The Trench

Egypt’s Interim Government Calls Out America

2012-02-15T11:20:00.000-08:00

The tête-à-tête may appear, on the surface, to be a case of powerful forces colliding.

Back from Cairo to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Martin Dempsey relayed the outcome of last weekend’s summit with his Egyptian counterparts. Relations hit a speed-bump in January after black-clad security units rolled up U.S.-funded organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI). Since then, the Obama administration has attempted to rescue a group of Americans holed up in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, free 19 citizens charged by the state, and restore U.S.-Egyptian ties all at once.

"I spent about a day-and-half in conversation with them, encouraging them in the strongest possible terms to resolve this so that our military-to-military relationship could continue," Dempsey said of his meetings with General Hussein Tantawi and Lt. General Sami Anan. "I am convinced that potentially they were underestimating the impact of this on our relationship. When I left there, there was no doubt that they understood the seriousness of it."

Despite the tough rhetoric and actions on both sides, Dempsey and Tantawi represent two forces battling to maintain their influence in post-Mubarak Egypt. The collective strength of Washington and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces has been infected with weakness, forcing them to expend maximum energy on protecting their interests. Human rights activist Hossam Bahgat warns, “The consistent message of vilification of human rights has become much worse since these raids and these indictments.” In response to the SCAF’s raids and ensuing campaign against them, the U.S. Senate has urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not to approve $1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million in economic assistance unless the situation is resolved.

Yet the current balance of power suggests that the SCAF is winning its game of chicken with Washington. Clinton can waive the Senate’s advisory by invoking America’s national security, but the SCAF is betting on the fact that most Egyptians don’t accept U.S. financial support with strings attached. Unless the Obama administration is willing to cut off political support, an unlikely possibility, Washington has few cards to play against the SCAF. The generals appear to realize that they hold the upper hand and, after marking Dempsey’s return to Washington with a sheet of charges against NGO staff, Egyptian officials proceeded to launch a verbal blitzkrieg on America as a whole.

According to International Cooperation Minister Faiza Aboul Naga, “The American determination and persistence to support these organizations to engage in political activities is a blatant violation of the law, which represents clear harm to national security.”

Like the NGO case, Naga’s comments could reflect weakness even though the SCAF is attempting to display its strength. Her comments stem from testimony given to two judges in October, and some activists are questioning the level of coordination over the release of her statements. Oppositional elements accuse the SCAF of timing its raids to November’s parliamentary election and wielding anti-U.S. rhetoric to stunt demands for an accelerated transition to civilian rule. As for Naga’s statements (published by the state-run MENA and major dailies), political analyst Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid cautioned, "It looks like an escalation, but I don't know if it is intended or it reflects a state of confusion in the conduct of domestic and foreign policies in Egypt.”

The New York Times would later report a rift between Tantawi and Naga, who is keen to secure U.S. aid on the government’s terms. In any event, the SCAF’s overall escalation against Washington indicates that the generals believe they hold the high ground. Instead of making any sincere attempt to repair damaged ties, Egypt’s interim government dutifully submitted its charges to Washington and proceeded to accuse the White House of wishing ill fortune on Egyptians.

"Evidence shows the existence of a clear and determined wish to abort any chance for Egypt to rise as a modern and democratic state with a strong economy since that will pose the biggest threat to American and Israeli interests, not only in Egypt, but in the whole region," Naga was quoted as saying. “But the United States and Israel could not directly create and sustain a state of chaos, so they used direct funding, especially American, as the means to reach those goals...”

“When presented this way, most Egyptians side with their army and against the Americans,” Bahgat predicted.

Many of Naga’s statements are embedded with kernels of truth. The Minister claims that Egypt’s “January 25 revolution was a surprise to the United States, and that it was out of America’s control, when the revolution transformed into a massive popular uprising all over Egypt.” She added that Washington “tried to hijack the January 25 revolution and manipulate the situation in Egypt in accordance with its interests.” These factual statements are aimed at Egypt’s midsection, but Naga’s words cannot distract revolutionaries from the SCAF’s own hijacking or the Obama administration's support for Tantawi’s “transition.”

Dempsey’s visit to Cairo is thus rendered a bluff. Like all preceding U.S. officials, his single-minded emphasis on NGOs amplifies Washington’s counter-revolutionary tone. The White House and Pentagon would like nothing more than to bury the NGO controversy and return to praising the SCAF’s “leadership.” Egypt’s generals (and former members of Mubarark’s regime) realize that they can back Washington down and escape with minimal damage; Port Said’s tragedy and two weeks of protests were effortlessly ignored. The Obama administration may not lay down a large check, but it is equally unlikely to demand accountability for the SCAF’s politico-security crackdown.

So what reason does Tantawi and company have to change their behavior?

Bahrain’s Feb14 “Anniversary” Burns Bright

2012-02-14T15:49:00.000-08:00

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has demonstrated his ability to blend into the Arab revolutionary wave and minimize the international fallout on his island. Employing low-intensity riot control, a decision partially based on the absence of a mechanized army, is keeping casualties and their ensuing scrutiny to a minimum (this ratio increases on a per capita basis). The King swiftly demolished Pearl Monument to prevent protesters from gathering at its base; the site now goes by the name of Al Farooq Junction, in reference to Caliph Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, or "Gulf Cooperation Council Roundabout.”

At Bahrain’s political level King Hamad crafts the appearance of being eager to reform his government, further reducing international pressure to act. U.S. politics, media and lobbyists contribute to the blackout of Bahrain’s uprising, primarily under the banner of containing Iranian influence in the Gulf.

"We don't get as much coverage as Syria or Libya, but with our limited resources we have done our best," Nabeel Rajab, founder of the Bahraini Center for Human Rights (BCHR), told The Atlantic's Karen Leigh. "The global media has ignored Bahrain. I understand that, and I don't expect the American media to talk about a revolution when no one [in] the American government is talking about Bahrain. The same with the British and Europeans. Because of that, we were marginalized in the media."

However denial often increases the scope and depth of a problem, and the King is equally prone to aggravating his island’s fault-lines. Inviting the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield into Manama created a back-draft effect, temporarily suffocating the uprising’s oxygen before releasing its energy. Superficial “dialogues” and reforms have eroded the political opposition’s remaining trust and irreversibly alienated street protesters - yesterday Hamad went so far as to claim Bahrain has no opposition. He also told Der Speigel that “there are no ‘political prisoners’ as such in Bahrain,” only “criminals.”

When asked how the word “Arab Spring” sounds, the King responds, “Arab Spring? That's the business of other countries. If you mean by ‘Arab Spring’ the call for democratic reform, then we started that process 10 years ago. We were one of the first to have parliamentary elections in the Arab world. It worked.”

Al Wefaq boycotted September’s snap election for Bahrain’s impotent Lower Chamber, citing the need for comprehensive political reform. Its response on Tuesday: “What is happening in Bahrain is an integral part of the uprising of the Arab peoples against oppression, dictatorship, and administrative and financial corruption and sectarian discrimination, sectarian, tribal and human rights violations and violating domestic and international laws and transform our countries into private farms controlled by the few at the expense of other citizens.”

Hamad staunchly denies that Peninsula Shield units roved Bahrain’s streets during 2011, even though the force was instrumental in suppressing the initial outbreak of protests. Personnel from two Saudi moons, non-GCC members Jordan and Pakistan still helm checkpoints across Manama. The cumulative effect of his politico-security campaign is now filling the international media with accounts of Bahrain’s atmosphere, including numerous statements from human rights organizations. Rajab would mock the government for removing foreign monitors, Twittering, “There are a lot of international observers now in the villages where protests are in Bahrain & deporting 5 of them will not have much impact.”

A partial rejection of various international media figures, such as the NYT’s Nick Kristof and CSM’s Kristen Chick, doesn’t appear to be yielding fruit. Even hackers such as Anonymous are joining the netwar by taking down Combined Systems Inc (CSI), the main supplier of tear gas to Gulf states.

The King should realize that “zero tolerance” often encourages political defiance, but this understanding doesn’t appear to have set in. In a statement issued on Monday night, Gen. Tariq Hassan al-Hassan blamed “terrorists, rioters and saboteurs” (the most common revolutionary slander) for the day’s violence. Bahrain's public security chief argued, “Security forces had to deal with the situation legally to restore things into normal." That a minority of protesters are engaging in more violent acts cannot be denied; “Molotovers” have been criticized by opposition members and average demonstrators alike. At the same time, maintaining a purely peaceful uprising is nearly impossible when violently suppressed.

Al Wefaq’s legally-approved rally and periphery protesters were still assaulted, and Mohammed al-Maskati (president of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights), said by phone, “They are storming houses suspected of harboring demonstrators, using tear gas, closing roads and arresting people." Senior Al Wefaq member Abdul Jalil Khalil warned of Bahrain’s more radicalized youth: "Of course we can't control them.”

After funneling protesters to al-Muqsha’s ad hoc “Freedom Square” as a crowd control measure, police vehicles finally occupied the spot in an attempt to smother all pro-democracy demonstrations. This tactic will disperse protesters into Manama’s outskirts and the capital’s core, creating the type of organized chaos witnessed on Monday and Tuesday. Numerous groups of protesters managed to reach the edge of Pearl before they were met with tear gas and birdshot. In one of many statements released by Al Wefaq and its political allies, the oppositional umbrella condemned security forces for “reverting to the worst of medieval practices, including assaulting peaceful people.”

The ultimate result of King Hamad’s “reform” is conflagration on February 14th.

While the King busies himself convincing his followers and the international community that 2011 was an anomaly, Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement aims to prove the opposite: this is no one-year event, but an indefinite struggle for equal rights and representation. To this end King Hamad has staged several “dialogues” with the opposition, each collapsing due to imbalanced representation, and another is reportedly coming down the political pipeline. The King naturally blamed the opposition for these developments.

When told that some Bahrainis desire more than a welfare state - “more participation and political reform” - Hamad responded, “We have made political reforms. We have just passed a number of amendments to the constitution which allow parliament to dismiss the government. We invited everyone with openness. But some people boycotted the election and certain people just walked out of parliament. If you want a better system you have to join...”

The King has a point about joining a process to improve it. Other times the system must be scrapped or totally renovated in order to function properly. Bahrain’s political opposition is unwilling to engage on the King’s present terms, within a fabricated “National Dialogue” that will jeopardize its standing in the streets. Al Wefaq’s president, Ali Salman, explicitly addressed his negotiating dilemma on Monday, saying, “They talk about it. They don't mean it." Al Wefaq and its allies later called a dialogue “pointless and not feasible” for not meeting “basic demands.” Thus the government is simultaneously blocking political outlets and condemning the use of violence.

“The authorities have essentially opted for the security solution, which has led to the current impasse and the resumption of large-scale protests,” said Mansour al-Jamri, who was reinstated as editor of the Al Wasat daily after being temporarily removed in April. “A year later and we’re back to square one. The crisis could escalate unless the authorities come up with a positive initiative to revive dialogue with the opposition.”

Yet King Hamad and his family has displayed no signs of implementing extensive reforms in parliament, the judiciary and security apparatus, instead opting for minimal refinements to the present system. Bahrain’s monarchy will only give what it is forced to give, leaving protesters no other choice except to intensify their activities. Failure to channel the streets’ energy also trends towards the more disturbing scenario of Shia-Sunni civil strife. International attention will presumably fade away after February 14th and assume Bahrain’s normal cycle, but 2011 should have taught King Hamad that protesters will keep returning to Pearl. The only way to stop them is by satisfying their political aspirations.

Al Wefaq advises, “The political associations call for the King of Bahrain to listen to the voice of his people and stop the machine of repression.”

Daniel Davis Fights Pentagon Over Afghanistan's "Truth"

2012-02-13T17:06:00.000-08:00

Earlier this month Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis dropped a bombshell on his Pentagon superiors in an AFJ article titled: Truth, lies and Afghanistan. Davis spent 2011 crisscrossing the warzone as a member of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF), a unit tasked to improving the material conditions of U.S. forces, affording him access to a wide range of operations and layers of Afghan society. He concluded that what he saw “bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.”

“I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.”

The New York Times reports that Davis expected to “get nuked” for his 84-page assessment; he says Pentagon officials disagree with his report but have since assured him that no “adverse action” is forthcoming.” In any event, the Obama administration’s new barrage of “progress propaganda” may come early this winter, and conservative media elements have already assailed Davis’s position. His full report can be downloaded here.

The following report is authored by IPS’s Gareth Porter:

WASHINGTON - An analysis by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, which the US Army has not approved for public release but has been leaked to Rolling Stone magazine, provides the most authoritative refutation thus far of the official military narrative of success in the Afghanistan War since the troop surge began in early 2010.

In the 84-page unclassified report, Davis, who returned last autumn after his second tour of duty in Afghanistan, attacks the credibility of claims by senior military leaders that the warstrategy led by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has succeeded in weakening the Taliban insurgent forces and in building Afghan security forces capable of taking primary responsibility for security in the future.

The report, which Davis had submitted to the army in January for clearance to make it public, was posted on the website of Rolling Stone magazine by journalist Michael Hastings on Friday. In a blog for the magazine, Hastings reported that "officials familiar with the situation" had said the Pentagon was "refusing" to release the report, but that it had been making the rounds within the US government, including the White House.

Hastings wrote that he had obtained it from a US government official. Contacted by IPS Friday, Davis would not comment on the publication of the report or its contents.

Writing that he is "no Wikileaks guy Part II", Davis reveals no classified information in the report. But he has given a classified version of the report, which cites and quotes from dozens of classified documents, to several members of the House and Senate, including both Democrats and Republicans.

"If the public had access to the classified reports," Davis writes, "they would see the dramatic gulf between what is often said in public by our senior leaders and what is true behind the scenes."

Davis is in a unique position to assess the real situation on the ground in Afghanistan. As a staff officer of the "Rapid Equipping Force", he traveled more than 14,500 kilometers to every area where US troop presence was significant and had conversations with more than 250 US soldiers, from privates to division commanders.

The report takes aim at the March 2011 Congressional testimony by General David Petraeus, then the top commander in Afghanistan, and the Defense Department's April 2011 Report to Congress as either "misleading, significantly skewed or completely inaccurate".

Davis attacks the claim in both the Petraeus testimony and the DOD report that US and NATO forces had "arrested the insurgents' momentum" and "reversed it in a number of important areas".

That claim is belied, Davis argues, by the fact that the number of insurgent attacks, the number of improvized explosive devices (IEDs) found and detonated and the number of US troops killed and wounded have all continued to mount since 2009, the last year before the addition of 30,000 US troops and 10,000 NATO troops.

Davis notes that Petraeus and other senior officials of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the US-NATO command in Afghanistan, have boasted of having killed and captured thousands of insurgent leaders and rank and file soldiers, cut insurgent supply routes and found large numbers of weapons caches as well as depriving the insurgents of their main bases of operation since spring 2010.

If these claims were accurate measures of success, Davis writes, after the Taliban had been driven out of their strongholds, "there ought to have been a reduction in violence not a continual, unbroken string of increases".

In fact, Davis writes, Taliban attacks "continued to rise at almost the same rate it had risen since 2005 all the way through the summer of 2011" and remained "well above 2009 levels in the second half of 2011" even though it leveled off or dropped slightly in some places.

Davis notes that total attacks, total number of IEDs and total US casualties in 2011 were 82%, 113% and 164% higher, respectively, than the figures for 2009, the last year before the surge of 30,000 troops. The annual number of US dead and wounded increased from 1,764 in 2009 to 4,662 in 2011.

The veteran Army officer quotes Congressional testimony by Admiral Mike Mullen on December 2, 2009, as citing a lesser increase in Taliban attacks in 2009 of 60% over the 2008 level as a rationale for a significant increase in US troop strength in Afghanistan, implying that the war was being lost.

Davis leaves no doubt about his overall assessment that the US war effort has failed. "Even a cursory observation of key classified reports and metrics," Davis concludes, "leads overwhelmingly to the conclusion that over the past two years, despite the surge of 30,000 American Soldiers, the insurgent force has gained strength..."

Davis is also scathing in his assessment of the Afghan army and police, who have been described as constantly improving and on their way to taking responsibility for fighting the insurgents.

"What I saw first-hand, in virtually every circumstance," writes Davis, "was a barely functioning organization - often cooperating with the insurgent enemy..."

Both in his longer report and in an article for Armed Forces Journal published online on February 5, Davis recounts his experience at an Afghan National Police station in Kunar province in January 2011. Arriving two hours after a Taliban attack on the station, Davis asked the police captain whether he had sent out patrols to find the insurgents.

After the question had been conveyed by the interpreter, Davis recalls, "The captain's head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed."

"No! We don't go after them," he quotes the captain as saying. "That would be dangerous!"

According to Davis, US troops who work with Afghan policemen in that province say they "rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints", allowing the Taliban to "literally run free".

Describing the overall situation, Davis writes, "[I]n a number of high profile mission opportunities over the past 11 months the ANA [Afghan National Army] and ANP [Afghan National Police] have numerous times run from the battle, run from rumors, or made secret deals with the Taliban."

The draft posted online notes after that statement that the classified version of the paper has been "redacted", indicating that Davis provides further details about those "secret deals" in the classified version.

The Army dissenter calls on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to "conduct a bi-partisan investigation into the various charges of deception or dishonesty in this report". He urges that such a hearing include testimony not only from senior military officials but from mid- and senior-level intelligence analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.

Both Senate and House Armed Services Committees have exhibited little or no interest in probing behind the official claims of success in Afghanistan. That passive role reflects what many political observers, including some members of congress, see as cozy relationships among most committee members, military leaders, Pentagon officials and major military contractors.

It remains to be seen whether Davis's raising of the issue of misleading claims of success in a front-page New York Times story on February 6 and in subsequent television appearances will bring pressure on those committees from other members to hold hearings on whether senior military officials are telling the truth about the situation in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the US military leadership in Afghanistan is brushing off Davis's critique as having no importance. During a briefing in which he claimed continued steady progress in Afghanistan, Army Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti, deputy commander of US Forces-Afghanistan, dismissed the Davis report as "one person's view of this."

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006. (Inter Press Service)

Bahraini King’s Hubris Fuels Uprising

2012-02-12T18:52:00.000-08:00

Maybe he wants to increase the scale of his crackdown.

Seemingly daring Bahrain’s opposition to erupt on February 14th, King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa issued one of his most inflammatory public statements since the uprising began. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Hamad hinted at the secondary objective of recent U.S. visits by telling Bashar al-Assad, “The best advice for him is to listen to the Syrian people.” He then attempted to deny the existence of Bahrain’s uprising.

"I regret the events of last year," the King told Der Spiegel during an interview due for Monday’s publication. "In a sense there is no 'opposition' in Bahrain, as the phrase implies one unified block with the same views. Such a phrase is not in our constitution, unlike say the United Kingdom. We only have people with different views and that's OK."

Hamad’s reasoning suggests a feigned ignorance towards fourth-generation warfare (4GW) and politics in general. By qualifying the definition of “opposition,” Hamad is announcing that no opposition exists to his rule - some people merely have “different views.” Except an “opposition” doesn’t necessitate unity in a political sphere, and the King’s formal usage of the term viscerally jars with the conventional defiance of asymmetric warfare. Netwar can operate on any level (albeit to greater and lesser degrees of effectiveness): different groups can orientate towards similar or varied goals, and pursue them through coordination, isolation and even confrontation.

Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria all experience the growing pains of a divided opposition, but the evolution of an ad hoc structure is inherent to netwar.

The net that is Bahrain’s streets will thicken on Tuesday, briefly illuminating one of the region’s darkest examples of 4GW. Only Yemen has received less media coverage, according to Google Trends, and Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement won’t allow the monarchy or international media to ignore their cause. Protesters plan to demonstrate the reality of Bahrain’s netwar by diversifying their activity. At the lowest level of coordination - but communicating at a high degree, relatively speaking - roving protesters seek encounters and probe the government’s force levels. Many protesters are constantly “on,” awaiting the next demonstration to join, and they can choose between a street band and organized protest.

"This is a continuous protest," said prominent activist Nabeel Rajab, who reached the edge of Pearl Roundabout with his 9-year-old daughter. "There will not be one central protest with thousands of people, it will be all over."

Although Sunday’s small march was chased away by tear gas, security forces dispersed Saturday’s protest before demonstrators neared Pearl. Protesters could successfully rendezvous at the site if divided into dozens or even hundreds of cells. Al Wefaq and its political allies plan to stage large-scale rallies that could free up street elements, and the opposition will presumably seek to establish its potency following King Hamad’s “dismissal.” Since netwar can be utilized by superior and inferior sides of an asymmetric conflict, thousands of security personnel (domestic and foreign) have been deployed to trim any unyielding gatherings, and construct barricades around Manama’s surrounding villages.

These measures are likely to yield an incomplete suppression of February 14th.

Undaunted, King Hamad launched another barrage at the political level by deploying his standard Iranian propaganda. Pieces of his interview contain a degree of truth: "There is no doubt that some in Iran have an unhealthy focus on Bahrain, as some of the broadcast coverage shows.” Iranian media coverage overwhelmingly favors Bahrain’s opposition as a result of the two countries’ strategic positioning and political alliances, but the King claims that Iran’s “threat” required him to summon the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsula Shield - “in case Iran would be more aggressive.” Introducing the Saudi-led force into Bahrain’s equation accelerated the uprising, suggesting that Riyadh is an equal or greater source of instability.

Hoping to tamp down the opposition in his own unique way, Vice Admiral Mark Fox told reporters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain that his 5th Fleet is “ready today” to confront Iranian forces.

Just as one cannot definitively conclude that Tehran possesses no influence in Bahrain’s streets or Shia political parties, the opposite is also true. (The “conspiracy theory” was outlined in a previous analysis of Bahrain’s pre-14th organization.) Both layers of the opposition openly reject Iranian interference, and local activist groups deny engaging in “pro-Khamenei chants.” Rajab also rejected the accusation on Sunday, saying, "This is just another way for the government to try and deny the legitimate demands of the people.”

"We have no connection with Iran," Sheikh Ali Salman, Al Wefaq’s president, told BBC a night after his house was tear gassed. "We are not calling for the overthrow of the royal family. We want reform."

Salman’s reaction is the latest example of King Hamad’s missed opportunity. His situation, more than any other regional uprising, could have been prevented through reform. By resisting and signaling no intention to enact deeper reforms, Hamad instead left street protesters and the opposition without recourse to politically express themselves. Change will only come through increased political organization at the popular level, not internal reviews or superficial international pressure.

Salman is still holding the door open for “meaningful dialogue,” but he doesn’t expect the King to walk through. "They talk about it,” he says of the royal family. “They don't mean it."

“Signs” Of Bahrain’s Progression

2012-02-11T23:08:00.000-08:00

The pitch of their condemnation suggested that they can’t imagine Moscow’s state of mind, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and company surely understand the motivation behind its Syrian veto. They know that Russian officials from aspiring president Vladimir Putin to state arms dealers aren’t ready to let go of Bashar al-Assad’s strategically-placed regime. They also know, on a deeper level, that Moscow despises U.S. hypocrisy as much as Washington loathes Russian hardball.

The U.S. response to Bahrain’s uprising offers of one of many gateways into Moscow’s thinking in Syria. Although vastly divergent in casualties and social complexities, the Obama administration’s steadfast support for King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa (and other regimes that will be addressed shortly) has added to Russian obstinacy in Damascus. When UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin hastily met with PBS’s Charlie Rose after last weekend’s veto, he repeatedly deflected questions on Russian policy by pointing out the selective nature of U.S. foreign policy. Both parties are guilty of the offense they accuse each other of - Washington and Moscow united against Yemen and Bahrain’s uprisings - but that doesn’t stop Russian officials from venting their irritation into Syria.

With Clinton consumed by Syria’s events, the Secretary just reinforced America’s double-standard by sending a tag-team to pin down Bahrain’s opposition. Michael Posner’s comprehensive government tour softened the ground for his partner, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor slapped a well-known hand on the way out. Following Posner’s high praise of the King’s reform, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman reviewed “the development of historic relations” with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa. Feltman spearheaded the initial U.S. blackout following February 14th’s outburst.

He also arrived in Manama with a secondary objective: secure political, financial and possible security assistance for Syria’s opposition. Miles away, the house of Al Wefaq’s president came under fire from a tear gas barrage. “This is the state of most homes now days in Bahrain,” said Sheikh Ali Salman.

The sight and stench of tear gas will blanket the island nation as pro-democracy demonstrators intensify their actions around the February 14th outbreak. Periphery protests continue across the country as a larger crowd flocks to al-Muqsha’s Freedom Square, located four miles west of the capital. Al Wefaq and its political allies have staged daily rallies in al-Muqsha for the last week; while an open-ended permit wasn’t granted, the government is satisfied to contain the opposition’s energy outside of Manama. The gathering also falls under 24-hour surveillance, partly due to the fact that protesters always viewed al-Musqsha as a temporary base.

Saturday's demonstrations offered a glimpse of how Tuesday is likely to transpire. Under the guidance of Nabil Rajab, president of the Bahraini Center for Human Rights, several hundred people gathered at the Standard Charter bank for a one-mile westward march to Pearl Roundabout. Police officials immediately warned Rajab against his unauthorized protest, then proceeded to disperse the group with tear gas and stun grenades.

“Unauthorized protests” are, of course, a common tactic of political resistance and civil disobedience.

February 14th should unfold at a higher level of intensity despite the corresponding spike in Manama’s security precautions. One activist reported, "the roads leading into the centre of Manama were all blocked by police.” Instead of massing, protesters may gather in smaller flash mobs and converge on Pearl Roundabout from multiple directions (a trial run was attempted on Saturday). Splitting up into dozens of groups should increase the chances of one group reaching the site and undermining the government’s security measures, otherwise protesters will spread throughout sympathetic villages and spill into the more vacated areas of Manama.

Contrary to Posner and Feltman’s optimistic statements, Bahrain’s political outreach is decaying in proportion to government-induced deaths, injuries, arrests and elapsed time. Failure to restore confidence at the political level ensures rising tensions in the streets, trapping the island in a cycle of hostilities. The uprising’s spark cannot be forgotten or ignored, yet the monarchy remains bent on paving over February 14th’s aftermath as though the day were Pearl Monument.

These are the signs of accelerated instability, not progress, and their effects aren’t limited to Bahrain’s shores.

Egypt’s SCAF Double-Barrel Resistance

2012-02-11T12:25:00.000-08:00

As if collecting red flags to emulate a twisted United Nations’ parkway, Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) hoisted two more flagpoles in anticipation of the revolution’s “Friday of Departure.”

One is forged from relatively new material. Facing down Washington over the status of several U.S.-funded non-government organizations (NGO) - and lying in the process - the SCAF and its political representatives continue to play hardball with the Obama administration. Weeks of pressure have failed to release 19 Americans (including Sam LaHood, son of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood), and Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri seemingly doused all hope for a legal or diplomatic resolution on Wednesday.

"Egyptian government won't back off in its criminal investigation into financial aid,” el-Ganzouri, a former prime minister under Hosni Mubarak, told a press conference following Wednesday's cabinet meeting. “Egypt will not kneel down to anybody and will overcome the crisis through unity.”

The SCAF posted a separate statement on Facebook in case anyone missed its message: "Since the great Egyptian judiciary started handling foreign funding for civil society organizations, a series of pressures, warnings and threats was being practiced by Washington against Egypt to the degree that Washington threatened Egypt to cut annual US military and economic assistance to Egypt, which is unacceptable.”

With an estimated 70% of Egyptians opposed to U.S. aid, the generals appear to be banking on this sentiment to cover its potential losses.

Despite the bluster and high stakes on both sides, political stalemate over NGOs should continue to benefit the Obama administration in the near future. After relying on Egypt’s parliamentary elections to divert attention from the SCAF’s grip on power, the administration has turned the status of 19 Americans into an inverse lightening. Their fate now serves as the focal point of U.S. criticism amid Port Said’s tragedy and the ensuing 10 days of demonstrations. Nearly all U.S. attention (political and media) has been devoted to the NGO crisis, conveniently ignoring the SCAF’s hostility towards pro-democracy protesters.

The tougher U.S. officials talk, the more obvious the Obama administration's front becomes. All eyes are directed towards the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, not the heavily-guarded Interior and Defense Ministries, where Egyptians gathered on Friday to demand the end of military rule. They also requested a cessation of violence against peaceful protesters, judicial reforms and a complete overhaul of the Interior Ministry, which has escaped genuine accountability. High-profile activist Asmaa Mahfouz tapped Al Jazeera to deliver her own message as she marched on the Defense Ministry, arguing, "Mubarak faces charges of instigating the killing of protesters during the revolution. So the SCAF should also be tried for the crimes committed under its rule."

"Whoever wants to know the truth should hit the streets," Mahfouz told Al Jazeera. "For those who say we're a bunch of thugs, we're not carrying any weapons and aren't damaging public property."

Feeling the pressure from Port Said, the Muslim Brotherhood has similarly escalated its anti-SCAF rhetoric in an attempt to neutralize its own negative perceptions. Last Friday the Brotherhood’s General Guide, Mohamed Badie, blasted the military during a speech televised by the group’s satellite channel. Badie would flip the SCAF’s script against the revolutionaries by accusing certain “individuals” of “plotting to burn this homeland and demolish its institutions.”

“They are trained for this,” he warned. “They are known to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the police, who are delaying bringing them to justice, which is totally unacceptable.”

While the Brotherhood isn’t acting in concert with the revolutionary movement, the two forces combine to apply significant pressure inside and outside of the established political system. Components of asymmetric networks often operate in isolation, and most of the SCAF’s backtracking has resulted from their joint-effort. After previously resisting popular calls during negotiations with the SCAF, a position attributed to establishing constitutional authority, the Brotherhood now seems committed to an accelerated transition to civilian rule. Deputy chairman Khairat al-Shater would follow al-Ganzouri’s Wednesday briefing by calling on Parliament to replace him.

