Israel's Counterproductive Spin Machine

Sharing a boat as they float through the Middle East’s ongoing transformation, Israel has faced the same crunch-time decision as America - ride the movement out in front or try to decelerate it from behind. While U.S. officials mix selective optimism with silence in an attempt to slow revolutions to a manageable speed, Israel has gone virtually silent as the region flips beneath it. A common concern in Washington is that two months just undid 20 years of counter-terrorism policies.

Israel suffers from the same anxiety.

These worries notwithstanding, the isolated allies also enjoy an equal opportunity to reverse course and support a field of democratic movements. They did, after all, inspire the oppressed to rise up by suppressing them, and most peoples haven’t outright rejected U.S. involvement. Contrary to the notion that America should "keep it about them," a defense adopted by some Washington pundits to excuse President Barack Obama’s sluggish and impersonal response, protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen call for varying levels of U.S. assistance. Arguing that America can’t interfere ignores the reality that Washington already interferes; inaction is impossible when supporting the current regime in power.

Although the opportunity hasn’t been fully exploited, revolution in the Middle East now offers America a chance to paint a new image of itself for the 21st century, one that aligns with its democratic heritage.

Israel finds itself in a similar "sink or swim" position. Blamed for much of the repression in Egypt, it too stood to gain by reforming its policy towards the Palestinians. Officials claimed to realize the opportunity to lock Hamas, Syria, and Iran outside of a pure democratic uprising. Israel’s ongoing silence, however, has been attributed to fear of all change. Considered a key instigator in the region, Israel possessed no alternative to getting out of the way, which in turn drove a feverish strategy to mitigate revisions to the Middle East’s status quo.

And now, instead of alleviating its political and security concerns, Israeli leadership just dug themselves into a deeper hole by playing the endangered “terror” card. Doesn’t look like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu learned much from Hosni Mubarak’s demise.

Rather than wield Muslim revolution as proof of Israel’s need to reach an equitable solution with the Palestinians, Netanyahu has hyped the uncertainty of democracy into his new bogeyman. Instead of announcing his intent to negotiate fairly, Netanyahu overlooked the Jordan Valley and declared, "Our security border is here, on the Jordan River. In any future situation, in any future arrangement, the Israeli Defense Force must stay here. If this was true before the major unrest shaking the Middle East, it is doubly true today."

Netanyahu’s statements apparently form part of the “peace initiative” he’s developed, one set to offer a provisional state with 60% of the West Bank, temporary borders, and a neighboring Israeli army. This “initiative” has already been rejected by the Palestinians, fearing that a “provisional" state could become permanent after failing to reach agreements on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.

Nabil Abu Rdeneh, an aide to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, insists, "Israel is making a big mistake if it believes that it can keep our land forever. Israeli policy that tries to wriggle out of the two state solution will keep the region in an endless state of conflict."

Like his demand for troops on the Jordan River, Netanyahu’s brashness is nothing new. Neither is his poor spin. That’s left Defense Minister Ehud Barak to attempt a softer spin, explaining to The Wall Street Journal, "It's a historic earthquake... a movement in the right direction, quite inspired. It's a movement of the Arab societies toward modernity."

Except Netanyahu’s fundamental contradictions shine through. During February meetings with U.S. officials, four months removed from the latest collapse in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Barak warned that Israel couldn’t seek new pledges of military aid without making a “daring” peace offer. Without the slightest indication of change, Israel is now exploiting its “insecurity” to extract additional demands from the Palestinians and Washington. A provisional state is suddenly “daring” enough, and now Barak needs “help dealing with potential threats arising from the turmoil in the Arab world.”

He then cites an Egyptian official who recently told him, "We're going to have a really open election... Civic parties will hire advisers from the US and Europe and find immediately that what can bring them voters is hostility to America and Israel.”

Oh no - an open election in Egypt. Better stock more arms for Iran and Syria. Give them to IDF troops on the Jordan River, they can fire at a Palestinian military that Israel rejects in the first place. Then comes Barak’s coup de grâce: the region needs a strong Israel to guide it.

"The issue of qualitative military edge for Israel becomes more essential for us, and I believe also more essential for you," he tells Americans. "It might be wise to invest another $20 billion to upgrade the security of Israel for the next generation or so... A strong, responsible Israel can become a stabilizer in such a turbulent region."

Because massive quantities of U.S. aid have made Israel such a responsible, stabilizing force in the region. So confident is Barak that his aides, possibly fearing a backlash, have already denied his interview remarks.

Even though the State Department responded with identical language: “Each and every security assistance request from the Israeli government is evaluated in light of our policy to uphold Israel’s qualitative military edge.”

Israel’s breach of silence wasted no time devolving into a comedy rather than statecraft. Instead of facing the inevitable and rearranging its stance towards the Palestinians, Israel is attempting to drape itself in democracy as it hardens its political and military positions. Doing so will maintain the local stalemate throughout the Middle East’s revolutionary cycle, potentially placing Israel at a greater disadvantage once Egypt shifts regional support to the Palestinians. And America continues to enable this status quo through political-speak, hoping “to narrow gaps and to find a way for the parties to return to direct negotiations."

"If and when Israel offers its own thoughts on how to move the process forward, we will be listening attentively," State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told reporters on Monday. "We do not know what the prime minister and his government are thinking at the present time."

The way to narrow gaps is by rejecting an unrealistic, weak “initiative,” for lack of a better word, and installing a sense of balance in the region. By rejecting Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory as illegal, by rejecting any Israeli military presence in the West Bank, by supporting East Jerusalem as the capital of a permanent Palestinian state, by dissolving Gaza's blockade, and by blocking U.S. aid until Netanyahu drops his totalitarian view of a two-state solution. Essentially, by convincing Israel that a just and equal resolution to the Palestinians’ plight offers the only security from revolution.

Israel really has gone rogue if Washington doesn’t know what Netanyahu is thinking - and risks even greater, self-created insecurity as a result.

Yemen Army, Police Storm Sana'a University, 10-75 Wounded

"It's a massacre," warns opposition spokesman Muhammad Qahtan. "It is a crime by security troops against students engaged in a peaceful sit-in."

Although Washington's persistent silence on Yemen has defied our predictions - making no mention today either - avoiding the crisis tomorrow doesn't seems possible. Should be tragically interesting to watch the U.S. government respond after repeatedly vouching for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Saleh himself is liable to deny the incident.

[Update: The government has accused protesters of smuggling automatic weapons into the camp and resisting arrest.]

Blood Money Leaves Davis’s Damage Unrepaired

As Raymond Davis’s immunity case nears its March 14th hearing (now March 16th), Washington is scrambling to avoid what one Pakistani source labels “an atomic bomb.” Davis, who stands accused of murdering two Pakistani civilians, has been fully outed as a present CIA and former Blackwater contractor with Special Forces experience. Yet the White House still insists that Davis enjoys diplomatic immunity, with President Barack Obama appealing to “a broader principle at stake” and Marc Grossman, U.S. special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, calling for Davis’s immediate and unconditional release.

So far Islamabad has resisted enormous political and military pressure to comply, leaving Davis in the Lahore High Court’s (LHC) hands. Chief Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry even denied a motion on Monday seeking to make Cameron P. Munter, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, party to Davis’s immunity petition.

As Washington tries to navigate Pakistani law and rewrite international law, it should turn to America’s own vision of justice in search of an equitable solution.

The steady drumbeat for diyya - blood money in Islamic law - reached a peak after U.S. legal experts arrived in Lahore to advise Davis. En vogue as a shortcut for averting an explosive trial, diyya presents an opening to avoid a calamitous spectacle between Washington and Islamabad. Realizing that its absolute position on immunity is unlikely to hold in court, the White House appears privately willing to sacrifice its “broader principle” to bury the case and "get back to business." Although U.S. officials maintain Davis’s unconditional release in public, Zahid Bokhari, Davis’s lawyer, wasted no time declaring diyya as, “not just a good way, but the best way” to resolve his case.

Unfortunately for U.S. policy in Pakistan, Bokhari operates as a legal expert rather than the politico-military mind of a counterinsurgency specialist. Blood money offers a quick fix to an incredibly complex problem, and there’s usually no such thing in COIN. While “get out of jail with a price” tempts the CIA and ISI as the cleanest option to reset their “rules of the game,” this mindset works against U.S.-Pakistani relations as a whole.

Diyya treats Davis’s case in a vacuum rather than in the fourth-generation war currently engulfing Pakistan.

America only holds half of the keys to releasing Davis in its present conception of diyya. The CIA’s lost man generated a matrix of perception battles upon being arrested for murder: the U.S. government vs. the victims’ families, the U.S. government vs. Pakistani public opinion, the Pakistani people vs. their government, Washington vs. Islamabad, and the CIA vs. ISI. Blood money resolves the first and last two problems under optimal conditions, leaving Pakistan's political and cultural spheres empty.

