abdullah Saleh would sign a power transfer orchestrated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a statement that preceded a massacre in Sana’a.

The GCC’s initiative is widely denounced as a violation of the revolution, but Nuland and other U.S. officials falsely claim that Yemen’s people support it.

The Obama administration also acknowledges that Saleh has repeatedly refused to sign the document, yet patiently waits for him to do so. The latest rumor indicates that Saleh insist on remaining “honorary president” until an election can be held “in weeks,” two giant red flags carried by Western and Gulf states. Saleh’s latest speech sounded identical to his previous speeches: “come back to the dialogue table,” “time-agreed mechanism,” “implementation of the GCC initiative as soon as possible.” Such lies have been pandered to and swallowed by the international community for months.

Saleh demonstrates no intention of authorizing his vice president of 19 years, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, to sign the GCC’s proposal for him. This proxy-arrangement is another red flag anyway. Saleh also employed his usual slander against the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) - the only political party he agrees to negotiate with - in his efforts to invalidate the GCC’s initiative. After accusing “opposition forces” of sabotage and the spreading of terror with al-Qaeda, he promised not to transfer power “if the opposition rebels and their supporters of the defected army continue to wage violence against government institutions and state troops."

While armed oppositional elements of Hashid chief Sadiq al-Ahmar and defected general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar have interfered with Yemen’s popular revolution, they are not responsible for state violence against the protesters. Furthermore, Saleh’s personal units constantly attack oppositional forces in order to draw them deeper into armed conflict, giving him pretext to null a political settlement.

These measures ultimately keep national and international attention on the GCC’s illegitimate proposal. Yemen’s revolutionaries, on the other hand, cannot be fooled by U.S.-Saudi support for his regime.

The contrasting rhetoric used against al-Assad offers further evidence of Washington’s double-standard. When Saleh promises to sign only to backtrack and murder, U.S. officials may voice their concern and urge him to sign the GCC’s initiative. On October 26th Saleh called in Ambassador Gerald Feierstein to assure him of his good intentions, even though his security forces were busy shooting protesters (including women). Nuland’s response: “we haven’t yet tasted a good pudding.” When al-Assad breaks his promises though, U.S. officials flank out for a brute assault.

“We have a long, deep history of broken promises by the Asad regime, and we seem to have that streak unbroken here – or broken again... the President’s made clear that he thinks it’s time for Asad to step aside, that we do not think that he is capable or willing of leading this transition that has to happen in Syria.”

Because of AQAP, the Obama administration considers Saleh to be capable of leading Yemen’s “transition” to his own vice president. This is not the definition of “universal rights,” only Washington’s skewed version, and one of many reasons why China and Russia don’t trust the West. Nuland would address Syria every day of the week compared to Yemen’s single warning - but death tolls shouldn’t matter in a world of universal rights.

Given that the Arab revolutions are over 10 months into their quest for regime change, the U.S. government is unlikely to take full advantage of the situation. The Obama administration believes that it chose a “bold” strategy of “supporting the people,” when the main risk comes with a safe play. U.S. policy continues to hinge on the Middle East’s status quo; this position is already sinking and may stunt U.S. interests in the long-term. By viewing the revolutions through a counter-terrorism lens, America’s double-standard also keeps al-Qaeda’s ideology alive and attractive.

A universal policy - in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria and across the region - would threaten military assets in several countries, but non-military gains may exceed these losses. U.S. foreign policy needs its own revolution.

Museveni Cashes Somali Dividends

As Somalia’s gears of war accelerate by the day, the New York Times recently reported Djibouti's incoming deployment of 850 soldiers. Regional observers immediately linked the battalion to America’s drone base in Djibouti, part of Africa’s ongoing militarized narrative. Djibouti troops will likely find themselves patrolling the vacated spaces left by al-Shabaab’s “tactical” retreat from Mogadishu, but they could theoretically bolster Kenya’s offensive as it stretches south to north.

Military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir listed Afgooye, roughly 15 miles northwest of Mogadishu, as one of nine towns under threat of air attack. AU troops would be needed to complete an effective operation.

Washington’s relationship with Djibouti leads down its own trail, but buried within the NYT report is Ugandan’s more immediate dilemma. President Yoweri Museveni has produced roughly 5,000 of the 9,500 African Union (AU) troops currently operating in Mogadishu; 2,000 more Ugandans are on their way and Museveni has promised up to 20,000 total. He’s even boasted of Uganda’s potential to raise two million men. Museveni wants the credit for stabilizing Somalia, and his 7,000 troops (and counting) render him untouchable to international criticism.

All the West can do is try: “The United States is concerned about Uganda’s deteriorating human rights record. Recently the Ugandan government has failed to respect freedoms of expression, assembly, and the media, as well as its commitment to protect the human rights of all Ugandans.”

On the same day that Amnesty International released its own report on escalating government repression, the State Department issued its latest cautionary memo on Uganda’s “deteriorating human rights record.” Museveni has smothered the opposition’s fledgling resistance - a “walk-to-work” boycott against high commodities prices - through a heavy security presence and liberal application of tear gas. Uganda’s symbolic oppositional leader, Kizza Besigye, was drubbed in February’s election and announced he wouldn’t run again, but he continues to lead the “walk-to-work” drive with injurious consequences. Police have sprayed Besigye’s followers with pink goo, temporarily blinded him with a point-blank spray of tear gas and arrested him over five times.