"The government has failed in managing the country,” added Mahmoud Ghozlan, a Brotherhood spokesman. “In any nation in the world, such a disaster would force a cabinet to give up power... We cannot go on like this forever. Egypt needs a firm government that enacts the rule of law and that is serious about the transition.”

Naturally the SCAF perceived Friday’s demonstration and the Brotherhood’s rhetoric as threats to its power, and responded with the appropriate hostilities. al-Ganzouri condemned these “demands and strikes” for “aiming at bringing about State failure,” telling “those calling for the downfall of the military rule to remember the situation in Iraq.” The SCAF then released its own statement on state TV, but such threats don’t qualify as “news” anymore.

"We will be honest with you that our precious Egypt is subject to plots that aim to hit the revolution in its core and sow strife between Egyptian people and between them and their armed forces... Never will we bow to threats, nor succumb to pressures, nor accept ultimatums. We face conspiracies hatched against the homeland, whose goal is to undermine the institutions of the Egyptian state and whose aim is to topple the state itself so that chaos reigns and destruction spreads.”

This language, however, is especially insulting to the revolutionaries when mixed with self-adulation, and the SCAF continues to praise its own “revolutionary” leadership. The council insists that “armed forces protected the revolution in its more critical time” and “stood as a supporter of the people." These statements were more accurate prior to Mubarak’s fall, when the army formed the last line of defense from state security, but are now mocked in the streets. The SCAF is thus delegitimizing Egypt’s revolutionaries - implying their participation in “conspiracies” - while using their cause to woo Egypt’s more traditional segments.

The generals are employing the same scheme towards Washington: targeting NGOs for “foreign conspiracy” despite the Obama administration’s unflinching support for a SCAF-led “transition.”

The possibility of severing $1.5 billion in U.S. aid remains open due to Congressional pressure, but a likelier outcome suggests the continuation of Egypt’s status quo. Washington cannot afford to lose its access to the SCAF and, even if aid is withheld, political cooperation will remain ongoing. The Obama administration lacks a sincere unease over the SCAF’s handling of protesters (aside from any impact on the SCAF’s sustainability), and is simply waiting out the NGO cases to normalize relations. Yet the SCAF’s actions from Mubarak’s fall to the present leave no doubt that the military will continue to exert a disruptive political influence after a civilian transition.

al-Shater’s warning bears repeating: “We strongly advise the Americans and the Europeans to support Egypt during this critical period as compensation for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship.”

YACC Condemns Saleh’s Immunity, Demands Accountability

2012-02-10T16:50:00.000-08:00

Nearly two weeks have elapsed since Ali Abdullah Saleh entered New York City under the diplomatic immunity afforded to Yemen’s “President.” During this time the Obama administration has only made one passing reference to Yemen, a throwaway statement courtesy of Secretary Hillary Clinton, as foreign powers busy themselves imposing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s power-sharing agreement. Saleh’s presence at Central Park’s Ritz Carlton is also generating a corresponding blackout in the U.S. media, a seemingly unbreakable trend unless al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is somehow involved.

Low odds, though, won’t stop Yemenis from shining light on their cause, and the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) is committed to altering the long-term status quo in Washington. Last Sunday’s demonstration resulted in a rare Saleh spotting, complete with a blown kiss to those protesting his immunity. As usual the Obama administration ignored this inflammatory act, and YACC’s actions failed to elicit a response from the White House or State Department (a modest media reaction was triggered). However YACC represents the only force capable of producing an immediate reaction, leaving the vanguard no choice except to continue engaging. Ceaseless operations are vital to both militarized and non-violent fourth-generation warfare (4GW).

YACC’s latest attempt to raise the profile of Saleh’s visit - Friday’s “March for Justice” - took protesters over the Brooklyn Bridge to New York City Hall, where they vented their frustration at the Obama administration’s interference in Yemen’s revolution.

“Over 29,000 peaceful protesters has been murdered and injured in less than a year by Saleh’s security forces and Obama administration still rolled the red carpet for this dictator to enjoy a luxury near Central Park in recognition for the crimes against humanity Saleh committed against the People of Yemen.”

The march has yet to force the Obama administration into breaking its silence, but YACC has tied its next theme into the plausible reaction. Western and Gulf powers view the GCC’s agreement as a successful counter-revolution; Saleh is “removed,” a controllable figure from his regime sits in his place, the opposition is cornered by the ruling party and foreign powers, and the youth movement is now forced to choose between a single-candidate “election” and further political isolation. The GCC’s power-sharing was constructed from the ground up to prevent regime change, and this reality will become more apparent over the two-year transitional period.

YACC must take aim at the GCC’s proposal and all of the risks that it entails. The following letter was sent to President Barack Obama:

We write to you today as concerned American citizens, urging you to reconsider your policy of support for Yemeni dictator President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and adopt instead a policy toward Yemen that honors the principles that Americans hold dear – principles of equality, justice, and freedom from tyranny. Living in one of the most heavily‐armed countries in the world, Yemen’s revolutionaries could have overthrown the regime by force or through civil war. Instead, they affirmed their commitment to non‐ violent change and their aspiration for a peaceful, democratic system. In response, they were slaughtered by embattled President Saleh’s security forces and loyalists for months on end.

We understand that President Saleh’s immunity from prosecution in Yemen was a central component of the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement (GCC), signed by President Saleh and by representatives of the formal political opposition. And we understand that this agreement has ushered in a period of relative freedom from government‐sponsored violence for the hundreds of thousands of Yemenis who continue to hope for genuine change. But the GCC agreement was negotiated with and endorsed by senior level political elites only, and it does not capture the voices or reflect the interests of the most vital forces in Yemen’s protest movement, its youth. Among the youth’s demands, the most consistent and clear has been the call for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to be held legally accountable for the crimes he has committed against the Yemeni people. While the US‐backed GCC agreement traded away this essential demand in exchange for a short‐term end to the bloodletting, it is unsustainable.

We do not believe that the situation is beyond repair, but any process of genuinely‐inclusive national reconciliation must begin with accountability. We call upon your administration to reverse its position on Saleh’s legal immunity and withdraw his visa immediately. As American citizens, we see no reason why a man with as much blood on his hands as President Ali Abdullah Saleh should continue to enjoy the protection and support of the United States. As Yemenis look ahead to next week’s uncontested election of Saleh’s designated successor, they know that it will be an uphill struggle to repair and build genuinely democratic institutions in Yemen, butut they will try. At the very least, we believe that by denying President Saleh sanctuary in the United States, we can demonstrate to Yemenis in good faith that we affirm democratic principles in this country.

Saleh’s immunity isn’t a pure case of maintaining diplomatic protocol. Protected from U.S. prosecution, he will return to Sana’a and maintain influence under Washington and Riyadh’s pseudo-authority. Saleh currently possesses immunity at the national level (parliamentary approval in accordance with the GCC deal) and he will never step foot in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Refusing to implicate Saleh has nothing to do with “peacefully” removing him from power, and everything to do with politico-military cooperation and guarding secrets with his regime. The puppet show is thus extended from Washington and Riyadh to Saleh’s arms, VP, son, nephews, uncle and half-brothers.

Yemen’s revolutionaries don’t fight and die for this subservient (and unstable) outcome, but envision a Yemen free of internal and external tyranny.

Bahraini Propaganda 101: Great cop/Not-so-bad cop

2012-02-09T18:30:00.000-08:00

As reported yesterday, Michael Posner is making his latest rounds with Bahraini officials in an effort to normalize U.S. relations and the island as a whole. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has met with Ali Al Saleh, chairman of the National Assembly’s powerful Consultative Council (Upper House), Health and Human Rights Minister Dr. Fatima Al Blushi, and now Lt-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa. Chief of Public Security Major-General Tariq Al Hassan was also present at Posner’s meeting with the Interior Minister.

On Thursday the Assistance Secretary released a lengthy statement that mirrors the Obama administration's superficial response to Bahrain’s opposition:

This is my fourth visit to Bahrain in the last 14 months, and I welcome the opportunity to be here. Bahrain is an important partner of the United States. We have a long-standing alliance based on shared political economic and security interests. Both countries benefit from stability and prosperity here, and from a society where all people here are able to contribute to the political process.

During my three days in Manama, I have met with a number of senior government officials, including the Crown Prince; the Ministers of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Human Rights; the Attorney General; and the head of the Shura Council. I also met with lawyers, journalists, medical professionals, human rights advocates, and members of political societies, including the opposition.

My discussions focused on the implementation of the recommendations made in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report. As my government has said, it is a great credit to King Hamad that he initiated the BICI process, accepted its recommendations and appointed a national commission to coordinate implementation of those recommendations. It is commendable for any government to invite and participate in an independent examination of its human rights record.

The government of Bahrain has taken many important steps toward the long-term institutional reforms identified in the report, such as removing arrest authority from the national security agency, drafting legislation concerning the investigation and prosecution of torture, and drafting a code of conduct for police based on international best practices. The government also has allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross access to its prisons. It has begun to rebuild religious sites, and engaged a team of qualified experts to advise on policing and legal reforms. These are signs of the government’s commitment to address the underlying cause of last year’s violence.

However, more needs to be done in several key areas. First, there are hundreds of pending criminal cases stemming from the events of February and March, including a substantial number where individuals remain in detention. The BICI report recommends that the government drop charges against all persons accused of offenses involving political expression. The government should fully comply with this recommendation. Also in this area, the government continues to prosecute 20 medical professionals. Though we are not privy to all the evidence in this or other cases, we suggested that alternatives to criminal prosecution be considered in the cases of the medics.

Second, while the Ministry of the Interior is taking steps to enhance the professionalization of the police, it needs to do more. Escalating violence in the streets points to the need for steps that will begin to integrate the police force, as recommended in the BICI report, so that Bahrain can build a police force that reflects the diversity of the communities it serves.

Third, with regard to the issue of dismissed workers, we urge the government, the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions and the private sector through the Tripartite Commission to continue to clarify and verify dismissals and reinstatements to the same or comparable positions. All parties should redouble their efforts to reach a resolution through a social dialogue and collaborative approach.

Finally, we call on the government to continue to prosecute those officials responsible for the violations described in the BICI report.

The United States views the BICI report and its follow-up as a bold measure by the government to begin to rebuild confidence with the Bahraini people. Implementing these recommendations is not an easy task, and we commend the efforts undertaken so far to realize the goals of the BICI process. Ultimately, the goal of the BICI and implementation of its recommendations is to create a path toward genuine political dialogue and national reconciliation.

In the days leading up to February 14, we call on all Bahraini citizens to refrain from violence. We also urge the government to permit peaceful demonstrations and the right of all citizens to express their political views.

We condemn the violent street actions that have escalated in recent months and that have included attacks on police with Molotov cocktails, metal projectiles and other instruments of harm. Such violence undermines public safety and further divides society.

At the same time, we continue to receive credible reports of excessive force by police, including widespread and sometimes indiscriminate use of tear gas. We urge Bahraini authorities to ensure compliance with international doctrines of necessity and proportionality.

Next Tuesday will mark the one-year anniversary of the first demonstrations in Bahrain. The days and weeks surrounding the anniversary are a moment for all Bahrainis in all segments of society to come together to move beyond the pain of last year and begin to forge a more peaceful, prosperous future through genuine dialogue.

We renew our call on all parties, including the government, political societies and others to engage in dialogue and negotiation in which all elements of society have a real voice. This must be a process led by Bahrainis themselves. It will not be easy. And it can only succeed by building a greater degree of mutual respect and mutual trust.

As a longtime friend of Bahrain, my government stands ready to support you.

The propagandist nature of Posner’s rhetoric is self-evident not only in its wording, but also the fact that King Hamad utilized his statement for propaganda. According to Bahrain News Agency, “A US official today lauded His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa for taking the initiative to establish the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, describing the panel as a ‘source of pride.’”

Posner’s statement generated a mutated good cop/bad cop by emphasizing the former and minimizing the latter. The majority of his word count is devoted to praising King Hamad’s reforms, especially his Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which the Secretary labels a “great credit” and “bold measure.” This setup allows him to include obligatory concerns over human rights abuses, and briefly address the integration of Bahrain’s security apparatus. The BICI serves as Washington’s main crux in its defense of the monarchy.

Posner’s focus is directed towards putting 2011 behind Bahrainis and moving towards “national reconciliation,” but his recommendations will simply fuel the pro-democracy uprising. Although Al Wefaq and its allies initially welcomed the BICI for admitting government abuses, the streets and political opposition ultimately rejected its attempt to scrub accountability from the top. Posner plays directly into this narrative by praising the King for investigating his own crimes and doing little about them. He also “condemns” the violent actions of street protesters while “receiving credible reports” of the government’s excessive force - a not-so-clever line that shields the government and delegitimizes the opposition.

When one reporter inquires into the status of Bahrain's arms package, Posner ignores the question by urging Al Wefaq to control urban demonstrators.

Nothing is said about the presence of foreign police and ex-military (Saudi, Jordanian, Pakistani) in Bahrain’s security force. Meanwhile Jeffrey Feltman, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs (and a frequent guest of King Hamad) “has been dispatched to Morocco, France and Bahrain” to gather the “Friends of Syria.” Syrian security forces allegedly operate within King Hamad’s foreign police unit.

More disturbingly, the Secretary’s political falsities exceed his distortion of Bahrain’s security environment. Brief meetings with oppositional representatives are vastly outweighed by his roll-call consultations with the monarchy, and the effects show in Posner’s statement. His message to Al Wefaq, its allies and pro-democracy protesters is no different than the government's: stop protesting and enter a “dialogue.” After enumerating the King’s reforms (“long-term institutional reforms,” police conduct, human rights access), Posner insists “these signs of the government’s commitment to address the underlying cause of last year’s violence.”

Except the underlying cause of Bahrain’s uprising has yet to be addressed, and the King’s “institutional reforms” are avoiding Al Wefaq’s demand for parliamentary reconstruction. No confidence has been rebuilt in the streets - instead the credibility gap with the King and Washington is accelerating. Yet Bahrain state media writes, “Mr. Posner lauded the Ministry of Interior for its close cooperation with the opposition, represented by Al-Wefaq Society...”

Posner also ignored those journalists who were denied access for the February 14th anniversary, a move that Al Wefaq condemned. Various representatives of the group criticize the Obama administration's bias and silence on a regular basis; the White House hasn’t mentioned Bahrain since the BICI’s release in November and Obama personally skipped over during his State of the Union address. The State Department last addressed Bahrain on January 5th, when a reporter asked whether the country had fallen off the administration’s radar screen. State spokeswoman Victoria Nuland answered in the defiant negative - and has yet to mention the island since.

Al Wefaq will not engage in dialogue under U.S. terms, and will not allow the monarchy to sweep Bahrain’s uprising into the Gulf sea.

Bahrain’s Uprising Gathers Under Blackout

2012-02-08T22:47:00.000-08:00

Signs of massing demonstrators are everywhere. On the capital’s outskirts, oppositional groups rehearse for D-Day as protesters resist government orders to disperse and fight off the stench of tear gas. Some engage in more violent behavior by picking up Molotovs and blocking traffic. Elsewhere, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa continues to meet with foreign leaders in an effort to maintain normality on the unstable island. Media visas to certain personalities - Nick Kristof and Adam Ellick of the New York Times, Gregg Carlstrom of Al Jazeera, Cara Swift of the BBC and Kristen Chick of the Christian Science Monitor - have been denied.

Shaikh Fawaz Bin Mohammad Al Khalifa, chief of Bahrain’s Information Affairs Authority (IAA), says the Kingdom hopes to receive them in the future.

"The Information Affairs Authority (IAA) has received an unusually high number of media visa requests for the period February 11 - 18 and had been processing them accordingly over the last month once visit dates had been specified... However, media that did not specify exact dates with their requests, or those who were late in applying, were asked to delay their visit, in order to insure their safety and their chances of securing interviews with key figures."

There is, of course, nothing abnormal about the number and timing of international media requests. Although Fawaz attempts to reason, “We wanted to make sure we had a wide range of international media here during this time, rather than having five to ten journalists from the same organization,” the perception of many Bahrainis and observers is trending in the opposite direction. Perhaps Kristof (who was briefly detained “by accident” in December) and company will secure their interviews “with key figures” at a later date, but they will miss the one-year mark of Bahrain’s uprising and all corresponding demonstrations.

Just another square in King Hamad’s veneer of normality.

Pearl Roundabout may or may not come under occupation when February 14th dawns on Bahrain. For months government security forces (bolstered by foreign police and ex-military) have swatted pro-democracy protesters away from the quarantined square, which remains on a high state of alert. The volume of security precautions indicates that protesters should consider themselves lucky to get anywhere near the void of Pearl’s razed monument. Enough to make international headlines are likely to try.

For now the oppositional Al Wefaq party is currently rallying protesters to al-Mughsha, a small village lying four miles outside Manama. An unstated rehearsal for retaking Pearl, the week-long demonstration at “Freedom Square” began last Friday after Al Wefaq was unable to secure approval for an open-ended demonstration. The Interior Ministry further announced that protesters could only demonstrate for two days, yet they continue to gather for their “steadfast rally” as the 14th approaches. Security units remain on Freedom Square’s periphery to monitor protesters and activists, helicopters fluttering overhead.

"The sit-in is the determination of the people to not go back to what the country was before Feb. 14,” Al Wefaq’s Secretary-General, Shaikh Aai Salman, told the crowd on Wednesday. "As we were in the Pearl Roundabout, we are here in Freedom Square, welcoming all to attend and confront dictatorship.”

Al Wefaq and its political allies continue to channel the reality that many street protesters demand more from the opposition than initially requested. The first embers of Mohammed Bouazizi wasted no time escalating their demands straight to regime change, leaving Al Wefaq behind the emerging curve despite its rapid merger with Pearl Square. The group still called for dialogue with King Hamad after boycotting September’s assembly election, settling for parliamentary and judiciary reform. Al Wefaq’s leadership eventually increased its focus on neutralizing the monarchy’s power after King Hamad’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) revealed and concealed government abuses in one sweep.

Naturally, government officials and complicit media figures blame Al Wefaq and Bahraini protesters for the island’s unrest, arguing that King Hamad has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to reform. Protesters are too disorganized, relying on nothing more than democratic slogans, while Al Wefaq and its allies are political opportunists. Or worse, agents of Iran. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, a senior adviser in the IAA, warns, "We definitely see an escalation from the radical elements of the protesters. We see their use of homemade weapons that have hurt our policemen in a bad way. The door is still open... but don't give me preconditions and don't give me that the government has to resign."

Part of this statement is true. Vanguard groups such as February 14 Youth Movement and February 14 Revolution participate non-violently within Al-Wefaq’s political organization, but most oppositional violence stems from youthful and energetic protesters. Allied cleric Shaikh Isa Qassim intensified his fiery rhetoric throughout 2011, raising the height of his lightning rod in the process. However these factors represent the edge of fourth-generation warfare (4GW): multiple governments vs. mobilized civilians. Particularly destructive acts such as police assault and arson have no formal use in a non-violent uprising, but these acts inevitably result from the suppression that accompanies non-violent uprisings.

The protesters’ more radical behavior and Al Wefaq’s refusal to engage on the King’s terms are both products of the government’s hollow appeasement. Throwing rocks doesn’t justify disproportionate force, nor are protesters responsible for the government's reaction - the frequent gassing of funeral processions, for example. Similarly, King Hamad’s failure to satisfy the urban resistance has left Al Wefaq no choice except to multiply its political demands (and thus social tensions). Worse still, the superficial manner in which he conducted all of his “reforms,” “dialogues” and “investigations” has generated a wider gap between the opposition. The tone of King Hamad’s speeches inflicts damage, while accusing the opposition of serving Iran’s interests could be the most inflammatory slander of all.

"We've been hearing this rhetoric for many years,” said Farida Ismail, a senior member of the Waad party. “Whenever there's a movement with political demands they play this song.”

Robert Taber called this song the “conspiracy theory.” One of the more astute revolutionary journalists to emerge during the 1960s, Taber would accompany Fidel Castro's small guerrilla force as it entered Havana in 1959. He proceeded to write extensively on the topic of national liberation movements - from Vietnam to South America - and the response of global powers. In the first chapter of his seminal War of the Flea (1965), Taber cautions against believing a guerrilla nucleus is “made up of outsiders, conspirators, political zombies... who somehow stand apart from their social environment...”

“On the more naive level, it seems to be assumed that people would scarcely choose the revolutionary path of their own accord; certainly not if the revolution in question were out of joint with the political traditions and ideals held dear by Americans.”

Bahraini officials and their foreign allies either refuse to admit this environment, or else hope that protesters will eventually tire. The Interior Ministry recently issued a full denial of Nabeel Rajab’s alleged run-in with Pakistani, Jordanian and Syrian personnel, presumably to Washington’s approval. Several low-ranking U.S. officials voiced concern over Rajab’s claims, but their attention quickly dissipated and the Obama administration has since broken down an arms package to avoid Congressional customs. U.S. officials such as CENTCOM’s General James Mattis and Michael Posner, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labour, continue to meet with royal officials on a regular basis. All to create the impression of normality in Bahrain.

They can try to blackout February 14th, but they will merely add oxygen to the revolutionary spirit.

Yemen’s Rumor Machine Outputs Disturbing Threats

2012-02-07T17:22:00.000-08:00

As inherent elements of human interaction, hearsay, speculation and rumor-mongering are unavoidable byproducts of national and international politics. Developing any sort of ranking is complicated by the universality of gossip. However Yemen’s political scene is held to a high standard by Yemenis and non-Yemenis alike, and the internal/external coverage of its revolution challenges all observers to separate truth from fiction.

Ali Abdullah Saleh’s six-week odyssey from Sana’a to New York City (he first declared his intent to travel in late December) is a recent example. Saleh would emerge, as rumored, from Central Park’s Ritz Carlton on Sunday. He is scheduled to return to Sana’a before February 21st, when the international community will stage an election to promote his long-time vice president and newly-anointed Field Marshall, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi.

Two other disturbing rumors that surfaced over the last three days also deserve greater attention than they received. The first traces to a local NewYemen interview with Hassan Zaid, secretary-general of the oppositional al-Haq party. Zaid’s Shia-oriented group forms one of many cogs in the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Yemen’s established but unpopular political opposition. Hoping to squeeze Saleh’s family out of power and fill his void, JMP leaders cooperated with the regime and involved foreign powers (U.S. and Saudi Arabia) by signing a power-sharing agreement known as the Gulf-Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative.

The deal is considered a success by Saleh, the JMP, Washington and Riyadh, rendering it highly unpopular in Yemen’s streets and outlying governorates.

Taking into consideration the deep-rooted international interests at stake, Zaid’s claim that certain powers threatened the JMP to sign or face “liquidation” still appears unrealistic. Saudi tanks are frequently “spotted” encroaching from the north, movement that has yet to develop on the ground. Zaid would compare the situation to Saudi Arabia’s invasion of Bahrain, a reaction infused by his personal involvement with the northern Houthi’s “national project.” The Houthis have waged an asymmetric conflict against Saleh’s regime for the last eight years, dragging Saudi and U.S. forces into the battle against their autonomous movement, and this conflict continues to intensify through Saudi (Salafi) proxies. Conversely, the suppression of Yemen’s capital proposes an unlikely escalation in warfare that would ultimately fuel the revolution.

The U.S. and international response to Yemen’s revolution has been consistently hostile from the beginning, but Zaid’s claim is exploring the limits of speculation.

The JMP also hedges its political stance through double-talk, and Zaid’s comments imply that the JMP “had no choice” except to sign the GCC’s unpopular initiative. After predicting that “some factions of the Shi'ite movement” will perceive February 21st’s “election” as "negative" - the Houthis express unilateral resistance to the GCC’s deal - he believed that Hadi “will gain legitimacy” through the internationally-approved transition. Hadi, the consensus candidate of Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP, launched his victory lap on Tuesday, declaring, "This election represents the best way out of the political crisis that could have turned into a civil war.”

His rhetoric emulates the international community’s false choice between sharing power and civil war, between security and democracy. This platform is literally anti-revolutionary - the revolution cannot be allowed to occur at all. Some Yemeni protesters have resigned themselves to moving the revolution forward through this process.

Many others continue to protest its imposed terms and debate the consequences of a boycott.

The hearsay of an anonymous Yemeni official, on the other hand, must be taken at face value until further notice. This minister claims that Washington “will not tolerate” attempts to “upset” Hadi’s selection, an assertion with mountains of evidence to provide confirmation. Whether the official takes orders from the GPC or JMP isn’t reported under the condition of anonymity, but he told Reuters after meeting with U.S. officials, "The American administration told representatives of (both sides within the unity government) that... the U.N. Security Council will strongly confront any attempts to keep Hadi from being elected as the country's president.”

Given that Western and Gulf forces did drop the GCC’s power-sharing initiative onto Yemen’s revolutionaries, this rumor has already graduated to truth-hood. Many sources and factors indicated that the JMP knew it would jeopardize its international influence by opposing the GCC’s deal. This pressure reduced any incentive to reject favorable terms for the bloc.

Add the fact that Reuters has connected to Saleh’s circle, and no reason exists to doubt its reporting in this particular case. Washington and Riyadh need Hadi too much to allow another candidate emerge from within the JMP (such as Islah heavyweight Hamid al-Ahmar) or off Yemen’s streets. They arranged this transition from the beginning, first proposing Hadi’s ascendance in April, in order to maintain political hegemony and keep their military channels online. The UN is now going through the “trouble” of staging a one-man election, when millions of dollars is a bargain to pull Yemen’s levers. If Hadi were upset by some fluke, the international community is liable to intervene and restore the status quo.

The depths of the UNSC’s duplicity is revealed in its latest statement, what amounts to a silent proclamation of Hadi’s “rule.”

“We the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU), wish to reiterate to the people of Yemen our full commitment to the political transition process taking place on the basis of the November 2011 GCC Agreement and in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011). The 21 February Interim Presidential Elections are an important step. We call upon all the political parties, military authorities, tribal and regional leaders, youth and non-governmental civil society actors to work together to ensure that the elections are as inclusive as possible and take place without violence and in a constructive spirit of cooperation.

International pressure on the JMP is real, just as it crushes Yemen’s persistent revolutionaries. A more urgent question is gauging the degree that foreign actors are willing to interfere.

The False Comfort of False Diplomacy

2012-02-06T19:32:00.000-08:00

They obviously realize the magnitude of events at work. Potential conflict between Israel, America and Iran could reshape the Gulf, but for now the topic dominates international media spheres like no other global issue. By this point everyone who wants to throw their “informed” opinion into the arena has done so. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli military officials are leaning on the inevitably of conflict to justify any future operation, while U.S. officials have been scrambling to muffle their sabers throughout January (while still flexing in Hormuz).

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was recently forced to deny his own thoughts, paraphrased by Pentagon insider David Ignatius to the effect that Panetta’s “biggest worry is the growing possibility that Israel will attack Iran over the next few months.”

Choosing Super Bowl prime time as his venue, President Barack Obama once again caught up to Israel’s war machine and attempted to pull back on the throttle. He’s also trying to reign in the Pentagon and GOP frontrunners in an attempt to regain control over the international debate. Obama had just used his State of the Union to tell the world, “a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better; and if Iran changes course and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations.” Now, after telling NBC’s Matt Lauer that he doesn’t believe Israel “has made a decision on what they need to do,” he reminded its leaders of the wider fallout from a preemptive military strike on Iran’s nuclear targets - a mess that U.S. and Gulf forces would have to clean up.

"Any kind of additional military activity inside the Gulf is disruptive and has a big effect on us," he said. "It could have a big effect on oil prices. We've still got troops in Afghanistan, which borders Iran.”

Not long ago David Petraeus, as Afghanistan’s ranking general, allegedly complained that Israel’s behavior could put U.S. troops in danger, comments he quickly denied once they became public.

Whether Israel has committed to preemptive action remains hotly debatable, but any warning of regional chaos is self-evidently true (this specter already hangs over Syria). The Trench advocates diplomacy over military operations whenever pragmatic, and Obama appears to have temporarily succeeded in halting Netanyahu’s rhetoric. More likely, the premier was angling for additional measures from the West, and Obama promised to accelerate a cycle of oil sanctions that are supposed to break Tehran’s political will.

“We have mobilized the international community in a way that is unprecedented. And they are feeling the pinch, they’re feeling the pressure, but they have not taken the step that they need to, diplomatically, which is to say we will pursue peaceful nuclear power; we will not pursue a nuclear weapon.”

Unfortunately Obama’s interview is hardly diplomatic to the core, a dilemma that underlines the entirety of U.S. policy towards Iran. Despite offering an “open hand” at his inaugural address, the Obama administration has generally treated Tehran with a backhand and closed fist. Token diplomacy is mixed with jingoism to avoid appearing overly soft, and the resulting “cart and stick” diplomacy has jaded Iranian policymakers more than anything else. Many aspects of Tehran’s behavior cannot be excused, but Washington’s disproportionate “dual-track” and the Gulf-enabled "nuclear umbrella" are escalating tensions on both sides.

What U.S.-Iranian relations truly need is a political solution, not a mere diplomatic solution. The Obama administration, Israel, Western and Gulf capitals essentially demand that Iran trade its nuclear ambitions for economic rewards, when nuclear weapons extend to all areas of national policy. Iran’s opponents will not succeed in dissuading its nuclear program without altering the strategic environment around Iran; the international community’s thinking borders on surrender, not an equitable political resolution to the region’s militarization.