Nor can diyya be considered the “best option” until the victims' families agree.

The murders of Mohammad Faheem and Faizan Haider, gunned down by Davis on January 27th, turned their families into national celebrities. Refusing U.S. aid turned them into heroes. Shamzad, Mohammad’s brother, claims Pakistanis have flooded him with assistance, saying he has no need for America's money. Both families allege that no government or U.S. officials have visited them, creating an immediate gap in perceptions and space for Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s main Islamic party. The group regularly denounces U.S. activity in Pakistan and has taken the families under its wing; a planned fundraiser intends to remove finances from consideration.

When reporters pointed out to Davis’s lawyer that the families have so far refused diyya, Bokhari replied, "To my mind, they are affected by the pressure of the public and the parties.”

This stunning political ignorance reveals all that’s wrong with America’s response to the Davis crisis, and Muhammad Aijazu Rehman can explain why. The brother of the third victim, killed by Davis’s extraction team as it raced to him, recently arrived from the United Kingdom after receiving a law degree. Rehman, whose brothers’ killers have already fled Pakistan into obscurity, knows exactly what he’s talking about and popular pressure plays a minimal role in his thinking. Pakistanis may hold America to a higher standard of diyya, which implies unintentional murder and often lets criminals walk, but in this case U.S. compensation becomes an appetizer to “a broader principle.”

Though open to diyya, Rehamn clarifies, "I can't straight away accept money, it's a question of family honor. There has to be something toward justice first.”

"They are using us," Rehman admits of Jamaat-e-Islami, "but at least they are doing something. I'm not anti-American or anything. I have looked up to the American judicial system since I was a child, but I haven't seen anything from them. It's like we have done something wrong and they are angry with us.”

Like Pakistanis in general, Davis's victims don’t want money so much as a show of remorse, a legal concept Americans should understand. Yet Washington is treating the incident like a civilian casualty in Afghanistan - here’s your $2,000 and move along. Other CIA agents have already fled the country, underlining Washington’s impunity. No reflection, no sense of understanding the situation, can be found. U.S. legal and law officials call these types of people "cold killers."

Pakistanis reject apologies for the same reason Afghans do: cash comes second to principle.

"It is not acceptable for the Afghan people anymore,” President Hamid Karzai said after nine boys were killed by U.S. forces. “Regrets and condemnations of the incident cannot heal the wounds of the people."

America’s response to Davis’s arrest runs contrary to what is first a political, then a military, and finally a legal battle. Washington has treated his case in reverse; the short-term challenge of securing Davis’s release, and the long-term challenge of protecting similar agents abroad, have overwhelmed a specifically-tailored response for Pakistan. Davis’s case is, in fact, far from an isolated event. After clashing with the ISI in December, when its station chief was outed and evacuated, the CIA expanded its personnel over the last three months to fill the intel gap inside Pakistan’s cities. It also wanted to send the message that if the ISI won't obey orders, the CIA will carry them out itself.

Davis was simply caught at the worst possible time, when, “US military and intelligence personnel would be brought to Pakistan under the cover of diplomatic assignments for covert operations.” Davis’s capture then triggered internal investigations into these assets, spawning reports of a 1,000 man spy-ring and fleeing CIA agents. Now, even if Davis is freed through a political deal or diyya, the damage could absorb itself into an ignoble lineage of U.S. errors. Once more the Pakistani public will be left unsatisfied, furious with their own government, and demonizing America.

All because Washington acts like Davis did nothing wrong, a response that insults the intelligence and dignity of Pakistanis.

“The pity is that the Americans are also well aware of the tense situation,” writes The Nation, “but their insistence on getting their man out of jail and back home at the earliest is prompted by, it seems, more than one, though largely inter-related, reason. The superpower, right or wrong, would like its wishes to be complied with. It might sound strange that although the US and its allies are desperate about extricating themselves from the war on terror to avoid the humiliation and shame of defeat, and although Islamabad holds the key to the kind of withdrawal they could claim to be honorable, Washington is not worried about upsetting Pakistan.”

Davis has taken root across Pakistani society and, especially during Islamabad’s weakened political state, cannot be extracted without interrupting a vast web of people and beliefs. As such, the Pakistani government expects a big payoff for releasing Davis rather than a thank you card from the White House. According to local reports, the ISI sees Davis as a bargaining chip to reset the CIA’s activity in Islamabad's favor. However, a more influential key to Davis’s release (in addition to remorse) happens to occupy Pakistan’s list of grievances with Washington. Fully capitalizing on the victims, Jamaat-e-Islami sent Shamzad to Karachi to meet with relatives of Aafia Siddiqui, who was convicted of attempting to murder U.S. personnel in Afghanistan.

Islamabad has tried, unsuccessfully, to exchange Davis for Siddiqui, now deteriorating in prison for 86 years after a highly controversial trial in New York. A trial during which Washington ignored Islamabad’s concerns.

The White House’s primary challenge in Davis’s case isn’t securing his release, a secondary goal in itself, but finding resolution within Pakistan’s political crisis and hypersensitivity. Diyya only mends military, intelligence, and possibly political relations between Washington and Islamabad. By contrast, swapping Siddiqui achieves success across the entire spectrum of fourth-generation warfare. Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani predicts that her release would go a long way in repairing America’s image, which in turn benefits its collective relationships in Pakistan.

Waseem Shamshad, the elder brother of Mohammad Faheem, already approves: “I outrightly reject any compensation for the cold blooded murder of my brother. I can only forgive him if US releases the daughter of Pakistan, Dr. Aafia Siddiqui.”

While Washington continues to balk at the exchange, controversial as it would be at home, Davis and Siddiqui’s cases aren’t so different as they might appear. Both caught at the wrong place at the wrong time, the pair possessed an equal bag of tricks when arrested. Siddiqui reportedly clutched a sack containing U.S. targets and bomb-making literature; Davis was found with a spy’s arsenal of mobile phones, targets in Lahore, “buckets of bullets,” and fake documentation. Both claim innocence.

And Davis's release is just as controversial in Pakistan as Siddiqui's would be in America. It should be noted that Aafia’s own kin reject a swap. Fauzia Siddiqui, her eldest brother, warns, “There is no comparison between Davis and Dr. Aafia. He is a killer, and he must be penalized for that.”

Nevertheless, Siddiqui’s release into Pakistani custody would achieve what diyya likely won't: admitting remorse and humility. Aafia speaks to the victims’ families, ordinary Pakistanis, Islamabad, and to the military and ISI, as improvement in U.S. perceptions favors their continual relationship with Washington. She also sucks the wind out of the Taliban's rally call for her release.

Although U.S. officials count Siddiqui as a hard sacrifice, they should deeply consider Davis’s knife hovering above their nose, waiting to spite America's face.

Journalists Under Attack In Yemen

From The New York Times:

SANA, Yemen — Journalists covering the antigovernment movement in Yemen are reporting being attacked by supporters of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and in some cases by state security officers.

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate has been alerted to 53 cases of harassment in the last few weeks. Those included threatening phone calls and serious physical attacks.

One Yemeni journalist, Mohammed al-Jaradi, said he was walking from the antigovernment demonstration at Sana University back to the office of the newspaper Al Ahali on Friday, when three men dressed in civilian clothes approached him.

One grabbed him by the collar. Mr. Jaradi said he immediately knew why.

“They asked me what I had been taking photos of,” Mr. Jaradi said. “They accused me of taking photos of women.” In Yemen, it is traditionally inappropriate to photograph women.

“I said to them, ‘I am taking photos for the sake of freedom,’ ” he said.

Mr. Jaradi said he was then beaten and thrown to the ground. One attacker took out a jambiya, a traditional dagger that is customary for Yemeni men to carry, and stabbed Mr. Jaradi in the arm. The attackers stole his jacket and shoes, but did not get his camera, which was in his pocket.

Journalists in Yemen typically enjoy greater freedoms than those in most other Arab countries.

Many independent news outlets freely criticize government policies, and some opposition members directly attack the president. But the government also has a history of preventing coverage of specific events, like its war with Houthi rebels in the northern Saada Province.

Human Rights Watch, which issued a statement urging the authorities to stop these attacks, believes the government is trying to carry out this type of selective news blackout now.

“Beating up journalists is a blatant attempt by the authorities to prevent the Yemeni people and the world from witnessing a critical moment in Yemen,” Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the group’s Middle East and North Africa division, said in a statement.

Ashraf al-Raify, of the journalists’ syndicate’s committee for press freedom, said that before the current political unrest began, the Ministry of Interior would respond to claims of harassment by sending officers to investigate. But in recent weeks, he said, “nothing” has been done.