“To prevent renewed protests in October, police preemptively arrested several dozen opposition and civil society activists and placed opposition leader Kizza Besigye under house arrest,” read the State Department’s statement. “On October 31, police again arrested Besigye for attempting to walk to work. In October, the Ugandan government also urged Parliament to adopt draft legislation severely limiting public meetings of three persons or more. This legislation specifically references meetings where participants discuss government principles, policies, and actions, and appears to target opposition and civil society organizations critical of the government.”

Museveni already finds himself mired in a parliamentary crisis over an oil contract with Tullow Oil. Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa and Internal Affairs Minister Hillary Onek are suspected of receiving bribes from the company, and elements of Museveni’s own National Resistance Movement (NRM) staged a walkout after he ordered them to drop the investigation. Some local media and analysts weigh this internal dispute, coupled with Uganda’s oil and inflation woes (and other turbulence from Europe’s financial crisis), as a greater threat to Museveni’s 26-year rule than his opposition.

That hasn’t stopped Museveni from treating Besigye as more than a nuisance. Although his government belittled Besigye’s weak showing in February and subsequent protests, Museveni is determined to prevent an oppositional uprising before it begins. Local analysts have speculated that Museveni will redouble his efforts after the demise of his close friend, Muammar Gaddafi; rather than confront Uganda’s problems before they mushroom, he intends to crackdown even harder on the minority protest movement.

After Besigye was released from custody, one of his political aide warned that “several youths” had attacked his home. Anne Mugisha claimed that his guards captured one of the assailants, who supposedly confessed to being hired with several other individuals, and blamed the police for orchestrating the attack. Museveni’s government is accused of funding proxy groups - the Kalangala Action Plan and Kiboko squad - to target political figures and suppress urban demonstrations. The Kiboko (cane) squad originated from 2010 riots after a gang of plain-clothed men caned people during the melee. The shadowy unit has been accused of politically targeting Besigye in the past, and is naturally denied by Ugandan officials.

Police spokeswoman Judith Nabakooba argued, "We have no time to hire youths to beat up Besigye. We have our medicine for Besigye and that is preventive arrest.”

While Ugandan police have repeatedly resorted to physical harassment, Nababooba makes a good point that house arrest suits their purpose. That an attack on Besigye’s home followed the lifting of his house arrest and disappearance of security forces is suspicious, but external political opponents presumably wish to do Besigye harm in the name of Museveni or the NRM. However the government’s “legitimized” strategy to prevent large-scale protests is equally deplorable: quarantine the few opposition leaders that exist, arrest their aides and issue time limits for public gatherings. Ugandan police detained Besigye because “they had received intelligence that he and others were set to participate in the walk-to-work protest,” as if they were going to plant a bomb.

His detention was necessary to “avert chaos” and protect Besigye’s life, according to police officials.

Uganda’s economic crisis is unlikely to pass in the near future, leaving its opposition movement to stagger onward with minimal external assistance. Museveni has no intention of changing his tactics for international consumption; he just received 100 U.S. personnel to track down Joseph Koy’s Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the Western-funded AMISOM would collapse in Somalia without his troops. Tamale Mirundi, a spokesman for Museveni, delivered a message to the State Department by denouncing Amnesty International’s “exaggerated” report.

"No one in Uganda is on detention order. There is no political prisoner in Uganda. No journalist is imprisoned in Uganda. What human rights abuse are they talking about?"

One problem Museveni doesn’t need to worry about: international powers looking over his shoulder. He’s in the backseat, not them.

Monitoring the GCC’s Counter-revolution

The GCC is going to need a new shape for its logo

Kings expect immediate results, and the contours of Bahrain’s Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa can be traced around Egypt’s latest political developments. Days after a prospect meeting with Hamad, part of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) expansion campaign, Egyptian Field Mohammed Hussein Tantawi released what appears to be the military council's most unpopular proposal yet. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) stands accused of hoarding power and preserving Hosni Mubarak’s climate of fear.

The SCAF’s new proposal won’t be finalized until an “exhaustive debate is completed,” according to Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Salmy, but Egyptian revolutionaries don’t believe that they’ll be asked to participate.

Egypt’s connected military council

The draft’s present form compromises every phase of Egypt’s revolutionary transition. The military would enjoy immunity from political oversight, possess a veto “over legislation dealing with military affairs,” and be declared the protector of "constitutional legitimacy," wording that encompasses all of Egypt’s affairs. The SCAF also targeted Egypt’s future elections; a parliamentary election is scheduled for the 28th, with a presidential election tentatively delayed until 2013. The SCAF previously ruled that a 100-member committee would be elected from the new parliament to author a constitution, and political groups hoped to put distance between the civil government and SCAF.

Now the SCAF proposes that only 20 members be selected from parliament, with the other 80 chosen by the SCAF and interim Prime Minister’s cabinet. These terms have elicited widespread condemnation across Egypt’s spectrum, from the liberal political parties and civil coalition to the Islamic Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has attracted its own criticisms for cooperating with the SCAF, but now calls “on the people of Egypt to reject the document to protect their rights."

A mass demonstration is scheduled for November 18th.

This schismatic and potential destruction proposal follows an ongoing campaign against high-profile activists. Topping the list of cases is Alaa Abdel-Fattah, arrested after the October 9th clashes between government forces and Christian protesters. Abdel-Fattah accused the military of directly targeting protesters, a claim verified on video, and was finally arrested on October 30th. His charges: inciting the violence of October 9th, damaging military property and assaulting on-duty soldiers. Abdel-Fattah is being held on an indefinite 15-day cycle, although he was able to smuggle a letter to the outside world.