Some regional problems are wholly owned by Tehran, but the Obama administration has failed to engage in fair negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. After giving into most of Israel’s terms except for settlements, an issue that Obama’s critics used to wrongfully brand him as pro-Palestinian, Tehran continues to view U.S. foreign policy as an unbalanced influence in the region. Washington is equally responsible for Iraq’s current problems. The Obama administration has also managed to salvage or save pro-U.S. regimes Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, creating a double-standard that Tehran constantly refers to when protecting Bashar al-Assad. Iran is morally and strategically sunk in Syria, but these developments weigh on its leaders minds.

Obama’s NBC interview reads just like his State of the Union: a peaceful conclusion doused with references to the strength of U.S-Israeli military bonds. Many GOP critics accuse Obama of appeasing Tehran or the Palestinians, but he sounds eager to appease the hawks flying over U.S.-Israeli relations. By referencing the closest “military and intelligence consultation” that the two countries have “ever had,” Obama assures his audience, “We are going to be sure that we work in lockstep as we proceed to try to solve this - hopefully diplomatically."

“We’re not taking any options off the table,” he promised. “I’ve been very clear that we’re going to do everything we can to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and creating an arms race, a nuclear arms race, in a volatile region.”

Naturally Obama says nothing about the nuclear weapons that Israel already possesses, one of many reasons that Iran may be seeking its own.

Unless all involved parties genuinely desire a peaceful resolution, the odds of large-scale conflict will continue to hang over Gulf throughout the decade. No force can stop a determined Israel from pulling the trigger and starting a global proxy war. An apparent majority stands ready to stop a gung-ho GOP candidate, but so long as America and Israel’s narrative remains dominated by war, U.S. officials are unlikely to convince their Iranian counterparts to defer their nuclear ambitions.

Yemen’s Netwar On Broadway

2012-02-05T18:07:00.001-08:00

Fresh off the success of Thursday’s press briefing, the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) struck again on Sunday as they rallied outside Central Park’s Ritz Carlton hotel. YACC is currently leading the street campaign in an effort to draw awareness to Ali Abdullah Saleh’s presence in New York City. The Yemeni strongman’s arrival went announced by the Obama administration (aside from a premature clarification that he remains president), and few media outlets have mentioned his stay over the past week.

Keeping in mind the relativity generated from Yemen’s blackout, Thursday’s protests took the coverage from zero to two, with the AP dispatching a brief report and The New York Times devoting a blog post to YACC. These reports are now multiplying again; sequential protests increased media coverage by upping the tempo of political activism and creating an inventory of events to reference. YACC’s persistent actions also yielded the best case scenario on Sunday: an antagonistic sighting of Saleh. He would emerge later in the day on Central Park South, wave at the protesters and blow a kiss in their direction, infuriating protesters to the point that one unsuccessfully rushed him.

Saleh is rumored to be receiving treatment from a June assassination attempt at the NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center. This information, though “unconfirmed,” may be as true as Saleh’s room at the Ritz.

YACC already intends to keep organizing until Saleh exits New York - a march from the Al-Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn to New York City Hall is scheduled for next Friday - but protesters are now sensing political blood. Saleh’s sighting added provocation to the demonstrations and ensnared him in their ambush, ultimately increasing the demand for a U.S. response. The Obama administration is liable to rehash previous statements in support of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing deal, which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton briefly alluded to on Saturday. The White House might even ignore Yemeni demonstrations as it has throughout the revolution.

At the same time, any rise in political pressure and awareness can deliver unpredictable benefits, and the White House won't comment unless forced to. Non-violent fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is no different from militarized asymmetry: both require ceaseless operations and ambushes to confuse and divide a superior opponent.

White House Still Sheltering Egypt’s SCAF

2012-02-04T22:24:00.000-08:00

Sam LaHood has fallen prey to causality. In charge of the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Egypt program, LaHood and a handful of his comrades (and possibly his wife) are currently holed up in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo as they await a legal ruling. On Friday Sameh Shoukry, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, told Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood that his son’s case would “hopefully” be resolved soon, but until then he cannot leave the country.

Just another manifestation of Egypt’s ongoing counterrevolution.

Politicized by U.S. and Egyptian officials alike, LaHood’s high-profile and 17 other Americans’ personal experiences have generated an accurate reflection of Washington’s siege mentality towards revolutionary Egypt. The battle over U.S.-funded NGO’s is certainly significant within the revolution’s arc; viewed as an assault on Egypt’s nascent democracy, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) is simultaneously mining nationalistic propaganda and testing the limits of Washington’s aid. Beyond the 17 individuals banned from traveling, Egyptian groups are being targeted by an investigation into the initial raids.

"It is one of the frontlines of the revolution," says Nasser Amin, Director General of the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP). "It is the counter revolution that is attacking us."

The status of 17 Americans assumes an understandable priority in the effort to resolve their legal obstacles and obtain their freedom. However the Obama administration’s emphasis on the NGO scandal has served a useful purpose by minimizing the SCAF’s other flaws. Egypt’s grander scheme continues to play out in Cairo’s streets, where thousands vent their bottomless distrust for SCAF and Interior Ministry. Fresh off Port Said’s tragedy - an incident that the administration has yet to politically react to - Egyptians gathered for a “Friday of Anger” that left at least 5 people dead and 1,400 wounded. These casualties added to Port Said’s estimated total of 74 and boosted anti-SCAF sentiment in the process.

"We believe this is something that has been well-organized," said Khaled Mortagy, a member of Al-Ahly's governing board. "I'm sure there are some hidden hands behind this, but we cannot really see, or we cannot really confirm, who is behind all that."

The general conspiracy alleges that police were ordered to stand down as part of the SCAF’s “us or the revolutionaries” campaign. Gen. Ismail Osman, an SCAF member, told Mehwar TV on Thursday that the military and police were not responsible, counter-arguing that fans instigated hostilities throughout the match. “Our policemen tried to contain them but not engage.” Osman may have valid points - soccer fans can be notoriously wild - but few involved Egyptians are inclined to listen after a year of active counter-revolution. Al-Ahly fans are especially inflexible after participating in the revolution; one pamphlet from the group declared, "The crimes committed against the revolutionary forces will not stop the revolution or scare the revolutionaries.”

While expressing sympathies over Port Said’s disaster, the Obama administration prefers to devote 24/7 coverage to Cairo’s U.S. Embassy rather than its Interior Ministry. Here the low-intensity evidence of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is scattered across an urban battlefield: rocks, tear gas canisters and bird pellets. Some protesters took the initiative of besieging government buildings, with their eyes trained on the Interior Ministry, but an overriding goal of 4GW is triggering disproportionate force and the ensuing political fallout. Egypt’s police predictably obliged, and social media would document Friday’s chaos in semi-real time.

"It was like a war," said a young doctor attending the wounded in Tahrir Square. "We didn't sleep at all. In just this tent, we had 500 people in eight hours. It started with tear gas, then wounds from stones. And after that it was shotgun pellets."

Activists claim that Port Said’s events are drawing previously-inactive Egyptians into the revolution. The White House and State Department have yet to respond to the weekend’s protests.

Although U.S. officials are leaning on SCAF at various pressure points, their weight is calibrated to preserve U.S. interests rather than advance the revolution’s cause. The SCAF has reacted by deploying a military team to Washington, leading to extensive meetings within Congress, the State Department and Pentagon (access the revolutionaries lack). Their efforts to influence Congress’s vote on a $1.3 billion bill also appear partially successful. As the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee in charge of foreign aid, Senator Patrick Leahy threw down Washington’s terms to the SCAF: free and fair elections, due process of law and freedom of expression, association, and religion.

"We want to send a clear message to the Egyptian military that the days of blank checks are over. We value the relationship and will provide substantial amounts of aid, but not unconditionally,"

Leahy didn’t speak clearly enough though. First, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton can overrule Congress’s decision by citing “US national security interests,” so long as she notifies Congress. Her main conditions reportedly center around NGOs and the prosecution of those policemen who assaulted Mona El-Tahawy, a “falsified” incident in Tantawi’s opinion. Leahy also preoccupied himself with NGO raids rather than the SCAF’s daily suppression of revolutionary energy. The same goes for President Barack Obama, who phones Tantawi on occasion to voice his concerns - before praising the SCAF’s guidance.

“The democratic transition in Egypt is hanging in the balance,” Khairat El-Shater, deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, warned from the group’s headquarters. “We strongly advise the Americans and the Europeans to support Egypt during this critical period as compensation for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship.”

Yet figures such as Clinton and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon continue to vouch for the SCAF, lavishing praise on its handling of Egypt’s election. One of many officials to defend the SCAF and General Hussein Tantawi, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta explicitly outlined Washington’s priorities on his way to NATO’s ministerial in Brussels. He says he told Tantawi, “you're making progress in Egypt, you've gone through the elections, you've taken off the emergency law, you're on a path towards establishing a democracy there, it's extremely important that we maintain the relationship and continue to work together to provide for your security, but our ability to maintain that relationship is being impacted by how this matter is being handled.”

Panetta’s comments fully expose Washington’s counterrevolutionary effect, mixing ambiguous remarks like “you’re making progress” with falsities such “taking off the emergency law.” Tantawi only lifted parts of the emergency law and used his platform to slander the revolutionaries as “thugs.” Panetta also claimed that the SCAF “obviously has to deal now with the parliament” and “an independent judiciary,” when the latter remains under SCAF control. All U.S. officials ignore the overall lack of trust that continues to swell (due to political interference and de facto immunity for the Interior Ministry), preferring to enumerate the SCAF’s achievements. Fortunately Tantawi does have to “deal with parliament;” although the SCAF is coordinating with the Muslim Brotherhood, the group is equally willing to inverse its rhetoric.

“It has now become evidently clear to everyone that there are individuals who are plotting to burn this homeland and demolish its institutions,” Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie said in a televised speech on Friday. “They are trained for this. They are known to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the police, who are delaying bringing them to justice, which is totally unacceptable.”

Washington has muted calls to accelerate the civilian transition, but Egypt’s non-binding advisory council is now issuing “a revolutionary plea.” One member, Sherif Zahran, told Reuters, "The advisory council will consider halting its meetings if the military council does not respond.”

What Panetta ultimately describes is a recipe for maintaining U.S. relations with Egypt’s SCAF: don’t obstruct elections, coerce the victors, minimize the revolution’s demands for civilian oversight. Whether by luck or design, falling into bed with the SCAF turned out to be Washington’s best contingency - a marked improvement over Omar Suleiman. Despite its sporadic hostilities, the SCAF provides Washington with the most cooperative partner available, resulting in mutual appreciation and a hardened counter-revolution.

"There are going to be differences of opinion,” argues Pentagon spokesman Captain John Kirby. “There were before the popular revolution there... Part of what makes a relationship a relationship is the ability to continue to discuss and try to find a way to move forward even beyond the differences you might share.”

Sadly Cairo and Washington’s politico-military leaders share an unbreakable bond: the desire to obstruct and divert Egypt’s revolutionary wave.

U.S. Caught In France’s Political Jetwash

2012-02-03T19:10:00.000-08:00

Leon Panetta’s skills as a bureaucrat have been lauded by the Obama administration, various Washington players, and the U.S. media, but his limited knowledge of counterinsurgency and fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is once again on display. Speaking to reporters on his way to NATO’s ministerial in Brussels, the Defense Secretary hyped America’s progress in Afghanistan to such a degree that he’s now actively contributing to its instability. Panetta would adhere to President Barack Obama’s line (he did, after all, help author and popularize it) by labeling the Taliban as a broken insurgency, giving rise to the possibility that America’s “combat role” could wrap up by “mid to late 2013.”

“2013 becomes an even more critical year, more critical because we'll be going into the final transitions, final tranches, and those'll be some of the most difficult areas. But nevertheless, you know, our goal is to complete all of that transition in 2013 and then, hopefully, by mid- to the latter part of 2013, we'll be able to make -- you know, to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role, which is basically fulfilling what Lisbon was all about. 2014 then becomes a year of consolidating the transition and making sure that those gains are in fact held, so that we can move towards a more enduring presence beyond 2014.”

On the surface, Panetta is proactively containing the fallout of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s political agenda. Rocked by the deaths of four French soldiers (killed by a Taliban infiltrator in the army) and his political opponent, who promises a rapid withdrawal of 3,900 troops if elected, Sarkozy recently convened with President Hamid Karzai to accelerate the security transition to Afghan forces. The two agreed to “ask NATO to consider a total handling of NATO combat missions to the Afghan army over the course of 2013.”

Panetta, in turn, jumped on the possibility as though it were a live grenade.

U.S. and NATO are now spinning this trend as a decision of strength - the surge will conclude successfully, the Taliban will remain broken and Afghans can assume the lead in security operations. Although caught in a 4GW vortex, Panetta’s remarks have admittedly been flipped upside-down by the narrow focus over NATO’s time-line. Most of his interview is expended on the progress of Obama’s surge: “We have weakened the Taliban. We've made good progress in going after them. The level of violence is down. It continues to be down.”

Questioned whether his comments reflect a shift in U.S. strategy, Panetta explicitly responds, "In the Lisbon discussions, it was always clear that there would come a point which we would make that transition and then be able to hopefully consolidate those gains in 2014. So the bottom line is: No, this isn't a new strategy. It's basically implementing what Lisbon is all about."

Except the overall perception appears irreversibly negative.

For starters, active parties in Afghanistan are clearly experiencing public and private disarray as they sort out France’s new position. The Obama administration failed to sufficiently coordinate Panetta’s remarks internally or externally, with Voice of America remarking, “Since Panetta spoke on Wednesday, American and NATO officials have been trying to explain the new prominence of 2013.” Fox News observed that he “may have gotten ahead of the administration on this.” Ben Rhodes, Obama’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communication, called Lisbon’s time-line the “framework of record” and said “we will need allies to remain committed to that goal.” A senior NATO official attempted to explain, “He said the combat role will come to an end. But he also said combat will continue, and that's exactly what I'm saying."

Back in Washington, CIA Director David Petraeus attempted to rescue his partner by making “bunny ears” to the House Intelligence Committee. Panetta’s replacement appealed to the same reasoning that other U.S. and NATO officials are holding onto, explaining the nature of a “progressive transition” between 2013 and 2014. Combat operations - especially night-raids and air-strikes - will not cease during this time-frame. Petraeus reasonably argues, “If you’re going to have it completed totally by the end of 2014, obviously somewhere in 2013 you have had to initiate that in all of the different locations...”

Only Panetta’s comments weren’t obvious enough to keep him from clarifying himself: “I want to be clear. Even as Afghans assume the security lead, ISAF (international forces) will continue to have to be fully combat-ready and we will engage in combat operations as necessary.”

As politically savvy as Petraeus may be, accusing the media of "overanalyzing” Panetta’s interview illustrates a chronic misunderstanding of the war’s politico-information sphere. The Pentagon is appealing to its own reason by spacing its transition to Afghan forces, when the potential run on NATO withdrawals has psychologically overwhelmed this narrative. That most NATO members (UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia) and their populations want out in the expedient future is no secret. Now, in the process of drawing on America’s strength, Panetta is exuding weakness by drifting behind France’s political wake. Afghanistan’s non-military spheres are burning with ambiguity and indecisiveness, undermining the desired stability of NATO’s transitional plan. Petraeus downplayed the U.S. media’s definition of a “stalemate” by arguing that the word never surfaces in a word search of NATO's leaked report.

Nor does it need to for Afghans, Americans, Europeans and Muslims in general to feel this way after 10 years of warfare.

The Taliban will naturally pounce on Panetta’s self-induced sensationalism to generate its own display of strength, and propaganda could become secondary to a field morale boost headed into 2013. These events dovetail straight into NATO’s report compiled from 27,000 interrogation sessions from 4,000 captured Taliban. According to an excerpt of the report, "Taliban commanders, along with rank and file members, increasingly believe their control of Afghanistan is inevitable. Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding and tactical proficiency remains intact.”

Demonstrating the depths of Panetta’s confusion, Afghan officials were also caught off guard despite Karzai’s support for Sarkozy’s accelerated time-line. One senior official told Reuters, "The transition has been planned against a timetable and this makes us rush all our preparations. A “former” government official who maintains contacts in the presidential palace said Karzai was “rattled” by Panetta’s comments, and predicted that the “real damage” will hit the negotiating table on both sides. With Taliban leadership already motivated to outlast the foreign coalition, “the palace in Kabul will... distrust U.S. intentions even more.”

Yet another danger - a constant during counterinsurgency - has manifested in the GOP’s political cycle; Panetta’s comments further politicized the U.S. debate over Afghanistan (what debate exists). This trend, though ongoing throughout the war, will increase its destructive potential as 2014 approaches.

As U.S. officials continue to jump on Pandora’s box, the Obama administration and NATO members will likely spread the propaganda fire by injecting oxygen. The more they attempt to “clarify,” the more confused they appear. White House spokesman Jay Carney echoed Panetta and Petraeus’s comments by saying the transition “could be moved up to 2013. But he was not making an announcement about a decision that had been made, simply about the consultations that would be taking place in Brussels and from Brussels forward to Chicago.”

Thus the administration intends to go high profile by putting the situation in Obama’s hands; Rhodes called Chicago’s summit “a chance for everybody to come back together, make sure we're aligned in our planning for our drawdowns and our transition." However this plan has already fallen victim to the impressions of another political maneuver. Obama’s personal credibility is sorely lacking in Afghanistan, as revealed by his State of the Union declaration that the Taliban’s momentum “has been broken.”

The Taliban must be starting to think the same about NATO’s coalition.

YACC Denounces Saleh’s Presence In America

2012-02-02T16:25:00.000-08:00

Asymmetric warfare just crystallized into a raw street performance fitting of New York City. Put up by a global power, Ali Abdullah Saleh had visitors Thursday as the Yemeni-American Coalition for Change (YACC) descended upon Central Park’s Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Yemen’s besieged “President,” as the Obama administration helped him, is lavishly recuperating from an assassination attempt as he gears up for Yemen’s upcoming “election.”

Already vexed by America’s deaf response to their revolution, Yemeni-Americans have taken Saleh’s presence as an unforgivable sucker-punch.

"We are so disappointed that Saleh is staying in one of New York city's hotels," said Nobel laureate Tawwakel Karman, who led Thursday’s press conference in spirit (through a cell phone) by delivering a defiant message to the White House. "Saleh should be held accountable and referred to the International Criminal Court."

With the U.S. media generally tuned out of Saleh’s visit, YACC is pursuing a combination of political activism and citizen’s journalist to alter Washington’s hardened status quo. No amount of force has been able to generate sufficient leverage in the short term - U.S. policy is currently steamrolling over Yemen’s revolution with relative ease - but the prolonged nature of revolution favors ceaseless asymmetric operations. YACC embodies the force ratio, development and technological drive of netwar, uniting civilian activists and community leaders to confront the actions of multiple governments. These nodes also form around Karman’s hub.

The youngest Nobel laureate has been graciously welcomed - and shamelessly ignored - by many Western leaders since winning her award in October, starting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

YACC directly targets the argument that appeasing Saleh will help stabilize Yemen, including U.S. relations with Yemen’s government and people. The administration and those who lobby its policy have rallied around this false premise, defending his stay as integral to Yemen’s transition of power. The White House indirectly countered through the U.S. media with a sinister line of propaganda, something to the effect that it “doesn't want to be seen as harboring a leader considered by his people to have blood on his hands.” 66% of Americans allegedly support drones strikes in Yemen, a position that inhibits political change, but many Yemenis and Americans alike have refused to bite.

“To provide Saleh with immunity or safe haven after he oversaw countless crimes against Yemenis, and while security forces headed by his sons, nephews and other family members continue to retaliate against the victims’ families and peaceful protesters, is an affront to accountability efforts in Yemen and will be seen by the people of Yemen as making the U.S. a partner in his crimes. Whatever the United States’ intentions may be, the symbolism in Yemen and the Arab world will be crystal clear: the U.S. is siding with repressive rulers rather than with the Arab people in the ongoing struggle for democracy and justice in the Arab world.”

Part of Washington’s meltdown in Yemen is pure image. Having invested 2010 in publicly highlighting its relationship with Saleh, the Obama administration cannot rhetorically escape political reality. Bringing him into America, even for 24 hours, generates an unavoidable “with us or against us” impression that Yemen’s revolution has lost. Although image can become king in asymmetric warfare, the larger half of Washington’s dilemma is policy-centric, as YACC makes clear.

“We also call on the Obama administration and the international community, especially Arab Gulf countries, to respect the Yemeni people’s legitimate calls for justice and democracy and support their right to choose and determine their next leaders, instead of imposing the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiative, which gives Saleh immunity for criminal acts, blocks accountability and transparency, and undermines the rightful demands of the Yemeni people.”

Manufactured by Washington and Riyadh, the GCC’s power-sharing agreement has created a false sense of progress and normality that all involved foreign powers are eager to continue. The deal itself took eight months and upwards of 1,000 lives to finalize, with Saleh signing under UN witness in Riyadh to avoid mayhem in Sana’a; the above privileges were internationally legitimized without input from Yemen’s pro-democracy movement. The GCC’s deal is widely opposed in Yemen’s streets, including its provision to transfer Saleh’s executive power to his vice president of 18 years.

This situation presents the exact "false choice" between security and democracy that the Obama administration claims to avoid. Before he left for America (via Oman), Saleh would send himself off by declaring, “We will inaugurate Abdo Rabbo Hadi as head of state after February 21st in the Presidential Palace.” He also told the youth to “return home,” and Saleh will implode the administration's argument if/when he returns to Sana'a.

YACC has deemed this undemocratic process as a “selection” of elite world powers: “As stipulated by the GCC initiative, on February 21st, 2012 elections will be held in Yemen. “Only one man will stand for election, the hand-picked successor of President Saleh, Abdo Rabo Mansour Hadi, a military man who has served as Saleh’s Vice President since 1994. Again, this is a provision accepted by the JMP to end the killing, but it is an embarrassment to the idea of a democratic Yemen. The is a selection, not an election, and will allowing Saleh’s regime to continue its dominance and repression.”

YACC instead advocates a policy of cooperation with Yemen’s people, not Saleh’s regime. Protesters, activists and observers have unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Obama administration of making this change, but giving up isn’t an option during revolution. YACC advises, “The U.S. should see the peaceful uprising in Yemen as a golden opportunity to promote a strong relationship with the Yemeni people and to forge a new relationship with the next generation - the youth of Yemen who make up three quarters of the population.”

Neither the White House nor State Department responded to today’s events or Yemen’s revolution in general, a normal day for U.S. policy. For now America continues to make enemies in the home of al-Qaeda’s fastest-growing branch, a simultaneous failure of diplomacy and counter-terrorism.

The Calm Before Iraq’s Next Storm

2012-02-01T18:32:00.000-08:00

After boycotting Nouri al-Maliki’s government for the last six weeks, Iraq’s Sunni-aligned Iraqiya List returned on Tuesday to participate in Baghdad’s parliamentary session. Immediately billed as a confidence-building measure that could “ease” Iraq’s political crisis, both Iraqiya and U.S. officials say the decision paves the ground for Baghdad’s looming “national conference.” Except a major caveat obstructs Washington’s efforts to spin progress out of a crisis that it helped generate.

As his organization announced its future political plans, Ayad Allawai cautioned, “if there had been an active Parliament and Government, and a real partnership, there would have been no reason for the holding of the National Conference.”

Iraqiya’s formal re-engagement merits an uptick in optimism, but not for the reasons cited by Washington. The administration's defense has remained unchanged since President Barack Obama welcomed al-Maliki to the White House, a controversial move that added fuel to Baghdad’s meltdown. U.S. officials argue that, by not resorting to violence, Iraqis are building their democracy through the political process. This reasoning, while true in a vacuum, inadvertently dehumanizes Iraqis by assuming them to be violent; most stand ready to rebuild their country through non-violent means. Some were unforgivably suppressed during the Arab Spring’s initial stage.

By turning the present crisis into an “opportunity,” the Obama administration has steadfastly ignored al-Maliki’s centrality to Iraq’s discord. The answer to every Iraqiya plea is “dialogue.”

U.S. policy might end up on its feet once Baghdad’s national conference, an event pushed hard by Washington, finally convenes. Weakening the divisive al-Maliki through Iraq’s political system offers a means to improving America’s strategic relationship inside (with Sunnis, Kurds and Shia) and outside (against Iran) of the country. Yet the breakdown between March 2010 and January 2012 suggests the opposite scenario: Washington is reacting to the consequences of favoritism towards al-Maliki. Consumed by Afghanistan’s surge, Iraqi officials accused the administration of checking out during the country’s parliamentary election. U.S. officials such as Vice President Joe Biden eventually increased their involvement over the summer by throwing their weight behind al-Maliki’s coalition, going so far as to accept his Iranian ties and Muqtada al-Sadr’s 30 seats.

Allawi was offered a national security post that he never received, and the Sunni-Shia chasm failed to dispel while transitioning to Iraq’s political battlefield. Prolonged friction has resulted in security lapses, inefficiency and a general lack of confidence in the new government.

The Obama administration now hopes that President Jalal Talabani can patch al-Maliki’s government into a more stable form. Biden would again phone al-Maliki, Allawi and Talabani over the weekend to stress “the importance of resolving outstanding issues through the political process.” Iraqiya possesses limited motivation to withdraw from al-Maliki’s coalition, as some officials of the bloc have threatened, due to the loss of power. A new election would be necessary, scaring away most representatives, and Iraqiya must hold onto this option as a last resort. Thus Iraqiya is coming to battle al-Maliki at Baghdad’s “national conference,” not reconcile with him. Allawi sees nothing to reconcile - Iraq’s Prime Minister must cede the powers (including the Interior Ministry) that he agreed upon in November 2010.

Iraqiya spokeswoman Maysoon al-Damluji listed several other priorities, starting with a resolution to Vice President Tariq Hashimi’s case. Currently awaiting his future in Kurdish territory, Hashimi has been accused of running a Sunni death squad that targets Shia politicians. Iraqiya plans to block Maliki’s request to dismiss Vice Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, who responded to Obama’s praise of al-Maliki by calling him a dictator; al-Maliki subsequently threatened a no-confidence motion. Iraqiya also wanted to convene over the nation’s budget and amnesty program. The bloc has yet end its boycott of al-Maliki’s cabinet sessions, and nine ministers failed to show on Tuesday. Ultimately, some Iraqiya members (including Allawi) view a national conference as the door to kick al-Maliki out of.

This situation doesn’t resemble the sunny glow of U.S. rhetoric: “we are encouraged by the decision of the Iraqiya bloc to end their boycott and to return to work at the Council of Representatives and also by the statements of other key blocs inside Iraq welcoming that decision.”

The Washington Post observed “it is unclear what Iraqiya has accomplished” through its boycott, but the results are beginning to add up. Iraq’s democratic obstacles would remain unaltered, with minimal pressure applied to al-Maliki as U.S. combat troops complete their withdrawal. Forcing the U.S. to respond at all, even in al-Maliki’s corner, is no small feat in itself. Had Iraqiya done nothing, al-Maliki would continue Iraq’s status quo indefinitely.

"What sort of Iraq we are talking about?" Hashimi wonders in response to Obama’s quasi-victory statements. "How the Americans will feel proud? How the American administration is going to justify to the taxpayer the billion of dollars that has been spent and at the end of the day the American saying, 'Sorry, we have no leverage even to put things in order in Iraq'?"

Separately, the State Department’s fleet of surveillance drones has produced another inadvertent error in the middle of a political crisis. These drones were downplayed as non-lethal by none other than Obama himself: “I think that there’s this perception that we’re just sending in a whole bunch of strikes willy nilly. It is important for everybody to understand that this is kept on a very tight leash.” Many Americans and Iraqis understand this distinction exactly. What Obama may not understand, judging from his rhetoric and potential use of private contractors, is the overwhelming power of perception.

Iraqis also value their sovereignty and privacy just like Americans.

Coupled with the Pentagon’s urgency to advance Iraq’s security relationship with al-Maliki, drones create the vivid impression that Washington remains primarily concerned with protecting its own interests, not Iraqis. This policy is not conducive to the country’s stability, but instead prolongs its politico-security vacuum. Now the White House must await Baghdad’s next storm with everyone else - and dividing Iraqiya or rescuing al-Maliki could shatter Iraq’s relative peace.

Propaganda 101: "Al Qaeda benefits from Yemen turmoil"

2012-01-31T19:10:00.000-08:00

Professional propaganda from CNN - “correcting” President Barack Obama's rhetoric in Yemen without reviewing his administration's disastrous policy:

When President Barack Obama told Americans last week that al Qaeda operatives in Yemen "are scrambling, knowing that they can't escape the reach of the United States of America," he may have been telling only half the story.

While al Qaeda's Yemen branch has been hit hard - most notably with the killing of American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki - U.S. officials and experts say there are signs that al Qaeda is making significant gains in Yemen as the government's control over outlying regions continues to fray amid political unrest.

Furthermore, they say, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) hasn't given up its goal of striking the United States, though there have been no attempted attacks on American soil by al Qaeda since 2010.

While the death of al-Awlaki by a CIA-operated drone in September eliminated AQAP's external operations commander and chief recruiter of English-speaking militants, key players remain at-large in Yemen.

They include AQAP leader Naser al-Wuhayshi - a close associate of Osama bin Laden - and Ibrahim al-Ashiri, the skilled bomb-maker U.S. officials believe was behind the attempt to blow up a U.S. commercial airliner on Christmas Day in 2009 and a plot to bomb cargo planes belonging to such companies as FedEx the following year.

And while some of al Qaeda's most-wanted members may be "scrambling," as Obama put it during his State of the Union speech Tuesday, AQAP's goal of striking the United States either overseas or at home has not diminished, according to one U.S. official.

"AQAP hasn't changed its two main aims which are to attack the West, while establishing a safe-haven in Yemen. They may have more success at the latter if they continue to take advantage of the political unrest there, which is going to be tense for some time," said the U.S. official, who spoke only on condition of anonymity.

Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert at Princeton University, said AQAP members "are taking advantage of the chaos" in Yemen right now.

In addition to the fight against AQAP, Yemen has been wracked with protests throughout the past year, with demonstrators and rival factions demanding the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and calling for elections.

Daniel Green, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed that AQAP has much more room to operate within Yemen, and offered a dire prediction: the group has an incentive to launch a spectacular attack in a presidential election year.

"They have shown a very entrepreneurial ability to get explosives into the U.S.," Green said. "I wouldn't put it past them to try and do something this year."

Most of the group's gains have been in the southern provinces where the government exercises little control, according to the experts. Clashes between suspected militants and security forces have been particularly fierce over the past year in southern Abyan province, where suspected AQAP members held the provincial capital of Zinjibar under siege for months before eventually being flushed out.

The U.S. official agreed AQAP is "particularly strong" in the southern provinces and warned, "they'll most likely try to expand from there to establish themselves as a force in the surrounding provinces."

It appeared they did just that with the recent seizure of Radda only 100 miles south of the capital of Sanaa and considered a key transit route to the south. Suspected militants stormed the town earlier this month, taking over government buildings and mosques and freeing inmates from jails, according to local authorities and residents...

Partial list of errors revolving around the absence of policy discussion:

Withdrawal by Saleh’s Republican Guard and Central Security Organization enabled AQAP’s takeover of Abyan governorate and its capital, Zinjibar. These areas have not been cleared.

This deceptive maneuver was replicated in Rada’a.

Although a U.S. official “cautioned against confusing secessionist violence with AQAP actions,” the Obama administration sacrificed Yemen’s Southern Movement to Saleh’s U.S.-trained counter-terrorism forces.

Overall, CNN documents AQAP’s expansion without any reference to America’s deeply unpopular and unstable presence in Yemen. The word "revolution" is never mentioned, being replaced by "turmoil" and "chaos."

CNN has yet to publish a report on Saleh’s recent arrival in New York City.

Syria’s Revolution Enters UNSC Battleground

2012-01-30T22:48:00.000-08:00

Two weeks ago The Trench speculated on the possibilities of intervention in Syria. One of these contingencies - organized insurgency against Bashar al-Assad’s regime - is already underway as oppositional representatives and commanders await further assistance from foreign powers. Those governments opposed to al-Assad’s rule can pursue this objective through their own volition, but direct military aid faces a stiff political battle in the UN Security Council. Walid al-Mouallem, Syria’s Foreign Minister, recently alerted the West of Moscow’s “red line."

“Russia cannot accept foreign intervention.”

This battle is set to commence after the Arab League decided to create space between the regime. Accused of cooperating with al-Assad and his security details, the League’s monitors were cornered by oppositional forces demanding material action and given no room for error. al-Assad’s tactical shifts left hundreds of protesters dead since mission commander and Sudanese General Muhammad Ahmed al-Dabi arrived in late December. At least 100 people were killed as the League met over the weekend, with government forces attacking multiple cities (Hama, Homs) from multiple directions. al-Assad also continues to organize mass rallies in praise of his “comprehensive reforms,” another sign that he has no intention of halting his crackdown.

A staunch defender of the regime and his mission, even al-Dabi is now forced to admit, “The situation at present, in terms of violence, does not help prepare the atmosphere” for negotiations. Violence has increased "in a significant way.”

Unable to broker a compromise with al-Assad, a divided League is increasing its pressure to maintain its own credibility with Syria’s opposition and Western capitals. Qatar currently leads the face of Arab intervention, with Riyadh looming in the background, and the withdrawal of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members helped push the debate into the UNSC. Turkey also hosted GCC foreign ministers in Istanbul to declare “unequivocal support” for the League’s decisions, including the recent suspension of its observer mission. This chain of events represents a modest victory for Syria’s opposition, but the UNSC’s battle could exceed the Arab League’s mission in length and casualties.

First circulated on Friday, a preliminary UN draft “calls on al-Assad to hand over authority to his deputy and calls for the formation of a national unity government.” The document also “condemns the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights" and demands an immediate ceasefire. al-Assad would be given 15 days to comply or risk new diplomatic and economic sanctions, with military force reserved for the political endgame. For now the UNSC is prepared to support Arab-led initiative “to facilitate... the transfer of power from the President and transparent and free elections.”

Specific analysis of the League’s initiative will be published shortly. Copied from the GCC’s power-sharing deal in Yemen - an unpopular and unstable agreement - the Arab League’s plan threatens al-Assad and Syria’s opposition alike.

Its secondary target is Moscow, where the UN’s political battle will rage most intensely. Months of pressure from the Obama administration and European powers such as Britain, France, and Germany is gradually encroaching upon Russia’s red-line, generating an unpredictable outcome. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland responded to the UN’s Friday diplomacy by speaking to Moscow: “We now have all of the members of the E.U., the United States, Australia and the Arab League countries making very clear that it's time for Assad to step aside... our question to those who are still protecting him is whether Syria really can go forward under his leadership, given the violence that we've seen."

So far Russia’s response hasn’t been positive. Labeling the current draft “unacceptable,” Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov instead pointed out the “positive aspects” of stopping violence and launching a “national dialogue” to “persuade the Syrian opposition to start a process of reconciliation.” He said Moscow was seeking clarification over future punitive measures. As for al-Assad’s fate, “Any decision about a future political settlement in Syria must be made during the political process without... preliminary conditions, and the demand for Assad’s resignation is a preliminary condition.”

Gatilov insists, “We cannot support a call to support Assad’s departure in any UN Security Council resolution.”

On Sunday Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his own disapproval of the League’s decisions, lobbying for more observers and time to open negotiations with Syria’s opposition. Lavrov has been a vocal advocate of the GCC’s deal in Yemen, but the Foreign Minister is keeping his cards close in Syria. No draft should be formally considered, in Lavrov’s opinion, until the League’s observer mission submits a report later this week. He might even be going through the trouble of ignoring Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who will attend UN meetings tomorrow and has been trying to reach Lavrov for 24 hours. “He’s in Australia and apparently unavailable,” according to State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland.

Russian analysts also point out the realities of an election year, and Vladimir Putin’s desire to avoid being outmaneuvered by the West in Libya and Syria.

As mentioned earlier, Syria’s opposition is now in danger of being squeezed by international forces, a process that inevitably weakens the control over a democratic transition. Most oppositional forces - including Syria’s National Council (SNC) and Local Coordination Committees - support international intervention on various levels, either humanitarian (no-fly) corridors into Turkey or military assistance to the national resistance. After receiving assurances from Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal that the Kingdom will recognize the SNC “as the official representative of the Syrian people," the council expects action to eventually replace diplomacy.

Bassma Kodmani, a Syrian-French member of the SNC’s 10-member executive board, explained, “I grew up hating NATO. I was taught it was the devil. It was unimaginable for decades for any Syrian to even think about asking for [help] from the West... But now people on the ground want humanitarian intervention. They want to be rescued.”

However the SNC still faces resistance from the Syrian National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, which the group has unsuccessfully attempted to link with. Unlike the SNC, the NCC adheres to non-intervention and supports Russian diplomacy; spokesman Haitham Mannaa told the AFP “we hope to see Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi head to Moscow before New York.” Although Mannaa reasonably argues that “sidelining” Russia will increase its support for al-Assad, this policy relies on two authoritarian forces to reach a democratic outcome.

Giving Russia “a bigger role” in the political process will bring disaster upon Syrians of all backgrounds.

Conversely, Kodmani stands firm on the SNC’s demand that al-Assad “move out before the transition can occur… he has no intention of having dialogue.” She said the opposition rejects open dialogue, instead favoring “a discussion on the modalities of [Assad’s] departure.” As a counterweight to the NCC, SNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun is wooing Moscow to let go of al-Assad and continue its “historic relationship” with Syria’s people. At the same time, the SNC has allegedly rejected an invite to Moscow. Whether the SNC and LCC will accept one of al-Assad’s vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa or Najah Al-Attar, remains uncertain, but the streets may take the decision out of their hands. Popular revolutionaries across the region are committed to regime change, not “sharing power” with the regime.

Another executive minister, Abdel Baset Seda, just clarified, "I say clearly that our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad).”

The council’s plan is to move forward in the UNSC and hope “the Arab League has the clout to convince the Russians to change their position.” Kodami says that Syrians expect “a serious Security Council resolution that says the council looks to blame the regime and then sets a period of time after which it will take other measures.” Meanwhile the SNC is mapping, coordinating with, and financing military groups operating in Syria and Turkey. Defected military commanders and experts are busy “linking them into some form of command chain."

In short, preparations are being made to infuse a long-term insurgency with foreign assistance.

Paris Threatens NATO’s Afghan Umbrella

2012-01-29T20:23:00.000-08:00

At first Nicholas Sarkozy’s rhetoric sounded relatively harmless.

Pressured by an impending election, challenger Francois Hollande and chronically low approval for war in Afghanistan, France’s incumbent Prime Minister needed to make up some ground. Hollande has pledged to withdrawal all troops from Afghanistan and, sensing an opportunity to close the gap, Sarkozy utilized the deaths of four French soldiers (shot by a Taliban infiltrator) to float his own accelerated withdrawal. The premier initially backed off from his expedient reaction last Tuesday, when Foreign Minister Alain Juppe told Parliament that Sarkozy would make a decision after meeting Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Paris.

Pointing out a “clear distinction” between “organized withdrawal and rushed withdrawal," Juppe promised that his government “will not give in to panic.” Except Sarkozy is now generating this exact sensation in Afghanistan, Washington and NATO capitals after closing ranks with Karzai. His current plan would bring 1,000 of France’s 3,900 troops home in 2012 and accelerate the final withdrawal from 2014 to 2013. "A few hundred" advisers would remain in the country.

"The pursuit of the transition and this gradual transfer of combat responsibilities will allow us to plan for a return of all our combat forces by the end of 2013," he said on Friday.

What Sarkozy fails to address in depth is the disproportionate effects of his words and actions. The immediate military upshot could first manifest in Kapisa, where Sarkozy promised to transfer French control by March instead of late 2012. The Taliban is almost certain to mount an offensive in the vulnerable province, a possibility that could dampen NATO’s overall transfer of the country. Afghanistan’s provincial and national levels could then become trapped in a mutual cycle of violence and propaganda typical of fourth-generation warfare (4GW).

For their part, U.S. officials realize that Sarkozy’s primary damage was inflicted in the political sphere, not on the battlefield. Withdrawal is already unpopular with conservatives and President Barack Obama cannot accelerate based on French politics - even if both capitals may share the same political boat. Reactions range from terse to approving; U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings insisted that "ISAF sees no effects to our current campaign plan.” Similarly, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland argued that Washington knew about Sarkozy’s change of course prior to the incident in Kapisa. Citing Sarkozy’s meeting with Karzai, she claimed that “this timetable was worked through both with the Afghans and with NATO as part of our collective process...”

“So this was a national decision of France. It was done in a managed way. We will all work with it. As the President has said with regard to our own presence, we are working on 2014. The alliance as a whole is working on 2014, but we are also going to work within this French decision.”

These comments indicate that the Obama administration is more worried than it publicly admits. An honest reaction was delivered by NATO’s own Secretary General, who warned Paris to make its decision “following consultations with commanders and ISAF partners.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen also told reporters, "It's important to the success of the operation that we maintain a commitment to this agreed plan.” The main threat of Sarkozy’s plan is overwhelmingly political in nature, and a textbook example of the dilemmas created by guerrilla warfare. Unwilling to be seen as acting in isolation, France’s premier also says he will use next month's NATO summit to accelerate its entire transfer.

"We have decided in a common accord with President Karzai to ask NATO to consider a total handling of NATO combat missions to the Afghan army over the course of 2013," Sarkozy said.

As the situation currently stands, France’s government would undertake a politically expedient decision with no basis in reality. Although the transfer of authority should occur as quickly as possible - many Afghans want foreign troops out of the country ASAP - much of Afghanistan remains unprepared for authorities to govern or police. This exchange cannot occur within two years. Of equal importance, Afghans won’t be leading Special Forces raids when 2014 dawns on the horizon. Karzai did qualify his conditions, saying 2013 marked the “earliest” deadline, but Sarkozy’s political damage is already being felt in Afghanistan’s provinces and capital.

Time will reveal the effects of Sarkozy’s reaction on NATO’s own coalition. Intense U.S. pressure is already being applied in order to keep the coalition from openly dividing, while British Prime Minister David Cameron attempted to establish a middle ground by relating to Paris: “Obviously, between now and 2014 there will be opportunities for different countries to reduce their troop numbers. Britain has reduced our troop numbers over the last year.”

However Cameron advised Sarkozy to act within NATO’s common perimeters, saying the rate of withdrawal and provincial transfers “should be the same for all of the members of NATO.”

Problematically for NATO, no contributing country enjoys a majority consensus on Afghanistan. The war is particularly unpopular in France, England, Germany, Italy, Spain and Australia, unnerving other contributors such as Poland. Sarkozy has effectively poisoned the well by unilaterally announcing a divisive proposal, one with significant approval in Western households. This damage is left to expand in all directions, starting with Afghanistan's provincial security and reverberating nationally by impairing the perceptions of Afghans. Boosting Taliban morale in the field is likely to be dwarfed by a propaganda campaign directed at NATO’s “weakness.”

Sarkozy’s rhetoric has opened Pandora’s Box a little wider. A concerted NATO effort is required to prevent France’s actions from becoming a systemic threat to the mission in Afghanistan.

White House Directs Sneak Attack Against Bahraini Opposition

2012-01-28T14:01:00.000-08:00

President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address made minor headlines in Bahrain by ignoring its 11-month uprising. Pro-democracy protesters expected nothing less, having vocalized their realization of America’s double-standard for months. This new batch of silence, though, turns out to be particularly potent.

Not only did Obama refuse to tell Bahrainis or Americans what his administration is up to - he won’t even tell Congress.

Hoping to polish U.S.- Bahraini relations through arms, the White House and Pentagon carried their weapons package straight into the unwelcome obstacle of democracy. A small coalition of Senators (allegedly six) opposed to the deal, first leaked in September, would briefly raise Bahrain’s profile high enough to temporarily block the delivery. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon knows the odds are stacked against Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement and hasn’t stopped lobbying the cause.

“Imagine if everyone in Congress had kept quiet and this arms sale had been completed,” Wyden wondered in December. “What kind of message would this have sent the world or to the people aspiring for freedom and democracy? America should NOT be rewarding brutal regimes with arms. It’s that simple.”

Instead of encouraging true reform in Bahrain, the Obama administration decided to respond by expanding the island’s political vacuum and media blackout. Copying the process of his “National Dialogue,” which collapsed in less a month, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) took center stage as the administration defended its actions. All questions related to the arms sale and daily state-sponsored violence were redirected to the impending BICI, ultimately highlighting the regime’s willingness to reform. By offering silence and inaction to Bahrain’s opposition, the Obama administration telegraphed its intent to deploy arms under the BICI’s cover.

"There is merit in naming and shaming and embarrassing, in pushing, in enlisting public opinion, domestic and international,” said Cherif Bassiouni, who chaired and initially defended the King’s inquiry. “This is not the style of Secretary Clinton or President Obama, and I'm not sure they are necessarily doing the right choice.”

Nevertheless, the administration has decided that Bahrain’s profile dipped enough to smuggle the arms past Congress - using the most duplicitous means available. As Foreign Policy reports, “the State Department has not released details of the new sale, and Congress has not been notified through the regular process.” The administration “simply briefed a few congressional offices and is going ahead with the new sale,” disregarding the need for formal notifications and a public explanation. Congressional sources said the State Department found a “legal loophole” around $1 million notifications; the $50+ million package will be broken down into “multiple sales of less than $1 million” to “avoid the burden.” The packages’ contents (reportedly Humvees, missiles and other technology) are now being kept secret.

"The Bahraini government has shown little progress in improving their human rights record over the last few months and in some ways, their record has gotten worse," Wyden told The Cable in response to the administration's actions. "Protesters are still being hurt and killed, midnight arrests are still happening and the government continues to deny access to human rights monitors. The kingdom of Bahrain has not shown a true good faith effort to improve human rights in their country and the U.S. should not be rewarding them as if they have."

Naturally, U.S. officials continue to base their argument precisely on the “recommendations” of King Hamad’s BICI. They will likely hedge their language along a similar line as one of Foreign Policy’s anonymous sources, who welcomed the King’s “important initial steps” before urging him “to take action on the full range of recommendations that we believe will help lay the foundation for longer-term reform and reconciliation." After exploiting the BICI’s torture findings and rejecting its superficial reforms, Al Wefaq and a growing majority of street protesters no longer trust the King’s ability to reform.

"This message of ‘business as usual' will only strengthen the regime's belief that there will continue to be lack of consequences to their human rights violations internationally," Maryam al-Khawaja, the head of the foreign relations office at the Bahrain Center for Human Rights BCHR, told Foreign Policy. "At a time when the United States is already being criticized for practicing double standards when it comes to the so-called Arab spring, to the protesters in Bahrain, the U.S. selling any arms to the government of Bahrain is exactly like Russia selling arms to Syria. Bahrain has become the United States' test on how serious they are about standing against human rights violations, and they are failing miserably."

The administration’s impending shipment comes three weeks after the State Department’s Victoria Nuland insisted that Bahrain hasn’t “fallen off Washington’s radar.” Of course not - the administration is actively minimizing its uprising. More weeks of silence would elapse as funerals were dispersed with ubiquitous tear gas and protesters died of “mysterious” circumstances. No U.S. response followed the government’s assault on Al Wefaq’s office, while Nabeel Rajab’s confrontation with security forces prompted both concern and praise for the King. The BCHR chairman is a vocal critic of U.S. policy in Bahrain and has directed his energy towards its double-standard. These factors generate a jarring experience: the Obama administration seeks to restore public confidence in U.S.-Bahraini relations, but must do so in secret.

The same juxtaposition is unfolding at a policy level. Maria McFarland, deputy Washington director at Human Rights Watch, predicted in September, "By continuing its relationship as if nothing had happened, the US is furthering an unstable situation."

White House Propaganda Machine Set On Turbo

2012-01-27T19:09:00.000-08:00

Following his interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor and one of Washington’s highest ranking Ministers Without Portfolio, Charlie Rose keeps the spotlight on Iran and China by interviewing Tom Donilon. President Barack Obama's National Security Adviser also praised his boss as a “natural executive,” before engaging in some PR on behalf of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

If only U.S. foreign policy was as comprehensive as its accompanying propaganda campaign.

And speaking of Ministers Without Portfolios - a common position in Israel’s government, the State Department has clarified Dennis Ross’s status in Washington. The former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region was never going to embrace private life after resigning in November 2011, instead wading back into the Beltway until a position opened in the next administration. However Ross never officially left Obama’s White House, despite his formal declaration, and retains his security clearance. He visits every week and meets regularly with Obama’s National Security Council.

Yesterday a senior Israeli official confirmed that Ross met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after requesting a “private” meeting to jumpstart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The State Department's Victoria Nuland would tell reporters on Friday, "Dennis has been a good partner to administrations of all kinds, whether he was in government or out of government, and always remains in close touch."

“We have done everything we can to recruit and retain Dennis in the government,” Donilon remarked upon Ross's "resignation." “He is one of those rare individuals who has global reach.”

Ross also represents a key piece of the U.S. mainstream narrative that Obama has been overly harsh to the Israelis, and too soft on the Palestinians. The opening paragraphs of his recent Washington Post op-ed placed all of the blame on Mahmoud Abbas instead of Netanyahu; “changing the realities on the ground” functions as a codeword for allowing Israel to dictate these realities on its terms. Ross presumably lobbied Netanyahu to offer the Palestinians as little as possible in order to build their confidence in the Israeli government, a process that is likely to yield a lopsided final-status agreement.

So goes life for the point-man of backchannel negotiations between Washington and Jerusalem - another “foreign policy success” for the Obama administration.

Egypt’s School of Revolution

2012-01-26T20:52:00.000-08:00

What has changed since protesters first massed in Cairo’s streets demanding the end of Hosni Mubarak’s regime? Everything or nothing remains the same, depending on the respondent. Wednesday’s scene in Tahrir Square unfolded as if hurled through a parallel dimension, with cautious peace replacing anxious violence and Egypt’s political parties joining the youth-induced civil movement.

Most noticeable of all, the revolution’s main opponent has reversed polarity from the weaker Mubarak to his mighty Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

Wednesday's calm was a product of this strength, a “goodwill gesture” designed to cast Egypt’s military council as the revolution’s eternal guardian (security forces lurked on Tahrir’s outskirts). Egypt’s SCAF launched a variety of counter-revolutionary initiatives after Mubarak collapsed in February, but few more pivotal than its information warfare against pro-democracy protesters. Exploiting its media powers to spin the revolutionaries as Egypt’s new enemy, the SCAF has manipulated all aspects of society by oscillating between condemnation and praise. State media “repeatedly warned the public of a foreign-financed plot to undermine Egypt on Wednesday.”

The previous week, during a setup speech for January 25th, Field Marshall Hassan Tantawi declared, "Egypt is facing grave dangers it has not seen before. The armed forces is the backbone that protects Egypt. These schemes are aimed at targeting that backbone. We will not allow it and will carry out our task perfectly to hand over the nation to an elected civilian administration."

Tantawi would build on these statements in another nationally-televised address by “partially” lifting Egypt’s emergency law, arguing “we've never deviated from the aims of the revolution.” He also deployed the blanket label of “thuggery” to defend future crackdowns against pro-democracy protesters; Mohamed Attiya, a member of the Jan. 25 Youth Coalition, said that “thuggery” has become Egypt’s equivalent of “terrorism.” Shaping negative public opinion around the revolutionaries facilitates the SCAF’s political hegemony and cushioned its heavy-handed crackdown.

Yasser Ramadan of the April 6 Youth Movement explained, "People began to hate the revolution and thought it only made the economic situation bad. It's been hard to make the people believe in the revolution again."

Armed with this impression, the SCAF took preemptive action to solidify its authority after a new constitution is drafted, and subsequently leveraged political parties to keep these powers when a civilian government is sworn in. The SCAF’s totalitarian tendencies - Tantawi and his generals obeyed Mubarak for decades - eventually alienated Mohamed ElBaradei, one of Egypt’s liberal presidential candidates. Although ElBaradei lacks widespread popularity inside Egypt, he is viewed as a relatively honest and capable leader.

He recently warned that the SCAF "has insisted on going down the same old path, as if no revolution took place and no regime has fallen.”

The SCAF, on the other hand, isn’t overly concerned with ElBaradei’s decision (even though he was reportedly urged to delay his announcement). Tantawi immediately perceived the division between Tahrir and Egypt’s political opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and has capitalized on their parliamentary gains to widen this gap. Either unwilling to confront the SCAF or awaiting a later opportunity, the Brotherhood is playing along by mirroring the council’s double-sided rhetoric. Days ago the group’s secretary-general, Mohammed Badie, told a televised audience that parliament “will scrutinize the military's budget and hold the army accountable for mistakes made during the transition.”

"We respect and appreciate the army but the military council must be held accountable for any mistakes," he promised. "No one is above accountability."

Other officials, such as spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan, then apply a counter-spin: “The army is the army of the people. Some of its activities must be surrounded with secrecy and we respect that.”

Parts of the Brotherhood’s behavior can be rationalized in a beneficial way; no group possesses as much leverage to check the SCAF, leaving some protesters comfortable with the dual track of political and street pressure. This is all they can reasonably hope for in a pluralistic Egypt. However the SCAF expects much from the Brotherhood in return for political favoritism in a post-Mubarak world, a dangerous prospect for the revolutionaries. The Brotherhood regularly abstained from demonstrations against the SCAF and flooded national protests, and its Freedom and Justice Party now holds a near-majority when the 100-member drafting committee meets on a new constitution.

The SCAF will attempt to dominate this process directly and indirectly, as control over Egypt’s parliament and constitution will shield investigations into its commercial assets. Already expecting immunity for crimes committed by the military and police since Mubarak’s fall, Tantawi’s ultimate goal is finding a suitable President before June 30th.

The SCAF has further streamlined its operations by maintaining the support of Western powers, notably America. With Gulf states keeping their relations intact - the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sent Bahrain’s King to reel in Tantawi - Washington completes the international community’s buffer around Egypt’s generals, allowing them to act with minimal consequences. The SCAF is viewed as the key to every door: preserving Israel’s treaty, controlling the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nour Party, inking economic deals and sidelining the youth movement. Days of violence often passed before Washington expressed “concern,” even holding the military and protesters equally responsible. Raids on NGOs, a tactic specifically designed to test Washington’s limits and manipulate Egyptians, generated private discussions and eventual praise from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

Unconcerned with his image in Egypt’s streets, “President Obama called Egyptian Field Marshal Tantawi today [Jan. 20th] to reaffirm the close partnership between the United States and Egypt and to underscore the United States’ support for Egypt’s transition to democracy.” When Tantawi announced a partial end to Egypt’s emergency law, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland welcomed these “good steps” before taking a question on Tantawi’s use of the word “thuggery.”

“Well, there was a little footnote on this, as I understand it, that it would continue to be applied in the case of thuggery and other small cases... We are seeking some clarification from the Egyptian Government what they mean by that. But the fact that they are finally, after these many, many months of demands, taking the major step is very important for Egypt and for its future.”

As if Tantawi’s constant use of “thuggery” requires clarification.

Facing overwhelming forces, Egypt’s revolutionaries have persevered beyond any expectations outside of themselves and their supporters. The energy of youth can only accomplish so much in the face of overwhelming historic and financial powers. These groups inevitably lack experience in the political arena, contrasting the savvy veterans within the SCAF and organized parties, and need years to equalize the playing field. This inexperience is why revolution still affords the ultimate school to Egypt’s youth, strengthening them through education and by forcing them to engage on the national level. These groups will mature through a trial of fire and gradually expand their role in a new Egypt.

Wael Ghomen, one of Egypt’s high-profile revolutionaries, was recently asked by The New York Times, “As there was no clear alternative to Mubarak, was it unwise to encourage revolution?

“I’m fully aware of a lot of opinions that this was a very big downside of the revolution — that it had no leadership to take over after Mubarak stepped down. Only history will judge. Regardless, a lot of Egyptians are now empowered.”

Consequently, revolutionaries mobilized to check anti-democratic forces throughout 2011 and will continue for as long as necessary. Many outsiders perceive their actions as a failure, but their absence would allow the SCAF to delay and manipulate Egypt’s democratic transition with relative impunity. Some revolutionaries admit to temporary defeat, or else concede a return to square one, before affirming their determination to continue organizing. Others believe that their revolution isn’t back in square one, never went away, and isn’t starting anew.

They will tell you that 2012 marks the second year of Egypt’s democratic revolution.

White House Welcomes “President Saleh” to America

2012-01-25T20:37:00.000-08:00

According to a State Department press release, "Ali Abdullah Saleh is still the President of Yemen and will be accorded those privileges and immunities accorded to any head of state until a new Yemeni president is sworn in following elections on February 21."

This "landmark presidential election," in Voice of America's words, has been predetermined by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and UN at the direction of Washington and Riyadh. The Wall Street Journal observes (possibly prematurely) that Saleh will "be formally stripped of his title as president on Feb. 21, when his deputy, Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, will become head of state."

Saleh himself is reportedly stuck in Oman, having refused to board a Saudi plane and now in the process of securing a jet from another Gulf state. The Yemeni Embassy in Washington has already confirmed that Saleh will return to Yemen after receiving medical treatment in New York.

SOTU: Inside Washington’s Propaganda Machine

2012-01-25T18:08:00.000-08:00

This Foreign Policy “grading session” of President Barack Obama is typical of the shallow, mainstream analysis leading up to and following his State of the Union address. Most laud the use of drones and offer generous praise of his administration’s response to the Arab revolutions. Nine graders are also excessive given that eight take on one Glenn Greenwald - but still atoms in the propaganda campaign that has spun Obama’s foreign policy into pyrite.

Robert Kagan is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The Obama administration has fortunately ignored the "realists'" call for standing by the collapsing dictatorships in the Middle East. (How people can call themselves "realists" when advocating such hopelessly unrealistic policies is a source of wonderment.)

Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. She served as director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department from 2009-2011.

Call it the private equity approach to American foreign policy: nimble, flexible, adaptable, and responsive are all essential characteristics for success in the continually accelerating, complex system we call international affairs.

Danielle Pletka is vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

The answer, of course, is politics. Politics matters to any sane politician; but when politics suffers no competition from principle, the nation's foreign policy is rudderless. It is why our allies mistrust us, our adversaries underestimate us, and why we no longer seek to shape a better world, but instead to retreat from it.

Aaron David Miller is public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

On balance, Obama has been credible and able in foreign policy, but neither the brilliant foreign transformer nor transactional negotiator and crisis manager he wanted to be. He shouldn't take it personally; it's a cruel world out there.

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

President Obama has amassed a decidedly mixed record on foreign policy. He can boast of several worthwhile achievements during his first 3 years. He fulfilled the commitment to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, repaired much of the damage that the Bush administration had caused to America's relationship with the European democracies, and put the United States -- at least rhetorically -- on the right side of history regarding the Arab Awakening. His campaign to eliminate al Qaeda's leadership achieved numerous successes, most notably the killing of Osama Bin Laden.”

Jamie M. Fly is executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative.

In his first three years in office, Obama has made several correct tactical decisions, but he seems to lack an appreciation of America's unique role in the world and a coherent vision for the use of U.S. power and influence. What the country needs from its next president is a leader who can shape world events rather than be shaped by them. There is little to indicate that this is Barack Obama's interest or aptitude.

Heather Hurlburt is executive director of the National Security Network.