“There has been an escalation in this crackdown campaign,” Mr. Raify said.

While the opposition believes the government is paying the attackers, Yemeni officials deny any relationship with them. But protesters have filmed police officers giving out sticks to government supporters, who use them to attack protesters.

Mr. Saleh has spoken out publicly against attacks on journalists, though that has not stopped them.

“No one is above the law,” said a high-ranking government official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the news media. “Whoever is attacking the journalists should be brought to justice and will be brought to justice. People have the right to express their opinions and write.” The official added that the attacks were “isolated incidents.”

Nasser al-Dubaiby, the publisher of a local opposition weekly, Al-Hurrah, said he woke up Wednesday to find his living room in flames. He suspected arson because the electrical equipment in the room did not appear to be the cause of the fire. Mr. Dubaiby said that he remembered closing all the windows in the living room, but that one facing the street was open when he got up.

If the fire was arson, the syndicate, which confirmed this episode, said it was the second case against a journalist’s home.

Mr. Dubaiby said he had received phone calls threatening him if he did not stop publishing coverage of the protests.

“They said, ‘Stop messing with us, or you will be punished. And what you write, it will not go unnoticed,’ ” he said.

“O.K., set my car on fire, set the office of the newspaper on fire, but my house?” Mr. Dubaiby said, adding that he has continued covering the protests.

The American Embassy in Sana said in a statement last week that it had “watched with concern recent infringements of press freedom in Yemen,” and it urged Mr. Saleh’s government “to demonstrate its respect for the role of independent media as stipulated by Yemen’s Constitution and laws.”

Mr. Saleh is a strategic American ally who saw foreign aid to his country more than double to $300 million in 2010 after a failed attack on a Detroit-bound airplane by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on Dec. 25, 2009.

“Saleh talks on the television that journalists won’t come under attack, the next day he attacks them,” said Abdul-Rahman Barman, a Yemeni human rights lawyer. “He talks on the television that he won’t attack the protesters, the next day they are attacked. He only does what he wants.”

Neither the White House nor State Department took any time away from Libya on Monday to discuss Yemen’s crisis. This silence over the assault of free press must be part of Obama's "low-key strategy" to uphold democracy and human rights. Ingatius won't be getting away with that one, especially when the threats to keep Saleh in power keep coming.

Former CIA agent Bruce Riedel, a leading Obama adviser, is his latest defender: "Two months ago, Suleiman and his Yemeni counterpart and Musa Kusa all had al-Qaeda at the top of their agenda list. Now their to-do lists are very different."

"Whatever focus we've maintained on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and insisted that Saleh maintain, will be turned because of all the other pressures he's under," added a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official.

Two months ago, Saleh's agenda had already begun to collapse under civil division and his counterproductive motion to eliminate presidential term-limits. AQAP was running wild before Yemen's revolutionary outbreak - democracy cannot be stopped by these threats.

"The West has a double-standard in maintaining these dictators," says Mir Ali, a protester in the Southern Movement's stronghold of Aden. "Why doesn’t [US President Barack] Obama get mad when he sees young people without any future in Yemen? Why doesn’t Obama stop giving Saleh military aid, especially when he knows the regime is going to use it to kill us? The US has interests, we understand. But we have interests [regime change] they must also understand."

U.S. Terror Alarm Can’t Stop Yemen’s Revolution

The White House is going to have to try a lot harder than another terror threat. Even as the international media chronicles the downfall of “terror” as a means of denying liberty, Washington continues to wield al-Qaeda as a main reason why democracy should slow down into an “orderly transition.” In Libya, rebel territory may become, in the ultimate nightmare, “another Somalia.” And apparently regime change puts U.S. citizens at risk in Yemen. Can’t have that either.

The revolution can wait.

Last Friday opened like any of the last three Fridays in Yemen - with protesters demanding the exit of 32-year President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh had just issued a proposal on Saba News Agency, the state media, outlining “an end to the crisis.” However it excluded previous reports of a one-year deadline for his resignation, an omission his spokesman formally confirmed less than 10 hours later. Around the same time, Yemeni troops opened fire on Houthi protesters in the north. The government initially denied the claims before accusing gunmen of attacking a military post, adding that no protesters were around.

That was good enough for Washington. Having remained relatively silent for three weeks - as if closing its eyes and wishing Yemen away - the State Department was forced to address the massing protests and escalation in government violence. Philip Crowley refuted a “presumptuous” reporter who questioned Saleh’s eroding position, saying, “The president solidly remains the president of Yemen. He has, in fact, opened up a dialogue with his opposition... This is exactly the kind of give-and-take that we believe is necessary so that governments can be seen as responding to the will of their people.”

As for rising violence, it “needs to stop.”

Fast forward two days and Americans have been advised to evacuate Yemen, its threat level now "extremely high due to terrorist activities and civil unrest.” In between, protests continued to swell as the mainstream opposition denied Saleh’s offer for dialogue. Persistent attacks in the north, central capital, and in the Southern Movement’s stronghold of Aden expose Saleh’s credibility, already on life-support, as totally hollow. Few believe their “president” when “unity” has become a codeword for crackdown.

Not surprisingly, Yemen’s youthful protesters want their dictator gone and will figure out what comes next afterward. And Saleh isn’t leaving the rest of Yemen’s opposition, divided as it is, much of a choice in resisting him. Already trapped in an insecure life, they have no security concerns. Where Saleh and Washington see a “mutual security threat,” protesters see political representation and economic opportunity.

But Yemen wasn’t doing OK on Friday and suddenly melting down on Sunday. Rather, this new warning appears to be setting up the Obama administration's next excuse: that its non-existence response to Yemen, as in Libya, is due to the safety of U.S. citizens. No argument would be cheaper; Washington simply doesn’t want to see Saleh fall. The U.S. embassy’s warning is particularly emblematic of a wider problem: “Should a crisis occur, evacuation options from Yemen would be extremely limited due to the lack of infrastructure, geographic constraints, and other security concerns.”

This hapless “evacuation” represents U.S. policy as a whole: militarily one-sided, constrained by supporting an unpopular ruler, and isolated from the people. That’s a far cry from securing U.S. citizens. Never will America win a counterinsurgency against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with its current strategy.

Consequently, America's presence and blind support for Saleh has enabled AQAP's growth to its current point.

Except terror threats continue to be applied on multiple levels; note how the State Department warns of “terrorist activities" before civil unrest. Washington has spent most of its energy in Yemen hooking AQAP into the country’s popular unrest, claiming it may “take advantage” by committing an unspecified variety of crimes. This possibility that cannot be ruled out, yet U.S. officials frequently make the link and simultaneously ignore Yemen’s genuine democratic movement.

They seem to be willing a tragic connection.

In regards to U.S. citizens, AQAP’s attacks usually occur far from populated areas and target military officials. This new threat is based on the killings of two Colonels in Marib province, 110 miles from the capital of Sana’a. What U.S. citizen is out here? And why is Washington delaying the revolution for a few people if so?

AQAP’s threat is further transposed to the macro level, where the White House and Pentagon’s response fundamentally differs between Libya and Yemen. Whereas Gaddafi’s self-created chaos must be jettisoned, Saleh must remain because of the chaos his vacuum would generate. This argument is a rehashed excuse of the Muslim Brotherhood. And while the possibility of civil war cannot be discounted, Saleh’s use as a tribal keystone has already expired.

Once Obama copies Libya’s script over to Yemen, he will implicate himself deeper in the reality that America lacks a response to Yemen. That’s why his administration remains silently inactive, along with the sad truth that it favors the conclusion of Saleh’s term in 2013.

Washington can only watch the revolution unfold as it does everything possible to stop it.

Cracks In the Saudi Mothership

Apparently only a fool would dare question Saudi Arabia’s susceptibility to revolution. Every attempt offers as many excuses and qualifiers as shots fired against the Kingdom. But why ask an analyst, or a local for matter, when the King’s actions tell no lies?

Having banned all protests and marches, he too feels the heat of revolution licking at his borders, from Egypt, Yemen, and Oman to Bahrain, Iraq, and Jordan.

King Abdullah’s track-record speaks for itself. Guarding Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from extradition, who stands accused of fleeing Tunisia with over 100 pounds of gold, and entertaining thoughts of Hosni Mubarak, the King warned President Barack Obama on January 29th that he would replace U.S. military aid to Cairo if necessary. Economists dispute whether Saudi Arabia’s increased oil output is directly attributed to Libya’s present shortage, however they concede the fact that King Abdullah hoped to improve market perceptions over Libya. Finally the King and his Crown Prince Sultan, both ill in health, returned from Morocco on February 23rd to oversee the regional crisis.