“I never expected to repeat the experience of five years ago: after a revolution that deposed the tyrant, I go back to his jails?”

Egyptian groups have decried Abdel-Fattah’s arrest as a flagrant insult by the SCAF. This imprisonment is designed to send a message that contradicts the SCAF’s rhetoric towards the international community: no one is safe. Activists and protesters continue to be arrested under martial law. State-media also remains corrupted under the SCAF’s watch, a vain attempt to counter Egypt’s widespread use of social media.

"Abd El Fattah's targeting is only the latest example of the systematic targeting of journalists, media figures, bloggers and activists by SCAF [the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]," said the 'No to Military Trials' group in a statement. "As of today we refuse to co-operate with the military prosecution of civilians and we call on all Egyptian citizens to stand with us... This is not the new Egypt we have fought and died for."

This may not be the Egypt that Washington envisioned post-Mubarak, but the Obama administration hasn’t done much to change its trajectory. Instead of fully backing the revolutionaries, U.S. officials maintain close contact with the SCAF in order to slow Egypt’s transition, and offer financial loans to further entrench Western influence. President Barack Obama exchanged pleasantries with Tantawi less than a week before Abdel-Fattah was arrested: “He welcomed Egypt’s willingness to accept international election witnesses and urged that Egypt lift the emergency law and end military trials for civilians.”

Although Abdel-Fattah's appeal was rejected earlier today, Ambassador William Taylor had nothing but positive things to say about the SCAF.

Given the SCAF’s interaction with Washington and the GCC, Tantawi’s circle of generals aren’t alone in corrupting Egypt’s revolution. The Saudis seek their own favorable endgame and have enlisted GCC members to coordinate with Tantawi. The White House is so obsessed with controlling the Arab revolutions that it appointed a Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions - a “cleaner,” in other words. Taylor proceeded to scrub the SCAF by claiming “they have a well-established timeframe.” Confronted by spiking doubts over the SCAF, he picked a bad day to insist that the military wants out “of the governing business.”

“I had a long discussion with many Egyptians while I was there, including with the SCAF. Had three major generals sitting there on the other side of the table. They were at pains to emphasize how eager they were not to be governing. They were – they wanted to make it very clear to this American sitting on the other side of the table that they didn’t like the governing business.”

A follow-up question asked, “Did they tell you what you want to hear?” to which Taylor replied, “Some would say they’re not doing a great job of it. But I think they recognize that they’ve got these problems.”

Such is the intense U.S. pressure applied to Egypt’s ruling military council.

New day, same scam in Syria

Russian officials basked in Abu Dubai’s sun after arriving for the first GCC-Russian dialogue. Among many priorities on their plate: obstructing Syria’s revolutionaries. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov insisted that a GCC proposal would model itself on Yemen’s unpopular initiative, an automatic warning to Syrians. For now a competing proposal from the Arab League’s mirrors the GCC’s terms, calling for an end to violence and “inclusive dialogue” with a murderous regime.

These types of proposals mean death the revolutionaries.

“Nothing has changed,” said Iyad Shurbaji, a Syrian journalist in Damascus and a critic of the government. “Excessive violence has increased, tanks are still in the streets and not even one barricade has been removed.” He added: “The regime has no intention of carrying out the initiative. It is trying to buy time, betting on time to crush the uprising in attempt to create new facts on the ground, then negotiate from a strong position.”

Interestingly, the White House is flowing with the Arab League’s proposal in order to dilute the revolution. In fact the State Department’s Victoria Nuland explicitly stated, “their goals are the same as ours... So we encouraged – as we did with the GCC in Yemen, we encouraged the neighbors to do what they can. Their objectives are the same as ours.” This line of thinking contradicts Washington’s alleged support for Syria’s revolutionaries, since any proposal based around Yemen’s will result in similar consequences for Syria’s popular movement.

U.S. pressure on Saleh and al-Assad appears to be night and day; Nuland told reporters that al-Assad’s regime “has a long, deep, and continued history of broken promises and it has significant blood on its hands... we have not seen any evidence that the Asad regime intends to live up to the commitments that it’s made.” Saleh’s exact same pattern is then ignored. Nuland would only tell reporters on Tuesday, “The agreement calls for him to step down, but so far we haven’t seen the results of that.” Reminded that people are dying in the meantime, Nuland simply responds that “it’s very much a matter of concern.”

Ultimately Washington may be willing to accept regime alternation in both countries.

Lounging under the GCC’s umbrella

Shortly after President Barack Obama formally announced America’s withdrawal from Iraq, Hillary Clinton puffed out her chest and issued an odd warning to Iran. As if Tehran was blind, the Secretary of State told CNN that Iranian officials shouldn’t misread America’s departure from Iraq. U.S. officials have done everything in their power to counter impressions that Washington is withdrawing out of weakness, with unfavorable results. And Clinton doesn’t need to remind Tehran, “the United States is very present in the region.”

Iranian officials must have welcomed this self-admitted imperialism with glee. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also told CNN, “What are the American bases doing in our region? During the current year they made military contract amounting to $90 billion with the countries of the region. We have no problems of the people of the United States, we love them. We have problems with the government of the United States.”