Achievement 10). Keeping the United States relevant to the Arab Spring. By choosing to ease out Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, play a key enabling role in the Libya intervention, and work hard if not so successfully behind the scenes in Bahrain and Yemen, Washington kept itself relevant to the conversation in a changing Arab world -- no small achievement, despite how far short it falls of hopes both there and here.

Glenn Greenwald is a contributing writer at Salon.com.

In sum, Obama has deftly and intelligently pursued ignominious and ignoble foreign-policy goals.

Bonus propaganda: 36 government responses to Obama’s State of the Union and only one mention of foreign policy - to praise his leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan and OBL’s raid.

Obama Assaults His Foreign Policy Critics

2012-01-24T21:21:00.000-08:00

Anyone holding low expectations for the foreign policy segment of President Barack Obama’s State of the Union probably weren’t disappointed. Washington tradition says that foreign policy is “reserved” for the end, but seven paragraphs felt like sticking an unwanted stepchild at the end of a dinner table. Obama would mill through a predictable roll-call as he crescendoed from domestic issues to the teamwork of Osama bin Laden’s raid. Yet this perfunctory atmosphere doesn’t stop U.S. foreign policy from being on track across “the globe,” from Europe and Asia to everywhere in between: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Israel.

Obama insists, “when we act together, there is nothing the United States of America can't achieve, that we've learned from our actions abroad over the last few years.”

The “lessons” of the President’s speech don’t warrant an extensive reaction beyond the conclusion that U.S. foreign policy will remain unchanged. One wouldn’t know that Iraq is experiencing a U.S.-infused political crisis with no end in sight; Sunni officials were “shocked” to hear Obama’s praise for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Meanwhile the Taliban’s momentum has been conclusively “broken,” although the only established metric for this claim is body counts and Pentagon statements. Obama also defended his “withdrawal” from a position of strength (60,000+ troops will remain into 2013), instead of running low on resources and time to fight a war that could persist long after 2014.

So audacious as to begin “from Pakistan to Yemen,” Obama efficiently transitioned from victorious war rhetoric to unconditionally supporting the Arab revolutions. Here America’s double-standard springs to life as he name-drops Gaddafi and al-Assad while ignoring Mubarak and Saleh. The latter is due into New York City at any moment for medical treatment after the U.S. Embassy approved his visit. Undaunted by the popular repercussions of Saleh’s visit, the White House has sacrificed Yemen’s pro-democracy movement to chase al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and preserve joint-hegemony with Saudi Arabia. Despite the high-profile death of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP has only grown since Obama took office in 2009. He also condoned the death-by-drone of Abdulrahman, al-Awlaki’s 16 year old son who had gone to look for him.

In Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain and even Syria, the Obama administration has failed to “support policies that lead to strong and stable democracies and open markets, because tyranny is no match for liberty.”

All of these statements were readily predictable beforehand. However Obama’s address takes a more amusing turn when he begins to directly target critics of his foreign policy: “The renewal of American leadership can be felt across the globe. Our oldest alliances in Europe and Asia are stronger than ever. Our ties to the Americas are deeper. Our iron-clad commitment to Israel's security has meant the closest military cooperation between our two countries in history. We've made it clear that America is a Pacific power, and a new beginning in Burma has lit a new hope."

Some of these claims border on the truth; Washington has successfully manipulated European powers to follow its lead in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. Hard-line rhetoric against Iran, followed by a last-minute olive branch, hedges U.S. policy on a realistic (if insincere) position. The “shift” back into Asia is naturally welcomed by America’s Pacific allies. Conversely, Chinese and Middle East underpinnings of this “Asian shift” resulted in a massive propaganda campaign with an appetite for global hegemony. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are blocked by ongoing favoritism towards Israel - not the Palestinians, as many U.S. foreign policy pundits argue. Iraq is a crisis waiting to happen, Afghanistan is mired in stalemate and Washington’s response to the Arab revolutions has highlighted the very double-standard that Osama bin Laden declared jihad against.

America’s global presence remains an undisputed fact, but the “renewal of American leadership” skipped the Middle East. So what lessons have been learned after OBL’s triumphant killing?

Obama paradoxically declares, “From the coalitions we've built to secure nuclear materials, to the missions we've led against hunger and disease; from the blows we've dealt to our enemies; to the enduring power of our moral example, America is back. Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about.”

Apparently us "cynics" don’t know what we’re talking about - so does that mean we do?

Yemen’s Gears of Counter-Revolution

2012-01-24T17:10:00.000-08:00

The rise of asymmetric warfare has suspended the possibility of entrenched conflicts fought between conventional armies, bringing dreaded “meat grinders” to a halt. Now entire populations are subjected to the political gears of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), and the fear of uncertainty is drawn equally from their own governments and fellow citizens. Yemenis currently find themselves smashed between enormous grinders: Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and foreign powers holding interests in their country.

These forces recently collided amid al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) high-profile “capture” of Rada’a, a modest town located 100 miles south of the capital. Like Yemen’s southern governorates and the local capital of Zinjibar (Abyan), Rada’a serves as a microcosm for everything wrong with international policy in Yemen. While headlines blared “AQAP takeover,” JMP officials and democratic activists busied themselves detailing Saleh’s mastery of sacrificing a town. The process combines a number of factors to simulate chaos: opportunistic militants, government-controlled “jihadists,” and the withdrawal of Saleh’s Republican Guard, which is later redeployed to the scene. Yemen’s strongman feeds on instability to maintain his rule, perversely arguing that only he is capable of stabilizing the country.

Saleh also understands - far too well - that al-Qaeda provides the quickest means of manipulating the international community. Emboldened by his immunity but still refusing to cede executive power under the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) terms, Saleh continues to exploit his cooperation against AQAP to sustain influence in Washington. The group also doubles as his go-to bogeyman in the Western audience; Rada’a produced more media coverage than Saleh’s political resistance.

Given that AQAP has increased its activities since U.S. forces escalated their operations in December 2009, the Obama administration is holding onto Saleh’s regime beyond the point of security or democracy. The longer the international community obstructs Yemen’s pro-democracy movement through an unrepresentative GCC deal, the longer Saleh will direct his energy towards survival and allow AQAP to expand. His son also sits on the military commission that is supposed to decommission his relatives; Ahmed commands the Republican Guard, a U.S.-trained “counter-terrorism” that spent 2011 terrorizing anti-government protesters and tribesmen. Concerned neither with democracy nor stability, U.S. policy is pursuing control of the Arabian Peninsula at any cost - even a stateside vacation for a potential war criminal.

This doppelgänger policy requires instability to justify hegemony.

"Neither Vice President Hadi nor anyone else will succeed in ruling and implementing real reforms if they do not preside over a unified and obedient army,” Tawakel Karman, Yemen’s resident Nobel laureate, warned upon her return. “If this doesn't happen the next president will be nothing but a pawn of the old regime.”

Despite local reports of friction between Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Yemen's Vice President of 17 years, Saleh continued to oversee government functions and communicate through Hadi until leaving for New York City on Monday. The Vice President speaks regularly with GCC Secretary General Abdullatif al-Zayani, whose bloc negotiated a power-sharing agreement between Saleh and the JMP, and al-Zayani recently praised himself for “putting an end to the Yemeni crisis according to the initiative and the United Nations resolution 2014.” Ending Yemen’s “political crisis” is a constant theme amongst Western and Gulf diplomats - a theme that will prolong the Revolution. Many protesters want to complete their quest with minimal bloodshed, making Saleh’s exile appear bearable, but the GCC’s deal is too undemocratic to achieve a popular consensus.

Washington, Riyadh, their satellites and the UN are also viewed with widespread suspicion after ignoring the streets' demands. Accordingly, Hadi is responsible for hosting veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, even allowing them to attend meetings with Yemen’s cabinet and security officials. All parties are looking to drum up financial support the GCC-controlled election in February, an "election" that will feature Hadi as a consensus candidate of Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP.

Meanwhile the JMP’s Salem Basindwa, Yemen’s new Prime Minister, just concluded a GCC tour to raise his own political and financial support. Fearful of irreversibly alienating Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, the JMP continues to hedge itself around the divisive issues of Saleh’s legal status and exile. Basindwa would tell Reuters from the United Arab Emirates, "I'm hopeful he will leave (before February 21)... but let us wait and see.” A week before, the Prime Minister defended Saleh’s immunity while urging those “who think a revolution can force Saleh out of power” to “try.” Considering the repeated delays over approving Saleh’s immunity, JMP officials could be accumulating their resources for a gradual takeover after February’s election. However the umbrella organization appears most interested in securing political and financial capital, a process that would divert foreign aid from its intended recipients.

The JMP may have sincere intentions of removing Saleh’s family, but their track record prior to and during Yemen’s revolution suggests that oppositional figures desire power for themselves. Basindwa’s office later denied his statements, nor does he leave any room for Yemen’s protesters when saying things like, "the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] agrees to play a major and leading role in the development of Yemen. This is not surprising from the Kingdom that always has stood by us.”

The only foreign entity more unpopular or meddlesome than America is Saudi Arabia.

Those protesters “looking forward” to Yemen’s referendum of Hadi are easily outnumbered by Saleh’s men, the JMP and foreign powers. Last week UN envoy Jamal Benomar highlighted the Security Council's commitment to “ending the crisis in Yemen" during meetings with Hadi and Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi. Another UN report will be released on January 25th, when Benomar is due to note Yemen’s political progress as all parties steam toward February 21st. Some UNSC members (Germany, France) have mounted sporadic resistance against the GCC's undemocratic process - now Benomar is lamenting Saleh's “blanket immunity” - but these are the same countries that unanimously approved Resolution 2014 in late October.

Every part of the international plan is in working order except for Saleh himself. Shortly after Rada’a went viral, al-Qirbi told Al Arabiya that the country’s deteriorating security could delay the UN-GCC sponsored election (an excuse that can be used indefinitely). U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would respond in passing that Yemen’s election must be held on schedule to ensure a “peaceful transition,” comments that temporarily knocked al-Qirbi back into line. However the situation’s odds indicate that Washington’s efforts to remove Saleh will continue to fail in the absence of a sincere disconnect.

After multiple itineraries had him stopping in Dubai or Riyadh, the Obama administration's latest flight plan would send him through Oman on his way to New York City. This “plan” suffers from an extensive list of flaws, starting with a general lack of transparency. Putting John Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism adviser, anywhere near Yemen’s diplomacy is an automatic red-flag; although considered friendly, Brennan has been routinely outmaneuvered by Saleh. Bringing him to America after a month of international warnings - and during Obama’s State of the Union address - also demonstrates the administration’s continual insensitivity, and running him through a middle party won't prevent his return.

His son will reportedly hold down the presidential palace until he returns.

While the White House has theoretically banned Saleh from engaging in political activity, what are the consequences of resistance? Keeping him in America? Shipping him back to a Gulf state? Little of U.S. policy makes sense beyond the need to maintain influence in Yemen and keep Saleh from testifying on Washington’s military cooperation. Both the White House and State Department deny that his trip to NYC is for "political purposes," calling the timing "fortuitous" for completing the GCC’s unpopular transition. Such rhetoric prompted one reporter to ask the State Department, "why are you playing this game with him on semantics? I mean, he’s doing what you want him to do."

Saleh may be willing to play along now that he possesses immunity at the national and international level, but his trip is simultaneously relevant and irrelevant. He and the Obama administration are treading opposite paths to the same end: one would ideally keep Hadi as Vice President, the other wants February’s election to “keep the transition on track." Saleh naturally desires to remain in Yemen while the White House plans to secure influence through his exile. Saleh has allegedly requested permanent sanctuary in neighboring Oman, a sensible choice that facilitates quick access back into Yemen, or perhaps the administration will accept a compromise along his lines. After promising to lead his party when the ballot boxes open, Saleh triumphantly declared upon his exit, “We will inaugurate Abdo Rabbo Hadi as head of state after February 21st in the Presidential Palace.”

Any outcome based on the GCC's initiative leaves the JMP to scrap for power and locks Yemen’s pro-democracy movement out of the political process. Revolutionaries demand a representative transition and a clean break from Saleh’s regime, not ongoing impunity and cooperation with a tyrant.

Bahrain’s King Hamad Suffocating Himself

2012-01-23T15:00:00.000-08:00

The complex and often paradoxical nature of warfare is known to flip weakness into strength, and strength into weakness. Any actor, whether conventional or unconventional, must learn to limit or convert its deficiencies into a resource, and protect its strengths from dulling. Comfortably shielded by a thick international bubble, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa now embodies this strategic decay as some of his main advantages becomes liabilities. Not just Manama’s Fifth Fleet, which simultaneously keeps Washington in his pocket and international attention on his island.

After transiting through the nexus of politics and business - complacency is bad for both - the King’s low-intensity response to Bahrain’s uprising is incrementally suffocating his own kingdom.

Every Arab regime threaten by revolution has utilized tear gas to disrupt protesters from moving or gathering en masse. No government, however, relies more extensively on gas canisters than Bahrain’s security apparatus. The King’s small military, limited armaments and use of his police force, combined with the savvy to stay low profile, dictates a non-lethal response of rubber bullets and gas waves. Smoke clouded Manama throughout last week as Al Wefaq, Bahrain’s leading Shia oppositional party, attempted to organize a secession of rallies in the capital. Determined to crush the uprising, the monarchy rejected Al Wefaq’s permit request on the grounds of disrupting traffic and quickly smothered all dissenters.

As they often do, security forces also moved north for a funeral job in Muharraq. Here protesters had gathered to attend the burial of Yousif Muwali, whose body washed up in on January 13th. Al Wefaq alleges that Muwali was being held by police at the time of his death, while the government claims that he suffered from “psychological issues.” The government also rejected a petition to protest at Muwali’s funeral, but even authorized demonstrations require indiscriminate force to scatter. Those protesters who broke for a street outside Muharraq’s graveyard were first confronted with gas and violent force by police (likely foreign) and plain-clothes men. Police later intervened and restored order through more peaceful means.

By this point Yassin Asfour, a 14-year old asthmatic, had died of asphyxiation after being gassed at a separate protest. Several other recent casualties suffered fatal trauma to the head after being struck by gas canisters, a tactic employed in Egypt and Yemen.

So goes daily life in Bahrain, a week after King Hamad articulated a list of reforms during his “keynote” address. His changes to parliament and the constitution fell short of all established oppositional parties, along with street protesters demanding total regime change. Hamad has downplayed the island’s civil strife throughout 11-months of low-intensity conflict, whether blaming Iran for instigating a revolt or denying systematic abuses by the government. His “National Dialogue” and Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) took the cosmetic route to reform, a dead end in the Arab revolutionary wave, and the King remains determined to restore “normality” to his kingdom. Royal officials regularly meet with U.S. officials such as CENTCOM commander James Mattis and Ambassador Thomas Krajiski, resulting in official state propaganda.

“During the meeting, the Minister welcomed the US ambassador and reviewed with him existing bilateral military cooperation relations between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the friendly United States of America in addition to discussion of a number of issues of mutual concern.”

The King already defied pro-democracy protesters by holding his air show on schedule, bringing in nearly $1 billion of "business deals" while conjuring a false sense of progress. Although U.S. and British buyers were reportedly leery of Bahrain’s security environment, the conference drew high praise from Lockheed Martin’s regional president and U.S. Vice-Admiral. Charles Moore, a former commander of the Fifth Fleet, called Bahrain’s International Air Show (BIAS) “one of the best international aviation exhibitions” before touching on the uprising - and the King’s “wisdom.” His son, Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa, is equally eager to hold Bahrain’s F-1 Grand Prix in April after 2010’s event was canceled in solidarity with the February 14th movement.

Both of these events are highlighted for their economic boost, when the developed and internationally subsidized island isn’t in dire need for cash. Although 11 months of unrest cost Bahrain’s economy an estimated $2 billion in lost revenue and foreign investments, King Hamad desires the perception of “order” above all else. Order maintains political and economic control abroad, whereas disorder scares away both sets of parties. The stronger and weaker forces of an asymmetric conflict wage a constant battle over the perception of stability.

“The reinstatement of our BIC colleagues is part of an important initiative towards national reconciliation and unity for the kingdom as a whole,” Sheikh Salman bin Isa Al-Khalifa, chief executive of the Bahrain International Circuit, told reporters. “I therefore welcome back our colleagues into the BIC family as we now look to focus on the future and the important job at hand.”

Foreign Affairs Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa greeted BIAS in similar fashion: “We are looking forward and ahead and sparing no effort in bringing the country together."

The odds of Bahrain’s political collapse remains the lowest of any active uprising. Buttressed by a loyal Sunni minority and unflinching foreign support, King Hamad may be able outlast six years of determined resistance (the length of Bahrain’s last uprising) in the streets, political arena and international media. Except these odds received a boost from the regional phenomena and will continue to increase in proportion to his failed reforms. King Hamad and his foreign allies are slowly asphyxiating themselves. Trapped in their cocoon, the smoke of uprising could eventually ignite into an open blaze - to a point where Al Wefaq and Waad have no choice except to support regime change.

The King may brush aside Human Rights Watch, but deputy direct Joe Stork offers a realistic prediction of the future: “Since the crackdown on the protests authorities have violently suppressed peaceful demonstrations and silenced dissident voices through arrests, torture, and job dismissal. But people in Bahrain, and throughout the region, have made it clear that violent suppression isn’t going to make the issues go away. People want their rights.”

A wise King would give the people what they want before they demand his crown.

Syrians Face Another Month of “Monitoring”

2012-01-21T20:05:00.000-08:00

Cairo’s arena is set for another battle royal on Sunday, when the Arab League will convene to discuss its endangered mission in Syria. As Bashar al-Assad continues to direct his lethal crackdown with precise choreography, the League must choose between keeping its monitors in place and transitioning to a new strategy. This political orientation pits League members against themselves, al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s pro-democracy movement and international powers.

Since the Arab League is incapable of functioning as a neutral organization or appeasing all involved parties, who will be selected for priority status?

The League’s mission has yielded a minor split in Syria’s opposition after producing an disproportionate ratio of risk and reward. Facing a shortage of options from the international community, some protesters and activists appear to favor the League’s presence in the absence of substitute measures. Their position is understandable given al-Assad’s blackout prior to the League’s arrival; select Western journalists have accessed to the monitors’ media circles. Those protesters who already lost faith in the League’s mission agree that urban demonstrations are escalating. The minority and majority share common ground, viewing the League as a deceptive but manipulatable tool.

However current reports and rumors indicate that oppositional protesters should brace for another round of disappointment. Arab officials are holding their line - "the killings are less, the protests increase” - as the League considers extending its mission under Sudanese General Mohammed Ahmed al-Dabi. Although chaired by Qatar’s Foreign Minister (the Gulf state has vocalized support for a peacekeeping mission), multiple League sources are predicting an indecisive outcome to Sunday’s meeting. One official told Reuters, "The closer Sunday's meetings of the Arab committee and the Arab foreign ministers get, the more the conviction grows that the Arab monitoring mission in Syria should be extended.”

"Yes, there is not complete satisfaction with Syria's cooperation with the monitoring mission. But in the absence of any international plan to deal with Syria, the best option is for the monitors to stay."

The League is prepared to stand on this defense until someone knocks it off. Counter-arguing at face value proves unrealistic; the international consensus that spearheaded Libya’s intervention is lacking in Syria. Arab and Western states remain divided on how to pursue intervention, and unsure of Russia and Iran’s military intentions. General Knud Bartels, head of NATO's Military Committee, also continues to downplay the possibility of intervention, saying, "There is no planning and we are not thinking about an intervention.” This rhetorical false front is calculated to avoid provoking al-Assad, but the center contains a large kernel of truth.

The inescapable danger of this reasoning lies in protracting Syria’s revolution; both the Arab League and Western powers prefers to remove al-Assad “at the lowest cost,” an approach that favors his survival. One official said the League’s “presence offers assurance to the people because the observers can spot any violations,” but protesters report numerous incidents where AL monitors refused to meet them or ignored the regime’s atrocities. The official added, “If there is a decision to extend the mission of the observers, we are ready to send more monitors after training them in three days.” Three days of training are vastly insufficient for the task at hand, and the League’s mission would still be undermanned at 300 monitors.

"Without the correct tools, without the correct authority … we can't do the job," said one observer who requested anonymity. "Which is sad because people are dying on both sides every day."

Arguing a reduction in Syria’s casualties slides down the same slippery slope of relativity. While large-scale massacres have temporarily subsided, daily bloodshed indicates that al-Assad has no intention of halting his crackdown. He’s simply finding new ways to disguise his forces, suppress demonstrations and cover up deaths. Building on UN estimates and local sources, estimates range near 600 since the League’s first monitors landed in late December; Saturday’s death toll swings between 30 and 100. Activists now fear another vicious crackdown in Zabadani, located roughly 20 miles northwest of Damascus, after Syrian forces withdrew to the town’s perimeter.

Mohammed al Dais, of the Syrian Revolution General Commission, predicted that Damascus was waiting until after the Arab League’s meeting to attack. In the meantime Zabadani is being spun as a “hub of resistance,” where several hundred soldiers from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are fighting to save their defected comrades from prison. Their intent to rally so close to the capital is sure to attract an iron-fisted response.

The Arab League argues, “there is a conviction even among Syria opponents that the extension is better than withdrawal,” when the street opinion demands that Syria’s case be referred to the UN Security Council. Syria’s National Council (SNC) gradually withdrew to this position after greeting the League’s monitors with hesitant approval, while the FSA has openly criticized their presence as an enabler to al-Assad’s crackdown. Extending the League’s mission with superficial improvements may provide long-term gains for the opposition, but the League’s short-term position hardens Syria’s status quo.

The underlying flaw of the Arab League’s policy remains a lack of confidence; protesters will exploit its monitors out of necessity, but they are widely viewed as pawns on al-Assad’s chessboard. This trust gap casts doubt on the League’s entire mission, from its monitors’ abilities to its opposition against al-Assad’s regime. Another month also provides no time to complete an observer mission. Syria’s view will improve slightly when al-Dabi releases his team’s findings; a harsh report could generate new friction with the regime, but oppositional groups expect a clear-cut report that places full responsibility on Damascus.

"The report must document the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime against civilians in all cities and towns," the SNC said in a statement. "Ongoing human rights violations include direct orders by the regime to kill civilians using snipers, and executions by firing squad, in public squares. The SNC delegation will stress that the report must contain clear language indicating genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by the regime against unarmed civilians."

A biased report will gnaw away at the lingering hope for accountability.

The Arab League’s monitors may or may not last another month in the field, but the upshot of a failed mission remains unchanged since the bloc introduced its initiative in November. Although al-Assad’s staunch international allies have announced their readiness to block any subsequent proposal, the League’s monitors are guiding Syria towards the UNSC. Here the political battle will intensify as Syria’s armed opposition continues their preparations for a national campaign.

At least one outcome appears guaranteed: the collective international community will confront the possibility of intervention sooner than their ideal deadlines allow.

NATO’s Misguided Info-Assault On Mullar Omar

2012-01-20T21:46:00.000-08:00

Generally speaking, the insurgent’s job is to manipulate information and the counterinsurgent’s job is to clarify information. Many governments blur or ignore this division as they attempt to fight fire with fire, but the basic notion urges a counterinsurgency force to become the accurate source on the information battlefield. U.S. and NATO officials find themselves trapped within this dilemma, spinning civilian deaths as unavoidable accidents and countering Tweets from the Taliban.

Apparently U.S. military officials believed they scored a propaganda victory after a suicide bomber blew himself up in a Helmand bazaar. As potential signs of the Taliban’s desperation in its heartland, suicide bombings are ripe material for NATO’s own propaganda campaign; General John Allen, the commanding officer of America’s international coalition, announced that the Taliban had "declared outright war" on the Afghan people. However the latest bombing in Kajaki Sofla doesn’t qualify as a pure civilian target. While NATO wouldn’t disclose details, its statement conceded that civilians, Afghan security forces and coalition troops were all injured or killed in the blast.

Allen ultimately crossed the line from believable to unbelievable propaganda when he confronted Taliban leader Mullah Omar, saying he "has lost all control over Taliban insurgents.”

That Taliban attacks continue to claim civilian lives, whether indirectly or directly, is evident across Afghanistan's war-zone. By violating Omar’s “code of conduct,” the unbroken trend provides ample opportunity to criticize the Taliban’s target selection, and many Afghans wish to live in a country free of militant influence. Yet numerous studies conducted over the years indicate an equal burden of responsibility between foreign and Taliban forces, regardless of who starts the firefight. This distribution of blame obstructs NATO efforts to paint the Taliban as Afghanistan's only aggressor.

It isn’t difficult to picture a well-off Taliban foot soldier armed with his cell phone, viewing Allen’s statements and another explosive video in secession. Timing is a key ingredient of propaganda and the general overshot his bullseye, choosing urinating Marines as his backdrop to attack. Although they weren’t ordered to desecrate Taliban corpses, the incident still underscores the challenge of keeping every last soldier in line. Separately, the Taliban’s bombing in Kajaki came one day after NATO helicopters “accidentally” killed six civilians in Kunar’s Chawkay district.

Provincial governor Fazlullah Wahidi told the AFP, "The raid was not coordinated with us.”

Although the difference between an “accidental” and “intentional” bombing cannot be rendered irrelevant, NATO obliterates its share of civilians despite its public rhetoric. Foreign forces remain willing to trade two militants for six civilians in the same way that the Taliban will sacrifice 10 Afghans to kill a U.S. soldier. After voicing their obligatory regret, night raids are staunchly defended as integral to America’s “success.” Coalition commanders haven’t lost “all control” of their soldiers due to these incidents, and neither has the Taliban’s semi-mythical leader.

Insurgencies can reach a sophisticated level of organization that enables them to finish the cycle as a semi-conventional force (such as the Vietcong), or maintain relatively strict discipline (Hezbollah). They can also thrive in looser formations that encourage personal initiative within the group’s ideological boundaries. The bottom and peripheries of an asymmetric force don’t always respond to its vertical hierarchy for countless reasons; in the Taliban’s case, thousands of part-time fighters operating under minimal oversight form the insurgency's local nervous system. Individual initiative is required to survive and rogue elements are common, whether at the local or regional level. Additionally, the Taliban utilizes netwar to maintain a degree of independence between hubs.

Omar and the Haqqanis’ mutual survival could be better served through isolated coordination.

The Wall Street Journal produced a more accurate account from recent interviews with provincial commanders, reaching the conclusion that most soldiers are loyal to Omar. The Taliban has suffered undeniable losses in men and territory, generating friction between lower and mid level commander, but none are thinking surrender. They argue that rogue elements exist just like U.S. forces and, in their minds, civilian deaths are the inevitable consequences of occupation. Maulvi Darwish, a Taliban commander in the eastern Logar province, tried to explain, “There are some groups in Karzai's government that disobey government guidelines. The Taliban are also a group of people, and there are bad people and good people. The bad people are few and they won't be in the favor of peace—but the Taliban will follow whatever the Leader of the Believers decides."

As for the Haqqanis, Jalaluddin joined Omar soon after his rise and maintained loyalty ever since. His son, Sirajuddin, has made numerous attempts on Omar’s behalf to reign in Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The semi-independent network is tasked to Kabul and Jalalabad, keeping each branch of the Taliban plugged into its local and regional connections. The WSJ offers a common definition of netwar: “the insurgency isn't a coherent and tightly organized movement, and its foot soldiers and local commanders sometimes contradict the top leadership's edicts.”

More disturbingly, preliminary negotiations between Washington and Taliban liaisons are spooking some hard-line jihadists and those who have done “wrong things,” in the words of one commander. Not every foot soldier understands the need to build political capital and outmaneuver foreign powers on the international stage, as the Vietnamese leadership did. Allen’s statements appear designed to strike the insurgency’s pressure points by addressing Afghanistan's reconciliation: "These attacks against the people of Afghanistan have no effect on the progress we are together making here with our Afghan partners and will only further isolate the Taliban from the process of peace negotiation."

Thus the general is simultaneously ridiculing Omar’s inability to control his troops, and antagonizing the less-controllable areas of his network.

One commander from Paktia laid down his own red lines: "Islamic laws are implemented, there will be no foreign interference and nobody will impose this Western democracy on Afghans." This commander predicted that the Haqqanis could continue fighting at the direction of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Another commander from Khost, Mullah Ayubi, outlined a plausible mindset among the Taliban’s lower and middle ranks, explaining, "Whatever the Taliban leadership and the Leader of the Believers decides will be in accordance with Islam and Afghanistan's national interests. He is our guide and we are obligated to obey his orders. But if he makes a decision against Islam we won't follow him and he wouldn't be our guide anymore."

Allen’s rhetoric provoke the Taliban’s more independent elements, or turn into glue as Omar attempts to demonstrate his authority. As for his negotiating position, the insurgency can’t that isolated when Western sources are publicizing their negotiating progress - when the Taliban’s leadership is pleased with their results. Washington is also isolating itself by leaving out Hamid Karzai, Islamabad, and Afghanistan’s minority ethnicities.

Afghans remain fortunate that U.S. night-raids, imprecise as they can be, are more accurate than American propaganda.

White House Drowning In Iraq’s Crisis

2012-01-20T10:32:00.000-08:00

The standing of counterinsurgency suffered a heavy blow when 20+ U.S. Special Operatives landed in a modest “mansion” courtyard in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Up to this point the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan had grudgingly forced the Pentagon to think horizontally and non-militarily - to accept the political and social realities of asymmetric warfare. Iraq’s “surge” was launched with these principles in the minds of COIN proponents, such as CIA Directer David Petraeus, and President Barack Obama felt enough political pressure to affix a COIN face onto his counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

This front fell off in the jubilant aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death. Believing that America no longer had a reason to occupy Afghanistan, the majority opinion in mainstream and beltway circles has settled around cheaper, robotic counterterrorism to fight insurgents. Except COIN isn’t “dead” and cannot be killed. Systematically organized in the 1960s, the practice and its evolving theories simply phase through cycles of awareness in relation to current events. No coincidence is necessary to explain how COIN still determines the fate of U.S. policy in Iraq.