First came $36 billion in incentives - pay raises, debt clearance, low-mortgage homes, financial and unemployment aid - plus an additional $400 billion for education and health care services. Then, with Facebook rallies set for March 11 and March 20, came new police deployments and the order to stay inside. Any attempt to cause public disorder will be prevented by “all measures.”

The sweeping efficiency of a monarchy is something to behold. While we understand the historically conservative nature of Saudi Arabia, the King seems to be playing a majority of his deck to block his people from following the transforming Muslim world.

There’s no need to qualify because the question isn’t whether Saudi Arabia will experience immediate and rapid turmoil. Two factors beyond the personal nature of Saudi Arabia’s diverse populace, and “low” 10% unemployment, hold the revolutionary virus at bay. One naturally takes shape in a fifth of the world’s oil reserves, generating a $622 billion GDP and an estimated $250 billion war-chest. On top of unleashing financial windfalls to sap economic discontent, Saudi Arabia accounts for most of the world’s “spare production capacity” - new oil production within 30 days and sustained over 90 days.

The country’s general wealth allows it to throw its weight behind regional dictators, a strategy that worked until February 11th and is trying to revive itself.

The second and more sinister obstruction to a revolutionary outbreak once more proves the irony of U.S. policy. Famous for its own world-altering revolution, America now stands a good chance of becoming infamous for impeding a revolutionary period in human history. At a time when Obama promised "change," no less. He hasn't hesitated simply out of oil, but hundreds of billions in arms contracts, decades of joint military exercises, leverage against Hezbollah and Hamas. And both Washington and Riyadh realize that, in the grand scheme, the Saudi Arabian mothership cannot show any sign of unrest.

Because if it happens in Saudi Arabia, no state is safe from the revolutionary spirit demanding democracy, human rights, and possibly regime change. Egypt's uprising barely registers compared to the same events played out in Saudi Arabia. Revolution in Riyadh would collapse U.S.-Israeli policy in an instant, rather than the gradual decay at work now.

"With Egypt in chaos, the kingdom is Washington's only major ally left in the Arab world and the Saudis want the Americans to remember that," said a source in Riyadh as Mubarak neared his end.

But the country’s fate becomes less certain over time. What happens when these advantages erode, especially America’s unquestioned allegiance to its heavyweight ally? How long can Washington support “no protests," along with the King's attempts to undermine a regional shift towards an opening system? And how long can the King insulate his people from the monumental change occurring beyond their borders? What if a democratic spirit sweeps the region over a period of five or ten years?

Will Saudis begin to feel as though they missed out?

Maybe not if the revolutionary cycle produces more instability. But some are already prepared to sacrifice in the name of freedom, enough to keep the system agitated. If democracy finally pays dividends in the Middle East, even the most conservative Saudi may find a hard time denying the progress of such awesome cultural forces.

TFG Risks Overextension With National Offensive

The big news out of Mogadishu are the gains secured by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union (AU). Eager to show off their progress in the international media, they've proudly displayed their hard fight through al-Shabab’s urban maze of trenches and abandoned buildings. Beyond these ancillary goals, TFG officials hope to ride their momentum into clearing al-Shabab from Somalia’s shattered capital.

The bigger news out of Somalia is how its government might not stop at Mogadishu’s city limits.

Campaign deliberations between TFG and AU military commanders revolve around a central question: how hard should they hit al-Shabab? Successful as Mogadishu’s clearing operation appears, al-Qaeda elements have entered the fray to help al-Shabab retake ground while the TFG and AU regrouped, prompting criticism that they didn't hit the insurgents hard enough. President Sharif Ahmed seems to agree, telling reporters, “The offensive has not yet occurred as intended. There are ongoing concrete plans to clear out al-Shabaab from Mogadishu... The shortest way to impair al-Shabab is to exert a powerful military action on them.”

So goes one strain of thinking on how to permanently eliminate the group.

This strategy, like most others, weighs its pros and cons. Estimated around 5,000 fighters and amplified by the TFG’s overall weakness, al-Shabab hasn’t needed to field a strong force in order to maintain control of its territory. Now that the TFG and AU increased their total forces past 20,000, smashing al-Shabab and pick off the pieces becomes a tempting vision. Combined with al-Shabab’s alienation of most Somalis, a successful outcome to this plan cannot be ruled out.

The main problem with a “smash” offensive recognizes the fact that Somalia presents a counterinsurgency (COIN), not conventional warfare. Clearing becomes the easiest task despite the guerrilla's many arms: hit and run tactics, attacking the weakest security points and rear lines, dispersing to divide the enemy. Although al-Qaeda has created a "little Afghanistan" in Qobdoro, in the northern Mogadishu neighborhood of Kanan, this stronghold will be abandoned after being "smashed," only to pop up somewhere else. And while the TFG and AU can hold a portion of seized territory, they lack the immediate means to rebuild the daily lives of Somalis.

The “clear, hold, build” theory of COIN activates when overlapped, not implemented in separate and potentially delayed phases that allow the insurgent to regroup. Pieces cannot be picked up later. al-Shabab may further interrupt this fragile cycle by intentionally ceding ground and going mobile, contrary to its present strategy of stiff resistance to superior numbers.

But the allure of a quick end might be baiting the TFG and AU beyond their abilities. While preemptive attacks outside Mogadishu are viewed as diversionary measures to tie up al-Shabab reinforcements, the TFG appears to be giving real consideration to a national offensive. Ethiopia and its proxy Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a have repeatedly assaulted Beledweyne, a major border city northwest of Mogadishu. 1,000 freshly-trained Ahlu Sunna fighters just returned from Ethiopia to reinforce their stronghold of Galgudud, where al-Shabab remains active. And Kenya keeps a battalion near the southern border town of Mandera, opposite Doolow and Beled Hawo, which are subsequently patrolled by Ethiopian forces.

"The Ethiopian troops are heavily armed and deployed along the border between Mandera and Doolow, giving us ammunition," explained a TFG officer on condition of anonymity. "Our troops and the Ahlu Sunna fighters are in the frontline. The fighting will continue. We want sustained fighting to weaken their power.”

Kenyan government spokesman Alfred Mutua claims his nation’s troops have no plans to deploy inside Somalia, saying, “There is fighting at the border, mostly on the Somali side.” However Kenyan military helicopters do swoop along the border providing support for TFG and Ethiopian troops, and they may be called upon to surprise al-Shabab from the south. The group is already nervous over reports of a local, Kenyan-funded militia drawing from its own recruits in Kismayo.

Meanwhile the TFG’s cabinet moved to blockade al-Shabab's three ports - Barawe, Marka, and Kismayo - hoping to lock the group in a vice grip.

The TFG and AU used to hole themselves up in Mogadishu, fighting for survival like a cornered boxer. Never would they regain the initiative while al-Shabab roamed freely across the country. Yet overextension swerves towards the extreme opposite a lack of coordination. The TFG and AU find themselves with enough force to regain parts of Mogadishu, but still lacking the military power or political organization at the state level. Before, the TFG and AU could barely coordinate their offensive in the capital. Now they may be trying to bite off too much.

The same counterinsurgency dilemma in Mogadishu manifests on a larger scale. How will the TFG hold cities hundreds of miles from Mogadishu? Does it possess the political ability to govern territorial gains, or will Somalia’s non-military vortex negate that progress? Can the TFG truly rely on Ethiopian military support to stabilize Somalia after historic animosity between the two nations? And how can it avoid the rising odds of civilian casualties that come with assaulting contested ground?

"My troops have very clear instructions," says Ugandan Maj. Gen. Nathan Mugisha, commander of AU forces in Somalia. "There are no-fire zones: markets, hospitals, schools, residential areas. There are some incidents which happen. But those are isolated. The picture you are getting is largely exaggerated.”

This may be true enough, but protecting civilians presents an even greater challenge outside Mogadishu - along with treating the wounded.

al-Shabab isn’t sitting still as the walls close in either. Mukhtar Robow, al-Shabab’s deputy and de facto chief, has launched a new recruitment drive with Sheikh Fu’ad Mohamed Shongole, overseer in Puntland. And Mansur claims to have met four former Somali military officials who fought against Ethiopia in the 1977-78 Ogaden War, hoping to prepare for large-scale warfare. A propaganda stunt to be sure, but not the type of information to be completely discard. Ethiopia remains the weakest link in the TFG’s strategy, militarily necessary yet politically and religiously unpopular.

Until sorting itself out in regards to its parliament and regional interaction with Somaliland and Puntland, the TFG remains politically disadvantaged heading into a wider campaign against al-Shabab. Although Mansur tried to lay defeat on the TFG for its parliamentary crisis, simplistic propaganda given al-Shabab’s losses, he does point out a valid concern that President Sharif has tried but so far failed to resolve. Nor have the TFG’s peripheral assaults yielded lasting gains; TFG and Ethiopian troops waste resources on failed assaults rather than change strategy. And local Kismayo businessmen question the effectiveness of a blockade, doubting international assistance and concerned for their trades.