The Obama administration's “new” strategy in the Gulf, which has been fomenting for years, calls for increased military cooperation with the GCC. According to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s count, 23,000 American troops are already stationed in Kuwait, with 7,500 in Qatar, 5,000 in Bahrain and almost 3,000 in the United Arab Emirates. Some of the remaining 39,000 redeploying from Iraq will join them. As U.S. and Gulf officials laud their improving relations and mutual interests, Arab revolutionaries and concerned citizens fear that “containing Iran” includes themselves. Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has now added his voice to equation, telling Al-Arabiya TV, "The American occupation will stay in Iraq under different names.”

"America is not only occupying Iraq but also other Islamic countries," he said. "Occupying Iraq means occupying what is around Iraq, and then to control the Middle East."

al-Sadr’s comments will be swiftly rejected and discarded by U.S. officials, but he speaks the truth on U.S.-GCC relations. Beyond containing Iran through the Gulf’s militarization, regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria have been marked for preservation. Those protesters trying create a new Middle East must overcome a massive counter-revolution that aims for regional hegemony. Clinton told CNN’s “State of the Union” that “no one, most particularly Iran, should miscalculate about our continuing commitment to and with the Iraqis going forward.”

Nor should anyone miscalculate Washington and Riyadh’s commitment to undermining the Arab revolutions.

Beware of Double-Sided Yemeni Analysis

Since we criticized Christopher Boucek’s outlook on Yemen’s revolution just four days ago, it seems appropriate to comment on his untimely passing at 38. The emerging eulogy within Washington’s Yemeni-analyst ring has rightfully mourned Christopher Boucek as a man, while simultaneously praising his deep knowledge and “love” of Yemen. Boucek knew his way around Yemen’s topography and history, and to his credit made its broken economy a focus of his studies.

Evidence that he understood the whole of Yemen’s revolution is scarcer.

Boucek’s death automatically triggered the same group think that surrounded the last 10 months of his analysis. Most established U.S. analysts on Yemen have reacted by wondering why Washington didn’t listen to his wise advice (which we’ve collected), when key parts of his reports were put to use. The military-economic divide in U.S. aid remains intact, but Boucek tacitly sided with the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) proposal since it was introduced in April. His entire argument is based around the tragic reality that Ali Abdullah Saleh will “drag on,” but eventually agree to a political settlement. Boucek’s media statements and Carnegie reports vary between echoing the U.S. line and directly mimicking U.S./EU diplomats advocating a negotiated settlement.

“Perhaps the most basic error of the international community is to describe what is happening in Yemen as a political crisis and not a revolution,” Takawel Karman, Yemen’s leading female activist and Nobel laureate, wrote in The Guardian. “The Yemenis insist it is – not by words only, but with their blood, which the regime continues to shed.”

Boucek placed himself in the box of “political crisis.” Instead of condemning Saleh’s murderous actions or the West’s duplicitous diplomacy, he made excuses for why Saleh won’t sign or why Washington still needs him. Boucek manipulates a valid concern - “the Americans probably don’t have as much influence as they would like” - into a means of control. By minimizing the level of influence Washington holds over Saleh, Boucek undersold the pressure that the Obama administration could exert if it truly sided with Yemen’s protesters. This makes sense in his mind because the revolutionaries were nearly irrelevant.

“Then there are protesters we see out on the streets, oftentimes referred to as youth protesters,” he told PBS’s NewsHour in April. “However, I think the youth protesters are probably a small subset of the overall protesters that we see in the streets... And in whatever settlement it is that brings this drama to a conclusion, most likely, it will be the youth, that segment of the protesters that will lose out.”

A realistic possibility, to be sure, but Boucek consistently spoke as though he’s unconcerned with this outcome. Yemen’s revolutionaries are also more representative that he credits them for, and Boucek was willing to ring al-Qaeda’s alarm without providing context to Saleh’s plot in southern Yemen.

"The operating space for al-Qaeda is getting bigger and bigger," journalist Jim Lobe quoted him as saying in June. "As the state's authority recedes, the space for al-Qaeda to plot, plan, and mount operations is getting larger."

Warnings of AQAP exceeded his warnings of U.S. policy, a primary source of AQAP’s growth: "They have the capacity to mount attacks against American interests. They've said they'll do it again and the bigger the space that (the group) has to plan and mount operations against international targets, the more dangerous they become. A failed state right next to the world's biggest oil producer is bad."

Boucek also believed that Saleh’s rule was “likely over” after his assassination attempt in June, when this outcome was completely up in the air. Many Yemenis and observers (including ourselves) expected an eventual return and weren’t shocked when he landed in Sanaa’s bloodbath.

Unfortunately for Yemenis, Boucek’s economic warnings shielded an approval of U.S. military support to Saleh’s regime. Military operations were further concealed by false objections to drone strikes and calls for a “balanced approach.” Washington has followed his latest advice, forcing a negotiated settlement on Yemen’s revolutionaries by manipulating a disjointed, power hungry opposition. He may have been a generous man and sincere student of Yemen’s history, but Boucek’s own words highlight his stance towards its revolution:

“Success breeds success. The killing of Awlaki helps Washington encourage Yemen to go after the other wanted terrorists. The American administration’s thinking on Yemen is much more mature than many people give it credit for, with Washington looking to find ways to make this situation work to America’s advantage...

The Yemeni government argues that a transition process needs to be lawful and legitimate - otherwise they say it would be a coup. No matter what you think about the Yemeni government, President Saleh is the legitimately elected leader. Simply throwing him out right now without any sort of plan for what would come next could make matters worse.”