The country isn’t experiencing new instability due to a lack of U.S. troops, but a lack of political action from Washington.

Several days ago Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pushed his country another foot deeper into hostilities, taking the boycotting Iraqiya party off “leave” and formally suspending its nine ministers. Government spokesman Ali Hadi al-Moussawi downplayed the move by calling it a “vacation,” and the State Department would avoid going into details. According to spokesman Mark Toner, “In terms of the broader political situation in Iraq, we’ve continued to press on senior Iraqi politicians the importance of dialogue to work out their differences, and that continues to be our message to them.” However the Obama administration’s infrequent statements remain unchanged despite a sharp escalation in Iraq’s political crisis, creating the vivid impression that Washington is still favoring al-Maliki.

Either the administration doesn’t understand the need for open diplomacy or refuses to accept the responsibility, a dilemma with only one outcome. The less active the White House is publicly, the more publicity Iraq will receive.

Having ignored multiple advisories from Iraqiya chief Ayad Allawi, who warned in early December that “Iraq is not a democracy,” Obama greeted al-Maliki shortly afterward with the hope of turning Iraq’s page into history. The President’s approval of al-Maliki triggered a landslide of criticism from the Sunni opposition, starting with Deputy premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s assertion that al-Maliki is ruling like “a dictator.” Allawi subsequently urged the administration to act in an ominous op-ed to The New York Times; amid U.S. silence, one of its authors hit an IED outside Samarra. Finance Minster Rafe al-Essawi, a vocal opponent of the Premier, held al-Maliki's forces accountable for security lapses as officials denied the incident.

Undaunted, al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya finally called for al-Maliki’s removal after multiple attempts to arrange a national conference on even terms. U.S. officials shifted from no comment to telling Iraqiya that grievances should be kept out of the media.

Sunnis have resorted to their information campaign because of this reaction - because they have run out of political options for al-Awlaki and Washington - and Allawi isn’t finished attacking. Iraqiya’s chairman explicitly rejected the White House’s previous comments over the weekend, telling CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, “President Obama said very clearly that the United States have left Iraq as a stable and democratic country. It’s neither stable nor democratic, frankly speaking.” His interview was similarly brushed off by the State Department even though Allawi warned, “The terrorists are hitting again very severely. Al Qaeda is fully operational now in Iraq.”

His solution, though, has nothing to do with U.S. troops.

"I am not asking for the American forces to come back, but for the United States to use its diplomatic and other channels through the strategy agreement between the United States and Iraq to try and bring about sanity to the political process and inclusivity. And I think there should be frank and real discussions with the Prime Minister, between him and between the Administration, to make it very clear that what is happening in Iraq is not acceptable.”

These discussions have yet to occur due to the White House’s tepidness to confront al-Maliki, belying the widespread local support to do so. Iraqiya continues to discuss possible actions with the Kurds, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shia bloc and independent parties, citing a loss of faith across the capital. Still, Sunni officials remain undecided on their future course of action. After several Iraqiya members (al-Mutlak and spokesman Haidar al-Mulla) demanded the removal of al-Maliki before holding a national conference, Allawi alluded to the possibility while keeping his door slightly ajar.

"Iraq is at a crossroads and I say that Iraq needs forgiving leaders, who will raise above their personal hatred," he told a news conference in Baghdad. "This is not the state for which we battled the dictatorship. On the contrary it represents the return to square one by building a dictatorship in the clothing of the disfigured democracy left behind by foreign troops."

Certain that al-Maliki cannot lead a unified Iraq, but cautious of bearing responsibility for the security fallout, Iraqiya officials and their potential allies are wary of another volatile election. Spokesman Maysoon al-Damaluji also predicted, “Opposition means that we will be further targeted. Fabricated accusations will continue to go around; we will have no protection whatsoever." Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi (the third co-author of Allawi’s NYT op-ed) continues to favor “de-escalating” through negotiations. He envisions a three-tier position, starting with the full implementation of 2010‘s power-sharing agreement and depoliticalization of security forces. The second phase would lobby for a Shia replacement, and finally give way to a no-confidence vote and early elections. Nujaifi called the no-confidence motion “unrealistic” at the present time, saying, "There is not a sufficient majority for this."

One must assume that they will play this option once a majority is secured, as the other options would be theoretically exhausted. Mutlaq observed that Baghdad’s political equation isn’t ripe for withdrawing from the government, but “maybe there will be a time when we will do it. It's a possibility."

Overt political action from Washington, as counter-intuitive as it may sound, is precisely what Iraq needs at this juncture. Enough popular support exists to justify public intervention and the implementation of 2010’s power-sharing agreement; many political forces expect U.S. officials to act because al-Maliki is considered “their man.” Allawi must be awarded his seat at the head of a foreign council, and political parties in general must be allowed to act with relative freedom. Autonomy shouldn’t create excessive problems with a representative prime minister sitting in Baghdad.

In sum, Iraq must be engaged at all non-military levels to stabilize its security environment. COIN is no less applicable today than it was in 1967 or 2007.

Al Wefaq Endures Silent U.S. Counterattack

2012-01-18T14:37:00.000-08:00

They didn’t fail due to lack of effort. Whether organizing rallies to condemn international silence or defending deceased individuals who are accused of having “psychological problems,” Al Wefaq officials actively direct global attention to the movement’s cause. Bahrain’s leading oppositional force has experienced struggle before and knows the stakes now; massive social events such as revolution are the product of countless individual actions.

However Al Wefaq’s initiative has failed to pay dividends in the short-term, and continues to advance Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement outside of the international spotlight that it seeks.

Following a week of international silence between the alleged beating Nabeel Rajab, head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa released another counterattack on Sunday to maintain his country’s blackout. Drawing exclusively from a failed “National Dialogue” and Bahrain’s “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), an internal investigation of the government’s own crimes, the King issued a number of “reforms” intended to finish Bahrain’s uprising. One amendment will substitute the parliamentary chairman as the deciding vote during joint meetings of the National Assembly, replacing the head of the Shura Council (upper chamber). Another change gives parliament members the “constitutional right to question ministers on the open floor,” along with the ability to hold a no-confidence vote. King Hamad is now obligating himself “to explain the criteria for appointing members of the Shura Council” and dismissing lawmakers. He’s also “limiting his ability” to dissolve the Lower House, impotent as the organ is.

"It is beyond doubt that the National Dialogue recommendations have outlined the shape of the reform that we are aiming to achieve and emanate from the solid base of our national experience,” he told his audience... “Our people have proven their desire for continuing with reforms. We complete the march today with those who have an honest patriotic desire for more progress and reform.”

Frequently commenting on the inability to reform “inside a vacuum,” King Hamad appears to have foreshadowed his own vacuous speech and misleading revisions. His proposal indicates just how authoritarian his rule is and how far Bahrain’s democracy has to grow. Al Wefaq has capitalized on popular dissent to transition from political and judicial reforms, including a reconfiguration of Bahrain’s parliament, to a full government overhaul. Another demand would replace the King’s uncle with a representative prime minister. Yet the prevailing fear is that Hamad has reached his limit to reform, missing a series of opportunities to repair the country’s divisions.

"People very clearly wanted an elected government, they want parliament that has actual power," said Rajab. "If we go into this detail, and go step by step... it's going to be 100 years before an elected parliament has power."

Unwilling to repeat its participation in the “National Dialogue” - Al Wefaq explicitly attended in order to disprove its credibility - the opposition met King Hamad with blunt force. A statement from Al Wefaq ridiculed the “insignificant trivia” of his reforms and expressed concern over his disconnect with Bahrain’s Shia majority. Sayyid Hadi Hasan al-Mosawi, one of the group’s resigned MP, told The New York Times, “His speech fell short of our expectations. The measures did not reflect any of the opposition or the people’s demands. The speech did not even tackle the core of the problem.”

Bahrain’s government and opposition are reading totally different books. While Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa was “drawing lessons” for the 1990’s uprising, Al Wefaq’s Ali al-Aswad told Al Jazeera, "Nothing was new. The opposition was expecting something like this from 10 years before. This is not the demand of the street. The demand is different now, after what has happened in all the Arab countries."

Keeping these demands at the forefront of its platform, Al Wefaq and political allies scheduled a "no to tyranny, yes to democracy" procession for downtown Manama. The Bahraini government rejected Al Wefaq’s proposal on Tuesday night, warning that the march will cause “traffic congestion and disturbance to embassies, commercial and government organizations.” Bahrainis were warned not to take part, and security forces crushed the pockets of activists who rallied on Wednesday. The monarchy’s excuses primarily appeal to Sunnis, many of whom are fed up with protesters, and international powers such as Gulf states and the U.S. (which defends Bahrain’s right to keep order).

The reality is that protests are often intended to disrupt, particularly during an uprising or revolution. King Hamad wants to return his island to “normal,” not fix Bahrain’s fundamental tensions that have resulted from unrepresentative rule.

As usual the Obama administration has issued no reaction to any of these events, instead following King Hamad’s lead and hiding behind the BICI. Both governments are producing parallel rhetoric, affirming Bahrain’s democratic values while lauding those reforms already undertaken. Washington has put up a wall that simultaneously absorbs criticism and reflects silence at the opposition; hollow initiatives such as the National Dialogue and BICI are then advanced to deliver military packages in accordance with U.S. law. On cue, King Hamad and Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa just received CENTCOM commander James Mattis for new security discussions.

This strategy is unlikely to change until the opposition forces Washington to alter its position through dynamic action, otherwise the King must commit a large-scale massacre to draw international attention.

Ignoring Bahrain’s uprising nevertheless remains a dangerous policy, one that has irresponsibly suppressed and ultimately increased dissent in the streets. What began as calls for reform evolved into widespread demands for regime change, generating an unsustainable political environment. Bahrain currently lacks pivotal moments to mark its trajectory - the fall of a tyrant, mass defection of troops - leaving the conflict to burn for years without the necessary response. However the country’s low intensity doesn’t eliminate the possibility of sporadic detonation. Another resigned MP, Matar Matar, predicted that the King’s speech, "won’t impact the situation, rather it could make things worse, reaffirming the idea that genuine reform is impossible for this regime.”

al-Aswad agreed: "If we accept this, we will have no power in the streets. We couldn't control the streets. The youth might go in a different direction now."

Potential Spectrum of Syrian Intervention

2012-01-17T18:34:00.000-08:00

As the dominant powers in a regional asymmetric movement, Western and Gulf nations are inherently allergic to the concept of revolution. Their officials go to great lengths to avoid the word itself, and have fallen back on a guerrilla tactic to protect their interests: false negotiations. Unlike its necessary function in genuine democracy, “dialogue” becomes a kiss of death to revolutionaries rising up against a dictator and his foreign allies. Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans forced their rulers out of power through direct action, not negotiations, while internationally-sponsored “initiatives” are prolonging Yemen, Bahrain and Syria’s uprisings.

Believing that their present situation couldn’t deteriorate any further, many Syrian protesters and local activists were the first to approve an international aid corridor and corresponding no-fly zone. Grassroots support within the Syrian National Council (SNC) gave Riad al-Asaad, de facto commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), enough confidence to threaten a large-scale campaign amid the Arab League’s drifting mission. Western capitals are suspected of planning a no-fly zone - or ground intervention - with Turkey, whose southeastern Anatolia region now serves as the FSA’s rear base. Behind this possibility lurks a regional war with Bashar al-Assad’s allies.

Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took another step towards war on Sunday when he declared his support for intervention during CBS’s “60 Minutes.” Asked whether he favors Arab nations intervening in Syria, Sheik Hamad said that "for such a situation to stop the killing some troops should go to stop the killing." His statements predictably triggered a new verbal barrage from al-Assad’s regime, which has taken shots at Qatar throughout the League’s negotiations and observer mission. Barring a dramatic change of behavior from al-Assad, the opposition movement and foreign powers, Syria is trending towards an organized conflict with geopolitical impact.

The outcome appears to break down into three scenarios that will be explored over time.

Semi-conventional Assault

Foreign capitals challenging al-Assad to resign face a strategic dilemma that hasn’t been encountered by Western powers in decades - the risk of defeat. Washington in particular has expected victory in every war since World War II, heightening the shock of political stalemate and military losses on the battlefield. External powers rightfully fear Syria’s multiple scenarios and potential impact on regional stability, but the revolution demands a commitment to direct or indirect strategies. This dilemma is generating significant friction and hesitation between al-Assad’s international opponents.

"We haven't been looking at a no-fly zone," William Hague, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, told Sky News. "There is no serious prospect certainly at the moment of the United Nations Security Council agreeing any resolution at the moment, let alone agreeing a resolution comparable to anything that happened in Libya."

Hague presents several military observations to buttress his claim, arguing that “the Syrian regime had not been relying on air power to repress protests.” The intense urban nature of Syria’s conflict also reduces the effectiveness of air superiority below Libya’s level. These points aside, intervention will require air cover to shield oppositional fighters and international peacekeepers, and to protect humanitarian corridors and convoys. Any foreign operation, whether military or non-military, will create the need for air support.

In the event that ground troops are approved - this possibility is more realistic than Western officials publicly concede - the region’s strategic orientation points to an international task force masked by select Muslim states. This spear-tip would theoretically include Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey, along with any satellites that Riyadh could bring on board (Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Morocco). Israel might also increase its clandestine activities against al-Assad, or a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission could be approved.

"The Arab League and their monitors failed in their mission and though we respect and appreciate our Arab brothers for their efforts, we think they are incapable of improving conditions in Syria or resisting this regime," al-Asaad told Reuters. "For that reason we call on them to turn the issue over to the U.N. Security Council and we ask that the international community intervene because they are more capable of protecting Syrians at this stage than our Arab brothers.”

Infantry is essential to warfare regardless of the technological innovations designed to replace them, and foreign powers must decide if they believe Syria’s revolutionaries can fill the job. This question is admittedly challenging because the same military defectors and armed civilians will face a more determined enemy than Muammar Gaddafi’s hollow force. Another problem is the lack of Arab manpower against al-Assad and his remaining allies: Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq. Any of these states could decide to support a counter-operation in his favor, while Egypt’s heavyweight army is liable to remain neutral.

With China likely to maintain its life-line to al-Assad through soft power, the greatest danger appears to stem from the possibility of overt Russian and Iranian intervention. Moscow didn’t sacrifice Gaddafi without reason, but to save its bullets for the younger, useful al-Assad. Tehran is similarly connected to his Shia regime and its nerve system to Hezbollah and Hamas, and one Quds official just pledged material support beyond Iran’s current level. This contingency is keeping Western and Gulf powers at bay, wishing to fight Iran on their terms rather than Syria’s unpredictable battleground.

Sustained Insurgency

The FSA experienced a leadership transition over the last two weeks after Brigadier General Mustafa Ahmad Al Shaikh defected to FSA headquarters in Turkey. As a regional commander in northern Syria, Al Shaikh fled the country after witnessing what he called “the regime's ruthlessness and the killings.” His first order of business is establishing a military council to oversee operations against al-Assad’s regime, starting with the gradual conscription of 30,000 new fighters. His media adviser, Fahd Al Masri, specified, "It will also help organize defections within the army and will be in contact with officers in the regular army to encourage large-scale rather than individual defections.”

The second task after organizing Syria’s diverse revolutionaries is establishing lines of communication with supportive international powers, a relatively simple task so long as military command is established on the ground. Next comes the decision whether to directly arm or finance the opposition’s arsenal. The FSA’s ranks are estimated between 15,000-30,000, with thousands of civilians theoretically willing to fight for the revolution.

General Al Shaikh publicly expects the opposition’s struggle to take “at least a year, possibly a year and a half to topple the Syrian dictator.” His general plan appears to be sound from an insurgent’s point of view: organize all armed elements (civil and martial) and “deploy them in small six to seven person squadrons” to “employ tactics of a war of attrition.” Oppositional force ratios will be increased over time as they absorb recruits and technology from the West and sympathetic Arab states, until a presence is established across the country and around Damascus.

An insurgency-infused civil war is normal for revolutionary situations, and thus seems to be the most plausible scenario for Syria’s future. Low-intensity conflict requires the least amount of effort from international powers and limits the risk of conventional warfare, which could decimate Syria beyond the revolution’s objectives. Unfortunately for the opposition, foreign actors and Syrians caught behind the regime, waging an insurgency against al-Assad’s regime is likely to protract for multiple years. Syria’s army contains several hundred thousand troops who, unlike Gaddafi’s regulars, weren’t intentionally weakened out of fear. They operate thousands of tanks and field pieces, and don’t rely on tribal or nomadic mercenaries to fight their battles. Syria’s air force, navy and special forces are equally advanced compared to Gaddafi’s forces.

The unfortunate reality is that al-Assad may launch an efficient guerrilla campaign of his own; a full-scale unconventional war will yield a bloody spectacle in its own right, capable of lasting 5-10 years and damaging a significant portion of the country. This type of war still leaves the door wide open for those proxy agents that will flood Syria from all directions. Whether conventional or asymmetric, the possibility of extended warfare and mass casualties is too real for Western and Arab powers to currently stomach.

Coup/Assassination

The final military option trades victory for defeat. Given the lengthy time-line of either course, oppositional elements and international powers may review the possibility of assassination by ground or air. This option could be attempted before open hostilities are initiated - possibly as a precursor since al-Assad will react aggressively either way - or as a desperation move deeper into the war. However the expediency of assassination could represent the most chaotic option available, lacking the popular buildup that culminates a successful revolution. Even a decapitation strike across al-Assad’s leadership could leave a resilient force defended by a strong-willed minority.

Foreign powers will likely phase across the spectrum from unconventional to conventional operations, a sound approach in light of Syria’s complex circumstances. However risk cannot be separated from warfare, and a failure to commit the appropriate forces could result in the need for greater action in the long-term.

Guerrilla State of Mind: Stalemate or Death

2012-01-16T20:29:00.000-08:00

As Washington attempts to spin its back-channel negotiations with the Taliban into a position of strength - masking an unreachable desire to eradicate the insurgency - Taliban officials have attacked Afghanistan’s political sphere with equal vigor. Spokesman Zabibullah Mujahid clarified the group’s position amid the fallout of urinating Marines, explaining, "This will not affect the negotiations with the Americans because they are only about the release of prisoners and the office in Qatar.”

"It is for this purpose and for bringing about peace and stability in Afghanistan that we have increased our political efforts to come to mutual understanding with the world in order to solve the current ongoing situation," Mujahid said in an emailed statement. "But this understanding does not mean a surrender from jihad and neither is it connected to an acceptance of the constitution of the stooge Kabul administration."

These comments strike an obvious contrast with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who recently assured Americans and Afghans that the Obama administration remains “committed to the red lines that we have consistently laid out”: renouncing violence, breaking from al-Qaeda, supporting the Afghan constitution and women’s equality. The combined rhetoric also demonstrates the illusion of private diplomacy during fourth-generation warfare (4GW); while U.S. and European diplomats hope to achieve a breakthrough out of the media spotlight, they are currently limited to increasing face-to-face familiarity between each side.

Afghanistan’s battlefield and international media function as an extension of the political back-room, an open arena where private leverage is competed for in public. Sincere as the Taliban is in pursuing a favorable settlement, the group is currently using negotiations to confuse and outmaneuver U.S. policymakers.

The insurgency has since followed up Mujahid’s statements by releasing a “formal proclamation of victory” on its website. Aware of Washington’s attempt to divide its lower ranks, the Taliban is feeling the pressure to defend its political feelers as battlefield tools. U.S. officials will surely scoff at the notion of victory after spending 2011 “breaking the Taliban’s momentum,” but the group’s latest statements paint an accurate image of its strategic mindset. Even if the insurgency’s momentum has been broken, a difficult claim to prove outright, this outcome is less noteworthy than U.S. officials acknowledge. By basing Afghanistan’s narrative on the fact that NATO was losing the battle as late as summer 2009, Washington is now justifying its march towards victory on an uphill stalemate.

Stalemate can become victory in the insurgent’s world - mere survival against overwhelming forces can become a triumph. The Taliban was nearly destroyed by Western firepower during 2001‘s invasion and left for dead, only to rebuild itself into a more lethal force of some 30,000 fighters. This network was strong enough to weather America’s surge without capitulating, and with Washington tacitly admitting that the Taliban cannot be destroyed politically or militarily, the insurgency is eager to capitalize on this concession.

“It is proved to the world that the Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted internally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic ummah. Militarily successful resistance against a gigantic international alliance, full presence on the whole soil and overall perseverance are the signs and secrets of the Islamic Emirate.”

According to Washington’s preliminary terms surrounding the release of Guantánamo prisoners, the Taliban’s high council was supposed to voice support for Afghanistan’s political process - which it did by declaring victory through the political process. Establishing an office in Qatar is being spun as another political victory and thus a display of strength, contrary to America’s demand that the Taliban use its office for non-recruiting purposes. The insurgency’s “victory” statement took numerous shots at “the international invasion.”

“The contractors of the international invasion can no more deceive the nation by their baseless talks. They used the word ‘peace’ as a propaganda fragment to deceive the people. But today as their guardians and supporters are fed up militarily and logistically with this war and are planning for retreat, they are giving contradictory statements which show their complete confusion and embarrassment.”

Many of these criticism hit their mark despite the Taliban’s outlandish rhetoric. Regional actors and observers view U.S.-Taliban negotiations as a hollow platform, a stalling tactic by both sides that lacks serious input from Kabul and Islamabad. Although Clinton and U.S. officials “have repeatedly said publicly that any reconciliation effort must be led by the Afghans themselves,” Washington seeks to negotiate directly with the Taliban in order to retain control of the terms. Kabul and Islamabad are viewed with mutual suspicion, equally capable of strong-arming the Taliban or reducing U.S. influence after the war ends.

Both capitals are trying to jump into negotiations at their preliminary stage instead of waiting for Washington to produce its own results. Islamabad, for instance, allegedly wants the U.S. to drop its preconditions, while Kabul holds the opposite position. M K Bhadrakumar of Asia Times Online adds that Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara representatives oppose negotiations until more conditions are met - such as their inclusion. U.S. officials speak of developing “confidence” with the Taliban, when the surrounding environment is experiencing a rampant crisis of confidence.

This disconnect applies friction across America and Afghanistan’s public spheres, further reducing the odds of a political settlement by 2014.

Washington’s military superiority is mirrored by its irreversible political weaknesses, generating an unfavorable dilemma as Western powers attempt to extract themselves from counterinsurgency. Erasing America and Taliban’s “red-lines” through compromise verges on the impossible; Washington demands an end to violence and a post-2014 task force, a condition that the Taliban’s leadership flatly opposes. So what if they don’t agree to Washington’s demands? Will Obama halt a withdrawal that is overwhelmingly popular with Democrats? Will a GOP candidate recommit to an unpopular war?

Accepting the fact that U.S. forces can raid Afghanistan day and night for the next 10 years, the Taliban’s leadership has adhered to guerrilla warfare by exhausting America’s political and economic capital at home. This is the definition of a stalemate, and it spells victory to the insurgent who should have been wiped out years ago.

Hakimullah’s Loss Could Be TTP’s Gain

2012-01-15T16:51:00.000-08:00

TTP deputy Wali-ur-Rehman lurks behind its chief, Hakimullah Mehsud

For the second time in as many years Hakimullah Mehsud has been reported dead at the tip of a Hellfire missile. Targeted by Predators on January 14th, 2010 after ordering a precision suicide bombing inside FOB Chapman, a CIA compound in Afghanistan's Khost province, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) chief would emerge four months later by taunting America. Now the CIA claims to have intercepted militants discussing the aftermath of January 12th’s drone strike near Miran Shah, the first since U.S. forces air-raided two Pakistani border camps.

"Six to seven TTP members were talking to each other through wireless radio in the conversations we heard, talking about Hakimullah Mehsud being hit by a drone when he was heading to a meeting at a spot near Miranshah," said one intelligence official.

Another official identified this spot as in Nawa Adda, a village in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Datta Khel is roughly 20 miles northeast of Miran Shah.

TTP spokesman Asimullah Mehsud quickly denied that the insurgency has lost its head, standard procedure during the heat of speculation. Hakimullah’s main spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, responded more colorfully by reasoning, "There is no truth in reports about his death. However, he is a human being and can die any time. He is a holy warrior and we will wish him martyrdom.” Ehsan’s bravado contains a large measure of truth for U.S. policymakers who presumably view Mehsud’s death as a small victory.

“We will continue jihad if Hakimullah is alive or dead,” he promises. “There are so many lions in this jungle and one lion will replace another one to continue this noble mission."

Having reached the temporarily conclusion that low-level militants aren’t worth the political cost after Salala ridge, U.S. officials clearly knew who they had in their sights as the Predators swarmed above Miran Shah. Taking out Mehsud was personal, as the jihadi warlord battled Washington with the same mindset. After orchestrating the bombing at FOB Chapman through Jordanian double-agent Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi - and drawing a quick missile strike by boasting - Hakimullah proceeded to inspire Faisal Shahzad’s unsuccessful Times Square bombing. Beyond his status as an enemy of America, the Pentagon and CIA make a special point of killing those who style themselves as invincible.

Removing the TTP’s chief should also benefit Islamabad by eliminating the group’s most hostile personality, a move that could help stabilize U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Passing up a high-value target like Hakimullah is generally inadvisable, however his final dividends in Afghanistan appear to swing in the opposite direction. The TTP chief’s relative isolation within his own group suggests that he’s wanted dead. Although serving as deputy to former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, the young and brash Hakimullah antagonized TTP commanders by overseeing the group’s relative decline. Too many Pakistani institutions and civilians had been targeted by Mehsud, the TTP’s most fervent al-Qaeda ideologist, and his forces are increasingly coordinating with rogue splinter groups.

Pakistan’s military response resulted in a significant reduction in tribal support by displacing over 300,000 people from Waziristan.

Anticipating the internal demand for Hakimullah’s death is a safe bet; regional commanders Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Faqir Mohammed all want him expelled from the TTP’s hierarchy. Rehman in particular believes that he should lead the TTP as a loyal branch of the Afghan Taliban, and has campaigned for the job since Baitullah was killed by drone in August 2009. Bahadur (the commander in North Waziristan) removed himself from the TTP’s umbrella in protest of Hakimullah’s behavior - he doesn’t enjoy the “emir” riding around his own territory.

All of these figures (and elements in Pakistan’s ISI) want the TTP to devote its focus towards U.S. troops in Afghanistan, not Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Mehsud stands as a main block in the pipeline between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Given that Hakimullah’s death remains conjecture, a more detailed account of the situation and the TTP’s reaction should await his confirmed demise. The strategic environment, though, is relatively basic. Removing Hakimullah would eliminate a dangerous disciple of al-Qaeda’s original core, potentially reducing the TTP’s campaign inside Pakistan. Replacing him with a “friendly” proxy - Rehman or Bahadur - should boost Islamabad’s leverage to minimize drone strikes and shift the TTP’s focus across the Durand Line.

A more daring strategy would allow Mehsud to walk while continuing to target his pro-Taliban deputies.

Unraveling Mysteries In Bahrain’s Black Hole

2012-01-14T22:08:00.000-08:00

Deftly wielding his influence abroad, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has managed to keep a low profile throughout the Arab revolutions. The island nation is fiercely guarded by Riyadh and Washington, an alliance with far-reaching benefits in the international community and media, and King Hamad’s image as a model reformer continues to stand on his “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI). Months after rejecting Al Wefaq’s request for an observer mission, the Arab League's Nabil Al Arabi arrived just in time for Hamad’s “keynote speech” on Sunday.

The King has no reason to fear the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose Peninsula Shield was deployed in March to “protect” the monarchy from an “Iranian uprising.”

While their role hasn’t changed for hundreds of years, political allies are essential to surviving a revolution in the 21st century. They supply material and financial aid (arms, oil, cash) when needed, limit international condemnation, manipulate foreign organizations, block hostile measures and orchestrate media campaigns. However no government is immune to the publicity of killing its own people. Here the King has excelled beyond his unstable counterparts - Mubarak, Gaddafi, al-Assad and Saleh - by abstaining from their mechanized assaults. Instead the monarchy has played to its strengths by mobilizing its police force, deploying non-lethal tactics, recruiting ex-soldiers and police from friendly states (Pakistan, Jordan, UAE), and calling in armor from Riyadh.

As a result Bahrain has witnessed the lowest number of casualties amongst the sustained uprisings - more people were killed during a single day of Libya or Syria’s initial protests. This low-intensity strategy is King Hamad’s “key” to masking his presence on the international radar.

What this strategy won’t accomplish is the absolute suppression of death, injury and the desire for political freedom. The last 72 hours have produced two murky deaths, one a 24-year old found on the reclaimed Amwaj islands. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry denied any knowledge of the case, saying that an autopsy concluded death by drowning. Al Wefaq released an opposing version of Yousif Ahmed Abbas’s final hours, claiming that his parents were notified by authorities after his detainment. They suspect that he was tortured.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry promptly responded, "The father of the missing man stated that his son suffered from psychological problems, sometimes going to the beaches in the area and requiring assistance in returning home.”

Apparently “psychological problems” serves as this weekend’s special excuse. Challenging the circumstances of each death, Bahrain’s government places the burden of responsibility on protesters rather than national and foreign security units. The same goes for funerals, which are “legitimately” dispersed after they evolve into anti-government rallies. On Saturday a 59-year old woman succumbed to burns inflicted when she lit herself on fire. One Gulf report said the woman “suffered from psychological problems,” but local sources claim that she had “fallen ill” after her son’s arrest in April. He was still being held when she self-immolated on her roof.