While the international community may wish to patrol all of Somalia’s coast, providing the funds for land and sea is another matter.

The TFG, AU, and their allies have a critical decision to make in the months ahead. Can they concentrate on Mogadishu and allow al-Shabab to regroup in its territory, or does al-Shabab's continual operations impede lasting security in the capital? Does the TFG and AU have enough forces and political reach to simultaneously capture Somalia’s key cities, or must they work sequentially? Does a wider offensive boost or deplete rising morale? Most importantly, how much military strength, time, and confidence do they risk in failing at the national level?

Judging by their general escalation, AU reinforcements are likely moving down the pipeline to accelerate Mogadishu’s momentum. The plan has always been to sweep Mogadishu by August, when the TFG's mandate expires, then push west and south with a secure capital behind them. Perhaps additional forces - and a more secure flow of Western aid - will provide the TFG with the resources to liberate all of Somalia. But until then, it must be careful not to overextend itself into territory it can neither clear nor hold. Dividing forces can be costly when done too soon.

In a classic test of tortoise vs. hare, the slow and steady campaign will likely trump a blitzkrieg attack that prematurely exhausts itself. Despite the risks of allowing al-Shabab room to operate, the TFG and AU can’t delay themselves even longer by fighting COIN battles they’re unprepared to win.

Arabs In America Express Hope, Fear In Revolution

From NPR:

Rebels in Libya continue to battle forces loyal to leader Moammar Gadhafi for control of the country, while neighboring Egyptians and Tunisians work to move forward following the ousters of their presidents.

Meanwhile, across the U.S., tens of thousands of residents of Middle Eastern and North African extraction have been devouring news out of their native or ancestral lands — and wondering what the changes mean for them and their families.

"We are happy, for sure," says Egyptian-born Ahmad Attia, 39, who lives in Watertown, Conn., with his American-born wife. "But there are some fears. And this is very normal, because the revolution will take some time to reach its goal."

Ongoing situations in North Africa differ from country to country — with the most dramatic at the moment in Libya, where armed forces loyal to Gadhafi have taken on rebels. But Attia's emotions of exhilaration and pride, tempered with fear and trepidation, have been constant companions of many Arabs in America in recent months.

"We are liberated in the east of Libya," says Salah Huwio, 50, a Libyan-born businessman in Ann Arbor, Mich. "I am so happy, so proud. But Gadhafi is gathering his army and may come back and destroy everything."

Watching 24/7

Attia, who was 9 years old when Mubarak came to power, says he barely slept during the 18 days of Egypt's street revolution, mesmerized by unfolding events and longing to be with the protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square.

"I was 24 hours watching CNN in English, and Al Jazeera in Arabic," says Attia, who has a doctorate in agriculture and worked for the Libyan government for 12 years as a scientist. "When it was announced that Mubarak was stepping down, I didn't know what I was doing."

He says he ran outside into the snow, crying and yelling, "Long live Egypt," before the New England cold and worry about his neighbors' reactions drove him indoors.

That euphoria remains, he says, but his attention and that of other Egyptians scattered around the world has shifted to the reality on the ground.

There are the coming political battles, including one over whether the Egyptian constitution should be amended to prevent those with dual citizenship, or foreign spouses, from leading the country.

"We don't like this," Attia says. "Being outside Egypt doesn't mean I'm half Egyptian."

He and others are also watching for signs of recovery in Egypt's tourism industry, a huge economic driver that has been largely dormant since protests began in late January.

Though Attia says his family does not need money, and that "Egypt is not a poor country," the revolution has meant that many people have been unable to work. And the country's borders are being stressed with Egyptians returning, and thousands of refugees coming from Libya.

"The support they need now is spiritual support," he says. "After every revolution there's spirit, but the fear that a split could come."

Attia set up a Facebook page this week for Egyptians abroad to share "comments, ideas and feelings — to see how we can help support them to stay together, and show we are still Egyptians."

It could be considered an online version of the traditional spirited Egyptian politics discussions that Attia says dominate post-dinner conversation in his native country — from the homes of those who can't read, to the highest levels of authority.

Regimes Ousted, But Revolutions Not Over

Tunisians tipped off the Arab revolts in December and were on their way to a new government a month later.

But Tunisian-American businessman Sami Guedoir, 49, of Manteca, Calif., says there are still big issues, including security, in the country he left in 1989.

"People are still in revolution, the Army is spread so thin, and monitoring the border is taking its toll," he says.

But he is convinced that some of the post-demonstration concerns — the desire of some to pursue vendettas and legal claims, worries about the transition becoming bloody — have diminished as the "hot, angry, excited" mood has tempered, he says.

There is suspicion among some in the country that the crush of refugees flowing into Tunisia from Libya is an attempt to "sabotage" the revolution, a sentiment Guedoir, chairman of the national Tunisian Community Center, doesn't share.

Still, he says he thinks refugees should be moved out from the ports as quickly as possible: "They should never have mixed a humanitarian crisis with politics."

Though Guedoir, who became a U.S. citizen in 1993, sees Tunisia's new reality as a potential boon to trade with his home country, he is adamant about what he believes is the main message from revolution in the Middle East — even though governance in the region remains uncertain.

"They were selling the myth of dictators or bin Laden," he says. "Tunisia has proven wrong the myth in the West that if you don't back a dictator, you'll have Muslim fundamentalists taking over."

Fragile Victories

In Libya, Gadhafi has unleashed an armed response to protesters, including aircraft attacks. But Huwio says he is convinced that civil war will not emerge in Libya.

"It would be hard to do that in Libya," he says, because of deep historic and familial ties between the country's people and tribes.

"How can we go and kill our uncles? Our nephews? Our cousins?" says Huwio, a 30-year U.S. resident who is in the construction business. "Gadhafi could not make that kind of problem between the tribes."

Born in Benghazi, the eastern Libyan city second only in size to Tripoli and that has become a hub of the opposition, Huwio is in constant contact with family there.

"Personally, in Benghazi, they don't need anything — things are going back to normal," he says. "People have become stronger and more organized."

His family in Libya is fine financially, he says, but relatives who are physicians — a niece and a cousin's wife — say there is a need for medicine and supplies to treat wounds.

People are being shot by high-caliber guns, he says. The brother of a Libyan friend of Huwio's living in the U.S. was shot to death last week by such a weapon during a funeral procession in Benghazi.

Common Sentiment

Huwio, Attia and Guedoir echo a theme common among the Arab diaspora: Changes in the Middle East have made them proud of and ready to celebrate their heritage.

"You have to tell the world that there is nothing to fear from Libya," says Huwio, a father of four who after 30 years in the U.S. had what he characterized as "the honor" of becoming a citizen six months ago.

His children, he says, don't know much about Libya, but they will.

"I was a depressed man, but now I have an identity," he says. "They are even using the flag that I grew up with — the independent flag — and that's what I open my eyes to."

Attia says many Egyptians have been disappointed in the Obama administration's response to revolution in the Middle East, but notes Americans demonstrating in support of the revolution.

"You cannot love this administration — they were always one step back from the revolution," he said. "But [Egyptians] do love the American people."

Wael Ghonim Speaks on Egypt's Revolution

Saleh’s Hypocrisy Only Hastens Falls

One could make a lot of cash shorting Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s teetering president; betting against his gains favors the statistical odds. After directly denouncing President Barack Obama (and Israel) for fomenting uprisings across the Muslim world, and after accepting several opposition proposal to leave office only to reject them, Saleh has pulled his latest U-turn.

The latest 8-point initiative - published on Saleh’s own news site - lacked the key condition of his resignation. Now we know why. Today Tarek al-Shami, a spokesman for the president's ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), said Saleh approved of the opposition plan except for one key detail.

"He would accept the opposition's plan, including the article about a smooth transition of power, but it needs to be implemented at the end of the president's term in 2013."

Being that his resignation trumps all other demands of the popular opposition, Saleh is further entrenching himself in a situation he cannot ultimately escape from. His typically hypocritical behavior has accelerated his fall by unifying a diverse opposition, and Friday’s protest reportedly turned out over several hundred thousand. Saleh loyalists organized a counter-protest attended by about 100,000 people, but these figures suggest a numerical disadvantage that he cannot overcome.

Meanwhile, the government is also denying responsibly for an attack on Houthi protesters in the north, who admittedly came armed. Government sources initially claimed that gunmen fired on a military post in Harf Sufyan, wounding four soldiers, and denied firing on protesters. Their story later switched to self-defense, arguing that they believed the protesters, who had begun pelting the post with rocks. were about to attack it.