Apparently legitimately elected leaders can murder “their people” without consequence and drive “their state” into the ground. Boucek’s rhetoric remained twisted to the end, as dozens of protesters (including children) have been killed in the 12 days since the UN Security Council stamped the GCC’s initiative. Yemen revolutionary opposes a transitional plan, but they want this plan to represent their unconditional interests - not Washington, Riyadh and Saleh’s.

Boucek's last report was paraphrased by the regime-friendly Yemeni Observer: "US expert stresses managed power transition and early election in Yemen."

GCC Forms Tip of Counter-Revolutionary Spear

“Strength in numbers.”

All participants of war - both superpowers and asymmetric actors - confront this ancient maxim, drawn directly from nature and the herd instinct. Conflicts are partially determined by numerical ratios and an opponent’s adaption to an unfavorable ratio. Being its own type of war, revolutionary war doesn’t get much more basic than mass strength, which is a prerequisite for asymmetric protesters.

As a natural principle, counter-revolutionary forces attempt to make equal use of numerical strength in order to overwhelm their opponents. Sufficient popular support is often unavailable, so the military gap between regime and revolutionary forces is exploited to close the distance. Threatened regimes rarely act in isolation, instead turning to their sympathetic allies abroad to out-mass a local uprising. This fundamental reaction is unfolding throughout the Arab revolutions, particularly beneath the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) expanding umbrella. GCC states would presumably beg to differ, but the political bloc only takes orders from one source: Riyadh.

The GCC’s corrupt decision-making has yielded numerous attempts to obstruct regime change in the Middle East. Now the bloc is engaging in retroactive regime alteration, moving into Egypt with a naked attempt to influence its uprising. On Monday Bahrain’s King Hamad Bin Eisa Al Khalifa met with Field Marshal Mohamed Hussain Tantawi - a meeting surely opposed by Egypt and Bahrain’s oppositions - as Bahraini officials drummed up support in the Gulf media. Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, was quoted as saying, “Egypt should top the names of the countries keen on joining the GCC.”

Translation: Saudi Arabia is keen to politically interfere with Egypt’s ongoing revolution.

Al Khalifa added that his government “strongly” supports Egypt’s membership into the GCC, “especially after Jordan and Morocco said they wanted to join.” Over 3,000 miles away, Moroccans have engaged in their own demonstrations for greater representative and political freedoms, with negligible results. Security forces have persistently cracked down on the February 20th movement, and one Reuters reporter “saw dozens of riot police with truncheons beating and kicking protesters who had gathered in front of the parliament building” in Rabat. Protesters are calling for a boycott to the parliamentary election scheduled for November 25th, a scenario that mirrors the position of Bahrain’s opposition.

Egypt’s potential inclusion highlights the GCC’s monarchic structure just as Morocco and Jordan reinforce it. Monarchies tend to cooperate smoothly given their mutual interests and style of governance, and often lack the inhibitions of democratic states. The GCC’s influence in Jordan paid immediate dividends in Bahrain after King Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein added troops to Riyadh’s “Peninsula Shield.”

Although the GCC has attempted to maintain stability inside and outside its own borders, counterproductive developments often follow its interference. Bahrain’s uprising intensified after Saudi troops deployed on March 15th and protesters show no sign of quiting; the GCC’s deployment to protect itself contributed to the opposition’s momentum and media campaign. The same pattern has unfolded in Yemen, where Riyadh and Washington are trying to manipulate the revolution’s outcome through the GCC’s dreaded initiative.

Due to the fact that Yemen isn’t an official member, the UN Security Council was eventually summoned to ratify the document under international law.

The majority of Yemen’s protesters reject the GCC initiative as a foreign usurpation of their cause. Not only does it grant Ali Saleh immunity for his countless human rights abuses, the GCC initiative would transfer power to his vice president and preserve his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) for a future election. The Obama administration has teamed the Saudi-bankrolled GCC to smother Yemen’s revolutionaries, and all the State Department can do is repeat Saleh’s “promise” to sign the initiative - and urge greater coordination with the GCC. This disturbing development is under renewed focus as Washington plans to withdraw from Iraq in December.

The GPC has since floated Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi as its candidate. Were he to actually run, the GCC would successfully oversee a flagrant hijacking of an Arab revolution.

U.S. officials, notably Secretaries Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta, make no attempt to hide the Obama administration's gung-ho attitude towards the GCC’s involvement. During the briefing for their mini-summit in September, U.S. officials spoke as though the GCC has contributed to stability throughout the region, when they are mostly thinking in terms of Iran. The GCC also followed the U.S. line on Libya, for which it was commended. One official opened by telling reporters, “The GCC is emerging as an increasingly critical partner to advancing our common interest, which include but also extend beyond this shared vision for regional security on issues from Libya to Yemen to Syria...”

U.S. officials sound no different from Russian officials who are busy cozying up to the GCC: “If I could sum up, I would just say that tomorrow’s meeting will be continuing to put the GCC at the heart of the regional – of the region’s security architecture, and in fact, starting to formalize how we work together between the United States and the GCC.”