Bahrain’s media blackout can only minimize these cases, not hide them completely. Nor can an information campaign disperse Bahrain’s opposition movement on the ground - Al Wefaq has simply turned the international community’s inaction into a central theme. On Tuesday thousands of protesters flocked to the UN’s office in Manama, where security forces allowed them to rally under the alleged specter of U.S. criticism. A more likely explanation: King Hamad realized the counter-productively of attacking a demonstration in the UN’s presence. U.S. officials expressed polite concern over the beating of Nabeel Rajab, head of Bahrain’s Center For Human Rights (BCHR), and the Obama administration immediately returned to the familiar silence that greets protesters on a daily basis.

Al Wefaq also dismissed a recent trial of two Pakistani policemen accused of “beating to death” Ali al-Saqer and Zakeriya al-Asheeri. “Torture is not just systematic,” the group said in a statement. “It is now a policy of the state.”

Undaunted, Al Wefaq held a “No Withdrawal” protest in Manama on Friday to express its determination and rally new supporters. Former parliamentarian Mattar Ebahim said authorities injured at least 13 people when they attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas, batons, stun grenades and sound bombs. Like the horror stories from Egypt’s November clashes, Ebahim claims that police are “targeting the protesters directly with tear gas canisters.” Several of the latest deaths have been attributed to injuries sustained from U.S.-made gas canisters.

None of these events are truly “mysterious.” All are products of Bahrain’s political marginalization, security crackdown and media blackout - the hardware and software of oppression.

White House Lost In Iraq’s Political Crisis

2012-01-14T10:26:00.000-08:00

Seven Iraqi monitors allegedly deserted the Arab League’s mission in Syria this week, transcending the significance of their removal beyond Syria’s borders. As the League’s walls close around Bashar al-Assad’s regime at a glacial rate, Damascus has attempted to divide the League’s decision-making between its opponents and remaining allies. Among those still pushing for a mild political transition - U.S. ally and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Except al-Maliki has bigger things to worry about - his own grip on power.

Tasked with the duty of international awareness, Saleh al-Mutlaq recently passed along Iraqiya’s message to Washington through The Associated Press. Iraq’s Deputy premier also defended his response to President Barack Obama’s cordial meeting with al-Maliki, telling CNN that he was “shocked” to hear Obama praise him as a democratic partner. al-Mutlaq proceeded to caution the White House that al-Maliki’s political ambitions threaten Iraq’s security after the U.S. withdrawal.

“Why should I regret it?” he asked on Friday. “I only said the truth.”

al-Mutlaq then took another leap of truth. Predicting that Iraq could enter a new cycle of sectarian violence with al-Maliki at the top of Baghdad’s power struggle, or possibly experience a unified uprising against his government, al-Mutlaq warned, "The longer al-Maliki stays in power, the higher the possibility of a divided Iraq.” These statements form the latest wave of information directed at al-Maliki’s “sectarian autocracy”; a NYT op-ed from Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi reads like a manifesto on al-Maliki and U.S. policy.

The party currently rests in a suspended state, its ministers placed on leave by al-Maliki as they temporarily boycott his government. Securing a fair trial for Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi, who faces charges of funding a Sunni death squad, and protecting al-Mutlaq from a no-confidence motion represent urgent demands. More important, though, is reversing 2010’s failed power-sharing agreement, which left al-Maliki in control of the Interior and Defense Ministries. Allawi was never given a position of oversight as promised, resulting in accusations that al-Maliki is politicizing Iraq’s security and intelligence agencies.

These factors (and many interrelated affairs) have inflated the demand for a national conference above al-Hashemi’s individual case. With al-Mutlaq addressing the U.S. media, Iraqiya spokesman Haidar al-Mulla told the London-based Asharq al-Awsat that, "no national reconciliation meeting can take place in Iraq whilst Nouri al-Maliki is prime minister... Maliki does not want any conference that could potentially remove him from office to take place.”

al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya aren’t the only actors operating under this tense state. On Tuesday Turkish Prime Minister Turek Erdogan phoned al-Maliki to “voice his concern over Iraq's political stand-off,” drawing a sharp rebuke from his counterpart.

Contrary to the shining “opportunity” left by U.S. soldiers and diplomats, Iraqis find themselves swamped in foreboding reports and rumors, bombings and the all-encompassing fear of new conflict. The country is drifting through an uneasy “post-war” period, simultaneously experiencing the “end” and continuation of America’s occupation. Worse still, al-Maliki is conjuring visions of Saddam Hussein (to al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist, among others), breaching America’s last line of political defense against a misguided invasion. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to rebuild their lives in peace, but the country is in no position to extract itself from a perpetual state of warfare.

The Obama administration continues to misread Iraq’s public sphere as it loses control over the image of U.S. policy. With Deputy Secretary of State William Burns en route to Baghdad through Turkey, U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey defended al-Maliki several days ago by telling Reuters, "I believe that he is trying very hard to bridge the gaps that currently exist with his partners.” Asked about al-Mutlaq’s latest interview, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland responded, “We don’t think it’s helpful for Iraqi politicians to be hashing out their differences in the media. We’d much rather see them sit down together.”

Such statements render the White House guilty of going public in al-Maliki’s favor.

In one way Obama should be personally thankful for al-Hashemi’s warrant and his ensuing flight to Kurdish territory. Iraq’s ongoing crisis traces to deep sources, however al-Mutlaq’s original statements run directly to Obama’s praise for al-Maliki - a public display of strength. The politicized debate on America’s withdrawal is shielding him from more deserving criticism, mainly Washington’s near-unconditional support for al-Maliki. As Baghdad’s present conflict drags into its second month, the White House is still calling for “all parties to enter a dialogue” when no confidence has been established.

“What we are continuing to do,” Nuland tries to explain, “as we’ve said a number of times in the last few days, is to impress upon senior Iraqi politicians the importance of direct dialogue with each other to resolve their differences and to work towards a solution that represents the interests of all Iraqis for an inclusive government and that’s within the Iraqi constitution.”

al-Maliki’s confidence crisis has spilled across Iraq’s private and public layers, and ultimately into the international media. It cannot and should not be kept private. Nor would the Obama administration devote as much attention to the problem without Sunni officials going public. The reality is that Iraqiya feels exhausted of options to influence Iraq’s political process and distribute power away from al-Maliki. Party officials must also force al-Maliki into a national conference on favorable terms; the premier wants to decide the location and conditions on his terms. The administration seems to be glossing over these considerations, instead coddling al-Maliki and blocking any sources of provocation.

This approach tacitly admits that he will respond aggressively to challenges against his rule.

Nuland lacks the information to clarify whether U.S. officials will monitor or facilitate Iraq’s national dialogue, but this offer should be readily accepted if proposed. Due to understandable political impressions and the inexcusable distraction of Afghanistan, the Obama administration has shirked from involving itself too deeply in Iraq’s political affairs. The aftermath of 2010’s parliamentary election was initially abandoned before U.S. officials launched a belated (and ill-advised) push for al-Maliki’s coalition, and the administration continues to avoid Iraq’s crisis as it sells Obama’s withdrawal. So far Washington has produced minimal results with private pressure, keeping al-Maliki on the edge but failing to walk him back.

The hour for private diplomacy has expired. Now is the time to stick both hands into Baghdad - inaction will only prolong the crisis and keep Iraq in the headlines.

“We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness,” writes Allawi. “But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.”

Removing al-Maliki from office obviously poses a greater risk to Iraq’s security and the influence retained through him. The administration must hope that Allawi’s party is attempting to leverage its dissatisfaction, starting with al-Maliki’s resignation and negotiating until receiving its allocated ministries (and various political terms). Yet moving against him, whether to back him down or remove him, will find support amongst Iraqiya, the Kurds and even anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who views al-Maliki as a personal enemy.

al-Mutlaq claimed, “The Kurds are getting more convinced that continuing to support the al-Maliki government is a mistake... and maybe boycotting Parliament is one of the ways to pressure the government to change.”

Other analysts speculate that the Kurds could exchange al-Hashimi for political concessions from al-Maliki, but President Jalal Talabani appears to be pursuing an alternative course: bring national attention and power to Kurdish territory. His chief of staff, Dr. Fuad Hussein, denied that al-Hashimi evaded his warrant, hinting that Baghdad wasn’t safe for a fair trial. Talabani added, "He does not disagree with attending court. All he asks... is to transfer the place of trial from Baghdad to Kirkuk and he is ready to go to court in Kirkuk. This is an Iraqi city which belongs to the central government."

Washington and Baghdad’s mutual dilemma doesn’t revolve around a lack of U.S. troops, whose presence would inflame popular grievances, force another government dispute, play into Iran’s narrative and embolden al-Maliki’s consolidation. Relying on U.S. troops to patch Iraq's long-standing issues completely ignores the theories of COIN and fourth-generation warfare (4GW), which demand a non-military emphasis. The real mistake is giving al-Maliki free reign to squeeze Iraqiya out of the highest levels of power, a consequential trend for all segments of Iraqi society. Limiting his power would undermine Iran’s influence and appease Riyadh - potentially salvaging U.S. influence - so Washington’s inaction comes as a modest surprise.

Iraqis don’t need another strongman to lead the country from war to democracy. They need a statesman.

Syria Devolving Into Total Chaos

2012-01-13T09:43:00.000-08:00

The Arab League’s mission in Syria has finally sprung a tangible leak. Whether Bashar al-Assad and his remaining allies in the League can plug this hole will be revealed shortly, as the mission cannot last much longer at its present rate. Amid a UN report that counted 400 dead in the last two weeks, the first monitors have begun to scurry off of Sudanese General Mohamed al-Dabi’s ship.

"Two monitors have excused themselves, an Algerian and an Sudanese," Syria operations chief Adnan Khodeir said at League headquarters in Cairo.

Anwar Malek presumably expected to find himself under immediate attack as the first deserter. Asked to estimate the ranks of his sympathizers, Malek would tell Reuters, "I cannot specify a number, but many.” When you talk to them their anger is clear.” The Algerian quickly attracted hostile fire from the Arab League and his own government, both of which denied his gruesome account of Syria’s cities. In a League statement, “Gen. Mohammed Al-Dabi, the head of the Arab monitors’ mission to Damascus, has confirmed that what the Malek said to a satellite channel does not relate to the truth in any way.”

“Since he was assigned to the Homs team, Malek did not leave the hotel for six days and did not go out with the rest of the team into the field giving the excuse that he was sick.”

The fallacy of this defense is easily demonstrable. First, Syrian protesters remark that anyone with eyes can see the conditions in oppositional cities; Malek could have looked outside and witnessed abuses in Homs. The conditions he reported match non-government accounts: "The snipers are everywhere shooting at civilians. People are being kidnapped. Prisoners are being tortured and none were released... The mission was a farce and the observers have been fooled.”

Meanwhile Secretary-General Nabil al-Arabi is alternating between bailing water and conceding his mission’s failure. After defending the League for increasing the number of protesters, removing military vehicles from cities and pushing violence pushed “to the outskirts,” as if this reaction was a positive development, al-Arabi confirmed the general content of Malek’s version. “The Syrian government isn’t acting in good faith,” he said, even telling Egyptian TV that he’s receiving “extremely worrying” reports from Dabi.

Thus Malek’s report cannot be as “baseless” as the Sudanese general labeled it.

More than one monitor is also jumping ship, burying the excuse that Malek remained inside during his deployment. New deserters include a Moroccan legal specialist, an aid worker from Djibouti and an Egyptian. Another observer told Reuters that he plans to leave on Friday, saying, "there are some people who are concerned about their safety... Some, from a professional perspective, feel they are not achieving anything." Mousab Azzawi of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights identified 11 more observers as candidates: seven Iraqis, two Kuwaitis and two Emiratis. The group had reportedly witnessed Syrian security open protesters in Deir el-Zour.

These events follow the death of French journalist Gilles Jacquier, who was killed during a grenade barrage in Homs. al-Assad’s regime naturally accused Syria’s National Council (SNC) and “terrorists” of the crime. Oppositional groups would return the accusation, and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe tacitly blamed the regime by announcing, "It's up to Syrian authorities to ensure the security of international journalists on their territory.” Although the League’s monitors aren’t necessary supposed to do anything more than watch, the impression of an untrained and ill-equipped force has poisoned the confidence that their final report will yield political action.

Facing a massive crisis of confidence, the League’s mission will struggle to survive its last week and the potential 30-day extension without an emergency response. Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani, told reporters after meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "I could not see up until now a successful mission, frankly speaking. We hope we will solve it, as we say, in the house of the Arabs, but right now the Syrian government is not helping us." Washington feels the same way, hoping for Arab solution that comes with the lowest regional price, yet this price is inevitably rising with al-Assad’s destructive behavior.

One League official in Cairo defended the organization’s lack of options, arguing, "This is not a problem with the Arab League. This is a problem with the international system. Who is willing to send in troops? Who is willing to send in a fighting force?... What is this team going to do? This team is not there to stop the violence. It is not there to pull back the military. It is not there to free prisoners. It is to verify. It is not a peacekeeping team.”

The natural barrier of deploying an inexperienced monitoring team into a conflict zone is yielding one overriding conclusion: the military option. Several League officials have acknowledged the possibility in recent days, only to argue that an operation requires 6-8 weeks to mobilize - too long for Syria’s opposition to wait. A political and military campaign can, of course, be organized simultaneously, however the League’s ideal response would maintain control of Syria’s political transition. More understandably, the League’s cumulative militaries seek to avoid al-Assad’s well-trained army in the field. Such a conflict will dwarf the battle against Gaddafi’s ragtag force and potentially draw foreign actors into a regional war.

In Moscow, Russian Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed to possess “information that NATO members and some Arab states of the Persian Gulf, acting in line with the scenario seen in Libya, intend to turn the current interference with Syrian affairs into a direct military intervention.”

This scenario may rest in the relative distance, but it’s also growing closer with each passing death, conspiracy and political breakdown. In fact al-Arabi just told Egypt’s Al Hayat, "Yes I fear a civil war and the events that we see and hear about now could lead to a civil war.” Patrushev speculated that “the main strike forces will be supplied not by France, Britain and Italy, but possibly by neighboring Turkey,” adding that Washington and Ankara are currently discussing a no-fly zone. Arab League officials have thrown Pakistan, a country familiar with UN peacekeeping missions, into a potential Arab coalition. These forces would theoretically link with the SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA) to conduct precise air and ground operations.

At this point Syria becomes too chaotic to predict with any realistic expectation of accuracy, save for the profuse bloodshed of open warfare between al-Assad and his opponents.

Three Myths of Ali Saleh’s Immunity

2012-01-11T21:16:00.000-08:00

Although instrumental in drafting the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing agreement in Yemen, including an immunity clause for Ali Abdullah Saleh’s extensive family, the Obama administration has advanced the unpopular deal in determined silence. Offering limited information since mobilizing the GCC in April, the White House and State Department eventually guided a ratification process over objections from the UN's Human Rights Council and through the Security Council. October’s Resolution 2014 would reaffirm the GCC’s initiative in full, while adding “that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.”

The distance between “will be” and “should be” equals Saleh’s immunity.

That the U.S., European powers and Gulf states support the continuation of Saleh’s regime over Yemen’s revolutionaries is well documented. Never, though, had the Obama administration explicitly articulated America’s support for the GCC’s immunity clause until Monday, when the State Department’s Victoria Nuland coolly defended Saleh’s special privileges.

“I think you’ll remember that as part of the GCC transition initiative, which President Saleh ultimately signed and which Vice President Hadi and the opposition are working together to try to implement now, there was a provision of immunity for President Saleh and those who worked with him during the period of his government. However, that had to be put into law, so that’s what they’re working on now. This is part and parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be able to move forward towards a democratic future.”

The influx of information over Saleh’s status requires extensive disassembling.

1. Immunity is the quickest way to end Yemen’s revolution

The White House’s public argument remains unchanged despite an increasing level of exposure: Saleh and dozens of relatives must be coaxed out of power to “move Yemen forward.” Immunity is critical to uprooting Saleh’s network and implementing the GCC’s terms before February 21st’s presidential election. Perhaps immunity remains the “quickest” way to end Yemen’s “crisis,” however this possibility isn’t as indisputable as the Obama administration argues. The natural counterargument is that immunity encourages Saleh’s destructive behavior, as it has since the Saudi-bankrolled GCC launched its initiative in May.

The GCC’s protection is trending towards the opposite end of the White House’s stated goal: “giving these guys confidence that their era is over.” Instead Saleh has been provided with an internationally-legitimized tool to stall his exit and maintain influence afterward. Confident that his regime survived the GCC’s “transition,” Saleh has taken Western and GCC leniency as his cue to act as he sees fit, whether inside or outside of Yemen. The strongman invited himself to New York City, then “postponed” his trip after suspecting that he wouldn’t be received as President (returning didn’t appear to be an issue). Twice he has returned from Saudi Arabia, rumored as his new vacation spot, and he will almost certainly return again before February 21st.

A minority of protesters remain open to Saleh’s immunity and exile so long as his regime follows, but this deal is preemptively compromised by other aspects of the GCC’s initiative. Saleh has already ignored a 30-day deadline to transfer executive power to his Vice President, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi; this “power struggle” is now being sold by Western capitals as political cover. Hadi did reach a combative state with Saleh’s family, primarily his son Ahmed, while filling in during Saleh’s medical leave to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s 17-year VP also submitted an immunity draft covering “all those who worked with him [Saleh] during his presidency across all civilian, military and security apparatuses.”

Saleh still expects to lead Hadi’s campaign as a consensus candidate between his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). He has no intention of turning apolitical during the ensuing two-year transitional period.

The theory that Saleh will accept immunity over his loss of power commits a dangerous psychological error by appealing to reason. Washington as a whole publicly alternates between acknowledging Saleh’s renowned duplicity and pleading ignorance, leaking a story about "getting played" amid conditional approval for an American visa. His behavior suggests that he would rather be dead than powerless, a level of stubbornness mirrored in the Obama administration’s refusal to let go of his regime. Western and Gulf capitals continue to minimize Yemen’s revolution as a “crisis” to be resolved ASAP, demanding an end according to their time-lines and interests.

Saleh and his foreign allies want the revolution over fast, not done right - a mindset that has prolonged low-intensity conflicts throughout the last half-century. Yemen's Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) recently advised, "The GCC Initiative, with or without its Implementation Mechanism, was not and could not be answerable to the genuine legitimate demands of the Yemeni people, in the immediate future or after a hundred years."

2. Immunity is necessary to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

The complimentary theory to immunity centers around AQAP, now described as al-Qaeda’s most evolved branch and one of America’s greatest threats. This theory contends that, by removing Saleh and his inner circle from Yemen’s equation, the country can “return to normal”; counter-terrorism units can switch from killing protesters to militants in the southern governorates. This theory may be true to an extent, since Saleh grew adroit at manipulating AQAP’s growth and allegedly funding proxy jihadists. The intense battle for Yemen’s Abyan, Aden and Ma'rib governorates is a byproduct of his misrule, and Saleh's own general admitted to being abandoned over the summer. Other U.S. technology and ammunition was redeployed against Yemen's Southern Movement (SM) or shifted to the Houthis' northern front.

If a government comes into power with no need to blackmail the international community or divert military assistance away from counter-terrorism, the U.S. could finally join a capable partner in defeating AQAP.

Unfortunately this theory isn’t much tighter than Saleh’s immunity, essentially weighing Yemen’s military sphere above its political and social levels. The battle against AQAP is more ideological than physical, and removing Saleh through a legitimate process would inflict greater damage than cushioning his downfall. International headlines now read “U.S. defends Saleh’s immunity,” the literal manifestation of al-Qaeda’s ideology. Only a handful of Yemenis have joined AQAP - revolutionaries want nothing to do with al-Qaeda - but many recruits must have America's support for Saleh at the front of their minds.

These fighters could be turned upside-down and isolated (or reconverted) by defending Yemen’s democratic movement, but their ideology is currently validated by Washington’s cooperation with the regime. Prolonging Saleh’s rule through the GCC’s initiative also ensures that the south remains unstable, and that his opportunistic military partnership will continue. Yemen’s uprising and AQAP are viewed independently, as if one must end to combat the other, when AQAP should be disintegrated within a just conclusion to the revolution.

Congress appears more concerned with the star power of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP’s former cleric and propagandist, than the recruiting power of U.S. policy.

3. Immunity in the name of democracy

Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, made modest headlines last week after warning Yemen’s GCC-approved “unity government” against granting immunity for crimes against humanity. Pillay’s comments may appear honest, but directing criticism at the remnants of Saleh’s regime is grossly manipulative; the UNSC is guilty of violating its own “international human rights obligations.” Hadi, the GPC and JMP are simply doing what the UNSC ordered them to do in October.

No aspect of the GCC’s initiative is truly democratic. Organized by Saleh and his foreign allies, GCC negotiations intentionally circumvented Yemen’s youth and civil movement through the unpopular JMP. Transparency is lacking across the GCC’s proposal, from its extensive negotiations to Saleh’s signature in Riyadh, to February’s ambiguous election and oversight of Yemen’s military command. No official copy of the GCC's initiative has been released, forcing protesters to guess what happens next, nor is Yemen a GCC member. All parts of the initiative, especially its power-sharing and immunity terms, are designed to confuse and divide Yemen’s opposition.

The GCC's papers are also stained by the blood of thousands of protesters, generating and whitewashing their deaths in the same cycle. Yemen’s revolutionaries are left without any semblance of justice - and with a gruesome impression of international law.

On a shadowy level, the Obama administration is using the GCC’s initiative to conceal ongoing military support for Saleh’s regime. Drone strikes have killed an undisclosed number of civilians along with their intended targets, including al-Awlaki's 16-year old son Abdulrahman, and the U.S.-funded Republican Guard and Central Security Organization continue to spearhead Saleh’s urban crackdown. Backing immunity admits these crimes by default, but Washington still hopes to avoid the spectacle of a trial and Saleh’s inevitable snitching.

Granting his immunity has nothing to do with genuine democracy, only the political expediency of external powers.

Syrian Opposition Stuck Between AL, UN

2012-01-10T16:19:00.000-08:00

Protesters feel the bullets whiz above their heads - if they’re lucky - as they dodge between streets and allies. Higher above them snaps the fire of international powers as they vie for control of Syria’s potential transition, and finally the deafening cannon of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the Arab League’s generally accepted failure in stopping widespread bloodshed, the bloc’s mission is fulfilling another purpose by gradually breaking down relations with Damascus.

Sadly this dissolution comes with high casualties and increased polarization. The League’s current cycle has been stuck on repeat since November, when the bloc first introduced a transitional initiative to end Syria’s revolution. Last week encapsulated the previous two months: political maneuvering, inconclusive weekend meetings and daily death tolls. Monday began with another reported massacre in the Khalidiyeh neighborhood of Homs. Local activist Omar Homsi claimed that “Syrian security forces fired at protesters after noon prayer,” and that an AL delegation fled the scene without documentation. al-Assad is also amending his tactics to include more crowd-control measures (tear gas, water cannons, and nail bombs).

Syrian activist Amal Hanano submitted a blueprint of Damascus’s “new” gameplan to Foreign Policy: “The observers' arrival changed the rules of the game. The regime sends spies to take pictures of the protesters who dare speak to the observers. Before every excursion, the streets are secured in any way necessary, by bullets or arrests (for the safety of the observers or to preserve what's left of the regime's tarnished image?). The streets of Deraa have to be scrubbed clean of its people, silencing their voices and erasing any sign of dissent, to present an image of control, safely guarded by snipers lurking on rooftops.”

Unsatisfied with Cairo’s conclusion that Damascus “only partly implemented” the League’s initiative - protesters contend that none of the League’s demands have been met - Syria’s opposition launched their latest media offensive to seize the country’s narrative. Pledging to increase the number of monitors from 165 to 200 remains a futile attempt to boost confidence in the League’s mission, given that 1,000 monitors could still be guided by Syrian authorities. Quoting a protester from Deraa, where one AL monitor sparked a furor after spotting or not spotting snipers, Hanano explains how the mission couldn’t visit a funeral because no transportation was available.

Reporting from inside the mission’s media bubble, CNN’s Nic Robertson observed, “the Arab monitors who are here... are largely seen as ineffective. The language that they use, they do not criticize the government here even though the government hasn't met what the Arab League is telling it to do in terms of pulling weapons and troops off the street.”

This pervading lack of confidence has rendered the League’s mission dead in the water, leaving its monitors to float through al-Assad’s carnage until their overview is submitted on January 19th. Syria’s opposition cannot afford to wait another 9 days without any political motion, as time equals lives and the potential for wider conflict. One particular group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), has already lost faith in the League’s mission and publicly expressed its intent to attack (with arms purchased from multiple sources) if the UN doesn’t assume observer duties. Most Syrian groups seem to be coalescing around these terms in the absence of new political action and clarification. Rami Abdulrahman, head of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, warned against "giving the regime more time to deal with the Syrian revolution.”

"The initial report is too vague, and it essentially buys the regime more time," said Rima Fleihan, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC). “We need to know what the League will do if the regime continues its crackdown in the presence of the monitors. At one point it needs to refer Syria to the U.N. Security Council."

Syria’s Local Coordination Committees (LCC) proposed its demands as follows: "Immediately announcing that the Arab observers have failed in their mission, referring the Syrian file to the UN Security Council, paving the way for imposing a no-fly zone and establishing a safe corridor for protecting the military defectors."

Accordingly, a spokesman for the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) continues to strike a more optimistic tone, saying the League’s presence has “reinvigorated” Syria’s revolution and “decreased the number of protesters killed.” These points, though true, come with substantial qualifiers. Protesters are massing to prove their existence and dare al-Assad to shoot in front of the League -and he hasn’t blinked. Dozens of dead and wounded have been documented daily since the observers arrived on December 23rd.

“Any talk of foreign intervention is an illusion, the Arab League initiative is the only way forward,” Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir said after meeting with AL Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby in Cairo.

Ideally, Syria’s opposition must reach a compromise before the League receives its full report. However the middle ground might have been destroyed by al-Assad’s bombardment, and closing the schism between the NCC and SNC, LCC and FSA essentially requires the NCC to cede its position. The NCC may feel more comfortable with UN oversight if Syria’s other networks can provide guarantees of political leadership, a task that the SNC has failed to accomplish. Somewhat reassuringly, SNC spokeswoman Basma Kadmani argued, "There is no major difference on foreign intervention... we have agreed on a joint formulation of what foreign intervention means and how it should come about if it were to come about."

Regardless of their alignment, counter-proposals from every network must be shared and ready for immediate broadcast.

The possibility of UN intervention has created a parallel gap within the Arab League, applying considerable friction to its relations with al-Assad (which may benefit the opposition by accelerating a transfer). Al Jazeera counts Elaraby as a believer in his own mission, explaining his close relations with the NCC. Meanwhile the “anti-Assad” capitals, led by Qatar, are giving him ammo to criticize the League’s mission and potentially shut it down on his terms (another potential accelerator to the UN).

"If the report comes out saying the violence has not stopped, the Arab League will have a responsibility to act on that," Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told a news conference in Cairo.

With the League’s mission set to continue relatively unchanged, al-Thani’s statements cut to the short-term endgame. Perhaps some benefit will be produced if the monitors return with reams of evidence and a complete picture to report, and if al-Assad’s non-compliance results in punitive action. Yet al-Thani, tough as he acts, has issued similar warnings for months. al-Assad shouldn’t be too concerned if Qatar poses his biggest threat. After al-Thani urged the detached dictator to “take a historic decision,” Syria’s Permanent Representative at the Arab League blasted him for “speaking on behalf of the Syrian people.”

al-Assad drowned out his officials on Tuesday with a hard-line, two-hour speech at Damascus University: “The Arab League failed for six decades to protect Arab interests. We shouldn’t be surprised it’s failed today.”

Blaming Western powers, the Arab League and “hundreds of media outlets” for instigating their revolution could form the glue that sticks Syria’s opposition together. Claiming that “external conspiracy is clear to everybody” sounds like a natural bond, and any skeptic of al-Assad’s violent mania should realize that he has no intention of ceding power. “We will declare victory soon” equates to a death sentence (al-Assad says no orders were given “for anyone to open fire on any citizen”). As the situation currently stands, the Arab League and Western powers have yet to break from al-Assad’s regime and his Eastern connections. However these counter-revolutionary forces are drifting away from each other, necessitating unity amongst Syria’s pro-democracy movement.

“The divisions are getting bigger, and I think we can expect the situation here - at the moment, stable - to deteriorate in the future,” Robertson concludes. “That's the direction it's going in.”

U.S. Explicitly Backs Saleh’s Immunity

2012-01-09T17:53:00.000-08:00

Although instrumental in drafting the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing agreement for Yemen, an “initiative” that included immunity for Ali Abdullah Saleh’s extensive family, the Obama administration has advanced the political deal in notorious silence. No detailed information has been offered by the White House or State Department since the GCC mobilized in early May, only unflinching support for its unpopular initiative. When Washington spearheaded the GCC’s ratification process through the UN Security Council, resolution 2014 simply reaffirmed the GCC’s initiative while adding “that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.”

Politically and legally speaking, “should be” is another world from “will be.”

Having never released an official copy of the GCC’s initiative, the international community continues to confuse and divide Yemen’s vigorous pro-democracy movement up to the present. This disinformation campaign generated modest headlines last week when Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned Yemen’s GCC-approved “unity government” against granting immunity for crimes against humanity. As honest as Pillay’s comments may appear, directing criticism at the remnants of Saleh’s regime is grossly manipulative; the UNSC - not just Yemen’s government - is guilty of violating its “international human rights obligations.”

Then again, neither Saleh nor his allies in the UNSC are likely to listen to her.

That the Obama administration has supported the continuation of Saleh’s regime over Yemen’s revolutionaries is well documented. Never, though, had the White House or State Department explicitly addressed America’s support for the GCC’s immunity clause until today. Questioned on Assistant Secretary Jeffery Feltman’s recent trip to Riyadh and discussions surrounding Saleh’s immunity, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland replied as though no one should be surprised - a rare truth from the administration.