Even so, lethal retaliation cannot be excused during such a volatile and largely-nonviolent uprising. Yet with the White House avoiding comment and the U.S. media remaining silent, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley issued new support for Saleh:

QUESTION: Yemen; just wondering if you can update. There continue to be protests there, obviously. If the Salih government falls, what will that mean or will it have any impact on the U.S. pursuit of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and its security interests there?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, there’s a presumption behind your question. The president solidly remains the president of Yemen. He has, in fact, opened up a dialogue with his opposition. There’s some fairly public negotiating going on. But this is exactly the kind of give-and-take that we believe is necessary so that governments can be seen as responding to the will of their people.

QUESTION: P.J., you called -

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. CROWLEY: I’m sorry. What?

QUESTION: What about the protestors who were killed in Yemen?

MR. CROWLEY: We are – there have been some fresh reports of protestors killed. The Embassy there is trying to verify those reports. We have been monitoring the clashes between pro-government and anti-government protestors that’s been going on for some time. As we’ve made clear, even as we support dialogue between governments and opposition figures, we want to see these efforts done peacefully and in the pursuit of more responsible and representative government. Violence needs to stop.

U.S. policy continues to enable violence and the very political vacuum that Washington fears.

More Duplicity from Yemen's Saleh

Saba News Agency, the state media of Yemen's government, has released an interesting document outlining an 8-point plan to "end the current crisis in the country." Likely a fluid document despite coming from President Ali Abdullah Saleh's own mouthpiece. The initiative is as follows:

1. The withdrawal of the current election and referendum draft laws. Parliament will have to approve a new law with the consensus of both parties.

2. The withdrawal of proposed constitutional amendments.

3. Establishment of a mediation committee to end political disputes. Five prominent judges will be selected to the committee. GPC will choose two Judges, JMP will also select two and the Committee of Religious Scholars will choose the fifth member.

4. All parties are to end inciting and provocative media campaigns in order to create a suitable environment for national dialogue.

5. The release of prisoners who has not been proven guilty or don’t have pending court cases.

6. Forming a national unity government.

7. Intensifying anti-corruption investigations and activities by speeding up the prosecution of pending cases.

8. All parties are to end demonstrations and sit-ins to bring an end to streets congestion, preventing chaos, destruction of public and private properties.

This new proposal makes no mention of Saleh's resignation - himself responsible for inciting a provocative media campaign - and bulldozes over the secessionist Southern Movement with "unity." Corruption probes have been ongoing for years. Now breaking news has the northern Houthi tribe accusing the government of bombing their rallies.

"During a peaceful protest this Friday morning... demanding the fall of the regime, an end to corruption and political change, a military site fired rockets at a group of protesters and hit dozens of people," the tribe said in a statement.

Saleh is a notorious liar, so we cannot understand what Yemeni protester will accept his "cleric-approved" proposal. Also, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani happens to have crafted the initiative. al-Zindani, head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen and designated as a "global terrorist" for connections to Osama bin Laden, has threatened jihad if America sends military forces to Yemen. This leads to questions of whether his proposal simultaneously favors Saleh and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as AQAP is growing under Saleh's watch.

A confusing situation that might trigger more phones calls from Washington and more backtracking.

Afghan Civilian Casualties Still Too Common

Nine children - 8 to 14 - are the latest victims of America's war in Afghanistan.

Lt. General David Rodriguez, deputy commander of U.S. forces in the country, briefs Tuesday's incident in Pech valley: assault helicopters fired rockets on a suspected group of Taliban, only to discover they had targeted 10 boys gathering firewood. The Pentagon is running in front of this latest tragedy with a personal apology from General David Petraeus, unlike the previous incident in Kunar. But this quick admission, being a reaction to fresh wounds, contradicts Rodriguez’s claim that, “These incidents are rare.”

Can’t be that rare in Kunar to happen twice in as many weeks.

Even those in Kabul, like Enyatullah, know too well, "It is not the first time they have killed our poor and innocent people, we don't accept their apologies. They have apologized in the past but continue killing our people again and again."

Petraeus’s personal response is the day to his night of February 17th, the 5-hour assault in Ghaziabad district. Here, according to locals and an Afghan investigation, U.S. attack helicopters bombarded a remote village and killed 65 civilians - including 21 boys and 19 girls under 18. Petraeus notoriously accused locals of conspiring to burn their own children to cover the Taliban’s losses, a claim the Pentagon refuted without providing any details. And ISAF continues to dispute the Afghan investigation's findings, saying surveillance indicated only insurgents had been killed. That’s just what U.S. forces initially thought in Pech before dispatching an investigation team.

If anything seems rare, it’s the rapidity of ISAF's decision to come clean. But they had no choice in light of the circumstances. With Hamid Karzai condemning this latest “ruthless attack” as he did in Ghaziabad, Petraeus’s response speaks to a deliberate change in tone from before.

"We are deeply sorry for this tragedy and apologize to the members of the Afghan government, the people of Afghanistan and, most importantly, the surviving family members of those killed by our actions. These deaths should have never happened."


So why do they keep occurring?

Some of the belligerent responses to these reports blame Afghans themselves, or the Taliban for using civilian shields. This blissful thinking ignores the existence of guerrilla warfare, choosing the preferred “American” way of making war over the necessary strategy of counterinsurgency, and discards the fact that Petraeus himself recognizes civilian casualties as a key factor in victory or defeat. Conventional warfare aims to crush a population; counterinsurgency aims to win that population’s trust.

However, Petraeus is also the brainchild behind NATO’s escalation of night-raids and air-assaults, and he’s futilely attempting to have it both ways. Mixups are always going to happen. One coalition official explained, "What seemed to have happened was that there was an error between what the people on the ground were passing up and what the helicopters got.”

Isn’t this often the problem?

A relative decrease in civilian casualties compared to the Taliban isn’t enough to win Afghans’ permanent trust. The Pentagon cannot avoid the reality that Afghans blame foreign forces regardless of whose at fault for their deaths. And anti-foreign sentiment runs particularly high in Kunar. By accusing local political officials and residents of allegiance to the Taliban, one is admitting the closeness between the two. Nor do apologies mean much in a province where foreigners are universally unwanted, where TV and Internet use is low.

Like the attack in Ghaziabad, the truth is often determined by perceptions that favor the Taliban.

Said Mohammed Bismil, the 20-year-old brother of two boys killed in the strike, "I don't care about the apology. The only option I have is to pick up a Kalashnikov, RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] or a suicide vest to fight."

Raymond Davis Nears Trial, U.S. Scrambling

LAHORE: A Pakistani court on Thursday said that the murder trial of a CIA contractor would go ahead, despite the insistence of the US government that he has diplomatic immunity.

The issue of his claim to diplomatic immunity is pending before the Pakistani High Court which is due to rule on it on March 14.

According to one Pakistani source of The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, Davis going to trial would be an "atomic bomb” for U.S.-Pakistani relations. A little humbleness from an obstinate Washington could go a long way.

Yemen's Saleh "Agrees" to Resign Within Year

Seeing will be believing. From the Saleh-friendly Wall Street Journal:

Yemen's president and opposition members agreed to a deal late Wednesday that opponents said gives the president until year's end to work out a framework for his eventual exit and that would rule out handing down power to his son.

A government official confirmed late Wednesday that the sides had reached "common ground" on opposition demands, but gave no details. The plan opposition leaders described, which would give President Ali Abdullah Saleh nearly a year to work out how he would eventually transfer power, would mark a softening from their demands earlier Wednesday that he step down this year.

Mr. Saleh, should he agree to a plan to transfer power, would become the third regional leader to step aside in the wave of protests against regimes across the region, following the ousters of Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak earlier this year.

Following weeks of unrest in Yemen as protesters sought Mr. Saleh's ouster and democratic reforms, Mr. Saleh's government met late Wednesday with representatives from the Joint Meeting Party, a coalition of opposition groups, both sides said.

Afterward, the Joint Meeting Party said in a statement: "The president agreed to determine the series of step that he will take to leave power, with no inheritance, during a period of time that will not extend beyond this year."

The government official familiar with the meeting wouldn't comment on whether the plan involves a departure date for Mr. Saleh. "The plan proposed to the ruling party was favorably received," the official said, adding the government would issue a formal response statement Thursday.

Earlier Wednesday, opposition leaders offered Mr. Saleh a five-point plan of demands that called for the president to leave power by year's end and sought for all political parties in Yemen to confer on the best way to transfer power democratically.

A protest leader said early Thursday that any agreement by the sides wouldn't be accepted unless the president was to leave immediately, underscoring the distance that remains between many protesters and some Joint Meeting Party leaders, many of whom include politicians who have provided loyal opposition to Mr. Saleh for years.