Two can play any game and the first ministerial meeting of the GCC-Russian Strategic Dialogue is nearly complete. Among other developments, Bahraini Foreign Affairs Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa affirmed Russia’s support for the government's “dialogue.” UAE Foreign Minister Shaikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan also rejected Western intervention in Syria by literally stating the GCC’s MO: “We want to help the Syrian brothers under the Arab umbrella." The GCC’s initiative in Yemen is so counter-revolutionary that Russia adopted some of its premise in Syria.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters in Abu Dhabi, "The Russian position has been embodied in the Security Council resolution on Yemen adopted a few days ago unanimously. This resolution was based on the GCC initiative which provides for the need of the government and the opposition to sit down and agree upon a deal which would resolve the current crisis. It's a fair deal, it's a fair initiative, an initiative which is being implemented these days.”

Russia is now demanding a “Syrian-led inclusive dialogue in which all responsible Syrian groups must participate,” a process identical to Yemen and Bahrain’s sham dialogues. Whether the West rejects the exact terms it drew up for friendly regimes remains to be seen, but a potential conflict of interests is brewing between Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Those who side with counter-revolutionary forces will eventually end up on the same side.

GCC states are nothing more than moons to Saudi Arabia’s planet. Its encroachment in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain is overtly designed to prevent regime change and control any ensuing political transitions. Combined with Washington’s hegemony, Saudi Arabia’s influence forms the main turbine of counter-revolutionary energy.

They see rain where many protesters see their first rays of sun, and are determined to cast their umbrella as far as possible.

Two Sides of Kenya’s COIN

The smoke and dust cloud has, for the moment, cleared around Jilib, Somalia. Left in the crater of Kenya’s air-strike are new questions and concerns over Operation Linda Nchi’s territorial scope, military resources and time-line. Kenyan officials are trying to maintain control of Somalia’s information sphere through briefings and social media, and Major Emmanuel Chirchir gave a plausible explanation to Monday’s air raid on an IDP camp.

“The incident at the IDP camp developed following enemy actions in the area,” he says. “Upon the aerial attack, an Al-Shabaab driver drove off a technical battle wagon mounted with an anti-aircraft gun towards the IDP camp. The wagon was on fire and laden with explosives. It exploded at the camp, causing the reported deaths and injuries.”

This explanation won’t satisfy every local resident though. War-weary Somalis are used to all sides misfiring and Kenya doesn’t enjoy a wide margin of error. Witnesses claim that at least one air-strike hit near the IDP camp, and an investigation must follow in accordance with Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s promise. Odinga chose the correct rhetoric to defend Operation Linda Nchi, telling reporters, "If there is any death that has occurred as a result of the military operation, it will be investigated thoroughly. It is not our intention to kill innocent civilians.”

A conclusive, neutral investigation now influences Kenya’s advancing columns in the south. Nairobi is leaning on air-strikes to soften al-Shabaab’s targets and counter the slow ground conditions, and local confidence cannot be lost in the middle of these forces. Fear has spiked now that Chirchi advised the populations of nine towns (on Twitter) to take cover and distance themselves from al-Shabaab: Baidoa, Baardheere, Dinsor, Afgoye, Buale, Baraawe, Jilib, Kismayo and Afmadow.

"We're not attacking towns - I want to make that clear - we're attacking al-Shabab camps - all we're saying is that people in Somalia, [should] avoid being close to al-Shabab camps," he told the BBC's Focus on Africa.

Kenyan officials and commanders are visibly aware that civilian casualties could sabotage their own mission. While Operation Linda Nchi’s media campaign has been criticized locally for a lack of government updates and reporters in the field, Kenyan and Somali officials are actively engaging the battlefield’s information sphere. They understand the impact of military and propaganda damage, but they must stay hyper-vigilant against the reality that insurgencies can rapidly destabilize.

Some of Jilib’s damage cannot be repaired and the dead cannot be revived. Even if local medical officials confirm Nairobi's version of the attack, lingering doubts may persist over the practicality of Kenya’s operation. The air raid triggered a protest down Jilib’s main streets and less-supportive Somalis could be thinking that Nairobi bit off more than it can chew. COIN theory assumes that the insurgent and government populations are the minorities, and aims for the fence-sitters in the hopes of affecting all segments of the population. Winning or losing the undecided majority is vital to Kenya’s operation.

"Kenya has no imperialistic intention of staying longer in Somalia or annexing any part of Somalia,” said Odinga. “We want to see a united, liberated strong Somalia to join the East African Community.”

Nonetheless, suspicions that Kenya seeks a buffer zone between its border refuse to die out; Nairobi’s emphasis on the issue serves as evidence. Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali spent the last two days hashing out southern Somalia’s authority with Kenyan officials, patching up the hole caused by President Sharif Ahmed’s half-rejection of Operation Linda Nchi. Ahmed reportedly fears that Kenyan troops will leave Jubbaland under a proxy administration instead of the TFG’s authority. Nairobi assured Abdiweli that his government has no reason to fear this scenario, but officials do interchange Jubbaland with Somalia.

"Our joint forces have liberated a large portion of Jubaland are now assisting the civilian population to set up local administrative units,” said Odinga. “The towns that have been captured are now being put under civilian administration.”

The new towns under air-raid warning tell a story of their own. In line with Sharif’s suspicions, the initial target zone of Lower Jubba is tangibly ballooning up the Jubba River. Anything less than total cooperation between Sharif and Nairobi will destabilize the ground campaign. Of potentially greater significance, Kenya’s troop and time demands will rise in proportion to the increase in territory. Moving the front-line to Baraawe, a port over 100 miles north of Kismayo, and up the Jubba River to Buale and Baardheere will more than double the size of Lower Jubba’s area. Expanding operations to Baidoa, al-Shabaab’s primary stronghold in the south, would triple the area.