“I think you’ll remember that as part of the GCC transition initiative, which President Saleh ultimately signed and which Vice President Hadi and the opposition are working together to try to implement now, there was a provision of immunity for President Saleh and those who worked with him during the period of his government. However, that had to be put into law, so that’s what they’re working on now. This is part and parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be able to move forward towards a democratic future.”

Thus the White House’s public argument remains unchanged despite a new level of exposure: Saleh and dozens of relatives must be coaxed out of power to “move Yemen forward.” Immunity is critical to implementing the GCC’s deal - and maintaining influence with the “new” government. The natural counterargument is that immunity will encourage Saleh’s destructive behavior, as it has since the GCC’s initiative launched in May, and many Yemenis still demand justice for 33 years of misrule. Furthermore, the Obama administration is blatantly covering up U.S. military support for Saleh's regime through his immunity clause.

Washington and European powers had some special concrete shoes made for the wrong side of Yemen’s revolution.

Fully analysis on Thursday, the alleged deadline for Saleh to cede power and withdraw from the country.

Who Is Really Running Yemen?

2012-01-09T13:25:00.000-08:00

International Blackout Can't Quiet Bahrain's Uprising

2012-01-08T18:07:00.000-08:00

Alwaleed bin Talal has been a busy business man lately. As his cousins labor to protect the kingdom’s “investments” during an unstable environment, either through political hegemony or military force, the Saudi billionaire Prince is diligently strengthening his King’s media front. Already in possession of a vast media network across the Gulf, Riyadh has recognized the value of information and is hoarding accordingly.

The supposedly progressive Bin Talal broke new ice in December with a symbolic $300 million investment in Twitter (4% stake), but his liberal norms shouldn’t be confused with democratic urges. The $20 billion Prince also selected Manama’s Media City to host his globally-minded Alarab news channel - as if Bahrain’s uprising could get any darker.

Like King Abdullah’s royal circle, Washington counts the efficient suppression of Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement and preservation of America’s Fifth Fleet as a “foreign policy success.” Protesters are systematically quelled each day (especially on Fridays and weekends), funerals are often dispersed with tear gas, and any march on Manama’s Pearl Square is stopped before it begins. When Al Wefaq organized a non-violent demonstration to prove the uprising’s existence, calling on protesters to stand in front of their homes, security personnel forced some of them back inside.

Two weeks ago Bahraini personnel shot up Al-Wefaq’s headquarters under an international quarantine.

Far from “over,” as NPR recently reported, the 10-month island uprising is simply blacked out by extensive Western factors. The New York Times mainly pays attention when someone important is beaten or gassed (or its own Nick Kristof). The Wall Street Journal posts favorable assessment from Bahraini officials and U.S. consultants, something the Washington Post has picked up on. Neither U.S. mainstream media nor European powers can escape the gravitational silence of the Obama administration, but ample video can be found across YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.

"Ongoing repression in Bahrain is happening amid international silence as people demand democratization and reject dictatorship," Al Wefaq tried to tell the world.

Up until Thursday the Obama administration had no public comment on any of these incidents, instead devoting its usual level of attention to Syria and Iran. The State Department’s Victoria Nuland was then confronted with the loaded question of whether Bahrain “is off your radar screen.” Nuland naturally replied with a hint of indignity - “Of course it’s not off our radar screen” - even though the Department’s last comment dates to December 9th. Unlike Thursday’s Q&A, where Nuland needed prompting to address Bahrain, the spokeswoman began her December briefing with praise for King Hamad’s “credible and transparent” Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI).

Nuland was immediately questioned about the latest suppressed funeral, but evidently hadn’t been briefed some 12 hours after the incident. This unbreakable pattern led former opposition MP Matar Matar to conclude, "The case of Bahrain is a great example of international hypocrisy. Democratic and liberation slogans go silent when it comes to Bahrain.”

In fact the BICI is functioning exactly as designed: “prove” the government’s outreach and minimize the uprising through shallow punishments and reforms. Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, recently reported that her team had “yet to see any prosecution of security forces for civilian injuries and deaths.” Bahrain isn’t “off” Washington’s radar either - the administration is actively concealing an obvious blip. The last official remarks on Bahrain trace to Michael Posner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and they sound eerily similar to the monarchy’s self-adulation.

“It is a great credit to King Hamad that he initiated the BICI process and that allowed the Commission freely free hand to conduct its activities. It is unusual for a government to invite a comprehensive external review of such sensitive matters. We strongly support the King's courage in initiating the review and his commitment to address the reforms outlined in the BICI report.”

High praise for an investigation into the Kingdom’s use of torture.

Posner does deliver several choice words for King Hamad, supporting “a broader, future-oriented agenda” and expressing “concern about reports of excessive use of force... in response to ongoing street protests.” He speaks of the “need for improved community policing practices, crowd control procedures, and accountability for incidents of excessive use of force.” However these lines only superficially differ from the government’s account. For starters Posner qualifies his “concern” over “reports” of government violence, whereas he explicitly “condemns the use of violence by demonstrators which the government has an obligation to stop.”

Two Western “supercops” were also deployed to oversee Manama’s “crowd control.”

That some of Bahrain’s protesters have turned violent is indisputable. They can be seen throwing rocks, bottles and Molotov cocktails at security personnel, and adopted a dangerous tactic of obstructing highway traffic with metal rods. Wefaq chief Sheikh Ali Salman has called on all protesters to cease their use of Molotov cocktails in particular, but low-intensity violence is a natural expression of a populace that loses total confidence in the government. “My team,” said Pillay, “has come back with the message that there is a profound lack of trust in the Government.”

Posner’s rhetoric also mirrors the government’s campaign to brand Bahrain’s Shia uprising as violent and uncontrollable, fulfilling the cycle of fourth-generation warfare (4GW). No level of asymmetric resistance justifies the combination of political marginalization and disproportionate force.

Although Washington has cashed in on Iran’s Hormuz threat to highlight Bahrain’s indispensable Fifth Fleet, the Obama administration couldn’t ignore Friday’s latest incident. Speaking to al Jazeera after stepping into an ambush, Nabeel Rajab recounted how a group of peaceful (but non-permitted) protesters was confronted by Jordanian, Pakistani and Syrian riot police. Once dispersed, the head of Bahrain’s Center For Human Rights hid for “25-30 minutes” before emerging towards his car.

"Five, six, seven people, I don't know how many people. They were attacking from everywhere. When a police officer came, I heard them say, 'We found Nabeel lying down,' and I said, 'No, I'm not lying down - you're beating me... They said, 'Are Nabeel Rajab?' I said 'Yes', then they beat me more.”

At this point the Bahraini CO intervened “when he saw them beating me, they stopped, because he knew it was too much and they called an ambulance."

On Saturday the monarchy offered an alternate version of Rajab’s case, as it does after every death. Not only did he lack a permit to protest, he was medically assisted after requesting aid for an injury. Unable to avoid comment, an anonymous U.S. official would wade into the information battle to minimize Rajab’s fallout, expressing “concern” but remaining inside the Kingdom’s line.

"We are not opining on the facts of what happened here but we are very concerned about this case," he added. "In general, we are very concerned about the frequent reports of excessive use of force by the police, widespread use of tear gas."

Nuland would release a copy of his statements on Sunday - only conclude with praise for the monarchy.

“The Government of Bahrain has taken significant steps to implement recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, and we urge it to complete this important undertaking without delay and continue the work of comprehensive reform. We encourage all the citizens of Bahrain to join in this effort, which can be the foundation for genuine reconciliation and a renewed spirit of national unity.”

These statements are unlikely to satisfy the majority of Bahrain’s opposition movement or Rajab, who delivered an unvarnished assessment of U.S. policy during a recent trip to the capita. Washington’s snug relationship with the monarchy provides rare transparency in a world of shadows. Al Wefaq has responded with politically correct appreciation, but Matar cautioned against the international community’s unsustainable position. He called for the Obama administration to apply real pressure on Manama, “rather than the international community just believing the regime's fake response, which contradicts the facts on the ground.”

As for Rajab’s foreign assailants, he predicts that they will never be found. Just another means of slipping Bahrain’s uprising into darkness.

The "End" of Iraq's War: Crisis and Conspiracy

2012-01-07T10:40:00.000-08:00

A recent bombing in Salahuddin province and Iraq’s political crisis have multiple traits in common: both events require more than six days to sort out. Six months might not allow sufficient time to shed light on an attempt to eliminate a leading Sunni leader, or to neutralize Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s consolidation of power.

Rafe al-Essawi found himself at the center of an inflating media bubble as his convoy rolled by Samarra, where al-Qaeda’s 2006 destruction of the Al ‘Askarī Mosque nearly plunged Iraq into outright civil war. Barely two days had passed since The New York Times profiled an ongoing struggle between Iraq’s Prime Minister and Finance Minister, creating the impression that someone didn’t want him to return to Baghdad. The Times was also following up its own scathing op-ed from al-Essawi, Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi and Osama al-Nujaifi, Iraq’s Parliamentary Speaker.

The timing between these reports and last Sunday’s IED blast outlined the factors currently at work.

Given that an IED doesn’t necessary select its target, laying immediate blame on al-Maliki’s government would extend beyond the available forensic evidence. Yet a well-placed IED also offers an ideal masking agent for political assassination, provided that its traces are scrubbed by security forces. Confusion quickly escalated after Salahuddin Operations Command denied “any security breach,” prompting local police to accuse Baghdad of “hiding” the blast.

Salahuddin’s regional authorities declared autonomy under Iraq’s constitution in October 2011, citing interference from the central government. al-Maliki is staunchly opposed to Sunni autonomous regions.

Cautious of sparking another political battle with limited information, al-Essawi held the government accountable for “a violated security situation” and requested an investigation from the Ministry of Interior. However al-Essawi is acutely aware of the target on his head - he remains a backbone of Iraqiy’a suspended boycott - along with the fact that al-Maliki maintains control of the Interior. He could be reserving an official accusation until Baghdad’s political crisis enters its next stage.

al-Maliki’s government has, for the moment, averted political catastrophe by placing Iraqiya on leave rather than firing the Sunni bloc. The move follows his threat to replace Iraqiya with his own allies, conjuring an illusion of progress. Al-Maliki's spokesman, Ali al-Moussawi, told reporters that “steps are being taken to try to persuade the Iraqiya lawmakers to return.” If and when they do, Baghdad is expected to hold a national dialogue mediated by the Kurds and sponsored by Washington.

"The political process, in spite of all the weaknesses it suffers, is still the only solution," Nujaifi said during a televised address on Monday. "The national conference that (Iraqi President) Jalal Talabani has called for is the right way to resolve the crisis, and we hope it will succeed."

However many obstacles remain in the path of a stable, equitable government. The Kurds refuse to hand Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi over to al-Maliki after being charged with funding a Sunni death squad, and “are not happy about being dragged into the dispute between Sunnis and Shiites.” The three sides have yet to agree on a meeting place to hold negotiations, with al-Maliki pushing for Hashimi’s return to Baghdad. Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, also rejected a political alliance supposedly explored by al-Maliki’s coalition.

“This would be the most dangerous step,” he warns. “It has to be a partnership between the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds. Anything contrary to that would be disastrous.”

Meanwhile the Sunnis have assumed their position out of necessity, not because they seek a compromise with al-Maliki. Not wishing to abandoned Iraq’s central government to al-Maliki or instigate a sectarian crisis, Iraqiya still hopes to change Baghdad from the inside. They see no compromise to broker; al-Maliki must relinquish the authority that he illegally maintained after 2010’s power-sharing agreement. Although supportive of national reconciliation, Nujaifi held a televised address to declare, "Human rights have not been achieved amid the deteriorating of the political process in Iraq."

His joint op-ed with Allawi and al-Essawi came with a list of political demands: “Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.”

In spite of the mounting popular pressure against al-Maliki, Iraq’s Premier is unlikely to back down without the addition of external pressure. Nor will Sunnis be convinced by al-Maliki’s words - they must see concrete action towards national unity and power sharing. Understanding the need for outside assistance, Iraqiya’s political face welcomed Washington’s support for “another national conference to resolve the crisis.” Now the Obama administration must pursue a genuine policy of national reconciliation, a response that has yet to develop since 2010’s parliamentary election.

“The United States must make clear that a power-sharing government is the only viable option for Iraq and that American support for Mr. Maliki is conditional on his fulfilling the Erbil agreement and dissolving the unconstitutional entities through which he now rules. Likewise, American assistance to Iraq’s army, police and intelligence services must be conditioned on those institutions being representative of the nation rather than one sect or party.”

Counterproductive as increased publicity may appear, the White House must intensify its diplomacy and step deeper into Iraq’s political crisis. Tasking Vice President Joe Biden to coordinate a “dialogue” represents a failure in public diplomacy; Washington is too deep into al-Maliki’s regime to feign neutrality. The problem isn’t a failure to extend the presence of U.S. troops, as Hashimi observed: “It’s not that they left too early. In fact, they left too late. The problem is what they have left behind.”

American favoritism for al-Maliki is the root of U.S. instability.

“We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness. But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.”

Last month U.S. officials heralded a “new opportunity” as the last combat troops exited Iraq, seemingly oblivious to al-Maliki’s ongoing consolidation of power. The Obama administration has yet to abandon this political narrative despite a vocal Sunni reaction to al-Maliki’s reception at the White House, and the subsequent crisis surrounding Hashimi, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlak and Iraqiya in general. Ultimately the White House doesn’t want to be seen as active because its officials want Iraq to fade away, but this process will keep the war in U.S. consciousness.

“Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government,” Iraqiya’s leadership warns, “Iraq is doomed.”

Syrian Regime Manufacturing Intricate Terror Propaganda

2012-01-06T19:43:00.000-08:00

Apparently Bashar al-Assad beat his former Colonel to the shock.

Less than 72 hours ago Riad al-Asaad, commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), had announced his dissatisfaction with the Arab League’s observer mission, giving monitors “a few days” to prove themselves fit for the task. Otherwise “we will take a decision which will surprise the regime and the whole world.” 24 hours and dozens of casualties later, al-Asaad declared that his tolerance for inaction had expired: “We are preparing for big operations.”

One day might be enough time for Syria’s regime to organize counter-propaganda in the form of another Damascus bombing. Three days gives al-Assad too much time to plot.

While Friday’s gruesome blast in the capital inspired nightmares to al-Assad loyalists as they passed by, oppositional forces are experiencing a severe case of déjà vu. According to the government's account, a suicide bomber detonated his 10 kilogram payload amid “a traffic place crowded with inhabitants, passersby and shops,” blowing out a bus in the process. SANA state news later designated the bus as the bomber’s target; at least 26 civilians and security personnel are reported dead, with upwards of 60 injured.

The terror attack in al-Midan, a historic neighborhood near Damascus’s old city, immediately replicated the dual suicide bombing that struck Syria’s intelligence centers on December 23rd. Again ready to broadcast, personnel from Syrian state TV found themselves on the scene within moments to control its image. So did the Assistant Regional Secretary of al-Baath Party Mohammad Saiid Bkheitan, Prime Minister Adel Safar, the Ministers of Information and Health, and a variety of security personnel.

Somehow reporting from the scene, the Guardian’s Ian Black observed Syrian officials “energetically” showing off bloody limbs. “There was a sense that the Syrian authorities wanted to show what had happened.”

This same atmosphere lingered over Damascus on December 23rd, when near-simultaneous bombings struck government targets hours before the Arab League’s arrival. Denying Syria’s popular revolution since March’s initial uprising, al-Assad’s regime has instead entrenched its hardline by accusing “terrorists” and “foreign conspirators” of fomenting dissent. Syrian personnel flooded the League’s monitors with this narrative as they escorted them to the blast sites, adding that al-Qaeda had collaborated with Syria’s opposition.

Syria’s National Council (SNC) condemned al-Assad for once again killing his own people.

Armed with his next excuse, al-Assad appears to have capitalized on al-Asaad’s statements with another high-profile terror attack. The possibility of SNC/FSA complicity is low considering that few benefits are transferred to the opposition (especially counterproductive for international intervention), but the opening was admittedly easy to exploit. Colonel Ammar al-Wawi also implied that the FSA predicted Friday’s attack, setting up a notorious pattern for the months ahead.

“We’re expecting more of these bombings in the coming days,” al-Wawi warned. “This regime is seeking to spread chaos in Syria.”

Also unconvinced by Damascus’s latest bombing, the SNC joined its military counterpart in holding al-Assad’s regime responsible for both attacks. Members of the opposition and local activists pointed out the difficulty of smuggling explosives through a dense ring of security checkpoints in the heavily-guarded Damascus. Spokesman Omar Idilbi explained, "It is a continuation of the regime's dirty game as it tries to divert attention from massive protests. We call upon for an independent international committee to investigate these crimes that we believe that the regime planned and carried out."

On top of slandering the FSA and its loose connection with the SNC, al-Assad’s regime wasted no time exploiting the Arab League’s own monitors and oppositional foreign powers. The security official that Ian Black allegedly witnessed displaying “Syrian blood” was quoted as screaming, "This is the crime of the Arab League.” Equally willing to cooperate and toy with the League’s monitors, al-Assad’s regime has used their presence to “prove” Syria’s terrorist activity.

The State Department’s Victoria Nuland remarked, "What's interesting here is that, as with previous attacks, the Assad regime has blamed just about everybody. They've blamed the opposition, they've blamed al-Qaida, they've even blamed the United States.”

Nuland finds herself linked to Damascus’s bombing after reflecting the opposition’s discontent and attempting to keep pace with more skeptical Western capitals (Paris). In a Wednesday statement, Syria`s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jihad Maqdisi declared that al-Assad’s regime "is not interested in presenting an account on compliance or noncompliance with a protocol to the US, which is not a party to the protocol in the first place but a party in inflaming and instigating violence.” SANA state media also summoned friendly media figures to accuse Washington of a “devilish act.”

Dr. Amin Huteit, “pointed out that the failure of the conspiracy against Syria drove the conspirators toward carrying out terrorist operations against innocent civilians in implementation of Washington's retaliatory strategy against Syria because of its steadfastness and commitment to its principles and refusal to succumb to the U.S. dictates.”

Although the Obama administration has responded to the Arab revolutions with continual duplicity, organizing terror attacks in Damascus only plays into al-Assad’s hands. When the equation is balanced, Syria’s government stands to gain far more than the opposition by bombing civilian and military targets. The political and military opposition, Arab League and Western powers are all exploited with one blast, triggering massive pro-Assad demonstrations in the process. This plot comes in two phases: first discredit the opposition and international community, then create additional justification to “strike back with an iron fist,” in the words of Interior Minister Ibrahim al-Shaar.

The New York Times reported, “In the chaotic aftermath of the attack, residents in nearby neighborhoods said security and paramilitary forces and loyalists to Mr. Assad went on what some described as a rampage, shooting randomly and beating and arresting people in the streets.”

Syria’s situation obviously stands at an extreme crossroads. The question doesn’t seem to be whether al-Assad will genuinely obey international demands from any party (he won’t), but how far Syria’s opposition is willing to militarize. al-Asaad believes that his former boss cannot be overthrown by peaceful demonstrations, and many protesters agree by supporting international intervention (a point of contention within Syria’s opposition groups).

However they might not have much time to synchronize before the next bomb goes off.

Syria’s Revolution Nearing Next Phase

2012-01-05T19:10:00.000-08:00

Only two weeks have elapsed since the Arab League entered a new phase of counter-revolution in Syria. After months of indecisive action, the League eventually hammered out an initiative to remove Bashar al-Assad’s regime "at the lowest cost.” In addition to the holding a national dialogue with Syria’s varied opposition, Arab League monitors initiated their mission on December 22nd to oversee the withdrawal of military forces and release of political detainees.

These maneuvers, in theory, will enable mass protests to catalyze the regime’s downfall.

Parts of Syria’s opposition and skeptical observers can accept the fact that demonstrations are intensifying in the League’s presence. A boost in raw energy has intrinsic value during revolution. They also find common ground with those willing to “give the League a chance to fail” - few actually believe in the League’s sincerity. Too much deception has already occurred in front of its monitors, who are subsequently backed by cautiously supportive officials in Cairo.

The League’s monitors insist that their mission isn’t to prevent violence, only to document and report its sources to international bodies. This position stands on quasi-valid ground, as chaperoned monitors cannot be expected to confront armed soldiers. Yet the League’s overall proposal, coupled with a discredited mission chief and 100+ deaths since his arrival, has projected an aura of complicity with al-Assad’s regime. “Today was very good and all sides were responsive,” Sudanese General Mustafa Dabi remarked after arriving in Homs.

Nor do many protesters and activists believe that the League’s monitors are digging deep enough to document Syria’s abuses. Daily violence consumed at least 30 people on Wednesday and Thursday (according to Syria’s Local Coordination Committees), a pattern that is bleeding al-Assad’s trickery into the mission’s image.

"The observers are going to areas known to be loyal to the regime," Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, told The Associated Press. "We are not seeing the release of detainees or the true removal of a military presence from the streets. Army tanks have been replaced with police armored personnel carriers that still have the capability to shoot heavy weaponry."

Oppositional sources also warn against painted military vehicles and government forces operating in civilian vehicles. One activist in the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr uploaded a video of League monitors standing in front of dirt barriers, with armored vehicles positioned close behind.

The League’s tour on Homs’ main prison unfolded in similar fashion: deception by al-Assad’s regime, initial compliance from the monitors, and hard-earned exposure by the opposition. Prison administrators attempted to steer the monitors away from political detainees only to be “greeted with chants of ‘freedom, freedom,’ and "the people want the fall of the regime.” The League’s team was eventually allowed access for presumably limited interaction.

Local activist Abu Rami further cautioned, "The security forces moved some of the detainees but the numbers are so huge they couldn't move them all. They moved some detainees to military bases and moved away the ones who are in bad health."

The number of political prisoners arrested since March is estimated between 25,000 and 100,000, and reports continue to conflict over their release.

For now the Arab League’s counter-revolution is progressing roughly as planned - gradually weaken al-Assad and maintain control of regime change - but blatant interference may trigger the next phase of Syria’s revolution. The two general positions breakdown into exploiting the mission or rejecting it entirely. Choosing the latter, Free Syrian Army (FSA) commander Riad al-Asaad recently gave the League’s monitors “a few days, or at most within a week” before he made his next move to “surprise the regime and the whole world.”

On Wednesday he slammed the League’s mission as a "mockery" with "no teeth.”

"We prepared ourselves for this stage," the defected Colonel said from his quarantined base in Turkey. "We can't force him off with the peaceful demonstrations, so we are going to force him by arms to leave. We don't believe in the Arab League mission in Syria. I think they are covering the regime and blocking any international intervention to help the Syrian people... We are preparing for big operations and have no faith in Arab League monitors or their useless mission.”

al-Asaad accused the monitors themselves of witnessing government assaults and "not doing anything about it.” He also lobbied for UN monitors to replace the League’s mission and assume the overall political lead in Syria.

Whatever the FSA’s nominal general decides to do, he must realize the necessity of coordinating all operations with Syrian’s highest oppositional authorities. Many members of the National Council (SNC) haven’t hidden their opinion of the League’s mission, condemning its inaction and fraternization with al-Assad’s regime, but Burhan Ghalioun spends time on both sides of the fence. The SNC’s chairman believes, perhaps erroneously, that "even the Arab League has no illusions about the regime's ability to meet its commitments.”

However the end result remains unchanged: allow the mission to fail under al-Assad’s weight: "It remains politically, morally and psychologically useful.”

Ghalioun’s strategy to exploit the League makes sense through the eyes of oppositional leadership - for the time being anyway. Casualties and incidents between the League and al-Assad’s regime could pressure the opposition to align with al-Asaad’s thinking. Conversely, the FSA commander lacks uniform support amongst the SNC and LCC - he’s also suspected of exaggerated his force of 20,000 - and going off on his own agenda is the quickest way to end his campaign. Not only will coordination generate a buffer between al-Assad’s “terrorist” propaganda, a revolution’s military arm loses its function when detached from its political leadership.

For his part Ghalioun addressed these concerns during an interview with BBC, saying, "We are in continuous discussions and whenever they take strategic discussions we are consulted.” The SNC, NCC, LCC and FSA must attempt to sync as closely as possible in order to maximize Syria’s revolution.

Despite the public confidence of its officials, the Arab League has scheduled an emergency session on Saturday to discuss its mission’s future. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jaber Al Thani conceded “there are some mistakes,” arguing that “they tried their best. They have less experience.” He indicated that UN assistance has been requested. How much impact Syria’s opposition and Western powers will have remains to be seen, but the League’s “mistakes” are piling up to an unsustainable level up - its mission will end one way or another within 1-4 weeks.

Syria’s opposition must be ready to politically attack at any moment.

Simulating Saleh’s Exit Strategy

2012-01-04T17:49:00.000-08:00

Beyond Yemen’s opportunistic opposition and meddling foreign powers, few individuals or parties are willing to join Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. That leaves the majority of his opponents to think like him in order to defeat him. Like an old-fashioned game show that reveals an image square by square, Saleh has gradually exposed his blueprint to confuse Yemenis and foreign powers: where will he end up, when will he land, how long will he stay or if/when will he return to Yemen?

Thus Yemen’s revolutionaries and concerned observers must entertain Saleh’s games to anticipate his end.

On Tuesday the White House confirmed a standing invitation for medical leave, prolonging a debate that briefly assumed priority in the U.S. media. Washington’s double-standard is readily demonstrable by switching Saleh’s approval with Bashar al-Assad, and Saleh’s potential arrival drew more mainstream attention than Yemen’s 11-month revolution. Despite its visible concern behind closed doors, the Obama administration has treated Saleh’s visa request and Yemen’s pro-democracy movement as inconvenient afterthoughts. Jay Carney continued this pattern by offhandedly clarifying U.S. policy three days after the strongman announced that he would remain in Yemen until further notice.

Asked about a potential time table, the White House’s press secretary responded “that the situation remains the same, that the United States is still considering President Saleh’s active request to enter the United States for the sole purpose - the sole purpose of seeking medical treatment.”

This political gamesmanship should reach its next stage in nine days. Citing government sources, the Yemen Post reports that Saleh is “under immense pressure from the west and gulf nations to leave the country and give it a chance to succeed.” Few protesters or observers are willing to believe any of Saleh’s rhetoric until he steps on a plane, and subsequent maneuvers are expected once he lands. For now his most probable location remains the U.S. by default, having declared that he only “postponed” his trip to attend unfinished political business.

Business that includes quelling dissent within his personal security units, or suppressing an ongoing government-economic strike known as the “Parallel Revolution.”

Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) recently “agreed” that he couldn’t travel abroad unless received as “President,” countering the possibility of a brief vacation to New York. Now Saleh’s party has again “decided” that he remain in Yemen and “lead his party” to February 21st’s presidential election; this news was heavily spun by his unpopular spokesman, deputy Information Minister Abdo al-Janadi. If Saleh does travel before January 12th, Washington has supposedly required him to fly through a third party to limit his control.

One official described as a “ruling family member” told the Yemen Post, “Saleh will have other options to enter the US, he will have to go to the Emirates or Ethiopia then head to the United States.”

“We’re not going to dictate his travel plans one way or the other,” the State Department’s Victoria Nuland added on Wednesday.

Given that all of this information comes from government sources, a list of jump-points could range from Kuwait to Jordan to the comfortable Saudi Arabia. Nor does any international guarantee exist to prevent Saleh from returning. Each time he withdrew to Saudi Arabia - to receive medical treatment and sign the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative - he’s triumphantly and violently returned to Washington’s “surprise.” Saleh also promised to return when he first declared his intention to travel, and shouldn’t be doubted in these particular situations.

As for the Obama administration, its strategy remains a delicate dance to remove Saleh personally while maintaining authority through his vice president, ruling party and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). The GPC and JMP would then compete for international favor, further solidifying external hegemony. Another senior official (or perhaps the same) planted a story suggesting that Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi is resisting Saleh’s attempt to reclaim authority (by not answering his calls).

"We need to move vigorously and effectively to implement the Gulf initiative and its mechanisms," Hadi told the first official session of Yemen's "new unity government."

Although a clear rift was exposed between the Vice President and Saleh’s inner circle during his absence, the consensus candidate for February’s election is too reliant on Saleh’s regime to survive without him. Saleh maintains authority as president while his relatives remain at their military commands, and the GCC’s deal has preserved his ruling party for future elections.

The final outcome of these maneuvers is a joint-PSYOP campaign between Washington and Sana'a. Loosely coordinated interests and disinformation leads toward the same goal - suppression of Yemen’s revolution - and both capitals have relentlessly countered the possibility of regime change. The administration seeks to remove Saleh so that Yemen can essentially return to normal, adding cosmetic political reforms and economic incentives to reduce popular pressure.

Upon hearing that Saleh will remain in the country, White House spokesman Tommy Vietor responded, "I would note that as part of the agreement to resolve the political crisis in Yemen, Saleh transferred executive powers to Vice President (Abdrabuh Mansur) Hadi, who is now overseeing the transition process in Yemen... Saleh signed this accord in front of the world. The United States and the international community are committed to holding him accountable to the agreement."

An open politico-military relationship isn’t in the interest of either party.

Digging through propaganda usually yields a few truths from the accumulating pile of disinformation, so the Yemen Post’s cache of intel cannot be disposed in bulk. Saleh is reportedly “worried that his ruling family will be toppled if he leaves the country for a long period of time,” a real possibility. Western and Gulf pressure does exist for the reasons mentioned above - crafting their entire narrative around completing the GCC’s initiative - so Saleh might withdraw while he still has time to return before February 21st.

Or he may choose to “overthrow the Gulf initiative and its implementation plan,” in the words of defected General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.