Mr. Saleh, who has been in power for more than 30 years, has been an important regional ally for the U.S. Washington has provided millions of dollars in military aid to Mr. Saleh's government to help him battle an increasingly ambitious Yemen-based affiliate of al Qaeda. The Yemen-based group claimed responsibility for the Christmas Day 2009 attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound jet and a thwarted plot to send explosives to the U.S. aboard cargo planes late last year.

The president said in February he wouldn't run for election when his term ends in 2013. In January, he said he wouldn't hand power over to his son Ahmed Saleh but the opposition have continued to voice concerns that he would do so.

Earlier Wednesday, Mr. Saleh told the White House that he regretted any "misunderstandings" created when he accused the U.S. of conspiring to foment Arab unrest, the White House said.
In a telephone call with John Brennan, President Barack Obama's top counterterrorism adviser, Mr. Saleh conveyed "his regret for misunderstandings related to his public remarks," according to a White House statement. Mr. Brennan told Mr. Saleh that the sentiments that were expressed were "unhelpful."

Mr. Saleh was quoted Tuesday as telling hundreds of students and academics at San'a University that he would "reveal a secret" that there is an "operations room in Tel Aviv with the aim of destabilizing the Arab world." He said the White House ran the operations room.

The White House statement didn't say whether Mr. Saleh clarified his position in the telephone call with Mr. Brennan. U.S. officials have urged Mr. Saleh to implement political reforms to address the demands of opposition groups.

Reform remains the White House's operative word. But Saleh is close to becoming the latest revolutionary casualty. A year leaves too much time to implement one of his schemes.

America’s Latest Excuse in Yemen: It’s the Iranians

Hillary Clinton surely received a video call from Jerusalem after Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's rant. Now, dripping with irony, the Secretary of State is choosing the easiest way out over self-reflection: blame Tehran.

"They are using Hezbollah... to communicate with counterparts... in (the Palestinian movement) Hamas who then in turn communicate with counterparts in Egypt," she told the Senate Appropriations Committee. "We know that they are reaching out to the opposition in Bahrain. We know that the Iranians are very much involved in the opposition movements in Yemen.”

Among other actors, Iran is accused of funding the Shia Houthi tribe - the same tribe Saleh and Saudi Arabia have bombed and shot at with U.S. technology. What else can be expected since no one supports them? Washington's response mirrors the incoherence of Saleh, supporting protesters while simultaneously demonizing the opposition.

But given America and Israel's coordination, the truth in Saleh's "conspiracy" cannot be denied. And luckily for Yemen's opposition, their involvement has only hastened Saleh's fall.

Saleh’s New Scam: “Apologize” to White House

Not so surprising that Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh has backtracked on his conspiratorial threats against America and Israel. This, too, is one of his tactics - excusing intentional remarks as “a misunderstanding.” According to the White House, Saleh called counter-terrorism chief John Brennan "to convey his regret for misunderstandings related to his public remarks that Israel and the United States have engaged in destabilizing activities in Arab countries."

And a silent Washington, so willing to defy Yemen’s will and keep Saleh in power, has publicly accepted his apology.

Said Brennan, “President Saleh also said that he is firmly committed to meaningful political reform in Yemen and that he is reaching out to opposition elements in an effort to achieve reform through a democratic, inclusive, and peaceful process.”

An interesting view that defies Yemen’s evolving revolution.

Protesters are unlikely to recognize the ruler that Brennan describes. Just today, the U.S. embassy in Sana’a released a belated warning that, "authorities have recently committed violations against the press including blocking websites and threatening to deport and abusing international correspondents.” In the southern port city of Aden, stronghold of the secessionist Southern Movement, Saleh has arrested dozens of SM officials as they try to organized protests in the south. Clashes between Saleh loyalists and the northern Houthi tribe have broken out in recent days. Neither group holds any trust in Saleh’s “dialogue,” if one can call it that.

And, of course, only yesterday America and Israel were responsible for this unrest.

The quick and quiet acceptance of Saleh’s “apology” is merely the latest sign of a broken, helpless U.S. policy in Yemen. While the opposition is reportedly considering a transitional period before Saleh’s exit, their demands are unlikely to be fulfilled as usual, a pattern that contributes to Yemen’s heated stalemate. His desperate accusation against America and Israel - a destabilizing “conspiracy” Yemenis would agree with given unilateral U.S. support for Saleh - added more evidence of why he cannot be taken seriously. Refusing to become distracted by diversionary measures, Yemen’s popular opposition remains adamant about securing the president’s exit.

Only America, Saleh, and his dwindling tribal allies want him to survive - and maybe a flourishing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Propping him up will inevitably lead to his fall, although we see what lengths Washington will go through to close its eyes.

Countdown: Saleh's Regime Falls in March

Yemen Post editorial:

With all the advice President Saleh was given to avoid his regime fall, Saleh insisted on following the same tactics his fallen friends Mubarak and Bin Ali thought were correct.

Killing protesters, attacking journalists, threatening opposition followers, and vowing to fight until last drop of blood is what Yemen witnessed in February.

We expected reforms, actions not promises, dialogue with opposition, and ending family control over the Yemeni military. That did not take place and that is why the regime will fall in March.

A senior opposition official we spoke to said, “For us as opposition, the easiest way to destroy the current regime is to stay aside and watch it destroy itself by the wrong policies it takes.” It seems that the opposition are not as stupid as people thought they were.

With Saleh’s own Hashed tribe stabbing him in the back and demanding that his regime falls, the countdown starts today for the fall of Yemen’s current regime.

Everyone in Yemen is an enemy according to the regime. The southerners are separatists, the northerners are rebels, tribes are barbarians, and the political parties are foreign agents, which leaves no one loyal to the country except the ruling family that has stolen billions of dollars of wealth that belonged to the family.

Saleh should have built a prosperous nation in the 32 years in rule, and that was much more than enough time.

Saleh must force his sons, nephews, in laws, and his 18 close relatives in power to step down from power before they all fall, him included. Saleh is still respected in Yemen, but if he plays his cards unwisely over the next ten days, his respect will fall when he falls.

Recent history has proved that the unexpected can be expected at anytime and without prior notice. The magic carpet of yesterday is the falling carpet of today.

Saleh described ruling Yemen like dancing on heads of snakes, so, most likely by the end of March, Saleh will be unemployed and not dancing on heads of snakes.

Hakim Almasmari is the publisher and editor-in-chief of Yemen Post Newspaper.

Quotes of the Day

"The Yemeni government's legitimacy was already low before all this started, especially in the south, and now it is worse. And now it is worse."

- General James Jones (ret.), President Barack Obama's former National Security Adviser

"In the context of AQAP [being able to] launch an attack and the partnership that Saleh has extended to us, it is in our homeland security interest that he continue to work with us. We can't have partners that attack their own citizens. I hope they survive [because] we can't see who the next leader will be."

- Garry Reid, deputy Secretary of Defensee for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism

A helpless impression of U.S. foreign policy.

White House Should Consider Siddiqui-Davis Swap

Last year the White House was offered a shortcut to rehabilitating America’s image in Pakistan. As Aafia Siddiqui’s New York trial descended into a circus, Siddiqui blaming her arrest on a “Zionist” plot and the U.S. prosecution rejecting her claim to mental illness, the Pakistani people rallied behind what they saw as the latest American injustice. Anti-U.S sentiment overflowed as Pakistani Prime Minister Rauf Gilani privately advised, “visiting American delegations that releasing Aafia Siddiqui unconditionally would greatly improve the image of the Americans in the public’s eyes.”

The White House scoffed and threw Siddiqui in jail for 83 years. Now it’s balked a second time at what could be the “cleanest” deal available for CIA spy Raymond Davis. Pakistani sources have revealed that Islamabad submitted the exchange, and received the reply that it was “a non-starter” because “these were two different cases.” Isn't that the point?

America’s response to Davis’s arrest can summed in the ancient proverb: cutting off one’s nose to spite the face.

Washington’s position is understandable in a legal vacuum, where precedent rules, and at the global level. Believing that Davis qualifies for diplomatic immunity under his employment at a U.S. consulate, the White House doesn’t want to negotiate and weaken its claim over the rest of Davis’s kind. Doing so may compromise other agents operating in diplomatic limbo.

With Pakistan running a new status check, the CIA has already suspended over 30 agents in Pakistan, at least publicly, while another 12 have fled the country. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry registers 851 Americans with diplomatic immunity, 297 of which work outside a diplomatic capacity, while sources at the Interior Ministry estimate the total of non-diplomats at 414. Many of these 'special Americans' are suspected covert US intelligence agents reporting to the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

They also disregard the Foreigners Act of 1946, which states that foreign citizens are not allowed to live in cantonment areas. Suspected agents in Lahore allegedly live within the Officers'/Generals' Colony on Sarwar Road and Cavalry Ground in the Lahore Cantonment. Some believe they stay hidden within the military’s security apparatus because Delta Force is “considered armed and dangerous,” or just to monitor and keep them out of view.