Afgoye is located roughly 20 miles outside of Mogadishu - over 300 miles north of Kismayo.

This massive increase in territory will necessitate more Kenyan resources. Feasible rumors have pegged its current force at 2,500 (three battalions of 800 men, plus police units) and Kenyan officials recently appealed to NATO and other international powers. The level of foreign assistance has remained a mystery throughout Operation Linda Nchi due to Western sensitivities, but a naval force around Kismayo is the natural starting point. Air surveillance could eventually give way to strikes - if they haven’t already. Whatever the plan, Odinga and Abdiweli briefed representatives of the U.S., Canada, EU, Turkey, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt.

al-Shabaab will also turn to outside support in order to repel a larger assault than anticipated. Kenyan military officials claim to possess reliable information that two Eritrean planes delivered a shipment of arms to Baidoa.

Beyond spreading its own resources too thin, Kenya risks conflating its operation by increasing the odds of error. Isolated air operations aren’t suitable for counterinsurgency, forcing Kenyan troops to follow their warplanes into Baardheere and Baidoa (TFG troops cannot fight independently). Otherwise air-strikes will result in dead al-Shabaab, civilian collateral and no gained territory. Only Afgoye can be realistically assaulted by AU forces in the immediate future, leaving the other cities to soak up Kenyan troops. Lower Juba’s relatively small area provided a realistic containment zone, whereas controlling all of Jubbaland could require years of operations.

That Somalia’s government and neighbors have decided to eliminate al-Shabaab throughout its territory is both noble and potentially reckless; August 2012’s election deadline will come too soon to liberate southern Somalia. Ethiopia could be summoned directly into the fight and ultimately poison Kenya’s credibility.

Kenyan officials must deeply consider whether their objectives match their time-line. If deployed according to COIN principles, Operation Linda Nchi could produce results within the Lower Juba region and along Kenya’s border. Expanding the target area to Jubbaland and beyond necessitates full cooperation with Mogadishu and the African Union (AU), or else the mission stands a high chance of collapsing under its own weight. As Nairobi attempts to accumulate enough good to cancel out the bad, it must concentrate on preventing the ugly from occurring.

U.S. Twisting Afghanistan’s Netwar

Some vanish in the explosion. Others feel the numbing sting of shrapnel. As singular nerves in an insurgency, their pain and absence amplifies throughout the intricate network stretching from Kabul to Washington. Unfortunate pawns caught up in Afghanistan’s cycle of violence, those civilians who perish in U.S. and Taliban attacks trigger the main reaction in an insurgency: the politico-information battle.

U.S., NATO and Afghan forces have yet to put an end to the Taliban’s “spectacular” attacks in urban areas. On Saturday a suicide bomber recruited from Europe drove his vehicle into a NATO convoy traveling in Kabul, killing four American soldiers and five civilian employees, a Canadian soldier, two British civilians, one Kosovo national, an Afghan police officer and three Afghan civilians. A second truck of explosives ran into a UN compound in Kandahar, killing at least three employees of the U.N. Refugee Agency, two Afghan civilians and an Afghan National Police officer. This attack followed a militant raid on the US-run Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) office in Kandahar.

The overall message was clear: the Taliban can strike anywhere in Afghanistan’s major population centers.

Evolution of a “high profile” attack

However commanders have developed a rhetorical response to these strikes, now specifically labeled as “high-profile.” Numerous U.S. and NATO officials will deploy to contain the information blast-site and attempt to black out the Taliban’s narrative. According to ISAF spokesman Brig. Gen. Cartsen Jacobsen, “We see less and less capability to actually face us, so there’s an increased use of I.E.D.’s and assassinations, and we can call them spectacular attacks, attacks that are simply laid on to make it a big story in the media.”

Another coalition official described Kabul’s bombing as an "act of desperation,” insisting that “all of these attacks by the insurgents in the last few months have not accomplished anything military or strategic."

U.S. and NATO information operations (IO) have produced mixed results. Apathy plays a role in the Obama administration's relative freedom to act, and low poll figures haven’t stopped him from extending his time-lines without a domestic response. Surge reinforcements (many of them support personnel) began to withdraw after summer - and after his supposed July deadline - in order to extend the fighting season. The rest of President Barack Obama’s surge received another summer to “take the fight to the Taliban,” and will likely overstay their time-line as well. Meanwhile perceptions of instability have risen or remains stagnant in many areas of Afghanistan.

The West’s response to the Taliban’s PR campaign operates on a minimum of three levels. One of the Pentagon’s ongoing goals is to dumb down the Taliban’s intellect, simultaneously crediting and discrediting its fighting ability. General Jacobson, for example, said the Taliban was adapting to losing its territorial dominance in the south, a truism that tacitly accepts their evolution as a guerrilla unit. He added that coalition officials were still working to determine whether the Taliban bomber had intel on his target, as a spokesman subsequently claimed.

“This could be a target of opportunity or a planned attack,” the general said. “We will have to find out. It might turn out that he just had a stroke of luck.”

These types of statements eat away at the Taliban’s sophistication, with the ultimate purpose of minimizing their influence in Afghanistan. Attacks in Kabul aren’t a sign of prolonged insecurity or the Taliban’s infiltration, but the last resort of a crumbling insurgency. The Taliban’s new campaign does indicate a relative weakening in the group’s lower and middle networks - and a high level of intelligence and information operations. Furthermore, conventionally battling a numerically/technologically superior force is the last strategy an insurgency should adopt. Guerrillas shouldn’t fight for territory that they can’t hold, as this approach quickly reduces their force levels and, most importantly, shortens the occupier’s time-line.

The Taliban has accomplished a strategic goal; many Afghans and international observers believe that U.S. forces are permanently stalemated. The group was responsible for thousands of Afghan deaths and has killed 382 U.S. soldiers in 2011, compared to 499 in 2010. Their annual total won’t be significantly lower than the previous year, and eclipses 2009’s total of 317 casualties. Assassinations have also eliminated key political leaders such as Hamid Karzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani. Afghanistan's political and economic rehabilitation remains behind U.S. schedule, a problem actively concealed by heightened military operations.

The combined effect of these developments will distort the West’s 2014 time-line.

Western counteroffensive targets Haqqanis

Because of the threat to U.S. troops and Washington’s overall strategy (and domestic support), the Obama administration is attempting to physically isolate the Haqqani network on all fronts. First, U.S. forces are beginning to shift from Kandahar and Helmand to the eastern provinces, where military officials claimed the lives of several hundred Taliban over a series of battles. Dozens of suspected “Haqqani” fighters were included in the death toll, as though they were foreign to the Taliban. The eastern campaign will likely dominate the 2012 fighting season.

While U.S. and Afghan forces probe their way along the Durland Line, the Obama administration will maintain its blistering pressure on Islamabad to assist in some form. Hyping the Haqqani’s connections to Pakistan serves dual purposes: drive up attention and justify military action in North Waziristan (whether drone strikes, ground incursions or helicopter raids) and remove the burden from U.S. strategy. If only Pakistan obeyed Washington’s commands and cut all of its ties with the Taliban, America’s mission would have already succeeded in Afghanistan.

The argument could persuade many Americans and Afghans by covering up Washington’s self-inflicted wounds.

U.S. and NATO officials have yet to firmly blame the Haqqanis for Saturday’s bombing, but high-ranking Afghan officials claim to possess intelligence on several operatives. The general theme paints a desperate network retaliating against the coalition’s recent operations, even though the Haqqanis possess additional motivation. For the last nine months U.S. officials have cautiously declared victory in southern Afghanistan. Secretaries Leon Panetta and Hillary Clinton speak as though Obama’s surge accomplished every goal, that Afghanistan is unequivocally improving, that the Taliban lost its momentum.

The insurgency has every reason to attack Kabul, not just one or two.

What’s striking is how built-in the concept of a network is to the Haqqanis, only for U.S. officials to market it as something foreign from Afghanistan. The Haqqanis couldn’t be any closer to Mullah Omar’s inner circle; Jalaluddin joined his movement during the initial uprising. These men are godfathers of Afghanistan’s resistance, bonded to the end of occupation, and their networks frequently join to assert control over Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A simplistically complex relationship connects the Haqqanis to the Taliban’s main shura; Omar’s fighters weather the U.S. storm in Afghanistan's fields and leave the Haqqanis to plot attacks in nearby Kabul. According to one senior U.S. official, at least 11 of about 15 major attacks in the capital this year can be blamed “on the Haqqanis.”

They argue that the Taliban “doesn’t have the means” to stage these sophisticated attacks, and it doesn’t need them. It already has them.

Washington’s isolation campaign has no basis in COIN except to understand each sub-network’s function. The West’s narrative is designed to smother any counter-argument without making a point beyond the Haqqanis’ destruction. Neither Mullah Omar nor the Haqqanis will stop fighting if Islamabad orders them to stand down, and will only reconsider if Pakistani officials deliver a sweet deal from Washington. Islamabad can only “bring them to the table,” not force Taliban leaders to sign. One Pakistani official told TIME, "If you set down conditions, they'll tell us to go take a hike. They'll say that the U.S. is not winning in the field and so they're not interested."

The New York Times surmised this dilemma in a recent report: “the United States is in the position of having to rely heavily on the ISI to help broker a deal with the same group of militants that leaders in Washington say the spy agency is financing and supporting.”

Apparently deeming Mullah Omar as necessary to the image of reconciliation, the Obama administration's plan calls to eliminate the Haqqanis’ area of the network. The Pakistani official added, “We have leverage [when it comes to the Haqqani network], and they wanted to neutralize that leverage." The White House and Pentagon have displayed no sincere indicators of a negotiated solution with the Taliban, an outcome that screens a prolonged military surge. Washington’s strategic objective remains the Taliban’s conditional surrender, not a political agreement between Kabul, Islamabad and the Taliban. Perhaps Mullah Omar has been deemed too sensitive (despite rumors of a CIA hunt inside Pakistan), so the U.S. will unilaterally target the Haqqanis before finally turning to Omar himself.

This strategy won’t produce the desired effect of capitulation. Regional analysts already fear that U.S. drone strikes hardened a new core of recruits and replaced national commanders with transnational operatives. Some believe that drone strikes empowered the Haqqani network’s position in the region. Western governments continue to misunderstand Afghanistan's other networks, such as the ongoing Pashtun/Tajik divide in the military and police, and the use of tribal militias or warlords as temporarily proxies.

Dividing the Taliban’s network won’t lead to its conquest - its network was constructed to be divided.