Not all of this information need be true to paint a realistic picture of what’s happening. These are the “diplomats” that President Barack Obama personally and explicitly claims to possess immunity, "diplomats" who used to work for Blackwater. And they do great damage to America’s wider interests in the region by becoming its face.

Thus while Davis’s unconditional release satisfies Washington’s legal and military interests abroad, this outcome negatively affects the war in Afghanistan and stability in South Asia.

Although Washington demands that Islamabad understand its position on Davis, the White House has rejected all inquiries into Siddiqui’s release. After attempting to kill U.S. troops, Siddiqui’s release would trigger a conservative backlash and possibly even liberal disapproval. The White House sees no need to trade the “murderous” Siddiqui for the “self-defensive” Davis - and cause a PR disaster in the process. Why trade a guilty person for an innocent person?

If the guilty isn’t so guilty and the innocent not so innocent.

Defending Siddiqui is unnecessary. For argumentative purposes she can guilty on all charges: her bag of U.S. targets and a laundry list of attempted murder charges. These specifics gain more importance during peace time, but during counterinsurgency perceptions come to influence and often dominate reality. Image control becomes equal to tactical and legal considerations. As America repeatedly fails to realize in Pakistan, perceptions are an integral part of long-term strategy during COIN.

At the time of her trial, U.S. and some Pakistani analysts blamed the country’s feverish media for drumming up anti-American sentiment. Perhaps the situation would be different if Pakistanis generally liked Americans, but this idealistic thinking ignores the initial absence of trust. The abysmal track record of U.S. policy is responsible for anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan, not Pakistanis, their media, and nationalistic officials.

“The iconization of Aafia Siddiqui as an emblem of Pakistani womanhood represents the kind of female rebel acceptable in a rapidly Islamizing Pakistani society,” said Dawn columnist Rafia Zakaria. “Leaving a husband for a second marriage, traveling alone, even putting your children in harm’s way, all acts that would be otherwise reviled, became acceptable when they are done with the ultimate aim of defying the United States."

Both Siddiqui’s own feelings and the perceptions surrounding her are products of short-sighted, authoritarian U.S. policy, not random acts of violence and aggression. Her treatment enraged Pakistanis because of long-standing perceived hypocrisy.

“On Dr Aafia Siddiqui, the Americans are showing no leniency,” the source said. “They have informed Pakistan that they are not even going to pursue it.”

As an alternative, Washington is considering a swap for an ISI chief on trial for links to the Mumbai massacre, which left four Americans and two Israeli-Americans dead. The move was already under review, according to Pakistani sources, and, “At one stage, the Americans were going to file papers in the court, stating that the ISI chief enjoyed sovereign immunity but decided not to do so after Mr. Davis’s arrest.” The CIA has waited to play their chip every since.

Except this swap still doesn’t repair the weakest link in U.S.-Pakistani relations. The CIA and ISI may reset their “rules of the game,” as every official seems to say, yet this backroom arrangement leaves the wider relationship between Pakistanis, their own government, and Washington in the gutter. Pakistani officials admit that stiff punishment back in America is unlikely, which would compound resentment. And Siddiqui, supposedly insane from her treatment, poses no danger if kept in confinement and treated.

Americans tend to think that Islamabad doesn’t value their lives. Washington shares the mentality that U.S. life comes before Pakistani life - and wonders how Islamabad could put Pakistanis before Americans. Releasing Siddiqui would be perceived as equal. Conversely, Davis’s unconditional escape or blood money transfer will further alienate a key long-term asset in the Pakistani public.

Then Washington is choosing to continue making enemies and lacing targets, rather than bring true peace to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Clinton Tunes Out Yemen's Revolution, Saleh's Threats

Anyone needing a good laugh and quick cry may want to peruse Hillary Clinton’s remarks to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Secretary of State has some interesting thoughts on Afghanistan, where “integrated military and civilian surges have helped set the stage for our diplomatic surge to support Afghan-led reconciliation that can end the conflict.” Sounds perfect. Describing the benefits of non-military aid, Clinton claims that it “focuses on these same goals in Somalia,” although she glosses over the minimal and interrupted flow of Western aid. She even takes credit for Egypt's revolution, explaining of U.S. military assistance, “over the years, these funds have created valuable ties with foreign militaries and trained, in Egypt, a generation of officers who refused to fire on their own people.”

Then Clinton got extra greedy: “even as our civilians help bring today’s wars to a close, we are working to prevent tomorrow’s. This budget devotes over $4 billion to sustaining a strong U.S. presence in volatile places where our security and interests are at stake. In Yemen, it provides security, development, and humanitarian assistance to deny al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula a safe haven and to promote the kind of stability that can lead to a better outcome than what might otherwise occur.”

So concerned is America with Yemen’s democracy that Clinton’s brief remarks broke a three week silence over the country’s aspiring revolution. Now she’s paying a karmic price, choosing the most timely opportunity to expose the hypocrisy of U.S. policy. As Clinton busied herself stumping for Yemen, embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh had already blamed his country’s unrest on America and Israel.

"What happened in the Arab world is plotted by Israel and run by the White House through manipulating international media," Saleh announced at a press conference at Sana’a University, where tens of thousands gather to protest his 32-year rule... "There is an operation room in Tel Aviv with the aim of destabilizing the Arab world. It is all run by the White House."

Turns out the White House did address Yemen’s conflict on Tuesday. State spokesman Philip Crowley Tweeted, “The protests in Yemen are not the product of external conspiracies. President Saleh knows better. His people deserve a better response.”

Needing no help in falsifying her statements, Clinton’s remarks on Yemen would still rot away in isolation. Washington concentrated almost solely on military aid until 2010, a delay that currently cripples U.S. policy. Furthermore, with 2011 military aid set at $250 million, Washington is boosting humanitarian aid as a direct reaction to international and local criticism. And of the $4 billion spread out globally, only several hundred million is allocated to Yemen’s non-military needs, a problem compounded by government corruption and misappropriation.

Yemen’s urban youth and rural tribes now build their numbers to critical mass because U.S. aid failed to reach them, because it’s too late to deliver sincere economic reform and development. Being tied together, Yemenis believe in America’s economic reform as little as they do in Saleh’s.

As economic development proved ineffective in Yemenis’ lives and in countering al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), one cannot legitimately argue that U.S. policy generates security in Yemen. Saleh’s inattentiveness and hostility towards rural tribes, the northern Houthis, and Southern Movement brought the country to its present and potentially violent stalemate. Material support of certain tribes ripened the conditions for a mass tribal backlash rather than resolve their local needs. And in the south, as Saleh threatens the SM for fomenting division, Yemeni security forces continue to crack down on protesters in the southern port of Aden.

In turn, SM official Nasser al-Khabji, told the Reuters news agency, "More separatist supporters are moving into the area, the situation is tense.”

Though this course of action falls into Saleh’s trap of preaching “unity” to crush the SM, it also negates Clinton’s sunny perspective in Yemen. Her remarks represent a dream world to those protesters trying to topple the regime. Behind the revolution lies a unilateral U.S. backdrop. All segments of the opposition hold grievances against Washington, either for supporting Saleh’s crackdown in the name of AQAP or for relegating marginalized Yemenis to a secondary priority.

The fact that Clinton spoke after Yemen’s besieged president crystallizes the impression that she didn’t even watch the news, another disturbingly belated reaction from the White House. Saleh’s accusations take her remarks to an unthinkable level. To tacitly praise him as he’s accusing America highlights Saleh’s rogue nature towards America. Many Yemenis believe he uses U.S. influence to solidify his own rule, extending the fight against AQAP as he pushes back against Washington’s orders, only to later scapegoat the White House anyway.

As Clinton defends U.S. policy in Yemen, Saleh has denounced U.S. policy as the source of instability in "his" country. He’s right in his own way, too. A strong U.S. presence contributes to the volatility of Yemen, rather than alleviating it. AQAP has increased in strength and profile since U.S. policy escalated in December 2009, and will continue to rise without a primary emphasis on non-military operations. Which means changing the way Washington handles Saleh.

The Secretary’s irony sinks to the deepest depths. Beyond competing with “Colonel” Gaddafi to make the craziest statements, Saleh allegedly funds Hezbollah out of their Shia ties. While U.S. policy isolates Iran because of its animosity towards Israel, one of Jerusalem’s leading boosters declares her support for another of Israel’s enemies. Yemenis can actually agree with Saleh - they do believe Washington and Israel are destabilizing their country.

And they deserve a better response from America than this hazardous spill of propaganda.